CHAPTER XIII

.

THE PÁNINI-DARSANA.[307]

If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great Commentary," is "_atha sabdánusásanam_," "Now comes the exposition of words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is meant the system of grammar put forth by Pánini. Now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else.

The word "exposition" (_anusásana_), as here used, implies that thereby Vaidic words, such as those in the line _sam no devír abhishtaye_,[308] &c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for "cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix. We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object [_sabdánusásanam_ standing for _sabdasyánusásanam_], and as there is a rule of Pánini (_karmani cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the phrase _sabdánusásanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised compound.

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the alleged rule of Pánini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with a _krit_ affix, there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprápti_ in the sútra as a _bahuvríhi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in the Kásiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence, this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in connection with a word ending with a krit affix, is to be put in the genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_ compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraschana_, _palása-sátana_, &c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this _shashthítatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in accordance with Pánini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartrihari in his _Vákyapadíya_ has shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána--

"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,

"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed.

"Thus have they explained the meaning of Pánini's sútras, since

"He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuh_ and _tatprayojakah_."[314]

Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question (of the _Mahábháshya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning words' are now commenced."

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since the employment of such a word as _sabdánusásanam_, the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate study (_anga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction, it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an _anga_ of the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say--

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,

"And therefore grammar is useless?"

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _anga_ of the Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that grammar is an _anga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _anga_ of the Veda that he uses the words _atha sabdánusásanam_ and not _atha vyákaranam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that Brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding, practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmani_, the affix _an_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakára_, "a potter," _kándaláva_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special rule (iii. 2, 3), _áto 'nupasarge kah_, directing that the affix _ka_ is to be used after a root that ends in long _á_ when there is no _upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be [since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But since there are other _angas_, why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _angas_ the principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,

"The wise have called grammar the first _anga_ of the Veda."

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319] Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word according to the _sástra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow." Thus (they say)--

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;

"But those who use such false forms as _achíkramata_ must trudge thither on foot."[320]

Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?" since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes, _lat_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the "manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" (_vrishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshana_), _i.e._, from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," _i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.

The eternal word, called _sphota_, without parts, and the cause of the world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartrihari in the part of his book called the Brahmakánda--

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,

"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírnaka--

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,

"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

Helárája interprets the fivefold division as including _karmapravachaníyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaníyas_ distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions (_upasargas_).[324]

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called _sphota_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception.

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphota_, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphota_ by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphota_ is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphutyate_) or revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphota_, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called _sphota_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word '_cow_' _gauh_? It is that word by which, when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "The _Vákyapadíya_ has established at length that it is the _sphota_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that the _sphota_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphota_ is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that _sphota_ conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphota_." This has been said by Bhatta in his Mímámsá-sloka-várttika--

"The grammarian who holds that _sphota_ is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."

The truth is, that, as Pánini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _díná_ as in _nadí_, in _mára_ as in _ráma_, in _rája_ as in _jára_, &c., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautátita--

"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called _sphota_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant].

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328] could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of _sphota_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called _sphota_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible _sphota_, and each successive letter makes this _sphota_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphota_ as a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus" (_játi_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331] (Brahman).

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."

"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have the following authoritative testimony--

"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Pánini v. 1, 119).

"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and _asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (_prátipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expresses _bháva_;[333] now, as _bháva_ is "existence," the meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriyá_); but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line--

"Others say that action (_kriyá_) is a genus, residing in many individuals."

So, too, if we accept Pánini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we speak of the nature (_bháva_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _tá_ [as _asvatva_ and _asvatá_] are used in the sense of _bháva_, that they do express "existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two _kárikás_ quoted above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."[336]

So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the Várttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of horse," &c.]

According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the

## particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c.,

denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pathati_, "he reads," &c., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

In the doctrine of Vyádi, who maintained that words meant individual things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pánini; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that "when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured," which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.

As it has been said--

"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the nature of this true meaning--

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says--

"_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they call the Supreme Nature."

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls."[344]

The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us--

"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a development of illusion likewise."

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the "exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.

Thus it has been said--

"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the science of sciences."[347]

And so again--

"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation."

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sástra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 307: Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímámsá school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphota_ here, and not in his Jaimini chapter.]

[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]

[Footnote 309: _Sabdánusásana_, if judged by the apparent sense of Pánini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as _ácháryena_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _áscharyo godoho sikshitena gopálena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we say _áscharyo gavám doho' sikshitasya gopálasya_ (as it would violate ii. 3, 66).]

[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprápti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a _bahuvríhi_ agreeing with _kriti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Pánini.]

[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Pánini, ii. 2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]

[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_ (_i.e._, _shashthí-sambandha_).]

[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]

[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Pánini's own sútras (i. 4, 30, and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as _shashthí seshe_.]

[Footnote 315: The very word _sabda_ in _sabdánusásanam_ implies the Veda, since this is pre-eminently _sabda_.]

[Footnote 316: Compare Max Müller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.]

[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _danda_ in line 3 after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _sabdánám_.]

[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]

[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahábháshya_, pp. 12, 64.]

[Footnote 320: _Achíkramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achankramyata_.]

[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartrihari which immediately follow.]

[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _sabdasya_ after _sámyam_, but the Mahábháshya has _nah sámyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]

[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]

[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaníyas_ imply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Sákalyasamhitám anu právarshat_, "he rained after the Sákalya hymns," _anu_ implies an understood verb _nisamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This _anu_ is said to determine this relation.]

[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]

[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might mean _kramena_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]

[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read _kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]

[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _viná_ after _nimittam_.]

[Footnote 329: The ghatta is the place where dues and taxes are collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddesyásiddhi_.]

[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphotakabhávam_ for _sphotábhávam_.]

[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9, 32.]

[Footnote 332: The Mímámsâ holds that a word means the genus (_játi_) and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Nyáya holds that a word means an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]

[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Prátis. xii. 5.]

[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]

[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]

[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really meant, the one abiding existence.]

[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.]

[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _asvattha_.]

[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical categories, _játi_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _sanjná_, and _kriyá_.]

[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.]

[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that the Mímámsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, since otherwise there would be _vyabhichára_ and _ánantya_ (cf. also Mahesachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakása, p. 10). If a word is held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."]

[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasmát dvayam satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasmád advayam satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."]

[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone exists.]

[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_jíva_) and Brahman.]

[Footnote 345: The _Samvriti_ of the text seems to correspond to the _ávarana_ so frequent in Vedánta books.]

[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi. 22.]

[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where it is explained by [']Samkara as _vidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanam tad adhividyam_.]

##