chapter three

hundred and seventy-four of the acts of eighteen hundred and seventy-three.”

Footnote 249:

Monroe _v._ Hartford R. Co., 76 Conn. 201; Tackett _v._ Taylor, 123 Ia. 149; Baker _v._ Portland, 58 Me. 199; Bourne _v._ Whitman, 209 Mass. 155; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Jennings, 98 Va. 70 _Accord_.

Footnote 250:

Atlantic R. Co. _v._ Weir, 63 Fla. 69; Lockridge _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 161 Ia. 74 _Accord_. See Lindsay _v._ Cecchi, 3 Boyce, 133; Hyde _v._ McCreery, 145 App. Div. 729.

In Bourne _v._ Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, a duly licensed automobile was being driven by an unlicensed person. Knowlton, C. J., said:

“It is universally recognized that the violation of a criminal statute is evidence of negligence on the part of the violator, as to all consequences that the statute was intended to prevent. It has been said in a general way that such a violation is evidence of negligence of the violator, and it has sometimes been stated that this would show negligence that can be availed of as a ground of recovery by one who suffers any kind of an injury from him while this illegality continues; but it is now settled that it is not even evidence of negligence, except in reference to matters to which the statute relates. Davis _v._ John L. Whiting & Son Co., 201 Mass. 91, 96 and cases cited. A criminal statute in the usual form is enacted for the benefit of the public. It creates a duty to the public. Every member of the public is covered by the protecting influence of the obligation. If one suffers injury as an individual, in his person or his property, by a neglect of this duty, he has a remedy, not because our general criminal laws are divided in their operation, creating one duty to the public and a separate duty to individuals; but because as one of the public in a peculiar situation, he suffers a special injury, different in kind from that of the public generally, from the neglect of the public duty....

If we consider the effect of such a violation of law by a plaintiff, upon his right to recover, the principles that have been recognized are instructive. They were considered long ago in connection with our Sunday law. It has been established from early times that one who is violating a criminal law cannot recover for an injury to which his criminality was a directly contributing cause....

The only matter which seems to be left doubtful under our decisions in this class of cases, is what constitutes ‘illegality,’ which is sometimes a directly contributing cause of the injury. Some cases have been decided, which seem to imply that if there is an illegal element entering into a plaintiff’s act or conduct, and this act or conduct directly contributes to his injury, he cannot recover, although the illegal element or the objectionable quality of the act had no tendency to produce the injury, and the consequences would have been the same under the other existing conditions, if the criminal element had been absent. In other cases the decision seems to turn upon whether the criminal element in the act or conduct, considered by itself alone, operated as a direct cause to produce a result that would not have been produced under the same conditions in other respects, if the criminal element had been absent. This latter seems to be the pivotal question in most cases decided in other States.

The fact that the number of punishable misdemeanors has multiplied many times in recent years, as the relations of men in business and society have grown complex with the increase of population, is a reason why the violation of a criminal statute of slight importance should not affect one’s civil rights, except when this violation, viewed in reference to the element of criminality intended to be punished, has had a direct effect upon his cause of action. Our decisions seem to have been tending toward the adoption of such a rule. Welch _v._ Wesson, 6 Gray, 505. Spofford _v._ Harlow, 3 Allen, 176. Steele _v._ Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59. Damon _v._ Scituate, 119 Mass. 66. Hall _v._ Ripley, 119 Mass. 135. Dudley _v._ Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass. 443, 446. Moran _v._ Dickinson, 204 Mass. 559, 562. Chase _v._ New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, 208 Mass. 137, 157.

Under particular statutes, we are brought back to the question, what is the legal element which is the essence of the command or prohibition? In most cases, the effect of doing or failing to do that which the law forbids or requires under a penalty, when considered in reference to its relation to one’s civil rights in collateral matters, ought to be limited pretty strictly. Take the case of driving without sleigh bells in violation of the law of the road. R. L., c. 54, § 3. Kidder _v._ Dunstable, 11 Gray, 342. Counter _v._ Couch, 8 Allen, 436, 437. The requirement of the law is that ‘No person shall travel on a bridge or way with a sleigh or sled drawn by a horse, unless there are at least three bells attached to some part of the harness.’ The wrong to be prevented is the failure to have bells while travelling in this way. The travelling in other respects is unobjectionable. The question arises whether the act should be deemed illegal as a whole, in reference to the rule that the courts will not aid one to obtain the fruits of his disobedience of law, or whether in this aspect its different qualities may be considered separately. It is possible to decide this question either way, but we think it is more consistent with justice and with the course of decision elsewhere, to hold that, in reference to the law of negligence and the rule as to rejection of causes of action that are founded on illegality, an act may be considered in its different aspects in its relation to the cause of

## action, and if only that part of it which is innocent affects the

cause of action, the existence of an illegal element is immaterial. We do not think, under this statute, that one who drives in a sleigh without bells should be treated as a trespasser on the highway, although he is punishable criminally for the failure to have the bells attached to the harness, and is liable in damages to any member of the public who suffers a special injury by reason of this failure.

Consider the St. 1909, c. 514, § 74, which forbids, under a penalty, the regular operation of any elevator by a person under the age of sixteen years, and the regular operation of any rapidly running elevator by a person under the age of eighteen years. If a person under the prescribed age, while employed to operate an elevator, is injured through the negligence of the owner, in leaving it in an unsafe condition, shall his violation of the statute by entering this service before reaching the prescribed age, be treated as criminality, entering into every one of his acts in moving the elevator, so as to prevent his recovery for an injury from the joint effect of his employer’s negligence and his own application of the power to raise or lower the elevator? We think it better to hold, if his age and the degree of his competency, which might depend in part upon his age, had no causal connection with the injury, that his criminality was not a direct cause of the injury. In other words, that the punishable element in the act is only disobedience as to age, and although his

## act in applying the power to the elevator which brought him in contact

with the defect, is punishable, and in a sense illegal because of the existence of that element, in determining the relation of his conduct to the cause of action, to see whether the court will aid him in the prosecution of it, we ought to limit the illegality to that part of his conduct towards which the statute is particularly directed. We are to consider the specific thing at which the statute is aimed, and the immediate effect that it was intended directly and proximately to accomplish by its command or prohibition....

Take the provision in St. 1903, c. 473, § 5, that ‘No person shall operate an automobile or motor cycle for hire, unless specially licensed by the commission so to do,’ and the earlier provision in the same section that no person shall ‘operate an automobile or motor cycle upon any public highway or private way laid out under authority of statute unless licensed so to do under the provisions of this act.’ The operating of the automobile in itself is unobjectionable. The illegal element in the act is the failure to have a license. The purpose of the requirement of a license is to secure competency in the operator. If in any case the failure to have a license, looking to those conditions that ordinarily accompany the failure to have it, is a cause contributing directly to an injury, a violator of the law would be legally responsible to another person injured by the failure; or, if he is injured himself, would be precluded from recovery against another person who negligently contributed to the injury. But we are of opinion that his failure in that respect is only evidence of negligence in reference to his fitness to operate a car, and to his skill in the actual management of it, unless in the case of the plaintiff, it is shown to be a contributing cause to the injury sued for, in which case it is a bar to recovery. We think that the operation of a car without a license, while it is a punishable act, does not render the operator a trespasser on the highway, but that the illegal element in the act is only the failure to have a license while operating it, so that if the operation and movement contributed to the accident with which the want of a license had no connection, except as a mere condition, they would not preclude the operator as a plaintiff from recovery. If the illegal quality of the act had no tendency to cause the accident, the fact that the act is punishable because of the illegality, ought not to preclude one from recovery for harmful results to which, without negligence, the innocent features of the act alone contributed.

The other part of this statute, relative to the licensing of automobiles, has been construed differently. In Dudley _v._ Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass. 443, because of the peculiar provisions of the statute and the dangers and evils that it was intended to prevent, it was decided, after much consideration, that the having of such a machine in operation on a street, without a license, was the very essence of the illegality, and that the illegality was inseparable from the movement of the automobile upon the street at any time, for a single foot; that in such movement the machine was an outlaw, and any person on the street as an occupant of the automobile, participating in the movement of it, was for the time being a trespasser. Some of us were disinclined to lay down the law so broadly, and the opinion of the court was not unanimous; but the doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed and is now the established law of the Commonwealth. Feeley _v._ Melrose, 205 Mass. 329. Chase _v._ New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, 208 Mass. 137, 158. The difference between this provision of the statute and that involved in the present case is in part one of form, but in connection with the form, it is still more the seeming purpose and intent of the Legislature as to permitting such machines upon the public ways without adequate means of identifying them and ascertaining their owner, together with the requirement that the machine itself, as a thing of power, shall have its own registration and legalization, the evidence of which it shall always carry with it....

We are of opinion that the law of these last cases should not be extended to the provision of the statute requiring every operator to have a personal license to operate the car. The jury should have been instructed that the defendant’s failure to have a license was only evidence of his negligence as to the management of the car.”

See also Holland _v._ Boston, 213 Mass. 560; Holden _v._ McGillicuddy, 215 Mass. 563; Conroy _v._ Mather, 217 Mass. 91.

In Taylor _v._ Stewart, 172 N. C. 203, Brown, J., (for the court) said:

“The plaintiff sues to recover for the death of his child, who was run over and killed by an automobile, belonging to the defendant J. W. Stewart. At the time the car was being operated by James Stewart, the son of the said J. W. Stewart, a lad of 13 years of age. A colored chauffeur, who had been sent out with the car by the owner, was sitting beside the lad.

His honor charged the jury that under the laws of North Carolina it was a misdemeanor for a person under the age of 16 to drive an automobile upon any highway or public street, and that it is a circumstance from which the jury may infer negligence, and that it does not necessarily follow that the jury shall conclude it was negligence, but that it is a circumstance to go to the jury. In this his honor erred. He should have instructed the jury that it is negligence _per se_ for the defendant James Stewart to have driven the machine in violation of the statute law of the state. Zageir _v._ Southern Express Co., 89 S. E. 44; Paul _v._ Railroad, 170 N. C. 231, 87 S. E. 66, L. R. A. 1916B, 1079; Ledbetter _v._ English, 166 N. C. 125, 81 S. E. 1066.”

See Davis, The Plaintiff’s Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 505; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private

## Action, 27 Harvard Law Rev. 317.

Footnote 251:

Part of case omitted; also arguments of counsel.

Footnote 252:

Williams _v._ New Albany R. Co., 5 Ind. 111; Vandalia R. _v._ Duling, 60 Ind. App. 332; Union R. Co. _v._ Rollins, 5 Kan. 167 (as to legislation, see Darling _v._ Rodgers, 7 Kan. 592; Missouri R. Co. _v._ Olden, 72 Kan. 110); Crawford _v._ Hughes, 3 J. J. Marsh. 433; Little _v._ Lathrop, 5 Me. 356; Richardson _v._ Milburn, 11 Md. 340; Eames _v._ Salem R. Co., 98 Mass. 560; Collins _v._ Lundquist, 154 Mich. 658; Vandegrift _v._ Rediker, 22 N. J. Law, 185; Munger _v._ Tonawanda R. Co., 4 N. Y. 349; Gregg _v._ Gregg, 55 Pa. St. 227; Hurd _v._ Rutland R. Co., 25 Vt. 116; Metropolitan Ins. Co. _v._ Clark, 145 Wis. 181 _Accord_.

As between adjoining owners, in absence of statutory duty as to division fence, see Bissell _v._ Southworth, 1 Root, 269; McNeer _v._ Boone, 52 Ill. App. 181; Myers _v._ Dodd, 9 Ind. 290; Stephenson _v._ Elliott, 2 Ind. App. 233; De Mers _v._ Rohan, 126 Ia. 488; Markin _v._ Priddy, 40 Kan. 684; Sturtevant _v._ Merrill, 33 Me. 62; Gillespie _v._ Hendren, 98 Mo. App. 622; Tewksbury _v._ Bucklin, 7 N. H. 518; Deyo _v._ Stewart, 4 Denio, 101; Angell _v._ Hill, 18 N. Y. Supp. 824; Kobayashi _v._ Strangeway, 64 Wash. 36.

_As to liability of the owner for unauthorized entry of a dog_ on another’s lands, see Brown _v._ Giles, 1 Carr. & P. 118; Read _v._ Edwards, 17 C. B. N. S. 245; Doyle _v._ Vance, 6 Vict. L. R. (Law) 87.

_Trespass on unenclosed land by chickens_, see Evans _v._ McLalin, 189 Mo. App. 310.

Footnote 253:

Morgan _v._ Hudnell, 52 Ohio St. 552 _Accord_.

Footnote 254:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 255:

Hartford _v._ Brady, 114 Mass. 466; Wood _v._ Snider, 187 N. Y. 28; Erdman _v._ Gottshall, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 295; Metropolitan Ins. Co. _v._ Clark, 145 Wis. 181 _Accord_.

Cattle, while being driven on the highway, enter on the unfenced land of A adjoining the highway, and pass thence on to the unfenced land of B, adjoining the land of A, but not adjoining the highway. B has an

## action against the owner of the cattle. Wood _v._ Snider, 187 N. Y.

28. See also note in 12 L. R. A. N. S. 912.

Footnote 256:

As to the effect of statutes requiring lands to be fenced, see Northern R. Co. _v._ Cunningham, 89 Fed. 594; Comerford _v._ Dupuy, 17 Cal. 308 (as to later legislation see Hahn _v._ Garratt, 69 Cal. 146; Fisch _v._ Nice, 12 Cal. App. 60); Nuckolls _v._ Gaut, 12 Col. 361; Wright _v._ Wright, 21 Conn. 329; Frazier _v._ Nortinus, 34 Ia. 82 (but no application to cultivated land—Hallock _v._ Hughes, 42 Ia. 516); Louisville R. Co. _v._ Simmons, 85 Ky. 151; Gorman _v._ Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 (as to later legislation, see O’Riley _v._ Diss, 41 Mo. App. 184); Smith _v._ Williams, 2 Mont. 195; Randall _v._ Gross, 67 Neb. 255 (no application to cultivated lands); Jones _v._ Witherspoon, 52 N. C. 555; Kerwhaker _v._ Cleveland R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172; Walker _v._ Bloomingcamp, 34 Or. 391; Gregg _v._ Gregg, 55 Pa. St. 227 (as to later legislation see Thompson _v._ Kyler, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 205); Davis _v._ Davis, 70 Tex. 123; Poindexter _v._ May, 98 Va. 143; Walls _v._ Cunningham, 123 Wis. 346.

As to effect of statutes providing for division fences, see D’Arcy _v._ Miller, 86 Ill. 102; Duffees _v._ Judd, 48 Ia. 256; Wills _v._ Walters, 5 Bush, 351; Gooch _v._ Stephenson, 13 Me. 371; Shepherd _v._ Hees, 12 Johns. 433; Barber _v._ Mensch, 157 Pa. St. 390; Tower _v._ Providence R. Co., 2 R. I. 404.

Such statutes apply only as between adjoining owners: Aylesworth _v._ Herrington, 17 Mich. 417; Wilder _v._ Wilder, 38 Vt. 678; and as to cattle lawfully on the adjoining land: Lord _v._ Wormwood, 29 Me. 282; Vandegrift _v._ Rediker, 22 N. J. Law, 185; Melody _v._ Reab, 4 Mass. 471; Lawrence _v._ Combs, 37 N. H. 331.

Footnote 257:

Arguments and portions of the opinion omitted.

Footnote 258:

Buford _v._ Houtz, 133 U. S. 320; Nashville R. Co. _v._ Peacock, 25 Ala. 229 (as to later legislation, see Phillips _v._ Bynum, 145 Ala. 549); Little Rock R. Co. _v._ Finley, 37 Ark. 562; Morris _v._ Fraker, 5 Col. 425; Studwell _v._ Ritch, 14 Conn. 292; Sprague _v._ Fremont R. Co., 6 Dak. 86; Savannah R. Co. _v._ Geiger, 21 Fla. 669; Macon R. Co. _v._ Lester, 30 Ga. 911 (but see later legislation, Puckett _v._ Young, 112 Ga. 578); Seeley _v._ Peters, 5 Gilm. 130 (but see Ill. Rev. St. c. 8, § 1); Bulpit _v._ Mathews, 145 Ill. 345; Vicksburgh R. Co. _v._ Patton, 31 Miss. 156; Gorman _v._ Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 (but see later legislation, Gumm _v._ Jones, 115 Mo. App. 597); Delaney _v._ Errickson, 10 Neb. 492; Laws _v._ North Carolina R. Co., 52 N. C. 468 (but see later legislation, State _v._ Mathis, 149 N. C. 546); Cleveland R. Co. _v._ Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474 (but see later legislation, Marsh _v._ Koons, 78 Ohio St. 68); Murray _v._ South Carolina R. Co., 10 Rich. Law, 227; Hardman _v._ King, 14 Wyo. 503 _Accord_.

_Turning or driving cattle on another’s uninclosed, unimproved lands_, where the common law is inapplicable or is abrogated by legislation: Lazarus _v._ Phelps, 152 U. S. 81; Bell _v._ Gonzales, 35 Col. 138; Bedden _v._ Clark, 76 Ill. 338; Dexter _v._ Heaghney, 47 Ill. App. 205; Harrison _v._ Adamson, 76 Ia. 337; Union R. Co. _v._ Rollins, 5 Kan. 167; Powers _v._ Kindt, 13 Kan. 74; Monroe _v._ Cannon, 24 Mont. 316; Musselshell Cattle Co. _v._ Woolfolk, 34 Mont. 126; Herrin _v._ Sieben, 46 Mont. 226; Delaney _v._ Errickson, 11 Neb. 533; Addington _v._ Canfield, 11 Okl. 204; Thomas _v._ Blythe, 44 Utah, 1; Cosgriff _v._ Miller, 10 Wyo. 190; Martin _v._ Platte Valley Sheep Co., 12 Wyo. 432; Healey _v._ Smith, 14 Wyo. 263. Compare Avery _v._ Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36.

Compare reasons given for the inapplicability of the common-law rule to Colorado. BECK, J., in Morris _v._ Fraker, 5 Col. 425, 428, 429.

Footnote 259:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 260:

See Herold _v._ Meyers, 20 Ia. 378; Williams _v._ Michigan R. Co., 2 Mich. 259; Christy _v._ Hughes, 24 Mo. App. 275; Peek _v._ Western Tel. Co., 159 Mo. App. 148; Crandall _v._ Eldridge, 46 Hun, 411.

_Whether there is a right of pasturage on uninclosed lands_, where the common law rule is not in force, see Union R. Co. _v._ Rollins, 5 Kan. 167; Caulkins _v._ Mathews, 5 Kan. 191; Knight _v._ Abert, 6 Pa. St. 472.

Footnote 261:

The arguments are omitted.

Footnote 262:

After stating that “if a man have a beast, as a bull, cow, horse, or dog, used to hurt people, if the owner know not his quality, he is not punishable, &c.,” Hale adds (citing authorities) that “these things seem to be agreeable to law.

“1. If the owner have notice of the quality of his beast, and it doth anybody hurt, he is chargeable with an action for it.

“2. Though he have no particular notice that he did any such thing before, yet if it be a beast that is _ferae naturae_, as a lion, a bear, a wolf, yea an ape or monkey, if he get loose and do harm to any person, the owner is liable to an action for the damage, and so I knew it adjudged in Andrew Baker’s Case, whose child was bit by a monkey that broke its chain and got loose.

“3. And therefore in case of such a wild beast, or in case of a bull or cow, that doth damage, where the owner knows of it, he must at his peril keep him up safe from doing hurt, for though he use his diligence to keep him up, if he escape and do harm, the owner is liable to answer damages.” 1 Hale’s P. C. 430, Part I, c. 33.—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 263:

Jackson _v._ Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563; Card _v._ Case, 5 C. B. 622; Strouse _v._ Leipf, 101 Ala. 433; Holt _v._ Leslie, 116 Ark. 433; Laverone _v._ Mangianti, 41 Cal. 138; Gooding _v._ Chutes Co., 155 Cal. 620; Woolf _v._ Chalker, 31 Conn. 121; Kightlinger _v._ Egan, 75 Ill. 141; Gordon _v._ Kaufman, 44 Ind. App. 603; Holt _v._ Myers, 47 Ind. App. 118; Kennett _v._ Engle, 105 Mich. 693; Hall _v._ Huber, 61 Mo. App. 384; O’Neill _v._ Blase, 94 Mo. App. 648; Muller _v._ McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195; People _v._ Shields, 142 App. Div. 194; Tubbs _v._ Shears, 55 Okl. 610; Mann _v._ Weiand, 81* Pa. St. 243; McCaskill _v._ Elliot, 5 Strob. 196; Missio _v._ Williams, 129 Tenn. 504; Harris _v._ Carstens Packing Co., 43 Wash. 647; Gunderson _v._ Bieren, 80 Wash. 459 _Accord_.

Footnote 264:

See Mason _v._ Keeling, 12 Mod. 332.

Footnote 265:

Besozzi _v._ Harris, 1 F. & F. 92; Texas R. Co. _v._ Juneman, 71 Fed. 939 (wild steer); Jackson _v._ Baker, 24 App. D. C. 100; Graham _v._ Payne, 122 Ind. 403 (ram); Marble _v._ Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (bull); Marquet _v._ La Duke, 96 Mich. 596; Phillips _v._ Garner, 106 Miss. 828; Manger _v._ Shipman, 30 Neb. 352; Van Leuven _v._ Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515; Mahoney _v._ Dwyer, 84 Hun, 348; Malloy _v._ Starin, 113 App. Div. 852 (reversed on other grounds, 191 N. Y. 21); Stamp _v._ Eighty-sixth St. Amusement Co., 95 Misc. 599 _Accord_.

Compare Hayes _v._ Miller, 150 Ala. 621, as to a wolf domesticated to such an extent that the owner believed it harmless.

_As to the liability of the owner of bees_, see O’Gorman _v._ O’Gorman, [1903] 2 I. R. 573; Parsons _v._ Manser, 119 Ia. 88; Petey Mfg. Co. _v._ Dryden, 5 Pennewill, 166; Lucas _v._ Pettit, 12 Ont. Law, 448; Notes in 97 Am. State Rep. 287, and 62 L. R. A. 132. Compare Earl _v._ Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630; Olmsted _v._ Rich, 25 N. Y. St. Rep. 271; Arkadelphia _v._ Clark, 52 Ark. 23.

Footnote 266:

“Certain animals _ferae naturae_ may doubtless be domesticated to such an extent as to be classed, in respect to the liability of the owner for injuries they commit, with the class known as tame or domestic animals; but inasmuch as they are liable to relapse into their wild habits and to become mischievous, the rule is that if they do so, and the owner becomes notified of their vicious habit, they are included in the same rule as if they had never been domesticated, the gist of the action in such a case, as in the case of untamed wild animals, being not merely the negligent keeping of the animal, but the keeping of the same with knowledge of the vicious and mischievous propensity of the animal.” Clifford, J., in Spring Company _v._ Edgar, 99 U. S. 645, 653.

Footnote 267:

See Bennet _v._ Bostock, 13 Scottish Sheriff Court Reports, 50; in the same direction with Scribner _v._ Kelley, 38 Barb. 14, cited in the foregoing opinion.

Footnote 268:

Kelley _v._ Killourey, 81 Conn. 320; Keightlinger _v._ Egan, 65 Ill. 235; Feldman _v._ Sellig, 110 Ill. App. 130; Donahue _v._ Scott Transfer Co., 141 Ill. App. 174; Bush _v._ Wathen, 104 Ky. 548; Quimby _v._ Woodbury, 63 N. H. 370; Badali _v._ Smith, (Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S. W. 642 _Accord_.

“There are expressions in some of the cases indicating that the liability of the owner is not affected by the negligence of the person injured.... If a person with full knowledge of the evil propensities of an animal wantonly excites him or voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself in the way of such an animal, he would be adjudged to have brought the injury upon himself, and ought not to be entitled to recover. In such a case it cannot be said, in a legal sense, that the keeping of the animal, which is the _gravamen_ of the offence, produced the injury.... But as the owner is held to a rigorous rule of liability on account of the danger to human life and limb, by harboring and keeping such animals, it follows that he ought not to be relieved from it by slight negligence or want of ordinary care [on the part of the plaintiff].... As negligence, in the ordinary sense, is not the ground of liability, so contributory negligence, in its ordinary meaning, is not a defence. These terms are not used in a strictly legal sense in this class of actions, but for convenience ... I think ... that the rule of liability before indicated is a reasonable one, and that the owner cannot be relieved from it by any act of the person injured, unless it be one from which it can be affirmed that he caused the injury himself, with a full knowledge of its probable consequences.” _Church, C. J._, in Muller _v._ McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195, 201, 202, 204.

So Woolf _v._ Chalker, 31 Conn. 121; Vredenberg _v._ Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627; Fake _v._ Addicks, 45 Minn. 37; Malloy _v._ Starin, 113 App. Div. 852.

_Negligence of the person injured_, see Graham _v._ Walsh, 14 Ga. App. 287; Buckley _v._ Gee, 55 Ill. App. 388; Milne _v._ Walker, 59 Ia. 186; Carpenter _v._ Latta, 29 Kan. 591; Tolin _v._ Terrell, 133 Ky. 210; Garland _v._ Hewes, 101 Me. 549; Twigg _v._ Ryland, 62 Md. 380; Spellman _v._ Dyer, 186 Mass. 176; Ryan _v._ Marren, 216 Mass. 556; Warrick _v._ Farley, 95 Neb. 565; Earhart _v._ Youngblood, 27 Pa. St. 331.

Footnote 269:

Arguments omitted. Compare report of same case in 1 Ld. Raym. 606.

Footnote 270:

_Sed quaere_: for in S. C. 1 Ld. Ray. 608, it is said that the case was adjourned, and that afterwards the parties agreed, and therefore no judgment was given.—Reporter’s Note.

As to the requirement of _scienter_ in case of injury by domestic animals, Shaw _v._ Craft, 37 Fed. 317; Kitchens _v._ Elliott, 114 Ala. 290; Finney _v._ Curtis, 78 Cal. 498; Warner _v._ Chamberlain, 7 Houst. 18; Reed _v._ Southern Express Co., 95 Ga. 108; Domm _v._ Hollenbeck, 259 Ill. 382; Indianapolis Abattoir Co. _v._ Bailey, 54 Ind. App. 370; Trumble _v._ Happy, 114 Ia. 624; Ballou _v._ Humphrey, 8 Kan. 219; Murray _v._ Young, 12 Bush. 337; Goode _v._ Martin, 57 Md. 606; Dix _v._ Somerset Coal Co., 217 Mass. 146; Durrell _v._ Johnson, 31 Neb. 796; Smith _v._ Donohue, 49 N. J. Law, 548; Vrooman _v._ Lawyer, 13 Johns. 339; Dufer _v._ Cully, 3 Or. 377; Robinson _v._ Marino, 3 Wash. 434; Johnston _v._ Mack Mfg. Co., 65 W. Va. 544; Kertschacke _v._ Ludwig, 28 Wis. 430 _Accord_.

_Liability for injury to trespassers in case of scienter_: Woolf _v._ Chalker, 31 Conn. 121; Conway _v._ Grant, 88 Ga. 40; Engebretson _v._ Bremer, 128 Minn. 232; Loomis _v._ Terry, 17 Wend. 496; Pierret _v._ Moller, 3 E. D. Smith, 574; Sherfey _v._ Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58.

_Liability where dog runs at large unmuzzled in violation of ordinance_: Buchanan _v._ Stout, 139 App. Div. 204.

_Where vicious dog kills trespassing dog_: Wiley _v._ Slater. 22 Barb. 506.

_What constitutes knowledge_, see: Shaw _v._ Craft, 37 Fed. 317; Barclay _v._ Hartman, 2 Marv. 351; Keightlinger _v._ Egan, 65 Ill. 235; Domm _v._ Hollenbeck, 259 Ill. 382; Kolb _v._ Klages, 27 Ill. App. 531; Cameron _v._ Bryan, 89 Ia. 214; Holt _v._ Myers, 47 Ind. App. 118; Murray _v._ Young, 12 Bush, 337; Twigg _v._ Ryland, 62 Md. 380; Knowles _v._ Mulder, 74 Mich. 202; Slater _v._ Sorge, 166 Mich. 173; Rowe _v._ Ehrmanntraut, 92 Minn. 17; Reynolds _v._ Hussey, 64 N. H. 64; Emmons _v._ Stevane, 73 N. J. Law, 349, 77 N. J. Law, 570; Rider _v._ White, 65 N. Y. 54; Brice _v._ Bauer, 108 N. Y. 428; Martin _v._ Borden, 123 App. Div. 66; McGarry _v._ New York R. Co., 60 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 367; Hayes _v._ Smith, 62 Ohio St. 161; Holden _v._ Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336.

_Knowledge of single vicious act_: Eastman _v._ Scott, 182 Mass. 192; Kittredge _v._ Elliott, 16 N. H. 77; Keenan _v._ Gutta Percha Mfg. Co., 46 Hun, 544; Cockerham _v._ Nixon, 11 Ired. 269. Compare: Linck _v._ Scheffel, 32 Ill. App. 17; Cooper _v._ Cashman, 190 Mass. 75; Buckley _v._ Leonard, 4 Denio, 500.

Statutes making owners or keepers of dogs liable irrespective of _scienter_ or of negligence in keeping are not uncommon, but vary greatly in detail.

Footnote 271:

Worthen _v._ Love, 60 Vt. 285 _Accord_. Baker _v._ Snell, [1908] 2 K. B. 352, 825; Laverone _v._ Mangianti, 41 Cal. 138; Muller _v._ McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195; Dockerty _v._ Hudson, 125 Ind. 102 _Contra_.

Compare: The Lord Derby, 17 Fed. 265; Melsheimer _v._ Sullivan, 1 Col. App. 22; Woodbridge _v._ Marks, 17 App. Div. 139; Lloyd _v._ Bowen, 170 N. C. 216; Hayes _v._ Smith, 62 Ohio St. 161; Fallon _v._ O’Brien, 12 R. I. 518.

See also Vredenberg _v._ Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (bear teased by third person broke loose and injured plaintiff); Kinmouth _v._ McDougall, 19 N. Y. Supp. 771 (ram teased by children injured plaintiff).

See Bevan, The Responsibility at Common Law for the Keeping of Animals, 22 Harvard Law Rev. 465.

Footnote 272:

Compare Merritt _v._ Matchett, 135 Mo. App. 176.

Footnote 273:

Hadwell _v._ Righton, [1907] 2 K. B. 345; Higgins _v._ Searle, 25 Times L. R. 301; Klenberg _v._ Russell, 125 Ind. 531; Dix _v._ Somerset Coal Co., 217 Mass. 146; Shipley _v._ Colclough, 81 Mich. 624; Smith _v._ Donahue, 49 N. J. Law, 548; Meegan _v._ McKay, 1 Okl. 59 _Accord_. But see Barnes _v._ Chapin, 4 All. 444.

Footnote 274:

Jewett _v._ Gage, 55 Me. 538 (hog) _Accord_.

Compare COULTER, J., in Goodman _v._ Gay, 15 Pa. St. 188, 193, 194; Corcoran _v._ Kelly, 61 Misc. 323.

_A fortiori_ if one turns loose a vicious animal: McGuire _v._ Ringrose, 41 La. Ann. 1029.

_Injuries by animals running at large contrary to statute_, see: Williams _v._ Brennan, 213 Mass. 28; Low _v._ Barnes, 30 Okl. 15; Palmer _v._ Saccocia, 33 R. I. 476.

Footnote 275:

In the argument for defendant the declaration is set out as follows:—

“In a plea of the case for that the said plaintiff, on the 14th day of September, 1855, was possessed of a valuable horse, of the value of $125.00, which was peaceably and of right depasturing in his own close, and the defendant was possessed of another horse, vicious and unruly, which was running at large where of right it ought not to be, and being so unlawfully at large, broke into the plaintiff’s close, at the time aforesaid, and viciously and wantonly kicked, reared upon, and injured the plaintiff’s horse, so that his death was caused thereby, which vicious habits and propensities were well known to the defendant at the time aforesaid. To the damage, &c.”

Footnote 276:

The arguments are omitted.

Footnote 277:

Angus _v._ Radin, 2 South. (N. J.) 815 _Accord_. The same result has often been reached in an action of trespass _quare clausum_ in which the injury by the trespassing animal is set up in aggravation. Lee _v._ Riley, 17 C. B. N. S. 722; Theyer _v._ Purnell, [1918] 2 K. B. 333; Van Leuven _v._ Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515; Dolph _v._ Ferris, 7 Watts & Sergt. 367; Chunot _v._ Larson, 43 Wis. 536.

But see McDonald _v._ Jodrey, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 142 (cat went on plaintiff’s premises and killed canary).

Footnote 278:

Statement and arguments omitted.

Footnote 279:

17 C. B. N. S. 260.

Footnote 280:

13 C. B. N. S. 430.

Footnote 281:

18 C. B. N. S. 732.

Footnote 282:

L. R. 10 C. P. 10.

Footnote 283:

McClain _v._ Lewiston Driving Ass’n, 17 Idaho, 63; Green _v._ Doyle, 21 Ill. App. 205; Chunot _v._ Larson, 43 Wis. 536 _Accord_.

Buck _v._ Moore, 35 Hun, 338 (defendant’s trespassing dog killed plaintiff’s dog); Van Etten _v._ Noyes, 128 App. Div. 406 _Contra_.

Footnote 284:

Statement condensed. Arguments and portions of opinions omitted.

Footnote 285:

But compare Bischoff _v._ Cheney, 89 Conn. 1 (trespassing cat).

In Pollock on Torts, 6th ed., 479, it is said that the owner of cattle and other live stock straying on the land of others is “liable only for natural and probable consequences, not for an unexpected event, such as a horse not previously known to be vicious kicking a human being.” In 1 Beven on Negligence, 2d ed., 637, it is said, that if animals are trespassing and do injury not in accordance with the ordinary instinct of the animals, “the owner is not liable for the injury apart from the trespass (though he may be for the trespass), unless he knows of the particular vice which caused the injury.”

See FISK, J., in Peterson _v._ Conlan, 18 N. D. 205, 212.

Footnote 286:

Statement abridged. Arguments in all the courts omitted; also opinions in Court of Exchequer.

Footnote 287:

“It is not every use to which the land is put that brings into play that principle [Rylands _v._ Fletcher]. It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.” Lord Moulton in Rickards _v._ Lothian, [1913] A. C. 263, 280.

“This was a case of the escape of water from lavatory pipes. It would appear, therefore, that the construction of distributing water-pipes in a building is an ordinary and natural use of land, but that the construction of the water-mains or reservoirs from which the water is obtained is not so. Such unreal and impracticable distinctions are not creditable to the development of English law.” Salmond, Torts (4 ed.) § 61, n. 13.

See the remarks of Doe, C. J., in Brown _v._ Collins, _infra_, p. 482.

“This rule is rightly applicable only to such unusual and extraordinary uses of property in reference to the benefits to be derived from the use and the dangers or losses to which others are exposed, as should not be permitted except at the sole risk of the user. The standard of duty established by the courts in these cases is that every owner shall refrain from these unwarrantable and extremely dangerous uses of property unless he provides safeguards whose perfection he guarantees.... The principle applicable to the erection of common buildings whose fall might do damage to persons or property on the adjacent premises holds owners to a less strict duty. This principle is that where a certain lawful use of property will bring to pass wrongful consequences from the condition in which the property is put, if these are not guarded against, an owner who makes such a use is bound at his peril to see that proper care is taken in every

## particular to prevent the wrong.... The duty which the law imposes

upon an owner of real estate in such a case, is to make the conditions safe so far as it can be done by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of all those engaged in the work. He is responsible for the negligence of independent contractors as well as for that of his servants. This rule is applicable to every one who builds an ordinary wall which is liable to do serious injury by falling outside of his own premises.... The uses of property governed by this rule are those that bring new conditions which involve risks to the persons or property of others, but which are ordinary and usual and in a sense natural, as incident to the ownership of the land. The rule first referred to applies to unusual and extraordinary uses which are so fraught with peril to others that the owner should not be permitted to adopt them for his own purposes without absolutely protecting his neighbors from injury or loss by reason of the use.” Knowlton, J., in Ainsworth _v._ Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 399–401.

Footnote 288:

Eastern Tel. Co. _v._ Capetown Tramways Cos., [1902] A. C. 381; Midwood _v._ Manchester Corporation, [1905] 2 K. B. 597; Charing Cross Co. _v._ London Hydraulic Power Co., [1913] 3 K. B. 442, [1914] 3 K. B. 772; Brennan Construction Co. _v._ Cumberland, 29 App. D. C. 554 (crude petroleum in tank); Shipley _v._ Associates, 106 Mass. 194; Cahill _v._ Eastman, 18 Minn. 324; Wiltse _v._ Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255 (reservoir); French _v._ Carter Creek Mfg. Co., 173 Mo. App. 220 (stored nitroglycerine); Defiance Water Co. _v._ Olinger, 54 Ohio St. 532; Bradford Co. _v._ St. Mary’s Co., 60 Ohio St. 560 (stored nitroglycerine); Langabaugh _v._ Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131 (crude petroleum in tank); Texas R. Co. _v._ Frazer (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1161 (dam); Weaver Mercantile Co. _v._ Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530 _Accord_. See Wing _v._ London General Omnibus Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 652.

“In every case of the kind which has been reported since Rylands _v._ Fletcher, that is, during the last 25 years, there has been a manifest inclination to discover something in the facts which took the case out of the rule. According to the English judicial system which has gone round the world with the English language and English or Anglicized institutions, the decisions of superior courts are not merely instructive and worthy of regard, but of binding authority in subsequent cases of the like sort. But there are some authorities which are followed and developed in the spirit, which become the starting-point of new chapters of the law; there are others that are followed only in the letter, and become slowly but surely choked and crippled by exceptions. This again, is independent of the considerations of local fitness which must always have weight when precedents are cited from a country remote both in place and in manners.” Pollock, Law of Fraud in British India, 53–54 (1894).

“In August, 1908, Count Z. sent one of his dirigibles from Mainz to Friederickshafen. Some motor trouble happened, and the ship was landed in a field. Thousands of people rushed to the place, so ropes were run around it, and soldiers were ordered on guard. The ship was anchored, and in addition held by forty men with ropes at the stem, and by thirty at the stern. In the afternoon a sudden thunderstorm came up, struck the dirigible, tore it loose and sent it adrift for about a mile, when it caught fire and was destroyed.

Spectators had been around all the time, and were standing outside the ropes in rows several deep. Some unfortunate person standing in the outer row near the rear gondola, was caught by the ship’s anchor, dragged into the air and carried for some distance; in the fall, one of his legs sustained such injuries that it had to be amputated.

He brought suit for damages, and was nonsuited; appealed; same result. Finally, he appealed to the Reichsgericht. It refused to interfere, for the following reasons: There being no special law governing damage by air-navigation, it becomes necessary to prove negligence on the part of the aviator or promoter. The idea that the mere undertaking of a business, acknowledged to be dangerous, carries with it responsibility for all damage caused thereby, is not law. The only duty which the hazardousness of the undertaking imposes upon the person engaged therein, is that of extra care. Otherwise, almost all kinds of transportation would be impossible.

In this case, the trip had commenced during exceptionally fine weather, which continued until after the time when the ship had been landed and anchored. Defendant had proved that on former occasions he had succeeded in landing, anchoring and holding his ship, even when the weather was unfavorable, and that the means he on such occasions had employed in keeping the ship at its moorings, were not any stronger than those employed on this occasion; in fact, they were weaker. It could not be demanded of the defendant that he should anticipate and provide against such an extraordinary violent gust of wind as tore his airship away.” 75 Central Law Journ. 311 (1912).

In Charing Cross Co. _v._ London Hydraulic Power Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 772, hydraulic mains under the streets burst and injured plaintiff’s cables, also laid in the streets. Lord Sumner said (pp. 779–780): “I think that this present case is also indistinguishable from Rylands _v._ Fletcher. Two grounds of distinction have been suggested. It is said that the doctrine of Rylands _v._ Fletcher is applicable between the owners of adjacent closes, which are adjacent whether there be any intermediate property or not; and that it is a doctrine depending upon the ownership of land and the rights attaching to the ownership of land, under which violations of that species of right can be prevented or punished. In the present case instead of having two adjacent owners of real property, you have only two neighboring owners, not strictly adjacent, of chattels, whose chattels are there under a permission which might have been obtained by the private license of the owners of the soil, though in fact obtained under parliamentary powers; hence the two companies are in the position of co-users of a highway, or at any rate of co-users of different rooms in one house, and Rylands _v._ Fletcher does not apply. The case depends on doctrines applicable to the highways, or to houses let out in tenements. I am unable to agree with any of these distinctions, though they have been pressed upon us by both learned counsel with great resource and command of the authorities. Midwood _v._ Manchester Corporation, [1905] 2 K. B. 597, is not decided as a case of a dispute arising between the owners of two adjacent closes. The case is treated as one between a corporation, whose business under the roadway is exactly similar to that of the defendant corporation here, and injured occupiers of the premises. If the distinction drawn between the present case and that of adjacent landowners in Rylands _v._ Fletcher be a good one, it either was not taken in Midwood _v._ Manchester Corporation or was taken and treated as of no importance. Further I am satisfied that Rylands _v._ Fletcher is not limited to the case of adjacent freeholders. I shall not attempt to show how far it extends. It extends as far as this case, and that is enough for the present purpose.”

See Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 Harv. Law Rev. 801; Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands _v._ Fletcher, 59 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 298, 373, 423; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. Law Rev. 315, 383, 442.

_Liability in case of customary or statutory duty or authority_ to use land as defendant did, see Madras R. Co. _v._ Zemindar, L. R. 1 Ind. App. 364; Green _v._ Chelsea Waterworks Co., 70 L. T. 547; Price _v._ South Metropolitan Gas Co., 65 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 126; City _v._ Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 81 Conn. 84.

Footnote 289:

Argument abridged.

Footnote 290:

The judgment of the Court below, read by BRAMWELL, B., states the finding thus: “In this case I understand the jury to have found that all reasonable care had been taken by the defendant, that the banks were fit for all events to be anticipated, and the weirs broad enough; that the storm was of such violence as to be properly called the act of God, or _vis major_.”

Footnote 291:

See Salmond, Torts (4 ed.) § 65.

Footnote 292:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 293:

See Carstairs _v._ Taylor, L. R. 6 Ex. 217; Wilson _v._ Newberry, L. R. 7 Q. B. 31; Rickards _v._ Lothian, [1913] A. C. 263.

Footnote 294:

## Actiesselskabet Ingrid _v._ Central R. Co., (C. C. A.) 216 Fed. 72

(explosives); Judson _v._ Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549 (explosives); Lake Shore R. Co. _v._ Chicago R. Co., 48 Ind. App. 584 (semble); Owensboro _v._ Knox, 116 Ky. 451 (electricity); Murphy _v._ Gillum, 73 Mo. App. 478 (semble); Losee _v._ Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 (boiler); Cosulich _v._ Standard Oil Co., 122 N. Y. 118 (petroleum); Huff _v._ Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386 (boiler); Pennsylvania Coal Co. _v._ Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126 (semble); Sowers _v._ McManus, 214 Pa. St. 244 (explosives); Davis _v._ Charleston R. Co., 72 S. C. 112 (boiler) _Accord_.

_Bursting of dam_, see: Alabama Coal & Iron Co. _v._ Turner, 145 Ala. 639; Todd _v._ Cochell, 17 Cal. 97; Shrewsbury _v._ Smith, 12 Cush. 177; City Water Power Co. _v._ City, 113 Minn. 33; King _v._ Miles City Co., 16 Mont. 463; Livingston _v._ Adams, 8 Cow. 175; Lapham _v._ Curtis, 5 Vt. 371. Compare Pennock _v._ Central R. Co., 159 App. Div. 517.

