Chapter XIII

.

Soda-lime was likewise a difficult problem. Starting with the British formula, the influence of the various factors was studied and a balance between a number of desirable qualities, absorptive activity, capacity, hardness, resistance to abrasion, chemical stability, etc., obtained. The final product consisted of a mixture of lime, cement, kieselguhr, sodium permanganate and sodium hydroxide.

Equally valuable work was performed in the perfection of two carbon monoxide absorbents for the Navy. The better of these consisted of a mixture of suitably prepared oxides which acts catalytically under certain conditions, and causes the carbon monoxide to react with the oxygen of the air. Since there are color changes connected with the iodine pentoxide reaction (the first absorbent) it has been possible to develop this so as to serve as a very sensitive detector for the presence of carbon monoxide in air.

While the question of smoke filters was so important that it occupied the attention of several Sections, the Defense Section developed, as a part of its work, a standard method of testing and comparing filters, and did a great deal of work on the preparation of paper for this purpose.

Various problems related to mustard gas were also studied. The question of a protective ointment was solved as successfully as possible under the circumstances, but was dropped when it appeared doubtful if under battlefield conditions of concentration and length of exposure, any ointment offered sufficient protection to pay for the trouble of applying it. The removal of mustard gas from clothing was investigated, especially by the accelerating effect of turkey red oil. Another phase of the work concerned the destruction of mustard gas on the ground, while a fourth phase related to the persistency of mustard (and other gases) on the field of battle.

The Gas Mask Research Section concerned itself largely with developing methods of testing canisters and with routine tests. When one considers the number of gases studied experimentally, the large number of experimental canisters developed, all of which were tested against two or more gases, and further that the Section assisted in the control of the production at Long Island City, it is seen that this was no small job. In addition, the effect of various conditions, such as temperature, humidity, ageing, size of particles, were studied in their relation to the life of absorbents and canisters. Man tests and mechanical tests will be discussed in a later chapter. Other studies were concerned with weathering tests of gas mask fabrics, mustard gas detector, and covering for dugout entrances (dugout blankets), which were impregnated with a mixture of mineral and vegetable oils. In studying the course of gases through a canister the “wave front” method was of great value in detecting defects in canister design and filling.

The Pyrotechnic Section was composed of a number of units, each with its own problem. The gas shell was studied, with special reference to the stability of gases and toxic solids, both on storage and on detonation. Extensive work was carried out on smoke screens—a Navy funnel, an Army portable smoke apparatus, using silicon tetrachloride, a grenade, a Livens, and various shell being developed for that purpose. The smoke screen was adapted to the tank and the airplane as well as to the funnel of a ship. Several types of incendiary bombs and darts were perfected. The liquid fire gun was studied but the results were never utilized because of the abandonment as useless of that form of warfare. Various forms of signal lights, flares, rockets and colored smokes were studied and in most cases specifications were written. Extensive studies were also carried out on gas shell linings, from which a lead and an enamel lining were evolved. Many physical properties of war gases and their mixtures were determined.

The Dispersoid Section studied the production of smokes or mists from various solid and liquid substances. Apparatus were developed to study the concentration of smoke clouds and their rate of settling. The efficiency of various filters and canisters was determined, and among other things, a new smoke candle was perfected.

Mechanical research at first was related to design and construction of a canister and mask, based on the English type. During the latter part of 1917 the Tissot type of mask was studied and then turned over to the Gas Defense Division. A Navy Head Mask and canister was perfected. The horse mask was developed along the lines of the British type, and also a dog mask of the same general nature. Horse boots were also constructed, though they never were used at the front. Many Ordnance and Pyrotechnic problems were also successfully completed, not the least of which was a noiseless gas cylinder. This section developed the first special poison gas suit, composed of an oilcloth suit, a mask and helmet and a special canister.

The Manufacturing Development Section had general charge of the defense problems, and really acted as an emergency section, filling in as occasion demanded. They developed mustard gas clothing and a horse mask. They constructed a hydrogen plant at Langley Field, assisted in solving the difficulties relating to Batchite charcoal at Springfield, Mass., and co-operated in the study of paper and felt as filtering materials for smokes. Towards the close of the war the Section was interested in the application of the gas mask to the industries.

The Physiological work is discussed under the Medical Division.

The Editorial Section received reports from all the other Sections, from which a semi-monthly report was written, and distributed to authorized representatives of the Army and Navy and to our Allies. Reports were also received from abroad and the information thus received was made available to the Research Division. As the number of reports increased the work was collected together into monographs on the various war gases, absorbents, smokes, etc. After the signing of the armistice these were revised and increased in number, so that about fifty were finally turned over to the Director of the Chemical Warfare Service.

