CHAPTER IX

{198}

MODERN CIVILIZATION AND PRIMITIVE CULTURE

In the preceding pages we have considered the effect of a number of fundamental biological, psychological and social factors upon modern problems.

There are many other aspects of modern culture that may be examined from an anthropological point of view.

One of the great difficulties of modern life is presented by the conflict of ideals; individualism against socialization; nationalism against internationalism; enjoyment of life against efficiency; rationalism against a sound emotionalism; tradition against the logic of facts.

We may discern tendencies of change in all these directions; and changes that appear to one as progress appear to another as retrogression. Attempts to further individualism, to restrict efficiency, to make tradition more binding would be considered as objectionable and energetically resisted by many. What is desirable depends upon valuations that are not universally accepted.

Such differences of opinion do not exist in the {199} domain of physics or chemistry. The purposes to which we apply physical or chemical knowledge are definite. We have certain needs that are to be filled. A bridge is to be built, houses are to be constructed, machinery for accomplishing some specific work is required, communication is to be facilitated, dyes are to be made, fertilizers to be invented. In every case, even if the need is called forth by preceding inventions, there is a definite object to be attained, the value of which lies in the improvement of the outer conditions of life. As long as we are satisfied that the resulting comforts and facilities are desirable, the application of our knowledge is valuable. The importance of achievements based on advances in physical sciences is readily acknowledged in so far as they enable us to overcome obstacles that would beset our lives if we had to do without them.

The applicability of the results of research to practical problems of social life are similar when we consider aims universally recognized as desirable. Individual health depending upon the health of the whole group is perhaps one of the simplest of these. Even in this case difficulties arise. There are individuals of impaired health whose existence may somewhat endanger public health. Is it of greater value to segregate these from the social body to their disadvantage, or to run the slight risk of their unfavorable influence {200} upon the whole population? The answer to this question will depend upon valuations that have no basis in science, but in ideals of social behavior, and these are not the same for all members of a modern social group.

In general we may say that in the practical application of social science absolute standards are lacking. It is of no use to say that we want to attain the greatest good for the greatest number, if we are not able to come to an agreement as to what constitutes the greatest good.

This difficulty is strongly emphasized as soon as we look beyond the confines of our own modern civilization. The social ideals of the Central African Negroes, of the Australians, Eskimo, and Chinese are so different from our own that the valuations given by them to human behavior are not comparable. What is considered good by one is considered bad by another.

It would be an error to assume that our own social habits do not enter into judgments of the mode of life and thought of alien people. A single phenomenon like our reaction to what we call “good manners” illustrates how strongly we are influenced by customary behavior. We are exceedingly sensitive to differences in manners; definite table manners, etiquette of dress, a certain reserve, are peculiar to us. When different table manners, odd types of dress, and an unusual expansiveness {201} are found, we feel a revulsion and the valuation of our own manners tinges our description of the foreign forms.

The scientific study of generalized social forms requires, therefore, that the investigator free himself from all valuations based on our culture. An objective, strictly scientific inquiry can be made only if we succeed in entering into each culture on its own basis, if we elaborate the ideals of each people and include in our general objective study cultural values as found among different branches of mankind.

Even in the domain of science the favorite method of approaching problems exerts a dominating influence over our minds. This is well illustrated by the fashions prevailing in different periods: the dialectics of the Middle Ages were as satisfying to the average scientific minds of those periods as is the aversion to dialectics and the insistence on observation in modern times. The concentration of biological thought upon problems of evolution in the early Darwinian period presents another example. The kaleidoscopic changes in interest, foremost in physiological and psychological inquiries of our times,--such as the theories based on the functions of glands of internal secretion, on racial and individual constitution, or on psychoanalysis,--are others. The passionate intensity with which these ideas are taken up, leading {202} to a temporary submersion of all others and to a belief in their value as a sufficient basis of inquiry, proves how easily the human mind is led to the belief in an absolute value of those ideas that are expressed in the surrounding culture.

The reasons for this type of behavior are not far to seek. We are apt to follow the habitual activities of our fellows without a careful examination of the fundamental ideas from which their actions spring. Conformity in action has for its sequel conformity in thought. The emancipation from current thought is for most of us as difficult in science as it is in everyday life.

The emancipation from our own culture, demanded of the anthropologist, is not easily attained, because we are only too apt to consider the behavior in which we are bred as natural for all mankind, as one that must necessarily develop everywhere. It is, therefore, one of the fundamental aims of scientific anthropology to learn which traits of behavior, if any, are organically determined and are, therefore, the common property of mankind and which are due to the culture in which we live.

We are taught to lay stress upon national differences that occur among Europeans and their descendants. Notwithstanding the peculiarities characteristic of each nation or local division the essential cultural background is the same for {203} all of these. The cultural forms of Europe are determined by what happened in antiquity in the Eastern Mediterranean. In our modern civilization we have to recognize the progeny of Greek and Roman culture. The slight local variations are built up on a fundamental likeness. They are insignificant when we compare them to the differences that obtain between Europe and peoples that have not developed on the basis of the ancient Mediterranean culture. Even India and China cannot be entirely separated from the historical influences emanating from western Asia and the Mediterranean area.

The objective study of types of culture that have developed on historically independent lines or that have grown to be fundamentally distinct enables the anthropologist to differentiate clearly between those phases of life that are valid for all mankind and others that are culturally determined. Supplied with this knowledge he reaches a standpoint that enables him to view our own civilization critically and to enter into a comparative study of values with a mind relatively uninfluenced by the emotions elicited by the automatically regulated behavior in which he participates as a member of our society.

The freedom of judgment thus obtained is of great value. We may not hope to reach it with ease, because it depends upon a clear recognition {204} of what is organically and what culturally determined. The inquiry into this problem is hampered at every step by our own subjection to cultural standards that are misconstrued as generally valid human standards. The end can be reached only by patient inquiry in which our own emotional valuations and attitudes are conscientiously held in the background. The psychological and social data valid for all mankind that are so obtained are basal for all culture and not subject to varying valuation.

