CHAPTER V
_Neither the Indian Ocean nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of occupation_
If therefore the Portuguese have acquired no legal right over the nations of the East Indies, and their territory and sovereignty, let us consider whether they have been able to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the sea and its navigation or over trade. Let us first consider the case of the sea.
Now, in the legal phraseology of the Law of Nations, the sea is called indifferently the property of no one (_res nullius_), or a common possession (_res communis_), or public property (_res publica_). It will be most convenient to explain the signification of these terms if we follow the practice of all the poets since Hesiod, of the philosophers and jurists of the past, and distinguish certain epochs, the divisions of which are marked off perhaps not so much by intervals of time as by obvious logic and essential character. And we ought not to be criticised if in our explanation of a law deriving from nature, we use the authority and definition of those whose natural judgment admittedly is held in the highest esteem.
It is therefore necessary to explain that in the earliest stages of human existence both sovereignty and common possession had meanings other than those which they bear at the present time.[44] For nowadays sovereignty means a particular kind of proprietorship, such in fact that it absolutely excludes like possession by any one else. On the other hand, we call a thing ‘common’ when its ownership
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quodam aut consensu collata est exclusis aliis. Linguarum paupertas coegit voces easdem in re non eadem usurpare. Et sic ista nostri moris nomina ad ius illud pristinum similitudine quadam et imagine referuntur. Commune igitur tunc non aliud fuit quam quod simpliciter proprio opponitur; dominium autem facultas non iniusta utendi re communi, quem usum Scholasticis[45a] visum est facti non iuris vocare, quia qui nunc in iure usus vocatur, proprium est quiddam, aut ut illorum more loquar, privative ad alios dicitur.
Iure primo Gentium, quod et Naturale interdum dicitur, et quod poetae alibi aetate aurea, alibi Saturni aut Iustitiae regno depingunt, nihil proprium fuit; quod Cicero dixit: ‘Sunt autem privata nulla natura’. Et Horatius:[46a]
_Nam PROPRIAE telluris ERVM NATVRA neque illum Nec me nec quemquam statuit._
Neque enim potuit natura dominos distinguere. Hoc igitur significatu res omnes eo tempore communes fuisse dicimus, idem innuentes quod poetae cum primos homines in medium quaesivisse, et Iustitiam casto foedere res medias tenuisse* dicunt; quod ut clarius explicent, negant eo tempore campos limite partitos, aut commercia fuisse ulla.
* [in medium quaerebant, Vergil, Georgica I, 127; medias casto res more tenebas, Avienus, Aratus, 298 (W. P. Mustard)].
_promiscua rura per agros Praestiterant cunctis COMMVNIA cuncta VIDERI._[47a]
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or possession is held by several persons jointly according to a kind of partnership or mutual agreement from which all other persons are excluded. Poverty of language compels the use of the same words for things that are not the same. And so because of a certain similarity and likeness, our modern nomenclature is applied to that state of primitive law. Now, in ancient times, ‘common’ meant simply the opposite of ‘particular’; and ‘sovereignty’ or ‘ownership’, meant the privilege of lawfully using common property. This seemed to the Scholastics[45] to be a use in fact but not in law, because what now in law is called use, is a particular right, or if I may use their phraseology, is, in respect to other persons, a privative right.
In the primitive law of nations, which is sometimes called Natural Law, and which the poets sometimes portray as having existed in a Golden Age, and sometimes in the reign of Saturn or of Justice, there was no particular right. As Cicero says: ‘But nothing is by nature private property’. And Horace:[46] ‘For nature has decreed to be the master of private soil neither him, nor me, nor anyone else’. For nature knows no sovereigns. Therefore in this sense we say that in those ancient times all things were held in common, meaning what the poets do when they say that primitive men acquired everything in common, and that Justice maintained a community of goods by means of an inviolable compact. And to make this clearer, they say that in those primitive times the fields were not delimited by boundary lines, and that there was no commercial intercourse. [As Avienus says]:[47] ‘The promiscuity of the fields had made everything seem common to all’.
The word ‘seemed’ is rightly added, owing to the changed meaning of the words, as we have noted above.
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Recte additum est ‘videri’ propter translationem ut diximus vocabuli. Communio autem ista ad usum referebatur:[48a]
_pervium cunctis iter, COMMVNIS VSVS omnium rerum fuit._
Cuius ratione dominium quoddam erat, sed universale, et indefinitum; Deus enim res omnes non huic aut illi dederat, sed humano generi, atque eo modo plures in solidum eiusdem rei domini esse non prohibebantur; quod si hodierna significatione sumamus dominium, contra omnem est rationem. Hoc enim proprietatem includit, quae tunc erat penes neminem. Aptissime autem illud dictum est:[49a]
_omnia rerum Vsurpantis erant,_
Ad eam vero, quae nunc est, dominiorum distinctionem non impetu quodam, sed paulatim ventum videtur, initium eius monstrante natura. Cum enim res sint nonnullae, quarum usus in abusu consistit, aut quia conversae in substantiam utentis nullum postea usum admittunt, aut quia utendo fiunt ad usum deteriores, in rebus prioris generis, ut cibo et potu, proprietas statim quaedam ab usu non seiuncta emicuit.[50a] Hoc enim est proprium esse, ita esse cuiusquam ut et alterius esse non possit; quod deinde ad res posterioris, generis, vestes puta, et res mobiles alias aut se moventes ratione quadam productum est.
Quod cum esset, ne res quidem immobiles omnes, agri
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But that kind of common possession relates to use, as is seen from a quotation from Seneca:[48]
“_Every path was free, All things were used in common._”
According to his reasoning there was a kind of sovereignty, but it was universal and unlimited. For God had not given all things to this individual or to that, but to the entire human race, and thus a number of persons, as it were en masse, were not debarred from being substantially sovereigns or owners of the same thing, which is quite contradictory to our modern meaning of sovereignty. For it now implies particular or private ownership, a thing which no one then had. Avienus has said very pertinently:[49] ‘All things belonged to him who had possession of them’.
It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction of ownerships did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing out the way. For since there are some things, the use of which consists in their being used up, either because having become part of the very substance of the user they can never be used again, or because by use they become less fit for future use, it has become apparent, especially in dealing with the first category, such things as food and drink for example, that a certain kind of ownership is inseparable from use.[50] For ‘own’ implies that a thing belongs to some one person, in such a way that it cannot belong to any other person. By the process of reasoning this was next extended to things of the second category, such as clothes and movables and some living things.
When that had come about, not even immovables, such,
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puta, indivisae manere potuerunt; quamquam enim horum usus non simpliciter in abusu consistat, eorum tamen usus abusus cuiusdam causa comparatus est, ut arva et arbusta cibi causa, pascua etiam vestium; omnium autem usibus promiscue sufficere non possunt. Repertae proprietati lex posita est, quae naturam imitaretur. Sicut enim initio per applicationem corporalem usus ille habebatur, unde proprietatem primum ortam diximus, ita simili applicatione res proprias cuiusque fieri placuit. Haec est quae dicitur occupatio, voce accommodatissima ad eas res quae ante in medio positae fuerant; quo Seneca Tragicus alludit:[51a]
_IN MEDIO est scelus POSITVM OCCVPANTI._
Et Philosophus:[52a] ‘Equestria OMNIVM equitum Romanorum sunt. In illis tamen locus meus fit PROPRIVS, quem OCCVPAVI’. Hinc Quintilianus dicit,[53a] quod omnibus nascitur, industriae esse praemium; et Tullius,[54a] factas esse veteri occupatione res eorum qui quondam in vacua venerant.