GAS DEFENSE DIVISION

The story of the Gas Defense Division is largely the story of the gas mask. Colonel (then Mr.) Bradley Dewey was in charge of the “first twenty thousand.” Soon after that work was undertaken, he was commissioned Major in the Gas Defense Division of the Sanitary Corps and was placed in charge of the entire manufacturing program. The work of the Division included the development and manufacture as well as the testing and inspection of gas masks, and other defense equipment. The magnitude of the work is seen from the following record of production: 5,692,000 completed gas masks, 3,614,925 of which were produced at the Long Island City Plant, while the remainder were assembled at the Hero Manufacturing Company’s Plant at Philadelphia, 377,881 horse masks, 191,388 dugout blankets, 2,450 protective suits and 1,773 pairs of gloves, 1,246 tons of protective ointment, 45,906 gas warning signals (largely hand horns), 50,549 trench fans and many oxygen inhalators.

[Illustration: FIG. 5.—The Defective Gas Mask.

Successfully used by the Gas Defense Division to stimulate care in every part of the operation of the manufacture of Gas Masks.]

The story of the “first twenty thousand” has already been told on page 43. That these masks were far from satisfactory is no reflection upon the men who made them. Even with the standard design of the British as a pattern, it was impossible to attain all the knowledge concerning gas masks in two months. The experience gained in this struggle enabled the Army to take up the manufacture of gas masks, in July, 1917, with a more complete realization of the seriousness of the task. The masks were not lost, either, for they were sent to the various camps as training masks and served a very useful purpose.

The first order after this was for 1,100,000 masks, to be completed within a year from date. For this production there was authorized one major, two captains, and ten lieutenants. How little the problem was understood is evident when we realize that in the end there were 12,000 employees in the Gas Defense Plant at Long Island City, N. Y. The first attempts were to secure these through existing concerns. The Hero Manufacturing Company of Philadelphia undertook the work and carried on certain portions of it all through the War. Experience soon showed, however, that because of the necessity for extreme care in the manufacture and inspection of the mask, the ordinary commercial organization was not adapted to carry on their manufacture on the scale necessitated by the Army program. Consequently, on Nov. 21, 1917, the Secretary of War authorized the establishment of a government operated plant, and experienced officials were drawn from New York, Chicago, Boston and other manufacturing centers to carry on the work. Buildings in Long Island City, not far from the chemical plant (charcoal and soda lime) at Astoria, were taken over by the officers of the Gas Defense Service, until in July, 1918, five large buildings were occupied, having a total floor space of 1,000,000 square feet (23 acres). The organization grew from the original thirteen officers until it included some 12,000 employees of whom about 8,500 were women. Because of the care required in all the work, attempt was made to secure, as far as possible, those who had relatives with the A. E. F. The thought was that their personal interest in the work would result in greater care in manufacture and inspection. The personnel was unique in that the authority was apparently divided between civilian and military, but there was no friction because of this. The efficiency of the entire organization is shown by the fact that the masks manufactured at Long Island City cost fifty cents less per mask than those manufactured under contract.

The first actual shipment (overseas) of box respirators was made from the Gas Defense Plant on March 4, 1918. From this date the production increased by leaps and bounds. As mentioned above, between this date and November 26, when the last mask was manufactured, 3,146,413 masks of the box respirator type were passed through final inspection in the plant. The greatest daily production, 43,926 masks, was reached on October 26, 1918. The process of manufacture will be discussed under the chapter on the Gas Mask.

During the last half of 1918 the Kops Tissot mask was manufactured. This mask had been perfected during the months preceding August, 1918, when its manufacture was started. Considerable difficulty was encountered in its production, but the first mask was completed on September 14, and between that time and the Armistice, 189,603 masks of this type had been manufactured.

Along with this manufacturing development went the building up of an elaborate procurement force charged with the responsibility of providing parts to be assembled at the Gas Defense Plant and at the Hero Manufacturing Company. This Section faced a hard and intricate task, but, though there were instances where the shortage of parts temporarily caused a slowing down of production, these were remarkably rare. Not only had the parts to be standardized, and specifications written, but a field inspection force had to be trained in order that the finished parts might be suitable for the final assembly plant. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the design was constantly changing, as improvement followed improvement. Officers, trained in inspection in a day, were sent out to train inspectors in the industrial centers.

In February, 1918, shortly before the German drive commenced, requisitions were received for sample lots of oiled mittens and oiled union suits as protection against mustard gas. These were prepared in quantity and sent to the front, as was also a considerable amount of chloride of lime for neutralizing the mustard gas in the field.

Another phase of the work consisted of the Field Testing Section, which was organized to provide field testing conditions for the regular product and for the development organization. Later there were added a preliminary course of training for officers for overseas duty in chemical warfare, the military training of the Gas Defense officers located in and near New York and the training of boat crews engaged in carrying offensive gas supplies. The Field Testing Section rendered valuable service in pointing out weaknesses of designs as developments took place and especially those uncomfortable features of the masks which were apparent only through long wear. During the course of this work the section built a complete trench system in the Pennsylvania Railroad yards with an elaborate dugout, the equal of any of the famous German quarters on the Western front.

