part ii

. of the _Treatise_.

Space and time.

(a) The nature of space and time as elements in conscious experience is considered by Hume in relation to a special problem, that of their supposed infinite divisibility. Evidently upon his view of conscious experience, of the world of imagination, such infinite divisibility must be a fiction. The ultimate elements of experience must be real units, capable of being represented or imagined in isolation. Whence then do these units arise? or, if we put the problem as it was necessary Hume should put it to himself, in what orders or classes of impressions do we find the elements of space and time? Beyond all question Hume, in endeavouring to answer this problem, is brought face to face with one of the difficulties inherent in his conception of conscious experience. For he has to give some explanation of the nature of space and time which shall identify these with impressions, and at the same time is compelled to recognize the fact that they are not identical with any single impression or set of impressions. Putting aside, then, the various obscurities of terminology, such as the distinction between the objects known, viz. "points" or several mental states, and the impressions themselves, which disguise the full significance of his conclusion, we find Hume reduced to the following as his theory of space and time. Certain impressions, the sensations of sight and touch, have in themselves the element of space, for these impressions (Hume skilfully transfers his statement to the _points_) have a certain order or mode of arrangement. This mode of arrangement or manner of disposition is common to coloured points and tangible points, and, considered separately, is the impression from which our idea of space is taken. All impressions and all ideas are received, or form parts of a mental experience only when received, in a certain order, the order of succession. This manner of presenting themselves is the impression from which the idea of time takes its rise.

It is almost superfluous to remark, first, that Hume here deliberately gives up his fundamental principle that ideas are but the fainter copies of impressions, for it can never be maintained that order of disposition is an impression, and, secondly, that he fails to offer any explanation of the mode in which _coexistence_ and _succession_ are possible elements of cognition in a conscious experience made up of isolated presentations and representations. For the consistency of his theory, however, it was indispensable that he should insist upon the real, i.e. presentative character of the ultimate units of space and time.

Mathematics.

(b) How then are the primary data of mathematical cognition to be derived from an experience containing space and time relations in the manner just stated? It is important to notice that Hume, in regard to this problem, distinctly separates geometry from algebra and arithmetic, i.e. he views extensive quantity as being cognized differently from number. With regard to geometry, he holds emphatically that it is an empirical doctrine, a science founded on observation of concrete facts. The rough appearances of physical facts, their outlines, surfaces and so on, are the data of observation, and only by a method of approximation do we gradually come near to such propositions as are laid down in pure geometry. He definitely repudiates a view often ascribed to him, and certainly advanced by many later empiricists, that the data of geometry are hypothetical. The ideas of perfect lines, figures and surfaces have not, according to him, any existence. (See _Works_, i. 66, 69, 73, 97 and iv. 180.) It is impossible to give any consistent account of his doctrine regarding number. He holds, apparently, that the foundation of all the science of number is the fact that each element of conscious experience is presented as a unit, and adds that we are capable of considering any fact or collection of facts as a unit. This _manner of conceiving_ is absolutely general and distinct, and accordingly affords the possibility of an all-comprehensive and perfect science, the science of discrete quantity. (See _Works_, i. 97.)

(c) In respect to the third point, the nature, extent and certainty of the elementary propositions of mathematical science, Hume's utterances are far from clear. The principle with which he starts and from which follows his well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, a distinction which Kant appears to have thought identical with his distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, is comparatively simple. The _ideas_ of the quantitative aspects of phenomena are exact representations of these aspects or quantitative impressions; consequently, whatever is found true by consideration of the ideas may be asserted regarding the real impressions. No question arises regarding the _existence_ of the fact represented by the idea, and in so far, at least, mathematical judgments may be described as hypothetical. For they simply assert what will be found true in any conscious experience containing coexisting impressions of sense (specifically, of sight and touch), and in its nature successive. That the propositions are hypothetical in this fashion does not imply any distinction between the abstract truth of the ideal judgments and the imperfect correspondence of concrete material with these abstract relations. Such distinction is quite foreign to Hume, and can only be ascribed to him from an entire misconception of his view regarding the ideas of space and time. (For an example of such misconception, which is almost universal, see Riehl, _Der philosophische Kriticismus_, i. 96, 97.)