Occupatio autem haec in his rebus quae possessioni renituntur, ut sunt ferae bestiae, perpetua esse debet, in aliis sufficit, corpore coeptam possessionem animo retineri. Occupatio in mobilibus est apprehensio, in immobilibus
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for instance, as fields, could remain unapportioned. For although their use does not consist merely in consumption, nevertheless it is bound up with subsequent consumption, as fields and plants are used to get food, and pastures to get clothing. There is, however, not enough fixed property to satisfy the use of everybody indiscriminately.
When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was established to imitate nature. For as that use began in connection with bodily needs, from which as we have said property first arose, so by a similar connection it was decided that things were the property of individuals. This is called ‘occupation’, a word most appropriate to those things which in former times had been held in common. It is this to which Seneca alludes in his tragedy Thyestes,
“_Crime is between us to be seized by one._”[51]
And in one of his philosophical writings he also says:[52] ‘The equestrian rows of seats belong to all the equites; nevertheless, the seat of which I have taken possession is my own private place’. Further, Quintilian remarks[53] that a thing which is created for all is the reward of industry, and Cicero says[54] that things which have been occupied for a long time become the property of those who originally found them unoccupied.
This occupation or possession, however, in the case of things which resist seizure, like wild animals for example, must be uninterrupted or perpetually maintained, but in the case of other things it is sufficient if after physical possession is once taken the intention to possess is maintained. Possession of movables implies seizure, and possession of
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instructio aut limitatio; unde Hermogenianus cum dominia distincta dicit, addit, agris terminos positos, aedificia collocata.[55a] Hic rerum status a poetis indicatur:
_Tum laqueis captare feras, et fallere visco Inventum._
_Tum primum subiere domos._[56a]
_COMMVNEMQVE PRIVS, ceu lumina solis et auras Cautus humum longo signavit LIMITE mensor._[57a]
Celebratur post haec, ut Hermogenianus indicat, commercium cuius gratia
_Fluctibus ignotis insultavere carinae._[58a]
Eodem autem tempore et respublicae institui coeperunt. Atque ita earum quae a prima communione divulsa erant duo facta sunt genera. Alia enim sunt publica, hoc est, populi propria (quae est genuina istius vocis significatio) alia mere privata, hoc est, singulorum. Occupatio autem publica eodem modo fit, quo privata. Seneca:[59a] ‘Fines Atheniensium, aut Campanorum vocamus, quos deinde inter se vicini privata terminatione distinguunt’. Gens enim unaquaeque
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immovables either the erection of buildings or some determination of boundaries, such as fencing in. Hence Hermogenianus, in speaking of separate ownerships, adds the boundaries set to the fields and the buildings thereon constructed.[55] This state of things is described thus by the poets Vergil and Ovid:
“_Then toils for beasts, and lime for birds, were found_,”[56]
_Then first men made homes._
“_Then landmarks limited to each his right, For all before was common as the light._”[57]
In still another place, as Hermogenianus points out, Ovid praises commerce, for the sake of which:[58]
‘_Ships in triumph sail the unknown seas_’.
At the same time, however, states began to be established, and so two categories were made of the things which had been wrested away from early ownership in common. For some things were public, that is, were the property of the people (which is the real meaning of that expression), while other things were private, that is, were the property of individuals. Ownership, however, both public and private, arises in the same way. On this point Seneca says:[59] ‘We speak in general of the land of the Athenians or the Campanians. It is the same land which again by means of private boundaries is divided among individual owners’.
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_PARTITA FINES regna constituit, novas Extruxit VRBES._[60a]
Hoc modo dicit Cicero agrum Arpinatem Arpinatium dici, Tusculanum Tusculanorum: ‘similisque est’, inquit, ‘privatarum possessionum discriptio. Ex quo quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant COMMVNIA, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat’.[61a] Contra autem Thucydides[62a] eam terram quae in divisione populo nulli obvenit, ἀόριστον hoe est, indefinitam, et limitibus nullis circumscriptam vocat.[63a]
Ex his quae hactenus dicta sunt duo intelligi possunt. Prius est, eas res quae occupari non possunt, aut occupatae numquam sunt, nullius proprias esse posse; quia omnis proprietas ab occupatione coeperit. Alterum vero, eas res omnes, quae ita a natura comparatae sunt, ut aliquo utente nihilominus aliis quibusvis ad usum promiscue sufficiant, eius hodieque condicionis esse, et perpetuo esse debere cuius fuerant cum primum a natura proditae sunt. Hoc Cicero voluit:[64a] ‘Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas’. Sunt autem omnes res huius generis, in quibus sine detrimento alterius alteri commodari potest. Hinc illud esse dicit Cicero:[65a] ‘Non prohibere aqua profluente’. Nam aqua profluens qua talis non qua flumen
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‘For each nation’, Seneca says in another place, ‘made its territories into separate kingdoms and built new cities’.[60]
Thus Cicero says: “On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot.”[61] On the other hand Thucydides[62] calls the land which in the division falls to no nation, ἀόριστος, that is, undefined, and undetermined by boundaries.[63]
Two conclusions may be drawn from what has thus far been said. The first is, that that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied, cannot be the property of any one, because all property has arisen from occupation. The second is, that all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature. This is what Cicero meant when he wrote: “This then is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained.”[64] All things which can be used without loss to any one else come under this category. Hence, says Cicero, comes the well known prohibition:[65] ‘Deny no one the water that flows by’. For running water considered as such and not as a
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est, inter communia omnium a Iurisconsultis refertur: et a Poeta:[66a]
_Quid prohibetis AQVAS? VSVS COMMVNIS aquarum est. Nec solem PROPRIVM NATVRA nec AERA fecit. Nec tenues VNDAS: in PVBLICA munera veni._
Dicit haec non esse natura propria, sicut Vlpianus[67a] natura omnibus patere, tum quia primum a natura prodita sunt, et in nullius adhuc dominium pervenerunt (ut loquitur Neratius[68a]); tum quia ut Cicero dicit, a natura ad usum communem genita videntur. Publica autem vocat tralatitia significatione, non quae ad populum aliquem, sed quae ad societatem humanam pertinent, quae publica Iuris gentium in Legibus vocantur, hoc est, communia omnium, propria nullius.
Huius generis est Aër, duplici ratione, tum quia occupari non potest, tum quia usum promiscuum hominibus debet. Et eisdem de causis commune est omnium Maris Elementum, infinitum scilicet ita, ut possideri non queat, et omnium usibus accommodatum: sive navigationem respicimus, sive etiam piscaturam. Cuius autem iuris est mare, eiusdem sunt si qua mare aliis usibus eripiendo sua fecit, ut arenae maris, quarum pars terris continua litus dicitur.[69a] Recte igitur Cicero:[70a] ‘quid tam COMMVNE quam Mare fluctuantibus,
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stream, is classed by the jurists among the things common to all mankind; as is done also by Ovid:[66] ‘Why do you deny me water? Its use is free to all. Nature has made neither sun nor air nor waves private property; they are public gifts’.