_As to constitutionality of legislation imposing liability without fault_, see City _v._ Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 322; Pittsburgh R. Co. _v._ Home Ins. Co., 183 Ind. 355; Daugherty _v._ Thomas, 174 Mich. 371; Ives _v._ South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 295–298.

Footnote 295:

See Cahill _v._ Eastman, 18 Minn. 324; Madras R. Co. _v._ Zemindar of Carvatenagarum, L. R. 1 Ind. App. 364.—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 296:

Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.

Footnote 297:

_Damage through escape of gas from pipes_, see: Gould _v._ Winona Gas Co., 100 Minn. 258; Taylor _v._ St. Joseph Gas Co., 185 Mo. App. 537; Morgan _v._ United Gas Co., 214 Pa. St. 109; Windish _v._ Peoples Gas Co., 248 Pa. St. 236.

Footnote 298:

Herndon _v._ Stultz, 124 Ia. 734 Accord. But see Indiana, Burns’ Ann. Stat., 1914, §§ 5524–5525; Texas, McEachin’s Civil Stat., arts. 6601–6602.

As to constitutionality of such legislation, see Ex parte Hodges, 87 Cal. 162.

Footnote 299:

Argument omitted.

Footnote 300:

Edwards _v._ Massingill, 3 Ala. App. 406; Kansas City R. Co. _v._ Wilson, (Ark.) 171 S. W. 484; Bullock _v._ Porter, 2 Boyce, 180; Talmadge _v._ Central R. Co., 125 Ga. 400; Beckham _v._ Seaboard Ry., 127 Ga. 550; Pittsburgh R. Co. _v._ Culver, 60 Ind. 469; Brummit _v._ Furness, 1 Ind. App. 401; Hanlon _v._ Ingram, 3 Ia. 81; Johnson _v._ Veneman, 75 Kan. 278; Needham _v._ King, 95 Mich. 303; Bolton _v._ Calkins, 102 Mich. 69; Steffens _v._ Fisher, 161 Mo. App. 386; Bock _v._ Grooms, 2 Neb. Unoff. 803; Read _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., 44 N. J. Law, 280; Clark _v._ Foot, 8 Johns. 421; Stuart _v._ Hawley, 22 Barb. 619; Hitchcock _v._ Riley, 44 Misc. 260; McDermott _v._ Consolidated Ice Co., 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 445; Pfeiffer _v._ Aue, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 98; Waldy _v._ Preston Mill Co., 80 Wash. 25; Fahn _v._ Reichart, 8 Wis. 255 _Accord_.

_Fires set by locomotives._ As to liability for fires set by locomotives, there is a conflict. One view is that the plaintiff must establish negligence, as in other cases. Garrett _v._ Southern R. Co., (C. C. A.) 101 Fed. 102; Pittsburgh R. Co. _v._ Hixon, 110 Ind. 225 (changed by statute); Louisville R. Co. _v._ Haggard, 161 Ky. 317; Wallace _v._ New York R. Co., 208 Mass. 16 (_res ipsa loquitur_ inapplicable); New England Box Co. _v._ New York R. Co., 210 Mass. 465; Fero _v._ Buffalo R. Co., 22 N. Y. 209; Peck _v._ New York R. Co., 165 N. Y. 347; Campbell _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 58 Pa. Super. Ct. 241.

Another view is that proof that the fire was due to sparks or coals from an engine makes a _prima facie_ case of negligence or even casts upon the company the burden of disproving negligence. McCullen _v._ Chicago R. Co., (C. C. A.) 101 Fed. 66; Woodward _v._ Chicago R. Co., (C. C. A.) 145 Fed. 577 (statute); Erickson _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., (C. C. A.) 170 Fed. 572 (statute); Alabama R. Co. _v._ Johnston, 128 Ala. 283; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Trotter, 89 Ark. 273 (changed by statute); Florida R. Co. _v._ Welch, 53 Fla. 145 (statute); Southern R. Co. _v._ Thompson, 129 Ga. 367 (statute); Osburn _v._ Oregon R. Co., 15 Idaho, 478; American Strawboard Co. _v._ Chicago R. Co., 177 Ill. 513; Kennedy _v._ Iowa Ins. Co., 119 Ia. 29 (statute); Atchison R. Co. _v._ Geiser, 68 Kan. 281; Fuller _v._ Chicago R. Co., 137 La. 997; Dyer _v._ Maine R. Co., 99 Me. 195; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Dorsey, 37 Md. 19; Continental Ins. Co. _v._ Chicago R. Co., 97 Minn. 467; Alabama R. Co. _v._ Barrett, 78 Miss. 432; Miller _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 90 Mo. 389; Rogers _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 52 Neb. 86; Laird _v._ Connecticut R. Co., 62 N. H. 254 (statute); Goodman _v._ Lehigh R. Co., 78 N. J. Law, 317 (statute); North Fork Lumber Co. _v._ Southern R. Co., 143 N. C. 324; Missouri R. Co. _v._ Gentry, 31 Okl. 579 (but changed by statute); Anderson _v._ Oregon R. Co., 45 Or. 211; Hutto _v._ Seaboard Ry., 81 S. C. 567; Gulf R. Co. _v._ Johnson, 92 Tex. 591; Ide _v._ Boston R. Co., 83 Vt. 66 (statute); Norfolk R. Co. _v._ Thomas, 110 Va. 622; Thorgrimson _v._ Northern R. Co., 64 Wash. 500; Jacobs _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 68 W. Va. 618; Moore _v._ Chicago R. Co., 78 Wis. 120.

In other jurisdictions there is a statutory absolute liability for such fires. St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Cooper, 120 Ark. 595; British Assur. Co. _v._ Colorado R. Co., 52 Col. 589; Martin _v._ New York R. Co., 62 Conn. 331; Pittsburgh R. Co. _v._ Chappell, 183 Ind. 141; Stewart _v._ Iowa R. Co., 136 Ia. 182; Murphy _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 248 Mo. 28; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Kreager, 61 Ohio St. 312; Midland R. Co. _v._ Lynn, 38 Okl. 695; MacDonald _v._ New York R. Co., 23 R. I. 558; Peoples Oil Co. _v._ Charleston R. Co., 83 S. C. 530; Jensen _v._ South Dakota R. Co., 25 S. D. 506.

Footnote 301:

State _v._ General Stevedoring Co., 213 Fed. 51; Kinney _v._ Koopman, 116 Ala. 310; Kleebauer _v._ Western Fuse Co., 138 Cal. 497; Simpson _v._ Du Pont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465; Barnes _v._ Zettlemoyer, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 468 _Accord_.

French _v._ Center Creek Powder Co., 173 Mo. App. 220 _Contra_.

Compare Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co. _v._ Prosch, 190 Ala. 290; Flynn _v._ Butler, 189 Mass. 377; Reilly _v._ Erie R. Co., 72 App. Div. 476.

Footnote 302:

Only part of case is given. Argument omitted.

Footnote 303:

Statement and arguments omitted.

Footnote 304:

Wright _v._ Malden R. Co., 4 All. 283; Nelson _v._ Burnham & Morrill Co., 114 Me. 213; Fluker _v._ Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N. Y. 40; Beck _v._ Vancouver R. Co., 25 Or. 32 _Accord_. See also Newcomb _v._ Boston Protective Department, _ante_, p. 391; Bourne _v._ Whitman, _ante_, p. 400, note 1.

Platte & Denver Canal Co. _v._ Dowell, 17 Col. 376: Richardson _v._ El Paso Min. Co., 51 Col. 440; Lindsay _v._ Cecchi, 3 Boyce, 133; Toledo R. Co. _v._ O’Connor, 77 Ill. 391; United States Brewing Co. _v._ Stoltenberg, 211 Ill. 531; Presto-Lite Co. _v._ Skeel, 182 Ind. 593; Correll _v._ Burlington R. Co., 38 Ia. 120; Schlereth _v._ Missouri R. Co., 96 Mo. 509; Brannock _v._ Elmore, 114 Mo. 55; Olson _v._ Nebraska Tel. Co., 83 Neb. 735; Texas R. Co. _v._ Brown, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 503; Smith _v._ Milwaukee Builders’ Exchange, 91 Wis. 360 _Contra_.

In Evers _v._ Davis, 86 N. J. Law, 196, 202, GARRISON, J., says:

“The question then is, What is, upon common law principles, the effect of statutes such as the one we are considering upon the action of negligence? The familiar expressions that the breach of such a statute is ‘negligence _per se_’ or is ‘_prima facie_ evidence of negligence’ seem to me to postpone elucidation rather than to contribute to it, while the implication that proof of a breach of a public statute will support a private recovery is positively misleading.

A fact constantly to be borne in mind in tracing the legal effect of such statutes is that the negligence that is essential to the action of negligence is not solely in the overt act that produced the injury complained of, but may lie in the failure to foresee the danger likely to result from the doing of such act. ‘Danger, reasonably to be foreseen at the time of acting, is the established test of negligence’ says the writer already cited. Of negligence of this sort it may be said that it is common to all phases of the action, which cannot be said of the mere overt act, which may not be an act of neglect or omission at all, but, on the contrary, one of affirmative commission, e. g., the blowing of a locomotive whistle (Bittle _v._ Camden and Atlantic Railroad Co., 55 N. J. L. 615), the discharge of steam (Mumma _v._ Easton and Amboy Railroad Co., 73 Id. 653) or the extraordinary lurching of a train (Burr _v._ Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 64 Id. 30). But whether the overt act be one of omission or of commission, and whether the conduct of the defendant be stated in terms of ‘duty’ or of ‘fault,’ the one common denominator, so to speak, of the action of negligence is this element of what we may call discoverable danger; that is to say, a danger that is susceptible of being discovered in advance of action or inaction by the exercise of that degree of care which if a man fails to exercise he becomes civilly liable for the consequences of his conduct. Now, it is precisely upon this element of discoverable danger that public statutes or ordinances act, and they do this not by giving to the plaintiff a right of action he did not have before, but by their operation upon what we may call the common law conscience of the defendant, better known to us in its personified form of ‘the ordinary prudent man,’ the familiar fiction designed by the common law to aid juries, when deciding what was the proper thing for a man to do, to lose sight of the personal point of view of that

## particular man and to base their judgment upon a general standard

which in the final assize is what the jury itself thinks was the proper thing to do.

Now this ordinary prudent man of common law creation must in the nature of things be regarded as a law-abiding citizen to whom, as is pointed out by Dean Thayer in the article referred to, it would be an unjust reproach to suppose that, knowing the statute—for upon familiar principles he can claim no benefit from his ignorance of it—he would break it, _reasonably_ believing that it was a prudent thing for him to do; and that in all probability no harm would come of it.

In other words, it is inconsistent with ordinary prudence for an individual to set up his private judgment against that of the lawfully constituted public authority. We must assume, therefore, that the ordinary prudent man would not do such a thing since to do so would be to change his entire nature and to forego the very traits that brought him into existence. He would, in fine, cease to be the pattern man he must continue to be in order to be at all.

Upon common law principles, therefore, when the legislature has by public statute established a certain standard of conduct in order to prevent a danger that it foresaw, it has in this regard forewarned the ‘ordinary prudent man’ and through him the defendant in a civil

## action, whose conduct must always coincide with this common law

criterion. Such danger, therefore, does not have to be proved by the plaintiff, since there is no longer room for a reasonable difference of opinion, for by his breach of the statute the defendant, through his common law conscience, is charged with knowledge that if injury ensues he will have acted at his peril.

The court therefore should so instruct the jury, whether such instruction be couched in the terms of the defendant’s duty to perform or of his culpability for neglect, or of his liability for the result of his action or inaction, as the case may be; and thus upon common law principles the plaintiff in an action of negligence obtains the benefit of the statute if he be one of the class for whose protection it was enacted and the breach of such statute was the efficient cause of the injury of which he complains.”

In Smith _v._ Mine & Smelter Co., 32 Utah, 21, 30, FRICK, J., says:

“The court instructed the jury in substance that, if they found from the evidence that the appellant had violated the city ordinance in respect to keeping or storing explosives, such violation constituted negligence per se. Counsel insist that such is not the law; that it would be _prima facie_ negligence at most. As to whether a violation of a law or ordinance constitutes negligence _per se_ depends in a large measure upon the nature of the law or ordinance. When a standard of duty or care is fixed by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance has reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as a matter of necessity, a violation of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence. In any case the standard is usually defined as that degree of care that men of ordinary care and prudence usually exercise. But, when the standard is fixed by law or ordinance, how can one be heard to say that he exercised care in exceeding, or in refraining to comply with, the standard fixed? There is, in such cases, no comparison to be made. Care and prudence alone cannot excuse. Exceeding or disregarding the standard of care imposed must be held to be negligence, if it is anything. If it is held not to be such _per se_, it simply amounts to this: That it is for the jury to say whether, in violating a law or ordinance fixing a standard of care to be observed the law was carefully or negligently violated. The violation, thus in and of itself, would mean nothing, and one would be permitted to violate the law with impunity, provided the jury find it to have been carefully done. Neither is it an answer to say that the violation may have been caused by the act of God or unavoidable accident. If such be the case, then the act constituted no violation in law, and when there is no violation there would be no negligence arising out of such act or acts alone, and the jury would be required to find whether the act or acts complained of constituted a violation, as above indicated, or not. If they found that the law was disregarded, but that it was occasioned by a higher power or through unavoidable accident, then there would be no violation by the person charged, and hence no negligence imputable to him from that act alone. But if they found that he had violated the law by his own act, or by the acts of others chargeable to him, then there would be negligence _per se_. This negligence, however, standing alone, is not civilly

## actionable. The negligence must in all cases be found to be the

proximate cause of the injury. The court instructed the jury that unless they found that the negligence, if they found negligence as above stated, was the proximate cause of the injury complained of, the respondent could not recover. This, we think, is a correct statement of the law pertaining to ordinances such as the one in question here. We do not hold that a violation of all laws or ordinances constitutes negligence _per se_, but we do hold that the violation of ordinances designed for the safety of life, limb, or property, does constitute negligence _per se_, and this, we think, is supported by the clear weight of authority.”

It is sometimes said that violation of a duty so imposed is “_prima facie_ evidence of negligence;” Giles _v._ Diamond State Iron Co., 7 Houst. 453; True _v._ Woda, 104 Ill. App. 15; Wabash R. Co. _v._ Kamradt, 109 Ill. App. 203; Mize _v._ Rocky Mountain Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521; Briggs _v._ New York R. Co., 72 N. Y. 26; Acton _v._ Reed, 104 App. Div. 507.

A distinction between a statute and a municipal ordinance has been urged. Philadelphia R. Co. _v._ Ervin, 89 Pa. St. 71; Lederman _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., 165 Pa. St. 118; Riegert _v._ Thackery, 212 Pa. St. 86.

In Ubelmann _v._ American Ice Co., 209 Pa. St. 398, 400, BROWN, J., says:

“When negligence is charged it must be proved. Proof of the violation of an ordinance regulating or relating to conduct alleged to have been negligent is not in itself conclusive proof of the negligence charged. The ordinance and its violation are matters of evidence, to be considered with all other evidence in the case: Lane _v._ Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136. But this rule is limited to cases in which the ordinance relates to the alleged negligent act under investigation. Here, as stated, it was the use of an alleged defective shifting rod in the elevator. Ordinances and their violation are admissible, not as substantive and sufficient proof of the negligence of the defendant, but as evidence of municipal expression of opinion, on a matter as to which the municipal authorities had acted, that the defendant was negligent, and are to be taken into consideration with all the other facts in the case. Illustrations of this are found in several of our later cases. In Lederman _v._ Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 165 Pa. 118, one of the questions was the undue rate of speed at which the defendant company was running its cars through the city of Lancaster, and we held that the ordinance in relation to the speed of railway trains within the city limits had been properly admitted. An ordinance of the city of Philadelphia requires all vehicles, including bicycles, to keep to the right, and, in Foote _v._ American Product Co., 195 Pa. 190, where the rider of the bicycle had conformed to this ordinance, and the driver of the wagon that ran into him had not, we said, through our Brother Mestrezat: ‘While the ordinance in itself was not evidence of negligence, it may be considered with other evidence in ascertaining whether the defendant was guilty of negligence.’ When the suit is against the municipality itself, and it is charged with negligence, due to the dereliction of its employees, their violation or disregard of its own regulations and ordinances relating to the matter under investigation are proof of such dereliction, though not necessarily of the specific negligence charged, which, as in all other cases, must be proved by proper and satisfactory evidence. The dereliction of the municipal employees is to be taken into consideration with the other facts in the case, upon proof of which the plaintiff relies to sustain his allegation of negligence. An illustration of this is Herron _v._ The City of Pittsburg, 204 Pa. 509, which was an action against the city to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a boy from contact with a live, naked telephone wire used in the police service of the city, and it appeared that the break in the wire was known to the police officials within an hour after it had occurred, and that it was also known to them to be in close proximity to other wires, some of which carried strong and dangerous currents of electricity. We regarded as proper the admission of the ordinance of the city and the rules of the police department relating to the inspection and use of the city wires.

The ordinance of April 10, 1894, provides for the inspection of elevators by inspectors duly appointed by the city of Philadelphia, and makes it the duty of the owner or operator of an elevator, after its inspection, to procure from the inspector a certificate that it is in condition to be operated, and to expose the certificate to public view as near as possible to the elevator car. This ordinance does not make it the duty of one owning or operating an elevator to demand an inspection, and it is only after the inspector has inspected that he must procure and expose the certificate. But, even if there had been an inspection here, and the defendant company had not procured and exposed the proper certificate, its failure to do so is not the negligence charged against it that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, and the ordinance clearly had no proper place in his evidence.”

_Breach of rules of a private corporation_, see Hoffman _v._ Cedar Rapids R. Co., 157 Ia. 655; Stevens _v._ Boston R. Co., 184 Mass. 476; Virginia R. Co. _v._ Godsey, 117 Va. 167.

See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harvard Law Rev. 317.

Footnote 305:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 306:

Steel Car Forge Co. _v._ Chec, (C. C. A.) 184 Fed. 868; Great Southern R. Co. _v._ Chapman, 80 Ala. 615; Lindsay _v._ Cecchi, 3 Boyce, 133; Gibson _v._ Leonard, 143 Ill. 182; Browne _v._ Siegel, 90 Ill. App. 49 (aff’d on another ground, 191 Ill. 226); Presto-Lite Co. _v._ Skeel, 182 Ind. 593; Kidder _v._ Dunstable, 11 Gray, 342; Curwen _v._ Bofferding, 133 Minn. 28; Koch _v._ Fox, 71 App. Div. 288; Kuhnen _v._ White, 102 App. Div. 36; Ledbetter _v._ English, 166 N. C. 125; Dobbins _v._ Missouri R. Co., 91 Tex. 60; Stacy _v._ Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 Wis. 614; Derouso _v._ International Harvester Co., 157 Wis. 32 _Accord_.

Compare Hartnett _v._ Boston Store, 265 Ill. 331, with Pizzo _v._ Wiemann, 149 Wis. 285; Beauchamp _v._ Burn Mfg. Co., 250 Ill. 303, with Berdos _v._ Tremont Mills, 209 Mass. 489.

Footnote 307:

In Cowley _v._ Newmarket Local Board, [1892] A. C. 345, 351, Lord Herschell said:

“My Lords, the question which arises in this action is whether the defendants are liable in respect of an accident which happened to the plaintiff, owing to the existence of a drop of eighteen inches in the level of a footway vested in the defendants, in consequence of which the plaintiff fell and sustained considerable injury. The difference of level in the footway arose from a carriage-way having been made for the purpose of access to Captain Machell’s stable, the yard of which adjoined the footway. This work was executed by Captain Machell in the year 1873. The plaintiff in his statement of claim asserted that the defendants had wrongfully suffered and permitted the footway to be out of repair and in a condition dangerous to passengers. It appeared clearly at the trial that there had been no misfeasance on the part of the defendants. The utmost that could be charged against them was nonfeasance. It was strongly urged at the bar that the highway including the footway being vested in the defendants, they were responsible if it was not kept in proper condition and repair to any one who was injured by reason of its not being so kept. In support of their contention they relied mainly on the 144th and 149th sections of the Public Health Act, 1875. By the former of those sections every urban authority is to execute the office of surveyor of highways, and to exercise and be subject to all the powers, duties, and liabilities of surveyors. By the latter it is provided that the urban sanitary authority shall from time to time cause all streets vested in them to be levelled, paved, metalled, flagged, channelled, altered, and repaired as occasion may require. Amongst the duties thus imposed upon the urban authority was undoubtedly the duty of keeping this highway in repair, and it is said that any person injured by the non-performance of a statutory duty is entitled to recover against the person on whom that duty rests. I entertain very grave doubts whether the proposition thus broadly stated can be maintained. The principal authority in support of it is the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench in the case of Couch _v._ Steel, 3 E. & B. 402. But in the case of Atkinson _v._ Newcastle Waterworks Company, 2 Ex. D. 441, the late Lord Cairns and Cockburn, C. J., and the present Master of the Rolls all expressed serious doubts whether the case of Couch _v._ Steel was rightly decided, and whether the broad general proposition could be supported, that whenever a statutory duty is created any person who can show he has sustained injury from the non-performance of that duty can maintain an action for damages against the person on whom the duty is imposed. I share the doubt expressed by these learned judges and the opinion expressed by Lord Cairns that much must ‘depend on the purview of the Legislature in the particular statute and the language which they have there employed.’ In the case of Glossop _v._ Heston and Isleworth Local Board, 12 Ch. D. 102, 109, James, L. J., made some observations bearing on this point, which seem to me to be of great weight. In that case the plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain a nuisance on the ground that the defendants had neglected to perform the statutory duty cast on them as the sanitary authority of a

## particular district. The learned Lord Justice said: ‘It appears to me

that if this action could be sustained it would be a very serious matter indeed for every ratepayer in England in any district in which there is any local authority upon whom duties are cast for the benefit of the locality. If this action could be maintained, I do not see why it could not, in a similar manner, be maintained by every owner of land in that district who could allege that if there had been a proper system of sewage his property would have been very much improved.’ And he expressed the opinion that such a contention was not supported either by principle or authority. It is to be observed that the Highway Act, which defines the duties of surveyors of highways, prescribes the mode of proceeding when the duty of repairing the highway is unfulfilled and the liability which is then to attach to the surveyor. By sect. 94 he may be summoned before the justices, and if it appears either upon the report of a person appointed by them to view, or on their own view, that the highway is not in a state of thorough and perfect repair, they are to convict the surveyor in a penalty, and to make an order on the surveyor to repair it within a limited time; and if the repairs are not made within the time so limited the surveyor is to forfeit and pay to a person to be named and appointed in a second order a sum of money equal to the cost of repairing the highway. I think it, to say the least, doubtful whether, apart from the reason to which I am about to refer, the contention that an action lies against the local board for a breach of their statutory duty to repair the highways can be maintained.”

Sydney Municipal Council _v._ Bourke, [1895] A. C. 433; Maguire _v._ Liverpool Corporation, [1905] 1 K. B. 767 _Accord_. But compare Dawson _v._ Bingley Urban District Council, [1911] 2 K. B. 149.

_Statutory duty to repair street or sidewalk_, see Manchester _v._ Hartford, 30 Conn. 118; Kirby _v._ Boylston Market, 14 Gray, 249; Rochester _v._ Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405.

Footnote 308:

“A person who sells, gives away, or disposes of, any poison, or poisonous substance, without attaching to the vial, box, or parcel containing such poisonous substance, a label, with the name and residence of such person, the word ‘poison,’ and the name of such poison, all written or printed thereon, in plain and legible characters, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”—Minnesota Penal Code, section 329.

“No person shall sell at retail any poisonous commodity recognized as such, and especially” [here enumerating various poisons], “without affixing to the box, bottle, vessel or package containing the same, and to the wrapper or cover thereof, a label bearing the name ‘poison’ distinctly shown, together with the name and place of business of the seller.... Any person failing to comply with the requirements of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable to a fine of not less than five (5) dollars for each and every such omission.”—Minnesota Laws, 1885, chap. 147, section 14.

Footnote 309:

Couch _v._ Steel, 3 E. & B. 402; Salisbury _v._ Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458; Parker _v._ Barnard, 135 Mass. 116; Marino _v._ Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530; Westervelt _v._ Dives, 220 Pa. St. 617 _Accord_. Compare Nugent _v._ Vanderveer, 38 Hun, 487.

See also Great Northern Fishing Co. _v._ Edgehill, 11 Q. B. D. 225.

Footnote 310:

Arguments omitted. Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to a single point.

Footnote 311:

Groves _v._ Wimborne, [1898] 2 Q. B. 402; Cowen _v._ Story & Clark Co., 170 Ill. App. 92; Andersen _v._ Settergren, 100 Minn. 294; Schaar _v._ Conforth, 128 Minn. 460 _Accord_. Compare Stehle _v._ Jaeger Machine Co., 220 Pa. St. 617; Drake _v._ Fenton, 237 Pa. St. 8.

Footnote 312:

Arguments of counsel omitted.

Footnote 313:

Bischof _v._ Illinois R. Co., 232 Ill. 446; Frontier Steam Laundry Co. _v._ Connolly, 72 Neb. 767; Hocking R. Co. _v._ Phillips, 81 Ohio St. 453 _Accord_.

_Breach of statutory duty toward third person_, see Gibson _v._ Leonard, 143 Ill. 182; Woodruff _v._ Bowen, 136 Ind. 431; Bott _v._ Pratt, 33 Minn. 323; Kelly _v._ Muhs, 71 N. J. Law, 348; Beehler _v._ Daniels, 19 R. I. 49. Compare Racine _v._ Morris, 201 N. Y. 240.

In Stanley _v._ Atchison R. Co., 88 Kan. 84, MASON, J., says:

“The evidence tended to show these facts: Stanley kept a number of cattle in a feed lot one side of which was formed by the right-of-way fence. Employees of the company who were engaged in its repair removed a part of it, as well as a part of Stanley’s fence which connected with it, and as a temporary protection strung two wires across the gap. The protection was insufficient and the cattle escaped. None of them was injured upon the right of way, but a number strayed and were not recovered, and others suffered injury, in some cases fatal.

The defendant maintains that in any view of the findings the judgment ought not to be reversed, for the reason that the petition does not state a cause of action, because the company was under no obligation to maintain the fence, except for the purpose of avoiding liability for animals killed or injured by its trains, and therefore cannot be held accountable for any other kind of loss occasioned by the want of a sufficient fence. The original statute upon the subject does not in terms require a railroad right of way to be fenced. It makes the company responsible for animals killed or injured by the operation of its railway irrespective of negligence, except where the road is enclosed with a lawful fence.... The later statute imposed a duty on the railroad company to maintain the fence, and it is liable for any injury of which its neglect of such duty is the proximate cause....

The defendant urges that the purpose of the statute referred to is to promote safety in the running of trains; that in this purpose is found the only warrant for imposing upon the railroad company the obligation to fence its right of way; and that therefore the company’s liability must be limited to injuries resulting from the operation of the road, and the state has no power to make it liable for losses occasioned by the escape of animals which do not meet with any injury upon the right of way. Assuming that the right of the legislature to require a railroad company to fence its tracks is based solely upon the consideration that such fencing may be deemed necessary to diminish the danger of injury to animals from the operation of trains, and to persons and property resulting from trains colliding with animals, it is competent as a means of enforcing such requirement to make the company liable for losses occasioned to the landowner by the escape of his cattle through a defective fence, although they pass from the right of way without injury.”

_Liability to licensee in case of breach of statutory duty as to condition of premises_, see Sheyer _v._ Lowell, 134 Cal. 357.

_Liability to trespassers_, see Nelson _v._ Burnham & Morrill Co., 114 Me. 213; Flanagan _v._ Sanders, 138 Mich. 253; Hamilton _v._ Minneapolis Desk Co., 78 Minn. 3; Bennett _v._ Odell Mfg. Co., 76 N. H. 180. Compare Butz _v._ Cavanaugh, 137 Mo. 503.

See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harvard Law Rev. 313, 336.

Footnote 314:

By “Lord Tenterden’s Act,” 9 Geo. IV. ch. 14, s. 6, it is provided, that no action shall be brought to charge any person upon any representation made concerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade, or dealings of any other person, to the intent that such other person may obtain credit, money, or goods, unless such representation “be made in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith.” Statutes of a similar nature have been enacted in some of the United States.

Footnote 315:

Only part of the opinion is printed.

Footnote 316:

Cf. Lillegren _v._ Burns, 135 Minn. 60.

Footnote 317:

Statement abridged. Only part of opinion is given.

Footnote 318:

In Aaron’s Reefs Ltd. _v._ Twiss, [1896] A. C. 273, 280–281, Lord Halsbury, L. C., says: “I must protest against it being supposed that in order to prove a case of this character of fraud, and that a certain course of conduct was induced by it, a person is bound to be able to explain with exact precision what was the mental process by which he was induced to act. It is a question for the jury. If a man said he was induced by such and such an inducement held out in the prospectus, I should not think that conclusive. It must be for the jury to say what they believed upon the evidence. Looking at the evidence in this case, I should say if I were a juryman that this was a very fascinating prospectus, and was calculated to induce any one who believed the statements in it to invest his money in the concern.”

In Mathews _v._ Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, Shaw, C. J., says: “The judge further instructed the jury, that in order to maintain this action, they must be satisfied that the defendants had made the false representation, and that the sale was produced by means of it; that it was not necessary that it should be the sole and only motive inducing the sale, but it must have been a predominant one. In this particular, the Court are of opinion, that the direction, as it may have been and probably was understood by the jury, was not strictly correct; though it may have been so qualified and illustrated as to prevent the jury from being misled by it.

The term ‘predominant,’ in its natural and ordinary signification, is understood to be something greater or superior in power and influence to others, with which it is connected or compared. So understood, a predominant motive, when several motives may have operated, is one of greater force and effect, in producing the given result, than any other motive. But the Court are of opinion, that if the false and fraudulent representation was a motive at all, inducing to the act, if it was one of several motives, acting together, and by their combined force producing the result, it should have been left to the jury so to find it. If the false suggestion had no influence, if the plaintiff’s agent would have done the same thing and made the sale if such representation had not been made, then it was not a motive to the act, and the plaintiff’s agent was not induced to sell by means of it. On the whole, considering that the ordinary and natural meaning of the term ‘predominant,’ when applied to one among several motives, is such as has been stated, that the jury may have so understood it, and if they did so understand it, they may have come to a verdict not warranted by law, upon the evidence before them, the Court are of opinion, that the verdict ought to be set aside, and a new trial granted.”

Footnote 319:

The case has been much abridged, and the greater part of the report omitted.

Footnote 320:

Cockrill _v._ Hall, 65 Cal. 326; United States Home Co. _v._ O’Connor, 48 Col. 354; Lynch _v._ Hall, 41 Conn. 238; Jones _v._ Crawford, 107 Ga. 318; Hinchey _v._ Starrett, 91 Kan. 181; Oldham _v._ Bentley, 6 B. Mon. 428; Price _v._ Read, 2 Har. & G. 291; Adams _v._ Anderson, 4 Har. & J. 558; Sweet _v._ Kimball, 166 Mass. 332; Garry _v._ Garry, 187 Mass. 62; McElrath _v._ Electric Investment Co., 114 Minn. 358; Holmes _v._ Wilkes, 130 Minn. 170; Cerny _v._ Paxton Co., 78 Neb. 134; Gabriel _v._ Graham, 168 App. Div. 847; American Hosiery Co. _v._ Baker, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 604; Standard Elevator Co. _v._ Wilson, 218 Pa. St. 280; Bowe _v._ Gage, 127 Wis. 245 _Accord_. See also Wilson _v._ Yocum, 77 Ia. 569.

Footnote 321:

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 322:

Harriage _v._ Daley, 121 Ark. 23; Dickinson _v._ Atkins, 100 Ill. App. 401; McAllister _v._ Indianapolis R. Co., 15 Ind. 11; Welshbillig _v._ Dienhart, 65 Ind. 94; Long _v._ Woodman, 58 Me. 49; Davis _v._ Reynolds, 107 Me. 61; Bullock _v._ Wooldridge, 42 Mo. App. 356; Wolters _v._ Fidelity Trust Co., 73 N. J. Law, 57 _Accord_. See also Bennett _v._ McIntire, 121 Ind. 231.

In Adams _v._ Gillig, 199 N. Y. 314, plaintiff sued in equity for cancellation of a conveyance procured by falsely representing that defendant intended to build a dwelling on the land, when his real intention was to build a garage. Chase, J., said (pp. 320–322): “A promise as such to be enforceable must be based upon a consideration, and it must be put in such form as to be available under the rules relating to contracts and the admission of evidence relating thereto. It may include a present intention, but as it also relates to the future it can only be enforced as a promise under the general rules relating to contracts.

A mere statement of intention is a different thing. It is not the basis of an action on contract. It may in good faith be changed without affecting the obligations of the parties. A statement of intention does not relate to a fact that has a corporal and physical existence, but to a material and existing fact nevertheless not amounting to a promise but which as in the case under discussion affects and determines important transactions. The question here under discussion is not affected by the rules relating to the admission of testimony. As it was not promissory and contractual in its nature there is nothing in the rules of evidence to prevent oral proof of the representations made by the defendant to the plaintiff. In an action brought expressly upon a fraud, oral evidence of facts to show the fraud is admissible. (Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 889.)

This case stands exactly as it would have stood if the plaintiff and defendant before the execution and delivery of the deed had entered into a writing by which the defendant had stated therein his intention as found by the court on the trial and the plaintiff had stated her acceptance of his offer based upon her belief and faith in his statement of intention, and it further appeared that the statement was so made by the defendant for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to sell to him the lot, and that such statement was so made by him falsely, fraudulently and purposely for the purpose of bringing about such sale.

Intent is of vital importance in very many transactions. In the criminal courts it is necessary in many cases for jurors to determine as a question of fact the intent of the person charged with the crime. Frequently the life or liberty of the prisoner at the bar depends upon the determination of such question of fact. In civil actions relating to wrongs, the intent of the party charged with the wrong is frequently of controlling effect upon the conclusion to be reached in the action. The intent of a person is sometimes difficult to prove, but it is nevertheless a fact and a material and existing fact that must be ascertained in many cases, and when ascertained determines the rights of the parties to controversies. The intent of Gillig was a material existing fact in this case, and the plaintiff’s reliance upon such fact induced her to enter into a contract that she would not otherwise have entered into. The effect of such false statement by the defendant of his intention cannot be cast aside as immaterial simply because it was possible for him in good faith to have changed his mind or to have sold the property to another who might have a different purpose relating thereto. As the defendant’s intention was subject to change in good faith at any time it was of uncertain value. It was, however, of some value. It was of sufficient value so that the plaintiff was willing to stand upon it and make the conveyance in reliance upon it.

The use of property in a particular manner changes from time to time and restrictive covenants of great value at one time may become a source of serious embarrassment at a later date. The fact that restrictive covenants cannot ordinarily be drawn to bend to changed conditions has made many purchasers disinclined to accept conveyances with such covenants. A restrictive covenant in a deed may be of sufficient importance to justify a refusal by a contractee to accept a conveyance subject to such conditions. A person in selling property may be quite willing to execute and deliver a deed thereof without putting restrictive covenants therein and in reliance upon the good faith of express, unqualified assurances of the present intention of the prospective purchaser. In such case the intention is material and the statement of such intention is the statement of an existing fact.

Unless the court affirms this judgment, it must acknowledge that although a defendant deliberately and intentionally, by false statements, obtained from a plaintiff his property to his great damage it is wholly incapable of righting the wrong, notwithstanding the fact that by so doing it does in no way interfere with the rules that have grown up after years of experience to protect written contracts from collateral promises and conditions not inserted in the contract.

We are of the opinion that the false statements made by the defendant of his intention should, under the circumstances of this case, be deemed to be a statement of a material, existing fact of which the court will lay hold for the purpose of defeating the wrong that would otherwise be consummated thereby.”

Footnote 323:

Butler _v._ Watkins, 13 Wall. 456; Rogers _v._ Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., (C. C. A.) 149 Fed. 1; Sallies _v._ Johnson, 85 Conn. 77; McLaughlin _v._ Thomas, 86 Conn. 252; Olson _v._ Smith, 116 Minn. 430; Herndon _v._ Durham R. Co., 161 N. C. 650; Blackburn _v._ Morrison, 29 Okl. 510 _Accord_.

Grubb _v._ Milan, 249 Ill. 456; Murray _v._ Smith, 42 Ill. App. 548; Chambers _v._ Mitchell, 123 Ill. App. 595; Younger _v._ Hoge, 211 Mo. 444 _Contra_.

In Commonwealth _v._ Althause, 207 Mass. 32, 47–49, Loring, J., says: “As a general proposition of law apart from statutes making it a crime to obtain property by a false pretence, it would seem that a man’s present intention as to a future act is a fact. Edgington _v._ Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459. Swift _v._ Rounds, 19 R. I. 527. In the first of these two cases (Edgington _v._ Fitzmaurice) Bowen, L. J., said, at p. 483: ‘The state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.’ And Chapman, C. J., in Commonwealth _v._ Walker, 108 Mass. 309, 312, said: ‘A man’s intention is a matter of fact, and may be proved as such....’

But in the case at bar the presiding judge went beyond any decided case in the explanation which he gave of the difference between the representation of a person’s present intention as to a future act and an assurance or promise that the future act shall be done. For the purpose of illustrating the essential difference between the two he put as an example of obtaining property by a false pretence a case which is not obtaining property by a false pretence. In effect he told the jury that if A buys property intending not to pay for it he obtains that property by a false pretence. In that case A makes no representation at all. All that he does is to make a promise, and a promise is not a representation of a fact. It has been sought to make out that in legal contemplation a promise with an intention not to perform is a false pretence because a promise to do a thing of necessity implies a present intention to do it, and therefore whenever you have a promise coupled with an intent not to perform you have an implied false representation of an intention to do the act which the defendant promised to do and so a false pretence. And this finds some apparent support in Swift _v._ Rounds, 19 R. I. 527. In that case it was held that where a defendant buys property intending not to pay for it he is liable in an action of deceit because he impliedly represents that he intends to pay for it by the act of buying. It may be doubted whether the making of a promise implies of necessity in all cases a present intention to perform that promise. Upon that question we do not find it necessary to express an opinion. For however that may be, the fraud of obtaining property by buying it intending not to pay for it is not, as matter of construction of the statute creating it, the crime of obtaining property by a false pretence.... It is evident that the fraud (which by enacting that statute the Legislature intended to make a crime) was obtaining the property of another by a false statement of a fact; and it is equally evident that in enacting it the Legislature did not have in mind the fraud of buying goods not intending to pay for them. Both are frauds but they are not the same fraud. In our opinion it was the former alone which the Legislature had in mind in making it a crime to obtain property by a false pretence.”

_As to whether intention at the time of the contract or at the time of delivery of the goods_ is to be regarded, see _In re_ Levi, 148 Fed. 654; Whitten _v._ Fitzwater, 129 N. Y. 626.

Footnote 324:

See Gardner _v._ State, 4 Ala. App. 131; Syracuse Knitting Co. _v._ Blanchard, 69 N. H. 447.

Footnote 325:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 326:

As to “promissory representations,” see also Sawyer _v._ Prickett, 19 Wall. 146; Sallies _v._ Johnson, 85 Conn. 77; Carter _v._ Orne, 112 Me. 365; Pedrick _v._ Porter, 5 All. 324; Pile _v._ Bright, 156 Mo. App. 301.

_Known impossible prophecy by one having superior knowledge_, see Murray _v._ Tolman, 162 Ill. 417; French _v._ Ryan, 104 Mich. 625; Hedin _v._ Minneapolis Institute, 62 Minn. 146.

Footnote 327:

Only part of the case is given.

Footnote 328:

But see Davis _v._ Reynolds, 107 Me. 61.

In Van Epps _v._ Harrison, 5 Hill, 63, 70–71, Bronson, J., says: “If an affirmation concerning the cost of the property was of any consequence, I think the defendant should have taken the trouble to inquire and satisfy himself. But I cannot think it a matter of any legal importance. It was only another mode of asserting that the property was of the value of $32,000; and all the books agree that no

## action will lie if such an affirmation prove false. It is the folly of

the purchaser to trust to it. Indeed, the representation here amounts to less than a direct affirmation of value, for it only asserts that the plaintiff and another man agreed that such was the value. It would lead to great mischief to allow men to annul contracts upon such a ground. If the defendant could make out that the plaintiff was his agent in purchasing from Van Rensselaer, then what the plaintiffs said about the price he paid might be material; but not in any other point of view.

Such are my views upon this branch of the case; but my brethren are of opinion that the false affirmation concerning the price paid for the land furnishes a good ground of action. There must, therefore, be a new trial upon this point, as well as the one relating to the condition of the land.”

_As to “puffing,”_ see: Mumford _v._ Tolman, 157 Ill. 258; Miller _v._ Craig, 36 Ill. 109; Wightman _v._ Tucker, 50 Ill. App. 75; Woods _v._ Nicholas, 92 Kan. 258; Buckingham _v._ Thompson, 135 S. W. 652.

But see Pratt _v._ Judge, 177 Mich. 558; Adams _v._ Soule, 33 Vt. 538.

_Statements as to value_, see: Harvey _v._ Young, Yelverton, 21; Lake _v._ Loan Assn., 72 Ala. 207; Stevens _v._ Alabama Land Co., 121 Ala. 450; Kincaid _v._ Price, 82 Ark. 20; Williams _v._ McFadden, 23 Fla. 143; Noetling _v._ Wright, 72 Ill. 390; Cagney _v._ Cuson, 77 Ind. 494; Bossingham _v._ Syck, 118 Ia. 192; Else _v._ Freeman, 72 Kan. 666; Reynolds _v._ Evans, 123 Md. 365; Picard _v._ McCormick, 11 Mich. 68; Doran _v._ Eaton, 40 Minn. 35; Boasberg _v._ Walker, 111 Minn. 445; Union Bank _v._ Hunt, 76 Mo. 439; Dalrymple _v._ Craig, 149 Mo. 345; Dresher _v._ Becker, 88 Neb. 619; Sandford _v._ Handy, 23 Wend. 260; Ellis _v._ Andrews, 56 N. Y. 83; Van Slochem _v._ Villard, 207 N. Y. 587; Mecum _v._ Becker, 166 App. Div. 793; Campbell _v._ Zion’s Real Estate Co., 46 Utah, 1; Shanks _v._ Whitney, 66 Vt. 405.

Compare Moon _v._ Benton, 13 Ala. App. 473; Pate _v._ Blades, 163 N. C. 267; Crompton _v._ Beedle, 83 Vt. 287.

Footnote 329:

Portions of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 330:

Gordon _v._ Butler, 105 U. S. 553; Kimber _v._ Young, (C. C. A.) 137 Fed. 744; Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co. _v._ Northern Ins. Co., 140 Fed. 888, 148 Fed. 674; Dotson _v._ Kirk, (C. C. A.) 180 Fed. 14; Rendell _v._ Scott, 70 Cal. 514; Wrenn _v._ Truitt, 116 Ga. 708; Dowden _v._ Wilson, 108 Ill. 257; Curry _v._ Keyser, 30 Ind. 214; Conant _v._ Nat’l State Bank, 121 Ind. 323; Scroggin _v._ Wood, 87 Ia. 497; Vokes _v._ Eaton, 119 Ky. 913; Holbrook _v._ Connor, 60 Me. 578; Bishop _v._ Small, 63 Me. 12; Donnelly _v._ Baltimore Trust Co., 102 Md. 1; Mooney _v._ Miller, 102 Mass. 217; Nash _v._ Minnesota Title & Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437; Lynch _v._ Murphy, 171 Mass. 307; Nowlin _v._ Snow, 40 Mich. 699; Myers _v._ Alpena Loan Ass’n, 117 Mich. 389; Getchell _v._ Dusenbury, 145 Mich. 197; Perkins _v._ Trinka, 30 Minn. 241; Brown _v._ South Joplin Min. Co., 194 Mo. 681; Ray County Bank _v._ Hutton, 224 Mo. 42; Fisher _v._ Seitz, 172 Mo. App. 162; Duffany _v._ Ferguson, 66 N. Y. 482; Hatton _v._ Cook, 166 App. Div. 257; Pritchard _v._ Dailey, 168 N. C. 330; Martin _v._ Eagle Creek Development Co., 41 Or. 448; Watts _v._ Cummins, 59 Pa. St. 84; Horrigan _v._ First Nat. Bank, 9 Baxt. 137; Jude _v._ Woodburn, 27 Vt. 415; Randall _v._ Farnum, 52 Vt. 539; Romaine _v._ Excelsior Machine Co., 54 Wash. 41; Crislip _v._ Cain, 19 W. Va. 438 _Accord_.

