CHAPTER X
.
Proceedings of the National Government.--Marshal Diebitsch continues in a state of inactivity.--Negotiations are opened by him.--His propositions are declined.--Position of the army on the 24th, and battle of Bialolenka.--Position on the 25th.--Great battle of Grochow.--Details.--State of the Russian army after its defeat.--Examination of the plan of the battle of Grochow.--Remarks upon the course adopted by prince Radzivil after that victory.--The Polish army crosses the Vistula to Warsaw.--Its reception by the national government and the citizens.--Resignation of prince Radzivil.
Whilst the army was thus gloriously fighting, the national government were laboring for the happiness of the people. Among other valuable institutions, it adopted a paternal guardianship over the defenders of the country by designating an allotment of lands for each soldier. Many of the most wealthy families contributed of their landed property for that object. Another act was to free the peasantry from the Corvee, by purchasing the rights of the landholders over them. Each peasant was made a proprietor, and for the landholders an arrangement of compensation in the form of annual instalments for a period of years, was made by the government. Other institutions for the public welfare, as the establishment of schools, &c, received also the attention of the government.
When, after so many battles, the Russian commander discontinued his attacks, it may be supposed that besides the repose which his army required, he had another object, viz. to wait the arrival of new corps, consisting of 20,000 men, and 36 pieces of cannon, under prince Sczachowski. He evidently wished to concentrate all his small detachments and all his reserves, in order to strike, with his whole force, a decisive blow; and the attempt was, in fact, soon made.
Our army, which in the ten preceding days had lost about six thousand men, was reinforced by three regiments armed with pitchforks, amounting to about the number we had lost. Our whole army, infantry and cavalry, may have amounted to 40,000 men, and, with the pieces taken from the enemy, 100 cannon.--The Russian army, with the new corps of Sczachowski, amounted to 188,000 men and 316 pieces of cannon, deducting the artillery which had been lost or dismounted.
Marshal Diebitsch, before commencing hostile operations, opened negotiations, and, for this purpose, sent a general of division, Witt, with a flag of truce to our head-quarters. This general was stopped at our advanced post, whither general Krukowiecki was sent by the commander in chief, with full powers, to meet him. General Witt commenced with expressions of the greatest sensibility, and enlarged much upon the friendship which ought to exist between the Poles and the Russians as brother nations. He then spoke in very flattering terms of the heroism of the Poles, lamenting that it was not displayed in a better cause. After much complimentary language, he insensibly passed to the ideas of duty and obedience to the monarch. General Krukowiecki, who understood perfectly well all these professions, which he knew to be insidious, answered nearly in the following laconic terms: 'General, after the sad circumstances which have taken place, after the bloody combats to which we have been forced by the tyranny of fifteen years, by the refusal of justice, and in fine by the violation of our frontier, and the laying waste of our territory,--upon this territory we can make no arrangements. You know well what are the frontiers of Poland. Upon the banks of the Dnieper, four hundred miles hence, we may enter into negotiations.'
Thus all was ready for the sanguinary battle of two days, which followed, and one memorable in the annals of war. It commenced by a combat on the 24th at Bialolenka, and ended on the 25th on the plain of Grochow.
POSITION ON THE 24th, AND BATTLE OF BIALOLENKA
The position of the two armies, on the 24th, was as follows. The Polish army occupied the same ground as when they ceased firing on the 20th; but the force was disposed in a different manner.--The right wing was reinforced by the division of general Szembek; and although Bialolenka, Kawenzyn, and Wavre composed the line of combat, there was this difference, that, while before, the centre was at Kawenzyn, and the left wing at Bialolenka, at present the left wing was at Kawenzyn; the forces which were at Bialolenka were posted as a detached corps, and the centre of the army was at the forest of elders. The right wing occupied the space between the great road and the marshes of the Vistula, called the marshes of Goclaw. This arrangement made our line more concentrated. The first division under Krukowiecki, which was at Bialolenka, with the division of cavalry under Uminski, was directed to observe the great road from Jablonna, and all the roads leading from Radzimin and Zombki to Warsaw. Between Kawenzyn and Bialolenka the debouchment of the enemy was prevented by extensive marshes.
The Russian army was upon the same points as on the 20th. Their greatest force was opposed to our right wing at Wavre.