He says that these things are not by nature private possession, but that, as Ulpian claims,[67] they are by nature things open to the use of all, both because in the first place they were produced by nature, and have never yet come under the sovereignty of any one, as Neratius says;[68] and in the second place because, as Cicero says, they seem to have been created by nature for common use. But the poet uses ‘public’, in its usual meaning, not of those things which belong to any one people, but to human society as a whole; that is to say, things which are called ‘public’ are, according to the Laws of the law of nations, the common property of all, and the private property of none.
The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is not susceptible of occupation; and second, its common use is destined for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries. Now, the same right which applies to the sea applies also to the things which the sea has carried away from other uses and made its own, such for example as the sands of the sea, of which the portion adjoining the land is called the coast or shore.[69] Cicero therefore argues correctly:[70] ‘What is so common as
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LITVS eiectis’? Etiam Vergilius auram, undam, litus cunctis patere dicit.
Haec igitur sunt illa quae Romani vocant communia omnium iure naturali[71a] aut quod idem esse diximus, publica iurisgentium, sicut et usum eorum modo communem, modo publicum vocant. Quamquam vero etiam ea nullius esse, quod ad proprietatem attinet, recte dicantur, multum tamen differunt ab his quae nullius sunt, et communi usui attributa non sunt, ut ferae, pisces, aves; nam ista si quis occupet, in ius proprium transire possunt, illa vero totius humanitatis consensu proprietati in perpetuum excepta sunt propter usum, qui cum sit omnium, non magis omnibus ab uno eripi potest, quam a te mihi quod meum est. Hoc est quod Cicero dicit inter prima esse Iustitiae munera, rebus communibus pro communibus uti. Scholastici dicerent esse communia alia affirmative, alia privative. Distinctio haec non modo Iurisprudentibus usitata est, sed vulgi etiam confessionem exprimit; unde apud Athenaeum convivator mare commune esse dicit, at pisces capientium fieri. Et in Plautina Rudente servo dicenti,[72a] ‘Mare quidem commune certost omnibus’, assentit piscator, addenti autem, ‘In mari inventust communi’ recte occurrit:
_Meum quod rete atque hami nancti sunt, meum potissimumst._
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the sea for those who are being tossed upon it, the shore for those who have been cast thereon’. Vergil also says that the air, the sea, and the shore are open to all men.
These things therefore are what the Romans call ‘common’ to all men by natural law,[71] or as we have said, ‘public’ according to the law of nations; and indeed they call their use sometimes common, sometimes public. Nevertheless, although those things are with reason said to be _res nullius_, so far as private ownership is concerned, still they differ very much from those things which, though also _res nullius_, have not been marked out for common use, such for example as wild animals, fish, and birds. For if any one seizes those things and assumes possession of them, they can become objects of private ownership, but the things in the former category by the consensus of opinion of all mankind are forever exempt from such private ownership on account of their susceptibility to universal use; and as they belong to all they cannot be taken away from all by any one person any more than what is mine can be taken away from me by you. And Cicero says that one of the first gifts of Justice is the use of common property for common benefit. The Scholastics would define one of these categories as common in an affirmative, the other in a privative sense. This distinction is not only familiar to jurists, but it also expresses the popular belief. In Athenaeus for instance the host is made to say that the sea is the common property of all, but that fish are the private property of him who catches them. And in Plautus’ Rudens when the slave says:[72] ‘The sea is certainly common to all persons’, the fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds: ‘Then what is found in the common sea is common property’, he rightly objects, saying: ‘But what my net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own’.
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Mare igitur proprium omnino alicuius fieri non potest, quia natura commune hoc esse non permittit, sed iubet, immo ne litus quidem;[73a] nisi quod haec addenda est interpretatio; ut si quid earum rerum per naturam occupari possit, id eatenus occupantis fiat, quatenus ea occupatione usus ille promiscuus non laeditur. Quod merito receptum est; nam cum ita se habet, cessat utraque exceptio per quam evenisse diximus, ne omnia in eius proprium transcriberentur.
Quoniam igitur inaedificatio species est occupationis, in litore licet aedificare, si id fieri potest sine ceterorum incommodo,[74a] ut Pomponius loquitur, quod ex Scaevola explicabimus, nisi usus publicus, hoc est communis impediretur. Et qui aedificaverit, soli dominus fiet, quia id solum nec ullius proprium, nec ad usum communem necessarium fuit. Est igitur occupantis; sed non diutius quam durat occupatio, quia reluctari mare possessioni videtur, exemplo ferae, quae si in naturalem se libertatem receperit, non ultra captoris est, ita et litus postliminio mari cedit.
Quicquid autem privatum fieri occupando, idem et publicum, hoc est populi proprium posse ostendimus.[75a] Sic litus Imperi Romani finibus inclusum, populi Romani esse Celsus
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Therefore the sea can in no way become the private property of any one, because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use.[73] Neither can the shore become the private property of any one. The following qualification, however, must be made. If any part of these things is by nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the property of the one who occupies it only so far as such occupation does not affect its common use. This qualification is deservedly recognized. For in such a case both conditions vanish through which it might eventuate, as we have said, that all of it would pass into private ownership.
Since therefore, to cite Pomponius, building is one kind of occupation, it is permissible to build upon the shore, if this can be done without inconvenience to other people;[74] that is to say (I here follow Scaevola) if such building can be done without hindrance to public or common use of the shore. And whoever shall have constructed a building under the aforesaid circumstances will become the owner of the ground upon which said building is; because this ground is neither the property of any one else, nor is it necessary to common use. It becomes therefore the property of the occupier, but his ownership lasts no longer than his occupation lasts, inasmuch as the sea seems by nature to resist ownership. For just as a wild animal, if it shall have escaped and thus recovered its natural liberty, is no longer the property of its captor, so also the sea may recover its possession of the shore.
We have now shown that whatever by occupation can become private property can also become public property, that is, the private property of a whole nation.[75] And so Celsus considered the shore included within the limits of the Roman Empire to be the property of the Roman people.
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existimat; quod si ita est, minime mirandum est, eundem Populum subditis suis occupandi litoris modum per Principem aut Praetorem potuisse concedere. Ceterum et haec occupatio non minus quam privata ita restringenda est, ne ulterius porrigatur, quam ut salvus sit usus Iurisgentium. Nemo igitur potest a Populo Romano[76a] ad litus maris accedere prohiberi, et retia siccare, et alia facere, quae semel omnes homines in perpetuum sibi licere voluerunt.
Maris autem natura hoc differt a litore, quod mare nisi exigua sui parte nec inaedificari facile, nec includi potest; et ut posset, hoc ipsum tamen vix contingeret, sine usus promiscui impedimento. Si quid tamen exiguum ita occupari potest, id occupanti conceditur. Hyperbole est igitur[77a]
_Contracta pisces aequora sentiunt Iactis in altum molibus._
Nam Celsus iactas in mare pilas eius esse dicit qui iecerit.[78a] Sed id non concedendum si deterior maris usus eo modo futurus sit. Et Vlpianus eum qui molem in mare iacit, ita tuendum dicit si nemo damnum sentiat. Nam si cui haec res nocitura sit, interdictum utique, ‘Ne quid in loco publico fiat’ competiturum. Vt et Labeo, si quid tale in mare struatur, interdictum vult competere, ‘Ne quid in mari, quo portus, statio, iterve navigiis deterius sit, fiat’.[79a]
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There is not therefore the least reason for surprise that the Roman people through their emperors or praetors were able to grant to its subjects the right of occupying the shore. This public occupation, however, no less than private occupation, was subject to the restriction that it should not infringe on international rights. Therefore the Roman people could not forbid any one from having access to the seashore,[76] and from spreading his fishing nets there to dry, and from doing other things which all men long ago decided were always permissible.