The chapters on Charcoal, Soda-Lime and the Gas Mask must be read in this connection to gain an idea of the work carried out by this Division. It is summed up in the statement that American soldiers were provided with equipment which neutralized the best effects of German chemical knowledge as evidenced by the offensive methods and materials employed.

The organization of the Gas Defense Division, as of Nov. 11, 1918, was as follows:

Colonel Bradley Dewey Officer in Charge Lieut. Col. A. L. Besse Asst. Officer in Charge Major M. L. Emerson Administration Section Major H. P. Schuit Comptrolling Section Mr. R. Skemp Procurement Section Major C. R. Johnson Technical Director Capt. K. Atterbury Field Testing Section Major J. C. Woodruff Chemical Manufacturing and Development Mr. R. R. Richardson Manager, Gas Defense Plant Capt. H. P. Scott Officer in Charge, Hero Manufacturing Co. Major L. W. Cottman Engineering Branch Major T. L. Wheeler Chemical Development Major I. W. Wilson Astoria Branch Capt. W. E. Brophy San Francisco Branch Lt. E. J. Noble Cleveland Branch Lt. L. Merrill Springfield Branch

EDGEWOOD ARSENAL

The Ordnance Department, in making plans for a shell filling plant, thought to interest existing chemical firms in the manufacture of the required toxic materials. As plans developed, however, difficulties arose in carrying out this program. The manufacture of such material at private plants necessitated its shipment to the filling plant at Edgewood. The transportation of large quantities of highly toxic gases seemed attended with great danger. The Director General of Railroads ruled that all such shipments must be made by special train, a very expensive method of transportation. Still more serious objections were encountered in the attempt to enlist the co-operation of existing firms. They recognized that the manufacture of such material would be attended by very great danger; that the work would be limited to the duration of the war; and that the processes involved, as well as the plants necessary for carrying out their processes, would have little post-war value. Moreover, such firms as had the personnel and equipment were already over-worked. With a few exceptions (notably the American Synthetic Color Company, the Oldbury Electro-Chemical Co., Zinsser & Co., and the Dow Chemical Company) they were unwilling to undertake work of this character on any terms whatever.

Early in December, 1917, therefore, it was decided to erect, on the site of the shell filling plant, such chemical plants as would be necessary to furnish the toxic materials required for filling the shell. The Arsenal is situated in an isolated district, twenty miles east of Baltimore, Maryland, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and comprises 3,400 acres. Since the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad runs on one side of the tract, while on another is the Bush River, only a few miles from its mouth in Chesapeake Bay, the tract was ideally situated for shipping. This site was referred to, at first, as “Gunpowder Reservation,” but on May 4, 1918, the name was officially changed to “Edgewood Arsenal.”

[Illustration: FIG. 6.—Edgewood Arsenal.

The upper view shows the site as it appeared Oct. 24, 1917. The lower view shows the same as it appeared nine months later.]

Some idea of the extent of the work may be gained from the following facts. On October 1, 1918, there were 233 officers, 6,948 enlisted men and 3,066 civilians engaged in work at Edgewood. 86 cantonments were built, accommodating about 8,500 men, while the five officers’ barracks provided accommodations for 290. The completed hospital unit consisted of 34 buildings, accommodating 420 patients under ordinary conditions. The total number of buildings erected on the Arsenal grounds was 550. 14.8 miles of improved roads were built, and 21 miles of standard gauge and 15 miles of narrow gauge railway. A system furnishing 9.5 million gallons of salt water and another furnishing two millions of fresh water daily were successfully installed. Large power plants were built in connection with the shell filling plants and the chlorine plant.

Plants for phosgene, chloropicrin, mustard gas, chlorine and sulfur chloride were built and placed in successful operation. Most of the raw materials, with the exception of sulfur chloride, were obtained from commercial firms. The other gases and manufactured materials used, such as phosphorus, tin and silicon tetrachlorides, bromobenzylcyanide and arsenic derivatives were supplied by various plants scattered through the East and Middle West States.

