CHAPTER XXI

.

General Gielgud advances into Lithuania.--Allows a Russian corps to pass within a league of him unperceived.--Operations on Wilno.--Enumeration of our present force.--Plan of a simultaneous attack upon Wilno on opposite sides by the corps in two divisions.--General Dembinski engages the enemy with the smaller part of the corps.--Being unsupported by Gielgud, is forced to retreat.--General Gielgud attacks Wilno.--Battle of Wilno.--A retreat is commenced.--Prodigious efforts of the Polish cavalry in protecting this retreat.--Consequences of the repulse from Wilno.--The removal of general Gielgud is called for.--General Chlapowski consents to take the virtual command of the corps, in the post of chef d'etat major.--Consideration on the state of things consequent to the battle of Wilno.--Details of the admirable plan of operations proposed by colonel Valentin.

The forces of general Gielgud having thus crossed the Niemen, passed a night at Rewdany, and the next day [_Plan_ XXXIV.] marched on to Czaykiszki (1), in the direction of Keydany. We cannot understand why general Gielgud did not attack Malinowski (_b_), who passed at the distance of half a league from us, at the head of 6,000 men, on his march to Wilno. It is, we believe, a thing unheard of in the history of military affairs, that an inferior force should be suffered to pass, unmolested, so near a hostile army. It discovered the very last degree of carelessness, to enter a country in the occupation of the enemy, without sending out even the ordinary reconnoissances. General Malinowski,[70] with his corps, which ought to have fallen into our hands, escaped, and made the second Russian force which had owed its safety to our negligence, and contributed a new accession to the forces which we should have to contend with.

[Illustration:

_XXXIV._ ]

On the 10th of June, the corps arrived at Keydany (2), in which place it was joined by general Chlapowski with his corps, which had so successfully traversed the departments of Bialystok and Grodno.

This force, which, on quitting Xienzopol, amounted to scarce 1,000 men, received reinforcements of cavalry and infantry, from the insurgents of the provinces, through which it had passed.[71] From the new forces, ten squadrons of cavalry, counting nearly 1,200 horse, and two battalions of infantry, amounting to nearly 1,800 men, were formed.

On the 11th of June, the united corps quitted Keydany, to march to Zeymy (3), where we arrived at night. In this little town we remained several days, we know not for what object. From this place general Chlapowski was sent with a detachment, consisting of the 1st regiment of lancers and five pieces of light artillery, to make reconnoissances in the direction of Wilno. The new forces of which we have just spoken, were attached to the main body, under general Gielgud. A few hundred of insurgent cavalry of Lithuania also arrived at Zeymy, which were joined to the lancers of Poznan and the 3d regiment of lancers.

On the day of our departure, general Szymanowski received orders to leave for Polonga with a small corps of insurgents (_c_) from the department of Szawla. This corps consisted of 1,500 infantry, 400 light cavalry, and two pieces of cannon.

As it was from Zeymy that we commenced our operations upon Wilno, after having organized the new forces; and as from this point begins an era in the history of the expedition, it may be well to give a new enumeration of our forces. Our infantry consisted of 13 battalions of infantry, amounting in all to nearly 8,700 men, including a body of sappers; our cavalry of 24 squadrons, amounting to about 2,750; and our artillery of 29 pieces of cannon. To these forces we might add a detachment of 500 men and 100 horse, acting independently as a corps of partizans, under colonel Zaliwski. This corps of colonel Zaliwski was formed in the duchy of Augustow, with the destination to operate there upon all the demonstrations of the enemy, on his communications, his magazines, his baggage, his transportations of provisions, &c; and when it is considered that this officer remained for four months thus successfully employed, and exposed to the enemy's forces on all sides, a particular acknowledgment is due to him for his meritorious services. In the above enumeration we have, of course, excluded the force of general Szymanowski, which, as we have stated, received another destination.

With the forces which we have enumerated, general Gielgud left Zeymy on the 14th of June. The operations on Wilno were planned for an attack on two sides, and with that view general Dembinski was detached with a small corps (_d_) of 1,200 infantry, 900 cavalry, and 4 pieces of cannon. This general was to attack Wilno on the road from Wilkomierz to that city, at the same time that the larger force (_e_) made the attack on the road from Kowno, on the left bank of the river Wiliia. This plan demanded the most exact communication between the two attacking corps. That communication was not observed, and, in fact, as it will be seen, the plan itself was not executed.

