CHAPTER VII

{131}

STABILITY OF CULTURE

An isolated community that remains subject to the same environmental conditions, and without selective mating, becomes, after a number of generations, stable in bodily form. As long as there are no stimuli that modify the social structure and mental life the culture will also be fairly permanent. Primitive, isolated tribes appear to us and to themselves as stable, because under undisturbed conditions the processes of change of culture are slow.

In the very earliest times of mankind culture must have changed almost imperceptibly. The history of man, of a being that made tools, goes back maybe 150,000 years, more or less. The tools belonging to this period are found buried in the soil. They are stone implements of simple form. For a period of no less than 30,000 years the forms did not change. When we observe such permanence among animals we explain it as an expression of instinct. Objectively the toolmaking of man of this period seems like an instinctive trait {132} similar to the instincts of ants and bees. The repetition of the same act without change, generation after generation, gives the impression of a biologically determined instinct. Still, we do not know that such a view would be correct, because we cannot tell in how far each generation learned from its predecessors. Animals like birds and mammals, act not only instinctively; they also learn by example and imitation. It seems likely that conditions were the same in early man.

The importance of the process of learning becomes more and more evident the nearer we approach the present period. The tools become more differentiated. Not all localities show the same forms, and it seems likely that if we could examine the behavior of man in periods one thousand years apart that changes would be discovered.

At the end of the ice age the differentiation in the forms of manufactured objects had come to be as great as that found nowadays among primitive tribes. There is no reason why we should assume the life of the people who lived towards the end of the ice age, the Magdalenians, to have been in any respect simpler than that of the modern Eskimo.

With the beginning of the present geological period the differentiation of local groups and of activities in each group was considerable. Changes {133} which in the beginning required tens of thousands of years, later thousands of years, occurred now in centuries and brought about constantly increasing multiplicity of forms.

With the approach of the historic period the degree of stability of culture decreased still further and in modern times changes are proceeding with great rapidity, not only in material products of our civilization but also in forms of thought.

Since earliest times the rapidity of change has grown at an ever-increasing rate.

The rate of change in culture is by no means uniform. We may observe in many instances periods of comparative stability followed by others of rapid modifications. The great Teutonic migrations at the close of antiquity brought about fundamental changes in culture and speech. They were followed by periods of consolidation. The Arab conquest of North Africa destroyed an old civilization and new forms took its place. Assimilation of culture may also be observed among many primitive tribes, and, although we do not know the rate of change, there is often strong internal evidence of a rapid adjustment to a new level. In language the alternation between periods of rapid change and comparative stability may often be observed. The transition from Anglo-Saxon and Norman to English was rapid. The development of English since that time has {134} been rather slow. Similar periods of disturbance have occurred in the development of modern Persian.

The most striking example is presented by the influence of European civilization upon primitive cultures. When they do not completely disappear a new adjustment is reached with great rapidity. Examples are the Indians of Mexico and Peru, or still more strikingly, the Negroes of the United States during and since the time of slavery. In all these cases outer influences broke the continuity of development.

Notwithstanding the rapid changes in many aspects of our modern life we may observe in other respects a marked stability. Conflicts between the inertia of conservative tradition and the radicalism of rapid change are characteristic of our civilization.

We are wont to measure the ability of a race by its cultural achievements which imply rapid changes. Those races among whom the later changes have been most rapid appear, therefore, as most highly developed.

For these reasons it is important to study the conditions that make for stability and for change; and to know whether changes are organically or culturally determined.

Behavior that is organically determined is called instinctive. When the infant cries and smiles, {135} when later on it walks, its actions are instinctive in this sense. Breathing, chewing, retiring from a sudden assault against the senses, approach towards desired objects are presumably organically determined. They do not need to be learned. Most of these actions are indispensable for the maintenance of life. Some, while useful, may be modified or even suppressed with impunity. Thus we may change our gait or learn to overcome the reaction to fear. It is difficult to do so, but not impossible. We can never account for the reasons of this class of impulses that prompt us to act. The stimulus is there and we react at once.