The values of our social ideals will thus gain in clarity by a rigid, objective study of foreign cultures.

If we could be sure that these studies would ultimately lead in their results to the discovery of definite laws governing the historical development of social life we might hope to construe a system for a reasonable treatment of our social problems. It is, however, questionable whether such an ideal is within our reach.

The fundamental difficulty may be illustrated by examples taken from the inorganic world. When we express a law in physics or chemistry we mean that, certain conditions being given, a definite result will follow. I release an object at a given place and it will fall with definite speed and acceleration. I bring two elements into contact and they will form, under controlled conditions, a definite {205} compound. The result of an experiment may be predicted if the conditions controlling it are known. If our knowledge of mechanics and mathematics is sufficient and the position of all the planets at one given moment is known, we can foretell what movements are going to happen and what movements happened in the past, as long as no disturbing outer influences make themselves felt.

Social phenomena cannot be subjected to experiments. Controlled conditions, excluding disturbing outer influences, are unattainable. These complicate every process that we try to study.

The more complex the phenomena the more difficult it is to foretell the future from a condition existing at a given moment, even if the essential laws governing the happenings are known. Supposing, for instance, we are studying erosion on a mountainside. Can we foretell which course it is to take, or how the present forms have resulted? We find a gulch. At its head is a large bowlder that deflected the water and caused it to cut a channel for itself on one side. If the stone had not been there, the gulch would have had a different direction. It so happens that the soil in one direction was soft so that the running water cut readily into it. We are dealing solely with the laws of erosion, but even the most intimate knowledge of these cannot adequately explain the present course of the gulch. The bowlder may be in its place because {206} it was loosened by an animal walking along the mountainside. It fell down and rested at the place where it obstructed the course of the running water.

All incidents of this class that influence the isolated process we want to study are excluded in experimentation. They are accidents in so far as they have no logical relation to the process about which we desire to gain knowledge. Even in the astronomical problem just alluded to the positions of the heavenly bodies at the initial moment are in this sense accidental, because they cannot be derived from any mechanical law. Disturbing outer influences that have no relation to the law must be admitted as accidents that determine the distribution of matter at the moment chosen as the initial one.

These conditions make prediction of what is going to happen in a special case exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Accidental occurrences that are logically not related to the phenomena studied modify the sequence of events that might be determined if the conditions were absolutely controlled and protected against all outside interference. This condition is attained in a completely defined physical or chemical experiment, but never in any phenomenon of nature that can only be observed, not controlled. Notwithstanding the advances in our knowledge of the mechanics of air currents, weather prediction remains insecure in {207} regard to the actual state of the weather at a given hour in a given spot. A general, fairly correct prognosis for a larger area may be possible, but an exact sequence of individual events cannot be given. Accidental causes are too numerous to allow of an accurate prediction.

What is true in these cases is ever so much more true of social phenomena. Let us assume that there exists a society that has developed its culture according to certain laws discovered by a close scrutiny of the behavior of diverse societies. For some reason, perhaps on account of hostile attacks that have nothing to do with the inner workings of the society, the people have to leave their home and migrate from a fertile country into a desert. They have to adjust themselves to new forms of life; new ideas will develop in the new surroundings. The fact that they have been transplanted from one region to another is just an accident,--like the loosened bowlder that determined the direction of the gulch.

Even a hasty consideration of the history of man shows that accidents of this kind are the rule in every society, for no society is isolated but exists in more or less intimate relations to its neighbors.

The controlling conditions may also be of quite a different nature. The game on which the people subsist may change its habitat or become extinct, a wooded area may become open country. All {208} cases of change of geographical or economic environment entail changes in the structure of society, but these are accidental events in no way related to the inner working of the society itself.

As an example we may consider the history of Scandinavia. If we try to understand what the people are at the present time we have to inquire into their descent. We must consider the climatic and geographic changes that have occurred since the period when the glaciers of the pleistocene retracted and allowed man to settle, the changes in vegetation, the early contact with southern and eastern neighbors. All these have no relation to the laws that may govern the inner life of a society. They are accidents. If the Central Europeans had had no influence whatever upon Scandinavia the people would not be what they are. These elements cannot be eliminated.

For these reasons every culture can be understood only as an historical growth. It is determined to a great extent by outer occurrences that do not originate in the inner life of the people.

It might be thought that these conditions did not prevail in early times, that primitive societies were isolated and that the laws governing their inner development may be learned directly from comparative studies of their cultures. This is not the case. Even the simplest groups with which we are familiar have developed by contact with their {209} neighbors. The Bushman of South Africa has learned from the Negro; the Eskimo from the Indian; the Negrito from the Malay; the Veddah from the Singhalese. Cultural influences are not even confined to close neighbors; wheat and barley traveled in early times over a large part of the Old World; Indian corn over the two Americas.

If we find that the legal forms of Africa, Europe and Asia are alike and different from those of primitive America, it does not follow that these forms represent a natural sequence, unless an actual, necessary order of the development can be demonstrated. It is much more probable that by cultural contact the legal forms of the Old World have spread over a wide area.

It is more than questionable whether it is justifiable to construct from a mere static examination of cultural forms the world over an historical sequence that would express laws of cultural development. Every culture is a complex growth and, on account of the intimate, early associations of people inhabiting large areas, it is not admissible to assume that the accidental causes that modify the course of development will cancel one another and that the great mass of evidence will give us a picture of a law of the growth of culture.

I am far from claiming that no general laws relating to the growth of culture exist. Whatever they may be, they are in every particular case overlaid {210} by a mass of accidents that were probably much more potent in the actual happenings than the general laws.

We may recognize definite, causally determined relations between the economic conditions of a people and the density of population. The number of individuals of a hunting tribe inhabiting a particular territory is obviously limited by the available amount of game. There will be starvation as soon as the population exceeds the maximum that may be maintained in an unfavorable year. If the same people develop agriculture and the art of preserving a food supply for a long period, a denser population is possible and, at the same time, each individual will have more leisure and there will be a greater number of individuals enjoying leisure. Under these conditions the population is liable to increase. We may perhaps say that complexity of culture and density of population are correlated. Whether this development actually occurs in a given population is an entirely different question.

