Part 5
And ’tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so _perfect_ and so _Great_, but I Understand that there may be _Perfecter_ and _Greater_, for if (for Example) I consider the _Faculty_ of _Understanding_, I presently perceive that in me ’tis very _small_ and _Finite_, and also at the same time I form to my self an _Idea_ of an other _Understanding_ not only _much Greater_, but the _Greatest_ and _Infinite_, which I perceive to belong to _God_. In the same manner if I enquire into _memory_ or _imagination_ or any other faculties, I find them in my self _Weak_ and _Circumscribed_, but in _God_ I Understand them to be _Infinite_, there is therefore only my _Will_ or _Freedome_ of _Choice_, which I find to be _so Great_, that I cannot frame to my self an _Idea_ of _One Greater_, so that ’tis by this _chiefly_ by which I Understand my self to Bear the _likeness_ and _Image_ of _God_. For tho the _Will_ in _God_ be without comparison _Greater_ then Mine, both as to the _Knowledge_ and _Power_ which are _Joyn’d_ therewith, which make it more _strong_ and _Effective_, and also as to the _Object_ thereof, for _God_ can apply himself to _more_ things then I can. Yet being taken _Formally_ and _Precisely Gods Will_ seems _no greater_ then Mine. For the _Freedome_ of _Will_ consists only in this, that we can _Do_, or _not Do_ such a Thing (that is, _affirm_ or _deny_, _prosecute_ or _avoid_) or rather in this Only, that we are _so carried_ to a Thing which is _proposed_ by Our _Intellect_ to _Affirm_ or _Deny_, _Prosecute_ or _Shun_, that we are _sensible_, that we are _not Determin’d_ to the _Choice_ or _Aversion_ thereof, by any _outward Force_.
Neither is it Requisite to make one _Free_ that he should have an _Inclination_ to _both_ sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more _strongly_ I am inclined to _one_ side (whether it be that I _evidently perceive_ therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that _God has so disposed_ my _Inward Thoughts_) By so much the _more Free_ am I in my _Choice_.
Neither truly do _Gods Grace_ or _Natural Knowledge_ take away from my _Liberty_, but rather _encrease_ and _strengthen_ it. For that _indifference_ which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me _more_ to _one side_, then to _the other_, is the _meanest_ sort of _Liberty_, and is so far from being a sign of _perfection_, that it only argues a _defect_ or _negation_ of _Knowledge_; for if I should always _Clearly see_ what were _True_ and _Good_ I should never _deliberate_ in my _Judgement_ or _Choice_, and Consequently, tho I were _perfectly Free_, yet I should never be _Indifferent_.
From all which, I perceive that neither the _Power_ of _Willing precisely_ so taken, which I have from _God_, is the _Cause_ of my _Errors_, it being most _full_ and _perfect_ in its kind; Neither also the _Power_ of _Understanding_, for whatever I _Understand_ (since ’tis from God that I _Understand_ it) I _understand aright_, nor can I be therein _Deceived_.
From _Whence_ therefore proceed all my _Errors_? To which, I answer, that they proceed from _hence_ only, that seeing the _Will_ expatiates it self _farther_ then the _Understanding_, I keep it not within the _same bounds_ with my _Understanding_, but often extend it to those things which I _Understand not_, to which things it being _Indifferent_, it easily Declines from what is _True_ and _Good_; and consequently I am _Deceived_ and _Commit sin_. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth _Exist_, and found that from my setting _my self_ to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I _my self Exist_, I could not but _Judge_, what I so _clearly Understood_, to be _true_, not that I was _forced_ thereto by any _outward impulse_, but because a _strong Propension_ in my _Will_ did follow this _Great Light_ in my _Understanding_, so that I believed it so much the more _freely_ and _willingly_, by how much the less _indifferent_ I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I _Exist_ as I am a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, but I also meet with a certain _Idea_ of a _Corporeal Nature_, and it so happens that I _doubt_, whether that _Thinking Nature_ that is in me be _Different_ from that _Corporeal Nature_, or Whether they are _both the same_: but in this _I_ suppose that _I_ have found no Argument to _incline_ me _either ways_, and therefore _I_ am _Indifferent_ to _affirm_ or _deny either_, or to _Judge nothing_ of _either_; But this _indifferency_ extends it self not only to those things of which I am _clearly ignorant_, but generally to all those things which are _not_ so very _evidently known_ to me at the Time when my _Will Deliberates_ of them; for tho never so probable _Guesses incline_ me to _one_ side, yet the Knowing that they are only _Conjectures_, and not indubitable _reasons_, is enough to Draw my _Assent_ to the _Contrary_ Part. Which Lately _I_ have sufficiently experienced, when _I_ supposed all those things (which formerly _I_ assented to as most _True_) as very _False_, for this _Reason_ only that _I_ found my self _able_ to doubt of them in some manner.