The raw materials used by the Arsenal in 1918 were as follows:

Salt 17,358,000 pounds Bleach 42,384,000 “ Picric acid 3,718,000 “ Alcohol 3,718,000 “ Sulfur 24,912,000 “ Sulfur chloride 6,624,000 “ Bromine 238,000 “ Benzyl chloride 26,000 “

The production of toxic materials and the amount shipped overseas in bulk follow:

-----------------------+-------------+------------- | Production, | Shipped in | Pounds | Bulk, Pounds -----------------------+-------------+------------- Chlorine: | | Liquid | 5,446,000 | 2,976,000 Gaseous | 2,208,000 | Chloropicrin | 5,552,000 | 3,806,000 Phosgene | 3,233,070 | 840,000 Mustard gas | 1,422,000 | 380,000 Bromobenzyl cyanide | 10,000 | White phosphorus | 2,012,000 | 342,000 Tin tetrachloride | 2,012,000 | 212,000 Titanium tetrachloride | 362,000 | -----------------------+-------------+-------------

For nearly a month previous to the signing of the Armistice, the various plants at the Arsenal had shut down or were operated only to an extent sufficient to maintain the machinery and equipment in good working order, on account of the lack of shell into which to fill the gas, so that the above figures do not at all represent maximum productive capacity.

These plants will be described in the appropriate chapters.

The shell filling plant was really composed of several small plants, each of which was made up of units radiating from a central refrigeration plant which would serve all the units. Each unit could then be fitted with machinery adapted for filling shell of a different size, and for a particular gas. Moreover, an accident in one of the units would in no way impair the working of the remainder.

The problem involved in the filling of a shell with toxic material (which is always a liquid or a solid and never a gas under the conditions in which it is loaded in the shell) is similar in a way to that of filling bottles with carbonated water. In the development of plans for the filling plant, many suggestions were obtained from a study of the apparatus used in commercial bottling plants. It was necessary to keep in mind not only the large number of shell to be filled, but also the highly toxic character of the filling material to be used. It was essential that the work of filling and closing the shell should be done by machinery in so far as that was possible, and that the operation should be carried out in a thoroughly ventilated room or tunnel, arranged so that the machinery contained in the tunnel could be operated from the outside. Special care was taken in closing the shell, the closing being accomplished by motors actuated by compressed air, which, in the closing process were driven until they stalled. In this way a uniform closing torque was obtained. The final results secured were admirable, as is evidenced by the fact, reported by the Quartermaster Officer at Vincennes on November 15, 1918, that not a single leaky shell had been found among the 200,000 shell received up to that date.

[Illustration: FIG. 7.—A Typical Shell filling Plant at Edgewood Arsenal.]

Details of the filling process will be found in the chapter on Phosgene.

Besides the ordinary gas filling plants (of which one was completed and two were 80 per cent completed) there was a plant for stannic chloride grenades, one for white phosphorus grenades, and one for smoke shell also filled with phosphorus and a plant for filling incendiary bombs.

Shell are designated by their diameter in inches or millimeters. The approximate amount of toxic gas required for filling each type of shell (10.5 per cent void) is as follows:

---------+-----------+-----------+------------- Shell | Phosgene, | N. C.,[13] | Mustard Gas, | Pounds | Pounds | Pounds ---------+-----------+-----------+------------- 75 mm | 1.32 | 1.75 | 1.35 4.7 inch | 4.27 | 6.20 | 4.20 155 mm | 11.00 | 15.40 | 10.35 8 inch | 22.00 | 30.30 | 21.60 Livens | 30.00 | | ---------+-----------+-----------+-------------

[Footnote 13: N.C. is a mixture of 80 per cent chloropicrin and 20 per cent stannic chloride.]

The gas grenades held 0.446 pound of stannic chloride, and the smoke grenades held 0.67 pound of white phosphorus.

The only type of shell filled was the 75 mm. variety, because either the shell of the other sizes or the accompanying boosters (bursting charges) were not available.

The work done by the filling plant is shown by the following figures, representing the number of shell, grenades, etc.

_75 mm. Shell_ ------------------+---------+--------- | Filled | Shipped | | Overseas ------------------+---------+--------- Phosgene | 2,009 | N. C. | 427,771 | 300,000 Mustard gas | 155,025 | 150,000 ------------------+---------+---------

_Livens Drum_ ------------------+---------+--------- Phosgene | 25,689 | 18,600 ------------------+---------+---------

_Grenades_ ------------------+---------+--------- White phosphorus | 440,153 | 224,984 Tin tetrachloride | 363,776 | 175,080 ------------------+---------+---------

_Incendiary Drop Bomb_ ------------------+---------+--------- Mark I. | 542 | Mark II. | 2,104 | ------------------+---------+---------

The total monthly capacity of the filling plants at the date of the Armistice was as follows:

Pounds 75 mm. shell 2,400,000 4.7 inch shell 450,000 155 mm. shell 540,000 6 inch shell 180,000 Gas grenade 750,000 Smoke grenade 480,000 Livens drum 30,000

One point relating to the casualties resulting from the work should perhaps be mentioned here. The number of casualties should change the mind of anyone who feels that men chose this work as being “safe” instead of going to France. During the six months from June to December there were 925 casualties, of which three were fatal, two being due to phosgene and one to mustard gas. These were divided among the different gases as follows:

Mustard gas 674 Stannic chloride 50 Phosgene 50 Chloropicrin 44 Chlorine 62 Other material 45

Of these 279 occurred during August, 197 during September and 293 during October. Since production stopped early in November, there were only 14 during that month and three during December.