Sociologists have made many attempts to discover the conditions controlling the social behavior of man and the development of culture, but their generalizations do not enable us to predict the actual happenings in a specific culture.

When we try to apply the results of anthropological studies to the problems of modern life, we {211} must not expect results parallel to those obtained by controlled experiments. The conditions are so complex that it is doubtful whether any significant “laws” can be discovered. There are certain tendencies in social behavior which are manifest; but the conditions in which they are active are controlled by accident, in so far as the varied activities of society and its relation to the outer world are logically unrelated. To give only one example: the technical development of electricity depended upon purely scientific work. The scientific discoveries depended upon the general advance of physics and upon purely theoretical interests. They were seized upon by the tendency of our times to exploit every discovery technically. The modifications of our lives brought about by the use of the telephone, radio, Roentgen rays and the many other inventions are so little related to the scientific discovery itself that in relation to them it plays the rôle of an accident. If some of the discoveries had been made at another time their effect upon our social life might have been quite different. Thus every change in one aspect of social life acts as an accident in relation to others only remotely related to it.

For these reasons anthropology will never become an exact science in the sense that the knowledge of the status of a society at a given moment will permit us to predict what is going to happen. {212}

Our observations relate primarily to the state of society and the processes that go on in it.

These viewpoints must be borne in mind when we try to approach the problems of cultural progress. They may also help us in a critique of some of the theories on which modern social aspirations are based.

The rapid development of science and of the technical application of scientific knowledge are the impressive indications of the progress of modern civilization.

An increase in our knowledge and in the control of nature, an addition of new tools and processes to those known before may well be called progress, for nothing need be lost, but new powers are acquired and new insight is opened. Much of the increase in knowledge is, at the same time, elimination of error and in this sense also represents a progress. In the acquisition of new methods of controlling the forces of nature no qualitative standard is involved. It is a quantitative increase in the extent of previous achievements. In the recognition of earlier errors our standard is truth; but at the same time the recognition of error implies more rational, often useful conclusions. In all these acquisitions a process of reasoning is involved. The achievements are a result of intellectual work extending over ever-widening fields and increasing in thoroughness. {213}

The discovery of methods of preserving food, the invention of manifold implements of the chase and of tools for manufacture; of clothing, shelter and utensils for everyday life; the discovery of agriculture and the association with animals that led to their domestication; the substitution of metals for stone, bone, and wood; all these are rungs on the long ladder that led to our modern inventions, which are now being added to with overwhelming rapidity.

Knowledge has been increasing apace. The crude observation of nature taught man many simple facts,--the forms and habits of animals and plants, the course of the heavenly bodies, the changes of weather and the useful properties of materials, of fire and of water.

A long and difficult step was taken when the acquired knowledge was first systematized and conscious inquiry intended to expand the boundaries of knowledge was attempted. In early times imagination was drawn upon to supply the causal links between the phenomena of nature, or to give teleological explanations that satisfied the mind. Gradually the domain for the play of imagination has been restricted and the serious attempt is being made to subject imaginative hypotheses to the close scrutiny of observation.

Thus we may recognize progress in a definite {214} direction in the development of invention and knowledge. If we should value a society entirely on the basis of its technical and scientific achievements it would be easy to establish a line of progress which, although not uniform, leads from simplicity to complexity.

Other aspects of cultural life are not with equal ease brought into a progressive sequence.

The intensity of technical activity which creates ever-increasing desires for physical comforts and conveniences makes such demands upon the time of all individuals that for the majority leisure is much restricted. The example of primitive life proves that activities that appeal to the emotions cannot flourish without leisure; but leisure alone is not sufficient. Unless the individual participates in a multiplicity of cultural activities, if his life is restricted within a narrow compass, leisure is unprofitable. If we measure progress in culture by these standards, advances in the control of nature and of knowledge alone are insufficient.

We have to consider also their effect upon the participation of the individual in social life.

It is not easy to define progress in any phase of social life other than in knowledge and control of nature.

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It might seem that the low value given to life in primitive society and the cruelty of primitive man {215} are indications of a low ethical standard. It is quite possible to show an advance in ethical _behavior_ when we compare primitive society with our own. Westermarck and Hobhouse have examined these data in great detail and have given us an elaborate history of the evolution of moral ideas. Their descriptions are quite true, but I do not believe that they represent a growth of moral _ideas_, but rather reflect the same moral ideas as manifested in different types of society and taking on forms varying according to the extent of knowledge of the people.

If we restrict our considerations to the closed society to which an individual belongs we do not find any appreciable difference in moral ideas. We have seen at another place that in a closed society without differentiation in rank there is an absolute solidarity of interest and the same moral obligation of altruistic behavior is found, as among ourselves. The behavior towards the slave or to members of alien societies may be cruel. There may be no regard for their rights. The obligations within the society are binding. The prevailing idea of a fundamental, even specific difference between the members of the closed society and outsiders hinders the development of sympathetic feeling.

We consider it our right to kill criminals dangerous to society, to kill in self-defense and in war. {216} We also kill animals for the mere pleasure of hunting and the excitement of the chase. Exactly the same rules prevail in primitive society. They give a different impression, because crime, self-defense, war and the killing of animals have not the same meaning as among ourselves. A breach of the laws regulating marriage may be considered a heinous crime endangering the existence of the whole community because it calls forth the ire of supernatural powers; an apparently slight breach of good manners may be a deadly insult.