On the afternoon of the 24th, the enemy attacked with impetuosity the first division at Bialolenka. The corps of the enemy which made this attack was that of the prince Sczachowski, which had recently joined the main army, and for which marshal Diebitsch was supposed to have waited. This corps, as was afterwards ascertained, had missed their road, and became unintentionally engaged with our forces on that day. The orders of that corps were to traverse the forests between Radzimin and Zombki, and to join the army without being observed by our forces. It was the false direction which they took that brought on the engagement at Bialolenka.
This battle consisted, like the former actions at this place, of an attempt by the enemy to force the passage of the dykes, which were defended on our side by about eight battalions, protected by some twenty pieces of cannon. This small force repulsed the enemy in three successive attacks upon the dykes. At about 5, P.M. another Russian corps, under general Pahlen, came to the succor of Sczachowski, and as the first corps attempted to pass the road leading from Radzimin, the latter attempted to force the passage of the two dykes leading from Zombki, and at both points under the cover of a terrible fire of artillery. If the reader will consider that our small force, consisting of only eight battalions and fifteen squadrons, stood their ground against two Russian corps of nearly 40,000 men and 60 pieces of cannon, the efforts which were made on that day may be appreciated. Our plan of action consisted chiefly in allowing a part of the enemy's forces to pass the dykes, and then falling upon and cutting them up by successive charges of cavalry and infantry, supported by an effective fire of artillery. By such efforts this handful of brave men repulsed the attacks of the enemy until night, when his attacks ceased. At the approach of night, general Krukowiecki sent small reconnoitering
## parties upon the roads from Radzimin and Zombki. These patrols, pushing
as far as, and even beyond Zombki, saw nothing of the enemy, and in fact learnt, to their astonishment, from the marauders whom they took, that the two Russian corps had quitted their position, and were on their march across the forest of Kawenzyn, to join the main army. This sudden withdrawal of the enemy's corps was an indication that they had received orders to join the grand army, and that a general attack was in contemplation for the next day. In expectation of this attack, a body of men was sent, during the night, to obstruct, by defences, the three roads leading from Radzimin and Zombki. Small detachments were left on those roads, and the forces which were at Bialolenka quitted their position, to reinforce the larger corps upon the plain of Wavre.
The following was the position of the two armies on the 25th, the day of the memorable battle of Grochow. [_See Plans_ XI _and_ XII]. The Russian army was distributed into eight divisions of combatants, and three divisions of reserves. Those eight divisions consisted of 126,000 infantry (_a_), 42,000 cavalry (_b_), and 280 pieces of cannon (_c_). The three divisions of reserve (E) were composed of 16,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 32 pieces of cannon. This enormous force, which occupied the space between Kawenzyn (A) and the marshes Goclaw (B), a distance of about three English miles, was arranged in two lines of combatants (C, D) and a third of reserve. Their position was as follows: Their left wing was between Wavre (_r_) and the above marshes of the Vistula, and was composed of four divisions of infantry, of 47,000 men, four divisions of cavalry, 15,700, and 120 pieces of cannon. The centre, opposite the forest of elders, consisted also of four divisions of infantry of 57,000 men, three of cavalry of 10,500 men, and 108 pieces of cannon. The right wing, opposite the village of Kawenzyn consisted of three and a half divisions of infantry of 31,000 men, four divisions of cavalry of 15,750 men, and 52 pieces of cannon. Upon the borders of the great forest opposite the forest of elders, was placed the reserve, commanded by the Grand Duke Constantine.
Against this force our inconsiderable army was posted in the following manner. The right wing (G), formed by the division of Szembek, consisting of about 7,000 infantry (_d_) and 24 pieces of cannon (_f_), occupied the space between the road and the marshes above mentioned. The centre (H) occupied the forest of elders, and touched upon the great road. It was composed of two divisions commanded by Skrzynecki and Zimirski, composed of about 15,000 infantry (_d_) and 60 pieces of cannon (_f_). The left wing (T) occupied Kawenzyn, consisting of the first division, commanded by Krakowiecki, composed of 6,500 men (_d_) and 12 pieces of cannon (_f_). Four divisions of cavalry (_g_), consisting of 9,500 men, commanded by Uminski, Lubinski, Skarzynski, and Jankowski, were not posted on any fixed point, but stood in readiness to act wherever occasions might offer. Besides these, was a small reserve (K) of four battalions and eight squadrons, in all about 5,400 men, under the command of general Pac.
