CHAPTER IV

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE IN FRANCE

It is worth noting here that the Chemical Warfare Service was organized as a separate service in the American Expeditionary Forces nearly ten months before it was organized in the United States, and that the organization in the United States as heretofore described was patterned closely on that found so successful in France.

Very soon after the United States declared war against the Central Powers, a commission was sent abroad to study the various phases of warfare as carried on by the Allies, and as far as possible by the enemy. Certain members of this commission gave attention to chemical warfare. One of those who did this was Professor Hulett of Princeton University. He, with certain General Staff officers, gathered what information they could in England and France concerning the gases used and methods of manufacturing them, and to a very slight extent the methods of projecting those gases upon the enemy. Some attention was paid to gas masks, but there being nobody on the General Staff, or anywhere else in the Regular Army, whose duty it was to look out

## particularly for chemical warfare materials, these studies produced no

results.

As has already been stated, the Medical Department started the manufacture of masks, and the Bureau of Mines, under the leadership of the Director, Mr. Manning, began studies upon poisonous gases and the methods of manufacturing them just before or shortly after war was declared.

Nevertheless, although American troops left for France in May, 1917, it was not until the end of August—the 17th to be exact—that definite

## action was taken toward establishing a Chemical Warfare Service, or,

as it was then known, a Gas Service in the American Expeditionary Forces. On that date a cablegram was sent to the United States to the effect that it was desired to make Lieut. Col. Amos A. Fries, Corps of Engineers, Chief of the Gas Service, and requesting that no assignments to the regiment of gas troops authorized in the United States be made which would conflict with this appointment. On August 22d, Lieut. Col. Fries entered upon his duties as Chief of the Gas Service.

There were then in France about 30 miles from the German lines, some 12,000 American troops without any gas masks or training whatever in Chemical Warfare. Immediate steps were taken to teach the wearing of the masks, and English and French gas masks were obtained for them at the earliest possible moment. At the same time efforts were made to obtain officer personnel for the C. W. S., and to have sent to France a laboratory for making such emergency researches, experiments, and testing as might become necessary. From that time to the end of the war the C. W. S. continued to develop on broad lines covering research, development, and manufacture; the filling of shell and other containers with poisonous gases, smoke and incendiary materials; the purchase of gas masks and other protective devices, as well as the handling and supply of these materials in the field; the training of the Army in chemical warfare methods, both in offense and defense; and the organization, equipment and operation of special gas troops.

This gave an ideal organization whereby research was linked with the closest possible ties to the firing line, and where the necessities of the firing line were brought home to the supply and manufacturing branches and to the development and research elements of the Service instantly and with a force that could not have been obtained in any other manner. The success of the C. W. S. in the field and at home was due to this complete organization. To the Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, is due the credit for authorizing this organization and for backing it up whenever occasion demanded. Other details of this work will be considered under the following heads: Administrative; Training; Chemical Warfare Troops; Supply; Technical; Intelligence; and Medical.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES

The duties of administration covered those necessary for a general control of research, of supply, of training, and the operation of special gas troops. At first the Chief of the Gas Service comprised the whole of the Service since he was without personnel, material, rules, regulations, or anything else of a chemical warfare nature.

The experience in getting together this organization should be sufficient to insure that the United States will never place on any other man’s shoulders the burden of organizing a new and powerful service in the midst of war, 4,000 miles from home, without precedent, material, or anything else on which to base action. It is true the Americans had available the experience of the English and the French, and it should be said to the credit of both of these nations that they gave of their experience, their time, and their material with the greatest freedom and willingness, but just as Americans are Americans and were Americans in 1917, just so the methods of the French and English or of the enemy were not entirely suitable to American conditions.

If there is any one thing needed in the training of U. S. Army leaders of today and for the future, it is vision—vision that can foresee the size of a conflict and make preparations accordingly. We do not mean vision that will order, as happened in some cases, ten times as much material as could possibly be used by even 5,000,000 troops, but the sort of vision that could foresee in the fall of 1917 that 2,000,000 men might be needed in France and then make preparations to get materials there for those troops by the time they arrived.

In order to cover the early formative period of the C. W. S. in France and to show some of the difficulties encountered, the following running account is given of some of the early happenings without regard to the subdivisions under which they might properly be considered.

=Assignment of Chief of the Gas Service.= Sailing from the United States on the 23d of July, 1917, Fries arrived in Paris on the morning of August 14, 1917, and was immediately assigned the task of organizing a highway service for the American Expeditionary Forces. Five days later and before the highway order was issued, he was asked what he would think if his orders were changed so as to make him Chief of the newly proposed Gas Service. Being given one night to think it over he told the General Staff he would undertake the work. The road work was immediately closed up and on the 22d of August the organization of a Gas Service was actively started.

At that time some information concerning gases and gas troops had been gathered by Colonel Barber of the General Staff. Likewise, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Hugh A. Drum had made a rough draft of an order accompanied by a diagram for the establishment of the Gas Service. This information was turned over to Fries who was told to complete the draft of the order, together with an organization chart, for the action of the Commander-in-Chief. After one and a half days had been put on this work the draft and chart were considered in good enough shape to submit to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief.

=First Trip to British Gas Headquarters.= Noting that the proposed organization provided for the handling of 4-inch Stokes’ mortars by gas troops, General Pershing asked why this work could not be done by regular trench mortar companies. He was told that gas operations were too technical and dangerous to be intrusted to any but especially trained troops, and that, furthermore, it was understood that 4-inch Stokes’ mortars were used only by the British troops. General Pershing said, “You had better beat it to the British Gas Headquarters in the field and settle definitely that and certain other minor points.” Fries told him he was only too glad to do this, and, having completed preparations, left on the morning of August 25th with Colonel Church and Captain Boothby, both of the Medical Department, for St. Omer, Headquarters of the British Gas Service in the Field.

Colonel Church of the Medical Department had been in France nearly one and a half years prior to the entry of the United States into the war, and had taken sufficient interest in Gas Warfare to collect considerable information and a number of documents from French sources bearing on the defensive side of the subject. Captain Boothby had done the same with the British, including a course in a British Gas Defense School. On this trip they took up the defensive side with the British, while Fries took up the offensive side of the Service. The latter included gases used, gas troops, and ammunition and guns used in Gas Warfare by the Artillery and other branches of the Service. The trip included a brief visit to the headquarters of the First British Army in the vicinity of Lens, where the British Gas Service had a large depot of offensive gas material.

=Order Forming Service.= Returning on the 28th of August the order, together with a chart organizing the Service, was completed and submitted to the General Staff. This was published as G. O. 31, September 3, 1917. As a result of a study of the information submitted by Colonel Barber and General Drum, together with his own observations of British organization and work, Fries decided it was advisable to make the Service cover as complete a scope as possible and to make the order very general, leaving details to be worked out as time and experience permitted. This proved to be a very wise decision, because the entire absence of gas knowledge among Americans either in France or the United States made it necessary to build from the bottom up and do it rapidly. At that time, and at all times since, it was found utterly impossible to separate the defensive side from the offensive side. Indeed, many of the worst troubles of the British with their Gas Service throughout nearly the whole war arose from such a division of duties in their Service. Thus, the development of masks must be kept parallel with the development of gases and methods of discharging them. Otherwise a new gas invented may penetrate existing masks and preparations be carried far towards using it before the development of masks are undertaken to care for the new gas. Obviously a gas which our own masks will not take care of cannot be safely used by our own troops until new masks are developed to protect against it.