It is true that in the life of primitive man revenge as a right and a duty is keenly felt and that its form is much more cruel than our ethical standards would permit. In judging the psychological causes of this difference we must consider the infinitely greater hazards of life in primitive society. The weather, the dangers of the chase, attacks of wild animals or of enemies make life much more precarious than in civilized communities and dull the feeling for suffering. The thoughtless pleasure that children feel in tormenting animals and cripples, an expression of their inability to identify their own mental processes with those of others, is quite analogous to the actions of primitive men. The significance of this attitude will best be understood when we compare our feeling of sympathy for animal suffering with that of the Hindu. While we kill animals that we need for food, {217} albeit without inflicting unnecessary suffering, all life is sacred to the Hindu. We claim the right to kill animals which we need; the Hindu extends the right to live over all his fellow creatures.

We must compare the code of primitive ethics with our own ethics and primitive conduct with our own conduct. It may safely be said that the code, so far as relations between members of a group are concerned, does not differ from ours. It is the duty of every person to respect life, well-being and property of his fellows, and to refrain from any

## action that may harm the group as a whole. All breaches of this code

are threatened with social or supernatural punishment.

When the tribe is divided into small self-contained groups and moral obligations of the individual are confined to the group members, a state of apparent lawlessness may result. When the tribe forms a firm unit, the impression of peaceful quiet, more closely corresponding to our own conditions is given. An example of the former kind is presented by the tribes of northern Vancouver Island, which are each divided into a considerable number of clans or family groups of conflicting interests. Solidarity does not extend beyond the limits of the clan. For this reason conflicts between clans are rather frequent. Harm done to a member of one clan leads to clan feuds.

The distinction between members of a group and {218} outsiders persists in modern life, not only in everyday relations but also in legislation. Every law discriminating between citizens and foreigners, every protective tariff that is by its nature hostile to the foreigner is an expression of a double ethical standard, one for fellows, the other for outsiders.

The duty of self-perfection has developed in modern society, but is apparently absent in more primitive forms of human life. The irreconcilable conflicts of valuations that are characteristic of our times and to which we referred previously are in part absent because in simple societies a single standard of behavior prevails. We have referred to the freedom of the Eskimos of human control and saw that, nevertheless, he is hemmed in on all sides by the narrowness of his material culture, his beliefs and traditional practices. There is no group known to him that possesses different standards, that presents the problem of choice between conflicting alternatives that beset our lives. We have also referred to the social development of the child in Samoa where the lack of stratification into groups of decidedly distinct ideals makes it exceedingly difficult for new types of thought to develop. It does occur every now and then that a person does not fit temperamentally into his culture, as for instance a timid, unambitious nobleman or an aggressive, ambitious commoner among the Northwest Coast Indians; {219} but these cases are as a rule rare and it is difficult for the individual to impress his qualities upon his environment. Thus it happens that the ethical duties that we feel towards ourselves, that in some strata of our society set the duty of self-perfection infinitely higher than that of service to the community, seem lost in the simple endeavor of every person to come up to the standards of his society.

The actual conduct of man does not correspond to the ethical code, and obedience depends upon the degree of social and religious control. Among ourselves actions opposed to the ethical code are checked by society, which holds every single person responsible for his actions. In most primitive societies there is no such power. The behavior of an individual may be censured, but there is no strict accountability, although the fear of supernatural punishment may serve as a substitute.

There is no evolution of moral ideas. All the vices that we know, lying, theft, murder, rape, are discountenanced in the life of equals in a closed society. There is progress in ethical conduct, based on the recognition of larger groups which participate in the rights enjoyed by members of the closed society, and on an increasing social control.

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It is difficult to define progress in ethical ideas. It is still more difficult to discern universally valid progress in social organization, for what we choose {220} to call progress depends upon the standards chosen. The extreme individualist might consider anarchy as his ideal. Others may believe in extreme voluntary regimentation; still others in a powerful control of the individual by society. Developments in all these directions have occurred and may still be observed in the history of modern states. We can speak of progress in certain directions, hardly of absolute progress, except in so far as it is dependent upon knowledge which contributes to the safety of human life, health and comfort.

Generally valid progress in social forms is intimately associated with advance in knowledge. It is based fundamentally on the recognition of a wider concept of humanity and with it on the weakening of the conflicts between individual societies. The outsider is no longer a person without rights, whose life and property are the lawful prey of any one who can conquer him, but intertribal duties are recognized. However these are developed, whether the tribe wishes to avoid the retaliation of neighbors, or whether friendly relations are established by intermarriage or in other ways, the intense solidarity of the tribal unit is liable to break down.

The important change of attitude brought about by this expansion is a weakening of the concept of a status into which each person is born.

The history of civilization demonstrates that the {221} extent to which the status of a person is determined by birth or by some later voluntary or enforced act has been losing in force. For most of us there are still two forms of status that entail serious obligation and that persist unless the status is changed by consent of the state. These are citizenship and marriage. The latter status shows even now strong evidence of weakening. In earlier times the status of the nobleman, of the serf, even of a member of a guild, was fixed. In primitive societies of complex structure the status of a person as a member of a clan, of an age group, of a society, was often absolutely determined and involved unescapable obligations. In this sense the freedom of the individual has been increasing.

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The multitude of forms found in human society as well as observations on the variability of human types throw important light upon modern political questions, particularly upon the demand for equality, upon sexual relations and upon the denial of the right of individual property.

Anatomy, physiology and psychology of social groups demonstrate with equal force that equality of all human beings does not exist. Bodily and mental ability and vigor are unevenly distributed among individuals. They also depend upon age and sex. Even in the absence of any form of organization which implies subordination, leadership {222} develops. Eskimo society is fundamentally anarchical because nobody is compelled to submit to dictation. Nevertheless the movements of the tribe are determined by leaders to whose superior energy, skill and experience others submit. The man, the provider of the family, determines the movements of the household and his wives and dependents follow.

It depends upon historical conditions to what extent the powers of a leader may be developed. In early times monarchical institutions spread over a large part of the Old World, democratic institutions over the New World. It is common to all forms of political organization that wherever communal work had to be undertaken, recognized leaders spring up. Among the North American Indians who were averse to centralized political control, the buffalo hunt necessitated strict police regulations to which the tribe had to submit, because disorganized, individual hunting would have endangered the tribal food supply. The hunt and war in particular require leadership. How far each individual must submit to leadership depends upon the complexity of organization, upon the necessity of joint action, and upon conflicts arising from individual occupations.

