Chapter XXIV

. On Matter.

Matter has already been spoken of in the fourth chapter of the supplements to the first book, when we were considering the part of our knowledge of which we are conscious _a priori_. But it could only be considered there from a one‐sided point of view, because we were then concerned merely with its relation to the forms of our intellect, and not to the thing in itself, and therefore we investigated it only from the subjective side, _i.e._, so far as it is an idea, and not from the objective side, _i.e._, with regard to what it may be in itself. In the first respect, our conclusion was that it is objective _activity_ in general, yet conceived without fuller determination; therefore it takes the place of causality in the table of our _a priori_ knowledge which is given there. For what is material is that which _acts_ (the actual) in general, and regarded apart from the specific nature of its action. Hence also matter, merely as such, is not an object of _perception_, but only of _thought_, and thus is really an abstraction. It only comes into perception in connection with form and quality, as a body, _i.e._, as a fully determined kind of

## activity. It is only by abstracting from this fuller determination that we

think of matter as such, _i.e._, separated from form and quality; consequently under matter we think of _acting_ absolutely and in general, thus of _activity_ in the abstract. The more fully determined acting we then conceive as the _accident_ of matter; but only by means of this does matter become perceptible, _i.e._, present itself as a body and an object of experience. Pure matter, on the other hand, which, as I have shown in the Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, alone constitutes the true and admissible content of the conception of _substance_, is causality itself, thought objectively, consequently as in space, and therefore filling it. Accordingly the whole being of matter consists in _acting_. Only thus does it occupy space and last in time. It is through and through pure causality. Therefore wherever there is action there is matter, and the material is the active in general. But causality itself is the form of our understanding; for it is known to us _a priori_, as well as time and space. Thus matter also, _so far_ and up to this point, belongs to the formal part of our knowledge, and is consequently that form of the understanding, _causality_ itself, bound up with space and time, hence objectified, _i.e._, conceived as that which fills space. (The fuller explanation of this doctrine will be found in the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, p. 77; third edition, p. 82.) So far, however, matter is properly not the _object_ but the _condition_ of experience; like the pure understanding itself, whose function it so far is. Therefore of pure matter there is also only a _conception_, no _perception_. It enters into all external experience as a necessary constituent part of it; yet it cannot be given in any experience, but is only _thought_, and thought indeed as that which is absolutely inert, inactive, formless, and without qualities, and which is yet the supporter of all forms, qualities, and effects. Accordingly, of all fleeting phenomena, thus of all manifestations of natural forces and all living beings, matter is the _permanent substratum_ which is necessarily produced by the forms of our intellect in which the world as _idea_ exhibits itself. As such, and as having sprung from the forms of the intellect, it is entirely _indifferent_ to those phenomena themselves, _i.e._, it is just as ready to be the supporter of this force of nature as of that, whenever, under the guidance of causality, the necessary conditions appear; while it itself, just because its existence is really only _formal_, _i.e._, is founded in the _intellect_ must be thought as that which under all that change is absolutely permanent, thus with regard to time is without beginning and without end. This is why we cannot give up the thought that anything may be made out of anything, for example, gold out of lead; for this would only require that we should find out and bring about the intermediate states which matter, in itself indifferent, would have to pass through upon that path. For _a priori_ we can never see why the same matter which is now the supporter of the quality lead could not some time become the supporter of the quality gold. Matter, as that which is only _thought_ _a priori_, is distinguished from the _a priori_ _intuitions_ or _perceptions_ proper by the fact that we can also think it entirely away; space and time, on the contrary, never. But this only shows that we can present to ourselves space and time in imagination without matter. For the matter which has once been placed in them, and accordingly thought as _existing_, we can never again absolutely think away, _i.e._, imagine it as vanished and annihilated, but are always forced to think of it merely as transferred to another space. So far, then, matter is as inseparably connected with our faculty of knowledge as space and time themselves. Yet even the difference that it must first be voluntarily thought as existing indicates that it does not belong so entirely and in every regard to the _formal_ part of our knowledge as space and time, but also contains an element which is only given _a posteriori_. It is, in fact, the point of connection of the empirical part of our knowledge with the pure and _a priori_ part, consequently the peculiar foundation‐stone of the world of experience.

Only where all _a priori_ assertions cease, therefore in the _entirely empirical_ part of our knowledge of bodies, in their form, quality, and definite manner of acting, does that _will_ reveal itself which we have already recognised and established as the true inner nature of things. But these forms and qualities always appear only as the properties and manifestations of that very _matter_ the existence and nature of which depends upon the subjective forms of our intellect, _i.e._, they only become visible in it, and therefore by means of it. For that which always exhibits itself to us is only _matter_ acting in some specially determined manner. Out of the inner properties of such matter, properties which cannot be further explained, proceeds every definite kind of effect of given bodies; and yet the matter itself is never perceived, but only these effects, and the definite properties which lie at their foundation, after separating which, matter, as that which then remains over, is necessarily added in thought by us; for, according to the exposition given above, it is objectified _causality itself_. Accordingly matter is that whereby the _will_, which constitutes the inner nature of things, becomes capable of being apprehended, perceptible, _visible_. In this sense, then, matter is simply the _visibility_ of the will, or the bond between the world as will and the world as idea. It belongs to the latter inasmuch as it is the product of the functions of the intellect, to the former inasmuch as that which manifests itself in all material existences, _i.e._, phenomena is the will. Therefore every object is, as thing in itself, will, and as phenomenon, matter. If we could strip any given matter of all the properties that come to it _a priori_, _i.e._, of all the forms of our perception and apprehension, we would have left the thing in itself, that which, by means of those forms, appears as the purely empirical in matter, but which would then itself no longer appear as something extended and

## active; _i.e._, we would no longer have matter before us, but the will.

This very thing in itself, or the will, in that it becomes a phenomenon, _i.e._, enters the forms of our intellect, appears as matter, _i.e._, as the invisible but necessarily assumed supporter of the properties which are only visible through it. In this sense, then, matter is the visibility of the _will_. Consequently Plotinus and Giordano Bruno were right, not only in their sense but also in ours, when they made the paradoxical assertion already referred to in