The Staff at Edgewood Arsenal at the signing of the Armistice was as follows:

Commanding Officer Colonel Wm. H. Walker { Lt. Colonel George Cahoon, Jr. Administrative Officers { Lt. Col. Edward M. Ellicott { Lt. Col. Wm. C. Gallowhur

{ Lt. Col. Wm. McPherson In Charge of Outside Plants { Major Adrian Nagelvoort { Major Charles R. Wraith { Captain John D. Rue Shell Filling Plant Lt. Col. Edwin M. Chance Chlorine Plant Lt. Col. Charles Vaughn Chemical Plants Major Dana J. Demorest Chemical Laboratory Major William L. Evans

As the work of the Arsenal expanded it was necessary to manufacture certain of the chemicals at outside plants. The men in charge of these plants were:

Bound Brook, N. J. Lt. William R. Chappell Stamford, Conn. Lt. V. E. Fishburn Hastings-on-Hudson, N. Y. Major F. G. Zinnsser Niagara Falls, N. Y. Major A. Nagelvoort Buffalo, N. Y. Lt. A. W. Davison Kingsport, Tenn. Lt. E. M. Hayden Charleston, W. Va. Lt. M. R. Hoyt Midland, Mich. Major M. G. Donk Croyland, Pa. Capt. A. S. Hulburt

After the Armistice, Edgewood Arsenal was selected as the logical home of the Chemical Warfare Service, and all the outside activities of the Service were gradually closed up and the physical property and files moved to Edgewood. At first the command of the Arsenal was in the hands of Lt. Col. Fries, but when he was appointed Chief of the Service, Major E. J. Atkisson, who had so successfully commanded the First Gas Regiment, A. E. F., was happily chosen his successor. At the present time (July 1, 1921), the organization of Edgewood Arsenal is as follows:

Commanding Officer Major E. J. Atkisson Executive Officer Major R. C. Ditto Technical Director Dr. J. E. Mills Chemical Division Mr. D. B. Bradner Mechanical Division Mr. S. P. Johnson Plant Division Capt. E. G. Thompson Chemical Warfare School Major O. R. Meredith Property Major A. M. Heritage First Gas Regiment Major C. W. Mason Mask Production Division Lt. L. A. Elliott Medical Department Major T. L. Gore Pathological Division Lt. H. A. Kuhn Quartermaster Department Capt. H. L. Hudson Finance Department Capt. C. R. Insley

DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

The Development Division had its origin in the research laboratories of the National Carbon Company and of the National Lamp Works of the General Electric Company. Both of these companies knew charcoal, and they were asked to produce a satisfactory absorbent charcoal. The success of this undertaking will be seen in the chapter on Absorbents. After a short time all the laboratory work was taken over by the National Carbon Co., while the developmental work was assigned to the National Lamp Works. When the final organization of the Chemical Warfare Service took place, the National Carbon Laboratory became part of the Research Division, while the National Lamp Works became the Defense Section of the Development Division.

The Development Division may be considered as having been composed of the following sections:

1. Defense 2. Offense 3. Midland 4. Willoughby 5. Special Investigation.

The work of the Defense Section consisted of the development of a charcoal suitable for use in gas masks, and its manufacture. While the details will be given later, it may be mentioned here that three weeks after the organization of the Section (April 28, 1917) the furnaces of the National Carbon Company were turning out cedar charcoal, using a straight distillation procedure. Cedar was selected from a large variety of materials as giving the highest absorptive value against chlorine. But phosgene and chloropicrin were also being used, and it was found that the cedar charcoal was not effective against either. Proceeding on a definite hypothesis, fifty materials were investigated to find the charcoal with the highest density. Cocoanut hulls furnished the raw material, which yielded the most active charcoal. By a process of air activation a charcoal was obtained which possessed high absorptive power for such gases as chloropicrin and phosgene. Later this air process was changed to one in which steam is used; the cocoanut shell charcoal activated with steam was given the name “Dorsite.”

Complete apparatus for this air process was installed at the plant of the Astoria Light, Heat & Power Company, Long Island City, and the first charcoal was prepared during September, 1917. This was followed by a large amount of experimental work, relating to the raw material, the method of activation, and the type of furnace used. Because of the shortage of cocoanut hulls, it later became necessary to use a mixture of cocoanuts with cohune nuts, apricot and peach pits, cherry pits and vegetable ivory. Another substitute for cocoanut charcoal was found in a steam activated product from high grade anthracite coal, called “Batchite.”