=American and British Masks.= Just prior to Fries’s assignment as Chief of the Gas Service twenty thousand American-made masks or box respirators were received from the United States. Through the energy of Captain Boothby several of these had been sent at once to the British for test. The test showed that the granules in the canisters were entirely too soft, the charcoal of poor quality, and more than all else, the fabric of the face piece was so pervious to gases that chloropicrin became unbearable to the eyes in less than a minute under the standard test used by the British. A cable containing this information had been framed and sent to the United States just prior to Fries’s appointment as Chief of the Service.

August 23d, the day after Fries took charge, it was decided to adopt the British mask or box respirator as the principal mask and the French M-2 as an emergency, both to be carried by the soldier, the French M-2, however, to be used only when the British mask became lost or unfit for use. A requisition for one hundred thousand of each was at once submitted and very shortly approved by the General Staff.

=Getting Gas Supplies.= It should be stated here that inasmuch as no Gas Service had been organized in the United States, no money appropriation had been made for it, thereby making it necessary for the Gas Service to obtain all its supplies through other departments ordinarily handling the same or similar materials. Thus defensive supplies were obtained through the Medical Department and offensive supplies through the Ordnance Department, while other miscellaneous equipment was obtained through the Engineer Department, the Quartermaster Department, or the Signal Corps. This procedure proved exceedingly embarrassing, cumbersome and inefficient. To begin with it was necessary to get some agreement between the departments as to what each would supply. This was very difficult, resulting in delays and consumption of time which was urgently needed on other work.

Not only was there trouble in getting orders accepted and started on the way but following them up became practically impossible. None of the Departments furnishing the materials were especially interested in them nor in many instances did they realize the vital nature of them. Accordingly in order to get any action it was necessary to continually follow up all orders and doing this through another department created friction and misunderstanding. Officers of these departments took the attitude that the whole question of obtaining supplies should be left to them, once the requisition was turned in. This could not be done. The Chief of the Gas Service was absolutely responsible for gas supplies, and he fully realized that no excuses would be accepted, no matter who stood in the way. It was necessary to get action. Finally the matter was settled, some six months after the Service was organized, by giving the Chemical Warfare Service the right of direct purchase.

=Purchase of Offensive Gas Supplies.= Realizing the difficulty that would probably be encountered in getting supplies at all times from the British and French, two requisitions for offensive gas supplies to be purchased from the British were submitted on September 8th and 10th respectively. It would seem proper to state here that investigation showed the British gas organization to be far superior to the French. Indeed, the latter practically had no organization.

Consequently it was determined to purchase complete equipment for gas troops and for the defensive side of the service from the British and to make no attempt to produce new materials, methods or equipment until ample supplies of the standard equipment of the British were at hand or in process of manufacture or delivery. This was another exceedingly wise conclusion. No supplies of any kind were received from the United States for the next eight months, and then only masks and certain defensive supplies. Indeed, no cylinders, mortars, projectors or artillery shell containing gas were received from the United States until just before the Armistice, though gas had been available in the United States for months in large quantities, over 3,600 tons having been shipped in one ton containers to the English and French. The Ordnance material was what was lacking.

=Obtaining Personnel.= On September. 8, Colonel R. W. Crawford was assigned to duty with the Gas Service. This matter of obtaining personnel became immediately, and continued for almost a year to be, one of the most serious difficulties facing the new Gas Service. The troubles here again were the same as those in respect to supplies. None of the old departments were especially interested in gas and hence none of them desired to let good officers be transferred.

Officers were scarce in the early days in France in every department of the Service, consequently a new department with no organization in the United States and no precedents or opportunities for promotion made the obtaining of officers almost a matter of impossibility. Further than this, while the Engineer Department was at first supposed to furnish most of the officer personnel, it failed to do so, apparently looking upon the Gas Service as an unimportant matter when compared with the regular work of the Engineers. It was necessary to make direct application to the Chief of Staff to obtain Colonel Crawford and shortly thereafter to cable directly to the United States for officers. A year later enough officers were obtained but only after the organization of a separate Service in the United States.

=Supplies for Gas Troops.= Colonel Crawford was at once put in Charge of all supplies for the Gas Service, including the location and construction of separate depots for that Service. Prior to this the General Staff had decided to have chemical supplies stored in depots separate from those of other supplies on account of the poisonous nature of the gases which might prove very annoying if leakage occurred near any other class of supplies. Colonel Crawford took hold of this work with zeal and energy and so conducted it as to relieve the Chief of the Gas Service of all anxiety in that matter. As before stated, on the 10th of September a requisition for a very large quantity of offensive supplies for gas troops was submitted to the General Staff for approval. Inasmuch as this involved approximately 50,000 gas cylinders, 50,000 Liven’s drums, with at least 20,000 Liven’s projectors and a large number of Stokes’ mortars and bombs, there was considerable difficulty in getting it approved. Finally Colonel Malone of the Training Section, who took an active interest in the Chemical Warfare Service, got it approved. Then began the difficulty of getting the order placed and of trying to expedite the filling of the order on time. These difficulties were never overcome until after the entire purchase of supplies was, as previously related, taken care of by the Gas Service.

=First Inter-allied Gas Conference.= The first inter-allied gas conference was held in Paris on September 16th, and consisted of American, British, French, Italian, and Belgian delegates. The conference busied itself mainly with questions of the medical treatment of gassed cases and of defense against gas.

=Mustard Gas.= The principal topic under consideration at this conference was the effects of the new mustard gas first used at Ypres against the British on the nights of the 11th and 12th of July, 1917. The British suffered nearly 20,000 casualties from this gas during the first six weeks of its use, and were so worried over it that the start of the attacks carried out later in the fall of 1917 against Ypres were delayed several days. The casualties were particularly heavy because the smell of the gas was entirely new and not unpleasant and because of the delayed action of the gas, whereby men got no indication of its seriousness until 4 to 8 hours after exposure. For these reasons men simply took shelter from the bombardment without putting on masks or taking other precautions. As a result of the Paris conference a long cable was sent to the United States asking among other things that immediate report be made on the possibilities of producing ethylene chlorhydrin, one of the essentials in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only method then known.

Within two weeks after this conference, there occurred an incident which illustrates the very great danger in taking the views of any one man unless certain that he is in a position to be posted on all sides of the question under discussion. A high British official was asked what he had heard in regard to the new mustard gas, and what and how it was considered. He said with emphasis that the British had no further fear of it since they had learned what it was and how to take care of themselves and that it had ceased to be any longer a problem with them.