Compare Wall _v._ Graham, 192 Ala. 396; Barron Estate Co. _v._ Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561; Phelps _v._ Grady, 168 Cal. 73; Sleeper _v._ Smith, 77 N. H. 337; Olston _v._ Oregon R. Co., 52 Or. 343.

_Opinion of third person_, see Adams _v._ Collins, 196 Mass. 422.

Footnote 331:

Jarratt _v._ Langston, 99 Ark. 438; Baum _v._ Holton, 4 Col. App. 406; Shelton _v._ Healy, 74 Conn. 265; Kenner _v._ Harding, 85 Ill. 264; Dwight _v._ Chase, 3 Ill. App. 67; Wightman _v._ Tucker, 50 Ill. App. 75; Coulter _v._ Clark, 160 Ind. 311; Stauffer _v._ Hulwick, 176 Ind. 410; Beck _v._ Goar, 180 Ind. 81; Automobile Co. _v._ Crowell, 149 N. W. 861; Hetland _v._ Bilstad, 140 Ia. 411; Picard _v._ McCormick, 11 Mich. 68; Nowlin _v._ Snow, 40 Mich. 699; McDonald _v._ Smith, 139 Mich. 211; Conlan _v._ Roemer, 52 N. J. Law, 53; Bacon _v._ Frisbie, 15 Hun, 26; Marshall _v._ Seelig, 49 App. Div. 433; Ganow _v._ Ashton, 32 S. D. 458; Rodee _v._ Seaman, 33 S. D. 184; Rorer Iron Co. _v._ Trout, 83 Va. 397; Fitzgerald _v._ Frankel, 109 Va. 603; Grant _v._ Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 _Accord_.

Footnote 332:

Winkler _v._ Jerrue, 20 Cal. App. 555; Hodgkins _v._ Dunham, 10 Cal. App. 690; Olvey _v._ Jackson, 106 Ind. 286; Crane _v._ Elder, 48 Kan. 259; Gurney _v._ Tenney, 197 Mass. 457; Van de Wiele _v._ Garbade, 60 Or. 585; Corey _v._ Boynton, 82 Vt. 257; Simons _v._ Cissna, 52 Wash. 115 _Accord_. Compare Foster _v._ Kennedy, 38 Ala. 359; Sheer _v._ Hoyt, 13 Cal. App. 662; Judy _v._ Jester, 53 Ind. App. 74; Burr _v._ Willson, 22 Minn. 206; Adan _v._ Steinbrecher, 116 Minn. 174.

Footnote 333:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 334:

See also Nevada Bank _v._ Portland Nat. Bank, 59 Fed. 338.

In Aaron’s Reefs _v._ Twiss, [1896] A. C. 273, Lord Halsbury, L. C., said (pp. 283–284): “I do not think any particular form of words is necessary to convey a false impression. Supposing a person goes to a bank where the people are foolish enough to believe his words, and says, ‘I want a mortgage upon my house, and my house is not completed, but in the course of next week I expect to have it fully completed.’ Suppose there was not a house upon his land at all, and no possibility, therefore, that it could be fully completed next week, can anybody say that that was not an affirmative representation that there was a house which was so near to completion that it only required another week’s work upon it to complete it? Could anybody defend himself if he was charged upon an indictment for obtaining money under false pretences, the allegation in the indictment being that he pretended that there was a house so near completion that it only required a week’s work upon it, by saying that he never represented that there was a house there at all? So here, when I look at the language in which this prospectus is couched, and see that it speaks of a property which requires only the erection of machinery to be either at once or shortly in a condition to do work so as to obtain all this valuable metal from the mine, it seems to me that, although it is put in ambidextrous language, it means as plainly as can be that this is now the condition of the mine, that such and such additions to it will enable it shortly to produce all those great results, and that that is a representation of an actually existing fact. I should quite agree with the proposition that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and the Master of the Rolls put forward—if you are looking to the language as only the language of hope, expectation, and confident belief, that is one thing; but it does not seem to have been in the minds of the learned judges that you may use language in such a way as, although in the form of hope and expectation, it may become a representation as to existing facts; and if so, and if it is brought to your knowledge that these facts are false, it is a fraud.”

Footnote 335:

The statement has been abridged.

Footnote 336:

Loewer _v._ Harris, (C. C. A.) 57 Fed. 368; King _v._ White, 119 Ala. 429; Christy _v._ Campbell, 36 Col. 261; Kronfeld _v._ Missal, 87 Conn. 491; James _v._ Crosthwait, 97 Ga. 673; Gordon _v._ Irvine, 105 Ga. 144; Aortson _v._ Ridgway, 18 Ill. 23; Dayton _v._ Kidder. 105 Ill. App. 107; Craig _v._ Hamilton, 118 Ind. 565; Firestone _v._ Werner, 1 Ind. App. 293; Coles _v._ Kennedy, 81 Ia. 360; Howerton _v._ Augustine, 130 Ia. 389; Nairn _v._ Ewalt, 51 Kan. 355; Faris _v._ Lewis, 2 B. Mon. 375; Weikel _v._ Sterns, 142 Ky. 513; Prentiss _v._ Russ, 16 Me. 30; Barrett _v._ Lewiston R. Co., 110 Me. 24; Johnston _v._ Cope, 3 Har. & J. 89; Burns _v._ Dockray, 156 Mass. 135; Batty _v._ Greene, 206 Mass. 561; Kenyon _v._ Woodruff, 33 Mich. 310; Tompkins _v._ Hollister, 60 Mich. 470; Busch _v._ Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315; Marsh _v._ Webber, 13 Minn. 109; Thomas _v._ Murphy, 87 Minn. 358; McAdams _v._ Cates, 24 Mo. 223; Morley _v._ Harrah, 167 Mo. 74; Manter _v._ Truesdale, 57 Mo. App. 435; Stevens _v._ Fuller, 8 N. H. 463; Fleming _v._ Slocum, 18 Johns. 403; Allen _v._ Addington, 7 Wend. 9; March _v._ First National Bank, 4 Hun, 466; Brown _v._ Gray, 6 Jones Law, 103; Lunn _v._ Shermer, 93 N. C. 164; Gidney _v._ Chappell, 26 Okl. 737; Fitzhugh _v._ Nirschl, 77 Or. 514; Rheen _v._ Naugatuck Wheel Co., 33 Pa. St. 356; Cardwell _v._ McClelland, 3 Sneed, 150; Allison _v._ Tyson, 5 Humph. 449; Graham _v._ Stiles, 38 Vt. 578; Maynard _v._ Maynard, 49 Vt. 297; Crompton _v._ Beedle, 83 Vt. 287; Jarrett _v._ Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602; Morgan _v._ Hodge, 145 Wis. 143 _Accord_. Compare: Randolph _v._ Allen, (C. C. A.) 73 Fed. 23; Ball _v._ Farley, 81 Ala. 288; Cherry _v._ Brizzolara, 89 Ark. 309; Roper _v._ Sangamon Lodge, 91 Ill. 518; Potts _v._ Chapin, 133 Mass. 276; Cochrane _v._ Halsey, 25 Minn. 52; Crowell _v._ Jackson, 53 N. J. Law, 656; Babcock _v._ Libbey, 82 N. Y. 144; Jones _v._ Stewart, 62 Neb. 207; Wicker _v._ Worthy, 51 N. C. 500; Harris _v._ Tyson, 24 Pa. St. 347; Iron Bank _v._ Anderson, 194 Pa. St. 205; Bishop _v._ Buckley, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 123; Campbell _v._ Kinlock, 9 Rich. Law, 300.

In Wiser _v._ Lawler, 189 U. S. 260, Brown, J., said (pp. 264–65): “Attached to these prospectuses was a map entitled ‘Map of the group of mines belonging to the Seven Stars Gold Mining Company.’ It is true that there is neither in the prospectuses nor in the map a distinct assertion that the legal title to the properties mentioned was vested in the Seven Stars Company; but we think that no one can read them without inferring and believing that the Seven Stars was the owner of these properties, and that the net proceeds of their operation would be distributed in dividends to stockholders. As they were circulated as an inducement to take stock in the enterprises, we are bound to interpret them by the effect they would produce upon an ordinary mind. Andrews _v._ Mockford, (1896) 1 Q. B. D. 372. They were, however, even more damaging in their omissions than in their statements. No mention was made of the fact that the title to these properties stood in the names of Lawler and Wells; no allusion to the Cowland agreement, with its provisions for forfeiture, nor to the fact that the only interest of the company was an equitable right to the properties after the sum of $450,000 had been realized from the profits and paid to defendants. In estimating the probability of subscribers being misled by these prospectuses we may take into consideration not only the facts stated, but the facts suppressed. New Brunswick Co. _v._ Muggeridge, 1 Drewey & Smale, 363. They are entitled to know the _cons_ as well as the _pros_. Gluckstein _v._ Barnes, (1900) App. Cas. 240; Hubbard _v._ Weare, 79 Iowa, 678; Hayward _v._ Leeson, 175 Mass. 310; In re Leeds and Hanley Theatres, (1902) 2 Ch. Div. 809.”

In Peek _v._ Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377, Lord Cairns said (p. 403): “Mere non-disclosure of material facts, however morally censurable, however that non-disclosure might be a ground in a proper proceeding at a proper time for setting aside an allotment or a purchase of shares, would in my opinion form no ground for an action in the nature of an action for misrepresentation. There must, in my opinion, be some

## active misstatement of fact, or, at all events, such a partial and

fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withholding of that which is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false.”

Compare Mitchell, J., in Newell _v._ Randall, 32 Minn. 171, 172–73: “It is doubtless the general rule that a purchaser, when buying on credit, is not bound to disclose the facts of his financial condition. If he makes no actual misrepresentations, if he is not asked any questions, and does not give any untrue, evasive, or partial answers, his mere silence as to his general bad pecuniary condition, or his indebtedness, will not constitute a fraudulent concealment. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §906; Bigelow on Fraud, 36, 37. But this was not a case of mere passive non-disclosure. The object of De Laittre’s inquiry clearly was to ascertain Bauman’s financial condition and ability to pay. Bauman’s statement was in response to that inquiry, and, when he undertook to answer, he was bound to tell the whole truth, and was not at liberty to give an evasive or misleading answer, which, although literally true, was partial, containing only half the truth, and calculated to convey a false impression. The natural construction which would, under the circumstances, be put on this statement is that he had $3,300 capital in his business. It was couched in language calculated to negative the idea that this was merely the gross amount of his assets, and that he owed debts to the extent of two-thirds or the whole of that amount. Such a statement, made under the circumstances it was, might fairly and reasonably be understood as amounting to a representation that he had that amount of capital which was and would remain available, out of which to collect any debt which he might contract with plaintiff. We think this is the way in which men would ordinarily have understood it. It is immaterial that more explicit inquiries by plaintiff would have disclosed the fact of his indebtedness. It does not lie in Bauman’s mouth to say that plaintiff relied too implicitly on this general statement. To tell half a truth only is to conceal the other half. Concealment of this kind, under the circumstances, amounts to a false representation.”

Footnote 337:

The statement is taken from 37 Ch. D. 541, omitting the last part. Arguments are omitted. None of the opinions are given except portions of LORD HERSCHELL’S.

Footnote 338:

The opinion of STIRLING, J., is reported in 37 Ch. D. 550. See especially 556–558.

Footnote 339:

“Want of honest belief in the truth of what one asserts, not positive knowledge that it is false, is the essence of the wrong. A man who knows that he is making a reckless assertion about things of which he really knows nothing may not be speaking against his own belief, but he is not speaking according to it, and therefore his conduct is dishonest, and is esteemed fraud by the law.” Pollock, Law of Fraud in British India, 43.

Footnote 340:

For a criticism of the view that the directors all believed the statement, see 6 Law Quarterly Rev. 73; 5 Law Quarterly Rev. 420–422.

Footnote 341:

Schuchardt _v._ Allens, 1 Wall. 359; Union R. Co. _v._ Barnes, (C. C. A.) 64 Fed. 80; Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co. _v._ Northern Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A.) 148 Fed. 674; Foster _v._ Kennedy, 38 Ala. 359; Morton _v._ Scull, 23 Ark. 289; Hutchinson _v._ Gorman, 71 Ark. 305; Davidson _v._ Jordan, 47 Cal. 351; Bartholomew _v._ Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271; Fooks _v._ Waples, 1 Har. (Del.) 131; Manes _v._ Kenyon, 18 Ga. 291; Cooley _v._ King, 113 Ga. 1163; Wheeler _v._ Randall, 48 Ill. 182; Holdom _v._ Ayer, 110 Ill. 448; Herman _v._ Foster, 185 Ill. App. 97; Holmes _v._ Clark, 10 Ia. 423; Scroggin _v._ Wood, 87 Ia. 497; Boddy _v._ Henry, 113 Ia. 462; Farmers’ Stock Breeding Ass’n _v._ Scott, 53 Kan. 534; Campbell _v._ Hillman, 15 B. Mon. 508; Haynes _v._ Gould, 83 Me. 344; Cahill _v._ Applegarth, 98 Md. 493; Emerson _v._ Brigham, 10 Mass. 197; Pike _v._ Fay, 101 Mass. 134; Cole _v._ Cassidy, 138 Mass. 437; Holst _v._ Stewart, 154 Mass. 445; Lillegren _v._ Burns, 135 Minn. 60; Taylor _v._ Frost, 39 Miss. 328; Utley _v._ Hill, 155 Mo. 232; Allen _v._ Wanamaker, 31 N. J. Law, 370; Williams _v._ Wood, 14 Wend. 126; Marsh _v._ Folker, 40 N. Y. 562; Wakeman _v._ Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27; Kountze _v._ Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124; Hamrick _v._ Hogg, 1 Dev. 350; Taylor _v._ Leith, 26 Ohio St. 428; Staines _v._ Shore, 16 Pa. St. 200; Erie Iron Works _v._ Barber, 106 Pa. St. 125; Lamberton _v._ Dunham, 165 Pa. St. 129; Deppen _v._ Light, 228 Pa. St. 79; Gibbs _v._ Odell, 2 Cold. 132; Weeks _v._ Burton, 7 Vt. 67 _Accord_.

In Heilbut _v._ Buckleton, [1913] A. C. 30, Lord Moulton said (p. 48): “In the history of English law we find many attempts to make persons responsible in damages by reason of innocent misrepresentations, and at times it has seemed as though the attempts would succeed. On the Chancery side of the Court the decisions favoring this view usually took the form of extending the scope of the action for deceit. There was a tendency to recognize the existence of what was sometimes called ‘legal fraud,’ i. e., that the making of an incorrect statement of fact without reasonable grounds, or of one which was inconsistent with information which the person had received or had the means of obtaining, entailed the same legal consequences as making it fraudulently. Such a doctrine would make a man liable for forgetfulness or mistake or even for honestly interpreting the facts known to him or drawing conclusions from them in a way which the Court did not think to be legally warranted. The high-water mark of these decisions is to be found in the judgment pronounced by the Court of Appeal in the case of Peek _v._ Derry, (1887) 37 Ch. D. 541; (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, when they laid down that where a defendant has made a misstatement of fact and the Court is of opinion that he had no reasonable grounds for believing that it was true he may be made liable in an action of deceit if it has materially tended to induce the plaintiff to do an act by which he has incurred damage. But on appeal to your Lordships’ House this decision was unanimously reversed, and it was definitely laid down that, in order to establish a cause of action sounding in damages for misrepresentation, the statement must be fraudulent or, what is equivalent thereto, must be made recklessly, not caring whether it be true or not. The opinions pronounced in your Lordships’ House in that case show that both in substance and in form the decision was, and was intended to be, a reaffirmation of the old common law doctrine that actual fraud was essential to an action for deceit, and it finally settled the law that an innocent misrepresentation gives no right of action sounding in damages.

“On the Common Law side of the Court the attempts to make a person liable for an innocent misrepresentation have usually taken the form of attempts to extend the doctrine of warranty beyond its just limits and to find that a warranty existed in cases where there was nothing more than an innocent misrepresentation. The present case is, in my opinion, an instance of this. But in respect of the question of the existence of a warranty the Courts have had the advantage of an admirable enunciation of the true principle of law which was made in very early days by Holt, C. J., with respect to the contract of sale. He says: ‘An affirmation at the time of the sale is a warranty, provided it appear on evidence to be so intended.’ So far as decisions are concerned, this has, on the whole, been consistently followed in the Courts of Common Law. But from time to time there have been dicta inconsistent with it which have, unfortunately, found their way into text-books and have given rise to confusion and uncertainty in this branch of the law. For example, one often sees quoted the dictum of Bayley, J., in Cave _v._ Coleman, 3 Man. & Ry. 2, where, in respect of a representation made verbally during the sale of a horse, he says that ‘being made in the course of a dealing, and before the bargain was complete, it amounted to a warranty’—a proposition that is far too sweeping and cannot be supported. A still more serious deviation from the correct principle is to be found in a passage in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in DeLassalle _v._ Guildford, [1901] 2 K. B. 215, at p. 221, which was cited to us in the argument in the present case. In discussing the question whether a representation amounts to a warranty or not the judgment says: ‘In determining whether it was so intended, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.’

“With all deference to the authority of the Court that decided that case, the proposition which it thus formulates cannot be supported. It is clear that the Court did not intend to depart from the law laid down by Holt, C. J., and cited above, for in the same judgment that dictum is referred to and accepted as a correct statement of the law. It is, therefore, evident that the use of the phrase ‘decisive test’ cannot be defended. Otherwise it would be the duty of a judge to direct a jury that if a vendor states a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, they must, as a matter of law, find the existence of a warranty, whether or not the totality of the evidence shows that the

## parties intended the affirmation to form part of the contract; and

this would be inconsistent with the law as laid down by Holt, C. J. It may well be that the features thus referred to in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case may be criteria of value in guiding a jury in coming to a decision whether or not a warranty was intended; but they cannot be said to furnish decisive tests, because it cannot be said as a matter of law that the presence or absence of those features is conclusive of the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties can only be deduced from the totality of the evidence, and no secondary principles of such a kind can be universally true.

“It is, my Lords, of the greatest importance, in my opinion, that this House should maintain in its full integrity the principle that a person is not liable in damages for an innocent misrepresentation, no matter in what way or under what form the attack is made. In the present case the statement was made in answer to an inquiry for information. There is nothing which can by any possibility be taken as evidence of an intention on the part of either or both of the parties that there should be a contractual liability in respect of the accuracy of the statement. It is a representation as to a specific thing and nothing more. The judge, therefore, ought not to have left the question of warranty to the jury, and if, as a matter of prudence, he did so in order to obtain their opinion in case of appeal he ought then to have entered judgment for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict.”

But compare Kirkpatrick _v._ Reeves, 121 Ind. 280; Mendenhall _v._ Stewart, 18 Ind. App. 262; McLeod _v._ Tutt, 2 Miss. 288; Searing _v._ Lum, 2 South, 683; Indianapolis R. Co. _v._ Tyng, 63 N. Y. 653; Cobb _v._ Fogalman, 1 Ired. 440; Mason _v._ Moore, 73 Ohio St. 275; Loper _v._ Robinson, 54 Tex. 510; Magill _v._ Coffmann, (Tex. Civ. App.) 129 S. W. 1146; Smith _v._ Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah, 580; Ogden Resort Co. _v._ Lewis, 41 Utah, 183; Cameron _v._ Mount, 86 Wis. 477; Palmer _v._ Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103; Knudson _v._ George, 157 Wis. 520.

As to whether an action ought not to be allowed for negligence in the use of language, see Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harvard Law Rev. 184; Cunningham _v._ Pease, 74 N. H. 435; Conway National Bank _v._ Pease, 76 N. H. 319. The English Directors’ Liability Act (1890), 53 & 54 Vict. c. 64, makes directors and others who issue prospectuses liable in certain cases to compensate persons sustaining loss by reason of any untrue statement in the prospectus, unless it is proved that the persons issuing the prospectus had reasonable ground to believe and did believe that the prospectus was true. See also the statute of Oklahoma, Howe _v._ Martin, 23 Okl. 561, 567.

_Liability for statement made recklessly not knowing whether true or not_, see: Cooper _v._ Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148; Hindman _v._ First National Bank, (C. C. A.) 112 Fed. 931; Mueller Furnace Co. _v._ Cascade Foundry Co., 145 Fed. 596; Einstein _v._ Marshall, 58 Ala. 153; McCoy _v._ Prince, 11 Ala. App. 388; Stimson _v._ Helps, 9 Col. 33; Scholfield Gear Co. _v._ Scholfield, 71 Conn. 1; Upchurch _v._ Mizell, 50 Fla. 456; Corbett _v._ Gilbert, 24 Ga. 454; Miller _v._ John, 208 Ill. 173; Snively _v._ Meixsell, 97 Ill. App. 365; West _v._ Wright, 98 Ind. 335; Graves _v._ Lebanon Bank, 10 Bush, 23; Stone _v._ Denny, 4 Met. 151; Fisher _v._ Mellen, 103 Mass. 503; Beebe _v._ Knapp, 28 Mich. 53; Stone _v._ Covell, 29 Mich. 359; Bullitt _v._ Farrar, 42 Minn. 8; Hamlin _v._ Abell, 120 Mo. 188; Chase _v._ Rusk, 90 Mo. App. 25; Ruddy _v._ Gunby, (Mo.) 180 S. W. 1043; Rowell _v._ Chase, 61 N. H. 135; Shackett _v._ Bickford, 74 N. H. 57; Zabriskie _v._ Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; Bennett _v._ Judson, 21 N. Y. 238; Taylor _v._ Commercial Bank, 174 N. Y. 181; Bell _v._ James, 128 App. Div. 241; Whitehurst _v._ Life Ins. Co., 149 N. C. 273; Cawston _v._ Sturgis, 29 Or. 331; Robertson _v._ Frey, 72 Or. 599; Thompson _v._ Chambers, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 213; Mitchell _v._ Zimmerman, 4 Tex. 75; Katzenstein _v._ Reid, Murdock & Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 106; Benton _v._ Kuykendall, (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 438; Wheeler _v._ Wheelock, 34 Vt. 553; Agnew _v._ Hackett, 80 Wash. 236; Cotzhausen _v._ Simon, 47 Wis. 103.

Compare Ray County Bank _v._ Hutton, 224 Mo. 42; Ramsey _v._ Wallace, 100 N. C. 75.

Footnote 342:

“The doctrine seems to be well established by authority that the conduct and admissions of a party operate against him in the nature of an estoppel, wherever, in good conscience and honest dealing, he ought not to be permitted to gainsay them. Thus, negligence becomes constructive fraud,—although, strictly speaking, the actual intention to mislead or deceive may be wanting, and the party may be innocent, if innocence and gross negligence may be deemed compatible; and in such cases the maxim is justly applied to him, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer who by his own acts occasioned the confidence and loss. The application of the maxim to the case before us is obvious. The principle involved in it is kindred to that of an equitable estoppel, the difference being that the application of the estoppel, instead of the maxim, avoids the loss to the innocent party who has been misled by the conduct of another. See 1 Story’s Eq. Jur., secs. 387, 389; Lucas _v._ Hart, 5 Iowa, 415; Commonwealth _v._ Moltz, 10 Pa. St. 527, 531; Smith _v._ McNeal, 68 Pa. St. 164.” Foster, J., in Stevens _v._ Dennett, 51 N. H. 324, 335.

“The usual form of expressing the situation which founds an estoppel _in pais_ has been that followed in the rulings given, in which, as in many of the older decisions, it is said that an intent to deceive is a necessary element. But under this formula the jury were not prohibited from finding the intention and the estoppel, if, without more, the plaintiff spoke or acted falsely, knowing or having cause to believe that his words or conduct reasonably might influence the defendant’s

## action. The more modern statement, that one is responsible for the

word or act which he knows, or ought to know, will be acted upon by another, includes the older statement that the estoppel comes from an intention to mislead. White _v._ Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 20. Tracy _v._ Lincoln, 145 Mass. 357, 359. O’Donnell _v._ Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 463. Washburn _v._ Hammond, 151 Mass. 132, 141.” Barker. J., in Stiff _v._ Ashton, 155 Mass. 130, 133.

Footnote 343:

Milson _v._ Gerstenberg, 43 App. D. C. 165; Ballard _v._ Thibodeau, 109 Me. 559; Kiefer _v._ Rogers, 19 Minn. 32; Hedin _v._ Minneapolis Medical Institute, 62 Minn. 146; Flaherty _v._ Till, 119 Minn. 191; Devero _v._ Sparks, 189 Mo. App. 500; Craig _v._ Ward, 1 Abb. Dec. 454; Garvin _v._ Harrell, 27 Okl. 373; Wells _v._ Driskell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 149 S. W. 205 _Accord_.

See Water Com’rs _v._ Robbins, 82 Conn. 623; Auman _v._ McKibben, 179 Ill. App. 425; Huntress _v._ Blodgett, 206 Mass. 318; Bank _v._ Wood, 189 Mo. App. 62.

_As to the fiction of “presumption of knowledge,”_ see: Hicks _v._ Stevens, 121 Ill. 186; Ward _v._ Trimble, 103 Ky. 153; Reynolds _v._ Evans, 123 Md. 365; Unitype Co. _v._ Ashcraft, 155 N. C. 63; Collins _v._ Chipman, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 563. Compare Brooks _v._ Hamilton, 15 Minn. 26.

Footnote 344:

O’Neill _v._ Conway, 88 Conn. 651; Bethell _v._ Bethell, 92 Ind. 318; Riley _v._ Bell, 120 Ia. 618; Gund Brewing Co. _v._ Peterson, 130 Ia. 301; Davis _v._ Central Land Co., 162 Ia. 269; Altoona State Bank _v._ Hart, 82 Kan. 398; Braley _v._ Powers, 92 Me. 203; Litchfield _v._ Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195; Savage _v._ Stevens, 126 Mass. 207; Teague _v._ Irwin, 127 Mass. 217; Adams _v._ Collins, 196 Mass. 422; Huntress _v._ Blodgett, 206 Mass. 318; Chatham Furnace Co. _v._ Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403; Riggs _v._ Thorpe, 67 Minn. 217; Vincent _v._ Corbitt, 94 Miss. 46; Western Cattle Co. _v._ Gates, 190 Mo. 391; Paretti _v._ Rebenack, 81 Mo. App. 494; Leicher _v._ Keeney, 98 Mo. App. 394, 110 Mo. App. 292; Leach _v._ Bond, 129 Mo. App. 315; Crosby _v._ Wells, 73 N. J. Law, 790; Thompson _v._ Koewing, 79 N. J. Law, 246; Hadcock _v._ Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604; Modlin _v._ Roanoke Navigation Co., 145 N. C. 218; Pate _v._ Blades, 163 N. C. 267; Joines _v._ Combs, 38 Okl. 380; Gibbens _v._ Bourland, (Tex. Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 274; Grant _v._ Huschke, 74 Wash. 257; Tolly _v._ Poteet, 62 W. Va. 231; Rogers _v._ Rosenfeld, 158 Wis. 285 _Accord_. See Roberts _v._ Anheuser Busch Ass’n, 211 Mass. 449.

In Brownlie _v._ Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925, Lord Blackburn said (pp. 952—53): “The Courts of Law had to refer fraud, in which knowledge was an essential ingredient, to a jury. A Court of Equity had to find it for itself, and consequently the judges in Courts of Equity were not driven to be so precisely accurate in stating exactly whether they were going upon the ground that there was a contract or warranty that the thing was so, or whether they were going upon the ground that the party, knowing it was not, and representing that it was, had committed a fraud in doing that. Most of the cases (the leading one is Burrowes _v._ Loch, 10 Ves. 470, and it is sufficient to mention that, though there were others) when looked at, if they do not absolutely amount to contract, come uncommonly near it. In Burrowes _v._ Loch a man proposing to lend money on the security of an equitable assignment of a share of what remained due on account of the residue of a testator’s estate, went to the trustee who held the fund and asked him, telling him the facts, ‘I am going to lend money upon the security of this share, has any prior loan upon this been communicated to you so as to make you have prior notice, so as to make that other loan come in before me and cut me out, tell me that, in order that I may know whether I will lend the money or not.’ The party on the other side answered, ‘There has been none such.’ To say that that is not warranty or contract that he has received no such notice is, I think, going very near the wind; if it was not that it was so uncommonly like it, that I cannot make the distinction myself. That would have been sufficient for the Master of the Rolls to say, ‘You have warranted this.’ He also had considerable ground for doubting whether the man had really _bona fide_ forgotten. The man, he seems to have thought, had thought this, ‘I will not take the trouble of a search,’ the fact being that he really knew nothing about this and would not take the trouble of looking, but he boldly made the assertion, ‘I know there is none,’ saying as a fact, ‘I know there is none,’ when the real truth could not be more than ‘I am pretty sure there is none.’ If, when a man thinks it is highly probable that a thing exists, he chooses to say he knows the thing exists, that is really asserting what is false—it is positive fraud. That has been repeatedly laid down, and I think the more it is considered the more clear it becomes. If you choose to say, and say without inquiry, ‘I warrant that,’ that is a contract. If you say, ‘I know it,’ and if you say that in order to save the trouble of inquiring, that is a false representation—you are saying what is false to induce them to act upon it. I think all the cases which have been cited come round to pointing to that, but none of them, as far as I am aware, are in contradiction with that which I have cited from Chief Justice Tindal, and I think there are a good many other authorities to the same effect.”

_As to liability where defendant had no reasonable ground to believe what he stated_, see Mayer _v._ Salazar, 84 Cal. 646; McCabe _v._ Desnoyers, 20 S. D. 581.

_Statement as to matter of which obviously defendant could not have personal knowledge_, see: Krause _v._ Cook, 144 Mich. 365; Spead _v._ Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46.

Footnote 345:

Part of the statement is an abridgment of the report in 6 Bingham, 396.

Footnote 346:

Hindman _v._ First Nat. Bank, (C. C. A.) 112 Fed. 931; Hart _v._ Tallmadge, 2 Day, 381; Young _v._ Hall, 4 Ga. 95; Endsley _v._ Johns, 120 Ill. 469; Leonard _v._ Springer, 197 Ill. 532; Skeels _v._ Porter, 165 Ia. 255; Carpenter _v._ Wright, 52 Kan. 221; Bean _v._ Herrick, 12 Me. 262; Page _v._ Bent, 2 Met. 371; Stoney Creek Woolen Co. _v._ Smalley, 111 Mich. 321; Busterud _v._ Farrington, 36 Minn. 320; Brownlee _v._ Hewitt, 1 Mo. App. 360; Bingham _v._ Fish, 86 N. J. Law, 316; White _v._ Merritt, 7 N. Y. 352; Hubbard _v._ Briggs, 31 N. Y. 518; Carpenter _v._ Lee, 5 Yerg. 265; Paddock _v._ Fletcher, 42 Vt. 389 _Accord_.

Footnote 347:

Statement of facts and arguments of counsel omitted.

Footnote 348:

See West London Bank _v._ Kitson, 13 Q. B. D. 360; National Bank _v._ Kershaw Oil Mill, (C. C. A.) 202 Fed. 90. Compare Tackey _v._ McBain, [1912] A. C. 186.

Footnote 349:

Iasigi _v._ Brown, 17 How. 183; Bank of Montreal _v._ Thayer, 7 Fed. 622; Merchants Nat. Bank _v._ Armstrong, 65 Fed. 932; Hindman _v._ First Nat. Bank, (C. C. A.) 98 Fed. 562, 112 Fed. 931; Western Tel. Co. _v._ Schriver, 141 Fed. 538; Harrison _v._ Savage, 19 Ga. 310; Slade _v._ Little, 20 Ga. 371; Hunnewell _v._ Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286; Nash _v._ Minnesota Title & Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437; Rawlings _v._ Bean, 80 Mo. 614; Lembeck _v._ Gerken, 88 N. J. Law, 329; McCracken _v._ West, 17 Ohio, 16; Wells _v._ Cook, 16 Ohio St. 67 _Accord_. But see Merchants Nat. Bank _v._ Robison, 8 Utah, 256.

_Person or member of a class to whom defendant expected the representation to be passed on_, see Shrewsbury _v._ Blount, 2 Man. & Gr. 475; Gerhard _v._ Bates, 2 E. & B. 476; Bedford _v._ Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538; Scott _v._ Brown, [1892] 2 Q. B. 724; Andrews _v._ Mockford, [1896] 1 Q. B. 372; Warfield _v._ Clark, 118 Ia. 69; Wells _v._ Western Tel. Co., 144 Ia. 605; Henry _v._ Dennis, 95 Me. 24; Chubbuck _v._ Cleveland, 37 Minn. 466; Baker _v._ Crandall, 78 Mo. 584; Stuart _v._ Bank of Staplehurst, 57 Neb. 569; Addington _v._ Allen, 11 Wend. 374; Hadcock _v._ Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604; Cazeaux _v._ Mali, 25 Barb. 578; Converse _v._ Sickles, 16 App. Div. 49.

Footnote 350:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 351:

In Allaire _v._ Whitney, 1 Hill, 484, 487, Cowen, J., says that actual damage is not necessary to an action for fraud; and see also Ingraham, J., in Isman _v._ Loring, 130 App. Div. 845. The same doctrine is stated in Northrop _v._ Hill, 57 N. Y. 351; and in Van Velsor _v._ Seaberger, 35 Ill. App. 598; but neither case was one of merely nominal damages. Leadbetter _v._ Morris, 3 Jones, Law, 543, sustains the view of Cowen, J. The doctrine of Cowen, J., in Allaire _v._ Whitney is also cited approvingly in 1 Sedgwick on Damages, 8th ed., § 101, and in 1 Sutherland on Damages, 3d ed., § 10.

But the great weight of authority is against this doctrine, and accords with the view taken by the Minnesota court in the above case of Alden _v._ Wright: viz., that an action of deceit cannot be maintained in the absence of actual damage. See Pollock, Torts, 9 ed., 190, 291; Pollock, Law of Fraud in British India, 22, 23; 1 Jaggard, Torts, 600, 601; Pigott, Torts, 270, 271; McCarrel _v._ Hayes, 186 Ala. 323; Winkler _v._ Jerrue, 20 Cal. App. 555; Morrison _v._ Martin, 84 Conn. 628; Wesselhoeft _v._ Schanze, 153 Ill. App. 443; Bailey _v._ Oatis, 85 Kan. 339; Barnard _v._ Napier, 167 Ky. 824; Reynolds _v._ Evans, 123 Md. 365; Brackett _v._ Perry, 201 Mass. 502; Tregner _v._ Hazen, 116 App. Div. 829; Badger _v._ Pond, 120 App. Div. 619.

Compare Skowhegan Bank _v._ Maxfield, 83 Me. 576 (fraudulently inducing plaintiff to pay debts); Garry _v._ Garry, 187 Mass. 62 (inducing release of inchoate right of dower); Urtz _v._ New York R. Co., 202 N. Y. 170 (release of disputed claim).

Footnote 352:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 353:

In re Pennewell, 119 Fed. 139; Kimmans _v._ Chandler, 13 Ia. 327; Dunn _v._ Bishop, (R. I.) 90 Atl. 1073 _Accord_. Compare Van Vliet Automobile Co. _v._ Crowell, (Ia.) 149 N. W. 861.

Footnote 354:

A new statement has been made covering but one point and only the portion of the opinion relating to that point is given.

Footnote 355:

Ely _v._ Stannard, 46 Conn. 124; Goring _v._ Fitzgerald, 105 Ia. 507; Briggs _v._ Brushaber, 43 Mich. 330; Currier _v._ Poor, 155 N. Y. 344; Hoffman _v._ Toft, 70 Or. 488 _Accord_.

See Conway Bank _v._ Pease, 76 N. H. 319.

Footnote 356:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 357:

See Graham _v._ Peale, (C. C. A.) 173 Fed. 9 (delay in asserting claim); Spreckels _v._ Gorrill, 152 Cal. 383; Barron Estate Co. _v._ Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561 (preparations for building); Williams Crusher & Pulverizer Co. _v._ Lyth Tile Co., 150 N. Y. Suppl. 6 (expensive investigation preliminary to contract not made).

Footnote 358:

“But there is one thing which intervenes between the _injuria_ and the _damnum_ and that is the plaintiff’s _action_ which results in damage. It is clear that a misrepresentation cannot of itself directly produce damage. It requires a means of conveyance, and that is the action which it produces, and which results in damage.”

“... It is the action of the plaintiff, and not the damage, which must be materially induced by the misrepresentation.”

“The fallacy is in regarding the damage, and the action resulting in damage, as the same thing.” Moncrieff, Law of Fraud and Misrepresentation, 187.

Footnote 359:

Statement abridged and arguments omitted.

Footnote 360:

Reaffirmed in Sigafus _v._ Porter, 179 U. S. 116. The authorities on each side of this controverted question are collected in a note to George _v._ Hesse, (100 Tex. 44) 8 L. R. A. N. S. 804. For later cases, see: Harris _v._ Neil, 144 Ga. 519 (_accord_); Trayne _v._ Boardman, 207 Mass. 581; Crawford _v._ Armacost, 85 Wash. 622 (_contra_).

Footnote 361:

Statement abridged; arguments omitted; also part of opinion.

Footnote 362:

Henderson _v._ Henshall, (C. C. A.) 54 Fed. 320; Tooker _v._ Alston, 159 Fed. 599; Jordan _v._ Pickett, 78 Ala. 331; Dingle _v._ Trask, 7 Col. App. 16; Carondelet Iron Works _v._ Moore, 78 Ill. 65; Jones _v._ Foster, 175 Ill. 459; Press _v._ Hair, 133 Ill. App. 528; Anderson Foundry _v._ Myers, 15 Ind. App. 385; Moore _v._ Turbeville, 2 Bibb, 602; Weaver _v._ Shriver, 79 Md. 530; Silver _v._ Frazier, 3 All. 382; Parker _v._ Moulton, 114 Mass. 99; Poland _v._ Brownell, 131 Mass. 138; Thompson _v._ Pentecost, 206 Mass. 505; Anderson _v._ McPike, 86 Mo. 293; Brown _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 187 Mo. App. 104; Morrill _v._ Madden, 35 Minn. 493; Grindrod _v._ Anglo-American Bond Co., 34 Mont. 169; Power _v._ Turner, 37 Mont. 521; Osborne _v._ Missouri R. Co., 71 Neb. 180; Saunders _v._ Hatterman, 2 Ired. 32; Mulholland _v._ Washington Match Co., 35 Wash. 315; Mosher _v._ Post, 89 Wis. 602; Farr _v._ Peterson, 91 Wis. 182; Kaiser _v._ Nummerdor, 120 Wis. 234; Jacobsen _v._ Whitely, 138 Wis. 434 _Accord_.

But see Wilson _v._ Higbee, 62 Fed. 723; King _v._ Livingston Mfg. Co., 180 Ala. 118; Mason _v._ Thornton, 74 Ark. 46; Linington _v._ Strong, 107 Ill. 295; Robinson _v._ Reinhart, 137 Ind. 674; Hanks _v._ McKee, 2 Litt. 227; Bowen _v._ Carter, 124 Mass. 426; Arnold _v._ Teele, 182 Mass. 1; Light _v._ Jacobs, 183 Mass. 206; Bachman _v._ Travelers Ins. Co., (N. H.) 97 Atl. 223; Fox _v._ Duffy, 95 App. Div. 202.

“The doctrine ... is not to be extended. It relates merely to seller’s talk.” Sheldon, J., in Townsend _v._ Niles, 210 Mass. 524, 531.

_Equal means of knowledge_, see Hill _v._ Bush, 19 Ark. 522; Strong _v._ Peters, 2 Root, 93; McDaniell _v._ Strohecker, 19 Ga. 432; Knight _v._ Gaultney, 23 Ill. App. 376; Foley _v._ Cowgill, 5 Blackf. 18; Boddy _v._ Henry, 113 Ia. 462; Hinchman _v._ Weeks, 85 Mich. 535; Bradford _v._ Wright, 145 Mo. App. 623; Conway Nat. Bank _v._ Pease, 76 N. H. 319; Long _v._ Warren, 68 N. Y. 426; Crislip _v._ Cain, 19 W. Va. 438.

_Execution of instrument without reading it_, see Dunham Lumber Co. _v._ Holt, 123 Ala. 336; Robinson _v._ Glass, 94 Ind. 211; Porter _v._ United Railways, 165 Mo. App. 619; Muller _v._ Rosenblath, 157 App. Div. 513; Griffin _v._ Roanoke Lumber Co., 140 N. C. 514.

_Reliance on friendship_, see Gray _v._ Reeves, 69 Wash. 374.

Footnote 363:

Arguments omitted; also part of opinion.

Footnote 364:

Martin _v._ Burford, (C. C. A.) 181 Fed. 922; Hutchinson _v._ Gorman, 71 Ark. 305; Scott _v._ Moore, 89 Ark. 321; Montgomery _v._ McLaury, 143 Cal. 83; Teague _v._ Hall, 171 Cal. 668; Eames _v._ Morgan, 37 Ill. 260; Ladd _v._ Pigott, 114 Ill. 647; Kehl _v._ Abram, 210 Ill. 218 (public records); Backer _v._ Pyne, 130 Ind. 288 (records); McGibbons _v._ Wilder, 78 Ia. 531; Faust _v._ Hosford, 119 Ia. 97 (records); Scott _v._ Burnight, 131 Ia. 507; McKee _v._ Eaton, 26 Kan. 226 (records of patent office); Davis _v._ Jenkins, 46 Kan. 19 (records of land office); Carpenter _v._ Wright, 52 Kan. 221 (deed records); Trimble _v._ Ward, 97 Ky. 748; Martin _v._ Jordan, 60 Me. 531; Braley _v._ Powers, 92 Me. 203; Harlow _v._ Perry, 113 Me. 239; David _v._ Park, 103 Mass. 501 (records of patent office); Holst _v._ Stewart, 161 Mass. 516; Rollins _v._ Quimby, 200 Mass. 162 (mortgage records); Jackson _v._ Armstrong, 50 Mich. 65; Smith _v._ Werkheiser, 152 Mich. 177; Faribault _v._ Sater, 13 Minn. 223; Redding _v._ Wright, 49 Minn. 322; Union Bank _v._ Hunt, 76 Mo. 439; Cottrill _v._ Krum, 100 Mo. 397; Stonemets _v._ Head, 248 Mo. 243; Shearer _v._ Hill, 125 Mo. App. 375; Gerner _v._ Mosher, 58 Neb. 135 (books of corporation); Perry _v._ Rogers, 62 Neb. 898; Martin _v._ Hutton, 90 Neb. 34; Bradbury _v._ Haines, 60 N. H. 123; Blossom _v._ Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434 (records of court); Gage _v._ Peetsch, 16 Misc. 291 (mortgage records); Blumenfield _v._ Stine, 42 Misc. 411 (records); Blacknall _v._ Rowland, 108 N. C. 554; Bank of North America _v._ Sturdy, 7 R. I. 109; Handy _v._ Waldron, 19 R. I. 618 (failure to inquire of references); Hunt _v._ Barker, 22 R. I. 18 (deed records); Wright _v._ United States Mfg. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 42 S. W. 789 (tax records); Chamberlain _v._ Rankin, 49 Vt. 133; Morrill _v._ Palmer, 68 Vt. 1; Jordan _v._ Walker, 115 Va. 109; City _v._ Tacoma Light Co., 17 Wash. 458; Simons _v._ Cissna, 52 Wash. 115; Borde _v._ Kingsley, 76 Wash. 613; Hall _v._ Bank, 143 Wis. 303 (records); Woteshek _v._ Neuman, 151 Wis. 365; Rogers _v._ Rosenfeld, 158 Wis. 285 _Accord_.