The Offense Section and the Midland Section were concerned with the manufacture of mustard gas. This work was greatly delayed because of the unsatisfactory nature of the so-called chlorohydrin process. Another difficulty was the development of a satisfactory ethylene furnace. Finally in February, 1918, Pope in England discovered the sulfur chloride method of making mustard gas. At once all the energies of the Research Division were concentrated on this process, and in March steps were taken to put this process into production. An experimental plant was established at Cleveland; no attempt was made to manufacture mustard gas on a large scale, but the results obtained in the experimental studies were immediately transmitted to the manufacturing plants at Edgewood Arsenal, the Hastings-on-Hudson plant, the National Aniline & Chemical Company (Buffalo) plant, and the Dow Chemical Company (Midland) plant. The details of the work on mustard gas will be given in a later chapter.

Special investigations were undertaken to develop a booster casing and adapter for 75 mm. gas shell, and to duplicate the French process of lining gas shell with glass.

The organization of the Development Division at the signing of the Armistice was as follows:

Colonel F. M. Dorsey Chief of the Division Major L. J. Willien Supt., Offense Section Capt. O. L. Barnebey Supt., Defense Section Lt. Col. W. G. Wilcox Supt., Experimental Station Capt. Duncan MacRae Special Investigation Section Dr. A. W. Smith Midland Section Capt. J. R. Duff Administrative Section

PROVING DIVISION

The Proving Division had its origin in the decision to build an Experimental Ground for gas warfare under the direction of the Trench Warfare Section of the Ordnance Department. While this decision was reached about September, 1917, actual work on the final location (Lakehurst, N. J.) was not started until March 26, 1918, and the construction work was not completed until August 1, 1918. However, firing trials were started on April 25, 1918, and in all 82 were carried out.

The Proving Division was created to do two things: To experiment with gas shell before they reached the point where they could be manufactured safely in large numbers for shipment overseas; and to prove gas shell, presumably perfect and ready for shipment, to guard against any mechanical inaccuracies in manufacture or filling. It is evident that the second proposition is dependent upon the first. Shell can not be proved to ascertain the effect of gases under various conditions and concentrations until the mechanical details of the shell itself, purely an Ordnance matter, have been standardized. Unfortunately many of the tests carried out had to do with this very question of testing Ordnance.

For field concentration work two complete and separate lines of trenches were used and also several impact grounds. The trenches were built to simulate the trenches actually used in warfare. Each line of trench contained several concrete shell-proof dugouts and was also equipped with shelves into which boxes could be placed for holding the sample bottles. At intervals of one yard throughout the trenches there were electrical connections available for electrical sampling purposes. The various impact grounds were used for cloud gas attacks, and experiments with mustard gas or in many cases for static trials. The samples were collected by means of an automatic sampling apparatus.

The work of the Division consisted in the first instance of determining the proper bursting charge. While a great deal of this work had been carried out in Europe, American gas shell were enough different to require that tests be carried out on them. The importance of this work is obvious, since phosgene, a substance with a low boiling point, would require a smaller bursting charge to open the shell and allow the substance to vaporize than would mustard gas, where the bursting charge must be not only sufficient to fragment the shell but also to scatter the liquid so that it would be atomized over the largest possible area. In the case of low boiling liquids it was necessary that the charge be worked out very carefully as a difference of one or two grams would seriously affect the concentration. Too small a charge would allow a cup to be formed by the base of the shell which would carry some of the liquid into the ground, while too great an amount of explosive tended to throw the gas too high into the air.

After the bursting charge had been determined a large number of shell were repeatedly fired into the trenches, wooded areas, rolling and level ground, and the concentration of gas produced and the effect upon animals placed within the area ascertained. From the results of these experiments the Proving Division was able to furnish the artillery with data regarding how many shell of given caliber should be used, with corrections for ranges, wind velocities, temperatures, ground conditions, etc. Trials were also held to determine how many high explosive (H.E.) shell could be fired with gas shell on the same area without unduly affecting the concentration. This was important, because H.E. shell were useful in disguising gas bombardments. Gas shell can usually be distinguished by the small detonation on bursting.

Experiments were performed to determine the decomposition of various gases on detonation. The shell were fired at a large wooden screen and burst on impact. Samples of gas were taken immediately and analyzed.

Co-operative tests were carried out with the Gas Defense Division to determine the value of given masks under field conditions. Companies of infantry, fully equipped for the field, would wear masks for hours at a time digging trenches, cutting timber, drilling, etc., and imitating in every way, as far as possible, actual field conditions. During these activities tons of gas in cylinders were released in such a way that the men were enveloped in a far higher concentration than would probably ever be the case in actual battle. These tests gave valuable data for criticizing gas mask construction.