Fries, knowing what he did, was convinced that this did not represent the attitude of the British authorities who knew what the gas was doing, and the statement was not allowed to influence the American Gas Service in the least. This was a very fortunate thing as events later proved. It should also be added that a quite similar report was made by a French officer in regard to mustard gas some time in the month of October. The French officer had more reason for his attitude than the British officer as up to that time mustard gas had not been largely used against the French. However, both cases simply emphasize the danger of accepting the views of any man who has seen but one angle of a problem so complicated as gas in war.

TRAINING

=Training in Gas Defense.= In the latter part of October seventeen young engineer officers, who had just arrived in France, were assigned to the Gas Service and were promptly sent to British Gas Schools for training in mask inspection, salvage and repair and in training men to wear masks and take other necessary precautions against gas in the field. It was also necessary at this time to establish gas training in the First Division, and Captain Boothby was assigned to that work.

[Illustration: FIG. 9.—Destroying Mustard Gas on the Battle Field.]

It is important to note that the Gas Service had to begin operations immediately upon its organization although it had almost no facilities of any kind to work with. At one and the same time it was necessary to decide upon the kinds of masks to be used and then to obtain them; to decide upon methods of training troops in gas defense and start at once to do it; to decide upon gases to be used and manufactured in the United States and then obtain and send the necessary data and finally to decide what weapons gas troops were to use and to purchase those weapons, since none of them existed in the United States. Worse still no one in the United States was taking any interest in them.

=New Mask.= About November 1, Major Karl Connell of the Medical Department, National Guard of New York, reported for duty in response to a cablegram that had been sent asking for him by name. It was intended to send him to a British School to learn the art of teaching gas defense. However, learning after a short talk with him that he had been interested in making masks for administering anæsthesia, there was at once turned over to him samples of all the masks in use by both the Allies and the Germans, with a view to getting his ideas for a new mask. Within two or three hours he suggested a new mask having a metal face piece with sponge rubber against the face and with a canister to be carried on the back of the head.

At that early date it was realized that a new mask must be invented which would be far more comfortable and give better vision than the British respirators adopted for use. Connell, thirty-six hours after reporting, had so far developed his idea that he was sent to Paris to make the first model, which he succeeded in doing in about three weeks. This first mask was good enough to risk testing in a high concentration of chlorine and while it leaked to some extent it indicated that the idea was sound. The problem then was to perfect the mask and determine how it could be produced commercially on the large scale necessary to equip an army.

Since the British at this time and practically throughout the war were much ahead of the French in all phases of gas warfare, Connell was sent to London. There he succeeded in getting additional models in such shape that one of them was sent to the United States during the first few days of January, 1918. Connell’s work and experiments were continued so successfully that after a model had been submitted to the General Staff, as well as to General Pershing himself, one thousand were ordered to be made early in May with a view to an extensive field test preparatory to their adoption for general use in the United States Army.

In this connection, during November, 1917, a letter was written to the United States stating that while the Gas Service in France insisted on the manufacture of British respirators exactly as the British were making them, they desired to have experiments pushed on a more comfortable mask to meet the future needs of the Army.

The following four principles were set down in that letter: (_a_) That the mask must give protection and that experience had shown that suitable protection could only be obtained by drawing the air through a box filled with chemicals and charcoal. (_b_) That there must be clear vision and that experience to date indicated that the Tissot method of bringing the inspired air over the eyepieces was by far the best, (_c_) That the mask must be as comfortable as compatible with reasonable protection, and that this meant the mouthpiece and noseclip must be omitted. (_d_) That the mask must be as nearly fool proof as it could be made. That is, it should be of quick and accurate adjustment, in the dark or in the trenches, and be difficult to disarrange or injure once in position.

=Gas Training and Battle of Picardy Plains.= On March 21, 1918, as is known to everyone, the Germans began their great drive from Cambrai across the Picardy Plains to Amiens. While the battle was expected it came as a complete surprise so far as the tactics used, and the extent and force of the attack, were concerned. Lieutenant Colonel G. N. Lewis, who had been sent about March 1 to British Gas Schools, and had been assigned to one of the schools run by the Canadians, was thus just on the edge of the attack. This gave him an opportunity to actually observe some of that attack and to learn from eye-witnesses a great deal more. The school, of course, was abandoned hurriedly and the students ordered back to their stations. Lewis submitted two brief reports covering facts bearing on the use of gas and smoke by the Germans. These reports exhibited such a grasp of gas and smoke battle tactics that he was immediately ordered to headquarters as assistant on the Defense side of gas work, that is, on training in gas defense. Up to that time no one had been able to organize the Defensive side of gas work in the way it was felt it must be organized if it were to prove a thorough success. A month later he was put at the head of the Gas Defense Section, and in two months he had put the Defense Division on a sound basis. He was then ordered to the United States to help organize Gas Defense Training there.

[Illustration: FIG. 10.—Close Burst of a Gas Shell. The 6th Marines in the Sommediene Sector near Verdun, April 30, 1918.]

=Cabled Report on Picardy Battle.= Based partly on Colonel Lewis’s written and oral reports, and also on information contained in Intelligence dispatches and the newspapers, a cablegram of more than 300 words was drafted reciting the main features of the battle so far as they pertained to the use of gas. This cablegram ended with the statement that “the above illustrates the tremendous importance of comfort in a mask” and that “the future mask must omit the mouthpiece and noseclip.”

=Keeping the General Staff Informed of Work.= In the early part of May, 1918, the Americans arrived in the vicinity of Montdidier, south of Amiens, on the most threatened point of the western front. It was on May 18, 1918, that the Americans attacked, took, and held against several counter-attacks the town of Cantigny. Shortly afterward they were very heavily shelled with mustard gas and suffered in one night nearly 900 casualties. Investigation showed that these casualties were due to a number of causes more or less usual, but also to the fact that the men had to wear the mask 12 to 15 hours if they were to escape being gassed. Such long wearing of the British mask with its mouthpiece and noseclip is practically an impossibility and scores became gassed simply through exhaustion and inability to wear the mask.

An inspector from General Headquarters in reporting on supplies and equipment in the First Division, stated that one of the most urgent needs was a more comfortable mask. The First Division suggested a mask on the principles of the new French mask which was then becoming known and which omitted the mouthpiece and noseclip. The efforts of the American Gas Service in France to perfect a mask without a mouthpiece and noseclip were so well known and so much appreciated that they did not even call upon the Gas Service for remark. The assistant to the Chief of Staff who drew up the memorandum to the Chief simply said the matter was being attended to by the Gas Service. This illustrates the value of keeping the General Staff thoroughly informed of what is being done to meet the needs of the troops on the firing line.

Then, as always, it was urged that a reasonably good mask was far more desirable than the delay necessary to get a more perfect one. Based on these experiences with mask development, the authors are convinced that the whole tendency of workers in general, in laboratories far from the front, is to over-estimate the value of perfect protection based on laboratory standards. It is difficult for laboratory workers to realize that battle conditions always require a compromise between perfection and getting something in time for the battle. It was early evident to the Gas Service in France that we were losing, and would continue to lose, vastly more men through removal of masks of the British type, due to discomfort and exhaustion, than we would from a more comfortable but less perfect mask. In other words when protection becomes so much of a burden that the average man cannot or will not stand it, it is high time to find out what men will stand, and then supply it even at the expense of occasional casualties. Protection in battle is always relative. The only perfect protection is to stay at home on the farm. The man who cannot balance protection against legitimate risks has no business passing on arms, equipment or tactics to be used at the Front.