The assumption that all leadership is an aberration from the primitive nature of man and an expression of individual lust for power cannot be {223} maintained. We have pointed out repeatedly that man is a gregarious being, living in closed societies, and that new closed societies are always springing up. Almost all closed societies of animals have leaders and in many cases a definite order of rank may be observed. It seems probable that conditions were different in the primitive horde of man.

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Observations on primitive society throw an interesting light upon the relation of the sexes. Setting aside for a moment that phase which is related to property rights we find everywhere a clear distinction between the occupations of man and woman. The woman, being encumbered throughout a large part of her mature life by the care of young children, is tied to the home more rigidly than the man. She is hindered in her mobility and for this reason more than for anything else she cannot participate in the strenuous life of the hunter and warrior. Here also a comparison with the life forms of gregarious animals is useful, for division of duties according to sex is not unusual. In some species the males are protectors of the herd, in other cases the females.

The domestic occupations of the home do not necessarily preclude women from active participation in the higher cultural activities of the tribe. Owing to the skill attained in their varied technical activities they are in some cases creative artists, {224} while the men who devote themselves to the chase do not participate to any extent in artistic production. Where a more complex economic system prevails in which wealth depends upon the management and care of the produce secured by the members of the household, her influence in social or even political matters may be important. She is not excluded from religious activities and acts as shaman or priestess.

Since among primitive tribes unmarried women are all but unknown, the position of womanhood is practically determined by the limitations imposed upon all by child-bearing and care of children.

Among primitive tribes the mortality of infants is high, and the intervals between births are correspondingly short. With the modern decrease in infant mortality, voluntary reduction of the number of children and the increasing number of unmarried women, the movements of many women have become freer and one of the fundamental causes of the differentiation between the social positions of men and of women has been removed. It is not by any means solely economic pressure that has led to the demand for wider opportunities and equality of rights of men and women, but the removal of the limitations due to child-bearing that have given to woman the freedom of action enjoyed by man.

The cultural values produced by woman in primitive society make us doubt the existence of {225} any fundamental difference in creative power between the sexes. We rather suspect that the imponderable differences in the treatment of young children, the different attitudes of father and mother to son or daughter, the differentiation of the status of man and woman inherent in our cultural tradition, outweigh any actual differences that may exist.

In other words, the creative power and independence of man and of woman seem to me largely independent of the physiologically determined differences in interests and character. The danger in the modern desire of woman for freedom lies in the intentional suppression of the functions connected with child-bearing that might hinder free activity. Society will always need a sufficient number of women who will bear children and of those who are willing to devote themselves lovingly to their bringing up.

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Marriage is another aspect of the relation between the sexes upon which light is thrown by the study of foreign cultures. The customs of mankind show that permanent marriage is not based primarily on the permanence of sexual love between two individuals, but that it is essentially regulated by economic considerations. Formal marriage is connected with transfer of property. In extreme cases the woman herself is an economic value that is acquired, although she may not become {226} the property of her husband in the sense that he can dispose of her at will without interference of her own family or herself.

Occasional sexual relations between man and woman are of a different order and are among many tribes permitted or even expected. In other cases girls are carefully guarded and illicit sexual intercourse is severely punished.

A religious sanction of marriage exists in hardly any primitive tribe. Strict monogamy does occur in rare cases and suggests that the sexual relations in earliest times were not of uniform character in all parts of the world. The binding elements in marriage are considerations of property in which the children who add potential strength to the family are included. It seems likely that our view of marriage developed from this earlier stage by reinterpretation.

In a well balanced family with competent parents permanence of matrimonial union is undoubtedly best adapted to the wholesome development of the individual and of society. But not all families are well balanced and competent, and permanence of affection is not universal. On the contrary, almost all societies illustrate fickleness of affection and instability of unions among young people. Unions become fairly stable only in old age, when the sexual passions have abated. Instability is found as much in modern civilization as in simpler {227} societies. Man is evidently not an absolutely monogamous being.

The efforts to force man into absolute monogamy have never been successful and the tendency of our times is to recognize this. The increasing ease of divorce which has been carried furthest in Mexico and Russia is proof of this. Equally significant are the endeavors to ease the unenviable position of the unmarried mother, the social attempts to lift the undeserved stigma from the illegitimate child, and the claims for a single standard of sexual ethics for man and woman.

The anthropologist may not be able to propose on the basis of his science the steps that should be taken to remedy the hypocrisy that attaches to the general treatment of sexual relations without unduly encouraging the light-hearted breaking of the marriage bond. He can only point out that the traditional point of view of absolute continence until a monogamic marriage is contracted is not enforceable, because it runs counter to the nature of a large part of mankind. In many cases it is accepted and followed like other social standards, but not without giving rise to severe crises.

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It is interesting to investigate the concept of property in simple tribes. We do not know of a single tribe that does not recognize individual property. The tools and utensils which a person {228} makes and uses are practically always his individual property which he may use, loan, give away or destroy, provided he does not damage the life of his household by doing so. An Eskimo man who would destroy his kayak and hunting outfit would make himself and his family dependent upon the industry of others; the Eskimo woman who would destroy her cooking utensils or her clothing would deprive the family of valuable property which could not be replaced without the help of her husband or other men. In this sense the control of their property is not absolutely free. Any economic theory that does not acknowledge these facts runs counter to anthropological data.

The concept of property in natural resources is of a different character. Except in the rare cases of truly nomadic peoples, the tribe is attached to a definite geographical area which is its property in so far as foreigners who would try to utilize it are considered as intruders. In simpler societies tribal territory and all its resources belong to the community as a whole; or when the tribe consists of subdivisions the tribal territory may be subdivided among them, and mutual encroachments are not permitted.