[Illustration:
XI. _Grochow p.139_ ]
BATTLE OF GROCHOW.
On the 25th, at break of day, the fire commenced on our left wing, on the position of Kawenzyn. The enemy pushed forward all the forces which were collected on his right wing, and commenced a terrible fire of artillery and musquetry, with the apparent determination to carry our wing by a single overpowering effort. Nearly fifty pieces of artillery opened their fire upon Kawenzyn, and numerous columns of infantry, under the protection of this fire, pressed forward to carry the position. But our forces prepared to meet the attack. Small as they were, consisting only of seven battalions with twelve pieces of cannon, they had formed the determination to die or conquer upon that ground. They could hope for no succor, for the whole line was in expectation of a general attack.
The brave generals Krukowiecki and Malachowski made every effort to sustain the perseverance of their troops, and each of them, at the head of their columns and on foot, threw themselves upon the enemy's ranks. Our artillery did not answer that of the Russians, but directed its fire of grape wholly upon the columns which were approaching. By the unparalleled bravery of our wing, of which every soldier seemed to have formed the resolution to fall rather than yield a foot of ground, this tremendous attack of the enemy was sustained for several hours, till at last he was obliged to slacken it.
During the whole of this attack upon our left wing, the centre and the right remained still in their positions, awaiting the expected attack. It was near ten o'clock when the fields of Wavre became, as it were, in one moment, covered with the forces of the enemy, which issued out of the cover of the forests overhanging the plain. Looking over that plain, between the forest of elders and the Vistula, one would have thought it was an undivided mass of troops which was in motion; for in that comparatively limited space, the eye could not distinguish the different divisions from each other.
Two hundred pieces of cannon, posted upon that plain, in a single line, commenced a fire which made the earth tremble, and which was more terrible than the oldest officers had ever witnessed. After having prolonged for some time this tremendous fire of artillery, the enemy made an attempt to carry our right wing; but in a moment all our cavalry were collected there, and fell upon and overthrew his columns, and his efforts were as fruitless here, as they had been against our left.
Having been unsuccessful in these two attacks on the wings, and hoping that he had weakened our line by the terrible fire of artillery, which he constantly kept up, the Russian commander collected the greater part of his forces opposite the forest of elders, and it was there that an attack was commenced which presented a scene unheard of in the annals of war. It could with more propriety be called a massacre of nearly four hours duration. The Russians brought together at this point one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, posted in the rear and on the sides of that forest. Some fifty battalions were incessantly pushed to the attack, with the view to get possession of that forest. Had they been able to effect this, they would have divided our army into two parts, and thus could not but have ensured its destruction. It was the consideration of this important fact which prompted the horrible attack, and the desperate resistance which it met. The brave Skrzynecki, Zimirski, Boguslawski, Czyzewski, and Rohland, defended this forest with fourteen battalions, whose admirably executed manoeuvres, the change of front, the arrangement of the attack in columns and escalon, the concentration of force upon the points in which the enemy's line seemed to waver, a fire which was never lost, but was always reserved for the closest approach of the enemy--all were executed with an activity, order and coolness never surpassed. It was only by such conduct that the tremendous attack of the enemy could have been sustained for four hours, and that, after having nine times gained possession of the forest, he was as often repulsed with an immense loss.
Like the infantry, our artillery performed prodigies. All the batteries, protected by cavalry which never abandoned them, pushed themselves in advance even of the line of the skirmishers, and approached sometimes within a hundred feet of the enemy's columns, in order to give their fire with the most infallible execution. The battery of the brave colonel Pientka, which defended the border of the forest, was so far advanced that it was sometimes surrounded by the enemy, who, in his own disorder, did not become aware of the advantage. All the different operations indeed, of our artillery in this battle were truly admirable. Batteries, now concentrated upon one point, were in a moment hurried to another and distant one, where the enemy was wholly unprepared for them, and was thrown into disorder by their sudden attack. In the early part of the afternoon, when the enemy, after having been several times repulsed, renewed his attack with the greatest determination, and our 2d division began to give way, the four batteries of artillery of the brave Adamski, Maslowski, Hilderbrand, and Bielak, in concert with that of colonel Pientka, advanced like cavalry to the charge, and, approaching close to the Russian columns, opened a fire of grape, which spread destruction and disorder in their ranks. Our infantry, thus animated to the contest, rallied, and threw themselves again upon the enemy, who then yielded before them.