Another line of activity consisted of a study of the persistency and relative effectiveness of various samples of mustard gas, in which the liquid was distributed uniformly upon the surface of grassy zones one to three feet in width, which formed the periphery of circular areas 14 to 21 feet in diameter, the central part of each circle being occupied by animals.

The work of the Proving Division was brought to an end (by the Armistice) just at the time when it had reached its greatest usefulness. Not only were the physical properties and personnel of the Division developed to the maximum degree, but the production of gas shell in this country for shipment to France had just reached the stage where the Proving Ground could have been used to its fullest extent in their proving.

TRAINING DIVISION

From the standpoint of the man at the front the Training Division is one of the most important. To him gas warfare is an ever present titanic struggle between poisonous vapors that kill on one side, and the gas mask and a knowledge of how and when to wear it, on the other. Because of this it is rather surprising that we did not hear more about this branch of the Service. It did exist, however, and credit must be given to those camp gas officers who remained in the United States performing an inconspicuous and arduous duty in the face of many local obstacles.

[Illustration: FIG. 8.]

The Field Training Division of the Gas Defense Service in the United States was organized in September, 1917, and consisted of Major J. H. Walton and 45 first lieutenants, all chemists. These men were given a three months’ military training at the American University. The arrival of Major (now Colonel) Auld during this time was very helpful, as he was able to give the Section first-hand knowledge. About 12 of the 45 men wore sent to France, while the remainder, together with British Gas Officers, were assigned to various Divisions still in training. There was little idea at that time as to what constituted real gas training. No one knew how much gas training would be received in France, and since little was often received due to lack of time, many men went into action with no idea of what this training really meant. Moreover, an order that the gas officers should not go to France with their Divisions had, as was only natural, a discouraging effect upon the men and upon gas training and discipline generally.

In January, 1918, the gas officers were transferred to the Engineers, and designated as the 473d Engineers. Later an Army Gas School was established at Camp Humphreys. Because of the rapidly changing personnel, owing to overseas assignments, the policy was adopted of sending specialized gas officers only to Divisional Camps and the larger training centers. The need of a larger unit and increased authority was recognized by all intimately associated with the work, but little was accomplished until the transfer to the Chemical Warfare Service. Upon the appointment of Brigadier General H. C. Newcomer as Assistant Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, he was placed in charge of all military affairs of the Service, and the administrative officers of the Training Section became his “military assistants.” A few weeks later the Training Section of the Administration Division, C.W.S. was formed.

At this time new duties fell to the lot of this Section, among the more important being:

(1) The organization of gas troops and casual detachments for overseas duty;

(2) The establishment of a Chemical Warfare Training Camp;

(3) The procurement and training of officers for overseas duty.

For this purpose a training camp was established near the Proving Ground (Camp Kendrick) to hold 1300 officers and men. Line officers were sent from the larger camps for training, the best of whom might later be transferred to the Chemical Warfare Service for duty as Gas Officers.

The work of the Section eventually grew to such proportions that it was recognized as the Training Division of the Chemical Warfare Service. It differed from other Divisions in that all administrative routine was carried on through the offices of the Director, and with the assistance and co-operation of its various Sections.

Because of the formation of the Chemical Warfare Service and the apparent need for officers, the office was soon flooded with applications for commissions. These were carefully examined and the men were sent first, by courtesy of the Chief of Engineers, to Camp Humphreys for a month’s course of military training. At the end of this period they were sent to Camp Kendrick as students of the Army Gas School. Toward the last of October all the officers and enlisted men were transferred to Camp Kendrick where an Officers’ Training Battalion was organized.

It is obvious that the gas training of troops was the most responsible duty of the Training Division. There was constantly in mind an ideal of supervised and standardized training for all troops in the United States, and the Division, at the time of the Armistice, for the first time found itself with a nearly adequate corps of officers through whom this ideal could be realized.

MEDICAL DIVISION

Dr. Yandell Henderson of Yale University was the logical man to inaugurate the medical work of the Bureau of Mines, because of his experience with oxygen rescue apparatus. A member of the first committee of the Bureau, he secured, in July, 1917, an appropriation for the study of toxic gases at Yale. This was in charge of Doctors Underhill, therapy; Marshall, pharmacology; and Winternitz, pathology. When the American University Station was opened Marshall was given charge of the pharmacology. About the same time a factory protection unit was organized under the direction of Doctors Bradley, Eyster and Loevenhart. At first this committee reported to the Ordnance Department, but later the work was transferred to the Gas Defense Service.