It is not possible to follow in the brief compass of these remarks the variety of concepts of property that develop from this primitive control, the centralization of ownership in the hands {229} of a favored class or of individuals, and the privileges that grow up with increasing complexity of society.

* * * * *

Political theories have also been built upon the assumption that single forces determine the course of cultural history. Most important among these are the theories of geographical and economic determinism.

Geographical determinism means that geographical environment controls the development of culture; economic determinism that the economic conditions of life shape all the manifestations of early culture and of complex civilization.

It is easy to show that both theories ascribe an exaggerated importance to factors that do play an important part in the life of man, but that are each only one of many determinant elements.

The study of the cultural history of any particular area shows clearly that geographical conditions by themselves have no creative force and are certainly no absolute determinants of culture.

Before the introduction of the horse the western American prairies were hardly inhabited, because the food supply was uncertain. When the Indians were supplied with horses their whole mode of life changed, because buffalo hunting became much more productive and the people were able to follow the migrating herds of buffalo. Many tribes {230} migrated westward and gave up agriculture. When the white man settled on the prairies, life was again different. Agriculture and herding were adapted to the new environment. According to the type of culture of the people who occupied the prairies, these played a different rôle. They compelled man to adapt his life to the new conditions and modified the culture. The environment did not create a new culture.

Another example will not be amiss. The Arctic tundra in America and Asia has about the same character. Still the lives of the Arctic Indians and Eskimos and that of the tribes of Siberia are not the same. The Americans are exclusively hunters and fishermen. The Asiatics have domesticated reindeer. The environment has not the same meaning for the hunter and for the herder; but herding was not invented owing to the stress of environment. It is a type of Asiatic culture that takes a

## particular form in the Arctic climate.

When the principal trade routes from Europe to the East crossed the Mediterranean Sea and vessels were of moderate size, the distribution of trade centers, of sea routes and of available harbors was quite different from that found in later times, when, owing to shifts in political and cultural conditions, to new discoveries, new demands, and in modern times, to larger vessels, the same environment brought about new alignments, decay {231} to once flourishing cities, and increased importance to others.

The error of the theory of geographic determinism lies in the assumption that there are tribes on our globe without any culture, that must learn to adapt themselves to the environment in which they live. We do not know of any tribe without some form of culture and even in the times of the older stone age, perhaps 50,000 years ago, this condition did not exist. The environment can only act upon a culture and the result of environmental influences is dependent upon the culture upon which it acts. Fertility of the soil has nowhere created agriculture, but when agriculture exists it is adapted to geographical conditions. Presence of iron ore and coal does not create industries, but when the knowledge of the use of these materials is known, geographical conditions exert a powerful influence upon local development.

Geographical conditions exert a limiting or modifying power, in so far as available materials, topographical forms, and climate compel certain adjustments, but many different types of culture are found adjusted to similar types of environment.

The error that is often committed is similar to the one that has for a long time made experimental psychology unproductive. There is no society without some type of culture, and there is no blank {232} mind, upon which culture,--or bringing up of the individual,--has left no impress. An immediate reaction of the mind to a stimulus depends not alone upon the organization of the mind and the stimulus, but also upon the modifications that the mind has undergone, owing to its development in the setting of a culture.

Economic determinism is open to the same objections. The theory is more attractive than geographic determinism because economic conditions are an integral part of culture and are closely interwoven with all its other aspects. In our life their influence makes itself felt in the most varied forms and modern civilization cannot be understood without constant attention to its economic background.

Nevertheless it would be an error to claim that all manifestations of cultural life are determined by economic conditions. The simplest cultural forms prove this. There are many tribes of hunters and fishermen whose economic life is built up on the same foundation. Nevertheless they differ fundamentally in customs and beliefs. African Bushmen and Australian aborigines; Arctic Indians and some of the river tribes of Siberia; Indians of Alaska, Chile and the natives of the island of Saghalin in eastern Asia are comparable, so far as their economic resources are concerned. Still, their social organization, their beliefs and customs {233} are diverse. There is nothing to indicate that these are due to economic differences; rather the use of their economic resources depends upon all the other aspects of cultural life.

Irregularities due to individual differences in skill and energy which may result in differences in economic status offer an adequate explanation of some aspects of cultural life.

Even the differences in the status of man and woman are not primarily economic. They are rather due to the differences in the physiological life of man and of woman. Based on this there is a difference in occupation, in interests and in mental attitude. These in turn produce economic differentiation, but the economic status is not the primary cause of the status of man and woman.

We may observe here that what is an effect of differentiation, becomes a cause of further differentiation. This relation may be observed in all specific phenomena of nature. A valley has been formed as the effect of erosion. It is the cause that in the further

## action of erosion the waters follow its course. Luxurious vegetation

is the effect of a moist soil. It is the cause of retaining more moisture in the soil. A household performs joint work, and the joint work strengthens the unity of the household. Leisure obtained by the preservation of a plentiful supply of food stimulates invention, and the inventions give more leisure. {234}

The interaction between the various forces is so intimate that to select one as the sole creative force conveys an erroneous impression of the process. It seems impossible to reduce the fundamental beliefs of mankind to an economic source. They arise from a variety of sources, one of which is the unconscious conceptualization of nature. The organization of the household is controlled in part by the size of the economic unit allowed by the food supply, in part by ties of association that are established by beliefs or habits so slightly related to economic conditions that it would require great ingenuity and a forced reasoning to reduce them to economic causes.

It is justifiable to investigate the intricate relations of economic life and of all the other numerous manifestations of culture, but it is not possible to rule out all the remaining aspects as dependent upon economic conditions. It is just as necessary to study economic life as dependent upon inventions, social structure, art, and religion as it is to study the reverse relations.

Economic conditions are the cause of many of these and they are with equal truth their effect. Social bonds and conflicts, concepts, emotional life, artistic activities are in their psychological and social origin only incompletely reducible to economic factors.

As geographical environment acts only upon a {235} culture modifying it, so economic conditions act upon an existing culture and are in turn modified by it.