Like the artillery and infantry, our cavalry, besides the different charges which they executed with so much bravery, was manoeuvred with the utmost skill by our generals, and was made to fill the voids occasioned by the inferiority of our forces, so as always to present to the enemy an unbroken line.
By such manoeuvres of the three arms, executed with the greatest determination, in which every commander performed his duty to the utmost, the enemy's plans were continually disorganized, and his enormous force, which at first sight would have been supposed capable to have absolutely crushed the small army opposed to it, was in effect only a great mass, making a continual oscillation, and which seemed to trust to do every thing by a terrible fire of artillery, which was always kept up, whether necessary or not.
Thus it was that fifty battalions of the enemy, amounting to over 40,000 men, supported by 120 pieces of artillery, in a concentrated attack upon one point, the forest of elders, the decisive point of the position, were nine times repulsed from that forest, which was left literally covered with their dead.
From eleven o'clock until three, these attacks continued through the whole line, (the most powerful being in the centre), and the destruction of life was immense. At the last named hour, our generals, each of whom we may remark had had their horses shot under them, and several of whom were severely wounded, formed the plan of giving the enemy a decisive blow. Their plan was to withdraw from the fire the 2d and 3d divisions, which had suffered most, and to make a general retrograde movement in such a form as to have the wings considerably in advance of the centre, which was to be drawn back as far as the Obelisk of Iron (_k_), at which there was a position more commanding. This plan had the following objects:--The first was, to draw the enemy upon the open plain; the second was, to concentrate our force still more, and to place it in two lines, the inner one to be composed of the whole of the 2d and a part of the 3d division, which were withdrawn for repose. A third object was, to lead the enemy to believe that a retrograde movement was forced upon us by our losses, and that we felt ourselves too weak to continue the defence of the forest.
To execute this manoeuvre, and to enable the 2d division to retire without being molested, the artillery was left with some twenty squadrons of cavalry to protect the retrograde movement. This artillery and cavalry were ordered afterwards to evacuate their positions gradually, and the former to take post in the centre under the protection of the whole of the cavalry, which were in escalon, and prepared for a general attack. The manoeuvre was as admirably executed as it was conceived. The enemy had no suspicion of its object, but, presuming it to be a flight, undertook to profit by it. It was at this moment that marshal Diebitsch, as if sure of victory, saw himself already at Warsaw, and, on the field of battle, he allowed these words to escape him: 'Well, then, it appears that after this bloody day, I shall take tea in the Belvidere palace.'
It was about three P.M. that our 2nd division, in conformity with the plan adopted, began to retire by an escalon movement. To hasten the execution of this movement, it was ordered that the columns, retiring in succession, on reaching a considerable distance from the enemy, should quicken their pace as they proceeded, in order to form the second line as soon as possible, and to give space for the operations of the artillery and cavalry. It was at this moment that general Zimirski, who had lost several horses under him, and had just placed himself upon a fresh horse, to superintend this movement, was struck with a twelve pound ball in the left shoulder, which carried away his arm, and caused his death in a few hours. The melancholy loss of this general was most deeply felt by the whole army, and particularly by his own division, but it did not interfere with the execution of these orders. The brave general Czyzewski immediately took command of the division, and continued the orderly movement of the division towards the rear, and he received great support from generals Rohland and Zaluski. As soon as the last columns of this force quitted the forest, [_See Plan_ XII] the Russian troops began to debouch from it, and our artillery commenced a terrible fire. The brave colonel Pientka, who was still far in advance, checked the debouchement from the forest near him. Seated with the most perfect sangfroid upon a disabled piece of artillery, this brave officer directed an unremitting fire from his battery. The artillery and cavalry, after having protected the retrograde movement of the centre, still continued to keep their ground, to enable the wings also to retire undisturbed. All our forces were then in movement, and the enemy pressed on. The Russian columns had already advanced beyond the position of colonel Pientka, but that brave officer still kept up the defence.[37] By this time, however, the 2nd division had already reached their destined position, and their battalions had commenced forming. Such was the state of things, when, between Kawenzyn and the forest, a cloud of Russian cavalry was seen advancing to the attack, having at their head five regiments of heavy cuirassiers; a force in fact of some forty squadrons, or between eight and nine thousand in all. Colonel Pientka, with his artillery, supported only by a single regiment of Mazurs, still held his post, to give yet another effective fire upon this advancing cavalry, which was already between him and Skrzynecki's division; and then, to save himself from being cut off, he quitted at full gallop a post which he had occupied for five hours under the terrible fire of the artillery of the enemy. This rapid movement of Pientka's battery and the regiment of cavalry which attended him, animated the Russian cuirassiers in their advance, and the infantry and artillery of the enemy followed their cavalry. At this moment Chlopicki was wounded by a grenade, and the army was without a head; but generals Skrzynecki and Czyzewski had already formed their divisions into squares, and awaited the attack of the enemy.