The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore, because the sea, except for a very restricted space, can neither easily be built upon, nor inclosed; if the contrary were true yet this could hardly happen without hindrance to the general use. Nevertheless, if any small portion of the sea can be thus occupied, the occupation is recognized. The famous hyperbole of Horace must be quoted here: “The fishes note the narrowing of the waters by piers of rock laid in their depths.”[77]
Now Celsus holds that piles driven into the sea belong to the man who drove them.[78] But such an act is not permissible if the use of the sea be thereby impaired. And Ulpian says that whoever builds a breakwater must be protected if it is not prejudicial to the interests of any one; for if this construction is likely to work an injury to any one, the injunction ‘Nothing may be built on public property’ would apply. Labeo, however, holds that in case any such construction should be made in the sea, the following injunction is to be enforced: ‘Nothing may be built in the sea whereby the harbor, the roadstead, or the channel be rendered less safe for navigation’.[79]
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Quae autem navigationis eadem piscatus habenda est ratio, ut communis maneat omnibus. Neque tamen peccabit si quis in maris diverticulo piscandi locum sibi palis circumsepiat, atque ita privatum faciat; sicut Lucullus exciso apud Neapolim monte ad villam suam maria admisit.[80a] Et huius generis, puto fuisse piscinas maritimas quarum Varro et Columella meminerunt. Nec Martialis alio spectavit, cum de Formiano Apollinaris loquitur:[81a]
_Si quando NEREVS sentit Aeoli regnum, Ridet procellas tuta de SVO mensa._
Et Ambrosius:[82a] ‘Inducis mare intra praedia tua ne desint belluae’. Hinc apparere potest quae mens Pauli fuerit, cum dicit,[83a] si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, _uti possidetis_ interdictum ei competere. Esse quidem hoc interdictum ad privatas causas comparatum, non autem ad publicas, (in quibus etiam ea comprehenduntur quae iure gentium communi facere possumus) sed hic iam agi de iure fruendo quod ex causa privata contingat, non publica, sive communi. Nam teste Marciano, quicquid occupatum est et occupari potuit,[84a] id iam non est iurisgentium, sicut est mare. Exempli causa, si quis Lucullum aut Apollinarem in privato suo, quatenus diverticulum maris incluserant, piscari prohibuisset, dandum illis interdictum
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Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to fishing, namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless there shall be no prejudice if any one shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea make a fish pond for himself, and so establish a private preserve. Thus Lucullus once brought the water of the sea to his villa by cutting a tunnel through a mountain near Naples.[80] I suspect too that the seawater reservoirs for fish mentioned by Varro and Columella were of this sort. And Martial had the same thing in mind when he says of the Formian villa of Apollinaris:[81] ‘Whenever Nereus feels the power of Aeolus, the table safe in its own resources laughs at the gale’. Ambrose also has something to say on the same subject:[82] ‘You bring the very sea into your estates that you may not lack for fish’. In the light of all this the meaning of Paulus is clear when he says[83] that if any one has a private right over the sea, the rule _uti possidetis_ applies. This rule however is applicable only to private suits, and not to public ones, among which are also to be included those suits which can be brought under the common law of nations. But here the question is one which concerns the right of use arising in a private suit, but not in a public or common one. For according to the authority of Marcianus whatever has been occupied and can be occupied[84] is no longer subject to the law of nations as the sea is. Let us take an example. If any one had prevented Lucullus or Apollinaris from fishing in the private fish ponds which they had made by inclosing a small portion of the sea, according to the opinion of Paulus they would have the right of bringing
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Paulus putavit non solum iniuriarum actionem, ob causam scilicet privatae possessionis.[85a]
Immo in diverticulo maris, sicut in diverticulo fluminis, si locum talem occuparim, ibique piscatus sim, maxime si animum privatim possidendi plurium annorum continuatione testatus fuerim, alterum eodem iure uti prohibebo; ut ex Marciano colligimus, non aliter quam in lacu qui mei domini est. Quod verum quam diu durat occupatio, quemadmodum in litore antea diximus. Extra diverticulum idem non erit, ne scilicet communis usus impediatur.[86a]
Ante aedes igitur meas aut praetorium ut piscari aliquem prohibeant usurpatum quidem est, sed nullo iure, adeo quidem ut Vlpianus contempta ea usurpatione si quis prohibeatur iniuriarum dicat agi posse[87a] Hoc Imperator Leo (cuius Legibus non utimur) contra iuris rationem mutavit, voluitque πρόθυρα, hoc est, vestibula maritima eorum esse propria, qui oram habitarent, ibique eos ius piscandi habere;[88a] quod tamen ita procedere voluit, ut septis quibusdam remoratoriis quas ἐποχάς Graeci vocant, locus ille occuparetur; existimans nimirum non fore ut quis exiguam maris portionem alteri invideret qui ipse toto mari ad piscandum admitteretur. Certe ut quis magnam maris partem, etiam si possit, publicis utilitatibus eripiat, non tolerandae est improbitatis, in quam merito Vir Sanctus invehitur:[89a]
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an injunction, not merely an action for damages based on private ownership.[85]
Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an inclosure in an inlet of the sea, just as in a branch of a river, and have fished there, especially if by doing so continuously for many years I shall have given proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall certainly prevent any one else from enjoying the same rights. I gather from Marcianus that this case is identical with that of the ownership of a lake, and it is true however long occupation lasts, as we have said above about the shore. But outside of an inlet this will not hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered.[86]
Therefore if any one is prevented from fishing in front of my town house or country seat, it is a usurpation, but an illegal one, although Ulpian, who rather makes light of this usurpation, does say that if any one is so prevented he can bring an action for damages.[87] The Emperor Leo, whose laws we do not use, contrary to the intent of the law, changed this, and declared that the entrances, or vestibules as it were, to the sea, were the private property of those who inhabited the shore, and that they had the right of fishing there.[88] However he attached this condition, that the place should be occupied by certain jetty or pile constructions, such as the Greeks call ἐποχαἰ, thinking doubtless that no one who was himself allowed to fish anywhere in the sea would grudge any one else a small portion of it. To be sure it would be an intolerable outrage for any one to snatch away, even if he could do so, from public use a large area of the sea; an act which is justly reprehended by the Holy Man,[89] who says: ‘The lords of the earth claim for
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‘SPATIA MARIS sibi vindicant IVRE MANCIPII, pisciumque iura sicut vernaculorum conditione sibi servitii subiecta commemorant. Iste, inquit, SINVS maris meus est; ille alterius. Dividunt elementa sibi potentes’.
Est igitur Mare in numero earum rerum quae in commercio non sunt,[90a] hoc est, quae proprii iuris fieri non possunt. Vnde sequitur si proprie loquamur, nullam Maris partem in territorio populi alicuius posse censeri. Quod ipsum Placentinus sensisse videtur, cum dixit: Mare ita esse commune, ut in nullius dominio sit nisi solius Dei; et Ioannes Faber, cum mare asserit relictum in suo iure, et esse primaevo, quo omnia erant communia.[91a] Alioquin nihil differrent quae sunt omnium communia ab his quae publica proprie dicuntur, ut mare a flumine. Flumen populus occupare potuit, ut inclusum finibus suis, mare non potuit.