* * * * *

A final question must be answered. Can anthropology help to control the future development of human culture and well-being or must we be satisfied to record the progress of events and let them take their course? I believe we have seen that a knowledge of anthropology may guide us in many of our policies. This does not mean that we can predict the ultimate results of our actions. It has been claimed that human culture is something superorganic, that it follows laws that are not willed by any individual participating in the culture, but that are inherent in the culture itself. Some of the gradual changes referred to before might seem to support this view. The increase of knowledge, the freeing of the individual from traditional fetters, the extension of political units have proceeded regularly.

It seems hardly necessary to consider culture a mystic entity that exists outside the society of its individual carriers, and that moves by its own force. The life of a society is carried on by individuals who act singly and jointly under the stress of the tradition in which they have grown up and surrounded by the products of their own

## activities and those of their forbears. These determine the {236}

direction of their activities positively or negatively. They may proceed to act and think according to the transmitted patterns or they may be led to move in opposite directions. Occupation with a thought or an invention may lead on in different directions. Seen retrospectively they may appear like a predetermined growth.

The forces that bring about the changes are active in the individuals composing the social group, not in the abstract culture.

Here, as well as in other social phenomena, accident cannot be eliminated, accident that may depend upon the presence or absence of eminent individuals, upon the favors bestowed by nature, upon chance discoveries or contacts, and therefore prediction is precarious, if not impossible. Laws of development, except in most generalized form, cannot be established and a detailed course of growth cannot be predicted.

All we can do is to watch and judge day by day what we are doing by what we have learned and to shape our steps accordingly.

REFERENCES {237}

In the following pages some of the more important literature is quoted on which are based the statements made in the text of the book:

P. 20. Claims of fundamental racial differences will be found in A. de Gobineau, _Essai sur l’inégalité des races_; Madison Grant, _The Passing of the Great Race_; Hans F. K. Günther, _Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes_; Houston Stewart Chamberlain, _Die Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts_. The opposite view is held by Th. Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturvölker_, 2nd edition, Vol. 1, p. 381; Franz Boas, _The Mind of Primitive Man_; Friedrich Hertz, _Race and Civilization_; Ignaz Zollschan, _Das Rassenproblem_. An attempt at a critical review of the literature is contained in Frank H. Hankins, _The Racial Basis of Civilization_, and more fully, but with a complete misunderstanding of the meaning of racial and national traits in Théophile Simar, _Etude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races_.

Pp. 27, 28. The effect of inbreeding upon the variability {238} of family lines has been discussed by F. Boas in the American Anthropologist N. S. Vol. 18 (1916), pp. 1 et seq., and by Isabel Gordon Carter, American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Vol. 11, pp. 457 et seq. See also Eugen Fischer, _Die Rehobother Bastards_.

P. 30. The foreign elements in the Swedish nation have been discussed by Gustav Retzius and Carl M. Fürst in _Anthropologia Suecica_, p. 18.

P. 32. The reversion to the type of a population has been first discussed by Francis Galton, _Natural Inheritance_; and later on elaborated by Karl Pearson, _Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution_, III; Royal Society of London, 1896, A, pp. 253 et seq. The varying regression from the same parental type to distinct populations has been illustrated by F. Boas, in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 14, pp. 496 et seq.

P. 35. The changes of stature in Europe are summarized in Rudolf Martin, _Lehrbuch der Anthropologie_, pp. 224 et seq., 1st edition. Edw. Ph. Mackeprang, _De vaernepligtiges legemshojde i Danmark_, Meddelelser om Danmarks Antropologi, Vol. 1, pp. 1 et seq. Comparisons of parents and their own children {239} are given in F. Boas, _Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants_, pp. 28, 30.

P. 36. A discussion of the measures of the hand according to occupation is found in E. Brezina and V. Lebzelter, _Ueber die Dimensionen der Hand bei verschiedenen Berufen_, Archiv für Hygiene, Vol. 92, 1923; and Zeitschrift für Konstitutionslehre, Vol. 10, pp. 381 et seq.

P. 36. A brief discussion of the effect of the use of the limbs upon the form of the leg bones is found in Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Anthropologie und Urgeschichte, Vol. 17 (1885), p. 253; and by L. Manouvrier in Bulletin de la Société d’Anthropologie, Paris, Series 3, Vol. 10, p. 128.

P. 44. Traits due to domestication have been studied particularly by Eugen Fischer. His results have been briefly summarized in his book, _Rasse und Rassenentstehung beim Menschen_.

P. 46. A summary of the literature relating to the study of the senses of races is found in Gustav Kafka, _Handbuch der vergleichenden Psychologie_, Vol. 1, pp. 163 et seq.

P. 46. Differences in basal metabolism were found by Francis G. Benedict, _The racial factor in metabolism_. Proceedings National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 11, pp. 342 et seq. {240}

P. 47. The margin of safety has been discussed by S. J. Meltzer, _Factors of safety in animal structure and animal economy_, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 48, pp. 655, et seq.; Science, New Series, Vol. 25, pp. 481 et seq.

P. 54. O. Klineberg, _An experimental study of speed and other factors in “racial” differences_. Archives of Psychology, No. 93.

P. 54. Paul Roloff has found considerable differences in the ability to define terms, among different social classes of the same district. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie, Vol. 27, pp. 162 et seq.

P. 59. Melville J. Herskovits discusses the mental behavior of a socially uniform group of negroes and mulattoes in _The American Negro_.

Pp. 60, 61. Studies of human culture without any regard to race are, for instance, Edward B. Tylor, _Primitive Culture_; Herbert Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_; F. Ratzel, _The History of Mankind_. Adolf Bastian’s viewpoint has been analyzed by Th. Achelis, _Moderne Völkerkunde_, pp. 189 et seq.

P. 64. Romain Rolland speaks of “race antipathy” in his _Jean Christophe_, 44th edition, Vol. 10, p. 23.

P. 66. The relations between Negroes, Indians, and Whites in Brazil were described to me {241} by Mr. Rüdiger Bilden, those in Santo Domingo by Mr. Manuel Andrade.