The Russian cavalry advanced upon the trot, and came in a direction perpendicular to the line of our battery of rockets, which was posted between the 2d and 3d divisions (A). Suddenly a discharge from this battery was poured into their ranks, and enveloped them with flame and noise. Their horses, galled to madness by the flakes of fire which were showered over them, became wholly ungovernable, and, breaking away from all control, spread disorder in every direction. The enemy's ranks were soon in the most utter confusion, and in a short time this enormous body of cavalry became one disordered mass, sweeping along towards the fire of our squares. In a very few minutes that cavalry was almost annihilated. So nearly complete, in fact, was their destruction, that of a regiment of cuirassiers, which was at the head of the attacking force, called the regiment of Albert, and which also bore the designation of the 'Invincible' inscribed upon their helmets, not a man escaped. The few who were not left dead upon the field were taken prisoners. In fact, some hundred horse of that regiment were whirled along through the intervals of our squares, and were left to be taken prisoners at leisure. The wrecks of this routed cavalry, closely pursued by our lancers, carried along in their flight the columns of infantry which were following them, and a general retreat of all the enemy's forces commenced. The battle was gained. The cry of 'Poland forever!' arose along our line, and reached the walls of Warsaw, to cheer the hearts of its anxious inhabitants. Nothing was wanting but a skilful commander in chief to our forces, to have insured the entire destruction of the Russian army.
Two thousand prisoners, among them twenty officers of different grades, five pieces of cannon, and upwards of a thousand horses, were the trophies of that immortal day, the memory of which will be forever terrible to tyrants.
It was nearly five P.M. when the Russian army commenced a general flight, and even evacuated its first position, which it had occupied in the early morning. It is to be regretted that the order to follow up the pursuit was wanting. Szembek alone threw himself, at times, with his division, among the Russian ranks, and took a great number prisoners, baggage and chests of ammunition. According to the declaration of general Szembek, if, during the retreat of the enemy, a charge of cavalry and artillery had been ordered between the left wing and the centre of the enemy, a great part (P) of that wing, which was considerably detached from the centre, would have been cut off. This could have been easily done, for no part of our little reserve was brought into action during the day, and they were eager to be permitted to make the charge.
The prince Radzivil, after the withdrawal of general Chlopicki from the army in consequence of his wound, found himself without council; and not feeling himself sufficiently capable to risk any bold manoeuvre; seeing too that the army was much exhausted by the fighting of that day and the preceding; and fearing also that the Vistula might become impassable, and the bridges be endangered by the melting of the ice; in fine, being unwilling to take upon himself the great responsibility of attempting to pursue his advantages, decided to give the army an interval of repose, and to occupy the time in re-organizing it.
Some farther details, and remarks upon this important battle may not be unacceptable to the reader. 1st. In regard to position: On examining critically the position of the Polish army, we notice some great faults. The right wing was upon a plain entirely uncovered, and exposed to the commanding fire of the enemy's artillery. All the talents of the brave Szembek were required to prevent this wing from being unprofitably sacrificed. This same wing, if it had been withdrawn a thousand paces farther to the rear, in such a manner as not to have leant on the marshes of the Vistula, but have occupied the small wooded hills on the right of the main road, and on a line with the village of Grochow, would have been then in a commanding position, and safe from the tremendous fire of the enemy. The enemy would probably have then occupied the plain, and thus been disadvantageously exposed to our fire. His loss would have been doubled, and all the charges of our cavalry and infantry would have been much more effective. But what was above all unpardonable, was that, with a full knowledge of the enemy's intention to attack us, together with a consciousness of our own inferiority of force, and the nature of our position, which was wanting in strength, no fortifications whatever were erected, although four days and five nights were passed in that position, during which the national guard of Warsaw, and all the unenrolled population, who would have cheerfully volunteered for the purpose, could have been employed in the construction of works to any desired extent.