On the ground of this experience we are inclined to consider every type of behavior that is marked by an immediate, involuntary reaction as instinctive. This is an error, for habits imposed upon us during infancy and childhood have the same characteristics.

Most of our actions are culturally determined.

We must eat in order to live. Arctic man is compelled by necessity to live on a meat diet; the Hindu lives on vegetal food by choice.

That we walk on our legs is organically conditioned. How we walk, our

## particular gait, depends upon the forms of our shoes, the cut of our

clothing, the way we carry loads, the conformation of the ground we tread. Peculiar forms of motion {136} may be, in part, physiologically determined, but many are due to imitation. They are repeated so often that they become automatic. They come to be the way in which we move “naturally.” The response is as easy and as ready as an instinctive

## action, and a change from the acquired habit to a new one is equally

difficult. When thoroughly established the mental effect of an automatic action is the same as that of an instinctive reaction.

In all these cases the _faculty_ of developing a certain motor habit is organically determined. The particular _form_ of movement is automatic, acquired by constant, habitual use.

This distinction is particularly clear in the use of language. The _faculty_ of speech is organically determined and should be called, therefore, instinctive. However, _what_ we speak is determined solely by our environment. We acquire one language or another, according to what we hear spoken around us. We become accustomed to very definite movements of lips, tongue and the whole group of articulating organs. When we speak, we are wholly unconscious of any of these movements and equally of the structure of the language we speak. We resent deviations in pronunciation and in structure. We find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to acquire as adults complete mastery of new articulations and new structures such as are required in learning a foreign language. {137} Our linguistic habits are not instinctive. They are automatic.

Our thoughts and our speech are accompanied by muscular movements,--some people would even say they _are_ our thoughts. The kinds of movements are not by any means the same everywhere. The mobility of the Italian contrasts strikingly with the restraint of the Englishman.

The human faculty of using tools is organically determined. It is instinctive. This, however, does not mean that the kind of tool developed is prescribed by instinct. Even the slightest knowledge of the development of tools proves that the special forms characteristic of each area and period depend upon tradition and are in no way organically determined. The choice of material depends partly upon environment, partly upon the state of inventions. We use steel and other artificially made materials; the African iron, others stone, bone or shell. The forms of the working parts of the implements depend upon the tasks they are to perform, those of the handles upon our motor habits.

The same is ordinarily true of our likes and dislikes. We are organically capable of producing and enjoying music. What kind of music we enjoy depends for most of us solely upon habit. Our harmonies, rhythms and melodies are not of the same kind as those enjoyed by the Siamese and {138} a mutual understanding, if it can be attained at all, can be reached solely by long training.

Whatever is acquired in infancy and childhood by unvarying habits becomes automatic.

All this implies that a culture replete with automatically established

## actions is stable. Every individual behaves according to the setting

of the culture in which he lives. When the uniformity of automatic reaction is broken, the stability of culture will be weakened or lost. Conformity and stability are inseparably connected. Nonconformity breaks the force of tradition.

We are thus led to an investigation of the conditions that make for conformity or nonconformity.

Conformity to instinctive activities is enforced by our organic structure; conformity to automatic actions by habit. The infant learns to speak by imitation. During the first few years of life the movement of larynx, tongue, roof of the mouth and lips are gradually controlled and executed with great accuracy and rapidity. If the child is removed to a new environment in which another language is spoken, before the movements of articulation have become stable, and as long as a certain effort in speech is still required, the movements required by the new language are acquired with perfect ease. For the adult a change from one language to another is much more difficult. {139} The demands of everyday life compel him to use speech, and the articulating organs follow the automatic, fixed habits of his childhood. By imitation certain modifications occur, but a complete break with the early habits is extremely difficult, for many well-nigh impossible, and probably in no case quite perfect.

