Part 6

For tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and _Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_ is _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the Remembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know God_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall never attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but _Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to the _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once _Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being as yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand that all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if I do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me _doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I have _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the like.

What now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by _Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be _deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none of those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this _Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is no more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self _moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing appear’d _evident_ to my Understanding, ’twould be _True_.

And Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_ Depends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known Him_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself, and of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which is the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_ to me.

MEDITAT. VI.

_~Of Corporeal Beings~, and Their ~Existence~: As Also of the Real Difference, Between ~Mind~ and ~Body~._

It now remains that I examine whether any _Corporeal Beings_ do _Exist_; And already I know that (as they are the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_) they _May_ (at least) _Exist_, for I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive them; and doubtless _God_ is _able_ to _make_, whatever I am _able_ to _perceive_, and I never Judged any thing to be _beyond_ his _Power_, but what was _Repugnant_ to a _distinct perception_. Moreover, such _Material Beings seem_ to _Exist_ from the _faculty_ of _Imagination_, which I find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I attentively Consider what _Imagination_ is, ’twill appear to be only _a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it_; and if it be _before it_, It must _Exist_.

But that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the _difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or _Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not only _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_, but I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as it were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But if I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a _Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by a _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_ of _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_ as _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a _Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may _confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think of a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other) yet ’tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_, because ’tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of _More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in the least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs from other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be put concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as I _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of _Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my _Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar sort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require not to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly shews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_.

Besides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in me (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain to the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it, yet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_; and I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which my _Mind_ were so _conjoyn’d_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased to _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I say, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine Corporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure Intellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does as it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and _beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when it _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_ something Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or _perceived_ by _Sense_.

But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination _May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence I _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say _probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my _Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_ conclude, _that Body does Exist_.

But I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that _Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such as are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so _distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which by the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of _Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for the _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_.

And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and the _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_ for which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will consider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_.

[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._]

First therefore I have always thought that I have had an _Head_, _Hands_, _Feet_, and other _Members_, of which _This Body_ (which I have look’d upon as a _Part_ of _Me_, or Perhaps as my _Whole self_) Consists; And I have also thought that this _Body_ of _Mine_ is Conversant or engaged among many _Other Bodies_, by which it is Liable to be _affected_ with what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_; What was _Advantagious_ I judged by a certain _sense_ of _Pleasure_, what was _Hurtful_ by a _sense_ of _Pain_. Furthermore, besides _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, I perceived in my self _Hunger_, _Thirst_, and other such like _Appetites_, as also certain _Corporeal Propensions_ to _Mirth_, _Sadness_, _Anger_, and other like _Passions_.

As to What hapned to me from _Bodies without_, Besides the _Extension_, _Figure_, and _Motion_ of those _Bodies_, I also perceived in them _Hardness_, _Heat_, and other _tactile Qualities_, as also _Light_, _Colours_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Sounds_, &c. and by the _Variation_ of these I _distinguish’d_ the _Heaven_, _Earth_, and _Seas_, and all other _Bodies_ from each other.

Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these _Ideas_ of _Qualities_, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I _properly_ and _Immediately perceived_) that I thought my self to Perceive some Things _Different_ from my _Thought, viz._ The _Bodies_ or _Objects_ from whence these _Ideas_ might _Proceed_; for I often found these _Ideas_ come upon me without my _Consent_ or _Will_; so that I can neither perceive an _Object_ (_tho I had a mind to it_) unless it were _before_ the Organs of my _Sense_; Neither can I _Hinder_ my self from perceiving it, when it is _Present_.

And seeing that those _Ideas_ which I take in by sense are much more _Lively_, _Apparent_ and in their kind more _distinct_, than any of those which _I knowingly_ and _Willingly_ frame by Meditation, or stir up in my _Memory_; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from _my self_. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things _Without_ Me. Of Which Things seeing _I_ have no other Knowledge but from these _Ideas_, _I_ cannot Think but that these _Ideas_ are _like_ the Things.

Moreover, Because _I_ remember that _I_ first made use of my _senses_ before my _Reason_; and because _I_ did perceive that those _Ideas_ which _I_ my self did frame were not so _Manifest_ as those which _I_ received by my _senses_, but very often _made up of their parts_, _I_ was easily perswaded to think that _I_ had no _Idea_ in my _Understanding_, which I had not _First_ in my _sense_.