In regard to the centre, we may remark, that it was indeed covered by the forest of elders, of which it occupied a part, but the attack of this forest by the enemy was thus made necessary, and their repulse cost us too great sacrifices. But besides the sacrifices which the support of such a position required, our troops were so incessantly occupied with repulse of the successive attacks of the enemy, that it was impossible to attempt any decisive manoeuvre. It was not there, in fact, as we have seen, that the battle was decided, but at the Obelisk of Iron, and by other means. The centre, like the right wing, should have been withdrawn so far as to have been on a line with the village of Grochow, and in such a manner as to profit by all the commanding positions between Targowek and Grochow, upon which our artillery (which, as the case was, were upon a low and exposed position opposite the forest), would have been very advantageously posted. In general, our whole position was too extended, reaching from Kawenzyn to the marshes of the Vistula at Goclaw. It ought to have been from the beginning more concentrated, and supported on the outermost circumvallations of Praga (B). It could thus have profited by the advantageous positions which adjoin those defences. In consequence of this too great extent of position, our forces remained in a single line for five hours in succession, in most dangerous exposure.
In regard to the evolutions, although the details were admirably executed, it is to be remarked that the left wing did not yield a sufficient support to the other bodies. The communications with that wing were not well sustained--another effect of the too great extent of the position. The line of the enemy was encumbered with artillery, and there were favorable moments for a general attack on that artillery by our cavalry. Such opportunities were perceived by our generals of cavalry, and the attack suggested by them to the commander in chief, but nothing was done. The greatest fault of all, however, and that which perhaps saved the Russian army from entire destruction, was the neglect to follow up the enemy in his retreat, and by a judicious manoeuvre to cut off his right wing, as was perfectly practicable;--by such a manoeuvre, as it will be seen was, in fact, afterwards successfully practised by Skrzynecki at Wavre, where a great part of that same force were taken prisoners.
The battle of Grochow cost the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, according to the reports published by the Russians themselves, 20,000 men. On our side the loss amounted to 5,000. But to give the reader an idea of the terrible fire of that day, it may be remarked that there was not a single general or staff officer, who had not his horse killed or wounded under him. Full two thirds of the officers, and perhaps the same proportion of the soldiers, had their clothes pierced with balls, and more than a tenth part of the army were slightly wounded, though not unfitted for service. In this battle the 2d and 3d divisions of infantry suffered the most, and twenty of their officers were mortally wounded with grape-shot. I would not desire to present a revolting picture of the horrors of a battle-field, yet to impress upon the reader how great a scourge tyranny is to mankind, I could wish to point out to him, along the whole road from Kawenzyn to the marshes of Goclaw, hillocks of dead at every step, especially in the forest of elders, where rank upon rank was seen prostrate upon the earth. Indeed, so strewed with bodies was this forest that it received from that day the name of _the forest of the dead_.[38]
With the twilight, our whole army began to evacuate their position, and to cross the Vistula to Warsaw. The passage of the river occupied the whole night. On the morning of the next day, all that remained of our forces upon the right bank, were two battalions of infantry, and thirty-six pieces of cannon, which were at the bridge-head of Praga. The Russians were well satisfied with our passage of the Vistula, for they felt the need of repose. It was at first presumed that in a few days the enemy would storm Praga. This, however, was soon found not to be their intention; and, for what cause we cannot conjecture, they continued in a state of complete inaction.