The corps of general Dembinski reached Wieprz (4), on the river Swieta, on the 14th of June. On the next day it passed that river, and arrived at Szerwinty (5). From thence, after resting for a few hours, the corps marched to Myszogola (6), where it passed the night. On the 16th, leaving this village, after a march of two leagues, the corps began to meet with small detachments of the enemy's Circassian cavalry.[72] General Dembinski gave the order to throw forward the flankers. The Circassians commenced a retreating fire, and, thus engaged with them, we approached within a league of Wilno, taking a position at Karczma-biskupia (7), or The Tavern of the Bishop, a large public house, surrounded by small dwellings, and which was in rather a commanding situation.

On the 17th, general Dembinski sent parties of cavalry to the right as far as the river Wiliia (W), and to the left as far as Kalwaria (8), to make reconnoissances, and advanced with the body of the corps in the centre, for the same object. In these reconnoissances a constant fire of flankers was kept up, with which the whole day was occupied. It was a great fault in general Dembinski, to have commenced this fire, without having any intelligence of the situation of the corps of general Gielgud, with which he was to act in concert. On the morning of the same day, in fact, on which general Dembinski was thus employed, the corps of general Gielgud was at the distance of thirty-six English miles from him. By these imprudent reconnoissances, general Dembinski laid open all his forces to the knowledge of the enemy. Of this fault the enemy took advantage on the next day.

On the 18th, at sunrise, clouds of Circassian cavalry made their appearance, and commenced attacks upon our flanks, endeavoring to turn them. Several columns of Russian infantry then approached, and manoeuvred upon our centre, on which also 12 pieces of Russian artillery of large calibre commenced firing. Other columns of cavalry manoeuvred upon our wings. As far as we could judge, the enemy's forces amounted to about 8,000 men. General Dembinski, seeing the strength of the enemy, and appreciating his own danger, gave orders for a retreat, which was commenced under a terrible fire from the enemy's artillery, and from his flankers, who harassed us on every side. The retreat was executed in the greatest order, as far as Myszogola, a distance of 12 miles from our position, with the loss only of some fifty cavalry. On arriving at Myszogola, general Dembinski, concerned at receiving no intelligence from general Gielgud, sent an officer with a report of what had occurred. That officer found general Gielgud with his corps, at Oyrany, occupied in making the passage of the Wiliia, at that place. The report of general Dembinski, as we can assert from personal knowledge, gave a faithful description of the occurrences of the preceding days, and contained a request, that, in case he (Dembinski) was expected to maintain the position in which he then was, general Gielgud must send him reinforcements of infantry and artillery. The report finished with the suggestion, that it would be, under all circumstances, the course most expedient, to re-unite his forces with those of general Gielgud. Upon the receipt of this report, to which general Gielgud gave little attention, orders were sent to general Dembinski to depart for Podbrzeze (9), eight miles to the left of the road which leads from Wilkomierz to Wilno. The pretext of this order was to attack Wilno on the side of Kalwaryi, and to pass the river Wiliia at that point. Thus, instead of being allowed to unite his corps with that of general Gielgud, as he had proposed, general Dembinski was ordered to remove to a still greater distance, a disposition for which we can conceive no possible motive. On the 19th of June, the day on which general Gielgud commenced his attack on Wilno, general Dembinski was thus employed on his march, without an object, to Podbrzeze.

BATTLE OF WILNO. [_Plan_ XXXV.]

The battle of Wilno was, in point of tactics, simply a strong attack upon the Russian centre (A), with the view, by forcing it, to pass on to the occupation of the city. The adoption of such a plan supposes an ignorance of the nature of the position of the enemy, and of the strength of his forces.[73] Indeed any plan of attacking this city on its strongest side, that toward Kowno, was almost impossible of execution.

[Illustration:

_XXXV. p. 312_]

[Illustration:

_XXXIII. p. 296_]

The battle commenced on the morning of the 19th of June. The enemy was dislodged from his first position, which was about one mile from the city. Their retreat was caused by a spirited charge, by the 1st regiment of lancers, upon the Russian artillery, and the columns of infantry in the centre. The enemy, on quitting this position, took another of great strength on the heights called Gory-Konarskie (B). This strong position was already covered with fortifications. The right wing of the enemy (C), composed of strong columns of infantry (_a_), rested on the river Wiliia; the centre, (A), embracing all their artillery, which consisted of 50 pieces of cannon (_b_), occupied the heights above mentioned; the declivity of those heights was covered with sharp-shooters (_d_), concealed behind small heaps of earth, thrown up for this purpose. The left wing of the enemy (D) was entirely composed of cavalry (_e_).

