CHAPTER XI

.

A STERNER SCHOOL.

THE same year which saw the foundation of the Royal Military Academy witnessed the commencement of a seven years' schooling, which was to leave an indelible mark on the Regiment. In the West Indies and in Flanders, as well as in the disturbances at home in 1745, officers and men learnt lessons, and acquired an _esprit de corps_, to which they had hitherto been strangers. It is at once pleasing and amusing to read in the old order-books, framed at Woolwich during the years between the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and the commencement of the Seven Years' War, reminders of the school of war and discipline represented by the years between 1741 and 1748. "The same as we wore in Flanders" was a favourite way for describing a particular dress for parade. And the word "we" is poetry to the student, who is searching for signs of an awakening Regimental _esprit_.

No history of a Regiment like the Royal Artillery could be compressed into any reasonable dimensions, if every campaign in which it was engaged were described in detail. It must suffice to sketch the campaigns, but to paint in body colours the Artillery's share. The gradual increase of the proportion of this arm; the occasions on which it more particularly distinguished itself; the changes in dress and equipment; and the officers whose services in the successive campaigns were most conspicuous; these are the details which will form the foreground of the Regiment's History. But even these are so numerous that most careful sifting will be required to prevent the story from becoming wearisome.

The same year, then, which saw the warrant issued for the foundation of the Royal Military Academy saw also the despatch to the West Indies of one of the most formidable expeditions, both in a naval and a military sense, which had ever left the shores of England. The squadron consisted of 115 vessels, well armed and manned, and the troops were in number over 12,000. The Royal Artillery was commanded by Colonel Jonas Watson—a brave and experienced officer, who did not live to return to England, being killed at the bombardment of Carthagena,—and was divided into trains for service on shore, and detachments for service on board the numerous bomb-vessels which formed part of the squadron.

The troops were to have been commanded by Lord Cathcart, but unfortunately this officer died of fever, on the arrival of the expedition at Dominica, and his successor, General Wentworth, was totally unfit for the duties which devolved upon him. To this circumstance, and the want of harmony between him and the naval commander, Admiral Vernon, the ultimate failure of the expedition was due. Notwithstanding additional reinforcements from England, so reduced was this force in two years by disaster and disease, that not a tenth part returned to England; "and thus ended in shame, disappointment, and loss, the most important, most expensive, and the best concerted expedition that Great Britain was ever engaged in, leaving this melancholy proof, that if dissension is the misfortune of a State, it is the ruin of any military undertaking."[11]

In reading the accounts of this expedition, more especially of the attack on Carthagena, there is a positive relief in turning from the passages relating to the quarrels between the naval and military commanders to those painful but proud episodes, in which the obedience and bravery of the troops and seamen were so gloriously manifested; and although the first service of the Royal Artillery on the Western side of the Atlantic was neither profitable nor pleasant, it can be studied with satisfaction, as far as their performance of their duties and endurance of hardship are concerned. As for the blunders which were committed by the commanders, the blame must lie with them, not with the executive.

To return, however, to Europe. The war of the Austrian succession had commenced, and England felt obliged to support Maria Theresa, which she did partly by a grant of money, and partly by sending an expedition to Flanders under the aged Earl of Stair. The force employed amounted to 16,000 men; and the Artillery comprised a considerable staff, three companies, and thirty guns, 3-pounders.

At this time the Regiment was distributed as follows:—One company at Minorca, one in Gibraltar, one at Newfoundland, two at Woolwich, and three in Flanders.

Although the Artillery was at Ghent in July, 1742, no military operations were carried on that year, owing to the backwardness of the Dutch to fulfil their part of the contract; and the English lay in Flanders, inactive until the following year.

The commanding officer of the Royal Artillery, at first, was Colonel Thomas Pattison, and the following is a nominal list of the combatant officers who served under him:—

Major GEORGE MICHELSON, Captain WILLIAM SUMPTER, Captain WITHERS BORGARD, First Lieutenant JAMES PATTISON, Captain THOMAS FLIGHT, Second Lieutenant SAMUEL CLEAVELAND, Lieutenant-Fireworker JOHN NORTHALL, Lieutenant-Fireworker NATHANIEL MARSH, Lieutenant-Fireworker THOMAS BROADBRIDGE, Lieutenant-Fireworker EDWARD BULLOCK, Adjutant JOSEPH BROOME.