The same is true in regard to the movements of the body. In childhood we acquire certain ways of handling our bodies. If these movements have become automatic it is almost impossible to change to another style, because all the muscles are attuned to act in a fixed way. To change one’s gait, to acquire a new style of handwriting, to change the play of the muscles of the face in response to emotion is a task that can never be accomplished satisfactorily.

What is true of the handling of the body is equally true of mental processes. When we have learned to think in definite ways it is exceedingly difficult to break away and to follow new paths. For a person who has never been accustomed as a young child to restrain responses to emotions, such as weeping or laughing, a transition to the restraints cultivated among us will be difficult. The teachings of earliest childhood remain for most people the dogma of adult life, the truth of which is never doubted. Recently the importance of the impressions of earliest childhood have {140} been emphasized again by psychoanalysts. Whatever happens during the first five years of life sets the pace for the reactions of the individual. Habits established in this period become automatic and will resist strongly any pressure requiring change.

It would be saying too much to claim that these habits are alone responsible for the reactions of the individual. His bodily organization certainly plays a part. This appears most clearly in the case of pathological individuals or of those unusually gifted in one way or another; but the whole population consists of individuals varying greatly in bodily form and function, and since the same forms and faculties occur in many groups, the group differences must be due to habits that determine behavior in adult life. Automatic habits are one of the most important sources of conservatism.

A few examples may illustrate the conditions that fix our habits. The tools of tribes of different periods or localities have definite forms so that an expert can readily determine the provenience of each object. In most cases the form is an expression of the manner of using the tool. A hand adze with a long handle, or one held close to the cutting blade; a draw knife or one used for cutting away from the body; a pestle and a grinding stone are adjusted to the kind of motion characteristic {141} of the tribe. For a person who is accustomed to cut with a drawing knife, a knife handle not fitted for this movement is unhandy.

The movements determined by the forms of handles are sometimes very special and a change to another form of handle is correspondingly difficult. A good example of this is the throwing board of the Eskimo. The board serves to give a greater impetus to a lance or a dart than the one that can be given by the hand. It is, as it were, an extension of the hand. The one end is held in the hand. On the surface is a groove in which the lance rests so that its butt end is supported at the other end. When the arm swings forward in the motion of throwing, the lance rests against the far end of the board, which, on account of its greater distance from the shoulder, moves more swiftly and thus gives greater impetus to the weapon. The accuracy with which the lance is thrown depends upon the intimate familiarity of the hand with the board, for the slightest variation in its position modifies the flight of the weapon. The forms of the throwing board differ considerably from tribe to tribe. In Labrador and in the region farther north it is broad and heavy, with grip holds for thumb and fingers. In Alaska it is slender with a grip arranged in quite a different manner. A hand accustomed to the wide board {142} would require considerable time to learn the use of the narrower one. An implement of the same kind occurs in Australia, but its form is fundamentally different. I presume an Australian who would try to use an Eskimo throwing board would fail to hit his game.

The same is true of our modern tools. The movements of the body are adjusted to the handle of the tool. The handle was not changed until machinery was introduced. The handle of the plane looks as though it were adapted to the hand. Its form has developed so as to facilitate the movements which we use. If we should use a different kind of movement for planing the form of the handle would have to be different, too; but the use of the handle that has been developed fixes the habitual movements that we acquire.

Our posture may serve as another example. We sit on chairs. We like to have our backs supported and our feet on the floor. The Indians do not find this comfortable at all. They sit on the ground. Some stretch their legs forward, others sideways. Many squat down, bending the lower legs backward and sitting on the ground between the feet. For most adults, among ourselves, this position is impossible.

The form of furniture depends upon our habitual posture. Some people sleep on the back, others on the side. When sleeping on the side it is convenient {143} to support the head with a pillow. People who sleep on the back find it convenient to support the neck by a narrow rest while the shoulders rest on the ground and the head is suspended. The neck rest cannot be used when it is customary to sleep on the side. Chairs, beds, tables and many kinds of household utensils are thus determined by our motor habits. They have developed as an expression of these habits, but their use compels every succeeding generation to follow the same habits. Thus they tend to stabilize them and to make them automatic.