See Henry _v._ Allen, 93 Ala. 197; Hanger _v._ Evins, 38 Ark. 334; Wheeler _v._ Baars, 33 Fla. 696 (records); Forbes _v._ Thorpe, 209 Mass. 570. Compare Campbell _v._ Frankem, 65 Ind. 591.

_Assertion of title_, see: Crandall _v._ Parks, 152 Cal. 772; Hale _v._ Philbrick, 42 Ia. 81; Young _v._ Hopkins, 6 T. B. Mon. 18; Cobb _v._ Wright, 43 Minn. 83; Manley _v._ Johnson, 85 Vt. 262.

_Statements as to boundaries_, see: Roberts _v._ Plaisted, 63 Me. 335; Olson _v._ Orton, 28 Minn. 36; Clark _v._ Baird, Seld. Notes, 187; Schwenk _v._ Naylor, 102 N. Y. 683; Roberts _v._ Holliday, 10 S. D. 576.

_Plaintiff informed of truth by third person_, see: Moncrief _v._ Wilkinson, 93 Ala. 373; Haight _v._ Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464; Grosjean _v._ Galloway, 82 App. Div. 380.

_Refusal of defendant to put representation in writing_, Ettlinger _v._ Weil, 184 N. Y. 179.

Footnote 365:

O’Neill _v._ Conway, 88 Conn. 651; Antle _v._ Sexton, 137 Ill. 410; Ledbetter _v._ Davis, 121 Ind. 119; Speed _v._ Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436; Judd _v._ Walker, 215 Mo. 312; Miller _v._ Wissert, 38 Okl. 808; Farris _v._ Gilder, (Tex. Civ. App.) 115 S. W. 645 _Accord_.

Compare Cawston _v._ Sturgis, 29 Or. 331. And see Disney _v._ Lang, 90 Kan. 309.

Footnote 366:

Credle _v._ Swindell, 63 N. C. 305; Wamsley _v._ Currence, 25 W. Va. 543 _Accord_.

See Cagney _v._ Cuson, 77 Ind. 494. Compare Lewis _v._ Jewell, 151 Mass. 345.

_Representations as to matter of law_, see Eaglesfield _v._ Londonderry, 4 Ch. D. 693, 702–703; Mutual Life Ins. Co. _v._ Phinney, 178 U. S. 327; Martin _v._ Wharton, 38 Ala. 637; Lehman _v._ Shackleford, 50 Ala. 437; McDonald _v._ Smith, 95 Ark. 523; Kehl _v._ Abram, 210 Ill. 218; Hill _v._ Coates, 127 Ill. App. 196; Clodfelter _v._ Hulett, 72 Ind. 137; Kinney _v._ Dodge, 101 Ind. 573; Whitman _v._ Atchison R. Co., 85 Kan. 150; Thompson _v._ Phoenix Ins. Co., 75 Me. 55; Stevens _v._ Odlin, 109 Me. 417; Bilafsky _v._ Conveyancers Ins. Co., 192 Mass. 504; Kerr _v._ Shurtleff, 218 Mass. 167; Rose _v._ Saunders, 38 Hun, 575; Unckles _v._ Hentz, 18 Misc. 644; Moreland _v._ Atchison, 19 Tex. 303; Texas Cotton Co. _v._ Denny, (Tex. Civ. App.) 78 S. W. 557; Gormely _v._ Gymnastic Ass’n, 55 Wis. 350.

_Law of another state_, see Travelers Protective Ass’n _v._ Smith, 183 Ind. 59; Schneider _v._ Schneider, 125 Ia. 1; Anderson _v._ Heasley, 95 Kan. 572; Wood _v._ Roeder, 50 Neb. 476.

Footnote 367:

“This contention assumes that the defrauded party owes to the party who defrauded him a duty to use diligence to discover the fraud. There is no such obligation. One who perpetrates a fraud cannot complain because his victim continues to have a confidence which a more vigilant person could not have.” Carpenter, J., in Smith _v._ McDonald, 139 Mich. 225, 229. See Barley _v._ Walford, 9 Q. B. 197, 209. Compare Thaler _v._ Neidermeyer, 185 Mo. App. 257.

Footnote 368:

The statement has been redrawn and only parts of the opinion are printed.

Footnote 369:

See Hicks _v._ Stevens, 121 Ill. 186.

Footnote 370:

The statement of the case has been abridged and only a part of the opinion is given.

Footnote 371:

The court decided that the answer was good.

Footnote 372:

In accordance with the opinion of the majority of the court see Clarke _v._ Postan, 6 Car. & P. 423; Stapp _v._ Partlow, Dudley, (Ga.) 176; Feazle _v._ Simpson, 2 Ill. 30 (_semble_); Holmes _v._ Johnson, Busbee, 44; Britton _v._ Granger, 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 281, 291.

In accordance with the opinion of the minority see Gregory _v._ Derby, 8 Car. & P. 749, 750 (_semble_); Cooper _v._ Armour, 42 Fed. 215, 217; Sheppard _v._ Furniss, 19 Ala. 760 (_semble_); Davis _v._ Sanders, 133 Ala. 275, 278 (_semble_); Newfield _v._ Copperman, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 360 (_semble_); Lawyer _v._ Loomis, 3 Th. & C. 393, 395; Mitchell _v._ Donanski, 28 R. I. 94; O’Driscoll _v._ McBurney, 2 N. & McC. 54 (_semble_); Heyward _v._ Cuthbert, 4 McC. 354 (_semble_).

Compare Swift _v._ Witchard, 103 Ga. 193.

_Arrest without warrant, not followed by prosecution_, see Auerbach _v._ Freeman, 43 App. D. C. 176; McDonald _v._ National Art Co., 69 Misc. 325.

_Search warrant issued but no arrest or seizure of property_, see Gulsby _v._ Louisville R. Co., 167 Ala. 122; Hardin _v._ Hight, 106 Ark. 190; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Holliday, 30 Okl. 680; Olson _v._ Haggerty, 69 Wash. 48.

_Application for a warrant, none issued_, see Schneider _v._ Schlang, 159 App. Div. 385. But see Kashare _v._ Robbins, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1041.

Some jurisdictions, however, require legal process of at least _prima facie_ validity. See Strain _v._ Irwin, 195 Ala. 414; Smith _v._ Brown, 119 Md. 236; Tiede _v._ Fuhr, 264 Mo. 622; Segusky _v._ Williams, 89 S. C. 414.

Cf. Grissom _v._ Lawler, 10 Ala. App. 540 (plaintiff gave bond after complaint, so no process issued).

Footnote 373:

Pippet _v._ Hearn, 5 B. & Al. 634; Rutherford _v._ Dyer, 146 Ala. 665; Peterson _v._ Hoyt, 4 Alaska, 713; Harrington _v._ Tibbet, 143 Cal. 78; Streight _v._ Bell, 37 Ind. 550; Shaul _v._ Brown, 28 Ia. 37; Bell _v._ Keepers, 37 Kan. 64; Potter _v._ Gjertsen, 37 Minn. 386; Stocking _v._ Howard, 73 Mo. 25; Hackler _v._ Miller, 79 Neb. 209; Dennis _v._ Ryan, 65 N. Y. 385; Kline _v._ Shuler, 8 Ired. 484; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Holliday, 30 Okl. 680; Ward _v._ Sutor, 70 Tex. 343; Strehlow _v._ Pettit, 96 Wis. 22; McIntosh _v._ Wales, 21 Wyo. 397 _Accord_.

Alexander _v._ West, 6 Ga. App. 72 _Contra_.

_Prosecution under unconstitutional statute_: Murten _v._ Garbe, 91 Neb. 439.

_Court without jurisdiction_: Calhoun _v._ Bell, 136 La. 149. Compare Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274.

Footnote 374:

1 Marsh. 12, S. C.

Footnote 375:

The statement of the case has been taken from 1 Marsh. 12; the arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 376:

See Saville _v._ Roberts, 1 Ld. Ray. 374; 12 Mod. 208, S. C.

“It is difficult to see on what grounds it can be maintained that a charge of breaking the peace conveys no imputation on the character of the person charged, and it may be doubted whether the authority of the cases above mentioned (Byne _v._ Moore and Saville _v._ Roberts) would now be recognized on this point.” Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, (5 ed.) 663.

Footnote 377:

Only the opinion of ERLE, C. J., is given.

Footnote 378:

Hyde _v._ Greuch, 62 Md. 577; Pixley _v._ Reed, 26 Minn. 80 (_semble_); Apgar _v._ Woolston, 43 N. J. Law, 57. 65 (_semble_); Bump _v._ Betts, 19 Wend. 421; Fortman _v._ Rottier, 8 Ohio St. 548 _Accord_.

See Brinkley _v._ Knight, 163 N. C. 194 (release by constable without a hearing).

Footnote 379:

Parker _v._ Langley, 10 Mod. 209; Whitworth _v._ Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695; Mellor _v._ Baddeley, 2 Cr. & M. 675; Watkins _v._ Lee, 5 M. & W. 270; McCann _v._ Preneveau, 10 Ont. 573; Poitras _v._ LeBeau, 14 Can. S. C. 742; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Steel _v._ Williams, 18 Ind. 161; West _v._ Hayes, 104 Ind. 251; Olson _v._ Neal, 63 Ia. 214; Wood _v._ Laycock, 3 Met. (Ky.) 192; Smith _v._ Brown, 119 Md. 236; Hamilburgh _v._ Shepard, 119 Mass. 30; Wilson _v._ Hale, 178 Mass. 111; Pixley _v._ Reed, 26 Minn. 80; Lowe _v._ Wartman, 47 N. J. Law, 413; Clark _v._ Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344; Searll _v._ McCracken, 16 How. Pr. 262; Swartwout _v._ Dickelman, 12 Hun, 358; Johnson _v._ Finch, 93 N. C. 205; Forster _v._ Orr. 17 Or. 447; Scheibler _v._ Steinburg, 129 Tenn. 614; Luby _v._ Bennett, 111 Wis. 613 _Accord_.

Consequently, the Statute of Limitations does not run until the prosecution is terminated. Mayor _v._ Hall, 12 Can. S. C. 74; Printup _v._ Smith, 74 Ga. 157; Rider _v._ Kite, 61 N. J. Law, 8.

Also although discharged by a magistrate, plaintiff can not sue if the grand jury afterwards indict. Hartshorn _v._ Smith, 104 Ga. 235; Weglein _v._ Trow Directory Co., 152 App. Div. 705. See Schippel _v._ Norton, 38 Kan. 567; Knott _v._ Sargent, 125 Mass. 95. Compare Simmons _v._ Sullivan, 42 App. D. C. 523 (amended or substitute information, altering the charge); Mistich _v._ Collette, 136 La. 294 (second prosecution instituted after termination of first and still pending).

Footnote 380:

Everything is omitted, except the opinion of the court on the question of the termination of the prosecution.

Footnote 381:

Cotton _v._ Wilson, Minor, 203; Hurgren _v._ Union Co., 141 Cal. 585; Chapman _v._ Woods, 6 Blackf. 504; Richter _v._ Koster, 45 Ind. 440; Coffey _v._ Myers, 84 Ind. 105; Kelley _v._ Sage, 12 Kan. 109; Bell _v._ Matthews, 37 Kan. 686; Yocum _v._ Polly, 1 B. Mon. 358; Stanton _v._ Hart, 27 Mich. 539; Swensgaard _v._ Davis, 33 Minn. 368 (_semble_); Kennedy _v._ Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503; Casebeer _v._ Drahoble, 13 Neb. 465; Casebeer _v._ Rice, 18 Neb. 203; Apgar _v._ Woolston, 43 N. J. Law, 57; Lowe _v._ Wartman, 47 N. J. Law, 413; Clark _v._ Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344 (_semble_); Moulton _v._ Beecher, 8 Hun, 100; Fay _v._ O’Neill, 36 N. Y. 11 (_semble_); Murray _v._ Lackey, 2 Murph. 368; Rice _v._ Ponder, 7 Ired. 390; Hatch _v._ Cohen, 84 N. C. 602; Marcus _v._ Bernstein, 117 N. C. 31; Douglas _v._ Allen, 56 Ohio St. 156; Murphy _v._ Moore, (Pa.) 11 Atl. 665; Driggs _v._ Burton, 44 Vt. 124; Woodworth _v._ Mills, 61 Wis. 44; Manz _v._ Klippel, 158 Wis. 557; McCrosson _v._ Cummings, 5 Hawn, 391 _Accord_.

Massachusetts formerly held to the contrary. Parker _v._ Farley, 10 Cush. 279. But see Graves _v._ Dawson, 130 Mass. 78, 133 Mass. 419; Langford _v._ Boston R. Co., 144 Mass. 431; Briggs _v._ Shepard Mfg. Co., 217 Mass. 446.

_Indictment quashed_, see Simmons _v._ Sullivan, 42 App. D. C. 523; Wilkerson _v._ McGee, 265 Mo. 574; Reit _v._ Meyer, 160 App. Div. 752.

Case stricken from docket because sent to wrong court, Sandlin _v._ Anders, 187 Ala. 473.

_Termination of a previous civil action._—If a party sues for a malicious arrest or seizure of property in a civil action, a voluntary abandonment of the latter action by the plaintiff therein is equivalent to its termination in favor of his adversary. Arundell _v._ White, 14 East, 216; Nicholson _v._ Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21; Pierce _v._ Street, 3 B. & Ad. 397; Watkins _v._ Lee, 5 M. & W. 270; Ross _v._ Norman, 5 Ex. 359; Emery _v._ Ginnan, 24 Ill. App. 65; Cardival _v._ Smith, 109 Mass. 158; Ludwick _v._ Penny, 158 N. C. 104; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283. Compare Hales _v._ Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46 (action recommenced after voluntary nonsuit).

The rule is the same as to malicious prosecutions of civil actions without arrest or attachment in jurisdictions where one is allowed to sue for malicious prosecution of a civil action, without more. Wall _v._ Toomey, 52 Conn. 35; Marbourg _v._ Smith, 11 Kan. 554; Mitchell _v._ Sullivan, 30 Kan. 231. See also Wilson _v._ Hale, 178 Mass. 111; Luby _v._ Bennett, 111 Wis. 613.

But an abandonment of the previous proceeding, brought about as a compromise, is not a termination in favor of the original defendant. Wilkinson _v._ Howel, M. & M. 495; Kinsey _v._ Wallace, 36 Cal. 462 (_semble_); Waters _v._ Winn, 142 Ga. 138; Emery _v._ Ginnan, 24 Ill. App. 65; Fadner _v._ Filer, 27 Ill. App. 506; Ruehl Brewing Co. _v._ Atlas Brewing Co., 187 Ill. App. 392; Singer Machine Co. _v._ Dyer, 156 Ky. 156; Marks _v._ Gray, 42 Me. 86; Sartwell _v._ Parker, 141 Mass. 405; Langford _v._ Boston R. Co., 144 Mass. 431; Rachelman _v._ Skinner, 46 Minn. 196; McCormick _v._ Sisson, 7 Cow. 715; Gallagher _v._ Stoddard, 47 Hun, 101; Atwood _v._ Beirne, 73 Hun, 547 (but see Reit _v._ Meyer, 160 App. Div. 752); Welch _v._ Cheek, 115 N. C. 310; Clark _v._ Everett, 2 Grant, (Pa.) 416; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283, 287; Rounds _v._ Humes, 7 R. I. 535; Russell _v._ Morgan, 24 R. I. 134. Unless the settlement was obtained by duress of the person or the goods of the original defendant. Morton _v._ Young, 55 Me. 24; White _v._ International Textbook Co., 156 Ia. 210.

Footnote 382:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 383:

Anon., 6 Mod. 73; Turner _v._ Ambler, 10 Q. B. 252; Hailes _v._ Marks, 7 H. & N. 56; Wheeler _v._ Nesbitt, 24 How. 544, 550; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Sanders _v._ Palmer, 55 Fed. 217; Jordan _v._ Alabama Co., 81 Ala. 220; Price _v._ Morris, 122 Ark. 382; Mark _v._ Rich, 43 App. D. C. 182; Marable _v._ Mayer, 78 Ga. 710; Joiner _v._ Ocean Co., 86 Ga. 238; Ames _v._ Snider, 69 Ill. 376; Barrett _v._ Spaids, 70 Ill. 408; Leyenberger _v._ Paul, 12 Ill. App. 635; Morrell _v._ Martin, 17 Ill. App. 336; Adams _v._ Lisher, 3 Blackf. 241; Green _v._ Cochran, 43 Ia. 544; Yocum _v._ Polly, 1 B. Mon. 358; Medcalfe _v._ Brooklyn Co., 45 Md. 198; Flickinger _v._ Wagner, 46 Md. 580; Stone _v._ Crocker, 24 Pick. 81; Coupal _v._ Ward, 106 Mass. 289; Hamilton _v._ Smith, 39 Mich. 222; Smith _v._ Austin, 49 Mich. 286; Webster _v._ Fowler, 89 Mich. 303; Cox _v._ Lauritsen, 126 Minn. 128; Burris _v._ North, 64 Mo. 426; Renfro _v._ Prior, 22 Mo. App. 403; Kennedy _v._ Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503, 519; Harris _v._ Quincy R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 261; McDonald _v._ Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432; Woodman _v._ Prescott, 65 N. H. 224; Heyne _v._ Blair, 62 N. Y. 19; Miller _v._ Milligan, 48 Barb. 30; Linitzky _v._ Gorman, 146 N. Y. Supp. 313; Dietz _v._ Langfitt, 63 Pa. St. 234; Emerson _v._ Cochran, 111 Pa. St. 619; Bartlett _v._ Brown, 6 R. I. 37; Welch _v._ Boston R. Corp., 14 R. I. 609; Stoddard _v._ Roland, 31 S. C. 342; Kelton _v._ Bevins, Cooke, (Tenn.) 90; Evans _v._ Thompson, 12 Heisk. 534; Johnson _v._ State, 32 Tex. Cr. 58; South Bank _v._ Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505; Waring _v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534; Bailey _v._ Gollehon, 76 W. Va. 322; Reicher _v._ Neacy, 158 Wis. 657 _Accord_.

_Definitions of probable cause_, see Gulsby _v._ Louisville R. Co., 167 Ala. 122; Hanchey _v._ Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Runo _v._ Williams, 162 Cal, 444; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573; Mark _v._ Rich, 43 App. D. C. 182; Pianco _v._ Joseph, 188 Ill. App. 555; Schwartz _v._ Boswell, 156 Ky. 103; Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind. 239; Banken _v._ Locke, 136 La. 155; Chapman _v._ Nash, 121 Md. 608; Gilecki _v._ Dolemba, 189 Mich. 107; Cox _v._ Lauritsen, 126 Minn. 128; Lammers _v._ Mason, 123 Minn. 204; Wilkerson _v._ McGhee, 163 Mo. App. 356, 153 Mo. App. 343; Humphries _v._ Edwards, 164 N. C. 154; Cole _v._ Reece, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 212; Waring _v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534; Bailey _v._ Gollehon, 76 W. Va. 322.

Footnote 384:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 385:

_Conviction reversed._—It is generally agreed that a conviction of the defendant in the criminal proceeding, although subsequently reversed, negatives the absence of probable cause, unless it is also made to appear that the conviction was procured by the fraud of the instigator of the criminal proceeding. Accordingly, a declaration alleging the conviction and its reversal, but not alleging any such fraud, is bad on demurrer. Reynolds _v._ Kennedy, 1 Wils. 232; Crescent Co. _v._ Butcher’s Co., 120 U. S. 141; Knight _v._ Internat. R. Co., 61 Fed. 87; Blackman _v._ West Co., 126 Fed. 252; Casey _v._ Dorr, 94 Ark. 433; Carpenter _v._ Sibley, 153 Cal. 215; Goodrich _v._ Warner, 21 Conn. 432 (_semble_); McElroy _v._ Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290; Dahlberg _v._ Grace, 178 Ill. App. 97; Adams _v._ Bicknell, 126 Ind. 210; Moffatt _v._ Fisher, 47 Ia. 473; Bowman _v._ Brown, 52 Ia. 437; Olson _v._ Neal, 63 Ia. 214; Barber _v._ Scott, 92 Ia. 52; White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 210; Ross _v._ Hixon, 46 Kan. 550, 555; Spring _v._ Besore, 12 B. Mon. 551; Kaye _v._ Kean, 18 B. Mon. 839; Duerr _v._ Ky. Co., 132 Ky. 228; Witham _v._ Gowen, 14 Me. 362; Payson _v._ Caswell, 22 Me. 212; Sidelinger _v._ Trowbridge, 113 Me. 537; Whitney _v._ Peckham, 15 Mass. 243; Dennehey _v._ Woodsum, 100 Mass. 195, 197; Phillips _v._ Kalamazoo, 53 Mich. 33 (see Spalding _v._ Lowe, 56 Mich. 366); Boogher _v._ Hough, 99 Mo. 183; Nehr _v._ Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863; Burt _v._ Place, 4 Wend. 591; Palmer _v._ Avery, 41 Barb. 290; Francisco _v._ Schmeelk, 156 App. Div. 335; Root _v._ Rose, 6 N. D. 575; Thienes _v._ Francis, 69 Or. 165; Herman _v._ Brookerhoff, 8 Watts, 240 (_semble_); Welch _v._ Boston R. Co., 14 R. I. 609; Hull _v._ Sprague, 23 R. I. 188; Memphis Co. _v._ Williamson, 9 Heisk. 314; Saunders _v._ Baldwin, 112 Va. 431; Topolewski _v._ Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52. Compare Carpenter _v._ Hood, 172 Mich. 533; Platt _v._ Bonsall, 136 App. Div. 397.

As to fraudulently procured plea of guilty, see Johnson _v._ Girdwood, 7 Misc. 651; Holtman _v._ Bullock, 142 Ky. 335.

In a few jurisdictions the conviction, although set aside, is treated as conclusive evidence of probable cause, proof of fraud in its procurement being inadmissible. Hartshorn _v._ Smith, 104 Ga. 235; Clements _v._ Odorless Co., 67 Md. 461, 605 (Bryan, J., diss.); Parker _v._ Huntington, 7 Gray, 36; Griffis _v._ Sellars, 4 Dev. & B. 176.

In Virginia, on the contrary, a count alleging a conviction and its reversal is sufficient without any allegation in regard to fraud. Jones _v._ Finch, 84 Va. 204 (_semble_); Blanks _v._ Robinson, 1 Va. Dec. 600; Va. L. J. (1886) 398 (overruling Womack _v._ Circle, 32 Grat. 324). See Hale _v._ Boylen, 22 W. Va. 234.

_Commitment for grand jury._—The holding of the defendant for the grand jury is _prima facie_ evidence of probable cause. Miller _v._ Chicago Co., 41 Fed. 898; Ewing _v._ Sanford, 19 Ala. 605; Price Mercantile Co. _v._ Cuilla, 100 Ark. 316; Ganea _v._ Southern Co., 51 Cal. 140; Diemer _v._ Herber, 75 Cal. 287; Ritchey _v._ Davis, 11 Ia. 124; Ross _v._ Hixon, 46 Kan. 550; Danzer _v._ Nathan, 145 App. Div. 448; Giesener _v._ Healy, 86 Misc. 16; Ricord _v._ Central Co., 15 Nev. 167; Ash _v._ Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119; Raleigh _v._ Cook, 60 Tex. 438; Hale _v._ Boylen, 22 W. Va. 234.

_Finding of indictment._—The finding of an indictment is _prima facie_ evidence of probable cause. Garrard _v._ Willet, 4 J. J. Marsh. 628; Sharpe _v._ Johnston, 76 Mo. 660; Peck _v._ Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138; Wilkerson _v._ McGhee, 153 Mo. App. 343, 163 Mo. App. 356.

_Failure of the prosecution._—The failure of the original prosecution is in some jurisdictions regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of want of probable cause. Miller _v._ Chicago R. Co., 41 Fed. 898; Hanchey _v._ Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Tucker _v._ Bartlett, 97 Kan. 163; Straus _v._ Young, 36 Md. 246; Whitfield _v._ Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311; Bostick _v._ Rutherford, 4 Hawks, 83; Downing _v._ Stone, 152 N. C. 525; Barhigh _v._ Tammany, 158 Pa. St. 545; McKenzie _v._ Canning, 42 Utah, 529 (but compare Smith _v._ Clark, 37 Utah, 116); Jones _v._ Finch, 84 Va. 204; Waring _v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534; Saunders _v._ First Nat. Bank, 85 Wash. 125; Brady _v._ Stiltner, 40 W. Va. 289; Fetty _v._ Huntington Loan Co., 70 W. Va. 688; Winn _v._ Peckham, 42 Wis. 493; Lawrence _v._ Cleary, 88 Wis. 473; Manz _v._ Klippel, 158 Wis. 557. In others there is no such presumption. Incledon _v._ Berry, 1 Camp. 203 n; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 195; Thompson _v._ Beacon Co., 56 Conn. 493; Plummer _v._ Collins, 1 Boyce, 281; Skidmore _v._ Bricker, 77 Ill. 164; Bitting _v._ Ten Eyck, 82 Ind. 421; Prine _v._ Singer Machine Co., 176 Mich. 300; Williams _v._ Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339; Boeger _v._ Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390; Eckerle _v._ Higgins, 159 Mo. App. 177 (distinguishing nol. pros. and discharge on preliminary examination—see also Smith _v._ Glynn, (Mo.) 144 S. W. 149); Harris _v._ Quincy R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 261; Scott _v._ Simpson, 1 Sandf. 601; Central Light Co. _v._ Tyron, 42 Okl. 86; Eastman _v._ Monastes, 32 Or. 291; Bekkeland _v._ Lyons, 96 Tex. 255; McIntosh _v._ Wales, 21 Wyo. 397. See also Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274.

Order vacating attachment as _prima facie_ evidence of want of probable cause in action for malicious attachment, see Petruschke _v._ Kamerer, 131 Minn. 320.

Footnote 386:

The statement of the evidence, the argument for the defendant, and the concurring opinion of HOLROYD, J., are omitted.

Footnote 387:

Snow _v._ Allen, 1 Stark. 502; Abrath _v._ North Eastern Co., 11 Q. B. Div. 440, 11 App. Cas. 247; Scougall _v._ Stapleton, 12 Ont. 206; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Blunt _v._ Little, 3 Mason, 102; Cuthbert _v._ Galloway, 35 Fed. 466 (_semble_); Miller _v._ Chicago Co., 41 Fed. 898; Coggswell _v._ Bohn, 43 Fed. 411; Staunton _v._ Goshorn, 94 Fed. 52; McLeod _v._ McLeod, 73 Ala. 42; Jordan _v._ Alabama Co., 81 Ala. 220; Lemay _v._ Williams, 32 Ark. 166; Bliss _v._ Wyman, 7 Cal. 257; Jones _v._ Jones, 71 Cal. 89; Brooks _v._ Bradford, 4 Col. App. 410; Mark _v._ Rich, 43 App. D. C. 182; Joiner _v._ Ocean Co., 86 Ga. 238; Baker _v._ Langley, 3 Ga. App. 751; Ross _v._ Innis, 26 Ill. 259; Ames _v._ Snider, 69 Ill. 376; Barrett _v._ Spaids, 70 Ill. 408; Brown _v._ Smith, 83 Ill. 291; Roy _v._ Goings, 112 Ill. 656; Aldridge _v._ Churchill, 28 Ind. 62; Paddock _v._ Watts, 116 Ind. 146; Adams _v._ Bicknell, 126 Ind. 210; Mesher _v._ Iddings, 72 Ia. 553; Schippel _v._ Norton, 38 Kan. 567; Dyer _v._ Singer Machine Co., 164 Ky. 538; Carrigan _v._ Graham, 166 Ky. 333; Stevens _v._ Fassett, 27 Me. 266; Soule _v._ Winslow, 66 Me. 447; Cooper _v._ Utterbach, 37 Md. 282; Hyde _v._ Greuch, 62 Md. 577; Torsch _v._ Dell, 88 Md. 459; Stone _v._ Swift, 4 Pick. 389; Monaghan _v._ Cox, 155 Mass. 487; Stanton _v._ Hart, 27 Mich. 539; Perry _v._ Sulier, 92 Mich. 72; Moore _v._ Northern Co., 37 Minn. 147; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274; Alexander _v._ Harrison, 38 Mo. 258; Burris _v._ North, 64 Mo. 426; Whitfield _v._ Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311; Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274; Jonasen _v._ Kennedy, 39 Neb. 313; Magowan _v._ Rickey, 64 N. J. Law, 402; Hall _v._ Suydam, 6 Barb. 83; Richardson _v._ Virtue, 2 Hun, 208; Turner _v._ Dinnegar, 20 Hun, 465; Beal _v._ Robeson, 8 Ired. 276; Ash _v._ Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119; El Reno Gas Co. _v._ Spurgeon, 30 Okl. 88; Sims _v._ Jay, 53 Okl. 183; Walter _v._ Sample, 25 Pa. St. 275; Smith _v._ Walter, 125 Pa. St. 453; Bartlett _v._ Brown, 6 R. I. 37; Jackson _v._ Bell, 5 S. D. 257; Kendrick _v._ Cypert, 10 Humph. 291; St. Johnsbury Co. _v._ Hunt, 59 Vt. 294; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168; Saunders _v._ Baldwin, 112 Va. 431; Hightower _v._ Union Trust Co., 88 Wash. 179; Sutton _v._ McConnell, 46 Wis. 269; Manz _v._ Klippel, 158 Wis. 557 _Accord_.

But see Brewer _v._ Jacobs, 22 Fed. 217; Stewart _v._ Mulligan, 11 Ga. App. 660; Smith _v._ Glynn, (Mo.) 144 S. W. 149; Downing _v._ Stone, 152 N. C. 525; Ramsey _v._ Arrott, 64 Tex. 320; Glasgow _v._ Owen, 69 Tex. 167; Shannon _v._ Jones, 76 Tex. 141; Tiedeman’s Note, 21 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 582.

The advice must be that of a lawyer, and not a layman. Murphy _v._ Larson, 77 Ill. 172; McCullough _v._ Rice, 59 Ind. 580; Olmstead _v._ Partridge, 16 Gray, 381; Beal _v._ Robeson, 8 Ired. 276. Even though the layman be a justice of the peace. Stephens _v._ Gravit, 136 Ky. 479; Coleman _v._ Heurich, 2 Mack. 189; Straus _v._ Young, 36 Md. 246; Monaghan _v._ Cox, 155 Mass. 487 (_semble_); Gee _v._ Culver, 12 Or. 228; Brobst _v._ Ruff, 100 Pa. St. 91; Sutton _v._ McConnell, 46 Wis. 269. But see Ball _v._ Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; Sisk _v._ Hurst, 1 W. Va. 53. Compare Marks _v._ Hastings, 101 Ala. 165.

The lawyer must have no personal interest in the controversy. Smith _v._ King, 62 Conn. 515; White _v._ Carr, 71 Me. 555.

In Hazzard _v._ Flury, 120 N. Y. 223, the Court of Appeals held that mistaken advice of counsel upon a point of law would not justify the client, since every one is presumed to know the law. Surely that much-abused fiction has seldom been so glaringly perverted in behalf of injustice. See Singer Machine Co. _v._ Dyer, 156 Ky. 156.

Footnote 388:

Vann _v._ McCreary, 77 Cal. 434; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274; Acton _v._ Coffman, 74 Ia. 17; Johnson _v._ Miller, 82 Ia. 693; Sharpe _v._ Johnston, 76 Mo. 660; Ames _v._ Rathbun, 37 How. Pr. 289; Laird _v._ Taylor, 66 Barb. 139; Davenport _v._ Lynch, 6 Jones, (N. C.) 545; Powell _v._ Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504 _Accord_.

_Withholding facts from or unfairstatement to counsel._ Fowlkes _v._ Lewis, 10 Ala. App. 543; Rothschach _v._ Diven, 97 Kan. 38; Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind. 239; Lammers _v._ Mason, 123 Minn. 204; Bowers _v._ Walker, 192 Mo. App. 230; Lathrop _v._ Mathers, 143 App. Div. 376; Baer _v._ Chambers, 67 Wash. 357; Rogers _v._ Van Eps, 143 Wis. 396; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463.

_Must state facts which might have been ascertained with reasonable diligence._ Weddington _v._ White, 148 Ky. 671; Virtue _v._ Creamery Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17; Duffy _v._ Scheerger, 91 Neb. 511. _Contra_—enough to make full and fair disclosure of known facts, Roby _v._ Smith, 40 Okl. 280.

Footnote 389:

The statement of facts is taken from 3 L. J. K. B. N. S. 35. The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Patteson and Taunton, JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 390:

Willans _v._ Taylor, 6 Bing. 183; Busst _v._ Gibbons, 30 L. J. Ex. N. S. 75; Brown _v._ Hawkes, [1891] 2 Q. B. 718; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Brown _v._ Selfridge, 224 U. S. 189; Sanders _v._ Palmer, 55 Fed. 217; Staunton _v._ Goshorn, 94 Fed. 52; Gulsby _v._ Louisville R. Co., 167 Ala. 122; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Stephenson, 6 Ala. App. 578; Ball _v._ Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; Johnson _v._ Southern R. Co., 157 Cal. 333; Smith _v._ King, 62 Conn. 515; Carroll _v._ Perry, 43 App. D. C. 363; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274; Helwig _v._ Beckner, 149 Ind. 131; Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind. 239; Lawrence _v._ Leathers, 31 Ind. App. 414; Henderson _v._ McGruder, 49 Ind. App. 682; Atchison Co. _v._ Allen, 70 Kan. 743; Michael _v._ Matson, 81 Kan. 360; Metrop. Co. _v._ Miller, 114 Ky. 754; Moser _v._ Fable, 164 Ky. 517; Medcalfe _v._ Brooklyn Co., 45 Md. 198; Thelin _v._ Dorsey, 59 Md. 539; Campbell _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 97 Md. 341; Bishop _v._ Frantz, 125 Md. 183; Good _v._ French, 115 Mass. 201; Bartlett _v._ Hawley, 38 Minn. 308; Shafer _v._ Hertzig, 92 Minn. 171; Williams _v._ Pullman Co., 129 Minn. 97; Harris _v._ Quincy R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 261; McNulty _v._ Walker, 64 Miss. 198; Cohn _v._ Saidel, 71 N. H. 558; Magowan _v._ Rickey, 64 N. J. Law, 402; Hartdorn _v._ Webb Mfg. Co., (N. J.) 75 Atl. 893; Heyne _v._ Blair, 62 N. Y. 19; Fagnan _v._ Knox, 66 N. Y. 525; Anderson _v._ How, 116 N. Y. 336; L. I. Union _v._ Seitz, 180 N. Y. 243; Viele _v._ Gray, 10 Abb. Pr. 1; McCarthy _v._ Barrett, 144 App. Div. 727; Galley _v._ Brennan, 156 App. Div. 443; Stanford _v._ Grocery Co., 143 N. C. 419; Humphries _v._ Edwards, 164 N. C. 154; Dunnington _v._ Loeser, (Okl.) 149 Pac. 1161; Leahey _v._ March, 155 Pa. St. 458; Roessing _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 226 Pa. St. 523; McCoy _v._ Kalbach, 242 Pa. St. 123; Cooper _v._ Flemming, 114 Tenn. 40; Landa _v._ Obert, 45 Tex. 539; Finigan _v._ Sullivan, 65 Wash. 625; Bailey _v._ Gollehon, 76 W. Va. 322 _Accord_. But see Wilson _v._ Thurlow, 156 Ia. 656; Griffin _v._ Dearborn, 210 Mass. 308.

Footnote 391:

Abrath _v._ North Eastern Co., 11 Q. B. Div. 440, 448, 455; Wiggin _v._ Coffin, 3 Story, 1; Johnson _v._ Ebberts, 11 Fed. 129, 6 Sawy. 538, S. C.; Brewer _v._ Jacobs, 22 Fed. 217; Gulsby _v._ Louisville R. Co., 167 Ala. 122; Hammond _v._ Rowley, 86 Conn. 6; Coleman _v._ Allen, 79 Ga. 637; South Western Co. _v._ Mitchell, 80 Ga. 438; Stewart _v._ Mulligan, 11 Ga. App. 660; McElroy _v._ Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290; White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 210; Foltz _v._ Buck, 89 Kan. 381; Metrop. Co. _v._ Miller, 114 Ky. 754; Pullen _v._ Glidden, 66 Me. 202; Wills _v._ Noyes, 12 Pick. 324; Mitchell _v._ Wall, 111 Mass. 492; Ross _v._ Langworthy, 13 Neb. 492; Callahan _v._ Kelso, 170 Mo. App. 338; Gee _v._ Culver, 13 Or. 598; Squires _v._ Job, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 289; Culberston _v._ Cabeen, 29 Tex. 247, 256; Sebastian _v._ Cheney, (Texas) 24 S. W. 970; Barron _v._ Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 198; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168; Spear _v._ Hiles, 67 Wis. 350; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463 _Accord_.

In Abrath _v._ North Eastern Co., _supra_, malice was defined by Brett, M. R., p. 448, as “a malicious intention in the mind of the defendant, that is, not with the mere intention of carrying the law into effect,” and by Bowen, L. J., as “a malicious spirit, that is, an indirect and improper motive, and not in furtherance of justice.” See also especially Pullen _v._ Glidden, and Johnson _v._ Ebberts, cited _supra_ in this note; Magowan _v._ Rickey, 64 N. J. Law, 402; Peterson _v._ Reisdorph, 49 Neb. 529; Nobb _v._ White, 103 Ia. 352; Brooks _v._ Bradford, 4 Col. App. 410; Jackson _v._ Bell, 5 S. D. 257.

_Definitions of “malice”_ in this connection, see Fowlkes _v._ Lewis, 10 Ala. App. 543; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Cecil, 164 Ky. 377; Lammers _v._ Mason, 123 Minn. 204; Downing _v._ Stone, 152 N. C. 525; Wright _v._ Harris, 160 N. C. 542.

Footnote 392:

Farmer _v._ Darling, 4 Burr. 1971; Busst _v._ Gibbons, 30 L. J. Ex. N. S. 75; Coulter _v._ Dublin Co., 60 L. T. 180; Hicks _v._ Faulkner, 46 L. T. Rep. 127 (affirming S. C. 8 Q. B. D. 167); Wheeler _v._ Nesbitt, 24 How. 544; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 191; Wiggin _v._ Coffin, 3 Story, 1; Burnap _v._ Albert, Taney, 244; Benson v. McCoy, 36 Ala. 710; Lunsford _v._ Dietrich, 93 Ala. 565; Bozeman _v._ Shaw, 37 Ark. 160; Levy _v._ Brannan, 39 Cal. 485; Harkrader _v._ Moore, 44 Cal. 144; Porter v. White, 5 Mackey, 180; Harpham _v._ Whitney, 77 Ill. 32; Krug _v._ Ward, 77 Ill. 603; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274; Frankfurter _v._ Bryan, 12 Ill. App. 549; Gardiner _v._ Mays, 24 Ill. App. 286; Newell _v._ Downs, 8 Blackf. 523; Oliver _v._ Pate, 43 Ind. 132; Ritchey _v._ Davis, 11 Ia. 124; Atchison Co. _v._ Watson, 37 Kan. 773; Gourgues _v._ Howard, 27 La. Ann. 339; Humphries _v._ Parker, 52 Me. 502; Medcalfe _v._ Brooklyn Co., 45 Md. 198; Mitchell _v._ Wall, 111 Mass. 492; Bartlett _v._ Hawley, 38 Minn. 308; Greenwade _v._ Mills, 31 Miss. 464; Sharpe _v._ Johnston, 59 Mo. 557; Finley _v._ St. Louis Co., 99 Mo. 559; March _v._ Vandiver, 181 Mo. App. 281; McKown _v._ Hunter, 30 N. Y. 625; Farnam _v._ Feeley, 56 N. Y. 451; Heyne _v._ Blair, 62 N. Y. 19; Thompson _v._ Lumley, 50 How. Pr. 105; Voorhes _v._ Leonard, 1 Th. & C. 148; Johnson _v._ Chambers, 10 Ired. 287; Gee _v._ Culver, 12 Or. 228, 13 Or. 598; Schofield _v._ Ferrers, 47 Pa. St. 194; Dietz _v._ Langfitt, 63 Pa. St. 234; Gilliford _v._ Windel, 108 Pa. St. 142; Bell _v._ Graham, 1 N. & M’C. 278; Campbell _v._ O’Bryan, 9 Rich. 204; Willis _v._ Knox, 5 S. C. 474; Caldwell _v._ Bennett, 22 S. C. 1; Evans _v._ Thompson, 12 Heisk. 534; Stansell _v._ Cleveland, 64 Tex. 660; Shannon _v._ Jones, 76 Tex. 141; Barron _v._ Mason, 31 Vt. 189; Carleton _v._ Taylor, 50 Vt. 220; Scott _v._ Shelor, 28 Grat. 891; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168 _Accord_.

But see, _contra_, Wilson _v._ Bowen, 64 Mich. 133.

Footnote 393:

The statement of facts and the argument for the defendant are abridged; the concurring opinions of Coleridge, Wightman, and Erie, JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 394:

In Exch. Ch. 1 T. R. 510, reversing the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in Sutton _v._ Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493. Judgment of Exch. Ch. affirmed on error, in Dom. Proc. 1 T. R. 784. S. C. 1 Bro. P. C. 76 (2d ed.).

Footnote 395:

1 T. R. 545.

Footnote 396:

The case alluded to is perhaps Broad _v._ Ham, 5 B. N. C. 722. By the report of S. C. in 8 Scott, 40, the cause appears to have been tried before Maule, B. (Reporter’s note.)

Footnote 397:

Broad _v._ Ham, 5 B. N. C. 722; Turner _v._ Ambler, 10 Q. B. 252; Roret _v._ Lewis, 5 D. & L. 371; Hinton _v._ Heather, 14 M. & W. 131; Williams _v._ Banks, 1 F. & F. 557; Chatfield _v._ Comerford, 4 F. & F. 1008; Shrosbery _v._ Osmaston, 37 L. T. Rep. 792; Steed _v._ Knowles, 79 Ala. 446; Harkrader _v._ Moore, 44 Cal. 144; Ball _v._ Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; Galloway _v._ Stewart, 49 Ind. 156; Donnelly _v._ Burkett, 75 Ia. 613; Humphries _v._ Parker, 52 Me. 502, 505; Mitchell _v._ Wall, 111 Mass. 492; Bartlett _v._ Hawley, 38 Minn. 308; Peck _v._ Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138; Chicago Co. _v._ Kriski, 30 Neb. 215; Howard _v._ Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; Burlingame _v._ Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141; Fagnan _v._ Knox, 66 N. Y. 525; Anderson _v._ How, 116 N. Y. 336; Wass _v._ Stephens, 128 N. Y. 123; Wilson _v._ King, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 384; Linitzky _v._ Gorman, 146 N. Y. Supp. 313; Thienes _v._ Francis, 69 Or. 165; King _v._ Colvin, 11 R. I. 582; Scott _v._ Shelor, 28 Grat. 891; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168; Spear _v._ Hiles, 67 Wis. 350; Baker _v._ Kilpatrick, 7 Br. Col. L. R. 150; Harcourt _v._ Aiken, 22 N. Zeal. L. R. 389; Clift _v._ Birmingham, 4 W. Aust. L. R. 20 _Accord_.

Footnote 398:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 399:

Brown _v._ Hawkes, [1891] 2 Q. B. 718; Grant _v._ Book, 25 Nova Scotia, 266 _Accord_.