As early as September, 1917, gas training was begun in the First Division at Condrecourt. This training school became the First Corps School. Later a school was established at Langres known as the Army Gas School while two others known as the Second and Third Corps Gas Schools were established elsewhere. The first program of training for troops in France provided for a total period of three months. Of this, two days were allowed the Gas Service. Later this was reduced to six hours, notwithstanding a vigorous protest by the Gas Service. However, following the first gas attacks against the Americans with German projectors in March, 1918, followed a little later by extensive attacks with mustard gas, the A. E. F. Gas Defense School was established at the Experimental Field. Arrangements were made for the accommodation of 200 officers for a six-day course. The number instructed actually averaged about 150, due to the feeling among Division Commanders that they could not spare quite so many officers as were required to furnish 200 per week.

This school was conducted under the Commandant of Hanlon Field, Lieutenant Colonel Hildebrand, by Captain Bush of the British Service. This Gas Defense School became one of the most efficient schools in the A. E. F., and was developing methods of teaching that were highly successful in protecting troops in the field.

=Failure of German Gas.= The losses of the Americans from German gas attacks fluctuated through rather wide limits. There were times in the early days during training when this reached 65 per cent of the total casualties. There were other times in battle, when due to extremely severe losses from machine gun fire in attacks, that the proportion of gas losses to all other forms of casualties was very small. On the whole the casualties from gas reached 27.3 of all casualties. This small percentage was due solely to the fact that when the Americans made their big attacks at San Mihiel and the Argonne, the German supply of gas had run very low. This was particularly true of the supply of mustard gas.

[Illustration: FIG. 11.—German Gas Alarms.]

Fries was at the front visiting the Headquarters of the First Army and the Headquarters of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Corps from two days before the beginning of the battle of the Argonne to four days afterwards. He watched reports of the battle on the morning of the attack at the Army Headquarters and later at the 1st, 5th and 3d Corps headquarters in the order named. No reports of any gas casualties were received. This situation continued throughout the day. It was so remarkable that he told the Chief of Staff he could attribute the German failure to use gas to only one of two possible conditions; first, the enemy was out of gas; second, he was preparing some master stroke. The first proved to be the case as examination after the Armistice of German shell dumps captured during the advance revealed less than 1 per cent of mustard gas shell. Even under these circumstances the Germans caused quite a large number of gas casualties during the later stages of the fighting in the Argonne-Meuse sector.

Evidently the Germans, immediately after the opening of the attack, or more probably some days before, began to gather together all available mustard gas and other gases along the entire western battle front, and ship them to the American sector. This conclusion seems justified because the enemy never had a better chance to use gas effectively than he did the first three or four days of the Argonne fight, and knowing this fact he certainly would never have failed to use the gas if it had been available. Had he possessed 50 per cent of his artillery shell in the shape of mustard gas, our losses in the Argonne-Meuse fight would have been at least 100,000 more than it was. Indeed, it is more than possible we would never have succeeded in taking Sedan and Mezieres in the fall of 1918.

=Officers’ Training Camp.= The first lot of about 100 officers were sent to France in July, 1918, with only a few days’ training, and in some cases with no training at all. Accordingly, arrangements were made to train these men in the duties of the soldier in the ranks, and then as officers. Their training in gas defense and offense followed a month of strenuous work along the above mentioned lines.

This camp was established near Hanlon (Experimental) Field, at a little town called Choignes. The work as laid out included squad and company training for the ordinary soldier, each officer taking turns in commanding the company at drill. They were given work in map reading as well as office and company administration.

This little command was a model of cleanliness and military discipline, and attracted most favorable comment from staff officers on duty at General Headquarters less than two miles distant. Just before the Armistice arrangements were made to transfer this work to Chignon, about 25 miles southeast of Tours, where ample buildings and grounds were available to carry out not alone training of officers but of soldiers along the various lines of work they would encounter, from the handling of a squad, to being Chief Gas Officer of a Division.

=Educating the Army in the Use of Gas.= As has been remarked before, the Medical Department in starting the manufacture of gas masks and other defensive appliances, and the Bureau of Mines in starting researches into poisonous gases as well as defensive materials, were the only official bodies who early interested themselves in gas warfare. Due to this early work of the Bureau of Mines and the Medical Department in starting mask manufacture as well as training in the wearing of gas masks, the defensive side of gas warfare became known throughout the army very far in advance of the offensive side. On the other hand, since the Ordnance Department, which was at first charged with the manufacture of poisonous gases, made practically no move for months, the offensive use of gas did not become known among United States troops until after they landed in France.

Moreover, no gas shell was allowed to be fired by the artillery in practice even in France, so that all the training in gas the artillery could get until it went into the line was defensive, with lectures on the offensive.

The work of raising gas troops was not begun until the late fall of 1917 and as their work is highly technical and dangerous, they were not ready to begin active work on the American front until June, 1918.

By that time the army was getting pretty well drilled in gas defense and despite care in that respect were getting into a frame of mind almost hostile to the use of gas by our own troops. Among certain staff officers, as well as some commanders of fighting units, this hostility was outspoken and almost violent.

Much the hardest, most trying and most skillful work required of Chemical Warfare Service officers was to persuade such Staffs and Commanders that gas was useful and get them to permit of a demonstration on their front. Repeatedly Chemical Warfare Service officers on Division staffs were told by officers in the field that they had nothing to do with gas in offense, that they were simply defensive officers. And yet no one else knew anything about the use of gas. Gradually, however, by constantly keeping before the General Staff and others the results of gas attacks by the Germans, by the British, by the French, and by ourselves, headway was made toward getting our Armies to use gas effectively in offense.

But so slow was this work that it was necessary to train men

## particularly how to appeal to officers and commanders on the subject.

Indeed the following phrase, used first by Colonel Mayo-Smith, became a watchword throughout the Service in the latter part of the war—“Chemical Warfare Service officers have got to go out and sell gas to the Army.” In other words we had to adopt much the same means of making gas known that the manufacturer of a new article adopts to make a thing manufactured by him known to the public.

[Illustration: FIG. 12.—A Typical Shell Dump near the Front.]

This work was exceedingly trying, requiring great skill, great patience and above all a most thorough knowledge of the subject. As illustrating some of these difficulties, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations) of a certain American Corps refused to consider a recommendation to use gas on a certain point in the battle of the Argonne unless the gas officer would state in writing that if the gas was so used it could not possibly result in the casualty of a single American soldier. Such an attitude was perfectly absurd.

The Infantry always expects some losses from our own high explosive when following a barrage, and though realizing the tremendous value of gas, this staff officer refused to use it without an absolute guarantee in writing that it could not possibly injure a single American soldier. Another argument often used was that a gas attack brought retaliatory fire on the front where the gas was used. Such objectors were narrow enough not to realize that the mere fact of heavy retaliation indicated the success of the gas on the enemy for everyone knows an enemy does not retaliate against a thing which does not worry him.