The difficulty of changing forms dependent upon well-established motor habits is well illustrated by the permanence of the keyboard of the piano, which withstands all efforts at improvement; or by the complexity of forms and inadequacy of the number of symbols of our alphabet, which is hardly realized by most of those who write and read.

The most automatic activity of man is his speech and it is well worth while to inquire in how far habitual speech influences our actions and, either through our actions or directly, our thought. The problem might also be so formulated that we ask in how far does language control

## action and thought, and in how far does our behavior control language.

Some aspects of this question have been touched upon before (p. 55). {144}

Language is so constituted that when new cultural needs arise it will supply the forms that express them. There is a large number of words in our vocabulary that have arisen with new inventions and new ideas that would be unintelligible to our ancestors who lived two hundred years ago. On the other hand, words no longer needed have disappeared.

What is true of words is equally true of forms. Many primitive languages are very definite in expressing ideas. Locality, time and modality of any statement are denoted accurately. An Indian of Vancouver Island does not say “the man is dead,” he would say “this man who has passed away lies dead on the floor of this house.” He does not, according to the form of his language, express the idea “the man is dead” in generalized form. It might seem that this is a defect in his language, that he cannot form a generalized statement. As a matter of fact he has no need of generalized statements. He speaks to his fellow-men about the specific events of everyday life. He does not speak about abstract goodness, he speaks about the goodness of a certain person and he has no call to use the abstract term. The question is what happens when his culture changes and generalized terms are needed. The history of our own language shows clearly what does happen. We do not mind forcing the language into new molds and {145} creating the forms that we require. If the philosopher develops a new idea he forces the language to yield devices that will adequately express his ideas and if these take root the language follows the lead thus given. A careful examination of primitive languages shows that these possibilities are always inherent in their structure. When missionaries train natives to translate the Bible and the Book of Prayer they compel them to do violence to the current forms; and it can always be done. In this sense we may say that culture determines language.

Most instructive in this respect are those parts of the vocabulary that express systems of classification; most notably in the numerical system and in the terminology of relationship.

All counting is based on a grouping of units. We group by tens and do so automatically. Some languages group by fives and combine four fives,--that is the fingers and toes,--in one higher unit. In English their terminology would be one, two, three, four, five; one, two, three, four, five on the other hand; one, two, three, four, five on the one foot; one, two, three, four, five on the other foot; and finally, for our twenty, a man. If I want to say in such a language 973, I have to group my units not in 9 times 10 times 10 (900) plus 7 times 10 (70) plus 3, but in 2 times 20 times 20 (800) plus three on the other hand (=8) times 20 (160) plus three {146} on the one foot (=13). In other words we cannot count 973 units as 900 + 70 + 3. In the other language 973 are counted as 2 × 400 plus (5 + 3) times 20 plus (10 + 3). Every number is divided in groups of units, multiples of twenty, of 400, 8,000 and so on. To acquire this new classification automatically is an exceedingly difficult process.

Our terms of relationship are based on a few simple principles: generation, sex, direct descent or agnatic line. My uncle is a person of the first ascendant generation, male, agnatic line. Among other people the principles may be quite different. For instance, the difference between direct and agnatic line may be disregarded, while the terms may differ according to the sex of the speaker. Thus a male calls his mother and all females of the ascendant generation by one term, and also his sons and nephews by a single term. The concept and emotional significance of our term mother cannot persist in such a terminology. The adjustment to the new concepts that make impossible the customary automatic emotional reaction to terms of relationship will also be exceedingly difficult.

In another way language sways the forms of our thought. Every language has its own way of classifying sense experience and inner life, and thought is, to a certain extent, swayed by the associations {147} between words. To us activities like breaking, tearing, folding may call forth the ideas of the kind of things that we break, tear or fold. In other languages the terms express with such vigor the way in which these actions are done, by pressure, by pulling, with the hand; or the stiffness, hardness, form, pliability of the object that the flow of ideas is determined in this fashion.