_Malice may be inferred from want of probable cause._ Hanchey _v._ Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Hawkins _v._ Collins, 5 Ala. App. 522; Fowlkes _v._ Lewis, 10 Ala. App. 543; Price _v._ Morris, 122 Ark. 382; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573; Stewart _v._ Mulligan, 11 Ga. App. 660; Holliday _v._ Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779; McElroy _v._ Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290; Pontius _v._ Kimball, 56 Ind. App. 144; Singer Machine Co. _v._ Dyer, 156 Ky. 156; Mertens _v._ Mueller, 119 Md. 525; Griffin _v._ Dearborn, 210 Mass. 308; Moscob _v._ Frank Ridlon Co., 216 Mass. 193; Krzyszke _v._ Kamin, 163 Mich. 290; Bowers _v._ Walker, 192 Mo. App. 230; Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274; Galley _v._ Brennan, 156 App. Div. 443; Kellogg _v._ Ford, 70 Or. 213; Cole _v._ Reece, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 212; Keener _v._ Jeffries, 54 Pa. Super. Ct. 553; Tufshinsky _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 121; Fetty _v._ Huntington Loan Co., 70 W. Va. 688.

It is not a necessary inference. Hanowitz _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 122 Minn. 241; Smith _v._ Glynn, (Mo.) 144 S. W. 149; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Holliday, 30 Okl. 680; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463.

It is not inferred from failure to prosecute, Malloy _v._ Chicago R. Co., 34 S. D. 330, nor from discharge or acquittal. Waring _v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534.

_Want of probable cause is not to be inferred from malice._ Runo _v._ Williams, 162 Cal. 444; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573; Plummer _v._ Collins, 1 Boyce, 281; McElroy _v._ Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290; Shadden _v._ Butler, 164 Ia. 1; Hudson _v._ Nolen, 142 Ky. 824; Chapman _v._ Nash, 121 Md. 608; Griffin _v._ Dearborn, 210 Mass. 308; Callahan _v._ Kelso, 170 Mo. App. 338; Motsinger _v._ Sink, 168 N. C. 548; Kellogg _v._ Ford, 70 Or. 213; McCoy _v._ Kalbach, 242 Pa. St. 123; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463; McIntosh _v._ Wales, 21 Wyo. 397. But see Squires _v._ Job, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 289.

Footnote 400:

Only a portion of the opinion is given.

Footnote 401:

Whitehurst _v._ Ward, 12 Ala. 264; Shannon _v._ Simms, 146 Ala. 673; Whipple _v._ Gorsuch, 82 Ark. 252; Adams _v._ Lisher, 3 Blackf. 241; Bruley _v._ Rose, 57 Ia. 651; Parkhurst _v._ Masteller, 57 Ia. 474; White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 210; Lancaster _v._ McKay, 103 Ky. 616, 624; Bacon _v._ Towne, 4 Cush. 217, 241; Threefoot _v._ Nuckols, 68 Miss. 116; Morris _v._ Corson, 7 Cow. 281; Turner _v._ Dinnegar, 20 Hun, 465; Bell _v._ Pearcy, 5 Ired. 83; Johnson _v._ Chambers, 10 Ired. 287; Thurber _v._ Eastern Ass’n, 118 N. C. 129 _Accord_. See Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind. 239.

Footnote 402:

Watson _v._ Norbury, Sty. 3, 201; Brown _v._ Chapman, 1 W. Bl. 427; Cotton _v._ James, 1 B. & Ad. 128; Whitworth _v._ Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695; Hay _v._ Weakley, 5 Car. & P. 361; Farley _v._ Danks, 4 E. & B. 493; Johnson _v._ Emerson, L. R. 6 Ex. 329; Metropolitan Bank _v._ Pooley, 10 App. Cas. 210; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Wilkinson _v._ Goodfellow Co., 141 Fed. 218; McDonald _v._ Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432; Lawton _v._ Green, 5 Hun, 157; Cohen _v._ Nathaniel Fisher & Co., 135 App. Div. 238; King _v._ Sullivan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 92 S. W. 51; Carleton _v._ Taylor, 50 Vt. 220 (_semble_) _Accord_.

Similarly an action will lie without proof of special damage for a malicious and unfounded presentation of a petition to wind up a trading company. Quartz Co. _v._ Eyre, 11 Q. B. Div. 674; Wyatt _v._ Palmer, [1899] 2 Q. B. 106 (_semble_).

_Malicious inquisition of lunacy_, see Lockenour _v._ Sides, 57 Ind. 360; Dordoni _v._ Smith, 82 N. J. Law, 525.

_Malicious proceeding for suspension or removal of an officer._ Fulton _v._ Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323.

_Malicious prosecution of unfounded claim for a patent._ Strelitzer _v._ Schnaier, 135 App. Div. 384.

Footnote 403:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 404:

_Malicious arrest on civil process._ Stribler _v._ Jones, 1 Lev. 276; Daw _v._ Swain, 1 Sid. 424; Parker _v._ Langley, Gilb. 163, 10 Mod. 209, S. C.; Goslin _v._ Wilcock, 2 Wils. 302; Sinclair _v._ Eldred, 4 Taunt. 7; Pierce _v._ Street, 3 B. & Ad. 397; Cozer _v._ Pilling, 4 B. & C. 26; Saxon _v._ Castle, 6 A. & E. 652; Roret _v._ Lewis, 5 D. & L. 371; Medina _v._ Grove, 10 Q. B. 152; Daniels _v._ Fielding, 16 M. & W. 200 (_semble_, see Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, 5 ed. 683); Moore _v._ Guardner, 16 M. & W. 595 (_semble_); Ross _v._ Norman, 5 Ex. 359; Ventress _v._ Rosser, 73 Ga. 534; Joiner _v._ Ocean Co., 86 Ga. 238; Cardival _v._ Smith, 109 Mass. 158; Hamilburgh _v._ Shepard, 119 Mass. 30; Cotter _v._ Nathan & Hurst Co., 218 Mass. 315; Stanfield _v._ Phillips, 78 Pa. St. 73; Emerson _v._ Cochran, 111 Pa. St. 619; Ward _v._ Sutor, 70 Tex. 343.

_Malicious holding to bail._ Steer _v._ Scoble, Cro. Jac. 667; Berry _v._ Adamson, 6 B. & C. 528; Small _v._ Gray, 2 Car. & P. 605.

_Malicious seizure of property on civil process._ Sanders _v._ Powell, 1 Lev. 129, 1 Sid. 183, 1 Keb. 603, S. C.; Craig _v._ Hasell, 4 Q. B. 481; Medina _v._ Grove, 10 Q. B. 152; Redway _v._ McAndrew, L. R. 9 Q. B. 74; Kirksey _v._ Jones, 7 Ala. 622; Vesper _v._ Crane Co., 165 Cal. 36; Juchter _v._ Boehm, 67 Ga. 534; Wilcox _v._ McKenzie, 75 Ga. 73; Lawrence _v._ Hagerman, 56 Ill. 68; Spaids _v._ Barrett, 57 Ill. 289; Western Co. _v._ Wilmarth, 33 Kan. 510; Wills _v._ Noyes, 12 Pick. 324; Savage _v._ Brewer, 16 Pick. 453; O’Brien _v._ Barry, 106 Mass. 300; Bobsin _v._ Kingsbury, 138 Mass. 538; Grant _v._ Reinhart, 33 Mo. App. 74; Smith _v._ Smith, 56 How. Pr. 316; Jaksich _v._ Guisti, 36 Nev. 104; Tyler _v._ Mahoney, 166 N. C. 509; Fortman _v._ Rottier, 8 Ohio St. 548; Sommer _v._ Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283.

_Malicious replevin._ O’Brien _v._ Barry, 106 Mass. 300; McPherson _v._ Runyon, 41 Minn. 524; Martin _v._ Rexford, 170 N. C. 540.

_Malicious issue of an injunction._ Munce _v._ Black, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 475; McFarlane _v._ Garrett, 3 Pennewill, 36; Landis _v._ Wolf, 206 Ill. 392; Krzyszke _v._ Kamin, 163 Mich. 290; Manlove _v._ Vick, 55 Miss. 567; Burt _v._ Smith, 84 App. Div. 47; Coal Co. _v._ Upson, 40 Ohio St. 17; Hess _v._ German Co., 37 Or. 297; Batson _v._ Paris Co., 73 S. C. 368; Powell _v._ Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504; Williams _v._ Ainsworth, 121 Wis. 600 (_semble_).

_Malicious procurement of the execution of a search warrant._ Cooper _v._ Booth, 3 Esp. 135, S. C. 1 T. R. 535 (_cited_); Elsee _v._ Smith, 2 Chit. R. 304, 1 D. & R. 97, S. C.; Wyatt _v._ White, 29 L. J. Ex. 193; Carey _v._ Sheets, 60 Ind. 17, 67 Ind. 375; Whitson _v._ May, 71 Ind. 269; Olson _v._ Tvete, 46 Minn. 225; Miller _v._ Brown, 3 Mo. 94; Boeger _v._ Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390.

_Malicious garnishment._ King _v._ Yarbray, 136 Ga. 212; Lopes _v._ Connolly, 210 Mass. 487.

_Levy of execution under fraudulent judgment._ Atlanta Ice Co. _v._ Reeves, 136 Ga. 294.

See also Hope _v._ Evered, 17 Q. B. Div. 338; Lea _v._ Charrington, 23 Q. B. Div. 45; Utting _v._ Berney, 5 T. L. Rep. 39.

Footnote 405:

Only the opinion of the court on this point is given.

Footnote 406:

Savile _v._ Roberts, 1 Ld. Ray. 374; Purton _v._ Honnor, 1 B. & P. 205; Cotterell _v._ Jones, 11 C. B. 713; Quartz Co. _v._ Eyre, 11 Q. B. Div. 674; Ray _v._ Law, Pet. C. C. 207; Tamblyn _v._ Johnston, 126 Fed. 267, 270; Mitchell _v._ South Western Co., 75 Ga. 398 (but see Slater _v._ Kimbro, 91 Ga. 217); Smith _v._ Mich. Co., 175 Ill. 619; Bonney _v._ King, 201 Ill. 47; McCormick _v._ Weber, 187 Ill. App. 290; Smith _v._ Hintrager, 67 Ia. 109; Cattle Co. _v._ Nat. Bank, 127 Ia. 153, 158; White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 310; Cade _v._ Yocum, 8 La. Ann. 477; McNamee _v._ Mink, 49 Md. 122; Sup. Lodge _v._ Unverzagt, 76 Md. 104 (see Clements _v._ Odorless Co., 67 Md. 461); Woodmansie _v._ Logan, 1 Penningt. 93; Potts _v._ Imlay, 1 South. 330; State _v._ Meyer, 40 N. J. Law, 252; Ely _v._ Davis, 111 N. C. 24 (_semble_); Terry _v._ Davis, 114 N. C. 31; Carpenter _v._ Hanes, 167 N. C. 551; Cincinnati Co. _v._ Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489 (explaining Pope _v._ Pollock, 46 Ohio St. 367); Kramer _v._ Stock, 10 Watts, 115; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283; Muldoon _v._ Rickey, 103 Pa. St. 110; Emerson _v._ Cochran, 111 Pa. St. 619, 622; Michell _v._ Donanski, 28 R. I. 94, 97 (_semble_); Smith _v._ Adams, 27 Tex. 28; Johnson _v._ King, 64 Tex. 226; Nowotny _v._ Grona, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 325; J. Calisher Co. _v._ Bloch, (Tex. Civ. App.) 147 S. W. 683; Abbott _v._ Thorne, 34 Wash. 692; Luby _v._ Bennett, 111 Wis. 613 (_semble_); Cross _v._ Comm. Agency, 18 N. Zeal. L. R. 153 _Accord_.

Burnap _v._ Albert, Taney, 244; Cooper _v._ Armour, 42 Fed 215, 217; Wade _v._ Nat. Bank, 114 Fed. 377; Eastin _v._ Stockton Bank, 66 Cal. 123; Berson _v._ Ewing, 84 Cal. 89; Hoyt _v._ Macon, 2 Col. 113 (_semble_); Whipple _v._ Fuller, 11 Conn. 582; Wall _v._ Toomey, 52 Conn. 35; Payne _v._ Donegan, 9 Ill. App. 566 (_semble_); Lockenour _v._ Sides, 57 Ind. 360; McCardle _v._ McGinley, 86 Ind. 538; Whitesell _v._ Study, 37 Ind. App. 429; Marbourg _v._ Smith, 11 Kan. 554; Cox _v._ Taylor, 10 B. Mon. 17; Woods _v._ Finnell, 13 Bush. 628; Johnson _v._ Meyer, 36 La. Ann. 333 (_semble_); Allen _v._ Codman, 139 Mass. 136 (_semble_); Wilson _v._ Hale, 178 Mass. 111; Brand _v._ Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590; Antcliff _v._ June, 81 Mich. 477; McPherson _v._ Runyon, 41 Minn. 524; O’Neill _v._ Johnson, 53 Minn. 439; Eickhoff _v._ Fidelity Co., 74 Minn. 139; Virtue _v._ Creamery Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17; Brown _v._ City, 90 Mo. 377 (_semble_); Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94; McCormick Co. _v._ Willan, 63 Neb. 391; Pangburn _v._ Bull, 1 Wend. 345; Dempsey _v._ Lepp, 52 How. Pr. 11; Smith _v._ Smith, 20 Hun, 555 (_semble_); Willard _v._ Holmes, 21 N. Y. Supp. 998 (_semble_); (but see Willard _v._ Holmes, 142 N. Y. 492; Paul _v._ Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9); Kolka _v._ Jones, 6 N. D. 461; Sawyer _v._ Shick, 30 Okl. 353; Lipscomb _v._ Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112; Swepson _v._ Davis, 109 Tenn. 99; Closson _v._ Staples, 42 Vt. 209 _Contra_.

In Eastin _v._ Stockton Bank, _supra_, the court said: “The English cases which deny the right to maintain the action, stand upon the ground that the successful defendant is adequately compensated for the damages he sustains by the costs allowed him by the statute. Those costs, it seems, include the attorney’s charges for preparing the case for trial in all its parts, the fees of the witnesses and the court officials, and even the _honorarium_ of the barrister who conducted the case in court. The reason upon which the English rule rests would not, therefore, seem to apply here, where the costs recoverable under the statute are confined to much narrower limits....

“Two other objections made to the maintenance of the action,—first, the claim that if such suits are allowed, litigation will become interminable, because every successful action will be followed by another, alleging malice in the prosecution of the former; and second, that if the defendant may sue for damages sustained by an unfounded prosecution, the plaintiff may equally bring an action when the defendant makes a groundless defence,—are well answered in the article already alluded to [Mr. Lawson’s note, 21 A. L. Reg. N. S. 281, 353]: ‘To the first objection, it is enough to say that the action will never lie for an unsuccessful prosecution, unless begun and carried on with malice and without probable cause. With the burden of this difficult proof upon him, the litigant will need a very clear case before he will be willing to begin a suit of this character. The second argument fails to distinguish between the position of the

## parties, plaintiff and defendant, in an action at law. The plaintiff

sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and maliciously he is the cause of the defendant’s damage. But the defendant stands only on his legal rights—the plaintiff having taken his case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling upon him to prove it to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, and he is guilty of no wrong in exercising this privilege.’”

In Doane _v._ Hescock, 155 N. Y. Supp. 210, the court (Appellate Term, First Department) says: “It clearly appears that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for abuse of process, nor are the allegations sufficient to support an action for malicious prosecution of a civil action in this state. There is no allegation that the action resulted in damages to the business or reputation of the defendant or that in any way his personal or property rights were interfered with. The sole allegation as to damage is the trouble, inconvenience, and expense of defending the action. This is not sufficient. Paul _v._ Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9, 11, 13 (dissenting opinion, 21), 82 N. Y. Supp. 369; Fulton _v._ Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323, 326, 151 N. Y. Supp. 130.”

_Malicious excessive attachment._ Tamblyn _v._ Johnston, (C. C. A.) 126 Fed. 267; Mills _v._ Larrance, 217 Ill. 446; Savage _v._ Brewer, 16 Pick. 453; Paul _v._ Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9; Sommer _v._ Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19.

Footnote 407:

The averments of the count are abridged and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 408:

Fivaz _v._ Nicholls, 2 C. B. 501, 514 (_semble_); Grove _v._ Brandenburg, 7 Blackf. 234 _Accord_.

“Pechell _v._ Watson came to be considered in Flight _v._ Leman. Its authority was recognized, but the latter case was decided against the plaintiff, who sued for maintenance, on the ground, I own I should have thought the narrow ground, that to instigate a suit was not maintenance, though to support one already instituted was.” _Per_ Coleridge, C. J., in Bradlaugh _v._ Newdegate, 11 Q. B. Div. 1, 8.

See also Alabaster _v._ Harness, [1894] 2 Q. B. 897, [1895] 1 Q. B. 339; Grieg _v._ National Union, 22 T. L. Rep. 274; Goodyear Co. _v._ White, 2 N. J. Law Journ. 150, 10 Fed. Cas. 752, no. 5602; Breeden _v._ Frankford Ins. Co., 220 Mo. 327, 373, 378–420, 424–443. Compare Metropolitan Bank _v._ Pooley, 10 App. Cas. 210, 217–218.

Footnote 409:

Only the opinion of the Chief Justice upon the point of abuse of legal process is given.

Footnote 410:

Heywood _v._ Collinge, 9 A. & E. 268; King _v._ Yarbray, 136 Ga. 212; Wicker _v._ Hotchkiss, 62 Ill. 107 (_semble_); Emery _v._ Ginnan, 24 Ill. App. 65 (_semble_); Whitesell _v._ Study, 37 Ind. App. 429 (_semble_); Page _v._ Cushing, 38 Me. 523; Wood _v._ Graves, 144 Mass. 365; White _v._ Apsley Co., 181 Mass. 339; White _v._ Apsley Co., 194 Mass. 97; Malone _v._ Belcher, 216 Mass. 209; Pixley _v._ Reed, 26 Minn. 80 (_semble_); Rossiter _v._ Minn. Co., 37 Minn. 296; Bebinger _v._ Sweet, 6 Hun, 478; Buffalo Co. _v._ Everest, 30 Hun, 586 (_semble_); Hazard _v._ Harding, 63 How. Pr. 326; Prough _v._ Entriken, 11 Pa. St. 81; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283; Lauzon _v._ Charroux, 18 R. I. 467 _Accord_.

As to the distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse of process, see Waters _v._ Winn, 142 Ga. 138; Wright _v._ Harris, 160 N. C. 542; Cooper _v._ Southern R. Co., 165 N. C. 578.

In Wood _v._ Graves, 144 Mass. 365, Allen, J., said, p. 366: “There is no doubt that an action lies for the malicious abuse of lawful process, civil or criminal. It is to be assumed, in such a case, that the process was lawfully issued for a just cause, and is valid in form, and that the arrest or other proceeding upon the process was justifiable and proper in its inception. Perhaps the most frequent form of such abuse is by working upon the fears of the person under arrest for the purpose of extorting money or other property, or of compelling him to sign some paper, to give up some claim, or to do some other act, in accordance with the wishes of those who have control of the prosecution. The leading case upon this subject is Grainger _v._ Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212, where the owner of a vessel was arrested on civil process, and the officer, acting under the directions of the plaintiffs in the suit, used the process to compel the defendant therein to give up his ship’s register, to which they had no right. He was held entitled to recover damages, not for maliciously putting the process in force, but for maliciously abusing it, to effect an object not within its proper scope.”

In Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283, Sharswood, J., said: “There is a distinction between a malicious use and a malicious abuse of legal process. An abuse is where the party employs it for some unlawful object, not the purpose which it is intended by the law to effect; in other words, a perversion of it. Thus, if a man is arrested, or his goods seized in order to extort money from him, even though it be to pay a just claim other than that in suit, or to compel him to give up possession of a deed or other thing of value, not the legal object of the process, it is settled that in an action for such malicious abuse it is not necessary to prove that the action in which the process issued has been determined, or to aver that it was sued out without reasonable or probable cause: Grainger _v._ Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212. It is evident that when such a wrong has been perpetrated, it is entirely immaterial whether the proceeding itself was baseless or otherwise. We know that the law is good, but only if a man use it lawfully.

“On the other hand, legal process, civil or criminal, may be maliciously used so as to give rise to a cause of action where no object is contemplated to be gained by it other than its proper effect and execution. As every man has a legal power to prosecute his claims in a court of law and justice, no matter by what motives of malice he may be actuated in doing so, it is necessary in this class of cases to aver and prove that he has acted not only maliciously, but without reasonable or probable cause. It is clearly settled also, that the proceeding must be determined finally before any action lies for the injury; because, as it is said in Arundell _v._ Tregono, Yelv. 117, the plaintiff will clear himself too soon, viz., before the fact tried, which will be inconvenient; besides, the two determinations might be contrary and inconsistent.”

To proceed unfairly and oppressively but without seeking to compel another to do what he is not obliged to do, e. g., to enter up judgment on a note after 10 P. M. and to bring immediate execution, is not a ground of action according to Docter _v._ Riedel, 96 Wis. 158. But see dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.

Footnote 411:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 412:

Y. B. 7 Hen. VI. 43; 1 Roll. Ab. 101, pl. 1, S. C.; Holliday _v._ Sterling, 62 Mo. 321 _Accord_.

Footnote 413:

Edwards _v._ Wooton, 12 Rep. 35; Peacock _v._ Raynell, 2 Brownl. 151; Barrow _v._ Lewellin, Hob. 152; Hick’s Case, Hob. 375; Rex _v._ Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95 _Accord_.

Footnote 414:

Phillips _v._ Jansen, 2 Esp. 624; Ward _v._ Smith, 4 Car. & P. 302; Sharp _v._ Skues, (C. A.) 25 T. L. Rep. 336; Warnock _v._ Mitchell, 43 Fed. 428; Western Co. _v._ Cashman, 149 Fed. 367; Spaits _v._ Poundstone, 87 Ind. 522; Yousling _v._ Dare, 122 Ia. 539; Lyon _v._ Lash, 74 Kan. 745; Buckwalter _v._ Gossow, 75 Kan. 147; McIntosh _v._ Matherly, 9 B. Mon. 119; Roberts _v._ English Co., 155 Ala. 414; Dickinson _v._ Hathaway, 122 La. 644; Gambrill _v._ Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Rumney _v._ Worthley, 186 Mass. 144, 145; Youmans _v._ Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 218; Lyle _v._ Clason, 1 Caines, 581; Waistel _v._ Holman, 2 Hall, 172; Prescott _v._ Tousey, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 12; Shepard _v._ Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498; Fonville _v._ McNease, Dudley, 303; State _v._ Syphrett, 27 S. C. 29; Fry _v._ McCord, 95 Tenn. 678; Sylvis _v._ Miller, 96 Tenn. 94; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 63 Vt. 481; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 64 Vt. 450 _Accord_.

See Ahern _v._ Maguire, A. M. & O. 39.

If two persons combine in sending a libel to the plaintiff, each is guilty of a publication to the other. Spaits _v._ Poundstone, 87 Ind. 522, 524, 525.

In Virginia, by statute, an action lies for insulting words written or spoken, although not read or heard by a third person. Rolland _v._ Batchelder, 84 Va. 664; Strode _v._ Clement, 90 Va. 553.

Footnote 415:

Part of the case, not relating to publication, is omitted.

Footnote 416:

Wenman _v._ Ash, 13 C. B. 836; Jones _v._ Williams, 1 T. L. Rep. 572; Sesler _v._ Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486, 489 (_semble_); Luick _v._ Driscoll, 13 Ind. App. 279; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 63 Vt. 481; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 64 Vt. 450 _Accord_.

But a communication by the libeller to his own wife is said not to be a publication. Wennhak _v._ Morgan, 20 Q. B. D. 635; Sesler _v._ Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486; Trumbull _v._ Gibbons, 3 City H. Rec. 97. But see State _v._ Shoemaker, 101 N. C. 690. See also Central R. Co. _v._ Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414 (dictation by officer of corporation to co-employee); Kirschenbaum _v._ Kaufman (N. Y. City Ct.), 50 N. Y. Law Journ. 406 (defamatory matter uttered to business partner in course of business). It would be more accurate to say that the communication in such cases is privileged. In Powell _v._ Gelston, [1916] 2 K. B. 615, a libellous letter, privileged as a communication to A, was sent to B, who asked for the information in his own name at A’s request. The letter was opened and read by A only.

Footnote 417:

M’Coombs _v._ Tuttle, 5 Blackf. 431; Van Cleef _v._ Lawrence, 2 City H. Rec. 41 _Accord_.

Footnote 418:

Wyatt _v._ Gore, Holt, 299; Wenman _v._ Ash, 13 C. B. 836; Kiene _v._ Ruff, 1 Ia. 482; Allen _v._ Wortham, 89 Ky. 485; Rumney _v._ Worthley, 186 Mass. 144; Schenck _v._ Schenck, Spencer, 208; State _v._ McIntire, 115 N. C. 769; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 64 Vt. 540; Adams _v._ Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250 _Accord_.

See Fox _v._ Broderick, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 453; Callan _v._ Gaylord, 3 Watts, 321.

_Slanderous statements to plaintiff in presence of his counsel_, Massee _v._ Williams, 207 Fed. 222.

_Sending libellous letter to plaintiff’s attorney_, Brown _v._ Elm City Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9.

Footnote 419:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 420:

Jones _v._ Davers, Cro. Eliz. 496; Price _v._ Jenkings, Cro. Eliz. 865; Amann _v._ Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; Kiene _v._ Ruff, 1 Ia. 42; Hurtert _v._ Weines, 27 Ia. 134; Mielenz _v._ Quasdorf, 68 Ia. 726; Economopoulos _v._ A. G. Pollard Co., 218 Mass. 294; Wormouth _v._ Cramer, 3 Wend. 394 _Accord_.

See Bechtell _v._ Shatter, Wright, (Ohio) 107. Conf. Anon., Moore, 182; Gibs _v._ Jenkins, Hob. 335; Zenobio _v._ Axtell, 6 T. R. 162; Jenkins _v._ Phillips, 9 Car. & P. 766; Hickley _v._ Grosjean, 6 Blackf. 351; Keenholts _v._ Becker, 3 Den. 346; Rahauser _v._ Barth, 3 Watts, 28; Zeig _v._ Ort, 3 Chandl. 26; K. _v._ H., 20 Wis. 239; Filber _v._ Dautermann, 26 Wis. 518; Simonsen _v._ Herald Co., 61 Wis. 626; Pelzer _v._ Benishy, 67 Wis. 291.

Footnote 421:

Anon., Sty. 70; Force _v._ Warren, 15 C. B. N. S. 806; Desmond _v._ Brown, 33 Ia. 13; Marble _v._ Chapin, 132 Mass. 225, 226; Cameron _v._ Cameron, 162 Mo. App. 110; Traylor _v._ White, 185 Mo. App. 325; Broderick _v._ James, 3 Daly, 481 Accord.

_Mailing of post card_. Three views have been expressed as to whether the mailing of a post card is a publication.

(1) The mailing is a publication. Sadgrove _v._ Hole, [1901] 2 K. B. 1, 4, 5 (_semble_); Logan _v._ Hodges, 146 N. C. 38; Spence _v._ Burt, 18 Lanc. L. Rev. 251; Robinson v. Jones, L. R. 4 Ir. 391 (_semble_); McCann _v._ Edinburgh Co., L. R. 28 Ir. 24, 28 per Palles, C. B.

(2) The mailing is _prima facie_ a publication. Odgers, Libel and Slander (4 ed.), 153, 281.

(3) The mailing is _prima facie_ not a publication, i. e., is not a publication unless evidence is given that the post card was read _in transitu_. Steele _v._ Edwards, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 52, 58.

_Publication in ignorance of the libel_. The dissemination of a libel by a carrier or newsvender or a public library, who neither knew nor ought to have known of the libel and who had no reason to suppose that the newspaper was likely to contain libellous matters, gives no cause of action. Emmens _v._ Pottle, 16 Q. B. D. 354; Martin _v._ Trustees of British Museum, 10 T. L. Rep. 338. But the proprietor of a circulating library was held liable for giving out a book containing defamatory statements, because his freedom from negligence did not appear. Vizetelly _v._ Mudie’s Library, [1900] 2 Q. B. 170. See also Morris _v._ Ritchie, Court of Sess., March 12, 1902, 4 F. 645.

Footnote 422:

The case has been much abridged.

Footnote 423:

Phillips _v._ Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199; Allen _v._ Fincher, 187 Ala. 599; Pouchan _v._ Godeau, 167 Cal. 692; United Mine Workers _v._ Cromer, 159 Ky. 605; Tawney _v._ Simonson, 109 Minn. 341; Sweaas _v._ Evenson, 110 Minn. 304; Vanloon _v._ Vanloon, 159 Mo. App. 255; Jones _v._ Banner, 172 Mo. App. 132; Bigley _v._ National Fidelity Co., 94 Neb. 813; Phillips _v._ Barber, 7 Wend. 439; Church _v._ New York Tribune Ass’n, 135 App. Div. 30; Rossiter _v._ New York Press Co., 141 App. Div. 339; Spencer _v._ Minnick, 41 Okl. 613; McGeary _v._ Leader Pub. Co., 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 35; Lehmann _v._ Medack, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 438 _Accord_. Compare Marshall _v._ Chicago Herald Co., 185 Ill. App. 224; Willfred Coal Co. _v._ Sapp, 193 Ill. App. 400; Sweet _v._ Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450; Corr _v._ Sun Printing & Pub. Ass’n, 177 N. Y. 131. But see M. _v._ J., 164 Wis. 39.

A lunatic is liable for torts generally and also for a libel. Mordaunt _v._ Mordaunt, 39 L. J. Pr. & M. 57, 59. But it is another illustration of the rule of the principal case that defamatory words spoken by a lunatic whose insanity was obvious or known to all the hearers, are not actionable. Yeates _v._ Reed, 4 Blackf. 463; Irvine _v._ Gibson, 117 Ky. 306; Dickinson _v._ Barber, 9 Mass. 225, 227; Bryant _v._ Jackson, 6 Humph. 199. So also of words spoken and understood as a jest. Donoghue _v._ Hayes, Hayes, 265. Drunkenness is no defence. Kendrick _v._ Hopkins, Cary, 133; Gates _v._ Meredith, 7 Ind. 440.

The old rule of construing defamatory statements _in mitiori sensu_ was long ago exploded. See Odgers, Libel & Slander (5 ed.), 111–113.

_Explanation of words by context_, see Deitchman _v._ Bowles, 166 Ky. 285; McCurda _v._ Lewiston Journal Co., 109 Me. 53; Wing _v._ Wing, 66 Me. 62; Larsen _v._ Brooklyn Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4; Guenther _v._ Ridgway Co., 170 App. Div. 725; Eddy _v._ Cunningham, 69 Wash. 544; Leuch _v._ Berger, 161 Wis. 564.

Footnote 424:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 425:

Massee _v._ Williams, (C. C. A.) 207 Fed. 222; Ivie _v._ King, 167 N. C. 174; Olympia Waterworks _v._ Mottman, 88 Wash. 694 _Accord_. See _Ex parte_ Nelson, 251 Mo. 63.

Footnote 426:

A portion of the opinion is omitted.

Footnote 427:

The article was as follows: “He Waxed Eloquent. H. P. Hanson fined ten dollars for refusing payment of car fare.... H. P. Hanson, a real estate and insurance broker of South Boston, emerged from the seething mass of humanity that filled the dock and indulged in a wordy bout with policeman Hogan, who claimed to have arrested Hanson on the charge of evading car fare and being drunk at the same time. The judge agreed that the prisoner was sober, but on the charge of evasion of car fare the evidence warranted the fining of the eloquent occupant of the dock ten dollars without costs, which he paid.”

Footnote 428:

The opinion of the dissenting judges is supported by the decisions and _dicta_ in other jurisdictions. Butler _v._ Barret, 130 Fed. 944 (_semble_); Every Evening Co. _v._ Butler, 144 Fed. 916; Taylor _v._ Hearst, 107 Cal. 262; Hulbert _v._ New Co., 111 Ia. 490; Davis _v._ Marxhausen, 86 Mich. 281, 103 Mich. 315 (_semble_); Clark _v._ North American Co., 203 Pa. St. 346 (_semble_); Hutchinson _v._ Robinson, 21 N. S. W. L. R. (Law) 130 (_semble_). Compare Newton _v._ Grubbs, 155 Ky. 479; Ellis _v._ Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538; Dunlop _v._ Sundberg, 55 Wash. 609.

Footnote 429:

Compare Gandia _v._ Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452; Van Wiginton _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., (C. C. A.) 218 Fed. 795; Jones _v._ R. L. Polk & Co., 190 Ala. 243 (publishing of white woman that she is colored); Ball _v._ Evening American Co., 237 Ill. 592; MacIntyre _v._ Fruchter, 148 N. Y. Suppl. 786 (“fit only for negroes to associate with”); Spencer _v._ Looney, 116 Va. 767 (assertion of white person that he was colored); Galveston Tribune _v._ Guisti, (Tex. Civ. App.) 134 S. W. 239.

Footnote 430:

This abridged statement has been substituted. The arguments and all but one of the opinions have been omitted.

Footnote 431:

Compare Northrop _v._ Tibbles, (C. C. A.) 215 Fed. 99. See Smith, Jones _v._ Hulton, Three Conflicting Views as to a Question of Defamation, 60 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 365, 461.

Footnote 432:

The statement of the pleadings is abridged, and only the opinion of Littledale, J., is given. Bayley and Parke, JJ., concurred.

Footnote 433:

That the defendant repeated a defamation, giving the name of the author, seems originally to have been a justification. Northampton’s Case, 12 Rep. 134 (Fourth Resolution). But the name of the author was to be given at the time of repetition, and not for the first time in the plea. Davis _v._ Lewis, 7 T. R. 17. The words, furthermore, had to be given with sufficient exactness to ground an action against the author. Maitland _v._ Goldney, 2 East, 426. Doubts were thrown upon the validity of this justification in Lewis _v._ Walter, 4 B. & Al. 605. The whole doctrine was repudiated, as to libel, in De Crespigny _v._ Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392, and Tidman _v._ Ainslie, 10 Ex. 63; and as to slander, in McPherson _v._ Daniels; Watkin _v._ Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396.

See to same effect Age-Herald Pub. Co. _v._ Waterman, 188 Ala. 272; Washington Herald Co. _v._ Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322; Brewer _v._ Chase, 121 Mich. 526; Hagener _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 172 Mo. App. 436; Vallery _v._ State, 42 Neb. 123; Walling _v._ Commercial Advertiser, 165 App. Div. 26; Galveston Tribune _v._ Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 302. See also Whitney _v._ Moignard, 24 Q. B. D. 630.

In Speight _v._ Gosnay, 60 L. J. Q. B. 231, the words were not

## actionable without special damage and the special damage resulted only

from unauthorized repetition by a third person.

Footnote 434:

This short statement of the case, taken from 3 Camp. 214, has been substituted for the declaration which is set out at considerable length in the original report.

Footnote 435:

“When our ancestors years ago drew the distinction between libel and slander, they exercised that kind of wise discretion which they always exercised over the whole field of the common law. It would to my mind be very dangerous for us nowadays to relax in any way the rule of law which confines actions for spoken words, in the absence of proof of special damage, to a very limited number of cases.” Vaughan Williams, L. J., in Dauncey _v._ Holloway, [1901] 2 K. B. 441, 448. See also A. L. Smith, L. J., Id. 447. But compare Colby _v._ Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489, 493; Tillson _v._ Robbins, 68 Me. 295.

The distinction sanctioned in the principal case between oral and written scandal still obtains in England and the United States. The definition of a libel as a written publication calculated to bring another into hatred, ridicule, or contempt, is also universally recognized in English-speaking countries. As it is a pure question of fact for the jury whether the publication in a given case comes within this definition, it has not seemed advisable to bring together in this book the multitudinous instances which have been passed upon. A full collection of the cases may be found in Odgers, Libel and Slander, (5 ed.) 18–38; Townshend, Slander and Libel; (4 ed.) 203–221; 25 Cyc. 255–264.

An action for a libel made in the course of judicial proceedings cannot be maintained until the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person defamed, Masterson _v._ Brown, 72 Fed. 136.

Footnote 436:

There is great diversity of opinion as to what words, imputing the commission of a crime, are actionable _per se_. The authorities may be classified as follows:—

I. Words imputing a criminal offence punishable corporally.

In Hawes’s Case, March, 113 (speaking against common prayer); Heake _v._ Moulton, Yelv. 90; Walden _v._ Mitchell, 2 Ventr. 265; Scoble _v._ Lee, 2 Show. 32 (regrating); McCabe _v._ Foot, 15 L. T. Rep. 115; Elliott _v._ Ailsberry, 2 Bibb, 473 (fornication); M’Gee _v._ Wilson, Litt. S. C. 187 (unchastity); Mills _v._ Wimp, 10 B. Mon. 417 (_semble_); Buck _v._ Hersey, 31 Me. 558 (drunkenness); Wagaman _v._ Byers, 17 Md. 183 (adultery); Birch _v._ Benton, 26 Mo. 153 (whipping one’s wife); Speaker _v._ McKenzie, 26 Mo. 255 (whipping one’s mother); Billings _v._ Wing, 7 Vt. 439 (“he snaked his mother out of doors by the hair of her head; it was the day before she died”), the words uttered were held not to give a right of action, since they imputed crimes punishable only by fine, or by imprisonment merely as a consequence of the non-payment of the fine.

II. Words imputing a criminal offence and involving moral turpitude. Sipp _v._ Coleman, 179 Fed. 997; Taylor _v._ Gumpert, 96 Ark. 354; Frisbie _v._ Fowler, 2 Conn. 707; Hoag _v._ Hatch, 23 Conn. 585; Page _v._ Merwin, 54 Conn. 426; Kennenberg _v._ Neff, 74 Conn. 62; Yakavicze _v._ Valentukevicious, 84 Conn. 350; Reitan _v._ Goebel, 33 Minn. 151.

III. Words imputing a criminal offence, involving moral turpitude and punishable corporally. Redway _v._ Gray, 31 Vt. 292 (qualifying Billings _v._ Wing, 7 Vt. 439); Murray _v._ McAllister, 38 Vt. 167.

IV. Words imputing a criminal offence involving disgrace. Miller _v._ Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Brown _v._ Nickerson, 5 Gray, 1; Kenney _v._ McLaughlin, 5 Gray, 3; Ranger _v._ Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Mayer _v._ Schleichter, 29 Wis. 646; Gibson _v._ Gibson, 43 Wis. 23; Geary _v._ Bennett, 53 Wis. 444.

V. Words imputing a criminal offence subjecting the offender to infamous punishment. Shipp _v._ McCraw, 3 Murph. 463; Brady _v._ Wilson, 4 Hawks. 93; Skinner _v._ White, 1 Dev. & Bat. 471; Wall _v._ Hoskins, 5 Ired. 177; Wilson _v._ Tatum, 8 Jones, (N. C.) 300; McKee _v._ Wilson, 87 N. C. 300; Harris _v._ Terry, 98 N. C. 131.

VI. Words imputing an _indictable_ offence involving moral turpitude, or subjecting the offender to an infamous punishment. See Brooker _v._ Coffin, _infra_, and cases cited.

VII. Words imputing an _indictable_ offence punishable corporally. Griffin _v._ Moore, 43 Md. 246; Shafer _v._ Ahalt, 48 Md. 171; Birch _v._ Benton, 26 Mo. 153; Curry _v._ Collins, 37 Mo. 324; Bundy _v._ Hart, 46 Mo. 460; Lewis _v._ McDaniel, 82 Mo. 577; Houston _v._ Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15, 24; Parsons _v._ Henry, 177 Mo. App. 329.

_As to defamation of a corporation_, see Oram _v._ Hutt, [1913] 1 Ch. 259; Axton Tobacco Co. _v._ Evening Post Co., 169 Ky. 64; Stone _v._ Textile Employers Ass’n, 137 App. Div. 655.

Footnote 437:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 438:

By 54 & 55 Vict. c. 51, words which impute unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl are actionable, without special damage.

Footnote 439:

This rule has been approved in the following cases: Pollard _v._ Lyon, 91 U. S. 225; Perdue _v._ Burnett, Minor, 138; Dudley _v._ Horn, 21 Ala. 379; Hillhouse _v._ Peck, 2 St. & P. 395; Heath _v._ Devaughn, 37 Ala. 677; Kinney _v._ Hosea, 3 Harring, 77; Pleasanton _v._ Kronemeier, 29 Del. 81; Pledger _v._ Hathcock, 1 Ga. 550; Giddens _v._ Mirk, 4 Ga. 364; Richardson _v._ Roberts, 23 Ga. 215; Burton _v._ Burton, 3 Greene, 316; Halley _v._ Gregg, 74 Ia. 563; Wooten _v._ Martin, 140 Ky. 781; St. Martin _v._ Desnoyer, 1 Minn. 156; West _v._ Hanrahan, 28 Minn. 385; Chaplin _v._ Lee, 18 Neb. 440; Hendrickson _v._ Sullivan, 28 Neb. 329; McCuen _v._ Ludlum, 2 Harr. 12; Johnson _v._ Shields, 25 N. J. Law, 116; Widrig _v._ Oyer, 13 Johns. 124; Martin _v._ Stilwell, 13 Johns. 275; Alexander _v._ Alexander, 9 Wend. 141; Case _v._ Buckley, 15 Wend. 327; Bissell _v._ Cornell, 24 Wend. 354; Demarest _v._ Haring, 6 Cow. 76; Young _v._ Miller, 3 Hill, 21; Wright _v._ Paige, 3 Keyes, 581, 3 Trans. App. 134, S. C.; Crawford _v._ Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; Johnson _v._ Brown, 57 Barb. 118; Quinn _v._ O’Gara, 2 E. D. Sm. 388; Torres _v._ Huner, 150 App. Div. 798; Dial _v._ Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228; Alfele _v._ Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238; Hollingsworth _v._ Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; Davis _v._ Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326; Davis _v._ Sladden, 17 Or. 259; Andres _v._ Koppenheafer, 3 S. & R. 255; Davis _v._ Carey, 141 Pa. St. 314; Lodge _v._ O’Toole, 20 R. I. 405; Gage _v._ Shelton, 3 Rich. 242; Smith _v._ Brown, 97 S. C. 239; Smith _v._ Smith, 2 Sneed, 473; McAnally _v._ Williams, 3 Sneed, 26; Poe _v._ Grever, 3 Sneed, 664; Payne _v._ Tancil, 98 Va. 262. See Moore _v._ Francis, 121 N. Y. 199.

Footnote 440:

Hence it is not actionable (without special damage) to call a man a “bastard,” Paysse _v._ Paysse, 86 Wash. 349, or a “blackleg and swindler,” McIntyre _v._ Fruchter, 148 N. Y. Supp. 786; or a “rascal,” Massee _v._ Williams, 207 Mass. 222, or to call a woman a “bitch.” Craver _v._ Norton, 114 Ia. 46; Sturdivant _v._ Duke, 155 Ky. 100; Kerone _v._ Block, 144 Mo. App. 575; Blake _v._ Smith, 19 R. I. 476.

But in Fowler _v._ Dowdney, 2 Moody & R. 119, the words “he is a returned convict” were held actionable, Lord Denman, C. J., saving that though the punishment had been suffered, “still the obloquy remains.” Gainford _v._ Tuke, Cro. Jac. 536; Boston _v._ Tatam, Cro. Jac. 623; Beavor _v._ Hides, 2 Wils. 300; Stewart _v._ Howe, 17 Ill. 71; Wiley _v._ Campbell, 5 T. B. Monr. 396; Krebs _v._ Oliver, 12 Gray, 239; Johnson _v._ Dicken, 25 Mo. 580; Van Ankin _v._ Westfall, 14 Johns. 233; Ship _v._ McCraw, 3 Murphy, 463; Smith _v._ Stewart, 5 Pa. St. 372; Beck _v._ Stitzel, 21 Pa. St. 522; Poe _v._ Grever, 3 Sneed, (Tenn.) 664 _Accord_.