In November, 1742, Captain James Deal was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel to the train; Lieutenant Archibald Macbean was appointed Bridge-master; and Lieutenant Charles Stranover joined as Lieutenant of Miners.

The number of non-combatants was very great, and the total strength of the companies amounted to eighteen non-commissioned officers, sixty-four gunners, 140 matrosses, four drummers, and twenty pioneers.

On the 10th February, 1743, the train left Ghent to join the Allied Army, which was effected on the 16th May. King George met the army on the 19th June, and on the 27th was fought the Battle of Dettingen. The Artillery share in this engagement was small, the chief points of note in the battle being the gallantry of King George and of the Duke of Cumberland, and the obstinate bravery of the infantry, to which—coupled with the blunder of the Duc de Grammont—the victory was due. The hardships suffered by the Allies before the battle had been excessive, nor were they removed by success; so it was considered advisable to fall back on their supplies instead of following the enemy. The guns present with the Royal Artillery at the battle were 3-pounders, twenty-four in number.

In the following year, 1744, and also in 1745, considerable augmentations to the officers with the train had been made, many having become available by the return of the expedition from the West Indies. Among others, Colonel Jonathan Lewis was appointed Second Colonel to the train: and Captains Borgard, Michelson, and Desaguliers, Lieutenants Charlton, Bennett, and Macbean, and, somewhat later, Major William Belford, joined it. The last-named officer was appointed Major to the train, in room of Michelson deceased.

In 1744, many of the British troops had been recalled, on account of an expected invasion of England; and so greatly did the French Army in Flanders outnumber that of the Allies, that no resistance could be made to its advance, and nothing but a diversion on the part of the Austrians, which made the French King hasten to the defence of his own kingdom, prevented the complete subjugation of Holland.

In 1745, the Artillery marched with the army from Ghent, leaving on the 13th April. The Artillery marched in rear of the Army in the following order:—First, a sergeant and six miners, two and two; a tumbril drawn by three horses with miners' tools; two four-horse waggons, containing Colonel Lewis's baggage; a front guard of twenty-four gunners and matrosses; a sergeant and two drummers; Lieutenant Pattison marching in front, and Lieutenant Macbean in rear; the kettledrum; Colonel Lewis and Captain Michelson on horseback; the flag-gun, a heavy 6-pounder, on a field-carriage and limber drawn by nine horses; nine more 6-pounders, drawn as above, but by seven horses; one spare 6-pounder carriage and limber, drawn by seven horses; twelve covered tumbrils with stores, each drawn by three horses; four howitzers with five horses each; one spare howitzer-carriage and limber, also with five horses; six covered tumbrils with stores, with three horses each; ten 3-pounders on "galloping carriages," with four horses each; a travelling forge cart with three horses; twenty-three powder tumbrils; and three covered waggons with officers' tents, baggage, &c., with three horses each. The remaining officers and men marched on the flanks of the waggons and guns, a gunner marching by every gun, with a match. A Regiment of infantry formed the escort, the grenadier company marching in front, the remainder in rear. It should have been mentioned that in 1744, an increase to the armament of the train had been made, comprising ten heavy 6-pounders and four 8-inch howitzers; and in 1745 another company arrived from Woolwich.

Some of the orders issued by the Duke of Cumberland, who was in command of the Army at this time, are curious: "It is strictly ordered by His Royal Highness that none presume to shoot or hunt, whether officer or private, officers' servants or huntsmen; this to be a standing order." Again: "Besides the going out of the Provost, there are fifty Hussars ordered to patrol in the front and rear of the camp, and to cut to pieces every man that they may find beyond the limits of the camp."

At Fontenoy, such of the guns as were engaged did good service, more especially those attached to Ligonier's column, which preceded its advance, dragged along by ropes, and doing great execution. Had the Dutch troops fought as well as the British, Fontenoy would have been a victory for the Allies, instead of a defeat. The loss of the Royal Artillery was small compared with that of the English infantry. It comprised Lieutenant Bennett, one sergeant, one gunner, and four matrosses killed; one conductor, two sergeants, one corporal, six gunners, and thirteen matrosses wounded; two gunners and four matrosses missing.

The guns actually present on the field comprehended ten 6-pounders, twenty-seven 3-pounders, six 1½-pounders,—recently sent from England—and four 8-inch howitzers.