More important than this is the emotional tone of words. Particularly those words that are symbols of groups of ideas to which we automatically respond in definite ways have a fundamental value in shaping our behavior. They function as a release for habitual actions. In our modern civilizations the words patriotism, democracy or autocracy, liberty are of this class. The real content of many of these is not important; important is their emotional value. Liberty may be nonexistent, the word-symbol will survive in all its power, although the actual condition may be one of subjection. The name democracy will induce people to accept autocracy as long as the symbol is kept intact. The vague concepts expressed by these words are sufficient to excite the strongest reactions that stabilize the cultural behavior of people, even when the inner form of the culture undergoes considerable changes that go unnoticed on account of the preservation of the symbol. {148}

Words are not the only symbols that influence behavior in this manner. There are also many objective symbols, such as the national flags or the cross, or fixed literary and musical forms that have attained the value of symbols, like the formal prayers of various creeds, national songs and anthems.

The conservative force of all of these rests on their emotional effect.

A study of the behavior of man shows that actions are on the whole more stable than thoughts. The ease with which words change their meanings while retaining their form which is produced by movements of the articulating organs is one of the many examples that may be adduced.

More striking examples are found in a variety of cultural facts. In North America similar rituals are performed over a wide area. The general plan and most of the details are the same among many tribes. They all do nearly the same things. On the other hand, the significance of the ritual differs considerably among various tribes. The so-called Sun Dance, which is alike in plan and the main features of its execution, serves in one tribe as a prayer for success in war; by another it is used as a pledge in prayers for recovery from serious illness. It is also a means of preventing disease.

The decorative art of the Plains Indians is another {149} excellent example. The designs used in painting and embroidery are largely simple forms, such as straight lines, triangles and rectangles. Their composition also is so much alike among many tribes that we must necessarily assume the same origin for the forms. We look at the designs as purely ornamental. To the Indian they have a meaning, somewhat in the same way as we associate a meaning with the flag and other national or religious emblems. The meanings, the thoughts connected with the design are very variable. An isosceles triangle with short straight lines descending from its base suggests to one tribe a bear’s paw with its long claws; to another a tent with the plugs that hold down the cover; to a third a mountain with springs at its foot; to a fourth a rain cloud with descending rain. The meaning changes according to the cultural interests of the people; the form which is dependent upon their industrial activities does not change.

The same observation may be made in the tales of primitive people. Identical tales are told over wide territories by people of fundamentally different types of culture. The ideas that attach themselves to a tale depend upon cultural interests. What is a sacred myth in one tribe is told for amusement in another. If the interest of the people centers in the stars we may have the tale as a star myth, if they are interested in animals it may {150} explain conditions in the animal world; if they have at heart ceremonial life the tale will deal with ceremonies.

Secondary explanations are also common in our own civilization. We speak of some of these as “survivals.” Many of the paraphernalia used by European royalty or by the Church are survivals of early lines that have changed their meaning.

Certain customs that have been transmitted to our times have undergone fundamental changes in meaning. We are inclined to explain them now on a utilitarian basis. It has been claimed that the Jews tabooed pork because it was recognized that pork was injurious to health. Still we know that the usage is parallel to food taboos that exist all over the world and which are not founded on hygienic considerations.

An analogous change is developing in regard to Sunday. It is now considered a day of rest for people to recuperate from the work of the week. It originated as a holy day and is analogous to unlucky days, or to days on which hostile tribes meet peacefully for the purpose of barter.

Still more striking is the example of forbidden marriages. We say that cousin marriages are dangerous to the offspring. When the parents are of healthy stock there is no danger. The wide distribution of forbidden or proscribed cousin {151} marriages and their general setting proves that the source of the custom must be looked for in forms of social organization and religious belief, and that by origin it has nothing to do with hygienic considerations.

I think in most of these cases the action must be considered as automatic. When an action is raised into consciousness our rationalizing impulses require a satisfying explanation and this follows the prevailing pattern of thought.