Compare Carpenter _v._ Tarrant, C. t. Hardw. 339; French _v._ Creath, Breese, 12; Barclay _v._ Thompson, 2 Pen. & W. 148.

Footnote 441:

Only portions of the opinion are given.

Footnote 442:

See also Keck _v._ Shepard, (Ark.) 180 S. W. 501 (statutory); Craver _v._ Norton, 114 Ia. 46; Hahn _v._ Lumpa, 158 Ia. 560; Traylor _v._ White, 185 Mo. App. 325 (statutory); Culver _v._ Marx, 157 Wis. 320. On the whole subject, see Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 Columbia Law Rev. 33, 52.

Footnote 443:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 444:

“We think that the rule as to words spoken of a man in his office or trade is not necessarily confined to offices and trades of the nature and duties of which the court can take judicial notice. The only limitation of which we are aware is, that it does not apply to illegal callings.” Channel, B., in Foulger _v._ Newcomb, L. R. 2 Ex. 327, 330.

Footnote 445:

Alexander _v._ Angle, 1 Cr. & J. 143; Sibley _v._ Tomlins, 4 Tyrwh. 90; Doyley _v._ Roberts, 3 B. N. C. 835; Brayne _v._ Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249; James _v._ Brook, 9 Q. B. 7; Dauncey _v._ Holloway, [1901] 2 K. B. 441; Hogg _v._ Dorrah, 2 Porter, (Ala.) 212; Oram _v._ Franklin, 5 Blackf. 42; Buck _v._ Hersey, 31 Me. 558; Oakley _v._ Farrington, 1 Johns. Cas. 129; Van Tassel _v._ Capron, 1 Den. 250; Ireland _v._ McGarvish, 1 Sandf. 155; Chomley _v._ Watson, [1907] Vict. L. R. 502 _Accord_.

Compare Ware _v._ Clowney, 24 Ala. 707; Butler _v._ Howes, 7 Cal. 87; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20.

“Some of the cases have proceeded to a length which can hardly fail to excite surprise: a clergyman having failed to obtain redress for the imputation of adultery; and a school-mistress having been declared incompetent to maintain an action for a charge of prostitution. Such words were undeniably calculated to injure the success of the plaintiffs in their several professions, but, not being applicable to their conduct therein, no action lay.” Lord Denman, C. J., in Ayre _v._ Craven, 2 A. & E. 2. See Morasse _v._ Brooks, 151 Mass. 567, 568.

_Imputation of misconduct to a clergyman_, see Bishop of Norwich _v._ Pricket, Cro. Eliz. 1 (heterodoxy in religion); Payne _v._ Bewmorris, 1 Lev. 248 (incontinence); Pope _v._ Ramsey, 1 Keb. 542 (knave, &c.); Chaddock _v._ Briggs, 13 Mass. 248 (drunkenness); Ritchie _v._ Widdemer, 59 N. J. Law, 290; Demarest _v._ Haring, 6 Cow. 76 (incontinence); Potter _v._ N. Y. Journal, 68 App. Div. 95; Hayner _v._ Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292 (drunkenness); McMillan _v._ Birch, 1 Binney, 178 (drunkenness); Starr _v._ Gardner, 6 Up. Can. Q. B. O. S. 512 (incontinence; but see, _contra_, Breeze _v._ Sails, 23 Up. Can. Q. B. 94, incontinence), holding the words actionable.

Parrat _v._ Carpenter, Cro. El. 502; Nicholson _v._ Lyne, Cro. El. 94; Anon., Sty. 49 _Contra_. Compare Gallwey _v._ Marshall, 9 Ex. 294, 568.

_Imputation to teacher of discreditable conduct with pupils._ Spears _v._ McCoy, 155 Ky. 1. Compare Nicholson _v._ Dillard, 137 Ga. 225.

_Imputation to an officer of drunkenness while on duty._ Reilly _v._ Curtis, 83 N. J. Law, 77.

Footnote 446:

Kempe’s Case, Dy. 72, pl. 6; Stanton _v._ Smith, 2 Ld. Ray. 1480; Brown _v._ Smith, 13 C. B. 596; Pacific Packing Co. _v._ Bradstreet, 25 Idaho, 696; Simons _v._ Burnham, 102 Mich. 189; Traynor _v._ Sielaff, 62 Minn. 420; Hynds _v._ Fourteenth Street Store, 159 App. Div. 766; Davis _v._ Ruff, Cheeves, 17 _Accord_.

Barnes _v._ Trundy, 31 Me. 321; Redway _v._ Gray, 31 Vt. 292 _Contra_.

See Bell _v._ Thatcher, Freem. 276; Bryant _v._ Loxton, 11 Moore, 344; Marino _v._ Di Marco, 41 App. D. C. 76 (“sells rotten goods”); Taylor _v._ Church, 1 E. D. Smith, 287; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Bilgrien _v._ Ulrich, 150 Wis. 532 (habitual cheating).

Footnote 447:

Sumner _v._ Utley, 7 Conn. 257; Garr _v._ Selden, 6 Barb. 416; Rodgers _v._ Kline, 56 Miss. 808; Lynde _v._ Johnson, 39 Hun. 5 _Accord_.

Footnote 448:

Johnson _v._ Robertson, 8 Port. (Ala.) 486; Sumner _v._ Utley, 7 Conn. 257; Lovejoy _v._ Whitcomb, 174 Mass. 586; Freisinger _v._ Moore, 65 N. J. Law, 286; Mattice _v._ Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 624; Krug _v._ Pitass, 162 N. Y. 154, 163 N. Y. 600; Lynde _v._ Johnson, 39 Hun, 12; Hollingsworth _v._ Spectator Co., 49 App. Div. 16; McIntyre _v._ Weinert, 195 Pa. St. 52; Holland _v._ Flick, 212 Pa. St. 201; Gauvreau _v._ Superior Co., 62 Wis. 403 _Accord_. See Watson _v._ Vanderlash, Hetl. 69; Edsall _v._ Russell, 4 M. & Gr. 1090. Compare Twiggar _v._ Ossining Printing Co., 161 App. Div. 718; Larsen _v._ Brooklyn Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4.

Foot _v._ Brown, 8 Johns. 64 _Contra_. See Camp _v._ Martin, 23 Conn. 86; Pratt _v._ Pioneer Co., 35 Minn. 251.

The imputation of misconduct in an office of honor but not of profit is actionable _per se_, Booth _v._ Arnold, [1895] 1 Q. B. 571; Livingston _v._ McCartin, [1907] Vict. L. R. 48. But the rule is otherwise, according to Alexander _v._ Jenkins, [1892] 1 Q. B. 797, as to the imputation of unfitness for such an office.

Footnote 449:

Brook _v._ Wife, Cro. El. 878; Davis _v._ Taylor, Cro. El. 648; Garford _v._ Clerk, Cro. El. 857; Miller’s Case, Cro. Jac. 430; Crittal _v._ Horner, Hob. 219 _b_; Elyott _v._ Blague, Sty. 283; Marshall _v._ Chickall, 1 Sid. 50; Comming’s Case, 2 Sid. 5; Lymbe _v._ Hockly, 1 Lev. 205; Grimes _v._ Lovel, 12 Mod. 242; Clifton _v._ Wells, 12 Mod. 634; Whitfield _v._ Powel, 12 Mod. 248; Bloodworth _v._ Gray, 7 M. & G. 334; Watson _v._ McCarthy, 2 Ga. 57; Nichols _v._ Guy, 2 Ind. 82; McDonald _v._ Nugent, 122 Ia. 651; Meteye _v._ Times Co., 47 La. Ann. 824; Golderman _v._ Stearns, 7 Gray, 181; Williams _v._ Holdredge, 22 Barb. 396; Hewitt _v._ Mason, 24 How. Pr. 366; Upton _v._ Upton, 51 Hun, 184; Simpson _v._ Press Co., 33 Misc. 228; Kaucher _v._ Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62; Irons _v._ Field, 9 R. I. 216 _Accord_.

Bury _v._ Chappel, Golds. 135; James _v._ Rutlech, 4 Rep. 17 _a_; Hunt _v._ Jones, Cro. Jac. 499; Califord _v._ Knight, Cro. Jac. 514 _Contra_.

In Taylor _v._ Hall, 2 Strange, 1189, it was held not actionable to say that plaintiff had had the pox. Smith’s Case, Noy, 151; Dutton _v._ Eaton, Al. 30; Carslake _v._ Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473; Nichols _v._ Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Pike _v._ Van Wormer, 5 How. Pr. 171; Irons _v._ Field, 9 R. I. 216 _Accord_. Austin _v._ White, Cro. El. 214; Anon. Ow. 34; Hobson _v._ Hudson, Sty. 199, 219 _Contra_.

Footnote 450:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 451:

But see Fitzgerald _v._ Young, 89 Neb. 693 (imputation of insanity to a teacher).

Footnote 452:

Only the opinion of the court upon this point is given.

Footnote 453:

Lucas _v._ Cotton, Moore, 79; Underwood _v._ Parks, 2 Stra. 1200; Ellis _v._ Buzzell, 60 Me. 209; Baum _v._ Clause, 5 Hill, 196 _Accord_.

The rule is the same as to actions for a libel. Leyman _v._ Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; Grand Union Tea Co. _v._ Lorch, (C. C. A.) 231 Fed. 390; Schuler _v._ Fischer, 167 Ala. 184; Children _v._ Shinn, 168 Ia. 531; Castle _v._ Hunston, 19 Kan. 417; Hanson _v._ Bristow, 87 Kan. 72; Herald Pub. Co. _v._ Feltner, 158 Ky. 35; Cook _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326; Merrey _v._ Guardian Pub. Co., 79 N. J. Law, 177; Willetts _v._ Scudder, 72 Or. 535. Unless modified by statute, as in Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island and West Virginia. Delaware Co. _v._ Croasdale, 6 Houst. 181; Jones _v._ Townsend, 21 Fla. 431; Palmer _v._ Adams, 137 Ind. 72; Perry _v._ Porter, 124 Mass. 338; Fordyce _v._ Richmond, 78 Neb. 752; McClaugherty _v._ Cooper, 39 W. Va. 313. In New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, however, the mere truth of the libel is not always a defence, although there is no such statute. Hutchins _v._ Page, 75 N. H. 215; Burkhart _v._ N. Am. Co., 214 Pa. St. 39.

Footnote 454:

The statement of the pleadings is abridged; the arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Martin, Channell, and Bramwell, BB., are omitted.

Footnote 455:

Rex _v._ Skinner, Lofft, 55; Thomas _v._ Churton, 2 B. & S. 475; Dawkins _v._ Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; Dawkins _v._ Prince Edward, 1 Q. B. D. 499; Law _v._ Llewellyn, [1906] 1 K. B. 487 (judge of inferior court—Scotch case Allardice _v._ Robertson, 1 Dow & Cl. 495 not followed); Bottomley _v._ Brougham, [1908] 1 K. B. 584 (official receiver); Miller _v._ Hope, 2 Shaw, App. Cas. 125; Yates _v._ Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 9 Johns. 395 (but see Aylesworth _v._ St. John, 25 Hun, 156); Allen _v._ Earnest, (Tex. Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 1101 _Accord_.

Kendillon _v._ Maltby, Car. & M. 402, 2 M. & Rob. 438, S. C., lays down too restricted a rule.

“The publication of defamatory words may be under an absolute or under a qualified or conditional privilege. Under the former there is no liability, although the defamatory words are falsely and maliciously published. The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow and practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and acts of state.” Hall, C. J., in Hassett _v._ Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35.

See Tanner _v._ Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Peterson _v._ Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87.

Footnote 456:

Only the opinion of Brett, M. R., is given.

Footnote 457:

Pedley _v._ Morris, 61 L. J. Q. B. 21 _Accord_.

See Buckley _v._ Wood, 4 Rep. 14 _b_; Hodgson _v._ Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 232; Mackay _v._ Ford, 5 H. & N. 792; Smallwood _v._ York, 163 Ky. 139; Rudin _v._ Fauver, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 315; Kruegel _v._ Cockrell (Tex. Ci _v._ App.) 151 S. W. 352.

“We cannot accept the absolute and unqualified privilege laid down in Munster _v._ Lamb.... We cannot agree with Brett, M. R., that in a suit against counsel for slander the only inquiry is whether the words were spoken in a judicial proceeding, and if so, the case must be stopped. We quite agree however, with Bramwell, J. A., in Seaman _v._ Netherclift, that ‘relevant’ and ‘pertinent’ are not the best words that could be used. These words have in a measure a technical meaning, and we all know the difficulty in determining in some cases what is relevant or pertinent. With Lord Chancellor Cairns we prefer the words ‘having reference’ or ‘made with reference,’ or in the language of Shaw, C. J., ‘having relation to the cause or subject-matter.’ And if counsel in the trial of a cause maliciously slanders a party, or witness or any other person in regard to a matter that has no reference or relation to, or connection with, the case before the Court, he is and ought to be answerable in an action by the party injured. This qualification of his privilege in no manner impairs the freedom of discussion so necessary to the proper administration of the law, nor does it subject counsel to actions for slander except in cases in which upon reason and sound public policy he ought to be held answerable. We cannot agree that for the abuse of his privilege he is amenable only to the authority of the Court. Mere punishment by the Court is no recompense to one who has thus been maliciously and wantonly slandered.” Robinson, J., in Maulsby _v._ Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 162. La Porta _v._ Leonard, 88 N. J. Law, 663; Andrews _v._ Gardiner, 165 App. Div. 595 _Accord_.

_Defamatory statements in brief of counsel._ Brooks _v._ Bank of Acadia, 138 La. 657.

_Pleadings._ Nalle _v._ Oyster, 230 U. S. 165; Carpenter _v._ Grimes Min. Co., 19 Idaho, 384; Hess _v._ McKee, 150 Ia. 409; Lebovitch _v._ Levy, 128 La. 518; Flynn _v._ Boglarsky, 164 Mich. 513; Rosenberg _v._ Dworetsky, 139 App. Div. 517; Harris _v._ Santa Fé Townsite Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 77.

In England, statements in a pleading are absolutely privileged, though not relevant. Hodson _v._ Pare, [1899] 1 Q. B. 455.

In the United States, statements in a pleading not pertinent to the

## action are not privileged. Union Ins. Co. _v._ Thomas, 83 Fed. 803;

King _v._ McKissick, 126 Fed. 215; Potter _v._ Troy, 175 Fed. 128; Myers _v._ Hodges, 53 Fla. 197; Gaines _v._ Aetna Ins. Co., 104 Ky. 695; Jones _v._ Brownlee, 161 Mo. 258; Gilbert _v._ People, 1 Denio, 41; Kemper _v._ Fort, 219 Pa. St. 85; Crockett _v._ McLanahan, 109 Tenn. 517; Miller _v._ Gust, 71 Wash. 139.

_Charges in disbarment proceedings_, see Preusser _v._ Faulhaber, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 312.

_Statements in a petition for pardon._ Connollee _v._ Blanton, (Tex. Ci _v._ App.) 163 S. W. 404 (held absolutely privileged).

_Statement by defendant on trial for crime._ Nelson _v._ Davis, 9 Ga. App. 131.

In Louisiana the statements of parties in judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged. Lescale _v._ Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 118 La. 718; Dunn _v._ Southern Co., 116 La. 431.

Footnote 458:

The arguments and the opinion of Amphlett, J. A., are omitted.

Footnote 459:

Revis _v._ Smith, 18 C. B. 126; Henderson _v._ Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 569; Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 7 H. L. 744, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255 (military court of inquiry); Goffin _v._ Donnelly, 6 Q. B. D. 307 (select committee of House of Commons); Gompas _v._ White, 6 T. L. R. 20; Watson _v._ Jones, [1905] A. C. 480 (privilege extends to statement to client and solicitor in preparation of case for trial); Terry _v._ Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375; Hunckle _v._ Voneiff, 69 Md. 173; Dodge _v._ Gilman, 122 Minn. 177; Runge _v._ Franklin, 72 Tex. 585; Kennedy _v._ Hilliard, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 195 _Accord_. But the English courts do not extend the doctrine to hearings before an administrative board. Atwood _v._ Chapman, 111 L. T. 726.

See also Hutchinson _v._ Lewis, 75 Ind. 55; Liles _v._ Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631.

In Dawkins _v._ Lord Rokeby, _supra_, Lord Penzance said: “It is said that a statement of fact of a libellous nature which is palpably untrue—known to be untrue by him who made it, and dictated by malice—ought to be the subject of a civil remedy, though made in the course of a purely military inquiry. This mode of stating the question assumes the untruth and assumes the malice. If by any process of demonstration, free from the defects of human judgment, the untruth and malice could be set above and beyond all question or doubt, there might be ground for contending that the law of the land should give damages to the injured man.

“But this is not the state of things under which this question of law has to be determined. Whether the statements were, in fact, untrue, and whether they were dictated by malice, are, and always will be, open questions, upon which opinions may differ, and which can only be resolved by the exercise of human judgment. And the real question is, whether it is proper on grounds of public policy to remit such questions to the judgment of a jury. The reasons against doing so are simple and obvious. A witness may be utterly free from malice, and may yet in the eyes of a jury be open to that imputation; or, again, the witness may be cleared by the jury of the imputation, and may yet have to encounter the expenses and distress of a harassing litigation. With such possibilities hanging over his head, a witness cannot be expected to speak with that free and open mind which the administration of justice demands.

“These considerations have long since led to the legal doctrine that a witness in the courts of law is free from any action; and I fail to perceive any reason why the same considerations should not be applied to an inquiry such as the present, and with the same result.”

Footnote 460:

The statement, arguments of counsel and parts of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 461:

“White _v._ Carroll, rightly understood, is in harmony with the other cases. The case shows that the court held that the answer given to the question put to the defendant as a witness before the surrogate was not material and pertinent to the inquiry; and further held it was privileged if the defendant, when he gave it, in good faith believed that it was; and whether he so believed, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Had the evidence proved that the answer was material and pertinent, the court must have held it privileged, irrespective of the defendant’s belief upon the subject.” Grover, J., in Marsh _v._ Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 313.

“It seems to be settled by the English authorities that judges, counsel, parties, and witnesses are absolutely exempted from liability to an action for defamatory words published in the course of judicial proceedings; and that the same doctrine is generally held in the American courts, with the qualification, as to parties, counsel, and witnesses, that their statements made in the course of an action must be pertinent and material to the case.” Lord, J., in McLaughlin _v._ Cowley, 127 Mass. 316, 319.

“The examination of witnesses is regulated by the tribunal before which they testify, and if witnesses answer pertinently questions asked them by counsel which are not excluded by the tribunal, or answer pertinently questions asked them by the tribunal, they ought to be absolutely protected. It is not the duty of a witness to decide for himself whether the questions asked him under the direction of the tribunal are relevant. As the witness is sworn to tell the whole truth relating to the matter concerning which his testimony is taken, he ought also to be absolutely protected in testifying to any matter which is relevant to the inquiry, or which he reasonably believes to be relevant to it. But a witness ought not to be permitted with impunity to volunteer defamatory statements which are irrelevant to the matter of inquiry, and which he does not believe to be relevant. This statement of the law we think, is supported by the decisions in this Commonwealth. The English decisions, perhaps, go somewhat further than this in favor of a witness; certainly they apply the rule liberally for his protection.” Field, J., in Wright _v._ Lothrop, 149 Mass. 385, 389.

The principal case and the preceding extracts in this note represent the views of the American courts in general.

King _v._ McKissick, 126 Fed. 215; Lawson _v._ Hicks, 38 Ala. 279; Wyatt _v._ Buell, 47 Cal. 624; Hollis _v._ Meux, 69 Cal. 625; People _v._ Green, 9 Col. 506; Lester _v._ Thurmond, 51 Ga. 118; Buschbaum _v._ Heriot, 5 Ga. App. 521; Spaids _v._ Barrett, 57 Ill. 289; Fagan _v._ Fries, 30 Ill. App. 236; Smith _v._ Howard, 28 Ia. 51; Hawk _v._ Evans, 76 Ia. 593; Forbes _v._ Johnson, 11 B. Mon. 48; Morgan _v._ Booth, 13 Bush, 480; Stewart _v._ Hall, 83 Ky. 375; Sebree _v._ Thompson, 126 Ky. 223; Kelly _v._ Lafitte, 28 La. Ann. 435; Gardemal _v._ McWilliams, 43 La. Ann. 454; Barnes _v._ McCrate, 32 Me. 442; Hoar _v._ Wood, 3 Met. 193; Kidder _v._ Parkhurst, 3 All. 393; McLaughlin _v._ Cowley, 127 Mass. 316; Wright _v._ Lothrop, 149 Mass. 385; Wheaton _v._ Beecher, 49 Mich. 348; Acre _v._ Starkweather, 118 Mich. 214; Hastings _v._ Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Ring _v._ Wheeler, 7 Cow. 725; Garr _v._ Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Marsh _v._ Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309; Moore _v._ Manufacturers’ Bank, 123 N. Y. 420, 136 N. Y. 666; Newfield _v._ Copperman, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 360; Perkins _v._ Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461; Dada _v._ Piper, 41 Hun, 254; McLaughlin _v._ Charles, 60 Hun, 239; Beggs _v._ McCrea, 62 App. Div. 39 (_semble_); Suydam _v._ Moffat, 1 Sandf. 459; Perzel _v._ Tousey, 52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 79; Cooper _v._ Phipps, 24 Or. 357; Shadden _v._ McElwee, 86 Tenn. 146; Mower _v._ Watson, 11 Vt. 536; Dunham _v._ Powers, 42 Vt. 1; Johnson _v._ Brown, 13 W. Va. 71; Jennings _v._ Paine, 4 Wis. 358; Calkins _v._ Sumner, 13 Wis. 193; Larkin _v._ Noonan, 19 Wis. 82.

_Statements volunteered by witness._ Viss _v._ Calligan, 91 Wash. 673.

_Statements in affidavit._ Perry _v._ Perry, 153 N. C. 266; Baggett _v._ Grady, 154 N. C. 342; Keeley _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 156 Wis. 181. But see Ritschy _v._ Garrels, 195 Mo. App. 670.

_Affidavit in legislative investigation._ Tuohy _v._ Hassell, 35 Okl. 61.

_Defamatory statements at creditors’ meeting._ Smith _v._ Agee, 178 Ala. 627.

_Statements in notice of foreclosure sale._ Tierney _v._ Ruppert, 150 App. Div. 863.

_Report of grand jury without indictment._ Rich _v._ Eason, (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 303.

_Statement of guardian as to person making claim against ward’s estate._ Marney _v._ Joseph, 94 Kan. 18.

_Letter from one attorney to another_, not confined to the matters in litigation. Savage _v._ Stover, 86 N. J. Law, 478.

_Message of a mayor._ A communication from the mayor of a city to the common council is absolutely privileged. Trebilcock _v._ Anderson, 117 Mich. 39.

_Official statements of officers of state_ are absolutely privileged. Chatterton _v._ Secretary of State, [1895] 2 Q. B. 189; Spalding _v._ Vilas, 161 U. S. 483.

_Statements of administrative officers._ Farr _v._ Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413; Haskell v. Perkins, 165 Ill. App. 144; Tanner _v._ Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87; Johnson _v._ Marsh, 82 N. J. Law, 4 (notice not to sell liquor to alleged drunkard); Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27.

Footnote 462:

It is well settled that no action is allowed against a witness for damage caused by his perjury. Damport _v._ Sympson, Cro. El. 520, Ow. 158, 2 And. 47, s. c.; Eyres _v._ Sedgewicke, Cro. Jac. 601; Yelv. 142, 2 Roll. R. 197, S. C.; Wimberly _v._ Thompson, Noy, 6; Harding _v._ Bodman, Hutt. 11; Coxe _v._ Smithe, 1 Lev. 119; Taylor _v._ Bidwell, 65 Cal. 489; Bostwick _v._ Lewis, 2 Day, 447; Grove _v._ Brandenburg, 7 Blackf. 239; Dunlap _v._ Glidden, 31 Me. 435; Severance _v._ Judkins, 73 Me. 376, 379; Garing _v._ Fraser, 76 Me. 37; Phelps _v._ Stearns, 4 Gray, 105; Curtis _v._ Fairbanks, 16 N. H. 542; Smith _v._ Lewis, 3 Johns. 157; Cunningham _v._ Brown, 18 Vt. 123.

See Bell _v._ Senneff, 83 Ill. 122. Compare Schaub _v._ O’Ferrell, 116 Md. 131.

Footnote 463:

See also Taylor _v._ Bidwell, 65 Cal. 489; Curtis _v._ Fairbanks, 16 N. H. 542; Stevens _v._ Rowe, 59 N. H. 578.

Footnote 464:

A part of the opinion relating to points of pleading is omitted.

Footnote 465:

The arguments and the concurring opinions of Martin and Channell, BB., are omitted.

Footnote 466:

Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18 L. T. Rep. 615; Hope _v._ Leng, 23 T. L. R. 243; Furniss _v._ Cambridge News, 23 T. L. R. 705; Todd _v._ Every Evening Co., (Del.) 62 Atl. 1089 (_semble_); Blodgett _v._ Des Moines Co., (Ia.) 113 N. W. 821; Billet _v._ Publishing Co., 107 La. 751 (_semble_); McBee _v._ Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Cowley _v._ Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392; Conner _v._ Standard Co., 183 Mass. 474; Nixon _v._ Dispatch Co., 101 Minn. 309; Hawkins _v._ Globe Co., 10 Mo. App. 174; Boogher _v._ Knapp, 97 Mo. 122; Brown _v._ Knapp, 213 Mo. 655 (_semble_); Brown _v._ Globe Co., 213 Mo. 611; Thompson _v._ Powning, 15 Nev. 195; Edsall _v._ Brooks, 17 Abb. Pr. 221; N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., § 1907; Ackerman _v._ Jones, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 42; Salisbury _v._ Union Co., 45 Hun, 120; Hart _v._ Sun Co., 79 Hun, 358; Cincinnati Co. _v._ Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548; Metcalf _v._ Times Co., 20 R. I. 674; Saunders _v._ Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369; American Co. _v._ Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663; People _v._ Glassman, 12 Utah, 238 _Accord_.

So publication of copies from the register of judgments is privileged. Searles _v._ Scarlett, [1892] 2 Q. B. 56.

Publication of papers filed in the clerk’s office, but not produced in open court, is not privileged. Meeker _v._ Post Pub. Co., 45 Col. 355; Cowley _v._ Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392; Lundin _v._ Post Pub. Co., 217 Mass. 213; Park _v._ Detroit Co., 72 Mich. 560; Barber _v._ St. Louis Co., 3 Mo. App. 377; Stuart _v._ Press Co., 83 App. Div. 467; Byers _v._ Meridian Printing Co., 84 Ohio St. 408; American Co. _v._ Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663; Houston Pub. Co. _v._ McDavid, (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 467; Ilsley _v._ Sentinel Co., 133 Wis. 20.

_Report of criminal proceeding before magistrate with no jurisdiction._ Lee _v._ Brooklyn Pub. Co., 209 N. Y. 245.

_Report of investigation before grand jury._ Poston _v._ Washington R. Co., 36 App. D. C. 359; Sweet _v._ Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450.

_Report in advance of judicial proceeding as to evidence to be adduced._ Houston Pub. Co. _v._ Tiernan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 542. See Kelly _v._ Independent Pub. Co., 45 Mont. 127.

_Humorous report._ Bresslin _v._ Star Co., 85 Misc. 609.

_Matter added to the report._ Smith _v._ New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 154 App. Div. 458.

Footnote 467:

Only the opinion of Lord Coleridge, and that, too, slightly abridged, is given. Lopes, J., concurred.

Footnote 468:

Curry _v._ Walter, 1 Esp. 456, 1 B. & P. 525; Lewis _v._ Levy, E. B. & E. 537; Kimber _v._ Press Association, [1893] 1 Q. B. 65; McBee _v._ Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Salisbury _v._ Union Co., 45 Hun, 120 (_semble_); Metcalf _v._ Times Co., 20 R. I. 674 (_semble_); Brown _v._ Providence Co., 25 R. I. 117 (_semble_) _Accord_.

See Duncan _v._ Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439; Todd _v._ Every Evening Co., (Del.) 62 Atl. 1089; Flues _v._ New Nonpareil Co., 155 Ia. 290; Cowley _v._ Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392; Jones _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 240 Mo. 200; Stanley _v._ Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Matthews _v._ Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Cincinnati Co. _v._ Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548; Mengel _v._ Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. St. 367.

The report of _ex parte_ proceedings may be published before their termination, if of such a character that there will be a final decision. Kimber _v._ Press Association, [1893] 1 Q. B. 65.

Footnote 469:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 470:

In 1843, see Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. lxx. pp. 1254–8; and in 1858, see vol. cxlix. pp. 947–82.—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 471:

See Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. lxx. p. 1254; and vol. cxlix. p. 947.—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 472:

Garby _v._ Bennett, 57 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 853; Buckstaff _v._ Hicks, 94 Wis. 34 (_semble_—report of proceedings of common council of a city not privileged); Dillon _v._ Balfour, L. R. 20 Ir. 600 _Accord_.

The publication must purport to be a report. Lewis _v._ Hayes, 165 Cal. 527.

Footnote 473:

The concurring opinions of Cockburn, C. J., and Baggallay and Bramwell, JJ. A., and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 474:

See Charlton _v._ Watton, 6 Car. & P. 385; Davison _v._ Duncan, 7. E. & B. 229, 233; Popham _v._ Pickburn, 7 H. & N. 891; Davis _v._ Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; Allbutt _v._ General Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400, 411.

By St. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, §§ 3 and 4, “§ 3. A fair and accurate report in any newspaper of proceedings publicly heard before any court exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously with such proceedings, be privileged: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter.

Ҥ 4. A fair and accurate report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting, or (except where neither the public nor any newspaper reporter is admitted) of any meeting of a vestry, town council, school board, board of guardians, board or local authority formed or constituted under the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of any committee appointed by any of the above-mentioned bodies, or of any meeting of any commissioners authorized to act by letters patent, Act of Parliament, warrant under the Royal Sign Manual, or other lawful warrant or authority, select committees of either House of Parliament, justices of the peace in quarter sessions assembled for administrative or deliberative purposes, and the publication at the request of any Government office or department, officer of state, commissioner of police, or chief constable of any notice or report issued by them for the information of the public, shall be privileged, unless it shall be proved that such report or publication was published or made maliciously: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter: Provided also, that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceedings if it shall be proved that the defendant has been requested to insert in the newspaper in which the report or other publication complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such report or other publication, and has refused or neglected to insert the same: Provided further, that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed or construed to limit or abridge any privilege now by law existing, or to protect the publication of any matter not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.

“For the purposes of this section ‘public meeting’ shall mean any meeting _bona fide_ and lawfully held for a lawful purpose, and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether the admission thereto be general or restricted.” Kelly _v._ O’Malley, 6 T. L. R. 62, was decided under this statute.

_Newspaper publication of reports of administrative officers._ Tilles _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609; Schwarz _v._ Evening News Co., 84 N. J. Law 486; Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27. _Contra_, Madill _v._ Currie, 168 Mich. 546. See Morasca _v._ Item Co., 126 La. 426.

_Report of investigation by administrative officers._ Williams _v._ Black, 24 S. D. 501.

Footnote 475:

The case has been much abridged.

Footnote 476:

Allbutt _v._ General Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400 _Accord_. But see Kimball _v._ Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248; Peoples Bank _v._ Goodwin, 148 Mo. App. 364.

_Report of proceedings of a church commission._ Bass _v._ Mathews, 69 Wash. 214.

Footnote 477:

Only the opinion of Mellish, L. J., is given.

Footnote 478:

Macdougall _v._ Knight, 14 App. Cas. 194 (explaining S. C. 17 Q. B. Div. 636); Salisbury _v._ Union Co., 45 Hun, 120 _Accord_.

See Annaly _v._ Trade Co., L. R. 26 Ir. 394.

Footnote 479:

Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439; Washington Herald Co. _v._ Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322; Lundin _v._ Post Pub. Co., 217 Mass. 213; Schwarz _v._ Evening News Co., 84 N. J. Law, 486; Williams _v._ Black, 24 S. D. 501; Williams Printing Co. _v._ Saunders, 113 Va. 156 _Accord_.

But see U. S. _v._ Journal Co., 197 Fed. 415; Tilles _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609.

“Their Lordships regret to find that there appeared on the one side of this case the time-worn fallacy that some kind of privilege attaches to the profession of the Press as distinguished from the members of the public. The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher. The responsibilities which attach to his power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and in the case of a conscientious journalist do, make him more careful; but the range of his assertions, his criticisms, or his comments is as wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject. No privilege attaches to his position.” Lord Shaw in Arnold _v._ King-Emperor, 111 L. T. 324, 325.

Footnote 480:

The statement has been condensed, the facts sufficiently appearing in the opinion of Mellor, J. The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinion of Hannen, J., are omitted.

Footnote 481:

Barbaud _v._ Hookham, 5 Esp. 109; McDougall _v._ Claridge, 1 Camp. 267; Dunman _v._ Bigg, 1 Camp, 269 _n._; Todd _v._ Hawkins, 2 M. & R. 20, 8 Car. & P. 88; Shipley _v._ Todhunter, 7 Car. & P. 680; Harris _v._ Thompson, 13 C. B. 333; Maitland _v._ Bramwell, 2 F. & F. 623; Scarll _v._ Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Cooke _v._ Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328; Croft _v._ Stevens, 7 H. & N. 570; Whiteley _v._ Adams, 15 C. B. N. S. 392; Spill _v._ Maule, L. R. 4 Ex. 232; Laughton _v._ Bishop, L. R. 4 P. C. 495; Davies _v._ Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 608; Waller _v._ Loch, 7 Q. B. D. 619; Cowles _v._ Potts, 34 L. J. Q. B. 247; Quartz Co. _v._ Beall, 20 Ch. Div. 501; Royal Aquarium _v._ Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431; Pittard _v._ Oliver, [1891] 1 Q. B. 474; Phila. Co. _v._ Quigley, 21 How. 202; Broughton _v._ McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Haight _v._ Cornell, 15 Conn. 74; Etchison _v._ Pergerson, 88 Ga. 620; Wharton _v._ Wright, 30 Ill. App. 343; Coombs _v._ Rose, 8 Blackf. 155; Kirkpatrick _v._ Eagle Lodge, 26 Kan. 384; Lynch _v._ Febiger, 39 La. Ann. 336; Remington _v._ Congdon, 2 Pick. 310; Bradley _v._ Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Farnsworth _v._ Storrs, 5 Cush. 412; York _v._ Pease, 2 Gray, 282; Gassett _v._ Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94; Shurtleff _v._ Parker, 130 Mass. 293 (_semble_); Howland _v._ Flood, 160 Mass. 509; Landis _v._ Campbell, 79 Mo. 433; Rothholz _v._ Dunkle, 53 N. J. Law, 438; Jarvis _v._ Hatheway, 3 Johns, 180; O’Donaghue _v._ McGovern, 23 Wend. 26; Streety _v._ Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Kilinck _v._ Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; McKnight _v._ Hasbrouck, 17 R. I. 70; Tillinghast _v._ McLeod, 17 R. I. 208; Holt _v._ Parsons, 23 Tex. 9; Shurtleff _v._ Stevens, 51 Vt. 501 (_semble_) _Accord_.

See also Dickeson _v._ Hilliard, L. R. 9 Ex. 79; Lyman _v._ Gowing, L. R. 6 Ir. 259 (where the communication was made to unsuitable persons); Phillips _v._ Bradshaw, 181 Ala. 541; Bohlinger _v._ Germania Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477.

_Communication by promoter of an enterprise to one whose assistance is sought._ Cook _v._ Gust, 155 Wis. 594.

_Communication from superintendent of railroad to express company as to employee who serves both._ International R. Co. _v._ Edmundson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 402.

_Communication by insurance adjuster to insurers._ Richardson _v._ Cooke, 129 La. 365.

_Indorsement of officer on recommendation for promotion._ Gray _v._ Mossman, 88 Conn. 247.

_Communication between stockholders as to manager of a corporation._ Ashcroft _v._ Hammond, 197 N. Y. 488.

_Communication by person immediately interested made honestly to protect his own interest._ Delany _v._ Jones, 4 Esp. 190 (but see Lay _v._ Lawson, 4 A. & E. 798); Fairman _v._ Ives, 5 B. & A. 642; Coward _v._ Wellington, 7 Car. & P. 531; Tuson _v._ Evans, 12 A. & E. 733 (_semble_); Blackham _v._ Pugh, 2 C. B. 611; Wenman _v._ Ash, 13 C. B. 836 (_semble_, communication to unsuitable person); Manby _v._ Witt, 18 C. B. 544; Taylor _v._ Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; Amann _v._ Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; Force _v._ Warren, 15 C. B. N. S. 806; Oddy _v._ Paulet, 4 F. & F. 1009 (_semble_); Cooke _v._ Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328; Regina _v._ Perry, 15 Cox C. C. 169; Bank _v._ Strong, 1 App. Cas. 307; Hunt _v._ Great Northern Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 189; Baker _v._ Carrick, [1894] 1 Q. B. 838; Hobbs _v._ Bryers, L. R. 2 Ir. 496; Lang _v._ Gilbert, 4 All. (N. B.) 445; Gasley _v._ Moss, 9 Ala. 266; Butterworth _v._ Conrow, 1 Marv. 361; Henry _v._ Moberly, 23 Ind. App. 305; Nichols _v._ Eaton, 110 Ia. 509; Caldwell _v._ Story, 107 Ky. 10; Baysett _v._ Hire, 49 La. Ann. 904; Dickinson _v._ Hathaway, 122 La. Ann. 644; Beeler _v._ Jackson, 64 Md. 589; Brow _v._ Hathaway, 13 All. 239; Bacon _v._ Mich. Co., 66 Mich. 166; Howard _v._ Dickie, 120 Mich. 238; Alabama Co. _v._ Brooks, 69 Miss. 168; Lovell Co. _v._ Houghton, 116 N. Y. 520; Lent _v._ Underhill, 54 App. Div. 609; Reynolds _v._ Plumbers’ Ass’n, 30 Misc. 709; Behee _v._ Missouri R. Co., 71 Tex. 424; Missouri R. Co. _v._ Richmond, 73 Tex. 568; Missouri Co. _v._ Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107; Miller _v._ Armstrong, 24 N. Zeal. 968.

Footnote 482:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 483:

Johnson _v._ Evans, 3 Esp. 32; Fowler _v._ Homer, 3 Camp. 294; Jones _v._ Thomas, 34 W. R. 104; Lightbody _v._ Gordon, 9 Scotch Sess. Cas. (4th series) 934; Dale _v._ Harris, 109 Mass. 193 _Accord_.

See to the same effect Flanagan _v._ McLane, 87 Conn. 220; Wall _v._ Seaboard Ry., 18 Ga. App. 457; Cristman _v._ Cristman, 36 Ill. App. 567; Harper _v._ Harper, 10 Bush, 447; Hyatt _v._ Lindner, 133 La. 614; Bavington _v._ Robinson, 127 Md. 46, 124 Md. 85; Eames _v._ Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342; Wells _v._ Toogood, 165 Mich. 677; Lally _v._ Emery, 59 Hun, 237; Hayden _v._ Hasbrouck, 34 R. I. 556; Viss _v._ Calligan, 91 Wash. 673. Compare Hansen _v._ Hansen, 126 Minn. 426; Hooper _v._ Truscott, 2 B. N. C. 457; Harrison _v._ Fraser, 29 W. R. 652.

But see Peak _v._ Taubman, 251 Mo. 390; Vanloon _v._ Vanloon, 159 Mo. App. 255; Hagener _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 172 Mo. App. 436.

_Relevant statement in course of dispute as to property._ Alderson _v._ Kahle, 73 W. Va. 690.

Footnote 484:

The argument for the plaintiff and the opinions of Lord Tenterden, C. J., Bayley, and Littledale, JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 485:

_Servant cases._ Edmondson _v._ Stevenson, Bull. N. P. 8; Weatherston _v._ Hawkins, 1 T. R. 110; Rogers _v._ Clifton, 3 B. & P. 587; Pattison _v._ Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Gardner _v._ Slade, 13 Q. B. 796; Murdoch _v._ Funduklian, 2 T. L. R. 614 (reversing S. C. 2 T. L. R. 215); Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171; Carroll _v._ Owen, 178 Mich. 551 _Accord_.

_Commercial agency cases._ Lemay _v._ Chamberlain, 10 Ont. 638; Todd _v._ Dun, 12 Ont. 791; Erber _v._ Dun, 12 Fed. 526; Johnson _v._ Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172; Pollasky _v._ Minchener, 81 Mich. 280; Mitchell _v._ Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226; King _v._ Patterson, 49 N. J. Law, 417; Taylor _v._ Church, 8 N. Y. 452; Sunderlin _v._ Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; Bradstreet Co. _v._ Gill, 72 Texas, 115 _Accord_.

Macintosh _v._ Dun, [1908] A. C. 390 _Contra_. _Aliter_ in case of credit association not for profit. London Ass’n for Protection of Trade _v._ Greenlands, [1916] 2 A. C. 15.

But information given to persons having no interest in the mercantile standing of the plaintiff—for example, reports sent by a commercial agency to its subscribers generally—is not privileged. Erber _v._ Dun, 12 Fed. 526; Trussell _v._ Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (criticising Beardsley _v._ Tappan, 5 Blatchford, 497); Locke _v._ Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Pacific Packing Co. _v._ Bradstreet, 25 Idaho, 696; Pollasky _v._ Minchener, 81 Mich. 280; Ormsby _v._ Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477; State _v._ Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348.

For other cases of communications privileged because made in answer to proper inquiries, see Cockayne _v._ Hodgkisson, 5 Car. & P. 543; Storey _v._ Challands, 8 Car. & P. 234; Kline _v._ Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297; Hopwood _v._ Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; Robshaw _v._ Smith, 38 L. T. Rep. 423; Weldon _v._ Winslow, Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (5th ed.) 255; Melcher _v._ Beeler, 48 Col. 233; Zuckerman _v._ Sonnenschein, 62 Ill. 115; Richardson _v._ Gunby, 88 Kan. 47; Atwill _v._ Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177; Howland _v._ Blake Co., 156 Mass. 543; Froslee _v._ Lund’s State Bank, 131 Minn. 435; Fahr _v._ Hayes, 50 N. J. Law, 275; Posnett _v._ Marble, 62 Vt. 481; Rude _v._ Nass, 79 Wis. 321.

_Advice by attorney to client as to person with whom client has business._ Kruse _v._ Rabe, 80 N. J. Law, 378.

_Fiduciary relations._ Communications made in the line of a business duty, for example, by an agent or employee to his principal or employer are privileged. Wright _v._ Woodgate, 2 C. M. & R. 573; Scarll _v._ Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Stace _v._ Griffith, L. R. 2 P. C. 420; Hume _v._ Marshall, 42 J. P. 136; Washburn _v._ Cooke, 3 Den. 110; Lewis _v._ Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369.

_Family relations._ A _bona fide_ communication by a brother to his sister reflecting on the character of her suitor is privileged. Anon., 2 Smith, 4, cited; Adams _v._ Coleridge, 1 T. L. R. 4. So is a similar communication by a son-in-law to his mother-in-law. Todd _v._ Hawkins, 2 M. & Rob. 20, 8 C. & P. 88.

_Inquiry as to character of candidate for admission to a society._ Cadle _v._ McIntosh, 51 Ind. App. 365.

Footnote 486:

Only this opinion and the dissenting opinion of Creswell, J., are given. Erle, J., concurred with the Lord Chief Justice; Coltman, J., agreed with Cresswell, J.

Footnote 487:

“If it had been necessary, I should have been fully prepared to go the whole length of the doctrine laid down by Tindal, C. J., in the case of Coxhead _v._ Richards,” _per_ Willes, J., in Amann _v._ Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 592, 602. Blackburn, J., in Davies _v._ Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 605, 611, and Lindley, J., in Stuart _v._ Bell, [1891] 2 Q. B. 341, 347, expressed similar approval of the opinion of Tindal, C. J.