Such then was the end of the grand operation of marshal Diebitsch, with his colossal forces, by which it was his purpose to put an end to the war in a few days! The boasted Crosser of the Balkan, with from 180,000 to 200,000 men, and 316 pieces of cannon, was not only unable to crush, as he proposed to do, an army of scarcely 40,000 men and 100 cannon, but was beaten by that small army, and only escaped a total ruin from the absence of a competent leader to the Polish forces. Such facts, so rare in history, cannot be too frequently impressed upon the mind of the reader, and they should be held up to the view of every despot, to teach him upon what a frail foundation his confidence in numbers may rest, and to convince him that his masses must melt away and be dispersed, before a people, who, on their own soil, are resolved to throw off the yoke of despotism, and who fight for liberty with the energy of despair.[39]
The nation and the army occupied this interval of repose in giving thanks to Providence for the successes of the preceding day. In all the churches Te Deums were sung, as well as in the chapels of the camp near Warsaw. The army was received by the people with solemnities. The senate, accompanied by the inhabitants, repaired to the camp, where patriotic addresses were delivered, and a public fete given to the army. For three successive nights, Warsaw was illuminated, and the inscription 'To the defenders of their Country,' was every where seen. Unequal to the description of these moments of exultation of a people animated with the recovery of their freedom, I can only say that they were moments which will live forever in the heart of every Pole, and will satisfy him that a nation so united will be always capable of great efforts.
On the day after the religious ceremonies, the provisional government met in the National (formerly the Royal) Palace, where all the general officers of the army were also assembled to deliberate upon the measures to be adopted both in regard to military and civil affairs. It was on that occasion that the prince Michael Radziwil, actuated by the noblest impulses, and having a single view to the good of his country, abdicated the chief command, surrendering his trust into the hands of the national government, with the avowal that he did not feel himself sufficiently capable to continue to hold so responsible a post. This step, which showed a great elevation of character, impressed the nation with feelings of gratitude, and has given to prince Radziwil a name in history.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 37: Admirable as was the conduct of all our artillery, every man in which deserved a decoration, yet among this artillery, the battery of colonel Pientka must be distinguished. Without yielding a step of ground, that battery held its place for five hours, and it often happened during the battle, that this single battery was left exposed alone to the fire of thirty or forty of the enemy's pieces. It was computed that this battery alone caused a greater loss to the enemy than the entire loss that his whole artillery caused in our ranks; and I do not exaggerate in saying, that the fire, chiefly of grape, which Pientka kept up for five hours, and at the distance often of a few hundred paces only, must have cost the Russians from one to two thousand men. What is most remarkable, this battery itself, during the whole of the fire, did not lose more than one officer and six men killed, six wounded, and ten or twelve horses, two of which were killed under colonel Pientka, whose clothes were pierced through and through with grape, and his casque torn in pieces, while, as if providentially preserved, his person was not in the slightest degree injured.]
[Footnote 38: Up to the 10th of March, when a reconnoisance was made, as far as the plain of Wavre, the dead were not yet interred, and all the confusion of a battle-field remained, proving that the enemy was too much occupied to give the ordinary attention to these duties. On that day several wagons filled with Russian cuirassiers were sent to Warsaw. Many ruined caissons of ammunition, many gun-carriages, three deserted cannons, and several hundred carbines, sabres, and pistols, knapsacks, and helmets in considerable numbers were strewed over the field, and indicated the disorder in which the enemy had made his retreat. To prevent an epidemical malady, our government made a request to general Diebitsch to send a body of his men to aid in the interment of the dead, which was in fact done.