While the interpretation of single actions may thus undergo considerable changes while the actions themselves persist, mental life shows in other ways a remarkable degree of stability while the material culture and actions related to it may become modified in many ways. Wherever there is a strong, dominant trend of mind that pervades the whole cultural life it may persist over long periods and survive changes in mode of life.

This is most easily observed in one-sided cultures characterized by a single controlling idea. Excellent examples are found among the North American Indians. The tribes of the Plains are not only warlike, but the standing of each individual is determined by his eminence in warfare. His deeds of valor are the measure of his worth and the thoughts of every man are forced in this direction. Public life is so entirely swayed by an interest in war that nothing else counts for {152} much. This attitude has held sway as long as Indian tribal life continued unbroken and there is no reason to assume that it is of recent origin.

On the North Pacific Coast the importance of hereditary social rank, to be maintained by the display and lavish distribution of wealth, determines the behavior of the individual. It is the ambition of every person to obtain high social standing for himself, his family, or for the chief of his family. Wealth is a necessary basis of social eminence and the general tone of life is determined by these ideas. They have even received a new impetus since European civilization has introduced new methods of acquiring wealth, notwithstanding the disintegration of the social fabric.

No less instructive is the fundamental rôle played by the idea of the sacredness of persons of high rank, expressed particularly by the taboo of their persons and of objects belonging to them, that prevails practically all over Polynesia and that must be an ancient trait of Polynesian culture.

European history also shows conclusively that fundamental viewpoints once established are held tenaciously. Changes develop slowly and against strong resistance. The relation of the individual to the Church may serve as an example. The willing submission to Church authority which {153} characterized European and American life in earlier times; the unhesitating acceptance of traditional dogma is giving way to individual independence, but the transition has been slow and is still vigorously resisted by the earlier attitude. The ease with which changes of denominational affiliation or complete break with the Church are accepted were unthinkable for many centuries and are even now resented by many.

The slow breaking up of feudalism and the gradual disappearance of the privileges of royalty and nobility are other pertinent examples.

The history of rationalism is equally instructive. The endeavor to understand all processes as the effects of known causes has led to the development of modern science and has gradually expanded over ever-widening fields. The rigid application of the method demands the reduction of every phenomenon to its cause. A purpose, a teleological viewpoint, and accident are excluded. It was probably one of the greatest attractions of the Darwinian theory of natural selection that it substituted for a purposive explanation of the origin of life forms a purely causal one.

The strength of the rationalistic viewpoint is also manifested in the attitude of psychoanalysis which refuses to accept any of our ordinary, everyday actions as accidental, but demands an inner, causal connection between all mental processes. {154}

It would be an error to assume that the universal application of rationalism is the final form of thought, the ultimate result which our organism is destined to reach. Opposition to its negation of purpose, or its transformation of purpose into cause and to its disregard of accident as influencing the individual phenomenon, is struggling for recognition.

The stability of a general trend of mind is likely to be the greater, the greater the uniformity of culture. In a complex culture, in which diverse attitudes are found, the probability of change must be much greater.

There is a negative effect of automatism, no less important than the positive one which results in the ease of performance.

Any action that differs from those performed by us habitually strikes us immediately as ridiculous or objectionable, according to the emotional tone that accompanies it. Often deviations from automatic

## actions are strongly resented. A dog taught to give his hind paw

instead of the front paw excites us to laughter. Formal dress worn at times when the conventions do not allow it seems ridiculous. So does the dress that was once fashionable but that has gone out of use. We need only think of the hoop skirt of the middle of the last century or of the bright colors of man’s dress and the impression they would create to-day. We must {155} also realize the resistance that we ourselves have to appearing in an inappropriate costume.

More serious are the resistances in matters that evoke stronger emotional reactions. Table manners are a good example. Most of us are exceedingly sensitive to a breach of good table manners. There are many tribes and people that do not know the use of the fork and who dip into the dish with their fingers. We feel this is disgusting because we are accustomed to the use of fork and knife. We are accustomed to eat quietly. Among some Indian tribes it is discourteous not to smack one’s lips, the sign of enjoying one’s food. What is nauseating to us is proper to them.