If I abstain from _passing_ my _Judgment_, when I do _not clearly_ and _distinctly_ enough perceive what is _Truth_, ’tis evident that I do _well_, and that I am _not deceived_: But if I _affirm_ or _deny_, then ’tis that I _abuse_ the _freedome_ of my _will_, and if I turn my self to that part which is _false_, I am _deceived_; but if I _embrace_ the _contrary_ Part, ’tis but _by chance_ that I light on the _Truth_, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by the _light_ of _Nature_ that the _Perception_ of the _Understanding ought_ to preceed the _Determination_ of the _Will_. And ’tis in this _abuse_ of _Free-Will_ that That _Privation_ consists, which Constitutes _Error_; I say there is a _Privation_ in the _Action_ as it proceeds from Me, but not in the _Faculty_ which I have received from _God_; nor in the _Action_ as it _depends_ on _him_.
Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a _larger Intellective Faculty_, or more _Natural Light_, for ’tis a necessary Incident to a _finite Understanding_ that it should not Understand _All_ things, and ’tis Incident to a _Created Understanding_ to be _Finite_: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has _bestowed_ upon me (tho he _owed_ me nothing) then to think my self _Robbed_ by him of those things which he _never gave me_.
Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a _Will_ larger then my _Understanding_: for seeing the _Will_ Consists in _one_ thing only, and as it were in an _Indivisible_ (viz. to _Will_, or _not to Will_) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be _less_ then ’tis; and certainly by how much the _Greater_ it is, so much the more _Thankful_ I ought to be to _him_; that Gave it me.
Neither can I Complain that God _concurrs_ with me in the Production of those _Voluntary Actions_ or _Judgements_ in which I am _deceived_: for those _Acts_ as they _depend_ on _God_ are altogether _True_ and _Good_; and I am in some measure _more perfect_ in that I can _so Act_, then if I could _not_: for that _Privation_, in which the _Ratio Formalis_ of _Falshood_ and _Sin_ consists, wants not the _Concourse_ of _God_; For it is _not A Thing_, and having respect to him as its _Cause_, ought not to be called _Privation_, but _Negation_; for certainly ’tis no _Imperfection_ in _God_, that he has given me a _freedome_ of _Assenting_ or _not Assenting_ to some things, the _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge whereof he has not _Imparted_ to my _Understanding_; but certainly ’tis an _Imperfection_ in me, that I _abuse_ this _liberty_, and _pass_ my _Judgement_ on those things which I do _not Rightly_ Understand.
Yet I see that ’tis Possible with _God_ to effect that (tho I should remain _Free_, and of a _Finite Knowledge_) I should _never Err_, that is, if he had endowed my _Understanding_ with a _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an _Occasion_ of _deliberating_; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, _That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand_; Either of which things had _God_ done, I easily perceive that _I_ (as consider’d in my self) should be _more perfect_ then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there _may be a greater perfection_ in the _whole Universe_ of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to _Errors_, and some not, then if they were all _alike_. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should _Act_ on the _Stage_ of this _World_ a _Part_ not the _chief_ and _most perfect_ of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from _Error_ in the _first way_ above specifi’d, which depends upon the _Evident Knowledge_ of those things whereof _I deliberate_; Yet that I may abstain from _Error_ by the _other means_ abovemention’d, which depends only on this, _That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident._ For tho I have experienced in my self this _Infirmity_, that I cannot _always_ be intent upon _one_ and the _same_ Knowledge, yet _I_ may by a _continued_ and _often repeated_ Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as _I_ have use of this Rule _I_ may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an _habit_ of _not erring_.