Vanspike _v._ Cleyson, Cro. El. 541; Peacock _v._ Reynal, 2 Br. & Gold. 151, 15 C. B. N. S. 418, cited; Herver _v._ Dowson, Bull. N. P. 8; Cleaver _v._ Sarraude, 1 Camp. 268, cited; Picton _v._ Jackman, 4 Car. & P. 257; Dixon _v._ Smith, 29 L. J. Ex. 125, 126; Masters _v._ Burgess, 3 T. L. R. 96; Stuart _v._ Bell, [1891] 2 Q. B. 341; Hart _v._ Reed, 1 B. Mon. 166; Fresh _v._ Cutter, 73 Md. 87; Noonan _v._ Orton, 32 Wis. 106 _Accord_.

Cockayne _v._ Hodgkisson, 5 Car. & P. 543 (_semble_); King _v._ Watts, 8 Car. & P. 614; Brown _v._ Vannaman, 85 Wis. 451 _Contra_. But see Hocks _v._ Sprangers, 113 Wis. 123.

In Bennett _v._ Deacon, 2 C. B. 628, a creditor of a buyer volunteered a warning to the seller as to the buyer’s credit. The court was evenly divided as to whether the communication was privileged.

Compare Irion _v._ Knapp, 132 La. 60 (letter to a public board as to a candidate for an appointment).

INDIAN PENAL CODE, § 499, exception 9. It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.

Footnote 488:

As to this remarkable litigant, see the article by Irving Browne, “Count Joannes,” 8 Green Bag. 435.

Footnote 489:

Only what relates to this count is given.

Footnote 490:

Krebs _v._ Oliver, 12 Gray, 239; Byam _v._ Collins, 111 N. Y. 143 _Accord_.

Anon., 15 C. B. N. S. 410 (cited); Adcock _v._ Marsh, 8 Ired. 360 _Contra_. See Dobbin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 157 Mo. App. 689.

Footnote 491:

The statement of the case has been condensed.

Footnote 492:

In Simmonds _v._ Dunne, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 358; Over _v._ Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191; York _v._ Johnson, 116 Mass. 482, the communications were not privileged for want of a legitimate interest or duty on the part of the defendant.

See Whiteley _v._ Newman, 9 Ga. App. 89.

Footnote 493:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 494:

Jones _v._ Thomas, 34 W. R. 104; Pittard _v._ Oliver, [1891] 1 Q. B. 474; Broughton _v._ McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Brow _v._ Hathaway, 13 All. 239; Billings _v._ Fairbanks, 136 Mass. 177, 139 Mass. 66; Keane _v._ Sprague (N. Y. City Court), 30 Alb. L. J. 283 _Accord_.

Webber _v._ Vincent, 9 N. Y. Supp. 101 _Contra_.

_Defamatory letter after termination of employment._ National Cash Register Co. _v._ Salling, 173 Fed. 22.

Footnote 495:

In Christopher _v._ Akin, 214 Mass. 332, the plaintiff was a journeyman painter in the employ of the defendant, and was at work on the house of one Tillinghast. Tillinghast complained to the defendant that some of his men had stolen a putty knife and other property belonging to him. The defendant recompensed Tillinghast for the property and testified that he was told by one of his men that the plaintiff had admitted to him that he took the putty knife. The men were paid off by the defendant at his shop on Saturday night,—their time being made up to Wednesday. Their pay was handed to them in envelopes. When a man was discharged his envelope contained his pay up to Saturday night. The plaintiff’s envelope contained his pay in full, less what the defendant had paid Tillinghast for the property, with a bill for it. There were four or five men in the shop waiting to be paid off when it came the plaintiff’s turn to be paid. The plaintiff opened his envelope and counted the money and found the bill. The plaintiff asked the defendant what that meant, and the defendant said in response, “Do you want to know in front of all these men?” and he said “Yes,” whereupon the defendant said, “That is the stuff you stole from the Tillinghast job.” Morton, J., said: “Whether a communication is or is not privileged does not depend so much on the manner or form in which crime is imputed, where the alleged slander consists as here of a charge of crime, as on the occasion and circumstances under which the charge is made. If made in good faith in reference to a matter in which the person making it is immediately interested, and for the purpose of protecting his interest and in the belief that it is true and without any malicious motive, the communication is what is termed privileged; that is, the occasion and the circumstances under which it is made are held to be such as, if nothing more appears, to excuse or justify the statements that are made.”

See Madill _v._ Currie, 168 Mich. 546.

Compare Adam _v._ Ward, [1917] A. C. 309 (statement given to the press by the army board in reply to a speech in Parliament regarding an army officer).

Footnote 496:

The statement of the case is abridged; the arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Denman, J., are omitted.

Footnote 497:

Robinson _v._ Jones, L. R. 4 Ir. 391 _Accord_.

Footnote 498:

Robinson _v._ Jones, L. R. 4 Ir. 391 _Accord_. See also Smith _v._ Crocker, 5 T. L. R. 441; Muetze _v._ Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236.

_Statement in presence of third persons not interested._ Fowlie _v._ Cruse, 52 Mont. 222; Fields _v._ Bynum, 156 N. C. 413.

_Notice of discharge of employee posted on the premises._ Ramsdell _v._ Pennsylvania Co., 79 N. J. Law, 379.

_Notice to customers in a local newspaper._ Hatch _v._ Lane, 105 Mass. 394. See Delany _v._ Jones, 4 Esp. 190 (but see Ley _v._ Lawson, 4 A. & E. 798); Commonwealth _v._ Featherston, 9 Phila. 594; Holliday _v._ Ontario Co., 33 Up. Can. Q. B. 558.

_General publicity with respect to candidate for local office._ Duncombe _v._ Daniel, 1 Willmore, W. & H. 101, 8 Car. & P. 222; Jones _v._ Varnum, 21 Fla. 431; State _v._ Haskins, 109 Ia. 656; Coleman _v._ MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711; Bronson _v._ Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; Wheaton _v._ Beecher, 66 Mich. 307; Belknap _v._ Ball, 83 Mich. 583; Aldrich _v._ Press Co., 9 Minn. 133 (but see, _contra_, Marks _v._ Baker, 28 Minn. 162); Bigner _v._ Hodges, 82 Miss. 215; Lewis _v._ Few, 5 Johns. 1; Root _v._ King, 7 Cow. 613; Hunt _v._ Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; Seely _v._ Blair, Wright, (Ohio) 358, 683; Knapp _v._ Campbell, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 199; Sweeney _v._ Baker, 13 W. Va. 158. Compare Flynn _v._ Boglarsky, 164 Mich. 513.

But a communication to the electors alone is privileged, if made in good faith. Wisdom _v._ Brown, 1 T. L. R. 412; Pankhurst _v._ Hamilton, 3 T. L. R. 500; Burke _v._ Mascarich, 81 Cal. 302 (_semble_); Mott _v._ Dawson, 46 Ia. 533; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251; State _v._ Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Commonwealth _v._ Wardwell, 136 Mass. 164; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404.

But see, _contra_, Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, where the distinction between fair comment and qualified privilege was overlooked. See also Estelle _v._ Daily News Pub. Co., 99 Neb. 397; Arnold _v._ Ingram, 151 Wis. 438; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524.

Footnote 499:

The court found that the defendant acted in good faith.

Footnote 500:

Ashford _v._ Evening Star Co., 41 App. D. C. 395; Addington _v._ Times Pub. Co., 138 La. 731; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404 (_semble_); Express Co. _v._ Copeland, 64 Tex. 354 _Accord_. Compare Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 141 App. Div. 301; Ivie _v._ Minton, 75 Or. 483.

_Statement at a meeting to oppose a candidate for public office._ Baker _v._ Warner, 231 U. S. 588.

_Criticism of minister in a church convention._ Dickson _v._ Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 17 S. W. 834.

_Criticism of member of association_ at a meeting to discuss the affairs of the association. Caldwell _v._ Hayden, 42 App. D. C. 166.

_Reply to defamatory statements._ Adam _v._ Ward [1917] A. C. 309; Preston _v._ Hobbs, 161 App. Div. 363; Smith _v._ Kemp, 132 La. 943.

Footnote 501:

Only part of the opinion is given.

Footnote 502:

_Criticism of member of congregation in a sermon._ Hassett _v._ Carroll, 85 Conn. 23.

_Statement by clergyman to congregation as to conduct of a trustee._ Everett _v._ DeLong, 144 Ill. App. 496.

Footnote 503:

The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Lopes and Kay, L.JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 504:

Bohlinger _v._ Germania Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477; Gambrill _v._ Schooley, 93 Md. 48 _Accord_. See Central R. Co. _v._ Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414. But the dictation of a defamatory letter by a lawyer to his clerk and the copying of it by another clerk in the regular course of serving his clients, although a publication, is, nevertheless, privileged. Boxsius _v._ Goblet, [1894] 1 Q. B. 842. And the authority of Pullman _v._ Hill is greatly weakened by Edmonson _v._ Birch, [1907] 1 K. B. 371, which treats as privileged the dictation of a defamatory letter by a company through one of its officers to a stenographer, and Roff _v._ British Chemical Co., [1918] 2 K. B. 277 (letter passed through the hands of two clerks of addressee). See to the same effect Owen _v._ Ogilvie Co., 32 App. Div. 465.

_Exchange of letters by mistake whereby privileged letter goes to wrong person._ See Tompson _v._ Dashwood, 11 Q. B. D. 43; Hebditch _v._ McIlwaine, [1894] 2 Q. B. 54, 61.

A defamatory statement true of A. but published concerning B., by mistake, will support an action by B. Shepheard _v._ Whitaker, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; Taylor _v._ Hearst, 107 Cal. 262; Griebel _v._ Rochester Co., 60 Hun, 319. But see, _contra_, Hanson _v._ Globe Co., _supra_, 665 (Holmes, Morton, and Barker, JJ., dissenting).

Compare Brett _v._ Watson, 20 W. R. 723; Fox _v._ Broderick, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 453, 459; Loibl _v._ Breidenbach, 78 Wis. 49.

Footnote 505:

The concurring opinions of Bramwell and Brett, L.JJ., and the argument for defendant are omitted.

Footnote 506:

Salmon _v._ Isaac, 20 L. T. Rep. 885; Lawyers Pub. Co. _v._ West Pub. Co., 32 App. Div. 585; Saunders _v._ Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369 _Accord_.

Footnote 507:

3 Q. B. Div. 237, S. C.

Footnote 508:

The charge of the learned baron is abridged; the arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Bramwell and Cotton, L.JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 509:

Barry _v._ McCollom, 81 Conn. 293; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251, 255–6; Hemmens _v._ Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Haft _v._ First Bank, 19 App. Div. 423 _Accord_.

Footnote 510:

The case is materially abridged.

Footnote 511:

Ranson _v._ West, 125 Ky. 457 (_semble_); Toothaker _v._ Conant, 91 Me. 438; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404; Conroy _v._ Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. St. 334; Mulderig _v._ Wilkes Barre Times, 215 Pa. St. 470; Egan _v._ Dotson, 36 S. D. 459 _Accord_.

See also, Douglass _v._ Daisley, 114 Fed. 628.

Compare Glisson _v._ Biggio, 139 La. 23; Estelle _v._ Daily News Pub. Co., 99 Neb. 397; Wiese _v._ Riley, 146 Wis. 640.

_Petition or memorial for removal of public officer privileged._ Blake _v._ Pilfold, 1 M. & Rob. 198; Woodward _v._ Lander, 6 Car. & P. 548; James _v._ Boston, 2 Car. & K. 4; Spackman _v._ Gibney, Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (5th ed.) 278; Beatson _v._ Skene, 5 H. & N. 838; Harrison _v._ Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; Hart _v._ Von Gumpach, L. R. 4 P. C. 439; Stanton _v._ Andrews, 5 Up. Can. Q. B. O. S. 211; Corbett _v._ Jackson, 1 Up. Can. Q. B. 128; Rogers _v._ Spalding, 1 Up. Can. Q. B. 258; McIntire _v._ McBean, 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 534; Bell _v._ Parke, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 279 (_semble_); White _v._ Nichols, 3 How. 266; Vogel _v._ Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311; Pearce _v._ Brower, 72 Ga. 243; Young _v._ Richardson, 4 Ill. App. 364; Rainbow _v._ Benson, 71 Ia. 301; Rabb _v._ Trevelyan, 122 La. 174; Bodwell _v._ Osgood, 3 Pick. 379; Wieman _v._ Mabee, 45 Mich. 484; Greenwood _v._ Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449; State _v._ Burnham, 9 N. H. 34; Thorn _v._ Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508; Vanderzee _v._ McGregor, 12 Wend. 545; Howard _v._ Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; Halstead _v._ Nelson, 24 Hun, 395; Decker _v._ Gaylord, 35 Hun, 584; Woods _v._ Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445, 47 Hun, 362; Cook _v._ Hill, 3 Sandf. 341; Van Wyck _v._ Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190; Harwood _v._ Keech, 6 Th. & C. 665; Logan _v._ Hodges, 146 N. C. 38; Gray _v._ Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23; Kent _v._ Bongartz, 15 R. I. 72; Reid _v._ Delorme, 2 Brev. 76; Harris _v._ Huntington, 2 Tyler, 129 _Accord_.

But not absolutely privileged, where the proceeding is not judicial. Dickson _v._ Wilton, 1 F. & F. 419; Proctor _v._ Webster, 16 Q. B. D. 112; Woods _v._ Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445; Morah _v._ Steele, 157 App. Div. 109; Fulton _v._ Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323.

Compare McKee _v._ Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455 (petition to revoke merchant’s license).

Footnote 512:

The statement of the case, the arguments of counsel, the judgment of Mellor, J., and portions of the judgments of Crompton and Blackburn, JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 513:

Hibbs _v._ Wilkinson, 1 F. & F. 608; Turnbull _v._ Bird, 2 F. & F. 508; Hunter _v._ Sharpe, 4 F. & F. 983; Hunt _v._ Star Co., [1908] 2 K. B. 309; Walker _v._ Hodgson, [1909] 1 K. B. 239, 253; De Mestre _v._ Syme, 9 Vict. L. R. (L) 10; Davis _v._ Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; Queen _v._ Carden, 5 Q. B. D. 1, 8; Crane _v._ Waters, 10 Fed. 619; Kinyon _v._ Palmer, 18 Ia. 377; Bradford _v._ Clark, 90 Me. 298; People _v._ Glassman, 12 Utah, 238 _Accord_.

Footnote 514:

Stuart _v._ Lovell, 2 Stark. 93; Macleod _v._ Wakley, 3 Car. & P. 311; Green _v._ Chapman, 4 Bing. N. C. 92; Parmiter _v._ Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105; Whistler _v._ Ruskin, Odgers, Lib. & Sl., (5th ed.) 196; Wilson _v._ Reed, 2 F. & F. 149; Morrison _v._ Belcher, 3 F. & F. 614; Hedley _v._ Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224; Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18 L. T. Rep. 615; Joynt _v._ Cycle Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 292; Massie _v._ Toronto Co., 11 Ont. 362; Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238; Cooper _v._ Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Reade _v._ Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, n.; Ullrich _v._ N. Y. Co., 23 Misc. 168 _Accord_.

Footnote 515:

See _contra_, Williams _v._ Spowers, 8 Vict. L. R. (Law) 82.

Footnote 516:

Honest belief is no defense apart from privilege. Van Wiginton _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., (C. C. A.) 218 Fed. 483; Brandt _v._ Story, 161 Ia. 451; Tanner _v._ Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Reid _v._ Nichols, 166 Ky. 423; Sweet _v._ Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450; Clair _v._ Battle Creek Journal Co., 168 Mich. 467; Ivie _v._ King, 167 N. C. 174; Spencer _v._ Minnick, 41 Okl. 613; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90.

_Fair comment on public affairs and public officers._ See Gandia _v._ Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452; Lowe _v._ News Pub. Co., 9 Ga. App. 103; Diener _v._ Star Chronicle Pub. Co., 230 Mo. 613; Cook _v._ Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471; Merrey _v._ Guardian Pub. Co., 79 N. J. Law, 177; Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27.

_Fair comment on candidates._ Walsh _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 250 Mo. 142; Schull _v._ Hopkins, 26 S. D. 21; Ingalls _v._ Morrissey, 154 Wis. 632.

_Fair comment on persons seeking public patronage._ Ott _v._ Murphy, 160 Ia. 730.

Footnote 517:

Dibdin _v._ Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Heriot _v._ Stuart, 1 Esp. 437; Stuart _v._ Lovell, 2 Stark. 93 (_semble_); Tabart _v._ Tipper, 1 Camp. 350 (_semble_); Dunne _v._ Anderson, Ry. & M. 287, 3 Bing. 88; Soane _v._ Knight, M. & M. 74; Thompson _v._ Shackell, M. & M. 187; Macleod _v._ Wakley, 3 Car. & P. 311; Fraser _v._ Berkeley, 7 Car. & P. 621; Evans _v._ Harlow, Dav. & M. 507; Paris _v._ Levy, 9 C. B. N. S. 342; Eastwood _v._ Holmes, 1 F. & F. 347; Hibbs _v._ Wilkinson, 1 F. & F. 608; Turnbull _v._ Bird, 2 F. & F. 508; Strauss _v._ Francis, 4 F. & F. 939, 1107, 15 L. T. Rep. 674; Henwood _v._ Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 606; Jenner _v._ A’Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; Mulkern _v._ Ward, 13 Eq. 619, 622; Whistler _v._ Ruskin, Odgers, Lib. & Sl., (5 ed.) 196; Duplany _v._ Davis, 3 T. L. R. 184; McQuire _v._ Western Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 100; Crane _v._ Waters, 10 Fed. 619; Snyder _v._ Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 137; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; O’Connor _v._ Sill, 60 Mich. 175; Dowling _v._ Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321; Cooper _v._ Stone, 24 Wend. 434 (_semble_); Reade _v._ Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, _n._ (_semble_); Adolf Philipp Co. _v._ New Yorker Staatszeitung, 165 App. Div. 377; Press Co. _v._ Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584 _Accord_.

“The defendant was, in my opinion, entitled to have the jury’s decision, as to the plea of fair comment, whether or not, in all the circumstances proved, the libel went beyond a fair comment on the plaintiff and on the system of medical enterprise with which he associated himself, as a matter of public interest treated by the defendant honestly and without malice. The plea of fair comment does not arise if the plea of justification is made good, nor can it arise unless there is an imputation on a plaintiff. It is precisely where the criticism would otherwise be actionable as a libel that the defence of fair comment comes in. But the learned judge put aside that defence, and told the jury that unless a justification was proved they were bound to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and that, unless justified, the libel is not fair comment and cannot come within the region of fair comment.” Lord Loreburn, L. C., in Dakhyl _v._ Labouchere, [1908] 2 K. B. 325, 326–27.

Footnote 518:

The arguments are omitted.

Footnote 519:

The statement has been abridged, and the arguments of counsel together with a small portion of the judgment are omitted.

Footnote 520:

Merivale _v._ Carson, _supra_, 775; McQuire _v._ Western Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 100, 110; Joynt _v._ Cycle Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 292; Digby _v._ Financial News, [1907] 1 K. B. 502; Hunt _v._ Star Co., [1908] 2 K. B. 309, 317; Walker _v._ Hodgson, [1909] 1 K. B. 239; Starks _v._ Comer, 190 Ala. 245; Com. _v._ Pratt, 208 Mass. 553; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524 _Accord_.

In Walker _v._ Hodgson, Kennedy, L. J., said, p. 256: “Now it is true that there may be comment of an injurious nature in which there is no statement of facts, or which refers to facts which are admitted or are indisputable. In such a case the fairness of the comment depends upon the character of the criticisms, or the inferences of which it is composed, that is, whether it is a comment made honestly and _bona fide_, or a comment made _mala fide_ and maliciously.... But where the words which are alleged to be defamatory allege, or assume as true, facts concerning the plaintiff which the plaintiff denies, and which either involve a slanderous imputation in themselves, or upon which the comment bases imputations or inferences injurious to the plaintiff, it is, I think, settled law that the defence of fair comment fails, unless the comment is truthful in regard to its allegation or assumption of such facts.” See also the remarks of Buckley, L. J., in the same case, p. 253.

In Hubbard _v._ Allyn, 200 Mass. 167, Rugg, J., said (p. 170): “The right of the defendant was not to make false statements of fact because the subject matter was of public interest, but only to criticise, discuss and comment upon the real acts of the plaintiff and the consequences likely to follow from them, or upon any other aspect of the case in a reasonable way. This may be done with severity. Ridicule, sarcasm and invective may be employed. But the basis must be a fact, and not a falsehood.”

Nor does it cover violent attacks and insulting statements. Press Pub. Co. _v._ Gillette, (C. C. A.) 229 Fed. 108; Jozsa _v._ Moroney, 125 La. 813; Hines _v._ Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669; Patten _v._ Harpers Weekly Corp., 158 N. Y. Supp. 70; Hayden _v._ Hasbrouck, 34 R. I. 556; Spencer _v._ Looney, 116 Va. 767; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524; Compare Dickson _v._ Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W. 834. And see Phillips _v._ Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199.

Footnote 521:

Robinson _v._ Coulter, 215 Mass. 566; Tawney _v._ Simonson, 109 Minn. 341 _Accord_.

The burden is on the plaintiff to show malice, not on the defendant to show good faith. Jenoure _v._ Delmege, [1891] A. C. 73; Davis _v._ Hearst, 160 Cal. 143; Locke _v._ Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Hemmens _v._ Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Haft _v._ Newcastle Bank, 19 App. Div. 423; Strode _v._ Clement, 90 Va. 553.

_Definitions of “malice.”_ Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171; Peake _v._ Taubman, 251 Mo. 390. See Marney _v._ Joseph, 94 Kan. 18.

“If proof of a malevolent motive would rebut the privilege, which we do not decide, nothing less than that would do, so far as malice is concerned. It is true, as is said in the very careful brief for the plaintiff, that in most connections malice means only knowledge of facts sufficient to show that the contemplated act is very likely to have injurious consequences. Apart from statute it generally means no more when the question is what is sufficient _prima facie_ to charge a defendant. Burt _v._ Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245. But sometimes the defence is not that the damage was not to be foreseen, but rests on what in substance is a privilege, whether of a kind usually pleaded as such or not, that is to say, on a right to inflict the damage even knowingly. In such cases, if malice in any sense makes a difference, as distinguished from excess over what was reasonable or needful to do or say under the circumstances, which often is included under the same word, Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 239, it means that the defendant is not within the privilege because he was not

## acting in _bona fide_ answer to the needs of the occasion, but outside

of it from a wish to do harm. See Wren _v._ Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730, 735, 736; Clark _v._ Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237, 246, 247.” Holmes, C. J., in Squires _v._ Wason Mfg. Co., 182 Mass. 137, 141.

See Advertiser Co. _v._ Jones, 169 Ala. 196, 670; Davis _v._ Hearst, 160 Cal. 143.

_Reckless republication without inquiry._ Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. _v._ Wegner, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 45.

_“Malice” on the face of publication._ Ashford _v._ Evening Star Co., 41 App. D. C. 395; Dickson _v._ Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W. 834.

Footnote 522:

16 C. B. N. S. 829, S. C.

Footnote 523:

Nevill _v._ Fine Arts Co., [1895] 2 Q. B. 156; Hollenbeck _v._ Ristine, 105 Ia. 488; Children _v._ Shinn, 168 Ia. 531; Atwill _v._ Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177; Wagner _v._ Scott, 164 Mo. 289; McGaw _v._ Hamilton, 184 Pa. St. 108; Hellstern _v._ Katzer, 103 Wis. 391 _Accord_. Compare Davis _v._ New England Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470; Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171.

Footnote 524:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 525:

Parmiter _v._ Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105; Odger _v._ Mortimer, 28 L. T. Rep. 472; Queen _v._ Carden, 5 Q. B. Div. 1, 8; Bryce _v._ Rusden, 2 T. L. R. 435; Duplany _v._ Davis, 3 T. L. R. 184; R. _v._ Flowers, 44 J. P. 377, _per_ Field, J.; LeFroy _v._ Burnside, L. R. 4 Ir. 556, 565, 566; Stewart _v._ McKinley, 11 Vict. L. R. 802; Browne _v._ McKinley, 12 Vict. L. R. 240; Smith _v._ Tribune Co., 4 Biss. 477; McDonald _v._ Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244; Hallam _v._ Post Co., 55 Fed. 456, 59 Fed. 530; Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439; Jarman _v._ Rea, 137 Cal. 339; Dauphiny _v._ Buhne, 153 Cal. 757; Star Co. _v._ Donahoe, (Del.) 58 Atl. 513; Jones _v._ Townsend, 21 Fla. 431; Rearick _v._ Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77; Klos _v._ Zahorik, 113 Ia. 161; Ott _v._ Murphy, 160 Ia. 730; Bearce _v._ Bass, 88 Me. 521; Negley _v._ Farrow, 60 Md. 158; Commonwealth _v._ Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 169 (_semble_); Curtis _v._ Mussey, 6 Gray, 261; Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238 (compare Sillars _v._ Collier, 151 Mass. 50); Hubbard _v._ Allyn, 200 Mass. 166; Foster _v._ Scripps, 39 Mich. 376; Bronson _v._ Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; Bourreseau _v._ Detroit Co., 63 Mich. 425; Wheaton _v._ Beecher, 66 Mich. 307; Belknap _v._ Ball, 83 Mich. 583; Hay _v._ Reid, 85 Mich. 296; Smurthwaite _v._ News Co., 124 Mich. 377; Aldrich _v._ Press Co., 9 Minn. 133 (but see, _contra_, Marks _v._ Baker, 28 Minn. 162); Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94; State _v._ Schmitt, 49 N. J. Law, 579; Lewis _v._ Few, 5 Johns. 1; Root _v._ King, 7 Cow. 613; Littlejohn _v._ Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. 41; Hamilton _v._ Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Mattice _v._ Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 624; Hoey _v._ New York Times Co., 138 App. Div. 149; Ullrich _v._ N. Y. Co., 23 Misc. 168; Seely _v._ Blair, Wright, (Ohio) 358, 683; Post Co. _v._ Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71; Upton _v._ Hume, 24 Or. 420; Barr _v._ Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385; Brewer _v._ Weakley, 2 Overt. 99; Banner Co. _v._ State, 16 Lea, 176; Democrat Co. _v._ Jones, 83 Tex. 302; Sweeney _v._ Baker, 13 W. Va. 158; Spiering _v._ Andrae, 45 Wis. 330; Eviston _v._ Cramer, 57 Wis. 570; Gagen _v._ Dawley, 162 Wis. 152; D. Ward _v._ Derrington, 14 S. Aust. L. R. 35; Haselgrove _v._ King, 14 S. Aust. L. R. 192 _Accord_.

Mott _v._ Dawson, 46 Ia. 533; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251 (but see State _v._ Haskins, 109 Ia. 656, 658, and Morse _v._ Printing Co., 124 Ia. 707, 723); State _v._ Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Coleman _v._ McLennan, 78 Kan. 711; Marks _v._ Baker, 28 Minn. 162; State _v._ Burnham, 9 N. H. 34; Neeb _v._ Hope, 111 Pa. St. 145; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404; Press Co. _v._ Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584; Jackson _v._ Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. St. 406; Ross _v._ Ward, 14 S. D. 240; Boucher _v._ Clark Co., 14 S. D. 72 _Contra_.

See Palmer _v._ Concord, 48 N. H. 211.

In Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238, Holmes, J., said: “But there is an important distinction to be noticed between the so-called privilege of fair criticism upon matters of public interest, and the privilege existing in the case, for instance, of answers to inquiries about the character of a servant. In the latter case, a _bona fide_ statement not in excess of the occasion is privileged, although it turns out to be false. In the former, what is privileged, if that is the proper term, is criticism, not statement, and however it might be if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made by others, and gave it no new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his own person to allege facts otherwise libellous, he will not be privileged if those facts are not true. The reason for the distinction lies in the different nature and degree of the exigency and of the damage in the two cases. In these, as in many other instances, the law has to draw a line between conflicting interests, both intrinsically meritorious. When private inquiries are made about a private person, a servant, for example, it is often impossible to answer them properly without stating facts, and those who settled the law thought it more important to preserve a reasonable freedom in giving necessary information than to insure people against occasional unintended injustice, confined as it generally is to one or two persons. But what the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom of discussion rather than of statement. Moreover, the statements about such matters which come before the courts are generally public statements, where the harm done by a falsehood is much greater than in the other case. If one private citizen wrote to another that a high official had taken a bribe, no one would think good faith a sufficient answer to an action. He stands no better, certainly, when he publishes his writing to the world through a newspaper, and the newspaper itself stands no better than the writer. Sheckell _v._ Jackson, 10 Cush. 25, 26.”

_Participants in legal proceedings_ are legitimate subjects for comment if restricted to their conduct therein. Rex _v._ White, 1 Camp. 359; Seymour _v._ Butterworth, 3 F. & F. 372; Hedley _v._ Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224; Woodgate _v._ Ridout, 4 F. & F. 202; Hibbins _v._ Lee, 4 F. & F. 243; Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18 L. T. Rep. 615; Reg. _v._ Sullivan, 11 Cox C. C. 44, 57; Kane _v._ Mulvany, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 402; Miner _v._ Detroit Co., 49 Mich. 358. See also Kelly _v._ Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699 (churchwarden); Harle _v._ Catherall, 14 L. T. Rep. 801 (waywarden).

_Matters not of public interest._ The right of comment was denied in Latimer _v._ Western Co., 25 L. T. Rep. 44; Hogan _v._ Sutton, 16 W. R. 127; Wilson _v._ Fitch, 41 Cal. 363.

See also Hearne _v._ Stowell, 12 A. & E. 719; Gathercole _v._ Miall, 15 M. & W. 319; Walker _v._ Brogden, 19 C. B. N. S. 65; Booth _v._ Briscoe, 2 Q. B. Div. 496.

Footnote 526:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 527:

The decision of the Appellate Division, overruling demurrer to complaint, is reported in 64 App. Div. 30.

Footnote 528:

Corelli _v._ Wall, 22 Times L. R. 532 (post cards depicting imaginary incidents of an author’s life); Atkinson _v._ Doherty, 121 Mich. 372 (picture of plaintiff’s dead husband on cigar label); Henry _v._ Cherry, 30 R. I. 13 (picture as advertisement); Hillman _v._ Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691 (picture of plaintiff in connection with report of arrest of her father for crime) _Accord_. Compare Chappell _v._ Stewart, 82 Md. 323 (shadowing).

Corliss _v._ Walker, 57 Fed. 434 (_semble_); Von Theodorovich _v._ Josef Beneficiary Ass’n, 154 Fed. 911 (_semble_); Pavesich _v._ New England Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (picture as advertisement); Foster-Milburn Co. _v._ Chinn, 134 Ky. 424 (picture as advertisement); Douglas _v._ Stokes, 149 Ky. 506 (publishing photograph of deceased deformed child of plaintiff); Itzkovitch _v._ Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 117 La. 708 (photograph in rogues’ gallery); Schulman _v._ Whitaker, 117 La. 704; Munden _v._ Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652 (picture as advertisement); Edison _v._ Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136 (picture—but here there was chiefly an interest of substance) _Contra_.

See also Dill, J. in Vanderbilt _v._ Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 919.

As to photographing persons arrested on charges of crime, see Hodgman _v._ Olsen, 86 Wash. 615.

NEW YORK, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51 (Laws of 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1, 2).

§ 50. A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait, or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

§ 51. Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm, or corporation so using his name, portrait, or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries maintained by reason of such use, and if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s name, portrait, or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.

See Binns _v._ Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51.

On the whole subject, see Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Rev. 193; Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harvard Law Rev. 343, 362–364.

Footnote 529:

4 Rep. 16 _b_, S. C.

Footnote 530:

Dame Morrison’s Case, Jenk. 316; Matthew _v._ Crasse, 2 Bulst. 89; Sell _v._ Facy, 2 Bulst. 276, 3 Bulst. 48; Nelson _v._ Staff, Cro. Jac. 422; Thomson’s Case, Bendl. 148; Countess of Salop’s Case, Bendl. 155; Taylor _v._ Tolwin, Latch, 218; Wicks _v._ Shepherd, Cro. Car. 155; Southold _v._ Daunston, Cro. Car. 269 _Accord_.

See Bridge _v._ Langton, Litt. 193; Norman _v._ Simons, 1 Vin. Abr. Act. Words, D, _a_, 12.

In Felty _v._ Felty, 164 Ky. 355, plaintiff’s husband left her as a result of the defamatory words.

Footnote 531:

The arguments of counsel are omitted, together with the concurring opinions of Martin, Bramwell, and Wilde, BB.

Footnote 532:

Guy _v._ Gregory, 9 Car. & P. 584; Adams _v._ Smith, 58 Ill. 417; Woodbury _v._ Thompson, 3 N. H. 194; Butler _v._ Hoboken Co., 73 N. J. Law, 45; Beach _v._ Ranney, 2 Hill, 309; Terwilliger _v._ Wands, 17 N. Y. 54 (overruling Bradt _v._ Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Olmsted _v._ Brown, 12 Barb. 657; Fuller _v._ Fenner, 16 Barb. 333); Wilson _v._ Goit, 17 N. Y. 442; Bassell _v._ Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561; Shepherd _v._ Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498; Clark _v._ Morrison, 80 Or. 240 _Accord_. But see Garrison _v._ Sun Publishing Ass’n, 207 N. Y. 1 (defendant published a libel on plaintiff’s wife resulting in illness and loss of her services).

McQueen _v._ Fulgham, 27 Tex. 463; Underhill _v._ Welton, 32 Vt. 40 _Contra_.

_Damage caused by another person’s repetition of the defendant’s words_ is too remote. Holwood _v._ Hopkins, Cro. El. 787; Ward _v._ Weeks, 7 Bing. 211 (but see Riding _v._ Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91); Rutherford _v._ Evans, 4 Car. & P. 74; Tunnicliff _v._ Moss, 3 Car. & K. 83; Kendillon _v._ Maltby, 1 Car. & M. 402; Parkins _v._ Scott, 1 H. & C. 153; Dixon _v._ Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; Clarke _v._ Morgan, 38 L. T. Rep. 354; Bree _v._ Marescaux, 7 Q. B. Div. 434; Cates _v._ Kellogg, 9 Ind. 506; Stevens _v._ Hartwell, 11 Met. 542; Hastings _v._ Stetson, 126 Mass. 329; Hastings _v._ Palmer, 20 Wend. 225; Hallock _v._ Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Olmsted _v._ Brown, 12 Barb. 657; Terwilliger _v._ Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Bassell _v._ Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561 (but see Sewell _v._ Catlin, 3 Wend. 295; Keenholts _v._ Becker, 3 Den. 346).

See also Whitney _v._ Moignard, 24 Q. B. Div. 630; Speight _v._ Gosnay, 60 L. J. Q. B. 231; Adams _v._ Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625; Mills _v._ Flynn, 157 Ia. 477; Fitzgerald _v._ Young, 89 Neb. 693.

The rule is otherwise where the repetition is made as a privileged communication. Gillett _v._ Bullivant, 7 L. T. 490; Derry _v._ Handley, 16 L. T. Rep. 263; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20.

Footnote 533:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 534:

The case is materially abridged.

Footnote 535:

The statement of the counts is abridged, and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 536:

But see now Paterson _v._ Welch, (Court of Sess. May 31, 1893) 20 R. 744. See also Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (1st ed.) 87, 91; Odgers, Outlines of Law of Libel, 17, 18; Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, (1st ed.) 497–98; Salmond, Torts, 426–27; Bower’s Code of Actionable Defamation, 338–39, 443–45.

Footnote 537:

“It may be reasonable to allow St. Peter a primacy of order, such a one as the ringleader hath in a dance.”—Barrow’s Treatise of the Pope’s Supremacy, Oxford edition of Works, 1830, vol. vii. p. 70. In Fox’s Preface to Tyndall’s Works, “these three learned fathers of blessed memory, William Tyndall, John Frith, and Robert Barons,” are styled “chief ringleaders in these latter tymes of thys Church of England.”—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 538:

Only the opinion of Day, J., is given. Wills, J., concurred.

Footnote 539:

_Slander of title._ Mildmay’s Case, 1 Rep. 175; Marvin _v._ Maynard, Cro. El. 419; Pennyman _v._ Rabanks, Cro. Eliz. 427; Newman _v._ Zachary, Al. 3; Rowe _v._ Roach, 1 M. & S. 304; Bignell _v._ Buzzard, 3 H. & N. 217; Webb _v._ Cecil, 9 B. Mon. 198; Ross _v._ Pynes, Wythe, 71, 3 Call, 490.

In Rowe _v._ Roach, _supra_, Lord Ellenborough said, p. 310: “The law makes no allowance for the slander of strangers, whatever it may do in behalf of those who have a real title, or a claim of title. _Rei immiscet se alienæ_ is the good sense which must govern this case. Here the defendant is a stranger himself, and shows no authority from those who are parties in interest.”

Where defendant has some interest, it is enough if he actually believes what he says against plaintiff’s title.

Gerard _v._ Dickenson, 4 Rep. 18 a, Cro. El. 196; Lovett _v._ Weller, 1 Rolle R. 409; Anon., Sty. 414; Pitt _v._ Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639; Smith _v._ Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246; Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707; Pater _v._ Baker, 3 C. B. 831; Watson _v._ Reynolds, M. & M. 1; Carr _v._ Duckett, 5 H. & N. 783; Atkins _v._ Perrin, 3 F. & F. 179; Brook _v._ Rawl, 4 Ex. 521; Burnett _v._ Tak, 45 L. T. Rep. 743; Steward _v._ Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; Wren _v._ Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730; Hart _v._ Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146 (_semble_); Baker _v._ Piper, 2 T. L. R. 733; Dicks _v._ Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22; Halsey _v._ Brotherhood, 19 Ch. D. 386; Royal Co. _v._ Wright, 18 Pat. Cas. Rep. 95; Dunlop Co. _v._ Talbot, 20 T. L. R. 579; Boulton _v._ Shields, 3 Up. Can. Q. B. 21; Hill _v._ Ward, 13 Ala. 310; McDaniel _v._ Baca, 2 Cal. 326; Thompson _v._ White, 70 Cal. 135; Reid _v._ McLendon, 44 Ga. 156; Van Tuyl _v._ Riner, 3 Ill. App. 556; Stark _v._ Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141; Gent _v._ Lynch, 23 Md. 58; Swan _v._ Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Walkley _v._ Bostwick, 49 Mich. 374; Chesebro _v._ Powers, 78 Mich. 472; Meyrose _v._ Adams, 12 Mo. App. 329; Butts _v._ Long, 106 Mo. App. 313; Andrew _v._ Deshler, 45 N. J. Law, 167; Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Like _v._ McKinstry, 4 Keyes, 397, 3 Abb. App. 62, 41 Barb. 186; Hovey _v._ Rubber Co., 57 N. Y. 119; Dodge _v._ Colby, 37 Hun, 515, 108 N. Y. 445; Lovell Co. _v._ Houghton, 116 N. Y. 520; Hastings _v._ Giles Co., 51 Hun, 364, 121 N. Y. 674; Cornwell _v._ Parke, 52 Hun, 596, 123 N. Y. 657; McElwee _v._ Blackwell, 94 N. C. 261; Harriss _v._ Sneeden, 101 N. C. 273.

Compare Virtue _v._ Creamery Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17.

As to the requirement of “malice,” see Coffman _v._ Henderson, 9 Ala. App. 553; Fearon _v._ Fodera, 169 Cal. 370; Long _v._ Rucker, 166 Mo. App. 572; Potosi Zinc Co. _v._ Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390; Fant _v._ Sullivan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 515.

See Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 Columbia Law Rev. 13, 121.

Footnote 540:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 541:

Tasburgh _v._ Day, Cro. Jac. 484; Gresham _v._ Grinsley, Yelv. 88; Sneade _v._ Badley, 3 Bulst. 74, 1 Roll. 244; Law _v._ Harwood, Cro. Car. 140, W. Jones, 196; Cane _v._ Golding, Sty. 169, 176; Manning _v._ Avery, 3 Keb. 153; Haddan _v._ Lott, 15 C. B. 411; Evans _v._ Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; Ashford _v._ Choate, 20 Up. Can; C. P. 471; Collins _v._ Whitehead, 34 Fed. 121; Ebersole _v._ Fields, 181 Ala. 421; Stark _v._ Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141; Continental Co. _v._ Little, 135 Ky. 618; Swan _v._ Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; Dooling _v._ Budget Co., 144 Mass. 258; Boynton _v._ Shaw Co., 146 Mass. 219; Wilson _v._ Dubois, 35 Minn. 471; Tobias _v._ Harland, 4 Wend. 537; Madison Church _v._ Madison Church, 26 How. Pr. 72; Linden _v._ Graham, 1 Duer, 670; Bailey _v._ Dean, 5 Barb. 297; Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Kennedy _v._ Press Co., 41 Hun, 422; Childs _v._ Tuttle, 48 Hun, 228; Maglio _v._ N. Y. Co., 93 App. Div. 546; Felt _v._ Germania Life Ins. Co., 149 App. Div. 14; Witteman Bros. _v._ Witteman Co., 88 Misc. 266; McGuinness _v._ Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162 _Accord_.

Compare Fleming _v._ McDonald, 230 Pa. St. 75.

The breach of a contract by a third person is special damage. Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. But see _contra_, Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Brentman _v._ Note, 3 N. Y. Sup. 420 (N. Y. City Court).

Footnote 542:

The arguments and the concurring opinions of Lords Watson, Macnaghten, Morris, and Shand are omitted.

Footnote 543:

_Disparagement of goods._ In the case cited it was held actionable to say falsely that plaintiffs’ manure was inferior to defendants’ if done without legal excuse. Young _v._ Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264; Alcott _v._ Millar, 21 T. L. R. 30; Dooling _v._ Budget Co., 144 Mass. 258 (_semble_); Boynton _v._ Shaw Co., 146 Mass. 219; Wilson _v._ Dubois, 35 Minn. 471; Wier _v._ Allen, 51 N. H. 177; Snow _v._ Judson, 38 Barb. 210; Kennedy _v._ Press Co., 41 Hun, 422 (_semble_); Paull _v._ Halferty, 63 Pa. St. 46; Young _v._ Geiske, 209 Pa. St. 515 _Accord_.

Footnote 544:

Lyne _v._ Nicholls, 23 T. L. R. 86; Barrett _v._ Associated Newspapers, 23 T. L. R. 666; Burkett _v._ Griffith, 90 Cal. 532 _Accord_.

Compare Marlin Fire Arms Co. _v._ Shields, 171 N. Y. 384.

Footnote 545:

Prestolite Co. _v._ Heiden, (C. C. A.) 219 Fed. 845; Zittlosen Mfg. Co. _v._ Boss, (C. C. A.) 219 Fed. 887; Coca-Cola Co. _v._ Butler, 229 Fed. 224; Hartzler _v._ Goshen Ladder Co., 55 Ind. App. 455; National Biscuit Co. _v._ Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 369; Sanford Iron Works _v._ Enterprise Machine Works, 130 Tenn. 669; Pacific Coast Milk Co. _v._ Frye, 85 Wash. 133 _Accord_. In March _v._ Billings, 7 Cush. 322, under similar circumstances, the plaintiff recovered in an

## action at law.

See also Coffin, Fraud as an Element of Unfair Competition, 16 Harvard Law Rev. 272; Wyman, Competition and the Law, 15 Harvard Law Rev. 427; Cox, The Prevention of Unfair Competition in Business, 5 Harvard Law Rev. 139; Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade Marks, 4 Harvard Law Rev. 321.