But on the other hand, when the value of gas troops had become fully known, the requests for them were so great that a single platoon had to be assigned to brigades, and sometimes even to whole Divisions. Thus it fell to the Lieutenants commanding these platoons to confer with Division Commanders and Staffs, to recommend how, when and where to use gas, and do so in a manner which would impress the Commanding General and the Staff sufficiently to allow them to undertake the job. That no case of failure has been reported is evidence of the splendid ability of these officers on duty with the gas troops. Efficiency in the big American battles was demanded to an extent unheard of in peace, and had any one of these officers made a considerable failure, it certainly would have been reported and Fries would have heard of it.

Equally hard, and in many cases even more so, was the work of the gas officers on Division, Corps and Army Staffs, who handled the training in Divisions, and who also were required to recommend the use of gas troops, the use of gas in artillery shell and in grenades, and the use of smoke by the infantry in attack. However, the success of the Chemical Warfare Service in the field with these Staff officers was just as great as with the Regiment.

To the everlasting credit of those Staff Officers and the Officers of the Gas Regiment from Colonel Atkisson down, both Staff Gas officers and officers of the Gas Regiment worked together in the fullest harmony with the single object of defeating the Germans.

CHEMICAL WARFARE TROOPS

Chemical Warfare troops were divided into two distinct divisions—gas regiments and staff troops.

[Illustration: FIG. 13.—Firing a 155-Millimeter Howitzer.

The men are wearing gas masks to keep out the enemy gas fired at them in Oct., 1918.]

=Staff Troops.= The staff troops of the Chemical Warfare Service performed all work required of gas troops except that of actual fighting. They handled all Chemical Warfare Service supplies from the time they were unloaded from ships to the time they were issued to the fighting troops at the front, whether the fighting troops were Chemical Warfare or any other. They furnished men for clerical and other services with the Army, Corps and Division Gas Officers, and they manufactured poisonous gases, filled gas shells and did all repairing and altering of gas masks. Though these men received none of the glamour or glory that goes with the fighting men at the front, yet they performed services of the most vital kind and in many cases did work as dangerous and hair raising as going over the top in the face of bursting shell and screaming machine gun bullets.

Think of the intense interest these men must have felt when carrying from the field of battle to the laboratory or experimental field, shell loaded with strange and unheard of compounds and which might any moment burst and end forever their existence! Or watch them drilling into a new shell knowing not what powerful poison or explosive it might contain or what might happen when the drill “went through”!

And again what determination it took to work 12 or 16 hours a day way back at the depots repairing or altering masks, and, as was done at Chateroux, alter and repair 15,000 masks a day and be so rushed that at times they had a bare day’s work of remodeled masks ahead. But they kept ahead and to the great glory of these men no American soldier ever had to go to the front without a mask. And what finer work than that of these men who, in the laboratory and testing room, toyed with death in testing unknown gases with American and foreign masks even to the extent of applying the gases to their own bodies.

Heroic, real American work, all of it and done in real American style as part of the day’s work without thought of glory and without hope of reward.

=The First Gas Regiment.= In the first study of army organization made by the General Staff it was decided to recommend raising under the Chief of Engineers one regiment of six companies of gas troops.

Shortly after the cable of August 17, 1917, was sent stating that Lieut. Colonel Fries would be made Chief of the Gas Service, the War Department promoted him to be Colonel of the 30th Engineers which later became the First Gas Regiment. At almost the same time, Captain Atkisson, Corps of Engineers, was appointed Lieut. Col. of the Regiment. Although Colonel Fries remained the nominal Commander of the regiment, he never acted in that capacity, for his duties as Chief of the Gas Service left him neither time nor opportunity. All the credit for raising, training, and equipping the First Gas Regiment belongs to Colonel E. J. Atkisson and the officers picked by him.

Immediately upon the formation of the Gas Service, the Chief urged that many more than six companies of gas troops should be provided. These recommendations were repeated and urged for the next two months or until about the first of November, when it became apparent that an increase could not be obtained at that time and that any further urging would only cause irritation. The matter was therefore dropped until a more auspicious time should arrive. This arrived the next spring when the first German projector attack against United States troops produced severe casualties, exactly as had been forecasted by the Gas Service. About the middle of March, 1918, an increase from two battalions to six battalions (eighteen companies) was authorized. A further increase to three regiments of six battalions each (a total of fifty-four companies) was authorized early in September, 1918, after the very great value of gas troops had been demonstrated in the fight from the Marne to the Vesle in July.

[Illustration: FIG. 14.—Receiving and Transmitting Data for Firing Gas Shell while Wearing Gas Masks. Battlefield of the Argonne, October, 1918.]

=No Equipment for Gas Troops.= About the first of December a cablegram was received from the United States stating that due to lack of equipment the various regiments of special engineers recently authorized, including the 30th (Gas and Flame) would not be organized until the spring of 1918. An urgent cablegram was then sent calling attention to the fact that gas troops were not service of supply troops but first line fighting troops, and consequently that they should be raised and trained in time to take the field with the first Americans going into the line. At this same time the 30th regiment was given early priority by the General Staff, A. E. F., on the priority lists for troop shipments from the United States. The raising of the first two companies was then continued under Colonel Atkisson at the American University in Washington.

About January 15 word was received that the Headquarters of the regiment and the Headquarters of the First Battalion together with Companies A and B of the 30th Engineers (later the First Gas Regiment) were expected to arrive very soon. Some months prior General Foulkes, Chief of the British Gas Service in the field, had stated that he would be glad to have the gas troops assigned to him for training. It was agreed that the training should include operations in the front line for a time to enable the American Gas Troops to carry on gas operations independently of anyone else and with entire safety to themselves and the rest of the Army.

Due to the fact that the British were occupying their gas school, the British General Headquarters were a little reluctant to take the American troops Feb. 1. However, General Foulkes made room for the American troops by moving his own troops out. He then placed his best officers in charge of their training and at all times did everything in his power to help the American Gas Troops learn the gas game and get sufficient supplies to operate with. Colonel Hartley, Assistant to General Foulkes, also did everything he could to help the American Gas Service. These two officers did more than any other foreign officers in France to enable the Chemical Warfare Service to make the success it did.

=Second Battle of the Marne.= The Chief of the Gas Service, following a visit to the British Gas Headquarters, and the Headquarters of the American 2d Corps then operating with the British, arrived on the evening of July 17, 1918, at 1st Corps Headquarters at La Ferte sous Jouarre about 10 miles southeast of Château-Thierry.

Two companies of the First Gas Regiment would have been ready in 48 hours to put off a projector attack against an excellent target just west of Belleau Wood had not the 2d battle of the Marne opened when it did. It is said that General Foch had kept this special attack so secret that the First American Corps Commander knew it less than 48 hours prior to the hour set for its beginning. Certainly the Chief of the Gas Service knew nothing of it until about 9:00 P.M., the night of July 17th. Consequently the gas attack was not made. At that time so little was known of the usefulness of gas troops that they were started on road work. At Colonel Atkisson’s suggestion that gas troops could clean out machine gun nests, he was asked to visit the First Corps headquarters and take up his suggestion vigorously with the First Corps Staff.

