chapter 863

of the Laws of 1873 provides that every building in the city of Brooklyn shall have a scuttle or place of egress in the roof thereof of proper size, and “shall have ladders or stairways leading to the same; and all such scuttles and stairways or ladders leading to the roof shall be kept in readiness for use at all times.” It also provides that houses like that occupied by the plaintiff “shall be provided with such fire-escapes and doors as shall be directed and approved by the commissioners (of the department of fire and buildings); and the owner or owners of any building upon which any fire-escapes may now or hereafter be erected, shall keep the same in good repair and well painted, and no person shall at any time place any incumbrance of any kind whatsoever upon said fire-escapes now erected or that may hereafter be erected in the city. Any person, after being notified by said commissioners, who shall neglect to place upon any such building the fire-escape herein provided for, shall forfeit the sum of $500, and shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Under this statute the defendant was bound to provide this house with a fire-escape. He was not permitted to wait until he should be directed to provide one by the commissioners. He was bound to do it in such way as they should direct and approve, and it was for him to procure their direction and approval. No penalty is imposed for the simple omission to provide one. The penalty can be incurred only for the neglect to provide one after notification by the commissioners.

Here was, then, an absolute duty imposed upon the defendant by statute to provide a fire-escape, and the duty was imposed for the sole benefit of the tenants of the house, so that they would have a mode of escape in the case of a fire. For a breach of this duty causing damage, it cannot be doubted that the tenants have a remedy. It is a general rule, that whenever one owes another a duty, whether such duty be imposed by voluntary contract or by statute, a breach of such duty causing damage gives a cause of action. Duty and right are correlative; and where a duty is imposed, there must be a right to have it performed. When a statute imposes a duty upon a public officer, it is well settled that any person having a special interest in the performance thereof may sue for a breach thereof causing him damage, and the same is true of a duty imposed by statute upon any citizen: (Cooley on Torts, 654; Hover _v._ Barkhoff, 44 N. Y. 113; Jetter _v._ N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R. Co., 2 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 458; Heeney _v._ Sprague, 11 R. I. 456; Couch _v._ Steele, 3 Ell. & Bl. 402). In Comyn’s Digest, Action upon Statute (F.), it is laid down as the rule that “in every case where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.”

[Remainder of opinion omitted.]

_Judgment for plaintiff affirmed._[311]

GORRIS _v._ SCOTT IN THE EXCHEQUER, APRIL 22, 1874. _Reported in Law Reports, 9 Exchequer, 125._

Declaration, first count: that after the passing of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869, the Privy Council, in exercise of the powers and authorities vested in them by the Act (s. 75), made an order (called the Animals Order of 1871) with reference to animals brought by sea to ports in Great Britain, and to the places used and occupied by such animals on board any vessel in which the same should be so brought to such ports; and thereby, amongst other things, ordered (1) that every such place should be divided into pens by substantial divisions; (2) that each such pen should not exceed nine feet in breadth and fifteen feet in length; that afterwards and whilst the order was in force the plaintiffs delivered on board a vessel called the Hastings, to the defendant as owner of the vessel, certain sheep of the plaintiffs, to be carried by the defendant for reward on board the said vessel from Hamburg to Newcastle, and there delivered to the plaintiffs; and the defendant, as such owner, received and started on the said voyage with the sheep for the purposes and on the terms aforesaid; that all conditions were fulfilled, &c., yet the place in and on board the said vessel which was used and occupied by the sheep during the voyage was not, during the said voyage or any part thereof, divided into pens by substantial or other divisions, by reason whereof divers of the sheep were washed and swept away by the sea from off the said ship, and were drowned and wholly lost to the plaintiffs.

Second count, similar to the first, but setting out a third regulation: “that the floor of each such pen should have proper battens or other foot-hold thereon,” and alleging the loss of the sheep as aforesaid to have been caused by the want of such battens.

Demurrer and joinder.

[The preamble of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vict.