(d) From this point onwards Hume's treatment becomes exceedingly confused. The identical relation between the ideas of space and time and the impressions corresponding to them apparently leads him to regard judgments of continuous and discrete quantity as standing on the same footing, while the ideal character of the data gives a certain colour to his inexact statements regarding the extent and truth of the judgments founded on them. The emphatic utterances in the _Inquiry_ (iv. 30, 186), and even at the beginning of the relative section in the _Treatise_ (i. 95) may be cited in illustration. But in both works these utterances are qualified in such a manner as to enable us to perceive the real bearings of his doctrine, and to pronounce at once that it differs widely from that commonly ascribed to him. "It is from the idea of a triangle that we discover the relation of equality which its three angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, so long as our idea remains the same" (i. 95). If taken in isolation this passage might appear sufficient justification for Kant's view that, according to Hume, geometrical judgments are analytical and therefore perfect. But it is to be recollected that, according to Hume, an idea is actually a _representation_ or individual picture, not a notion or even a _schema_, and that he never claims to be able to extract the predicate of a geometrical judgment by analysis of the subject. The properties of this individual subject, the idea of the triangle, are, according to him, discovered by observation, and as observation, whether actual or ideal, never presents us with more than the rough or general appearances of geometrical quantities, the relations so discovered have only approximate exactness. "Ask a mathematician what he means when he pronounces two quantities to be equal, and he must say that the idea of _equality_ is one of those which cannot be defined, and that it is sufficient to place two equal quantities before any one in order to suggest it. Now this is an appeal to the general appearances of objects to the imagination or senses" (iv. 180). "Though it (i.e. geometry) much excels, both in universality and exactness, the loose judgments of the senses and imagination, yet [it] never attains a perfect precision and exactness" (i. 97). Any exactitude attaching to the conclusions of geometrical reasoning arises from the comparative simplicity of the data for the primary judgments.

So far, then, as geometry is concerned, Hume's opinion is perfectly definite. It is an experimental or observational science, founded on primary or immediate judgments (in his phraseology, _perceptions_), of relation between facts of intuition; its conclusions are hypothetical only in so far as they do not imply the existence at the moment of corresponding real experience; and its propositions have no exact truth. With respect to arithmetic and algebra, the science of numbers, he expresses an equally definite opinion, but unfortunately it is quite impossible to state in any satisfactory fashion the grounds for it or even its full bearing. He nowhere explains the origin of the notions of unity and number, but merely asserts that through their means we can have absolutely exact arithmetical propositions (_Works_, i. 97, 98). Upon the nature of the reasoning by which in mathematical science we pass from data to conclusions, Hume gives no explicit statement. If we were to say that on his view the essential step must be the establishment of identities or equivalences, we should probably be doing justice to his doctrine of numerical reasoning, but should have some difficulty in showing the application of the method to geometrical reasoning. For in the latter case we possess, according to Hume, no standard of equivalence other than that supplied by immediate observation, and consequently transition from one premise to another by way of reasoning must be, in geometrical matters, a purely verbal process.

Hume's theory of mathematics--the only one, perhaps, which is compatible with his fundamental principle of psychology--is a practical condemnation of his empirical theory of perception. He has not offered even a plausible explanation of the mode by which a consciousness made up of isolated momentary impressions and ideas can be aware of coexistence and number, or succession. The relations of ideas are accepted as facts of immediate observation, as being themselves perceptions or individual elements of conscious experience, and to all appearance they are regarded by Hume as being in a sense analytical, because the formal criterion of identity is applicable to them. It is applicable, however, not because the predicate is contained in the subject, but on the principle of contradiction. If these judgments are admitted to be facts of immediate perception, the supposition of their non-existence is impossible. The ambiguity in his criterion, however, seems entirely to have escaped Hume's attention.

Real cognition and causation.

A somewhat detailed consideration of Hume's doctrine with regard to mathematical science has been given for the reason that this portion of his theory has been very generally overlooked or misinterpreted. It does not seem necessary to endeavour to follow his minute examination of the principle of real cognition with the same fulness. It will probably be sufficient to indicate the problem as conceived by Hume, and the relation of the method he adopts for solving it to the fundamental doctrine of his theory of knowledge.