=Attacking Machine Gun Nests.= Thereupon the Gas troops were allowed to try attacking machine gun nests with phosphorus and thermite. This work proved so satisfactory that not long afterwards the General Staff authorized an increase in gas troops from 18 companies to 54 companies, to be formed into three regiments of two battalions each. The 6 companies in France did excellent work with smoke and thermite during all the second battle of the Marne to the Vesle river, where by means of smoke screens they made possible the crossing of that river and the gaining of a foothold on the north or German side.

With the assembling of American troops in the sector near Verdun in September, 1918, the gas troops were all collected there with the exception of one or two companies and took a very active part in the capture of the St. Mihiel salient. It was at this battle that the Chemical Warfare Service really began to handle offensive gas operations in the way they should be handled. Plans were drawn for the use of gas and smoke by artillery and gas troops both. The use of high explosives in Liven’s bombs was also planned. Those plans were properly co-ordinated with all the other arms of the service in making the attack. Gas was to be used not alone by gas troops but by the artillery. Plans were made so that the different kinds of gases would be used where they would do the most good. While these plans and their execution were far from perfect, they marked a tremendous advance and demonstrated to everyone the possibilities that lay in gas and smoke both with artillery and with gas troops.

Following the attack on the St. Mihiel salient, came the battle of the Argonne, where plans were drawn as before, using the added knowledge gained at St. Mihiel. The work was accordingly more satisfactory. However, the attempt to cover the entire American front of nine divisions with only six companies proved too great a task. Practically all gas troops were put in the front line the morning of the attack. Due to weather conditions they used mostly phosphorus and thermite with 4 inch Stokes’ mortars. Having learned how useful these were in taking machine gun nests, plans were made to have them keep right up with the Infantry. This they did in a remarkable manner considering the weight of the Stokes’ mortar and the base plates and also that each Stokes’ mortar bomb weighed about 25 pounds. There were cases where they carried these mortars and bombs for miles on their backs, while in other cases they used pack animals.

[Illustration: FIG. 15.—Setting Up a Smoke Barrage with Smoke Pots.]

Not expecting the battle to be nearly continuous as it was for three weeks, the men, as before stated, were all put in the front line the morning of the attack. This resulted in their nearly complete exhaustion the first week, since they fought or marched day and night during nearly the whole time. Taking a lesson from this, in later attacks only half the men were put in the line in the first place, no matter if certain sectors had to be omitted. Fully as good results were obtained because, as the men became worn out, fresh ones were sent in and the others given a chance to recuperate. Officers relate many different occurrences showing the discipline and character of these gas troops. On one occasion where a battalion of infantry was being held up by a machine gun nest, volunteers were called for. Only two men, both from the gas regiment, volunteered though they were joined a little later by two others from the same regiment, and these four took the guns. While it was not considered desirable for gas troops to attempt to take prisoners, yet the regiment took quite a number, due solely to the fact that they were not only with the advancing infantry but at times actually in front of it. On another occasion a gas officer, seeing a machine gun battalion badly shot up and more or less rattled, took command and got them into action in fine shape.

At this stage the Second Army was formed to the southeast of Verdun and plans were drawn for a big attack about November 14. The value of gas troops was appreciated so much that the Second Army asked to have British gas troops assigned to them since no American gas troops were available. Accordingly in response to a request made by the American General Headquarters, the British sent 10 companies of their gas troops. These reached the front just before the Armistice, and hence were unable to carry out any attacks there.

This short history of the operations of the First Gas Regiment covers only the high spots in its organization and work. It covers

## particularly its early troubles, as those are felt to be the ones most

important to have in mind if ever it be necessary again to organize C. W. S. troops on an extensive scale. The Regiment engaged in nearly 200 separate actions with poisonous gases, smoke and high explosives, and took part in every big battle from the second battle of the Marne to the end of the War. They were the first American troops to train with the British, and were undoubtedly the first American troops to take actual part in fighting the enemy as they aided the British individually and as entire units in putting off gas attacks, in February and March, 1918. It would be a long history itself to recite the actions in which the First Gas Regiment took part and in which it won distinction.[16]

[Footnote 16: Story of the First Gas Regiment, James T. Addison. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919.]

No better summary of the work of this Regiment can be written than that of Colonel Atkisson in the four concluding paragraphs of his official report written just after the Armistice:

“The First Gas Regiment was made up largely of volunteers—volunteers for this special service. Little was known of its character when the first information was sent broadcast over the United States, bringing it to the attention of the men of our country. The keynote of this information was a desire for keen, red-blooded men who wanted to fight. They came into it in the spirit of a fighting unit, and were ready, not only to develop, but to make a new service. No effort was spared to make the organization as useful as the strength of the limited personnel allowed.

“The first unit to arrive in France moved to the forward area within eight weeks of its arrival, and, from that time, with the exception of four weeks, was continuously in forward areas carrying on operations. The third and last unit moved forward within six weeks of its arrival in France, and was continuously engaged until the signing of the Armistice.

“That the regiment entered the fight and carried the methods developed into execution where they would be of value, is witnessed by the fact that over thirty-five percent of the strength of the unit became casualties.

“It is only fitting to record the spirit and true devotion which prompted the officers and men who came from civil life into this Regiment, mastered the details of this new service, and, through their untiring efforts and utter disregard of self, made possible any success which the Regiment may have had. It was truly in keeping with the high ideals which have prompted our entire Army and Country in this conflict. They made the motto of ‘Service,’ a real, living, inspiring thing.”

SUPPLY

As previously stated it was decided early that the Chemical Warfare Service should have a complete supply service including purchase, manufacture, storage and issue, and accordingly separate supply depots were picked out for the Gas Service early in the fall by Col. Crawford. Where practicable these were located in the same area as all other depots though in one instance the French forced the Gas Service to locate its gas shell and bomb depot some fifteen miles from the general depots through an unreasonable fear of the gas.

=Manufacture of Gases.= Due to the time required and the cost of manufacturing gases, an early decision became imperative as to what gases should be used by the Americans, and into what shells and bombs they should be filled. As there was no one else working on the subject the sole responsibility fell upon the Chief of the Gas Service. The work was further complicated by the fact that the British and French did not agree upon what gases should be used. The British condemned viciously Vincennite (hydrocyanic acid gas with some added ingredients) of the French, while the French stated that chloropicrin, used by the British principally as a lachrymator, was worthless. Fries felt the tremendous responsibility that rested upon him and finally after much thought and before coming to any conclusion, wrote the first draft of a short paper on gas warfare. In that paper he took up the tactical uses to which gases might be put and then studied the best and most available gases to meet those tactical needs.

Without stating further details it was decided to recommend the manufacture and use of chlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin, bromoacetone and mustard gas. As the gas service was also charged with handling smoke and incendiary materials, smoke was prescribed in the proportion of 5 per cent of the total chemicals to be furnished. The smoke material decided upon was white phosphorus.