Still more striking is our reaction to breaches of modesty. We have ourselves witnessed a marked change in regard to what is considered modest, what immodest. A comparative study shows that modesty is found the world over, but that the ideas of what is modest and what immodest vary incredibly. Thirty years ago woman’s dress of to-day would have been immodest. South African Negroes greet a person of high rank by turning the back and bowing away from him. Some South American Indians consider it immodest to eat in view of other people. Whatever the form of modest behavior may be, a breach of etiquette is always strongly resented.

This is characteristic of all forms of automatic {156} behavior. The performance of an automatic action is accompanied by the lowest degree of consciousness. To witness an action contrary to our automatic behavior excites at once intense attention and the strongest resistances must be overcome if we are required to perform such an

## action. Where motor habits are concerned the resistance is based on

the difficulty of acquiring new habits, which is the greater the older we are, perhaps less on account of growing inadaptability than for the reason that we are constantly required to act and have no time to adjust ourselves to new ways. In trifling matters the resistance may take the form of fear of ridicule, in more serious ones of social criticism. But it is not only the fear of the outer world that determines the resistance, it rests equally in our own unwillingness to change, in our thorough disapprobation of the unconventional.

Intolerance is often, if not always, based on the strength of automatic reactions and upon the feeling of intense displeasure felt in acts opposed to our own automatism. The apparent fanaticism exhibited in the persecution of heretics must be explained in this manner. At a time when the dogma taught by the Church was imposed upon each individual so intensely that it became an automatic part of his thought and action, it was accompanied by a strong feeling of opposition, of hostility {157} to any one who did not participate in this feeling. The term fanaticism does not quite correctly express the attitude of the Inquisition. Its psychological basis was rather the impossibility of changing a habit of thought that had become automatic and the consequent impossibility of following new lines of thought, which, for this very reason, seemed antisocial; that is, criminal.

We have a similar spectacle in the present conflict between nationalism and internationalism with their mutual intolerance.

Even in science a similar intolerance may be observed in the struggle of opposing theories and in the difficulty of breaking down traditional common viewpoints.

The example of medieval orthodoxy proves that the uniformity of automatic reaction of the whole society is one of the strongest forces making for stability. When all react in the same way it becomes difficult for an individual to break away from the common habits.

This is strikingly illustrated by the contrast between the culture of primitive tribes and our modern civilization. Our society is not uniform. Among us even the best educated cannot participate in our whole civilization. Among primitive tribes the differences in occupations, interests and knowledge are comparatively slight. Every individual is to a great extent familiar with all the {158} thoughts, emotions and activities of the community. The uniformity of behavior is similar to that expected among ourselves of a member of a social “set.” A person who does not conform to the habits of thought and actions of his “set” loses standing and must leave. In our modern civilization he is likely to find another congenial “set,” to the habits of which he can conform. In primitive society such sets are absent. With us the presence of many groups of different standards of interest and behavior is a stimulus for critical self-examination, for conflicts of group interests and other forms of intimate contact are ever present. Among primitive people this stimulus does not occur within the tribal unit. For these reasons individual independence is attained with much greater difficulty and tribal standards have much greater force.

Individual independence is the weaker the more markedly a culture is dominated by a single idea that controls the actions of every individual. We may illustrate this again by the example of the Indians of the northwest coast of America and of those of the Plains. The former are dominated by the desire to obtain social prominence by the display of wealth and by occupying a position of high rank which depends upon ancestry and conformity to the social requirements of rank. The life of almost every individual is regulated by this {159} thought. The desire for social prestige finds expression in amassing riches, in squandering accumulated wealth, in lavish display, in outdoing rivals of equal rank, in marrying so as to insure rank for one’s children, more even than in a set of rich young people in our cities who have inherited wealth and who lose caste unless they come up to the social pace of their set. The uniformity of this background and the intensity with which it is cultivated in the young do not allow other forms to arise and keep the cultural outlook stable. Quite similar observations may be made among the natives of New Guinea, among whom display of wealth is also a dominating passion.

