book iii

., _Of Morals_, was published in the following year. The publisher of the first two volumes, John Noone, gave him L50 and twelve bound copies for a first edition of one thousand copies. Hume's own words best describe its reception. "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate; it fell _dead-born from the press_, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." "But," he adds, "being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country." This brief notice, however, is not sufficient to explain the full significance of the event for Hume's own life. The work undoubtedly failed to do what its author expected from it; even the notice, otherwise not unsatisfactory, which it obtained in the _History of the Works of the Learned_, then the principal critical journal, did not in the least appreciate the true bearing of the _Treatise_ on current discussions. Hume naturally expected that the world would see as clearly as he did the connexion between the concrete problems agitating contemporary thought and the abstract principles on which their solution depended. Accordingly he looked for opposition, and expected that, if his principles were received, a change in general conceptions of things would ensue. His disappointment at its reception was great; and though he never entirely relinquished his metaphysical speculations, though all that is of value in his later writings depends on the acute analysis of human nature to which he was from the first attracted, one cannot but regret that his high powers were henceforth withdrawn for the most part from the consideration of the foundations of belief, and expended on its practical applications. In later years he attributed his want of success to the immature style of his early exposition, to the rashness of a young innovator in an old and well-established province of literature. But this has little foundation beyond the irritation of an author at his own failure to attract such attention as he deems his due. None of the principles of the _Treatise_ is given up in the later writings, and no addition is made to them. Nor can the superior polish of the more mature productions counterbalance the concentrated vigour of the more youthful work.

After the publication of the _Treatise_ Hume retired to his brother's house at Ninewells and carried on his studies, mainly in the direction of politics and political economy. In 1741 he published the first volume of his _Essays_, which had a considerable and immediate success. A second edition was called for in the following year, in which also a second volume was published. These essays Butler, to whom he had sent a copy of his _Treatise_, but with whom he had failed to make personal acquaintance, warmly commended. The philosophical relation between Butler and Hume is curious. So far as analysis of knowledge is concerned they are in harmony, and Hume's sceptical conclusions regarding belief in matters of fact are the foundations on which Butler's defence of religion rests. Butler, however, retained, in spite of his destructive theory of knowledge, confidence in the rational proofs for the existence of God, and certainly maintains what may be vaguely described as an a priori view of conscience. Hume had the greatest respect for the author of the _Analogy_, ranks him with Locke and Berkeley as an originator of the experimental method in moral science, and in his specially theological essays, such as that on _Particular Providence and a Future State_, has Butler's views specifically in mind. (See BUTLER.)

The success of the _Essays_, though hardly great enough to satisfy his somewhat exorbitant cravings, was a great encouragement to him. He began to hope that his earlier work, if recast and lightened, might share the fortunes of its successor; and at intervals throughout the next four years he occupied himself in rewriting it in a more succinct form with all the literary grace at his command. Meantime he continued to look about for some post which might secure him the modest independence he desired. In 1744 we find him, in anticipation of a vacancy in the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh university, moving his friends to advance his cause with the electors; and though, as he tells us, "the accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism or theism, &c., &c., was started" against him, it had no effect, "being bore down by the contrary authority of all the good people in town." To his great mortification, however, he found out, as he thought, that Hutcheson and Leechman, with whom he had been on terms of friendly correspondence, were giving the weight of their opinion against his election. The after history of these negotiations is obscure. Failing in this attempt, he was induced to become tutor, or keeper, to the marquis of Annandale, a harmless literary lunatic. This position, financially advantageous, was absurdly false (see letters in Burton's _Life_, i. ch. v.), and when the matter ended Hume had to sue for arrears of salary.

In 1746 Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St Clair, and was a spectator of the ill-fated expedition to France in the autumn of that year. His admirable account of the transaction has been printed by Burton. After a brief sojourn at Ninewells, doubtless occupied in preparing for publication his _Philosophical Essays_ (afterwards entitled _An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_), Hume was again associated with General St Clair as secretary in the embassy to Vienna and Turin (1748). The notes of this journey are written in a light and amusing style, showing Hume's usual keenness of sight in some directions and his almost equal blindness in others. During his absence from England, early in the year 1748, the _Philosophical Essays_ were published; but the first reception of the work was little more favourable than that accorded to the _Treatise_. To the later editions of the work Hume prepared an "Advertisement" referring to the _Treatise_, and desiring that the _Essays_ "may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Some modern critics have accepted this disclaimer as of real value, but in fact it has no significance; and Hume himself in a striking letter to Gilbert Elliott indicated the true relation of the two works. "I believe the _Philosophical Essays_ contain everything of consequence relating to the understanding which you would meet with in the _Treatise_, and I give you my advice against reading the latter. By shortening and simplifying the questions, I really render them much more complete. _Addo dum minuo_. The philosophical principles are the same in both." The Essays are undoubtedly written with more maturity and skill than the _Treatise_; they contain in more detail application of the principles to concrete problems, such as miracles, providence, immortality; but the entire omission of the discussion forming part ii . of the first book of the _Treatise_, and the great compression of