After driving the Russians from their first position, our artillery (_f_) was brought forward and placed opposite the enemy's centre. This is to be regarded as a great fault. At the same time that our artillery was thus disposed, our left wing received orders to attack the right wing of the enemy. The columns of our infantry (_g_), composed in part from the new Lithuanian levies,[74] threw themselves with such fury upon the enemy, that they did not give them even time to fire, but fought them hand to hand: an immense slaughter ensued, and the Russians began to give way before this desperate assault; but at this very moment, our artillery, who could not sustain themselves under the overpowering fire of the enemy from his commanding position, began to fall back; and gave time to the Russians to send fresh bodies of infantry to support their right wing. Our left wing, being unable to sustain a conflict with the reinforced strength of the enemy, and apprehensive of being cut off, to which hazard they were exposed by the retreat of our artillery, began to give way also, and upon that a retreat commenced along our whole line, under the protection of the cavalry (_h_). The cavalry, both old and new, performed prodigies of valor, in executing this duty. Single squadrons were obliged to make charges against whole regiments of the enemy, who constantly pressed upon us, with the object of throwing our forces into disorder. All the efforts of the enemy were thwarted, by this determined bravery. The Russians themselves have borne testimony to the unparalleled efforts of our cavalry on that occasion. Our lancers seemed to feel the imminent danger of permitting the Russian cavalry to fall upon our ranks, and they fought with the energy of desperation. They repelled the attacks of a cavalry three times superior in force, and which was in part composed of regiments of the imperial guard.

The enemy having been thus foiled in his attacks, our forces repassed in safety the bridge of Oyrany, leaving it destroyed.

The battle of Wilno, so disastrous to us, was our greatest fault in the expedition to Lithuania; and it was the first of a series of disasters. The evil consequences of this battle did not rest with ourselves; they fell heavily upon the inhabitants of Wilno, whose hopes of acting in concert with us were disappointed. At the sound of our cannon, a revolt of the inhabitants was commenced, and after the repulse of our forces, arrests and imprisonments of course followed. This unfortunate battle, in fine, disorganized all the plans of the main army, and had a most discouraging effect upon the spirits both of the army and the nation. An attack upon Wilno, at a time when all the enemy's forces were concentrated there, should only have been made upon the basis of the most extensive and carefully adjusted combinations. A successful attack on Wilno would have been a difficult achievement, even by a force equal to that of the enemy, when the strong positions of the place are considered. What then shall we say of an attack, with a force amounting to but one third of that of the enemy, and made also, in broad day, upon the most defensible point of the enemy's position?

But, as if these disadvantages were not enough, general Dembinski, after having been compromitted at Myszggola, instead of being enabled to aid in this attack, was, by the orders of general Gielgud, at the very moment of the attack, marching in the direction of Podbrzeze, [(9) _Plan_ XXXIV,] and was also by this separation exposed even to be cut off by the enemy, who could easily have done it, by sending a detachment for this object on the road from Wilno to Wilkomierz.

This succession of inconceivable faults arrested the attention of the corps, and created a universal dissatisfaction. The removal of general Gielgud, and the substitution of general Chlapowski in the chief command, who had distinguished himself so much in the departments of Bialystok and Grodno, was loudly called for. General Chlapowski was unwilling to take the chief command, but, to satisfy the wishes of the corps, he consented to take the office of chef d'etat major, a post in which he was virtually chief, having the exclusive responsibility of every operation. To this arrangement general Gielgud readily consented. It took effect on the evening of the 20th. From that day general Chlapowski was the director of all our operations.

After all these disasters, which had both morally and physically weakened us, and with a clear knowledge of the amount of the enemy's strength, our leaders should have been satisfied that it must be out of the question with us to act any longer on the offensive, and that our whole plan of operations on Samogitia ought to be abandoned. We will give the reader an exposition of the views of a great majority of the officers of the corps, upon this point, formed even during the battle of Wilno.