P. 68. Local forms in animal life have been described by Friedrich Alverdes, _Tiersoziologie_, 1925. The social life of insects has been treated by William M. Wheeler, _Social Insects, Their Origin and Evolution_, 1928.

P. 72. The actual distribution of mixtures of Whites and Negroes has been described by Melville J. Herskovits in the book previously referred to. The United States Census is not a reliable source for the relative number of Mulattoes and full-blood Negroes.

P. 75. Marriage preferences of Negroes and Mulattoes have been discussed by Herskovits in the book just mentioned.

P. 87. Owing to the economic advantages accruing to Indians who speak Spanish, there is a marked tendency in many Mexican villages to discourage the use of the native language. I have heard Indian mothers reprimand their children for speaking Indian.

P. 87. The descent of the Swedish nobility has been discussed by P. E. Fahlbeck, _Der Adel Schwedens_, Jena, 1903.

P. 107. As examples of attempts to correlate bodily form and pathological or psychological conditions I mention George Draper, _Human {242} Constitution_, and E. Kretschmer, _Körperbau und Charakter_.

P. 109. For examples of heredity of defective traits see R. L. Dugdale, _The Jukes_, and A. H. Estabrook, _The Jukes in 1915_; also H. H. Goddard, _The Kallikak Family_; A. H. Estabrook and C. B. Davenport, _The Nam Family_; F. H. Danielson and C. B. Davenport, _The Hill Folk_.

P. 122. C. Lombroso’s views are set forth in many of his books, for instance, _L’uomo delinquente in rapporto all’ antropologia_; _L’homme criminel_.

P. 123. One of the most thorough studies of criminals is that by C. Goring, _The English Convict_.

P. 128. A discussion of observations in Habit Clinics is given in Blanche C. Weill, _The Behavior of Young Children of the Same Family_, Cambridge, 1928.

P. 146. In F. Boas, _Handbook of American Indian Languages_, the forms of primitive languages are discussed. See also Edward Sapir, _Language_.

P. 150. The significance of the Sun Dance among various tribes has been studied by Leslie Spier, in Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. 16, pp. 451 et seq. {243}

P. 151. The stability of ornamental form and the variety of interpretation are illustrated in F. Boas, _Primitive Art_, pp. 88 et seq. Examples of the varied interpretation of tales have been collected by T. T. Waterman, Journal of American Folk-Lore, Vol. 27, pp. 1 et seq.

P. 152. The theory of survivals has been set forth by Edward B. Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, Vol. 1, pp. 70 et seq.

P. 152. Some of the rules of forbidden and proscribed cousin marriages will be found in Robert H. Lowie, _Primitive Society_.

P. 163. A remarkable instance illustrating the conservatism of the Eskimo and their Arctic neighbors is contained in a phrase in their folklore. In East Greenland it is told of a man “who was so strong even in death, that he did not lie stretched out, but rested on his muscles (_i.e._, of the buttocks and shoulders);” Knud Rasmussen, _Myter og Sagn, from Grönland_, Vol. 1, p. 272 (figure). The Chukchee of eastern Siberia tell of a strong man who had been killed: “He lay there, touching the ground merely with his calves, with his shoulder blades, and with the other fleshy parts of his body.” W. Bogoras, _Chukchee Texts_, Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, Vol. 8, p. 98.

P. 164. Changes of ritual are occurring among {244} the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island who, during the last seventy or eighty years, have constantly been adding new features and dropping old ones. Changes owing to the premature death of the keeper of a secret ritual must have occurred repeatedly among the Pueblo tribes. The best authenticated case is that of the Pueblo of Cochití where, owing to the death of the chief of ceremonies and rituals during the absence of his successor, the latter had only a fragmentary knowledge of his duties.

P. 164. The best described example of the origin of a mixed religion is that of the Ghost Dance by James Mooney in the 14th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology.

P. 164. The restriction of inventiveness of the artist has been described in F. Boas, _Primitive Art_.

P. 166. Maria Montessori, in her _Pedagogical Anthropology_, has tried to apply anthropometric data to educational problems.

P. 169. The periods of certain physiological stages have been described by F. Boas in _Remarks on the Anthropological Study of Children_, Transactions of the 15th International Congress of Hygiene and Demography.

P. 171. Observations on variations in development according to social classes are found in {245} many places. See, for instance, references in H. Ploss, _Das Weib_, 2nd edition, Vol. 1, p. 228; also H. P. Bowditch, _The Growth of Children_, 8th Annual Report State Bureau of Health of Massachusetts; C. Roberts, _A Manual of Anthropometry_. See also the selected bibliography in D. A. Prescott, _The determination of anatomic age in school children and its relation to mental development_.

P. 172. Milo Hellman, _Nutrition, Growth and Dentition_, Dental Cosmos, January, 1923.

P. 174. The differences in bodily form of boys and girls have been pointed out by me at the place just mentioned and by Ruth O. Sawtell, _Sex Differences in Bone Growth of Young Children_, American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 1928.

P. 175. A full treatment of the psychology of childhood in its relation to educational problems is contained in E. L. Thorndike, _Educational Psychology_.

P. 177. A comparison of Jewish and Northwest European children will be found in F. Boas, _The Growth of Children as Influenced by Environmental and Hereditary Conditions_, School and Society, Vol. 17, p. 305 et seq.

P. 178. The uncertainty of correlations between height and weight and undernourishment have been set forth by Louis I. Dublin and {246} John C. Gebhart, _Do Height and Weight Tables Identify Undernourished Children?_, New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor.

P. 182. The correlations between stature attained at a certain age and subsequent growth have been discussed by Clark Wissler, American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 5, pp. 81 et seq.

P. 188. See descriptions of the killing of aged persons in Waldemar Bogoras, _The Chukchee_, Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, Vol. 8.

P. 189. The life of the adolescent girl in Samoa has been discussed by Margaret Mead, _Coming of Age in Samoa_.

P. 217. E. Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_; L. T. Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_.

THE END