The officers present at the Battle of Fontenoy were Colonel Pattison, Lieut.-Colonel Lewis, Major Belford, Captains Michelson, Mace, Desaguliers, Flight, Captains-Lieutenant Ord, Leith, Brome, and Johnson, and Lieutenants Pattison, Campbell, Cleaveland, Tovey, Stranover, T. Smith, McLeod, Macbean, Charlton, Strachey, Northall, Maitland, Hussey, Pike, B. Smith, Bennett (killed), Mason, Durham, Knox, Farquharson, Worth, and Lindsay. Many of these had joined the train just before the battle.

The strength of the Allied Army did not exceed 53,000 men; that of the French—under Marshal Saxe, and inspirited by the presence of the King and the Dauphin—approached 80,000. Of the British troops 4000 were killed and wounded, besides 2000 Hanoverians. Fontenoy was a defeat, but hardly one which can be said to have tarnished in the slightest the British Arms.

The Duke of Cumberland withdrew his forces in good order. On the march, an order which is extant shows a novel means of confining prisoners: "The sergeant of miners is to make a black hole _under ground_, and the carpenter to make a door to it with a padlock; always to be clean straw for the prisoners; and if any sergeant or corporal suffer anything to go in to them, but bread and water, they shall be tried for disobedience of orders."

In October, the rebellion in Scotland had created such an alarm that the whole of the Artillery in Flanders, now amounting to four companies, was recalled to England.

Prior to their return, however, news had reached the Allied Army, near Brussels, of the successful result of the Siege of Louisbourg by the New England troops, and, as a symptom of rejoicing, a review of the Army was ordered by the Duke of Cumberland, which is mentioned by General Forbes Macbean in his MS. diary, on account of a circumstance which can best be described in his own words: "The Army was drawn up in order of battle, and reviewed by the Duke: the Park of Artillery was formed in great order on a fine extensive plain near Vilvorden: the four companies of Artillery under arms, drawn up, two on the right, and two on the left of the park: Colonel Pattison, Lieut.-Colonel Lewis, and Major Belford, posted themselves on horseback in front of the park, when they saluted His Royal Highness as he passed, by dropping their swords. The other officers, carrying fusees, only took off their hats as he passed them."

At this time—in 1745—a company was sent to garrison Louisbourg, and another was sent to Newfoundland, the Regiment at this date having been increased to ten companies.

The interlude of the Scotch rebellion, which involved the recall of the companies from Flanders, does not require detailed mention. There was a good deal of what Albert Borgard would have called useless marching and counter-marching in England. The Artillery was successful at Carlisle and Culloden; very unsuccessful at Falkirk. At Prestonpans, the guns were not served by the Royal Artillery, but by seamen. At Falkirk, the guns were hard and fast in a bog, and were not once in action. As soon as the peasant drivers, who had been engaged with the horses, saw the Royal Army waver, they promptly fled; and of the eight guns which had accompanied the King's troops, seven fell into the hands of the enemy. At Culloden, the victory may be said to have been won by the Artillery. In the words of Sir Edward Cust, "the guns were so exceedingly well plied that they made dreadful lanes through some of the clan regiments. It was with extreme difficulty that the men could be kept in their places to stand this murderous fire." The Artillery was under the command of Colonel Belford. Only one company of the Regiment was at Culloden, the remaining five on home service being at Woolwich, whence in the preceding winter they had furnished detachments for service in England at Chester, Carlisle, and Newcastle. The guns employed during the rebellion were 6-pounders, 3-pounders, and howitzers.

It is with pleasure that one turns from the story of civil war, always painful, rarely glorious, to Flanders again, where two companies were ordered immediately after the suppression of the rebellion. But before doing so, it is impossible to avoid mentioning a coincidence which is somewhat singular. As in the Scotch rebellion of 1715, the disastrous unwieldiness, and the indifferent equipment of the Artillery trains on the old spasmodic principle, forced upon the country the idea of a permanent force of Artillery, so in the Scotch rebellion of 1745, the disaster of Falkirk forced upon the public attention the folly of a Field Artillery with no assured mobility. In a contemporary article in the 'Gentleman's Magazine,' quoted by the author of 'England's Artillerymen,' this feeling found expression; and as to one Scotch rebellion the Regiment may be said to owe its birth, so to another it may date the first step in advance made by that portion of it intended for service in the field. This coincidence suggests many questions to the student. Is public opinion necessary to bring about military reform? And is English public opinion on military questions only awakened when civil or other war thrusts military blunders in a very prominent and personal way before public attention? These questions may be answered