Real cognition, as Hume points out, implies transition from the present impression or feeling to something connected with it. As this thing can only be an impression or perception, and is not itself present, it is represented by its copy or idea. Now the supreme, all-comprehensive link of connexion between present feeling or impression and either past or future experience is that of causation. The idea in question is, therefore, the idea of something connected with the present impression as its cause or effect. But this is explicitly the idea of the said thing as having had or as about to have existence,--in other words, belief in the existence of some matter of fact. What, for a conscious experience so constituted as Hume will admit, is the precise significance of such belief in real existence?

Clearly the real existence of a fact is not demonstrable. For whatever is may be conceived not to be. "No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction." Existence of any fact, not present as a perception, can only be proved by arguments from cause or effect. But as each perception is in consciousness only as a contingent fact, which might not be or might be other than it is, we must admit that the mind can conceive no necessary relations or connexions among the several portions of its experience.

If, therefore, a present perception leads us to assert the existence of some other, this can only be interpreted as meaning that in some natural, i.e. psychological, manner the idea of this other perception is excited, and that the idea is viewed by the mind in some peculiar fashion. The natural link of connexion Hume finds in the similarities presented by experience. One fact or perception is discovered by experience to be uniformly or generally accompanied by another, and its occurrence therefore naturally excites the idea of that other. But when an idea is so roused up by a present impression, and when this idea, being a consequence of memory, has in itself a certain vivacity or liveliness, we regard it with a peculiar indefinable feeling, and in this feeling consists the immense difference between mere imagination and belief. The mind is led easily and rapidly from the present impression to the ideas of impressions found by experience to be the usual accompaniments of the present fact. The ease and rapidity of the mental transition is the sole ground for the supposed necessity of the causal connexion between portions of experience. The idea of necessity is not intuitively obvious; the ideas of cause and effect are correlative in our minds, but only as a result of experience. Hobbes and Locke were wrong in saying that the mind must find in the relation the idea of Power. We mistake the subjective transition resting upon custom or past experience for an objective connexion independent of special feelings. All reasoning about matters of fact is therefore a species of feeling, and belongs to the sensitive rather than to the cogitative side of our nature. It should be noted that this theory of Causation entirely denies the doctrine of Uniformity in Nature, so far as the human mind is concerned. All alleged uniformity is reduced to observed similarity of process. The idea is a mere convention, product of inaccurate thinking and custom.

While it is evident that some such conclusion must follow from the attempt to regard the cognitive consciousness as made up of disconnected feelings, it is equally clear, not only that the result is self-contradictory, but that it involves certain assumptions not in any way deducible from the fundamental view with which Hume starts. For in the problem of real cognition he is brought face to face with the characteristic feature of knowledge, distinction of self from matters known, and reference of transitory states to permanent objects or relations. Deferring his criticism of the significance of self and object, Hume yet makes use of both to aid his explanation of the belief attaching to reality. The reference of an idea to past experience has no meaning, unless we assume an identity in the object referred to. For a past impression is purely transitory, and, as Hume occasionally points out, can have no connexion of fact with the present consciousness. His exposition has thus a certain plausibility, which would not belong to it had the final view of the permanent object been already given.

The final problem of Hume's theory of knowledge, the discussion of the real significance of the two factors of cognition, self and external things, is handled in the _Treatise_ with great fulness and dialectical subtlety.

The self in cognition.

As in the case of the previous problem, it is unnecessary to follow the steps of his analysis, which are, for the most part, attempts to substitute qualities of feeling for the relations of thought which appear to be involved. The results follow with the utmost ease from his original postulate. If there is nothing in conscious experience save what observation can disclose, while each act of observation is itself an isolated feeling (an impression or idea), it is manifest that a permanent identical thing can never be an object of experience. Whatever permanence or identity is ascribed to an impression or idea is the result of association, is one of those "propensities to feign" which are due to natural connexions among ideas. We regard as successive presentations of one thing the resembling feelings which are experienced in succession. Identity, then, whether of self or object, there is none, and the supposition of _objects_, distinct from impressions, is but a further consequence of our "propensity to feign." Hume's explanation of the belief in external things by reference to association is well deserving of careful study and of comparison with the more recent analysis of the same problem by J. S. Mill.