In December, 1917, the Medical Advisory Board was organized. This included all the men who were carrying on experimental work of a medical nature. This board had as its object the correlation of all medical work; new work was outlined and attempts were made to secure the co-operation of scientific men throughout the country. The following groups of workers assisted in this effort: At Yale, Underhill studied therapy, turning his animals over to Winternitz for pathological study. Henderson was specially interested in the physiology of aviation. At the American University Marshall carried on pharmacological research, specially as regards mustard gas, the toxicology being covered by Loevenhart. A pathological laboratory was also started, under Winternitz, where many valuable studies were made.[14] At Cleveland Sollmann was busy with mustard gas and protective agents. Pearce, working in co-operation with Dr. Geer of the Goodrich Rubber Company, perfected the Goodrich Lakeside Mask. His study was very valuable as concerning the physiology of the gas mask. At Ann Arbor Warthin and Weller[15] were studying the physiology and pathology of mustard gas. Wells, Amberg, Helmholz and Austin of the Otho Sprague Memorial Institute were interested in protective clothing, while at Madison, Eyster, Loevenhart and Meek were engaged in a study of the chronic effect of long exposures to low concentrations, and later expanded their work to protective ointments and certain problems in pathology.

[Footnote 14: See the Pathology of War Gas Poisoning, 1920, Yale Press.]

[Footnote 15: See Medical Aspects of Mustard Gas Poisoning, 1919, C. O. Mosby Co.]

In the spring of 1918 many of these men were commissioned into the Gas Defense Service of the Sanitary Corps, and were later transferred to the Chemical Warfare Service as the Medical Division, with Colonel W. J. Lyster, M.C., in charge.

One of the most important functions of this Division was the daily testing of a large number of compounds for toxicity, lachrymatory or vesicant properties. The accuracy of these tests might and probably did save a large amount of unnecessary experimental work on the part of the Research Division. These tests are described in a later chapter.

Very interesting and likewise valuable was the study of mustard gas by Marshall, Lynch and Smith. They were able to work out the mechanism of its action and the varying degrees of susceptibility in individuals (see page 171).

Another interesting point was the fact that in the case of certain gases there is a cumulative effect. With superpalite and mustard gas the lethal concentration (that concentration which is fatal after a given exposure) is lower on longer exposures. On the other hand there is no cumulative effect with hydrocyanic acid. Whether the action is cumulative or not depends on the rate at which the system destroys or eliminates the poison.

LIAISON OFFICERS

This chapter should not be closed without reference to the Liaison Service that was established between the United States and her Allies, especially England.

During the early days no one in the States was familiar with the details of gas warfare. At the request of the Medical Corps, upon the urgent representations of the Gas Service, A.E.F., Captain (now Major) H. W. Dudley was sent to this country (Sept., 1917) to assist in the development and manufacture of gas masks. For some time he was the Court of Appeal on nearly all technical points regarding matters of defense. Dudley’s continual insistence on the need for maintaining the highest possible standard of factory inspection was one of the factors resulting in the excellent construction of the American Mask. In March, 1918, Lieut. Col. Dewey and Captain Dudley made a trip to England and France, during which the idea of a liaison between the defense organizations of the two countries originated. Dudley was transferred to the Engineers, promoted and placed in charge of the Liaison service. While the time until the Armistice was too short to really test the idea, enough was accomplished to show the extreme desirability of some such arrangement.

Probably the best known liaison officer from the British was Colonel S. J. M. Auld, also sent upon the urgent representations of the Gas Service, A.E.F. He arrived in this country about the middle of October, 1917, in charge of 28 officers and 28 non-commissioned officers, who were to act as advisers in training and many other military subjects besides gas warfare. Since Auld had had personal experience with gas warfare as then practiced at the front, his advice was welcomed most heartily by all the different branches of the Army then handling gas warfare. On questions of general policy Auld was practically the sole foreign adviser. The matter of gas training was transferred from the Medical Corps to the Engineers, and was greatly assisted by four pamphlets on Gas Warfare issued by the War College, which were prepared by Major Auld with the assistance of Captain Walton and Lieut. Bohnson. Later Auld gave the American public a very clear idea of gas warfare in his series of articles appearing in the Saturday Evening Post, and re-written as “Gas and Flame.”

Major H. R. LeSueur, who was at Porton previous to his arrival in this country in December, 1917, rendered valuable aid in establishing the Experimental Proving Ground and in its later operations.

Towards the close of the war the British War Office had drawn up a scheme for a Gas Mission, which was to correlate all the gas activities of England and America. This was never carried through because of the signing of the Armistice.

The French representatives, M. Grignard, Capt. Hanker and Lt. Engel furnished valuable information as to French methods, but they were handicapped by the fact that French manufacturers did not disclose their trade secrets even to their own Government.

About August, 1918, Lieut. Col. James F. Norris opened an office in London. His duties were to establish cordial and intimate relations not only with the various agencies of the British Government which were connected with gas warfare, but also with the various laboratories where experiments were being conducted, that important changes might be transmitted to America with the least possible delay. The English made Colonel Norris a member of the British Chemical Warfare Committee. Here again the signing of the Armistice prevented a full realization of the importance of this work.

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