The paper on Gas Warfare was then re-drafted and submitted to the French and British and written up in final form prescribing the gases above mentioned on October 26. Following this a cable was drawn and submitted to the General Staff. After many conferences and some delay the cable went forward on November 3.

CABLE 268, NOVEMBER 4, 1917

Paragraph 12. For chief of Ordnance. With reference to paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, desire prompt information as to whether recommendation is approved that phosgene, chloropicrin, hydrocyanic acid, and chlorine be purchased in France or England and filling plants established in France for filling shells and bombs with those gases.

Subparagraph A. Reference to your telegram 253, recommend filling approximately 10 per cent all shells with gases as given below, but that filling plants and gas factories be made capable of filling a total of 25 per cent. Unless ordinary name is given, gases are designated by numbers in chemical code War Gas investigations. Of 75 millimeter shells fill 1 per cent Vincennite, 4 per cent phosgene or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent chloropicrin, 2½ per cent mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material. According to French 75 millimeter steel shells should not be filled with Vincennite more than three months before being used. No trouble with other gases or other sized shells except that bromoacetone must be in glass lined shells. Of 4.7 inch shells fill 5 per cent with phosgene or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent with chloropicrin, 2½ per cent with mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material. Provide same percentage for all other shells up to and including 8 inch caliber as for 4.7 inch shells. 4 inch Stokes’ mortar will use same gases and smoke shells and in addition thermit. 8 inch projector bombs will use the same as the Stokes’ mortar and also oil to break into flame on _bursting_. Cloud gas cylinders will be filled with 50 or 60 per cent phosgene, mixed with 40 to 50 per cent chlorine, or phosgene and some other gas. Renew recommendation that filling plants be established in France to provide sudden shifts in gas warfare of all kinds, as well as for filling all 4 inch Stokes’ mortar bombs, 8 inch projector bombs and cloud gas cylinders. It is strongly recommended that efforts be made to produce white phosphorus on large scale for its usefulness both as smoke screens and to produce casualties.

Subparagraph B. For the Adjutant General of the Army. With reference to paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, desire information as to whether recommendation is approved that an engineer officer assisted by Professor Hulett be assigned to Gas Service in Washington to handle all orders and correspondence concerning gas.

Subparagraph C. For Surgeon General. With reference to paragraph 2 your cablegram 205, and paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, what is status of chemical laboratory for France? Also have the 12 selected Reserve Officers for training in gas defense sailed for France?

Subparagraph D. With reference to paragraph 17 your cablegram 165 and paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, Tissot has constructed simpler model of his mask for attachment to any box. Have ordered 6 which will be completed in two weeks, 3 of which will be forwarded at once. A simple type such as this may prove useful for large number of troops. Letter of permission to manufacture Tissot masks being forwarded.

Subparagraph E. With reference to paragraph 8 your cablegram 143, and paragraph 4 your cablegram 247, in considering charcoal and other fillers for canister of box respirator it should be remembered that the front is very damp, the air being nearly saturated during greater part of winter, fall and spring.

This cable is given in full to show that not later than November 4, 1917, it was known in the United States not only what gases would be required but also in what shells, bombs, guns and mortars each would be used. While a small quantity of Vincennite was recommended in this cable, another cable sent within a month requested that no Vincennite whatever be manufactured. This decision as to gases and guns in which they were to be used, while very progressive, proved entirely sound and remained unchanged, with slight exceptions due to new discoveries, until the end of the war. Without a thorough understanding of tactics a proper choice of gases could not have been made. This fact emphasizes the necessity of having a trained technical army man at the head of any gas service.

Due to the absence of a Chemical Warfare Service in the United States at this time, a very great deal of the information sent from France, whether by cable or by letter, never reached those needing it.

=Smoke.= About the first of December after a study of results obtained by the British and the Germans in the use of smoke in artillery shells for screening purposes, the Gas Service decided that much more smoke than had been stated in cable 268 to the United States was desirable. The General Staff, however, refused to authorize any increase, but did allow to be sent in a cable a statement to the effect that a large increase in smoke materials might be advisable for smoke screens, and that accordingly the amount of phosphorus needed in a year of war would probably be three or four times the one and a half million pounds of white phosphorus stated to have been contracted for by the Ordnance Department in the United States. This advanced position of the Gas Service in regard to smoke proved sound in 1918, when every effort was made to increase the quantity of white phosphorus available and to extend its use in artillery shells including even the 3 inch Stokes’ mortar.

[Illustration: FIG. 16.—Troops Advancing Behind a Smoke Barrage (Phosphorus).]

=Overseas Repair Section No. 1.= During the latter part of November, 1917, Overseas Repair Section No. 1, under the command of Captain Mayo-Smith, Sanitary Corps, with four other officers and 130 men, arrived in France. Since mask development and manufacture in the United States was still under the Medical Department, this mask repair section was organized as a part of the Sanitary Corps. As there were at that time no masks to be repaired and no laboratory equipment or buildings for that purpose on hand and none likely to be for months to come, Captain Mayo-Smith was assigned to duty under Colonel Crawford, Chief Gas Officer with the Line of Communication, in Paris. A site for a mask repair plant was located at Châteauroux, and a site for a gas depot at Gievres was investigated. Inasmuch as there was at that time greater need for men to learn the handling of poisonous gases than to repair masks, some 40 or 50 of the company were put in gas shell filling plants at Aubervilliers and Vincennes in the suburbs of Paris, while later still others were assigned to Pont de Claix near Grenoble. The remainder of the company were used in the Gas Depot at Gievres and in the office in Paris.

It was not until the latter part of June, 1918, that the mask repair plant began operations. In the meantime these men did very valuable work in shell filling and in learning the manufacture of gases. Several of them were sent to the United States, some of them remaining throughout the war to aid in gas manufacture and in shell filling.

=Construction Division, Gas Service.= The Construction Division under Colonel Crawford in Paris made complete plans for phosgene manufacturing plants, for shell filling plants and for the Mask Repair Plant. These plans included a complete layout of the work for all persons to be employed in the plants. During this same time a very careful study of the possibilities for manufacturing gas for filling shell in France was made.

Finally about March 1, in accordance with the strong recommendations of these men, Fries reported to General Pershing in person that the manufacture of gas as well as the filling of shell in France was inadvisable from every point of view and accordingly he recommended that gas manufacture and shell filling in France be given up. General Pershing strongly approved the recommendation and a cablegram was at once sent to the United States to that effect. The main reason for this action was the lack of chlorine, since chlorine was the principal ingredient of nearly all poisonous gases then in use. Chlorine takes, besides salt, electric power and lots of it. Electric power requires coal or water power. Neither of the latter sources were available in France. This question was gone into very thoroughly. The only place where power might have been developed was in a remote spot near Spain, and the outlook there was such that it appeared impossible to begin the manufacture of chlorine under two years. On the other hand the shipment of chlorine from the United States required from 75 per cent to 100 per cent of the tonnage required to ship the manufactured gases themselves, to say nothing of the labor, raw materials, and the machinery that would have had to be shipped in order to manufacture gas in France.