Territoria autem sunt ex occupationibus populorum, ut privata dominia ex occupationibus singulorum. Vidit hoc Celsus, qui clare satis distinguit inter litora,[92a] quae Populus Romanus occupare potuit, ita tamen ut usui communi non noceretur, et mare quod pristinam naturam retinuit. Nec ulla lex diversum indicat.[93a] Quae vero leges a contrariae
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themselves a wide expanse of sea by _jus mancipii_, and they regard the right of fishing as a servitude over which their right is the same as that over their slaves. That gulf, says one, belongs to me, and that gulf to some one else. They divide the very elements among themselves, these great men’!
Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an article of merchandise,[90] and which cannot become private property. Hence it follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be considered as the territory of any people whatsoever. Placentinus seems to have recognized this when he said: ‘The sea is a thing so clearly common to all, that it cannot be the property of any one save God alone’. Johannes Faber[91] also asserts that the sea has been left _sui juris_, and remains in the primitive condition where all things were common. If it were otherwise there would be no difference between the things which are ‘common to all’, and those which are strictly termed ‘public’; no difference, that is, between the sea and a river. A nation can take possession of a river, as it is inclosed within their boundaries, with the sea, they cannot do so.
Now, public territory arises out of the occupation of nations, just as private property arises out of the occupation of individuals. This is recognized by Celsus, who has drawn a sharp distinction between the shores of the sea,[92] which the Roman people could occupy in such a way that its common use was not harmed, and the sea itself, which retained its primitive nature. In fact no law intimates a contrary view.[93] Such laws as are cited by writers who are of
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sententiae auctoribus citantur, aut de insulis loquuntur, quas clarum est occupari potuisse, aut de portu qui non communis est, sed proprie publicus.
Qui vero dicunt mare aliquod esse Imperi Romani, dictum suum ita interpretantur, ut dicant ius illud in mare ultra protectionem et iurisdictionem non procedere; quod illi ius a proprietate distinguunt; nec forte satis animadvertunt idipsum quod Populus Romanus classes praesidio navigantium disponere potuit, et deprehensos in mari piratas punire, non ex proprio, sed ex communi iure accidisse, quod et aliae liberae gentes in mari habent. Illud interim fatemur, potuisse inter gentes aliquas convenire, ut capti in maris hac vel illa parte, huius aut illius reipublicae iudicium subirent, atque ita ad commoditatem distinguendae iurisdictionis in mari fines describi, quod ipsos quidem eam sibi legem ferentes obligat,[94a] at alios populos non item; neque locum alicuius proprium facit, sed in personas contrahentium ius constituit.
Quae distinctio ut naturali rationi consentanea est, ita Vlpiani responso quodam comprobatur, qui rogatus an duorum praediorum maritimorum dominus, alteri eorum quod venderet servitutem potuisset imponere, ne inde in certo maris loco piscari liceret, respondet: rem quidem ipsam, mare scilicet, servitute nulla affici potuisse, quia per naturam hoc omnibus pateret, sed cum bona fides contractus legem venditionis servari exposceret, personas possidentium et in ius eorum succedentium per istam legem obligari.
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the contrary opinion apply either to islands, which evidently could be occupied, or to harbors, which are not ‘common’, but ‘public’, that is, ‘national’.
Now those who say that a certain sea belonged to the Roman people explain their statement to mean that the right of the Romans did not extend beyond protection and jurisdiction; this right they distinguish from ownership. Perchance they do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that although the Roman People were able to maintain fleets for the protection of navigation and to punish pirates captured on the sea, it was not done by private right, but by the common right which other free peoples also enjoy on the sea. We recognize, however, that certain peoples have agreed that pirates captured in this or in that part of the sea should come under the jurisdiction of this state or of that, and further that certain convenient limits of distinct jurisdiction have been apportioned on the sea. Now, this agreement does bind those who are parties to it,[94] but it has no binding force on other nations, nor does it make the delimited area of the sea the private property of any one. It merely constitutes a personal right between contracting parties.
This distinction so conformable to natural reason is also confirmed by a reply once made by Ulpian. Upon being asked whether the owner of two maritime estates could on selling either of them impose on it such a servitude as the prohibition of fishing in a particular part of the sea, he replied that the thing in question, evidently the sea, could not be subjected to a servitude, because it was by nature open to all persons; but that since a contract made in good faith demands that the condition of a sale be respected, the present possessors and those who succeed to
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Verum est loqui Iurisconsultum de praediis privatis, et lege privata, sed in territorio et lege populorum eadem hic est ratio, quia populi respectu totius generis humani privatorum locum obtinent.
Similiter reditus qui in piscationes maritimas constituti Regalium numero censentur, non rem, hoc est mare, aut piscationem, sed personas obligant.[95a] Quare subditi, in quos legem ferendi potestas Reipublicae aut Principi ex consensu competit, ad onera ista compelli forte poterunt; sed exteris ius piscandi ubique immune esse debet, ne servitus imponatur mari quod servire non potest.
Non enim maris eadem quae fluminis ratio est:[96a] quod cum sit publicum, id est populi, ius etiam in eo piscandi a populo aut principe concedi aut locari potest, ita ut ei qui conduxit, etiam interdictum Veteres dederint, de loco publico fruendo, addita condicione si is cui locandi ius fuerit, fruendum alicui locaverit;[97a] quae condicio in mari evenire non potest. Ceterum qui ipsam piscationem numerant inter Regalia, ne quidem illum locum quem interpretabantur satis inspexerunt, quod Iserniam et Alvotum non latuit.
Demonstratum est[98a] nec populo nec privato cuipiam ius
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their rights were bound to observe that condition. It is true that the jurist is speaking of private estates and of private law, but in speaking here of the territory of peoples and of public law the same reasoning applies, because from the point of view of the whole human race peoples are treated as individuals.
Similarly, revenues levied on maritime fisheries are held to belong to the Crown, but they do not bind the sea itself or the fisheries, but only the persons engaged in fishing.[95] Wherefore subjects, for whom a state or a ruler is by common consent competent to make laws, will perhaps be compelled to bear such charges, but so far as other persons are concerned the right of fishing ought everywhere to be exempt from tolls, lest a servitude be imposed upon the sea, which is not susceptible to a servitude.
The case of the sea is not the same as that of a river,[96] for as a river is the property of a nation, the right to fish in it can be passed or leased by the nation or by the ruler, in such a way (and the like is true with the ancients) that the lessee enjoys the operation of the injunction _de loco publico fruendo_ by virtue of the clause ‘He who has the right to lease has leased the exclusive right of enjoyment’.[97] Such a condition cannot arise in respect to the sea. Finally those who count fishing among the properties of the Crown have not examined carefully enough the very passage which they cite to prove their contention, as Isernia* and Alvotus† have noticed.
* [Andrea d’Isernia (c. 1480-1553), an Italian commentator, called often Feudistarum Patriarcha.]
† [Probably a misprint for Alvarus (Alvarez).]
It has therefore been demonstrated[98] that neither a nation nor an individual can establish any right of private ownership
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aliquod proprium in ipsum mare (nam diverticulum excipimus) competere posse, cum occupationem nec natura, nec usus publici ratio permittat. Huius autem rei causa instituta fuerat haec disputatio, ut appareret Lusitanos mare quo ad Indos navigatur sui iuris non fecisse. Nam utraque ratio quae proprietatem impedit, in hac causa est quam in ceteris omnibus infinito efficacior. Quod in alii difficile videtur, in hac omnino fieri non potest; quod in aliis iniquum iudicamus, in hac summe barbarum est, atque inhumanum.