_Misleading similarity._ Hanover Milling Co. _v._ Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403; McDonald Mfg. Co. _v._ Mueller Mfg. Co., 183 Fed. 972; British American Tobacco Co. _v._ British American Cigar Stores Co., (C. C. A.) 211 Fed. 933; Hiram Walker & Sons _v._ Grubman, 224 Fed. 725; Jenkins _v._ Kelly & Jones Co., (C. C. A.) 227 Fed. 211; Jacoway _v._ Young, (C. C. A.) 228 Fed. 630; Van Zile _v._ Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed. 829; Moline Plow Co. _v._ Omaha Stores Co., (C. C. A.) 235 Fed. 519; Boston Shoe Shop _v._ McBroom Shoe Shop, 196 Ala. 262; Italian Swiss Colony _v._ Italian Vineyard Co., 158 Cal. 252; Dunston _v._ Los Angeles Van & Storage Co., 165 Cal. 89; Modesto Creamery _v._ Stanislaus Creamery Co., 168 Cal. 289; Motor Accessories Co. _v._ Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 167 Ia. 202; Bonnie & Co. _v._ Bonnie Bros., 160 Ky. 487; Crutcher _v._ Starks, 161 Ky. 690; George G. Fox Co. _v._ Best Baking Co., 209 Mass. 251; C. A. Briggs & Co. _v._ National Wafer Co., 215 Mass. 100; Grocers’ Supply Co. _v._ Dupuis, 219 Mass. 576; Rodseth _v._ Northwestern Marble Works, 129 Minn. 472; Rubber & Celluloid Co. _v._ Rubber Bound Brush Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 419, 519; Westcott Chuck Co. _v._ Oneida Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247; World’s Dispensary Ass’n _v._ Pierce, 203 N. Y. 419; Material Men’s Ass’n _v._ New York Material Men’s Ass’n, 169 App. Div. 843; German American Button Co. _v._ Heymsfeld, 170 App. Div. 416; Collier _v._ Jones, 66 Misc. 97; Frohman _v._ William Morris, 68 Misc. 461; Elbs _v._ Rochester Egg Carrier Co., 134 N. Y. Supp. 979; Columbia Engineering Works _v._ Mallory, 75 Or. 542; Rosenburg _v._ Fremont Undertaking Co., 63 Wash. 52; J. I. Case Plow Works _v._ J. I. Case Machine Co., 162 Wis. 185.

_Use of one’s own name_, see L. E. Waterman Co. _v._ Modern Pen Co., 235 U. S. 88; Borden Ice Cream Co. _v._ Borden’s Consolidated Milk Co., (C. C. A.) 201 Fed. 510; Deister Concentrator Co. _v._ Deister Machine Co., 63 Ind. App. 412; C. H. Batchelder Co. _v._ Batchelder, 220 Mass. 42; Zagier _v._ Zagier, 167 N. C. 616.

_Where defendant passes off his product as plaintiff’s_, recovery is allowed without proof of actual damage. Blofeld _v._ Payne, 4 B. & A. 410; Singleton _v._ Bolton, 3 Doug. 293 (_semble_); Sykes _v._ Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541; Morison _v._ Salmon, 2 M. & G. 385; Crawshay _v._ Thompson, 4 M. & G. 357 (_semble_); Rodgers _v._ Nowill, 5 C. B. 109; Forster Co. _v._ Cutter Co., 211 Mass. 219. Compare Glendon Co. _v._ Uhler, 75 Pa. St. 467.

Footnote 546:

The learned judge here discussed McDonald _v._ Snelling, 14 All. 290, and Rigby _v._ Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240, and cited 2 Pars. Cont. 456; Dixon _v._ Fawcus, 30 L. J. Q. B. 137; Tarleton _v._ McGawley, Peake, 270; Bell _v._ Midland Co., 10 C. B. N. S. 307 Keeble _v._ Hickeringill, 11 East, 574, _n._

Footnote 547:

Defendant put out an envelope, with the word “telegram” conspicuously printed thereon, similar to that used by plaintiff, a telegraph company, to be used for advertising circulars. Plaintiff claimed that it tended to make its patrons think plaintiff was imposing on them by allowing advertisers to use its facilities in order to gain their attention and so injured its business. An injunction was denied. Postal Telegraph Co. _v._ Livermore & Knight Co., 188 Fed. 696.

In Riding _v._ Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91, plaintiff sued for injury to his business due to defendant’s charging his wife with adultery, by reason whereof customers ceased to deal with him.

In Hamon _v._ Falle, 4 App. Cas. 247, an officer of an insurance company notified a shipowner that the company would not insure the ship if plaintiff was employed as master. Defendant set up that he honestly believed plaintiff unfit. See also Bowen _v._ Matheson, 14 All. 499.

In Morasse _v._ Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, defendant in a sermon warned his congregation against a physician who had been excommunicated for remarrying after divorce.

Footnote 548:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 549:

The opinion of the court on this point is omitted. The defendant’s contention was not sustained.

Footnote 550:

Only the opinion is given.

Footnote 551:

“It is contended that the amount of the plaintiff’s loss is so entirely a matter of pure chance as to be incapable of assessment. I cannot for this purpose draw any distinction between a chance and a probability. In the Oxford English Dictionary one of the definitions of ‘chance’ is ‘a possibility or probability of anything happening, as distinct from a certainty,’ and a citation is given from Reid’s Intellectual Powers, ‘The doctrine of chances is a branch of mathematics little more than an hundred years old.’ The two words ‘chance’ and ‘probability’ may be treated as being practically interchangeable, though it may be that the one is somewhat less definite than the other.... It is obvious, of course, that the chance or probability may in a given case be so slender that a jury could not properly give more than nominal damages, say one shilling; if they had done so in the present case, it would have been entirely a question for them, and this Court could not have interfered. But in the present competition we find chance upon chance, two of which the plaintiff had succeeded in passing. From being one of six thousand she had become a member of a class of fifty, and, as I understand it, was first in her

## particular division by the votes of readers of the paper; out of those

fifty there were to be selected twelve prize-winners; it is obvious that her chances were then far greater and more easily assessable than when she was only one of the original six thousand. If the plaintiff had never been selected at all, the case would have been very different; but that was not the case. In my opinion the existence of a contingency, which is dependent on the volition of a third person, is not enough to justify us in saying that the damages are incapable of assessment.” Farwell, L. J., in Chaplin _v._ Hicks, [1911] 2 K. B. 786, 798.

Footnote 552:

Adler _v._ Fenton, 24 How. 407; Findlay _v._ McAllister, 113 U. S. 104 (_semble_); Austin _v._ Barrows, 41 Conn. 287; Green _v._ Kimble, 6 Blackf. 552; Moody _v._ Burton, 27 Me. 427; Lamb _v._ Stone, 11 Pick. 527; Wellington _v._ Small, 3 Cush. 145; Security Bank _v._ Reger, (Okl.) 151 Pac. 1170; LeGierse _v._ Kellum, 66 Tex. 242 _Accord_.

Penrod _v._ Mitchell, 8 S. & R. 522; Penrod _v._ Morrison, 2 Pen. & W. 126; Mott _v._ Danforth, 6 Watts, 305; Hopkins _v._ Beebe, 26 Pa. St. 85, 87; Kelsey _v._ Murphy, 26 Pa. St. 78, 84; Collins _v._ Cronin, 117 Pa. St. 35, 45 _Contra_. See note in 47 L. R. A. 433–440.

In Smith _v._ Tonstall, Carthew, 3, defendant was held liable for conspiracy with plaintiff’s debtor on _scire facias_ to procure a false judgment and anticipate plaintiff by execution thereon and carrying off of all the debtor’s property. Findlay _v._ McAllister, 113 U. S. 104 (_semble_); Adams _v._ Paige, 7 Pick. 541 _Accord_. See Pullen _v._ Headberg, 53 Col. 502.

Footnote 553:

Only the opinion is given, and it is somewhat abridged.

Footnote 554:

In Randall _v._ Hazelton, 12 All. 412, plaintiff, a mortgagor, had a gratuitous promise from the mortgagee not to foreclose without notice. In order to obtain the property, defendant falsely told the mortgagee that plaintiff wished the mortgage assigned to defendant and obtained an assignment and foreclosed without plaintiff’s knowledge.

Footnote 555:

Statement, and part of opinion, omitted.

Footnote 556:

In Rice _v._ Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, plaintiff had a contract with a third person for a cheese. By means of a forged telegram defendant procured the third person to sell to him instead. The contract was within the Statute of Frauds, but it was found that the third person would have performed but for defendant’s act.

Footnote 557:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 558:

See American Ins. Co. _v._ France, 111 Ill. App. 382; Davis _v._ New England Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470; Haney Mfg. Co. _v._ Perkins, 78 Mich. 1; Benton _v._ Pratt, 2 Wend. 385.

“[If, from the nature of the case, the amount of damage caused to a plaintiff by the tort of a defendant cannot be estimated with certainty, shall the defendant therefore be exonerated from liability?] Certainty, it is true, would thus be attained, but it would be the certainty of injustice.” Christiancy, J., in Allison _v._ Chandler, 11 Michigan, 542, 555. See also pp. 553–556.

Footnote 559:

Standard Oil Co. _v._ Doyle, 118 Ky. 662; Dickson _v._ Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1261 _Accord_.

_Threats of vexatious suits against customers_: Emack _v._ Kane, 34 Fed. 46; Lewin _v._ Welsbach Light Co., 81 Fed. 904; Farquhar Co. _v._ National Harrow Co., 99 Fed. 160; Adriance _v._ National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827, 98 Fed. 118; Dittgen _v._ Racine Paper Goods Co., 164 Fed. 85; Electric Renovator Co. _v._ Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754; Atlas Underwear Co. _v._ Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347; Shoemaker _v._ South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Pratt Food Co. _v._ Bird, 148 Mich. 631.

Footnote 560:

St. Johnsbury Co. _v._ Hunt, 55 Vt. 570 (arrest of plaintiff’s engineer on a malicious and baseless charge, whereby the running of plaintiff’s train was delayed) _Accord_.

Footnote 561:

Gunter _v._ Astor, 4 Moore, 12; Hartley _v._ Cummings, 5 C. B. 247; Jones _v._ Blocker, 43 Ga. 331; Wharton _v._ Jossey, 46 Ga. 578; Lee _v._ West, 47 Ga. 311 (_semble_); Smith _v._ Goodman, 75 Ga. 198; Bundy _v._ Dodson, 28 Ind. 295; Jones _v._ Tevis, 4 Litt. 25; Tyson _v._ Ewing, 3 J. J. Marsh, 185; Carew _v._ Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; Bixby _v._ Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; Stille _v._ Jenkins, 3 Green, (N. J.) 302; Scidmore _v._ Smith, 13 John. 322; Covert _v._ Gray, 34 How. Pr. 450; Johnston Co. _v._ Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. C. 393; Stout _v._ Woody, 63 N. C. 37; Haskins _v._ Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Robinson _v._ Culp, 3 Brev. 302; Daniel _v._ Swearengen, 6 S. C. 297; Fowler _v._ Stonum, 6 Tex. 60; Thacker Co. _v._ Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; Cowper _v._ Macfarlane, 6 Sess. Cas., 4th Series, 683 _Accord_.

See, also, Martinez _v._ Gerber, 3 M. & G. 88.

An action will lie against one who induces a servant to violate his duty not to communicate the trade secrets of his employer. Jones _v._ Westervelt, 7 Cow. 445; Kerr _v._ Roxburgh, 3 Murr. (Scotland) 126; Roxburgh _v._ McArthur, 3 Sess. Cas., 2d Series, 556.

Footnote 562:

In Blake _v._ Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221, a journeyman, while his work was unfinished, left plaintiff and hired with defendant, who then did not know the facts. Defendant was held liable for retaining the journeyman after notice. Fawcet _v._ Beavres, 2 Lev. 63; Pilkington _v._ Scott, 15 M. & W. 657; Kennedy _v._ McArthur, 5 Ala. 151; Dacy _v._ Gay, 16 Ga. 203; Everett _v._ Sherfey, 1 Ia. 356; Stowe _v._ Heywood, 7 All. 118; Sargent _v._ Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54; Dickson _v._ Taylor, 1 Murr. (Scotland) 141 _Accord_. Adams _v._ Bafeald, 1 Leon. 240; Caldwell _v._ O’Neal, 117 Ga. 775 (if contract is oral only) _Contra_.

It was said also that there was no liability for the hiring of plaintiff’s journeyman without notice of the facts. Eades _v._ Vandeput, 5 East, 39 n. (_a_); Sherwood _v._ Hall, 3 Sumn. 127; Ferguson _v._ Tucker, 2 Har. & G. 182; Butterfield _v._ Ashley, 6 Cush. 249; Sargent _v._ Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54; Clark _v._ Clark, 63 N. J. Law, 1; Stuart _v._ Simpson, 1 Wend. 376; Caughey _v._ Smith, 47 N. Y. 244; Bell _v._ Lakin, 1 McMull. 364; Conant _v._ Raymond, 2 Aik. 243 _Accord_.

Footnote 563:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 564:

“The rule which governs the numerous cases upon this subject is, that where the proximate effect of the criminal connection is an incapacity to labor, by reason of which the master loses the services of his servant, such loss of service is deemed to be the immediate effect of the connection, and entitles the master to his action. The same principle which gives a master an action where the connection causes pregnancy or sexual disease applies to all cases where the proximate consequence of the criminal act is a loss of health resulting in a loss of service. There may be cases in which the seduction, without producing pregnancy or sexual disease, causes bodily injury, impairing the health of the servant, and resulting in a loss of services to her master. So the criminal connection may be accomplished under such circumstances, as, for instance, of violence or fraud, that its proximate effect is mental distress or disease, impairing her health and destroying her capacity to labor. In either of these cases the master may maintain an action, because the loss of services is immediately caused by the connection, as much as in cases of pregnancy or sexual disease. Vanhorn _v._ Freeman, 1 Halst. 322. But if the loss of health is caused by mental suffering, which is not the consequence of the seduction, but is produced by subsequent intervening causes, such as abandonment by the seducer, shame resulting from exposure, or other similar causes, the loss of services is too remote a consequence of the criminal act, and the action cannot be maintained. Boyle _v._ Brandon, 13 M. & W. 738; Knight _v._ Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413.

“In the case at bar, as the ruling appears to have been general that the action could not be maintained unless pregnancy or sexual disease was proved, we think a new trial should be granted.” Morton, J., in Abrahams _v._ Kidney, 104 Mass. 222. See to the same effect Blagge _v._ Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191; Clark _v._ Clark, 63 N. J. Law, 1; White _v._ Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; Ingerson _v._ Miller, 47 Barb. 47.

Footnote 565:

The father can maintain no action in such a case: Goodwin _v._ Thompson, 2 Greene, 329; Jones _v._ Tevis, 4 Litt. 25; Hervey _v._ Moseley, 7 Gray, 479; Beard _v._ Holland, 59 Miss. 161, 164; Wilkinson _v._ Dellinger, 126 N. C. 462. Unless the daughter was induced to marry the defendant by the latter’s fraud. Hills _v._ Hobert, 2 Root, 48; Goodwin _v._ Thompson, _supra_.

Footnote 566:

A part of the argument and the concurring opinion of Montague Smith, J., with which Keating, J., agreed, are omitted.

Footnote 567:

Whether it is an excess of fair competition to induce a servant at will to leave the plaintiff, and enter the service of the defendant, cannot be said to be definitely settled. In Salter _v._ Howard, 43 Ga. 601, the plaintiff prevailed; but in Campbell _v._ Cooper, 34 N. H. 49, the defendant was successful. The other cases commonly cited for the plaintiff are distinguishable. In Sykes _v._ Dixon, 9 A. & E. 693, and Peters _v._ Lord, 18 Conn. 337, the servant had left the plaintiff of his own head before entering the service of the defendant. In Keane _v._ Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 512, the defendant, a recruiting officer, officiously induced the servant to leave the plaintiff, in order to enlist as a soldier. In Speight _v._ Oliviera, 2 Stark. 493; Morgan _v._ Molony, 7 Ir. L. R. N. S. 101, 240; Ball _v._ Bruce, 21 Ill. 161; and Noice _v._ Brown, 39 N. J. Law, 569, as in the principal case, the enticement was for an immoral purpose. In Cox _v._ Muncey, 6 C. B. N. S. 375, a father induced an apprentice at will to leave the master, but the motive of the father does not appear.

“[Keane _v._ Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 512] seems contrary to the general principle and is certainly opposed to the decision of the Court of Appeals in DeFrancesco _v._ Barnum, 45 Ch. D. 430. The defendant there had enticed away an apprentice of the plaintiff. But the indenture contained unreasonable stipulations, and it was held that it might be avoided by the apprentice, and that it was not unlawful for the defendant to persuade the apprentice to do that which was lawful. It is different, however, if malice, force or fraud be used to take or decoy the servant away. In that case the master has a right of action, even though the servant be under no binding obligation. Per _Willes_, J., Evans _v._ Walton, L. R. 2 Com. PL., pp. 621–622.” Clerk and Lindsell, Torts, 5 ed. 227.

To induce a servant who is under contract with the plaintiff to leave the latter at the expiration of the term of service, and to enter the defendant’s service, is no more than lawful competition. Nichol _v._ Martyn, 2 Esp. 732; Boston Manufactory _v._ Binney, 4 Pick. 425.

Footnote 568:

The statement of the case and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 569:

The learned judge here discussed and approved of Blake _v._ Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221.

Footnote 570:

The rest of the opinion on this point is omitted.

Footnote 571:

See note (4) to Skinner _v._ Gunton, 1 Wms. Saund. 230.—Reporter’s note.

Footnote 572:

Only the opinion of Coleridge, J., on this point is given. It is now generally admitted that this learned judge, although wrong on this point, was right in maintaining that the actress was not a servant.

Footnote 573:

William Hankford, Justice of the Common Pleas in 1398, afterwards, in 1414 (1 H. 5), Chief Justice of England.—Reporter’s note.

Footnote 574:

Cattle _v._ Stockton Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 453, 458 (_semble_); Angle _v._ Chicago R. Co., 151 U. S. 1; Bitterman _v._ Louisville R. Co., 207 U. S. 205, 222–23; Dr. Miles Medical Co. _v._ Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 394 (_semble_); Heaton Co. _v._ Dick, 55 Fed. 23, 52 Fed. 667; Heath _v._ American Book Co., 97 Fed. 533; Tubular Co. _v._ Exeter Co., 159 Fed. 824; Motley _v._ Detroit Co., 161 Fed. 389; Chipley _v._ Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; Doremus _v._ Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608; Heywood _v._ Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 236 (_semble_); Knickerbocker Ice Co. _v._ Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556; Walker _v._ Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Beekman _v._ Marsters, 195 Mass. 205; Joyce _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 225; Mealey _v._ Bemidji Lumber Co., 118 Minn. 427; Lally _v._ Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. 524; Van Horn _v._ Van Horn, 52 N. J. Law, 284; Haskins _v._ Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Jones _v._ Stanly, 76 N. C. 355; Flaccus _v._ Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128; Delz _v._ Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405; Raymond _v._ Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443; Brown Co. _v._ Indiana Stove Works, 96 Tex. 453; Duffies _v._ Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 377 (_semble_); Martens _v._ Reilly, 109 Wis. 464; Hewitt _v._ Ontario Co., 44 Up. Can. Q. B. 287 _Accord_.

Boyson _v._ Thorn, 98 Cal. 578; Barron _v._ Collins, 49 Ga. 580 (_semble_); Chambers _v._ Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121; Bourlier _v._ Macauley, 91 Ky. 135; Kline _v._ Eubanks, 109 La. 241 (_semble_); Ashley _v._ Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430; De Jong _v._ Behrman, 148 App. Div. 37; Laskey Feature Play Co. _v._ Fox, 93 Misc. 364; Swain _v._ Johnson, 151 N. C. 93; Sleeper _v._ Baker, 22 N. D. 386 _Contra_.

It was decided before the case of Lumley _v._ Gye that an action for slander of title was maintainable where the only special damage laid was the breach by a third person of his contract with the plaintiff. Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. But see, _contra_, Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Brentman _v._ Note, 3 N. Y. Sup. 420 (N. Y. City Court).

So an action would doubtless lie for defamatory words, not actionable _per se_, which induced a third person to break his contract to marry the plaintiff. But compare Davis _v._ Condit, 124 Minn. 365 (seduction of plaintiff’s fiancée).

As to justification, see Leonard _v._ Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383.

On the general subject, see also Sweeney _v._ Smith, 167 Fed. 385; Mahoney _v._ Roberts, 86 Ark. 130; Citizens’ Light, &c. Co. _v._ Montgomery Light, &c. Co., 171 Fed. 553, 560, 561; McGurk _v._ Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457; Globe Ins. Co. _v._ Fireman’s Ins. Co., 97 Miss. 148; Biggers _v._ Matthews, 147 N. C. 299; Thacker Coal Co. _v._ Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; Huffcutt, Interference with Contracts and Business in New York, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 423.

Footnote 575:

The statement of facts and the dissenting opinion of Lord Coleridge, C. J., are omitted.

Footnote 576:

“That this was a wrongful interference on the part of the Omaha Company, and that it resulted directly in loss to the contractor and to the Portage Company, is apparent. It is not an answer to say that there was no certainty that the contractor would have completed his contract, and so earned these lands for the Portage Company. If such a defence were tolerated, it would always be an answer in case of any wrongful interference with the performance of a contract, for there is always that lack of certainty. It is enough that there should be, as there was here, a reasonable assurance, considering all the surroundings, that the contract would be performed in the manner and within the time stipulated, and so performed as to secure the land to the company.

“It certainly does not lie in the mouth of a wrong-doer, in the face of such probabilities as attend this case, to say that perhaps the contract would not have been completed even if no interference had been had, and that, therefore, there being no certainty of the loss, there is no liability.” Brewer, J., in Angle _v._ Chicago R. Co., 151 U. S. 1, 12.

Footnote 577:

Statement abridged. Arguments omitted; also part of opinions.

Footnote 578:

As to the distinction between intent and motive, see Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 253, 256–259.

Footnote 579:

Compare Tunstall _v._ Sterns Coal Co., (C. C. A.) 192 Fed. 808. Section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 6 Edward 7, Chap. 47, enacted Dec. 21, 1906, is as follows:—

“Sect. 3. An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labor as he wills.”

See Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 253, 345, 429.

Footnote 580:

Only the opinion of Bowen, L. J., is given. Fry, L. J., concurred, but Lord Esher, M. R., dissented. The decision was afterwards affirmed in the House of Lords, [1892] A. C. 25.

Footnote 581:

Payne _v._ Railroad Co., 13 Lea, 507 (Freeman and Turney, JJ., dissenting); South Royalton Bank _v._ Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505; Delz _v._ Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405 (_semble_) _Accord_. See Lough _v._ Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271.

Footnote 582:

Statement rewritten.

Footnote 583:

See Boggs _v._ Duncan Furniture Co., 163 Ia. 106; Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 Harvard Law Rev. 139.

Footnote 584:

The arguments are omitted.

Footnote 585:

In Holbrook _v._ Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, a land owner put a sign on her land reading, “For Sale. Best Offer From Colored Family.” Defendant wished to sell but was also moved by ill will toward plaintiffs, whose real estate business was seriously interfered with by the threatened sale. See Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 420; Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 429, 453, 455.

Footnote 586:

In this case, however, the means used by defendant involved trespasses and fraud. See American Waltham Watch Co. _v._ United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85.

Footnote 587:

See Faloon _v._ Schilling, 29 Kan. 292.

“_Spite fence._” Malicious use of property to the injury of a neighbor was held not actionable in Capital Bank _v._ Henty, 7 A. C. 741, 766 (_semble_); Giller _v._ West, 162 Ind. 17; Brostrom _v._ Lauppe, 179 Mass. 315; Bordeaux _v._ Greene, 22 Mont. 254; Mahan _v._ Brown, 13 Wend. 261; Auburn Co. _v._ Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444 (_semble_); Pickard _v._ Collins, 23 Barb. 444; Levy _v._ Brothers, 4 Misc. 48; Letts _v._ Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73; Koblegard _v._ Hale, 60 W. Va. 37; Metzger _v._ Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267.

_Contra_ Norton _v._ Randolph, 176 Ala. 381; Burke _v._ Smith, 69 Mich. 380; Flaherty _v._ Moran, 81 Mich. 52; Kirkwood _v._ Finegan, 95 Mich. 543; Peek _v._ Roe, 110 Mich. 52; Barger _v._ Barringer, 151 N. C. 433. See Wilson _v._ Irwin, 144 Ky. 311; Metz _v._ Tierney, 13 N. M. 363; Smith _v._ Speed, 11 Okl. 95; Haverstick _v._ Sipe, 33 Pa. St. 368; Shell _v._ Kemmerer, 13 Phila. 502; McCorkle _v._ Driskell, (Tenn.) 60 S. W. 172.

_Malicious diversion of percolating water_ was held to give no right of action in Corporation of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587; Meeker _v._ East Orange, 76 N. J. Law, 435; Phelps _v._ Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39; Chatfield _v._ Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Huber _v._ Merkel, 117 Wis. 355.

_Contra_ Chasemore _v._ Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 388 (_semble_); Roath _v._ Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 540–44 (semble); Chesley _v._ King, 74 Me. 164 (_semble_); Stevens _v._ Kelley, 78 Me. 445, 452; Greenleaf _v._ Francis, 18 Pick. 119 (_semble_); Swett _v._ Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 447 (_semble_); Wyandot Club Co. _v._ Sells, 3 Ohio N. P. 210; Wheatley _v._ Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528, 533 (_semble_); Haldeman _v._ Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514 (_semble_); Lybe’s Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 626 (_semble_); Williams _v._ Laden, 161 Pa. St. 283 (_semble_); Miller _v._ Black Rock Co., 99 Va. 747 (_semble_).

But cases of this type are now coming to be treated on a different principle of waste or unreasonable use of water underlying neighboring tracts. Gagnon _v._ French Lick Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687; Barclay _v._ Abraham, 121 Ia. 619; Stillwater Water Co. _v._ Farmer, 89 Minn. 58; Springfield Waterworks Co. _v._ Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74.

(1) Has the owner of land the same ownership and control of percolating water (water passing, or filtering, through the ground beneath the surface of the earth, without flowing in definite channels), that he has of the soil, _e. g._, the sand and the rocks?

Or (2) has he only a limited and qualified right in the percolating water; a right of reasonable user limited by the correlative rights of his neighbors?

On those questions there is, in recent cases, a conflict of authority. For illustrative cases endorsing the first theory, see Acton _v._ Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324; Mayor of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587; Meeker _v._ East Orange, 76 N. J. Law, 435. For illustrative cases favoring the second theory, see Bassett _v._ Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569 (where the question related to the right of the defendant to prevent water percolating under the surface of plaintiff’s land from passing off through defendant’s land); Katz _v._ Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 140, 141.

We are concerned here only to point out how the adoption of one or the other of the above conflicting views may affect the materiality of the landowner’s motive in the use of percolating water.

If the first theory is adopted, then, in some jurisdictions, the landowner would not be held liable, even though actuated by bad motive (Mayor of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587); and, in all other jurisdictions, he would be liable only when, and because, he was actuated by bad motive.

But if the second theory is adopted, the landowner might frequently be held liable, irrespective of motive. On the second theory percolating water might be regarded as, in a certain sense, the common property of the adjoining owners (bearing some analogy to an underground lake); and it would be held that each owner is entitled to only a reasonable share, and is entitled to use that share only for certain purposes. See 3 Farnham, Waters, § 935. Upon this view an owner who uses more than his share, or who uses it for purposes outside those legally allowable, would be liable entirely irrespective of motive. “Later American cases,” says Professor Huffcut, “transfer the emphasis from the showing of ‘malice’ to a showing of ‘unreasonable user,’ which may or may not be accompanied by malice.” 13 Yale Law Journal, 222.

We may add that if bad motive should not be held, in itself, a substantive ground of liability, yet the existence of bad motive might be a piece of evidence bearing upon the question of reasonable user. User for the sole purpose of gratifying ill will might not be deemed reasonable.

On the general question of liability for malevolent acts in reference to percolating water, see, Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 414–415; Huffcut, Percolating Waters: the Rule of Reasonable User, 13 Yale Law Journ. 222.

Footnote 588:

Statements abridged. Portions of opinion omitted.

Footnote 589:

In Rideout _v._ Knox, 148 Mass. 368, where a similar statute was held constitutional, it was held error to charge that defendant could not justify building the fence unless his sole motive was a legitimate use; malice must be the dominant motive. See also Ingwerson _v._ Barry, 118 Cal. 342; Gallagher _v._ Dodge, 48 Conn. 387; Holmes _v._ Fuller, 68 Vt. 207; Karasek _v._ Peier, 22 Wash. 419; Jones _v._ Williams, 56 Wash. 588; Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 414–415.

Footnote 590:

The rest of the opinion is omitted. This case was followed in Carrington _v._ Taylor, 11 East, 571. See Lamprey _v._ Danz, 86 Minn. 317; Whittaker _v._ Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386; Meredith _v._ Triple Island Gun Club, 113 Va. 80.

Footnote 591:

Only the opinion of Bramwell, B., is given. Pollock, C. B., Martin and Pigott, BB., concurred.

Footnote 592:

Statement rewritten. Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.

Footnote 593:

Statement rewritten. Arguments omitted. Some of the opinions are entirely omitted, and none are given in full.

Footnote 594:

... “The litigants are members of two rival associations of workingmen, registered under the Trade Unions Act of 1871.”... Lord Watson, [1898] A. C., p. 90. “It is not a dispute between employers and employed,—between capital and labor,—but rather one between the members of one trade union and of another trade union.”... Lord Ashbourne, _ibid._ p. 109. “Each party had the financial support of their union.” Lord Macnaghten, p. 147.

Footnote 595:

As to the terms of the ironworkers’ employment, see Lord Watson, pp. 90, 99, and Lord Herschell, p. 130.

Footnote 596:

See Lord Macnaghten, p. 146.

Footnote 597:

It was _held_, both by Kennedy, J., and by the Court of Appeal, that Jackson and Knight were not liable. Upon this branch of the case there was no appeal to the House of Lords.

Footnote 598:

See Lord Macnaghten, p. 148.

Footnote 599:

The statement here given is compiled from extracts recited in the opinions of Lord Shand, p. 162, Lord Halsbury, p. 82, and Lord Macnaghten, p. 149.

Footnote 600:

See Veeder, Advisory Opinions of the Judges in England, 13 Harv. Law Rev. 358.

Footnote 601:

... “There is no ground for even a suggestion that the defendant’s acts were due to competition in trade or employment. There could be no competition between the two sets of men in the circumstances under which they were then working, the one at wood, the other at iron only; and even if they were competing, the plaintiffs were working well within their right.” Hawkins, J., p. 23. “Now, although according to the principles of the Mogul Case the action of Allen might have been justified on the principles of trade competition, if it had been confined to the time when the respondents were doing ironwork, and were therefore acting in competition with the boilermakers, it appears to me that as soon as he overstepped those limits, and induced their employers to dismiss them by way of punishment, his action was without just cause or excuse, and, consequently, malicious within the legal meaning of that word.” Cave, J., p. 37. “This action was not an effort, by competition, to enable the boilermakers to get the work instead, but to punish the plaintiffs by causing the employment of other shipwrights in their room.” Lord Ashbourne, p. 111.

Footnote 602:

GERMAN CIVIL CODE, §§ 226, 826.

226. The exercise of a right is not permitted, when its sole object is to injure another.

826. Whoever intentionally inflicts damage upon another in a morally reprehensible manner is bound to compensate the other for the damage.

See also Digest, xxxix, 3, 1, § 12, xxxix, 3, 2, § 9; L. 17, 55; Domat, Civil Law (Cushing’s ed.) § 158; Erskine, Institutes of the Law of Scotland, Bk. II, tit. 1, § 2; Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, § 966; Planiol, Traité Elémentaire de droit civil, (4 ed.), II, §§ 870–72; Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, I, § 121; Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411; Walton, Motive as an Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law, 22 Harvard Law Rev. 349.

Footnote 603:

Some opinions are omitted. None are given in full. Arguments omitted.

Footnote 604:

Read by Lord Davey in Lord Lindley’s absence.

Footnote 605:

[1895] 2 Q. B. 22, 23; [1898] A. C. 3.

Footnote 606:

[1898] A. C. p. 19, Lord Watson; p. 115, Lord Herschell; pp. 147–150, Lord Macnaghten; pp. 161, 165, Lord Shand; p. 175, Lord Davey; p. 178, Lord James.

Footnote 607:

ENGLAND, TRADE DISPUTES ACT, 1906, 6 Ed. 7, c. 47.

1.—The following paragraph shall be added as a new paragraph after the first paragraph of section three of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875:—

“An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable unless the act, if done without any such agreement or combination, would be actionable.”

2.—(1) It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.

(2) Section seven of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, is hereby repealed from “attending at or near” to the end of the section.

3.—An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labor as he wills.

4.—(1) An action against a trade union, whether of workmen or masters, or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade union in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court.

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the trustees of a trade union to be sued in the events provided for by the Trades Union Act, 1871, section nine, except in respect of any tortious act committed by or on behalf of the union in contemplation or in furtherance of a trade dispute.

5.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and this Act may be cited together as the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906.

(2) In this Act the expression “trade union” has the same meaning as in the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and shall include any combination as therein defined, notwithstanding that such combination may be the branch of a trade union.

(3) In this Act and in the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, the expression “trade dispute” means any dispute between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of the employment, or with the conditions of labor, of any person, and the expression “workmen” means all persons employed in trade or industry, whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a trade dispute arises; and, in section three of the last-mentioned Act, the words “between employers and workmen” shall be repealed.

See Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 345, 351, note 3.

Footnote 608:

The statement has been abridged.

Footnote 609:

“The defendant associations had the absolute right to threaten to do that which they had the right to do.” Parker, C. J., in National Protective Association _v._ Cumming, 170 New York, 315, p. 329.

“It will be said that a man has the absolute right to threaten to do that which he has a right to do. Granted that what you may absolutely do you may absolutely threaten to do (give unqualified notice of your intention to do). But it does not follow that you may conditionally threaten to do it. The right to absolutely refuse to work and the right to conditionally refuse do not, as against third persons, _i. e._, persons other than the employer, stand to each other in the relation of the greater to the less. The former does not necessarily include the latter. They are distinct from each other; and the latter may sometimes be the more important and the more dangerous right of the two.” 20 Harvard Law Rev., p. 273.

“The right to quit an employment which is terminable at will may include a right to give absolute and unqualified notice of intention to leave.”

“It may also include, _as against an employer_, a right to annex any possible condition to an offer to work or to a threat to refrain from working. By ‘right as against an employer’ we mean that an employer could not maintain an action against a laborer for annexing such conditions. The employer is not legally damaged by such an offer. He is not bound to accept it. As between B and C, the person with whom B is directly dealing, it may be true that ‘the right to refuse to deal involves the right to name any terms which one pleases, and to refuse to deal except on these terms.’ C cannot maintain an action against B for insisting on unreasonable terms. But the terms or conditions annexed to an offer may relate to the offeree’s relations to a third person, and [if the offeree accepts and performs the conditions] that may raise a question whether such third person has any ground of complaint.”

“We think that the right to work or not to work does not include, _as against third persons_, the right to annex any possible condition to an offer to work or to a notice of intention to refrain from work. Suppose that B offers to work for C on condition that C commits a battery on A. Could B effectively deny that he instigated the commission of the battery? Could B escape liability to A on the ground that he was merely stating to C the conditions on which he was willing to exercise his right to labor or not to labor?” 20 Harvard Law Rev. 270–271.

The contrary view is open to several objections:—

“1. It assumes that, if certain conduct of B does not violate any legal right of C, it cannot infringe a legal right of A.

“2. It overlooks the distinction between unconditionally exercising a right, and offering to exercise it (or to refrain from exercising it) on condition that the offeree shall take action which is intended to produce (and does produce) damage to a third person.

“3. It assumes that one who intentionally instigates a second person to inflict damage on a third person can escape responsibility by putting the instigation in the form of a conditional offer to exercise, or to refrain from exercising, a right which he had against the second person.” 20 Harvard Law Rev. 269.

Footnote 610:

“In many of the cases the element of combination or conspiracy is found. If the act be lawful, the combination or conspiracy to commit it does not make the act unlawful; if it be unlawful, the combination to commit it may render its commission easier and may aggravate the injury; but it does not change the character of the act. The fact of combination is treated by the courts as of great evidentiary value in deciding the question of coercion or duress.” Burke, J., in Sumwalt Ice Co. _v._ Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 Md. 403, 414.

“The gist of a civil action of this sort is not the conspiracy but the deceit or fraud causing damage to the plaintiff, the combination being charged merely for the purpose of fixing joint liability on the defendants.” Rugg, J., in New England Foundation Co. _v._ Reed, 209 Mass. 556.

See also Romer, L. J., in Giblan _v._ National Amalgamated Union, [1903] 2 K. B. 600, 619–620. But compare Henshaw, J., in Vallejo Ferry Co. _v._ Solano Club, 165 Cal. 255.

Footnote 611:

_Intimidation._ See Springhead Co. _v._ Riley, 6 Eq. 551 (intimidating placards); Southern R. Co. _v._ Machinists Union, 111 Fed. 49; Knudsen _v._ Benn, 123 Fed. 636; Atchison R. Co. _v._ Gee, 139 Fed. 582; Pope Motor Co. _v._ Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (collection of large crowd); Allis Chalmers Co. _v._ Iron Molders’ Union, 150 Fed. 155 (crowds); Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. _v._ Goldfield Miners’ Union, 159 Fed. 500; Kolley _v._ Robinson, (C. C. A.) 187 Fed. 415; Fortney _v._ Carter, (C. C. A.) 203 Fed. 454; Bittner _v._ West Virginia Coal Co., (C. C. A.) 214 Fed. 716; Goldberg _v._ Stablemen’s Union, 149 Cal. 429; Underhill _v._ Murphy, 117 Ky. 640; Sherry _v._ Perkins, 147 Mass. 212 (intimidating banner); Ideal Mfg. Co. _v._ Ludwig, 149 Mich. 133 (crowd); Baltic Mining Co. _v._ Judge, 177 Mich. 632; Minnesota Stove Co. _v._ Cavanaugh, 131 Minn. 458; Jones _v._ Maher, 62 Misc. 388; O’Neil _v._ Behanna, 182 Pa. St. 236; Jensen _v._ Cooks’ Union, 39 Wash. 531; Commercial Printing Co. _v._ Tacoma Typographical Union, 85 Wash. 234.

_Picketing_, see American Steel Co. _v._ Wire Drawers’ Union, 90 Fed. 608; Iron Molders’ Union _v._ Allis Chalmers Co., (C. C. A.) 166 Fed. 45; Sona _v._ Aluminum Castings Co., (C. C. A.) 214 Fed. 936; Karges Furniture Co. _v._ Woodworkers’ Union, 165 Ind. 421; Beck _v._ Teamsters’ Union, 118 Mich. 497.

_Annoyance of workers resorting to plaintiff._ Union P. R. Co. _v._ Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; Frank _v._ Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443; Jonas Glass Co. _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219.

_Inducing employer to break contracts._ Read _v._ Friendly Society, [1902] 2 K. B. 732; Jonas _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219; Flaccus _v._ Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128.

_Inducing employees to break contract._ Hardie Tynes Mfg. Co. _v._ Cruse, 189 Ala. 66; Folsom _v._ Lewis, 208 Mass. 336; Jonas Glass Co. _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219; Grassi Contracting Co. _v._ Bennett, 160 N. Y. Suppl. 279.

Footnote 612:

This section is as follows: “No person shall, by intimidation or force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of any person or corporation.”

Footnote 613:

In accord with the prevailing opinion, see Tunstall _v._ Stearns Coal Co., 192 Fed. 808; Folsom _v._ Lewis, 208 Mass. 336; Burnham _v._ Dowd, 217 Mass. 351; Fairbanks _v._ McDonald, 219 Mass. 291; Cornellier _v._ Haverhill Mfr’s Assn, 221 Mass. 554; Blanchard _v._ Newark District Council, 77 N. J. Law, 389; Ruddy _v._ United Journeyman Plumbers, 79 N. J. Law, 467, 81 N. J. Law, 574. Compare Giblan _v._ National Amalgamated Union, [1903] 2 K. B. 600; National Fire Proofing Co. _v._ Mason Builders’ Ass’n, 169 Fed. 259; Gill Engraving Co. _v._ Doerr, 214 Fed. 111.

_Contra_, Kemp _v._ Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213.

_Purpose of gaining control of the labor market._ New England Cement Co. _v._ McGivern, 218 Mass. 198; Jacobs _v._ Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207; McCord _v._ Thompson Starrett Co., 129 App. Div. 130; Schwarcz _v._ International Union, 68 Misc. 528; Newton _v._ Erickson, 70 Misc. 291.

Compare Reynolds _v._ Davis, 198 Mass. 294.

Footnote 614:

See majority and minority opinions in the later case of Willcut & Sons Co. _v._ Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, also Booth _v._ Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181. Compare Rhodes _v._ Musicians’ Union, 37 R. I. 281.

Footnote 615:

The following condensed statement is taken from 20 Harvard Law Review, 445–447.

Footnote 616:

Loring, J., p. 583.

Footnote 617:

Ibid.

Footnote 618:

Only a part of the opinion is given (pp. 587–88).

Footnote 619:

Bossert _v._ Dhuy, 166 App. Div. 261, 221 N. Y. 342 _Accord_. But see Grassi Contracting Co. _v._ Bennett, 160 N. Y. Suppl. 279.

In Bohn Mfg. Co. _v._ Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, “a large number of retail lumber dealers formed a voluntary association, by which they mutually agreed that they would not deal with any manufacturer or wholesale dealer who should sell lumber directly to consumers not dealers, at any point where a member of the association was carrying on a retail yard; and they provided in their by-laws that, whenever any wholesale dealer or manufacturer made any such sale, the secretary should notify all the members of the fact. The plaintiff, a wholesaler, having made such a sale directly to a consumer, the secretary threatened to send notice of the fact, as provided in the by-laws, to all the members of the association.” (This statement is copied from 17 Green Bag, 218. See also statement by Professor Lewis, 44 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 469.) The court refused to grant an injunction against sending out the notice. Here the retail dealers did not threaten to cease dealing with any one except their competitors, _i. e._, wholesale dealers who should attempt to sell directly to consumers. They used no lever but their own conduct. They did not threaten to induce outsiders to refrain from working for, or selling goods to, the wholesalers. And even as to their own conduct, they did not threaten to abstain from dealings with wholesalers in all matters, but only in the purchase of lumber. Much less did they threaten to abstain from dealing with persons who dealt with the wholesalers. In a subsequent case the same court said: “It is to be noted that the defendants in the Bohn case had similar legitimate interests to protect which were menaced by the practice of wholesale dealers in selling lumber to contractors and consumers; and that the defendants’ efforts to induce parties not to deal with offending wholesale dealers were limited to the members of the association having similar interests to conserve, and that there was no agreement or combination or attempt to induce other persons not members of the association to withhold their patronage from such wholesale dealers.” Ertz _v._ Produce Exchange Co., 79 Minn. 140, 144. See also Jackson _v._ Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; Brown _v._ Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429; and other cases collected by Professor Wyman, 17 Green Bag, 210, 222.

_Strike unless plaintiff is discharged, as a means toward better conditions in the shop_, see Minasian _v._ Osborne, 210 Mass. 250.

_Strike to get rid of personally objectionable foreman._ De Minico _v._ Craig, 207 Mass. 593.

Footnote 620:

Statement abridged. Portions of opinion omitted.

Footnote 621:

Gompers _v._ Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418; Baldwin _v._ Escanaba Dealers’ Ass’n, 165 Mich. 98; Fink _v._ Butchers’ Union, 84 N. J. Eq. 638; McCormick _v._ Local Unions, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 165 _Accord_.

Compare _Ex parte_ Heffron, 179 Mo. App. 639.

Footnote 622:

Bossert _v._ Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. _v._ Bricklayers’ Union, 92 Conn. 161 _Accord_. See Iron Molders’ Union _v._ Allis Chalmers Co., (C. C. A.) 166 Fed. 45. Also Wigmore, The Boycott as Ground for Damages, 21 American Law Rev. 509, and Interference with Social Relations, 21 American Law Rev. 764.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 403, changed “Holden v. McGillicuddy, 213 Mass. 563” to “Holden v. McGillicuddy, 215 Mass. 563”. 2. P. 552, changed “they avoid the contract” to “they void the contract”. 3. P. 840, changed “by continued user in connection” to “by continued use in connection”. 4. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in spelling. 5. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. 6. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter. 7. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.