## partly in the affirmative, and partly in the negative.

It is undoubtedly a consequence of military training, to produce, in a man's mind, more of an inclination to make the best of what is, than to suggest change and improvement. And, further, as change for the better generally implies expense; and as the heads of military, as of other public departments, have a particular horror of anything involving increased outlay, it follows that suggestions in that direction, made by their own subordinates, are received with scant favour, and the would-be reformers are deterred in every way from pursuing their inclinations. But the public owes no allegiance to its officials; and the wildest schemes from an outsider receive an attention denied to the most practical suggestions from those in the employment of a department. Although, therefore, the public is often the father of military advances, it must not hastily be assumed that this is owing to a want of originality in military men.

Again, although civil war in England demonstrated military defects in a very special way, it must not be assumed either that these defects had not been apparent to soldiers before, or that so strong a measure as civil war was necessary to enlist public opinion. Apart from the cause above mentioned, which would deter an officer from recommending change, it must not be inferred that the same delicacy was shown to the peasantry of other countries, where transport was required for the Artillery, as to those who were called upon in England for assistance. Martial law, which would have been rarely, if ever, enforced upon English peasantry by English commanders, was freely exercised abroad; and, with this exercise, the want of mobility was not so frequently allowed to appear. And with regard to the necessity of an actual, bitter home-experience being required to awaken public opinion, the recent Franco-German war proves the contrary. The reports of the value of Artillery in that campaign were sufficient, without actual and personal observation, to awaken in the public mind a strong and unanimous resolution to perfect that arm in England, such as no government could have dared to thwart. When backed by public opinion in England, a Government will gladly make changes involving expense, and in fact, to refuse to do so would be folly; but when that public opinion, even if foolish and ignorant, is against change or expense, or even indifferent on the subject, the military reformer within the ranks of the Army may as well beat the air as urge his suggestions. All these considerations have to be borne in mind when studying the history of Army reforms.

The two companies which went to Flanders in 1746, were under the command of Colonel Lewis; Captain Borgard, Michelson acting as Major; Lieutenant Brome as Adjutant, and Lieutenant Stranover as Quartermaster. The number of subaltern officers with the companies seems excessive, being no less than ten, besides three Captain-Lieutenants; but a means of employing them was adopted this year, by distributing the fourteen 3-pounder guns, which were with the companies, among the seven battalions; two to each battalion under a Lieutenant. This arrangement was ordered on the 20th July, 1746; but it is soothing to the student to find on the 23rd of the following month this pernicious custom suspended, and the battalion guns ordered to join the reserve.

In 1747, there were five companies in Flanders, three having been added to the Regiment; and the following was the armament in their charge: six heavy 12-pounders; six heavy 9-pounders; fourteen heavy and twelve light 6-pounders: fourteen heavy 3-pounders: two 8-inch howitzers; and six Royal mortars.

In 1748, in addition to the above, thirty-two light 6-pounders were sent for use with the battalions.

At the battle of Roncoux, the want of Artillery was sorely felt by the British, the more so, as the enemy was in this arm particularly strong; and doubtless this led to the great increase made in 1747, both in men and guns.