Non de mari interiore hic agimus, quod terris undique infusum alicubi etiam fluminis latitudinem non excedit, de quo tamen satis constat locutos Romanos Iurisconsultos, cum nobiles illas adversus privatam avaritiam sententias ediderunt; de Oceano quaeritur, quem immensum, infinitum, rerum parentem, caelo conterminum antiquitas vocat, cuius perpetuo humore non fontes tantum et flumina et maria, sed nubes, sed ipsa quodammodo sidera pasci veteres crediderunt; qui denique per reciprocas aestuum vices terram hanc humani generis sedem ambiens, neque teneri neque includi potest, et possidet verius quam possidetur.
In hoc autem Oceano non de sinu aut freto, nec de omni quidem eo quod e litore conspici potest controversia est. Vindicant sibi Lusitani quicquid duos Orbes interiacet, tantis spatiis discretos, ut plurimis saeculis famam sui non potuerint transmittere. Quod si Castellanorum, qui in eadem sunt
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over the sea itself (I except inlets of the sea), inasmuch as its occupation is not permissible either by nature or on grounds of public utility. The discussion of this matter has been taken up for this reason, namely, that it may be seen that the Portuguese have not established private ownership over the sea by which people go to the East Indies. For the two reasons that stand in the way of ownership are in this case infinitely more powerful than in all others. That which in other cases seems difficult, is here absolutely impossible; and what in other cases we recognize as unjust is here most barbarous and inhuman.
The question at issue then is not one that concerns an INNER SEA, one which is surrounded on all sides by the land and at some places does not even exceed a river in breadth, although it is well known that the Roman jurists cited such an inner sea in their famous opinions condemning private avarice. No! the question at issue is the OUTER SEA, the OCEAN, that expanse of water which antiquity describes as the immense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens, parent of all things; the ocean which the ancients believed was perpetually supplied with water not only by fountains, rivers, and seas, but by the clouds, and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the ocean which, although surrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the ebb and flow of its tides, can be neither seized nor inclosed; nay, which rather possesses the earth than is by it possessed.
Further, the question at issue does not concern a gulf or a strait in this ocean, nor even all the expanse of sea which is visible from the shore. [But consider this!!] The Portuguese claim as their own the whole expanse of the sea which separates two parts of the world so far distant the one from the other, that in all the preceding centuries neither one has so much as heard of the other. Indeed, if we take into account the share of the Spaniards, whose claim
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causa, portio accedat, parvo minus omnis Oceanus duobus populis mancipatus est, aliis tot gentibus ad Septentrionum redactis angustias; multumque decepta est Natura, quae cum elementum illud omnibus circumfudit, omnibus etiam suffecturum credidit. In tanto mari si quis usu promiscuo solum sibi imperium et dicionem exciperet, tamen immodicae dominationis affectator haberetur; si quis piscatu arceret alios, insanae cupiditatis notam non effugeret. At qui etiam navigatum impedit, quo nihil ipsi perit, de eo quid statuemus?
Si quis ab igni qui totus suus est, ignem capere, lumen suo de lumine, alterum prohiberet, lege hunc humanae societatis reum peragerem: quia vis ea est istius naturae:
_Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat, cum illi accenderit._[99a]
Quid ni enim quando sine detrimento suo potest, alteri communicet, in iis quae sunt accipienti utilia, danti non molesta.[100a]
Haec sunt quae Philosophi[101a] non alienis tantum, sed et ingratis praestari volunt. Quae vero in rebus privatis invidia est, eadem in re communi non potest non esse immanitas, improbissimum enim hoc est, quod naturae instituto, consensu gentium, meum non minus quam tuum est, id te ita intercipere, ut ne usum quidem mihi concedas, quo concesso nihilominus id tuum sit, quam antea fuit.
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is the same as that of the Portuguese, only a little less than the whole ocean is found to be subject to two nations, while all the rest of the peoples in the world are restricted to the narrow bounds of the northern seas. Nature was greatly deceived if when she spread the sea around all peoples she believed that it would also be adequate for the use of them all. If in a thing so vast as the sea a man were to reserve to himself from general use nothing more than mere sovereignty, still he would be considered a seeker after unreasonable power. If a man were to enjoin other people from fishing, he would not escape the reproach of monstrous greed. But the man who even prevents navigation, a thing which means no loss to himself, what are we to say of him?
If any person should prevent any other person from taking fire from his fire or a light from his torch, I should accuse him of violating the law of human society, because that is the essence of its very nature, as Ennius has said:
“_No less shines his, when he his friend’s hath lit._”[99]
Why then, when it can be done without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one person share with another things which are useful to the recipient, and no loss to the giver?[100] These are services which the ancient philosophers[101] thought ought to be rendered not only to foreigners but even to the ungrateful. But the same act which when private possessions are in question is jealousy can be nothing but cruelty when a common possession is in question. For it is most outrageous for you to appropriate a thing, which both by ordinance of nature and by common consent is as much mine as yours, so exclusively that you will not grant me a right of use in it which leaves it no less yours than it was before.
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Tum vero etiam qui alienis incumbunt, aut communia intercipiunt, certa quadam possessione se tuentur. Quia enim prima, ut diximus, occupatio res proprias fecit, idcirco imaginem quandam dominii praefert quamvis iniusta detentio. At Lusitani num sicuti terras solemus, sic mare illud impositis praediis ita undique cinxerunt, ut in ipsorum manu esset quos vellent excludere? An vero tantum hoc abest, ut ipsi etiam, cum adversus alios populos mundum dividunt, non ullis limitibus aut natura, aut manu positis, sed imaginaria quadam linea se tueantur? quod si recipitur et dimensio talis ad possidendum valet, iamdudum nobis Geometrae terras, Astronomi etiam caelum eriperent.
Vbi hic igitur est ista, sine qua nulla dominia coeperunt, corporis ad corpus adiunctio? Nimirum apparet in nulla re verius dici posse, quod Doctores nostri prodiderunt,[102a] Mare cum sit incomprehensibile, non minus quam aër, nullius populi bonis potuisse applicari.
Si vero ante alios navigasse, et viam quodammodo aperuisse, hoc vocant occupare, quid esse potest magis ridiculum? Nam cum nulla pars sit maris, in quam non aliquis primus ingressus sit, sequetur omnem navigationem ab aliquo esse occupatam. Ita undique excludimur. Quin et illi qui terrarum orbem circumvecti sunt, totum sibi Oceanum acquisivisse dicendi erunt. Sed nemo nescit
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Nevertheless, even those who lay burdens upon foreigners, or appropriate things common to all, rely upon a possession which is to some extent real. For since original occupation created private property, therefore detention of a thing, though unjust, gives an appearance of ownership. But have the Portuguese completely covered the ocean, as we are wont to do on land, by laying out estates on it in such a way that they have the right to exclude from that ocean whom they will? Not at all! On the contrary, they are so far from having done so, that when they divide up the world to the disadvantage of other nations, they cannot even defend their action by showing any boundaries either natural or artificial, but are compelled to fall back upon some imaginary line. Indeed, if that were a recognized method, and such a delimitation of boundaries were sufficient to make possession valid, our geometers long since would have got possession of the face of the earth, our astronomers of the very skies.