It was near mid-day on the 19th, and when our line was commencing their retreat, that colonel Valentin, with several other officers, addressed themselves to general Gielgud, represented to him the disastrous situation in which we were placed, and proposed to him a plan of operations adapted to our new circumstances. There was, in their opinion, but one course to pursue. This was, to abandon our whole plan of operations between the rivers Niemen, Dwina, and Wiliia. The space enclosed between these rivers, the Baltic Sea and the Prussian territory, was a dangerous position for us, as it contracted our movements, and at the same time exposed us to being surrounded by the superior forces of the enemy. Colonel Valentin designated, as the most eligible line of operations, the space between Kowno and Lida. From this oblique line we could at any moment menace Wilno. He proposed to occupy Kowno, and to fortify that town as well as Alexota and Lida in the very strongest manner. On this line we should have been in a situation to profit by any advantageous opportunities which the negligence of the enemy might leave to us, of acting upon Wilno; and if we might not be fortunate enough to surprise that city, we should, at least, compel the Russians to keep a strong force within its walls, as a garrison. The town of Lida touches upon the great forest of Bialowiez. It is situated at the meeting of three great roads, viz. those from Poland, from Volhynia, and from the province of Black Russia, a circumstance in its position which made it a place of great importance. The communications of the town with the neighboring forest were extremely easy, and this forest colonel Valentin designed a place of concentration for all the insurgent forces of Lithuania and the other provinces. He proposed to fortify, in the strongest manner, all the roads which concentrated here, and thus to make the position difficult and dangerous of access to the enemy. This forest, which is more than one hundred and twenty English miles in length, and from thirty to sixty in breadth, reaches the great road which passes by Bielsk, from Warsaw to St Petersburgh and Moscow, and extends northwards to the environs of Wilno.

By means of prompt operations, according as circumstances might direct, our forces could act upon each of these roads, and could obstruct all the communications of the enemy with St Petersburgh and Moscow. Colonel Valentin, in proposing this plan, also gave much weight to the consideration that our main army under general Skrzynecki, was victorious in the vicinity of Warsaw, and that general Chrzanowski was with a corps in the environs of Zamosc, having been victorious over Rudiger, and on the point of entering into Volhynia; with this latter corps, a junction could easily be effected, and the two corps could

## act in concert, for the support of the insurrections which might occur

in all the provinces between the Dnieper and the Black Sea; and even if all these great advantages, which we should have been justified in counting upon, had not been attained, we should, at least, have compelled the enemy to retain a great body of forces in Lithuania, and thus have hindered him from reinforcing his main army.[75]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 70: This general Malinowski, as was generally understood, was a native of Mohilew, or Little Russia, a province of ancient Poland, and had been long in the Russian service. The Lithuanians and Samogitians had much reason to complain of his conduct in those provinces.]

[Footnote 71: Among the Lithuanians who hastened to join our ranks, and aid in the restoration of their beloved country, were several of the fair sex,--generally from the principal families of the province. There were personally known to me the following, whose names I deem it an honor to record;--Plater, Rasinowicz, Karwoska, Matusiewicz, Zawadzka, and Lipinska. The countess Plater, perhaps, should receive a more especial notice. This young heroine joined our corps with a regiment of from five to six hundred Lithuanians, raised and equipped at her own expense, and she was uniformly at their head in the midst of the severest engagements. How strongly do such examples prove the sacred nature of our cause! What claims must not their country have presented to the minds of these females of the most exalted character, to have induced them thus to go out of their natural position in society, and to sacrifice domestic happiness, wealth, life itself, in the effort to rescue that country from her degradation!]

[Footnote 72: This was a formidable force from the province of Circassia, consisting of two regiments, amounting to about 3,000 men, which had recently arrived at Wilno. It was a species of light cavalry, of the most efficient character. The fleetness of their horses was such, that they would often throw themselves in the very midst of our flankers, and having discharged their arms, retreat in safety. They were armed with two pistols, a long fusil, a sabre, a long knife, and a lance.]

[Footnote 73: As we have been informed, Wilno was defended by five corps, consisting in all, of about 30,000 men, under generals Kuruta, Tolstoy, Saken, Malinowski, and Szyrman.]

[Footnote 74: This Lithuanian force consisted of the regiment of the countess Plater, who accompanied them in the charge.]

[Footnote 75: This valuable officer, colonel Valentin, unfortunately lost his life on the day after the battle of Wilno, while bathing in the Wiliia. The regrets of his brother officers were aggravated by their sense of the value of those wise counsels, the suggestion of which was the last act of his life. He had every quality of heart and intellect for the highest military station.]

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