The arrival of Colonel Belford to command the Artillery in the winter of 1746, and during the rest of the campaign, produced a marked and beneficial effect. Colonel Pattison and Major Lewis were allowed to retire on full-pay, in January 1748, on account of old age and infirmities: and their younger successors devoted themselves to giving a military appearance to the companies under their command. In this they were greatly assisted, not merely by the improved and better educated class of officers, now joining from the Academy; but also by an accidental circumstance which swelled the ranks with many well-trained soldiers. It is mentioned as follows by old General Macbean: "About this time, three Regiments of Cavalry being reduced to Dragoons, and the troopers having it in their option to remain as Dragoons or be discharged, many of them chose the latter; and above two hundred of them enlisted into the Artillery. From this period, the Regiment improved much in appearance, and in the size of the men, neither of which had been hitherto much attended to; but receiving at once so many tall men in the corps may be said to have given rise to the change that has taken place in regard to the height, strength, and figure of the men which now compose it." Among other means of training and disciplining the men under his command during the tedious months when the Army was in winter quarters, Colonel Belford devoted much time to practising them in the use of small-arms, and in infantry manœuvres, never yet practised in the Regiment. So successful was he, that the Duke of Cumberland reviewed the companies; on which occasion the gunners of the companies, with their field staffs, formed upon the right as a company of grenadiers; and the matrosses, with their muskets, as a battalion. There are not wanting, in the nineteenth century, men who wish that Colonel Belford's zeal had taken some other direction; who think the use of Artillerymen, even on field-days, as infantry, is a misuse; and who would remove the carbines from the Garrison Artillery, in order that more time might be allowed for their own special and varied drills. There are even scoffers, who say that the presence of a body of men in the garrison under his command, armed and equipped like infantry, is more than a General Officer can bear; that he is never at rest until he sees this body swelling his Brigade by another battalion; and that he inspects it in infantry details more minutely than in those of its own special arm. Whatever ground there may be for these complaints, there can be no doubt that Colonel Belford was innocent of any desire to divert his men from their own work: and merely availed himself of this, as of other means of disciplining and training them into habits of smartness and obedience. And among other things which he borrowed from the infantry, besides their drill, was that of an Officer's Regimental Guard over the Artillery Park, in addition to the guard furnished by the Line Regiments, a more important item than it would at first sight appear to be.

Two Courts-martial, one upon an officer, and one upon a gunner, are mentioned here, as probably interesting to the reader. Lieutenant McCulloch, having been tried and found guilty by a General Court- martial, of disobedience to Colonel Belford's orders, was suspended for the space of three months, and ordered to make the following submission: "I am very sorry I am guilty of a neglect of my duty, and I do

## particularly ask Colonel Belford's pardon, and will, for the future,

avoid being guilty of a thing of the like nature." Having complied with the submission, and Colonel Belford having requested that the remaining part of the sentence might be remitted, the Duke of Cumberland, being highly pleased with the conduct of the Artillery at the recent battle of Val, was pleased to accede to the request.

The gunner, who was tried, had been guilty of insubordination towards a sergeant, and being formally convicted by a Regimental Court-martial, was sentenced to be "reduced in pay and duty for one month to matross, ride the gun, ask the sergeant's pardon at the head of the Regiment, and that the difference of his pay be employed for the use of the sick."

In reading the accounts of this war between the Allies and the French, one feels how just was the remark of Louis XV. after Val, that the "British not only paid all, but fought all." On them fell all the brunt of every engagement, and the discussion and misunderstanding which so often prevailed among the Allied commanders had no effect upon the bravery of the British troops. At Val, the Artillery had thirty men killed, Major Michelson, Lieutenants McLeod, Farrington, Dexter, Stephens, Pedley, and nineteen men wounded; and twenty-five taken prisoners. They received the special thanks of the Duke for their conduct during this obstinate and bloody engagement.

The next thing that strikes one is the cool and able generalship of Marshal Saxe. He had superior numbers under his command; nor did he suffer from divided counsels, but these advantages do not conceal his military talent.

Next, to the student's mind, the absurdly luxurious way of making war then prevalent suggests itself, if the term can be applied to any contest where loss of life was so great. It was, indeed, a game at which the leaders played; and in the quiet of their systematic winter-quarters they devised and matured new moves for the coming season. How changed is modern warfare! What a different system is to be read in the stories of the trenches before Sebastopol, or the winter encampment of the Germans round Paris!

The war gradually filtered itself away into the peace of Aix-la- Chapelle. After Val came the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where fourteen men of the Royal Artillery were killed; then came winter quarters at Breda; then came preparations for a new campaign in 1748; although peace was in every one's mind, and the plenipotentiaries to conclude it had already met; then came the siege of Maestricht, with its Quixotic ending; and at last came peace itself. A peace which brought profit neither to England nor to France; which could not obliterate the long list on the rolls of each nation which war had entered in the books of death; which, if possible, only made the folly of the contest more apparent; and which, while it ceased the actual roll of cannon, and crossing of bayonets, did not stop the pulsation of hatred in each nation's breast, which was to throb with increasing vigour, until a new and more bitter war should gratify the unsmothered longings of each. A peace which—with the solitary exception of Prussia—seemed to do good, or bring rest to none but unhappy Flanders, the battleground of Europe, the victim in every international contest.