Quite different is the background of life of the Indians of the Plains. The desire to obtain honors by warlike deeds prompts thoughts and

## actions of every one. Social position is intimately bound up with

success in war, and the desire for prominence is inculcated in the mind of every child. The combination of these two tendencies determines the mental status of the community and prevents the development of different ideals.

Again different are conditions among the sedentary tribes of New Mexico. According to Dr. Ruth L. Bunzel the chief desire of the Zuni Indian is to conform to the general level of behavior and not to be prominent. Prominence brings with it so many duties and enmities that it is avoided. The {160} dominating interest in life is occupation with ceremonialism and this combined with fear of outstanding responsibility gives a steady tone to life.

In all these cases the uniformity of social habits and the lack of examples of different types of behavior make deviations difficult and place the individual who does not conform in an antisocial class, even if his revolt is due to a superior mind and to strength of character.

In primitive society the general cultural outlook is in most cases uniform and examples that are opposed to the usual behavior are of rare occurrence. The participation of many in a uniform attitude has a stabilizing effect.

When at times of great popular excitement the masses in civilized society are swayed by a single idea, the independence of the individual is lost in the same manner as it is in primitive society. We have passed through a period of such dominant ideas during the World War and it is probable that every European nation was affected in the same manner. What seemed before the outbreak of hostilities as momentous differences vanished and one thought animated every nation.

All this is quite different in a diversified culture, particularly if the child is exposed to the influences of conflicting tendencies, so that none has the opportunity to become automatically settled, to become sufficiently firmly ingrained in {161} nature to evoke intense resistance against different habits. When only one dominant attitude exists, the rise of a critical attitude requires a strong, creative mind. Where many exist and none has a marked, emotional appeal, opportunity for critical choice is given.

The greater the differentiation of groups within the social unit, and the closer the contact between them the less is it likely that any of the traditional lines of behavior will be so firmly established that they become entirely automatic. In a diversified culture the child is exposed to so many conflicting tendencies that few only have the opportunity to become so strongly ingrained in nature as to evoke energetic resistance against different habits. A stratified society consisting of classes with privileges and different viewpoints is, therefore, more subject to change than a homogeneous society. This may account for the intense conservatism of the Eskimo, whose culture has changed very little over a long period. They are remote from contact with foreign cultures, and their society is remarkably homogeneous, all households being practically on the same level and all participating fully in the tribal culture. In contrast to the permanence of their culture there is evidence of comparatively rapid changes among the Indians of British Columbia. They are exposed to contact with cultures of distinct types; and on account of the {162} diversity of privileges of individuals, families and societies their customs have been in a state of flux.

These changes are facilitated in all those cases in which customs are entrusted to the care of a few individuals. Among many tribes sacred ceremonials are in the keeping of a few priests or of a single chief or priest. Although they are supposed to preserve the ceremonial faithfully in all its details, we have ample evidence showing that owing to forgetfulness, to ambition, to the workings of a philosophic or imaginative mind, or to the premature death of the keeper of the secret, the forms may undergo rapid changes.

The influence of an individual upon culture depends not only upon his strength but also upon the readiness of society to accept changes. During the unstable conditions of cultural life produced by contact between European and primitive civilizations many native prophets have arisen who have with more or less success modified the religious beliefs of the people. Their revelations, however, were reflexes of the mixed culture. The new ideas created in society are not free, but are determined by the culture in which they arise. The artist is hemmed in by the peculiar style of the art and the technique of his environment; the religious mind by current religious belief; the political leader by established political forms. Only when these are {163} shaken by the impact of foreign ideas or by violent changes of culture owing to disturbing conditions is the opportunity given to the individual to establish new lines of thought that may give a new direction to cultural change.

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