Neither was it without Reason that _I_ Judged, _That Body_ (which by a _peculiar right I_ call my _Own_) to be _more nighly_ appertaining to _Me_ then any _other Body_. For from It, as from other _Bodies_, _I_ can never be _seperated_, _I_ was _sensible_ of all _Appetites_ and _Affections in It_ and _for It_, and lastly _I_ perceived _pleasure_ and _Pain_ in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the _sense_ of Pain a certain _Grief_, and from the _sense_ of _pleasure_ a certain _Joy_ of the _Mind_ should arise, or Why that _Gnawing_ of the _stomach_, Which _I_ call _Hunger_, should put me in mind of _Eating_, or the _driness_ of my _Throat_ of _Drinking_, _I_ can give no other Reason but _that I am taught so by Nature_. For to my thinking there is no _Affinity_ or _Likeness_ between that _Gnawing_ of the _Stomach_, and the desire of _Eating_, or between the _sense_ of _Pain_, and the _sorrowful thought_ from thence arising. But in this as in all other _judgments_ that I made of _sensible objects_, I seem’d to be taught by _Nature_, for I first perswaded my self that things were _so_ or _so_, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it.

[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I doubted my senses._]

[Sidenote: _Medit. I._]

But afterwards I discover’d many experiments, wherein my _senses_ so grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seem’d _Round_ a far off, nigh at hand appear’d _square_, and _large_ Statues on their tops seem’d _small_ to those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the _judgements_ of my _outward senses_ were _deceived_: and not of my _outward_ only, but of my _inward senses_ also; for what is more _intimate_ or _inward_ than _Pain_? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt _pain_ in that part which they _wanted_, and therefore I am not _absolutely certain_ that any part of me is affected with _pain_, tho I _feel pain_ therein. To these I have lately added two very _general Reasons_ of _doubt_; The first was, that while I was _awake_, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were _a sleep_; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my _sleep_ proceeds from _outward Objects_, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am _awake_? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not the _Author_ of my _Being_ (or at least I then _supposed_ my self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by _Nature_ as to be _deceived_ even in those things which appear’d to me most _true_. And as to the _Reasons_, which induced me to give _credit_ to _sensible_ Things, ’twas easie to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by _Nature_ to many Things, which _Reason_ disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by _Nature_. And tho the perceptions of my _senses_ depended not on my _Will_, I thought _I_ should not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from _Objects different_ from my self; for perhaps there may be some other _Faculty_ in me (tho as yet _unknown_ to me) which might frame those _perceptions_.

[Sidenote: _How far the senses are now to be trusted._]

But now that I begin better to know _my self_ and the Author of my _Original_, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my _senses_ are _rashly_ to be _admitted_, neither are all things so _had_, to be _doubted_. And first because I know that whatever I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, _may be_ so made by _God_ as I perceive them; the _Power_ of _understanding clearly_ and _distinctly_ one Thing _without_ the other is sufficient to make Me _certain_ that One Thing is _different_ from the Other; because it _may_ at least be placed apart by _God_, and that it may be esteem’d _different_, it matters not by what _Power_ it _may_ be so _sever’d_. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that _I my self exist_, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my _Nature_ or _Essence_, but that I am a _thinking Being_, I rightly conclude, that my _Essence_ consists in this alone, that I am a _thinking Thing_. And tho _perhaps_ (or, as I shall shew presently, ’tis _certain_) I have a _Body_ which is very _nighly_ conjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and _distinct Idea_ of my self, as I am only a _thinking Thing, not extended_; and on the other side because I have a _distinct Idea_ of my _Body_, as it is onely an _extended_ thing, _not thinking_, ’tis from hence _certain_, that I _am really distinct from my Body_, and that I can _exist without_ it.

Moreover I find in my self some _Faculties_ endow’d with _certain_ peculiar waies of _thinking_, such as the _Faculty_ of _Imagination_, the _Faculty_ of _Perception_ or _sense_; without which _I_ can conceive my _whole self clearly_ and _distinctly_, but (changing the phrase) _I_ cannot _conceive_ those _Faculties_ without _conceiving My self_, that is, an _understanding substance_ in which they are; for none of them in their _formal Conception_ includes _understanding_; from whence I perceive they are as _different_ from _me_, as the _modus_ or _manner_ of a Thing is _different_ from the _Thing it self_.