But a peace, also, which closed for a time that sterner school of discipline in which the Royal Artillery had now for years been studying; in which there had been officers such as Macbean, Desaguliers, Phillips, and Pattison, learning lessons, which were to bear fruit in yet grimmer warfare, both in Europe and America; and on whose black-boards—blank in this respect, when the war commenced—there had now been indelibly inscribed the words, that "an Army without Artillery is no Army at all!"

Before closing this chapter, there are one or two points connected with the Artillery in the field, which deserve mention. First; the amount of ammunition which was carried in the field with each gun was as follows:— 100 round-shot, and 30 rounds of grape; with the exception of the long 6-pounder guns, which carried 80 round-shot, and 40 grape. Second; the stores and ammunition were issued direct by the Commissaries to the officers commanding Brigades of guns, _i.e._ Batteries—on requisition— who had, however, to make their own cartridges, and fix the wooden bottoms to the round-shot and grape, after receipt. The wooden bottoms were made by the artificer, called the turner; and were fastened by the tinman. Another of the tinman's duties was the manufacture of the tubes— and of boxes to contain them. Third; luxurious in one sense, as the war was, it had its hardships, as the following extract will show:—August 27th, 1746.—"Arrived at camp after a most difficult march, the Artillery constantly moving for four days and three nights without encamping— nearly starved; through woods, over mountainous country, with the bottoms full of rapid little rivers and deep marshes. Almost all the horses lost their shoes, and men and horses nearly starved. 3rd September.—Marched from the camp at 3 A.M., and crossed the Maise, 170 yards broad, over the pontoon bridges, near Maistricht. The bridges were commenced laying at one o'clock in the morning, and were completed by seven, when the heads of the column made their appearance. The French army was in order of battle on the heights of Hautain, opposite to Visel, where he supposed we were to pass, with a design to fall upon us when we were partly crossed the river. 5th September.—The enemy attacked our light troops posted opposite to Visel, on the Maise, and handled them very roughly; those that were not killed, being forced into the river, where they were drowned." Lastly, it is to be noted that, as in all our later wars before they have lasted any time, the ranks were thinned by disease and death, and there was a difficulty in replenishing them, even with _recruits_. It is to be hoped that the system of reserves recently organized in the English Army will in future mitigate this evil.

On the return of the Army to England in 1748, three companies of Artillery were reduced; the officers being gradually brought in, as vacancies occurred. Among other customs brought by the companies from Flanders was that of employing fifers as well as drummers: "the first fifers in the British Army having been established in the Royal Regiment of Artillery at the end of this war, being taught by John Ulrich, a Hanoverian fifer, brought from Flanders by Colonel Belford, when the Allied Army separated."[12]

So much for the school of discipline in Europe. But there had been a class-room opened in the East, to which the Regiment sent some pupils. Admiral Boscawen had been ordered to the East Indies, in command of a mixed naval and military force, including a company of the Royal Artillery, under Major Goodyear. The force of the enemy, and the strength of his defences, had been underrated; and it cannot be said that the expedition was very successful. The ordnance which accompanied the Artillery consisted of twelve 6-pounders, six 3-pounders, two 10- inch, three 8-inch, fifteen 5½ inch, and twenty-five 4⅖-inch mortars, all of brass. It was at the siege of Pondicherry that these guns were used, a siege which lasted from the 11th of August to the 6th of October, 1748, when Admiral Boscawen was compelled to raise it after a loss of over 1000 men. The Royal Artillery lost, out of a total of 148 of all ranks, no less than forty-three, including Major Goodyear, who fell, mortally wounded, during the siege, his leg being carried away by a round-shot.

A stop was put to the hostilities by the declaration of peace, but the presence of Admiral Boscawen enabled him to ratify, in a prompt manner, that part of the treaty which restored Madras to the English. Many men of Major Goodyear's company were allowed, in 1749, to volunteer for the East India Company's service.

But this expedition has an interest to the Artilleryman beyond the military operations. Before sailing, Admiral Boscawen asserted his intention, in spite of Major Goodyear's remonstrances, of filling up, as Commander-in-Chief, any vacancies which might occur in the company of Artillery.