Contemplating these masses of Russian dead, the victims of a horrible despotism, what reflections were awakened! Those unfortunate men were dragged to the combat to be sacrificed. Not one of that mass of victims could see the justice of the cause for which they were thus sacrificed. What consolation could there be in the last agonies of suffering incurred in such a cause? There could be none. How different must have been the death of the Polish soldier, who felt the sacredness and importance of the struggle on which he had entered. His last moments were consoled with the thought that his life was sacrificed for the good of his country. If the deaths of the Russian and the Polish soldier were thus different, their lives are not less so. What reward awaits the Russian soldier? Is it a service of twenty-five years under the terror of the knout, in which service he most generally dies, or if he survives, is too much broken down to be able to gain a subsistence afterwards? The Russian soldier, besides the fatigues of the general service, is subject to a private service under any one of his superiors, the merest subaltern perhaps, who, far from rewarding him for such services, abuses him but the more freely. The full pay of a Russian soldier is a groat a day; and even out of this little pay his superiors exact a profit. The consequence is, that the degree of his misery is excessive, and he would be in extremity if the proprietors of land where he is quartered did not succor him. What other recompense is given to these wretched men, who are thus led to the sacrifice of their lives for the self-will of a despot, who, while the soldier, covered with wounds, is groaning under his sufferings, spends his time in luxurious enjoyment, and perhaps mocks at the abjectness of men who are thus willing instruments of his pleasure? What other recompense for all this? Perhaps to this soldier is given a medal of brass, which, if his commander in a moment of good humor, as he passes down the line, may have addressed him with the title of 'Staryk' or 'old soldier,' he receives as a token of his having been through a campaign. Compare this with the recompense which awaited the Polish soldier on his return from the campaign. He was received by his countrymen with the warmest demonstrations of joy. Mothers lifted their children in their arms, and pointed him out to them as one of the defenders of their country. No anxiety for the future weighed upon him, for his country had made ample provision for him. It was at his will to remain in the service, or to go to occupy the land designated for him by the national government. He would find there all that his wants might require. Remaining in the military service, he enjoyed the respect of those about him. All were his brothers, and the greatest delicacy of intercourse was observed between him and his superiors. His service was an agreeable duty, in which, besides gaining an honorable subsistence, he received each day some new mark of friendship and esteem.]
[Footnote 39: The courage of our forces that day, was no doubt much animated by the vicinity of Warsaw, for the battle was fought within view of the inhabitants, who covered the fields about Praga. Many of the equipages of the wealthy families attended to receive the wounded from the field of battle, and all the inhabitants, without distinction of rank, pressed forward to remove and succor them. Those of the wounded who could not be led to the carriages, were carried in the arms of the citizens, and among those who performed this office were the highest members of the national government, ministers of religion, and even ladies. How then could such an attachment of the nation to her defenders, fail to be answered by an enthusiasm in her defence which knew no bounds. The wounded soldiers, in order not to draw upon this sympathy, conquered their sufferings, and stifled their groans; and to check the tears of those who bore them, they even forced themselves to raise the patriotic shout, and sing the national hymn.
To the details illustrating the courage which was displayed upon that field, I may add the following:--In one of the attacks upon the forest of elders, when the enemy had gained possession of it, there was an interruption to our advance from a ditch which had been cut across the road, and which it was necessary to pass. The Russian artillery, observing the effect of this obstruction, poured a heavy fire of grape upon the spot to add to the confusion. Lieutenant Czaykowski, who commanded a platoon of grenadiers of the 7th regiment, in the attacking columns, had passed with his platoon this small ditch, when he received a grape shot in the leg, which threw him down. As he fell, he cried, 'Grenadiers, advance!' and continued this cry, regardless of his suffering, as he lay prostrate on the ground. Those brave grenadiers, animated by this noble spirit, pushed their attack with such fury that they drove the enemy from his position.
Our artillery, which had so bravely fought, and which had to answer the terrible fire of the numerous artillery of the enemy, as well as to check the strong attacks of the Russian columns, were obliged often to change their place, to concentrate, and disperse, as occasion required. It was in one of those evolutions, that a battery, posted near that commanded by captain Hilderbrand, was required to change its position. The bombardier Kozieradzki was sent to give orders to this effect. He was on his way to execute this commission, when a ball carried away his arm. That brave man, however, continued his way, thus severely wounded, reached the battery, executed his commission, and then fell from the loss of blood.
The following incidents of this battle-field deserve to be mentioned, as indicating how little of national animosity mingled with the feelings of the combatants. It was often seen that the wounded soldiers of the hostile forces who happened to be thrown in each other's vicinity, would drag themselves towards each other for mutual relief, and engage in friendly conversation. 'Why,' would a Polish soldier say to the Russian, 'why are we shedding each other's blood? The cause for which we have taken arms is that of your happiness, as well as our own.' The Russian soldier could only answer, with tears of shame, 'We have been driven to march against you.' No stronger example could be given, of the kindest dispositions of the Poles towards the Russians, than the treatment of the latter in our hospitals. They were nursed and fed, like our own wounded, by the hands of those benevolent and patriotic females who had devoted themselves to these holy duties. On leaving those hospitals, the Russian soldiers swore never to forget the kindness they had experienced.]
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