Negative result of Hume's treatise.

The weak points in Hume's empiricism are so admirably realized by the author himself that it is only fair to quote his own summary in the _Appendix_ to the _Treatise_. He confesses that, in confining all cognition to single perceptions and supplying no purely intellectual faculty for modifying, recording and classifying their results, he has destroyed real knowledge altogether:

"If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only _feel_ a connexion or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, when, reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other.

"However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise us. Modern philosophers seem inclined to think that personal identity _arises_ from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head....

"In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz. _that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences_. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case" (ii. 551).

The closing sentences of this passage may be regarded as pointing to the very essence of the Kantian attempt at solution of the problem of knowledge. Hume sees distinctly that if conscious experience be taken as containing only isolated states, no progress in explanation of cognition is possible, and that the only hope of further development is to be looked for in a radical change in our mode of conceiving experience. The work of the critical philosophy is the introduction of this new mode of regarding experience, a mode which, in the technical language of philosophers, has received the title of _transcendental_ as opposed to the psychological method followed by Locke and Hume. It is because Kant alone perceived the full significance of the change required in order to meet the difficulties of the empirical theory that we regard his system as the only sequel to that of Hume. The writers of the Scottish school, Reid in particular, did undoubtedly indicate some of the weaknesses in Hume's fundamental conception, and their attempts to show that the isolated feeling cannot be taken as the ultimate and primary unit of cognitive experience are efforts in the right direction. But the question of knowledge was never generalized by them, and their reply to Hume, therefore, remains

## partial and inadequate, while its effect is weakened by the uncritical

assumption of principles which is a characteristic feature of their writings.

Theology and ethics.

The results of Hume's theoretical analysis are applied by him to the problems of practical philosophy and religion. For the first of these the reader is referred to the article Ethics, where Hume's views are placed in relation to those of his predecessors in the same field of inquiry. His position, as regards the second, is very noteworthy. As before said, his metaphysic contains _in abstracto_ the principles which were at that time being employed, uncritically, alike by the deists and by their antagonists. There can be no doubt that Hume has continually in mind the theological questions then current, and that he was fully aware of the mode in which his analysis of knowledge might be applied to them. A few of the less important of his criticisms, such as the argument on miracles, became then and have since remained public property and matter of general discussion. But the full significance of his work on the theological side was not at the time perceived, and justice has barely been done to the admirable manner in which he reduced the theological disputes of the century to their ultimate elements. The importance of the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, as a contribution to the criticism of theological ideas and methods, can hardly be over-estimated. A brief survey of its contents will be sufficient to show its general nature and its relations to such works as Clarke's _Demonstration_ and Butler's _Analogy_. The _Dialogues_ introduce three interlocutors, Demea, Cleanthes and Philo, who represent three distinct orders of theological opinion. The first is the type of a certain a priori view, then regarded as the safest bulwark against infidelity, of which the main tenets were that the being of God was capable of a priori proof, and that, owing to the finitude of our faculties, the attributes and modes of operation of deity were absolutely incomprehensible. The second is the typical deist of Locke's school, improved as regards his philosophy, and holding that the only possible proof of God's existence was a posteriori, from design, and that such proof was, on the whole, sufficient. The third is the type of completed empiricism or scepticism, holding that no argument, either from reason or experience, can transcend experience, and consequently that no proof of God's existence is at all possible. The views of the first and second are played off against one another, and criticized by the third with great literary skill and effect. Cleanthes, who maintains that the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God is hardly distinguishable from atheism, is compelled by the arguments of Philo to reduce to a minimum the conclusion capable of being inferred from experience as regards the existence of God. For Philo lays stress upon the weakness of the analogical argument, points out that the demand for an ultimate cause is no more satisfied by thought than by nature itself, shows that the argument from design cannot warrant the inference of a perfect or infinite or even of a single deity, and finally, carrying out his principles to the full extent, maintains that, as we have no experience of the origin of the world, no argument from experience can carry us to its origin, and that the apparent marks of design in the structure of animals are only results from the conditions of their actual existence. So far as argument from nature is concerned, a total suspension of judgment is our only reasonable resource. Nor does the a priori argument in any of its forms fare better, for reason can never demonstrate a matter of fact, and, unless we know that the world had a beginning in time, we cannot insist that it must have had a cause. Demea, who is willing to give up his abstract proof, brings forward the ordinary theological topic, man's consciousness of his own imperfection, misery and dependent condition. Nature is throughout corrupt and polluted, but "the present evil phenomena are rectified in other regions and in some future period of existence." Such a view satisfies neither of his interlocutors. Cleanthes, pointing out that from a nature thoroughly evil we can never prove the existence of an infinitely powerful and benevolent Creator, hazards the conjecture that the deity, though all-benevolent, is not all-powerful. Philo, however, pushing his principles to their full consequences, shows that unless we assumed (or knew) beforehand that the system of nature was the work of a benevolent but limited deity, we certainly could not, from the facts of nature, infer the benevolence of its creator. Cleanthes's view is, therefore, an hypothesis, and in no sense an inference.