The Board of Ordnance was appealed to, and most warmly protested against such an interference with its prerogative,—declaring that none of the appointments made by the Admiral would be recognized by the present or any succeeding Master-General. Doubtless, the Board was right; and Admiral Boscawen, being anxious to retain the favour of all under his command, let the matter drop. With a seniority corps, essentially detached when on service, it was absolutely necessary that promotion should be general, not local. At the same time, the restraint of the Board was irksome—not the less so because just; and the feeling could never be agreeable to a commander, that serving under him were those who owed a special allegiance to another. As time went on, and the military department of the Ordnance increased, this irritation would become more general, and the points of difference between Generals and the Board would multiply.

The wisdom of the change which put Generals and the Ordnance Corps under one head might have been proved by _à priori_, as it has been by _à posteriori_ reasoning; and this trifling episode between Admiral Boscawen and the Board is interesting, as showing that, thirty years after the Regiment had been called into existence, the Dual Government of the Artillery was already producing natural consequences. But it is also interesting, as manifesting the affection which the Board already evinced for the child they had begotten—an interest sometimes too paternal, but never unlovely.

An excellent letter from the principal officers of the Ordnance is extant, urging the claims to Army Rank of the officers of the Artillery, which had been again questioned by some belonging to the other arms of the service. The difficulty was, in a very few years, settled by the King, in place of the Master-General, signing the commissions of Artillery officers; but this letter from the Board is interesting, as pleading, on grounds of justice and in language far warmer than could have been expected, the claims of the corps which they had created. The letter bears date 24th February, 1744, and, after quoting the decision in favour of Artillery officers arrived at by the King in 1724, and confirmed in 1735, and mentioning two Courts-martial held in 1737 and 1742, at which officers of Artillery sat with those of the other arms, according to date of Commission, goes on to say that, notwithstanding these facts, there are not wanting those who deny any military status to Artillery officers in the field. The writers then state a case, to show the absurdity of the view objected to:—"If a Captain of Artillery, with a number of guns and Artillery people, should happen to be escorted by a Lieutenant of a Regiment on Foot, with a number of men belonging thereto, the Captain (according to the sentiments of those with whom we differ) must take his orders from the Lieutenant, which he would, with reason, think a great hardship; for the Lieutenant would not obey one whom he deems to be no more than a titular Captain, and who, he is taught to believe, has no rank in the Army. And if the said Lieutenant should be killed, and the command devolve to the eldest sergeant, according to the notion before mentioned, the Captain of Artillery must take his orders from the said Sergeant of Foot,—the consequence of which is so obvious, that we need not enlarge upon it."

"But further, my Lord, should this opinion prevail, it would be a total discouragement to the officers of Artillery, as well as highly prejudicial to His Majesty's Service."

"The ordinary duty and discipline of the officers and private men of the Artillery is, in every respect, the same with that of every other Regiment of the Army. The qualifications of Artillery officers are not acquired by practice only, but are the result of long study and application. They must be proficients in several sciences, and Masters of several arts, which is not required from other officers. They are subjected to the Articles of War, and all the penalties of the Act for Mutiny and Desertion, and are equally a part of His Majesty's Forces with any other Regiment of the Army. The service of the Artillery is generally understood to be more dangerous and severe than any other; and although they are an essential part of one and the same Army, yet if they bear no rank in it, but at Courts-martial only, they are in a worse situation and under greater difficulties and discouragements than any part of the Army; for, let their service have been ever so long,—their conduct and bravery ever so conspicuous and meritorious,—they can only rise gradually and slowly in their own little corps, if they have no rank in the Army, and can never be promoted in any other, which is the usual and almost only reward of distinguished merit in other officers."

While sympathizing with the spirit which animated the writers of the above, one may differ as to the nature of the reward they sought for meritorious officers of Artillery, in promotion into the other arms. For more than forty years after this letter was written this reward was one which was coveted by the senior officers of the corps for the younger members. Doubtless, the intention was to obtain a promotion for them which could not be found in the stagnation of a seniority corps. But, to the modern Artilleryman, the promotion which involved separation from the Regiment for whose duties he had been specially trained would be but a doubtful reward.

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Footnote 11:

Cust.

Footnote 12:

Macbean's MSS.

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