In which thing seeing, the _greatest_ and _chief perfection_ of _Man_ consists, _I_ repute my self to have gain’d much by this days _Meditation_, for that therein _I_ have discover’d the _Cause_ of _Error_, _and Falshood_; which certainly can be no other then what _I_ have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, _I_ bridle my _Will_ so that it extend it self _only_ to those things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, it is impossible that I can _Err_. For doubtless All _clear_ and _distinct_ Perception is _something_, and therefore cannot _proceed_ from _Nothing_, but must necessarily have _God_ for its _Author_ (_God_, I say, Who is _infinitely Perfect_, and who _cannot Deceive_) and therefore it Must be _True_.
Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must _beware off_ that I be not _deceived_, but also what I must _Do_ to Discover _Truth_, for _That_ I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things _only_, which I _perfectly_ understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but _confusedly_ and _obscurely_; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.
MEDITAT. V.
_~Of the Essence~ of Things ~Material~. And herein Again of ~God~. And that he does ~Exist~._
There are yet remaining many Things concerning _Gods Attributes_, and many things concerning the _nature_ of _my self_ or of my _Mind_, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I must _avoid_, and what I must _Do_ for the _Attaining_ of _Truth_) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.
But before I enquire whether there be any such things _Really Existent without_ Me, I ought to consider the _Ideas_ of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are _Distinct_, which _confused_.
In which search I find that I _distinctly imagine Quantity_, that which Philosophers commonly call _continued_, that is to say, the _Extension_ of that _Quantity_ or thing _continued_ into _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, I can _count_ in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign _Bigness_, _Figure_, _Position_, and _Local Motion_, to which _Local Motion_ I can assign _Duration_. Neither are only these _Generals_ plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable _particulars_ concerning the _Shapes_, _Number_, and _Motion_ of These Bodies; The _Truth_ whereof is so _evident_, and _agreeable_ to my _Nature_, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have _Learnt_ any thing that is _new_, as to have only _remembred_ what I have known _before_, or only to have thought on those things which were in me _before_, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so _diligently_.
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist no where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho they are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are not _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_. As when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a _Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_, yet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is _Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_ on my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_ of this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_ never thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of _sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_; for I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various _properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all _true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_, and not a meer _Nothing_, for ’tis Evident that _what is true is something_.
And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive, is True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_ of my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_ perceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held those _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived, such as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of _Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and _abstracted Mathematicks_.
Now therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find the _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in me, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and _distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_, as I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or _Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that, tho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days were not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a _God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_.
_Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but looks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things to _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self that the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish’d_ from his _Essence_, so that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_.
_Solution._ But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the _Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_, then the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be _seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a _Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that ’tis no less a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely perfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then to think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_.
_Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a _Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with a Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_ in the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet does it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_ no _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no _Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God exist_.
_Solution._ ’Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence follow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow, that whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they cannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but as _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_, and therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does all this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily, because the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_) _Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a _God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without the _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either _with_ or _without Wings_.
_Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God Existing_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_, seeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._ His _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, ’tis not _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in a _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to Confess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_.
_Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho I do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One; which _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a _Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_ to allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at all _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True natural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_; For by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_ on my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_; As first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose _Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More Gods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive it _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to Eternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_, Which I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_.
But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only, which appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more _carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less certainly_ believed when once ’tis perceived, then this _Last_.
Thus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with _Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible Objects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him; For what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or then that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does _Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems most _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so _depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_.