The _Dialogues_ ought here to conclude. There is, however, appended one of those perplexing statements of personal opinion (for Hume declares Cleanthes to be his mouthpiece) not uncommon among writers of this period. Cleanthes and Philo come to an agreement, in admitting a certain illogical force in the a posteriori argument, or, at least, in expressing a conviction as to God's existence, which may not perhaps be altogether devoid of foundation. The precise value of such a declaration must be matter of conjecture. Probably the true statement of Hume's attitude regarding the problem is the somewhat melancholy utterance with which the _Dialogues_ close.

It is apparent, even from the brief summary just given, that the importance of Hume in the history of philosophy consists in the vigour and logical exactness with which he develops a particular metaphysical view. Inconsistencies, no doubt, are to be detected in his system, but they arise from the limitations of the view itself, and not, as in the case of Locke and Berkeley, from imperfect grasp of the principle, and endeavour to unite with it others radically incompatible. In Hume's theory of knowledge we have the final expression of what may be called psychological individualism or atomism, while his ethics and doctrine of religion are but the logical consequences of this theory. So far as metaphysic is concerned, Hume has given the final word of the empirical school, and all additions, whether from the specifically psychological side or from the general history of human culture, are subordinate in character, and affect in no way the nature of his results. It is no exaggeration to say that the later English school of philosophy represented by J. S. Mill made in theory no advance beyond Hume. In the _logic_ of Mill, e.g., we find much of a special character that has no counterpart in Hume, much that is introduced _ab extra_, from general considerations of scientific procedure, but, so far as the groundwork is concerned, the _System of Logic_ is a mere reproduction of Hume's doctrine of knowledge. It is impossible for any reader of Mill's remarkable posthumous essay on theism to avoid the reflection that in substance the treatment is identical with that of the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, while on the whole the superiority in critical force must be assigned to the earlier work.

Economics.

2. Hume's eminence in the fields of philosophy and history must not be allowed to obscure his importance as a political economist. Berkeley had already, in the _Querist_, attacked the mercantile theory of the nature of national wealth and the functions of money, and Locke had, in a partial manner, shown that political economy could with advantage be viewed in relation to the modern system of critical philosophy. But Hume was the first to apply to economics the scientific methods of his philosophy. His services to economics may be summed up in two heads: (1) he established the relation between economic facts and the fundamental phenomena of social life, and (2) he introduced into the study of these facts the new historical method. Thus, though he gave no special name to it, he yet describes the subject-matter, and indicates the true method, of economic science. His economic essays were published in the volumes entitled _Political Discourses_ (1752) and _Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects_ (1753); the most important are those on Commerce, on Money, on Interest and on the Balance of Trade, but, notwithstanding the disconnected form of the essays in general, the other less important essays combine to make a complete economic system. We have said that Berkeley and Locke had already begun the general work for which Hume is most important; in details also Hume had been anticipated to some extent. Nicholas Barbon and Sir Dudley North had already attacked the mercantile theory as to the precious metals and the balance of trade; Joseph Massie and Barbon had anticipated his theory of interest. Yet when we compare Hume with Adam Smith, the advance which Hume had made on his predecessors in lucidity of exposition and subtlety of intellect becomes clear, and modern criticism is agreed that the main errors of Adam Smith are to be found in those deductions which deviate from the results of the _Political Discourses_. A very few examples must suffice to illustrate his services to economics.