I acknowledge also, that I have several other _Faculties_, such as _changing_ of _place_, _putting on various shapes_, &c. Which can no more be understood without a _substance_ in which they are, then the foremention’d _Faculties_, and consequently they can no more be understood to _Exist_ without that _substance_: But yet ’tis Manifest, that this sort of _Faculties_, to the End they may exist, ought to be in a _Corporeal_, _Extended_, and not in an _Understanding substance_, because _Extension_, and not _Intellection_ or _Understanding_ is included in the _Clear_ and _Distinct conception_ of them.

But there is also in me a certain _Passive Faculty_ of _sense_, or of _Receiving_ and _Knowing_ the _Ideas_ of _sensible Things_; of which _Faculty_ I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certain _Active Faculty_ of _Producing_ and _Effecting_ those _Ideas_. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no _Understanding_, and those _Ideas_ are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against my _Will_. There remains therefore no Place for this _Active Faculty_, but that it should be in some _substance different_ from me. In which because all the _Reallity_, which is contain’d _Objectively_ in the _Ideas_ Produced by that _Faculty_, ought to be contain’d _Formally_ or _Eminently_ (as I have Formerly taken notice) this _substance_ must be either _a Body_ (in which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Formally_) or it Must Be _God_, or some _Creature_ more _excellent_ then a _Body_ (In which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Eminently_). But seeing that _God_ is not a _Deceivour_, ’tis altogether Manifest, that _he_ does not Place these _Ideas_ in me either _Immediately_ from himself, or _Mediately_ from any other Creature, wherein their _Objective Reallity_ is not * contain’d _Formally_, but only _Eminently_. And seeing _God_ has given me no _Faculty_ to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from _Corporeal_ or _Incorporeal Beings_, but rather a _strong Inclination_ to believe that they are sent from _Corporeal Beings_, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a _Deceiver_, if these _Ideas_ came from any Where, but from _Corporeal Things_. Therefore we must conclude that there are _Corporeal Beings_. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by _my sense_ (for Perception by sense is in many Things very _Obscure_ and _Confused_) but those things at least, which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_; those things I say at least are _True_.

As to What Remains, They are either some _Particulars_, as that the Sun is of such a _Bigness_ or _Shape_, _&c._ or they are Things less _Clearly_ Understood, as _Light_, _Sound_, _Pain_, &c. And tho these and such like Things may be very _Doubtful_ and _Uncertain_, yet because _God_ is not a _Deceiver_, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be _false_ unless God has Given me some _Faculty_ or other to _Correct_ my _Error_, hence ’tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining _Truth_ even in these very Things.

And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever _I_ am taught by _Nature_ has something therein of _Truth_. By _Nature_ in General I understand either _God_ himself, or the _Coordination_ of Creatures Made by God. By my _Own Nature_ in _Particular_ I understand the _Complexion_ or _Association_ of all those things which are given me by God.

Now there is nothing that this _my Nature_ teaches me more _expresly_ then that I have a _Body_, Which is not _Well_ when I _feel Pain_, that this _Body_ wants _Meat_ or _Drink_ When I am _Hungry_ or _Dry_, _&c._ And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are _True_. And by this _sense_ of _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, &c. My _Nature_ tells me that _I_ am not in my _Body_, as a _Mariner_ is in his _Ship_, but that I am most _nighly conjoyn’d_ thereto, and as it were _Blended therewith_; so that _I_ with _It_ make up _one_ thing; For Otherwise, when the _Body_ were hurt, _I_, who am only a _Thinking Thing_, should not therefore _feel_ Pain, but should only _perceive_ the Hurt with the _Eye_ of my _Understanding_ (as a _Mariner perceives_ by his _sight_ whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the _Body_ wants either Meat or Drink, I should only _Understand_ this want, but should not have the _Confused sense_ of _Hunger_ or _Thirst_; I call them _Confused_, for certainly the _Sense_ of _Thirst_, _Hunger_, _Pain_, &c. are only _Confused Modes_ or _Manners_ of _Thought_ arising from the _Union_ and (as it were) _mixture_ of the _Mind_ and _Body_.

I am taught also by _Nature_, that there are many other _Bodies Without_ and _About_ my _Body_, some whereof are to be _desired_, others are to be _Avoided_. And because that I Perceive very Different _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, _Hardness_, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are _Correspondent Differences_ in _Bodies_, from which these _different perceptions_ of _sense_ proceed, tho perhaps not _Alike_. And because that some of these _perceptions_ are _Pleasant_, others _Unpleasant_, ’tis evidently _certain_, that my _Body_, or rather my _Whole self_ (as _I_ am compounded of a _Mind_ and _Body_) am liable to be _Affected_ by these _Bodies_ which encompass me about.