But where in this case is that corporal possession or physical appropriation, without which no ownerships arise? There appears to be nothing truer than what our learned jurists have enunciated, namely,[102] that since the sea is just as insusceptible of physical appropriation as the air, it cannot be attached to the possessions of any nation.
But if the Portuguese call _occupying_ the sea merely to have sailed over it before other people, and to have, as it were, opened the way, could anything in the world be more ridiculous? For, as there is no part of the sea on which some person has not already sailed, it will necessarily follow that every route of navigation is occupied by some one. Therefore we peoples of today are all absolutely excluded. Why will not those men who have circumnavigated the globe be justified in saying that they have acquired for themselves the possession of the whole ocean! But there
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navem per mare transeuntem non plus iuris, quam vestigii relinquere. Verum etiam quod sibi sumunt neminem ante ipsos eum Oceanum navigasse, id minime verum est. Magna enim pars eius de quo agitur maris, ambitu Mauritaniae, iam olim navigata est; ulterior et in orientem vergens victoriis Magni Alexandri lustrata est, usque in Arabicum sinum.[103a]
Olim autem hanc navigationem Gaditanis percognitam fuisse, multa argumento sunt. Caio Caesare Augusti filio in Arabico sinu res gerente signa navium ex Hispaniensibus naufragiis agnita. Et quod Caelius Antipater tradidit, vidisse se qui ex Hispania in Aethiopiam commercii gratia navigasset. Etiam Arabibus, si verum est, quod Cornelius Nepos testatus est, Eudoxum quendam sua aetate cum Lathyrum Regem Alexandriae fugeret, Arabico sinu egressum Gades usque pervectum. Poenos autem, qui re maritima plurimum valuerunt, eum Oceanum non ignorasse longe clarissimum est, cum Hanno Carthaginis potentia florente circumvectus a Gadibus ad finem Arabiae, praeternavigato scilicet promontorio quod nunc Bonae Spei dicitur, (vetus videtur nomen Hesperion ceras fuisse) omne id iter, situmque litoris et insularum scripto complexus sit, testatusque ad ultimum non mare sibi, sed commeatum defuisse.
Ab Arabico autem sinu ad Indiam, Indicique Oceani insulas, et auream usque Chersonesum, quam esse Iapanem credunt plerique, etiam re Romana florente navigari solitum, iter a Plinio descriptum,[104a] legationes ab Indis ad
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is not a single person in the world who does not know that a ship sailing through the sea leaves behind it no more legal right than it does a track. And as for the assumption of the Portuguese that no one has sailed that ocean before themselves, that is anything but true. For a great part of that sea near Morocco, which is in dispute, had already been navigated long before, and the sea as far east as the Arabian gulf has been made famous by the victories of Alexander the Great, as both Pliny and Mela tell us.[103]
There is also much to substantiate the belief that the inhabitants of Cadiz were well acquainted long ago with this route, because when Gaius Caesar,* the son of Augustus, held command in the Arabian gulf, pieces were found of shipwrecks recognized as Spanish. Caelius Antipater also has told us in his writings that he himself saw a Spaniard who had sailed from Spain to Ethiopia on a commercial voyage. Also the Arabians knew those seas, if the testimony of Cornelius Nepos is to be believed, because he says that in his own day a certain Eudoxus, fleeing from Lathyrus, king of Alexandria, sailed from the Arabian gulf and finally reached Cadiz. However, by far the most famous example is that of the Carthaginians. Those most famous mariners were well acquainted with that sea, because Hanno, when Carthage was at the height of her power, sailing from Cadiz to the farthest confines of Arabia, and doubling the promontory now known as the Cape of Good Hope (the ancient name seems to have been Hesperion Ceras), described in a book the entire route he had taken, the appearance of the coasts, and the location of the islands, declaring that at the farthest point he reached the sea had not yet given out but his provisions had.
* [Strictly speaking, Gaius was the grandson of Augustus, but was adopted as his son.]
Pliny’s description of the route to the East,[104] the embassies
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Augustum, ad Claudium etiam ex Taprobane insula, deinde gesta Traiani et tabulae Ptolemaei satis ostendunt. Iam suo tempore Strabo[105a] Alexandrinorum mercatorum classem ex Arabico sinu, ut Aethiopiae ultima, ita et Indiae, petiisse testatur, cum olim paucis navibus id auderetur. Inde magna populo Romano vectigalia; addit Plinius[106a] impositis sagittariorum cohortibus piratarum metu navigatum; solamque Indiam quingenties sestertium, si Arabiam addas et Seres, millies annis omnibus Romano Imperio ademisse; et merces centuplicato venditas.
Et haec quidem vetera satis arguunt primos non fuisse Lusitanos. In singulis autem sui partibus Oceanus ille et tunc cum eum Lusitani ingressi sunt, et numquam non cognitus fuit. Mauri enim, Aethiopes, Arabes, Persae, Indi, eam maris partem cuius ipsi accolae sunt, nescire neutiquam potuerunt.
Mentiuntur ergo qui se mare illud invenisse iactant.
Quid igitur, dicet aliquis, parumne videtur, quod Lusitani intermissam multis forte saeculis navigationem primi repararunt, et, quod negari non potest, Europaeis gentibus ignotam ostenderunt, magno suo labore, sumptu, periculo?
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from the Indies to Augustus, and those from Ceylon to the emperor Claudius, and finally the accounts of the deeds of Trajan, and the writings of Ptolemaeus, all make it quite clear that in the days of Rome’s greatest splendor voyages were made regularly from the Arabian gulf to India, to the islands of the Indian ocean, and even so far as to the golden Chersonesus, which many people think was Japan. Strabo says[105] that in his own time a fleet of Alexandrian merchantmen set sail from the Arabian gulf for the distant lands of Ethiopia and India, although few ships had ever before attempted that voyage. The Roman people had a large revenue from the East. Pliny says[106] that cohorts of archers were carried on the boats engaged in trade as protection against pirates; he states also that every year 500,000 sesterces* were taken out of the Roman empire by India alone, or 1,000,000 sesterces if you add Arabia and China; further, that merchandise brought from the East sold for one hundred times its original cost.
* [A Roman sestertius was about four cents.]
These examples cited from ancient times are sufficient proof that the Portuguese were not the first in that part of the world. Long before they ever came, every single part of that ocean had been long since explored. For how possibly could the Moors, the Ethiopians, the Arabians, the Persians, the peoples of India, have remained in ignorance of that part of the sea adjacent to their coasts!
Therefore they lie, who today boast that they discovered that sea.
Well then, some one will say, does it seem to be a matter of little moment that the Portuguese were the first to restore a navigation interrupted perhaps for many centuries, and unknown--as cannot be denied--at least to the nations of Europe, at great labor and cost and danger to themselves?
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Immo vero si in hoc incubuerunt ut quod soli reperissent id omnibus monstrarent, quis adeo est amens, qui non plurimum se illis debere profiteatur? Eandem enim gratiam, laudemque et gloriam immortalem illi promeruerint, qua omnes contenti fuerunt rerum magnarum inventores, quotquot scilicet non sibi, sed humano generi prodesse studuerunt. Sin Lusitanis suus ante oculos quaestus fuit, lucrum quod semper maximum est in praevertendis negotiationibus, illis sufficere debuit. Et scimus itinera prima proventus interdum quater decuplos, aut etiam uberiores dedisse, quibus factum ut inops diu populus ad repentinas divitias subito prorumperet, tanto luxus apparatu, quantus vix beatissimis gentibus in supremo progressae diu fortunae fastigio fuit.