Money.

Interest.

Free trade.

Taxation and national debt.

In dealing with money, he refutes the Mercantile School, which had tended to confound it with wealth. "Money," said Hume, "is none of the wheels of trade; it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy." "Money and commodities are the real strength of any community." From the internal, as distinct from the international, aspect, the absolute quantity of money, supposed as of fixed amount, in a country, is of no consequence, while a quantity larger than is required for the interchange of commodities is injurious, as tending to raise prices and to drive foreigners from the home markets. It is only _during the period of acquisition_ of money, and before the rise in prices, that the accumulation of precious metals is advantageous. This principle is perhaps Hume's most important economic discovery (cf. F. A. Walker's _Money in its Relations to Trade and Industry_, London, 1880, p. 84 sqq.). He goes on to show that the variations of prices are due solely to money and commodities in circulation. Further, it is a misconception to regard as injurious the passage of money into foreign countries. "A government," he says, "has great reason to preserve with care its _people_ and its _manufactures_; its _money_ it may safely trust to the course of human affairs without fear or jealousy." Dealing with the phenomena of interest, he exposes the old fallacy that the rate depends upon the amount of money in a country; low interest does not follow on abundance of money. The reduction in the rate of interest must, in general, result from "the increase of industry and frugality, of arts and commerce." In connexion with this he emphasizes a too generally neglected factor in economic phenomena, "the constant and insatiable desire of the mind for exercise and employment." "Interest," he says in general, "is the barometer of the state, and its lowness an almost infallible sign of prosperity," arising, as it does, from increased trade, frugality in the merchant class, and the consequent rise of new lenders: low interest and low profits mutually forward each other. In the matter of free trade and protection he compromises. He says on the one hand, "not only as a man, but as a British subject I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and even France itself," and condemns "the numerous bars, obstructions and imposts which all nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade." On the other hand, he approves of a protective tax on German linen in favour of home manufactures, and of a tax on brandy as encouraging the sale of rum and so supporting our southern colonies. Indeed it has been fairly observed that Hume retains an attitude of refined mercantilism. With regard to taxation he takes very definite views. The best taxes, he says, are those levied on consumption, especially on luxuries, for these are least heavily felt. He denies that all taxes fall finally on the land. Superior frugality and industry on the part of the artisan will enable him to pay taxes without mechanically raising the price of labour. Here, as in other points, he differs entirely from the physiocrats, and his criticism of contemporary French views are, as a whole, in accordance with received modern opinion. For the modern expedient of raising money for national emergencies by way of loan he has a profound distrust. He was convinced that what is bad for the individual credit must be bad for the state also. A national debt, he maintains, enriches the capital at the expense of the provinces; further, it creates a leisured class of stockholders, and possesses all the disadvantages of paper credit. "Either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation." To sum up, it may be said that Hume enunciated the principle that "everything in the world is purchased by labour, and our passions are the only causes of labour"; and further, that, in analysing the complex phenomena of commerce, he is superior sometimes to Adam Smith in that he never forgets that the ultimate causes of economic change are the "customs and manners" of the people, and that the solution of problems is to be sought in the elementary factors of industry.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--1. Life.--J. H. Burton's _Life and Correspondence of David Hume_ (2 vols., 1846); Dr G. Birkbeck Hill, _Letters of Hume to William Strahan_; C. J. W. Francke, _David Hume_ (Haarlem, 1907).

2. Works.--Until 1874 the standard edition was that of 1826 (reprinted 1854), in 4 vols. The best modern edition is that in 4 vols. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (containing a valuable introduction and excellent bibliographical matter); the _Enquiry_ and the _Treatise_ (1894 and 1896, Oxford), edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.