Si vero eidem in hoc praeiverunt, ne quisquam sequeretur, gratiam non merentur, cum lucrum suum respexerint; lucrum autem suum dicere non possunt, cum eripiant alienum. Neque enim illud certum est nisi ivissent eo Lusitani, iturum fuisse neminem. Adventabant enim tempora, quibus ut artes paene omnes, ita et terrarum et marium situs clarius in dies noscebantur. Excitassent vetera, quae modo retulimus, exempla, et si non uno impetu omnia patuissent, at paulatim promota velis fuissent litora alio semper aliud monstrante. Factum denique fuisset,
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On the contrary, if they had laid weight upon the fact that they were pointing out to all what they alone had rediscovered, there is no one so lacking in sense that he would not acknowledge the greatest obligation to them. For the Portuguese will have earned the same thanks, praise, and immortal glory with which all discoverers of great things have been content, whenever they have striven to benefit not themselves but the whole human race. But if the Portuguese had before their eyes only their own financial gain, surely their profit, which is always the largest for those first in a new field of enterprise, ought to have satisfied them. For we know that their first voyages returned a profit sometimes of forty times the original investment, and sometimes even more. And by this overseas trade it has come about that a people, previously for a long time poor, have leaped suddenly into the possession of great riches, and have surrounded themselves with such outward signs of luxurious magnificence as scarcely the most prosperous nations have been able to display at the height of their fortunes.
But if these Portuguese have led the way in this matter in order that no one may follow them, then they do not deserve any thanks, inasmuch as they have considered only their own profit. Nor can they call it their profit, because they are taking the profit of some one else. For it is not at all demonstrable that, if the Portuguese had not gone to the East Indies, no one else would have gone. For the times were coming on apace in which along with other sciences the geographical locations of seas and lands were being better known every day. The reports of the expeditions of the ancients mentioned above had aroused people, and even if all foreign shores had not been laid open at a single stroke as it were, yet they would have been brought to light gradually by sailing voyages, each new discovery pointing the way to the next. And so there would finally
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quod fieri potuisse Lusitani docuerunt, cum multi essent populi non minus flagrantes mercaturae et rerum externarum studio. Venetis qui multa iam Indiae didicerant, cetera inquirere promptum fuit. Gallorum Brittonum indefessa sedulitas, Anglorum audacia coepto non defuisset. Ipsi Batavi multo magis desperata aggressi sunt.
Nulla igitur aequitatis ratio, ne probabilis quidem ulla sententia a Lusitanis stat. Omnes enim qui mare volunt imperio alicuius subici posse, id ei attribuunt qui proximos portus et circumiacentia litora in dicione habet.[107a] At Lusitani in illo immenso litorum tractu paucis exceptis praesidiis nihil habent quod suum possint dicere.
Deinde vero etiam qui Mari imperaret, nihil tamen posset ex usu communi deminuere, sicut Populus Romanus arcere neminem potuit, quo minus in litore imperi Romani cuncta faceret, quae iure gentium permittebantur.[108a] Et si quicquam eorum prohibere posset, puta piscaturam qua dici quodammodo potest pisces exhauriri, at navigationem non posset, per quam mari nihil perit.
Cui rei argumentum est longe certissimum, quod ex Doctorum sententia ante retulimus, etiam in terra, quae cum populis, tum hominibus singulis in proprietatem attributa est, iter tamen, certe inerme et innoxium, nullius gentis
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have been accomplished what the Portuguese showed could be done, because there were many nations with no less ardor than theirs to engage in commerce and to learn of foreign things. The Venetians, who already knew much about India, were ready to push their knowledge farther; the indefatigable zeal of the French of Brittany, and the boldness of the English would not have failed to make such an attempt; indeed the Dutch themselves have embarked upon much more desperate enterprises.
Therefore the Portuguese have neither just reason nor respectable authority to support their position, for all those persons who assume that the sea can be subjected to the sovereignty of any one assign it to him who holds in his power the nearest ports and the circumjacent shores.[107] But in all that great extent of coast line reaching to the East Indies the Portuguese have nothing which they can call their own except a few fortified posts.
And then even if a man were to have dominion over the sea, still he could not take away anything from its common use, just as the Roman people could not prevent any one from doing on the shores of their dominions all those things which were permitted by the law of nations.[108] And if it were possible to prohibit any of those things, say for example, fishing, for in a way it can be maintained that fish are exhaustible, still it would not be possible to prohibit navigation, for the sea is not exhausted by that use.
The most conclusive argument on this question by far however is the one that we have already brought forward based on the opinions of eminent jurists, namely, that even over land which had been converted into private property either by states or individuals, unarmed and innocent passage is not justly to be denied to persons of any country, exactly as the right to drink from a river is not to be
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hominibus iuste negari; sicut et potum ex flumine. Ratio apparet, quia cum unius rei naturaliter usus essent diversi, eum dumtaxat gentes divisisse inter se videntur, qui sine proprietate commode haberi non potest, contra autem eum recepisse, per quem domini condicio deterior non esset futura.
Omnes igitur vident eum qui alterum navigare prohibeat nullo iure defendi, cum eundem etiam iniuriarum teneri Vlpianus dixerit;[109a] alii autem etiam interdictum utile prohibito competere existimaverint.[110a]
Et sic Batavorum intentio communi iure nititur, cum fateantur omnes, permissum cuilibet in mari navigare etiam a nullo Principe impetrata licentia; quod Legibus Hispanicis diserte expressum est.[111a]
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denied. The reason is clear, because, inasmuch as one and the same thing is susceptible by nature to different uses, the nations seem on the one hand to have apportioned among themselves that use which cannot be maintained conveniently apart from private ownership; but on the other hand to have reserved that use through the exercise of which the condition of the owner would not be impaired.
It is clear therefore to every one that he who prevents another from navigating the sea has no support in law. Ulpian has said[109] that he was even bound to pay damages, and other jurists have thought that the injunction _utile prohibito_ could also be brought against him.[110]
Finally, the relief prayed for by the Dutch rests upon a common right, since it is universally admitted that navigation on the sea is open to any one, even if permission is not obtained from any ruler. And this is specifically expressed in the Spanish laws.[111]
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CAPVT VI
_Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esse Lusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae_
Donatio Pontificis Alexandri, quae a Lusitanis mare aut ius navigandi solis sibi vindicantibus, cum inventionis deficiat titulus, secundo loco adduci potest, satis ex iis quae ante dicta sunt vanitatis convincitur. Donatio enim nullum habet momentum in rebus extra commercium positis. Quare cum mare aut ius in eo navigandi proprium nulli hominum esse possit, sequitur neque dari a Pontifice neque a Lusitanis accipi potuisse. Praeterea cum supra relatum sit ex omnium sani iudicii hominum sententia Papam non esse dominum temporalem totius orbis, ne Maris quidem esse satis intelligitur; quamquam etsi id concederetur, tamen ius annexum Pontificatui in Regem aliquem aut populum pro parte nulla transferri debuisset. Sicut nec Imperator posset Imperi provincias in suos usus convertere, aut pro suo arbitrio alienare.[112a]
Illud saltem nemo negaturus est, cui aliquid sit frontis, cum ius disponendi in temporalibus Pontifici nemo concedat, nisi forte quantum eius rerum spiritualium necessitas requirit, ista autem de quibus nunc agimus, mare scilicet et ius navigandi, lucrum et quaestum merum, non pietatis negotium
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