3. Philosophic (the more important only can be quoted).--Huxley's _Hume_ (a popular reproduction of Hume's views in "English Men of Letters" series); Sir L. Stephen's _English Thought in the XVIIIth Century_ (1876, especially ch. vi.); J. Orr, _David Hume and his Influence on Philosophy and Theology_ (1903, especially ch. ix. on "Moral Theory of Hume"); H. Calderwood, _David Hume_ (1898, especially ch. vii. on Hume's attitude to religion); A. Seth, _Scottish and German Answers to Hume_; F. Jodl, _Leben und Philosophie D. Humes_ (1872); E. Pfleiderer, _Empirismus und Skepsis in D. Humes Philosophie_ (1874); G. Spicker, _Kant, Hume und Berkeley_ (1875); G. Compayre, _La Philosophie de D. Hume_ (1873); A. Meinong, _Hume-Studien_ (1877, especially Hume's nominalism); G. von Gizycki (a thorough exposition of Hume's utilitarianism), _Die Ethik D. Humes_ (1878); G. Lechartier, _D. Hume, moraliste et sociologue_ (1900); M. Klemme, _Die volkswirtschaftlichen Anchauungen D. Humes_ (1900); E. Marcus, _Kants Revolutionsprinzip. Eine exakte Losung des Kant-Hume'schen Erkenntnisproblems_ (1902); C. Hedvall, _Humes Erkenntnistheorie_ (1906); R. Honigswald, _Uber die Lehre Humes von der Realitat der Aussendinge_ (1904); O. Quast, _Der Begriff des Belief bei David Hume_ (1903). Hume's relation to the society of his time is described in the Rev. H. G. Graham's _Social Life in Scotland_ and _Scottish Men of Letters_; "Jupiter" in Carlyle's _Autobiography_. J. MacCosh published a short pamphlet (1884) containing interesting but perhaps not conclusive arguments on the _Agnosticism of Hume and Huxley_.

4. Economic.--J. Bonar, _Philosophy and Political Economy_ (London, 1893), chapter on Hume; notes to W. G. F. Roscher's _Principles of Political Economy_ (J. Lalor's trans. of 13th ed., New York, 1878); F. A. Walker's _Money_ (New York, 1877) gives an account of Hume's views on interest and money; H. H. Gibbs (Lord Aldenham), _Colloquy on the Currency_; for Hume's relation to Adam Smith, John Rae's _Life of Adam Smith_ (London, 1895). See also M. Teisseire, _Les Essais economiques de David Hume_ (1902; a critical study); A. Schatz, _L'Oeuvre economique de David Hume_ (1902). (R. Ad.; J. M. M.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Burton, ii. 265, 148 and 238. Perhaps our knowledge of Johnson's sentiments regarding the Scots in general, and of his expressions regarding Hume and Smith in particular, may lessen our surprise at this vehemence.

[2] Macaulay describes Hume's characteristic fault as an historian: "Hume is an accomplished advocate. Without positively asserting much more than he can prove, he gives prominence to all the circumstances which support his case; he glides lightly over those which are unfavourable to it; his own witnesses are applauded and encouraged; the statements which seem to throw discredit on them are controverted; the contradictions into which they fall are explained away; a clear and connected abstract of their evidence is given. Everything that is offered on the other side is scrutinized with the utmost severity; every suspicious circumstance is a ground for argument and invective; what cannot be denied is extenuated, or passed by without notice; concessions even are sometimes made; but this insidious candour only increases the effect of the vast mass of sophistry."--_Miscell. Writings_, "History." With this may be compared the more favourable verdict by J. S. Brewer, in the preface to his edition of the _Student's Hume_.

HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855), British politician, was born on the 22nd of January 1777, of humble parents, at Montrose, Scotland. After completing his course of medical study at the university of Edinburgh he sailed in 1797 for India, where he was attached as surgeon to a regiment; and his knowledge of the native tongues and his capacity for business threw open to him the lucrative offices of interpreter and commissary-general. In 1802, on the eve of Lord Lake's Mahratta war, his chemical knowledge enabled him to render a signal service to the administration by making available a large quantity of gunpowder which damp had spoiled. In 1808, on the restoration of peace, he resigned all his civil appointments, and returned home in the possession of a fortune of L40,000. Between 1808 and 1811 he travelled much both in England and the south of Europe, and in 1812 published a blank verse translation of the _Inferno_. In 1812 he purchased a seat in parliament for Weymouth and voted as a Tory. When upon the dissolution of parliament the patron refused to return him he brought an action and recovered part of his money. Six years elapsed before he again entered the House, and during that interval he had made the acquaintance and imbibed the doctrines of James Mill and the philosophical reformers of the school of Bentham. He had joined his efforts to those of Francis Place, of Westminster, and other philanthropists, to relieve and improve the condition of the working classes, labouring especially to establish schools for them on the Lancasterian system, and promoting the formation of savings banks. In 1818, soon after his marriage with Miss Burnley, the daughter of an East India director, he was returned to parliament as member for the Border burghs. He was afterwards successively elected for Middlesex (1830), Kilkenny (1837) and for the Montrose burghs (1842), in the service of which constituency he died. From the date of his re-entering the House Hume became the self-elected guardian of the public purse, by challenging and bringing to a direct vote every single item of public expenditure. In 1820 he secured the appointment of a committee to report on the expense of collecting the revenue. He was incessantly on his legs in committee, and became a name for an opposition bandog who gave chancellors of the exchequer no peace. He undoubtedly exercised a check on extravagance, and he did real service by helping to abolish the sinking fund. It was he who caused the word "retrenchment" to be added to the Radical programme "peace and reform." He carried on a successful warfare against the old combination laws that hampered workmen and favoured masters; he brought about the repeal of the laws prohibiting the export of machinery and of the act preventing workmen from going abroad. He constantly protested against flogging in the army, the impressment of sailors and imprisonment for debt. He took up the question of lighthouses and harbours; in the former he secured greater efficiency, in the latter he prevented useless expenditure. Apart from his pertinacious fight for economy Hume was not always fortunate in his political activity. He was conspicuous in the agitation raised by the so-called Orange plot to set aside King William IV. in favour of the duke of Cumberland (1835 and 1836). His action as trustee for the notorious Greek Loan in 1824 was at least not delicate, and was the ground of charges of downright dishonesty. He died on the 20th of February 1855.

A _Memorial_ of Hume was published by his son Joseph Burnley Hume (London, 1855).

HUMILIATI, the name of an Italian monastic order created in the 12th century. Its origin is obscure. According to some chroniclers, certain noblemen of Lombardy, who had offended the emperor (either Conrad III. or Frederick Barbarossa), were carried captive into Germany and after suffering the miseries of exile for some time, "humiliated" themselves before the emperor. Returning to their own country, they did penance and took the name of Humiliati. They do not seem to have had any fixed rule, nor did St Bernard succeed in inducing them to submit to one. The traditions relating to a reform of this order by St John of Meda are ill authenticated, his _Acta_ (_Acta sanctorum Boll._, Sept., vii. 320) being almost entirely unsupported by contemporary evidence. The "Chronicon anonymi Laudunensis canonici" (_Mon. Germ. hist. Scriptores_, xxvi. 449), at date 1178, states that a group of Lombards came to Rome with the intention of obtaining the pope's approval of the rule of life which they had spontaneously chosen; while continuing to live in their houses in the midst of their families, they wished to lead a more pious existence than of old, to abandon oaths and litigation, to content themselves with a modest dress, and all in a spirit of Catholic piety. The pope approved their resolve to live in humility and purity, but forbade them to hold assemblies and to preach in public; the chronicler adding that they infringed the pope's wish and thus drew upon themselves his excommunication. Their name, Humiliati ("Humiles" would have been more appropriate), arose from the fact that the clothes they wore were very simple and of one colour. This lay fraternity spread rapidly and soon put forth two new branches, a second order composed of women, and a third composed of priests. No sooner, however, had this order of priests been formed, than it claimed precedence of the others, and, though chronologically last, was called _primus ordo_ by hierarchical right--_propter tonsuram_ (see P. Sabatier, "Regula antiqua Fr. et Sor. de poenitentia" in _Opuscules de critique historique_,