=Mustard Gas.= As previously stated Mustard Gas was first used by the Germans against the British at Ypres on the nights of July 11 and 12, 1917. It was not used much against the French until more than two months later. Indeed, gas was never used by the Germans to the same extent against the French as against the English. There are probably two reasons for this; first, the Germans had a deeper hatred for the British than the French; second, the British morale was higher than the French in 1917, and the German thought that if he could break down this British morale, he could win the war.

The first attack came as a surprise and accordingly got an unusually large number of casualties. As previously stated the casualties numbered about 20,000 in about six weeks. This number was considered so serious that the beginning of the series of attacks against Ypres in the fall of 1917, was delayed by the British for 10 days or two weeks until they could study better how to avoid such great losses from mustard gas. While the composition of the gas was known within two or three days, as well as the laboratory method by which it was first manufactured by Victor Meyer in 1886, it took some 11 months to develop reliable and practical methods of manufacturing it on a large scale. The Inter-allied Gas Conference in September, 1917, gave a great deal of attention to mustard gas and methods of combating it both from the view point of prevention and of curing those gassed by it.

Just following the close of that conference a cable was sent to the United States asking the possibility of manufacturing ethylene chlorhydrin, the principal element in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only process then known. Later, that is about the middle of October, a cablegram was sent urging investigation into the manufacture of this gas. It is believed a great deal of time might have been saved had the policy of undue secrecy not been adopted by the British and others before the Americans entered the war. In fact we were only told in whispers the formula for mustard gas, and where a description of it could be found in German chemistries. This was arrant nonsense since if the Germans had gotten all mustard gas information then in the hands of the British they would have received far less information than they already possessed on mustard gas.

[Illustration: FIG. 17.—“Who Said Gas?”]

Whether the information sent to the United States on mustard gas ultimately proved of any great value is an open question since the methods adopted in the United States were very greatly superior to those used in England and in France. It probably helped by suggestion rather than by actual details of design. Anyhow it all emphasizes the difficulties encountered in war when so vital a substance as mustard gas must be investigated after the enemy has begun using it on a large scale.

=Delay of British Masks.= As December 1 approached, and as nothing further had been heard of the order for 300,000 British Respirators placed about the middle of October, a telegram was sent to England asking if deliveries would be made as required in the order for the masks. This order required the first 75,000 to be delivered December 1, 1917. In reply it was stated that the British could not furnish these masks, and that they understood that the Americans were just beginning a large output of masks in the United States. An exchange of cablegrams with the United States showed that no masks could be expected from there for 3 to 5 months. Moreover it became increasingly evident that the Americans were going into the battle line sooner than at first contemplated. Another cablegram was then sent to England urging the delivery of these masks. The reply was to the effect that the English Government could not deliver the masks because they did not have enough for their own use. This situation was very serious. Unless the order for 300,000 masks placed with the British could be filled, we were facing the necessity of sending American troops into the front line with only the French M-2 mask. While the M-2 mask was then the only mask used by the French, it was well known to afford practically no protection against the high concentrations of phosgene obtained from cloud or projector attacks. And it was just such attacks as these that our men would encounter in the front line during training. Accordingly arrangements were made for a hurried trip to England.

Colonel Harrison of the British Royal Engineers was in charge of the British manufacture of masks and it is desired here to express appreciation of his uniform courtesy and great helpfulness. He exhibited their methods and facilities and assured us they could meet any requirements of ours for masks up to a half million, or even more if necessary, provided they were given time to establish additional facilities. Finally after a further exchange of cables the masks were obtained.

During December, 1917 and January, 1918, when every effort was being made to hurry a lot of masks from Havre—Havre being the British supply base in France from which the masks were issued to the United States, the severe cold and snow had so disorganized French traffic that it was extremely difficult to get cars moving at all. In an effort to get the masks, priority of shipment was obtained and two or three officers were assigned to convoy the cars. Notwithstanding convoying, one carload of 4,000 masks, mainly threes and fours, became lost and only turned up five weeks later. To make matters worse the British were sending us very many more of the small sized No. 2 masks than we could use. The loss of this carload of 4,000 number threes and fours was all but a tragedy. Indeed, in order to get the First Brigade of the First Division equipped in time it was necessary to take a large number of masks already issued to men of the Second Brigade. These masks were first thoroughly washed and disinfected and then re-issued.

This all emphasizes the great difficulties that are encountered when a new and vital service must be organized in war 4,000 miles overseas without material, home supplies, or men to draw from. This struggle to get sufficient masks to keep all men fully equipped remained very acute until in July, 1918, when the arrival of hundreds of thousands of masks from the United States made the situation entirely safe. Even then the necessity of weakening the elastics and shortening the rubber tubing of the mouthpieces on some 700,000 masks, doubled up our work tremendously, and added enormously to our troubles in getting masks to the front in time.

Notwithstanding these troubles the Chemical Warfare Supply Service never failed and finally forged to the very forefront of all American supply services. Its method of issuing supplies to troops at the front has been adopted as the standard for American field armies of the future.

TECHNICAL

=Gas Laboratory in Paris.= Early in January, 1918, the first members of the Chemical Service Section, National Army, under the command of Colonel R. F. Bacon, arrived in France and reported for duty. Previously, a laboratory site at Puteaux, a suburb of Paris, had been selected. This plant had been built by a society for investigation into tuberculosis. Previous to the arrival of the Chemical Service Section, information had been requested from the United States by cable as to the size of the laboratory section to be sent over. The reply stated that the number would probably total about 100 commissioned and enlisted. The site at Puteaux was accordingly definitely decided upon. Just following this decision two cables, one after the other, came from the United States recommending certain specified buildings in Paris for the laboratory. It was found upon investigation in both cases that the buildings were either absolutely unsuited or unfinished. This was another case of trying to fight a war over 4,000 miles of cable. Colonel Bacon was made head of the Technical Division, which position he held throughout the war.

[Illustration: FIG. 18.—Shaper for Opening Captured Gas Shell.]

=Technically Trained Men.= In January, 1918, in response to a cable from the United States a request had been made on the French Government to send six of their ablest glass blowers to the United States to aid in making glass lined shells. The French Gas authorities said that it would be impossible to send those or indeed any other men trained in the manufacture or handling of poisonous gases or gas containers as they did not have enough such men for their own work. Accordingly a cablegram was drafted and sent to the United States, requesting that 50 men experienced in various lines of technical and chemical work be sent to France. The French authorities said they would put them in any factories, laboratories or experimental places that the Chief of the Gas Service desired. A second inquiry about these men was sent but nevertheless no answer was ever received and no men were sent.

=Protection Against Particulate Clouds.= Just at this time, about the first of February, 1918, the danger that the Germans might devise some better method of sending over diphenylchloroarsine than by pulverizing it in high explosive shell was felt to be serious. The British had just then perfected protection against diphenylchloroarsine by employing unsized sulfate wood pulp paper—48 to 60 layers being required. This number of layers was found to be necessary as they are very thin and porous. The British had developed a method of putting this paper around a canister and yet keeping the canister small enough to fit into the knapsack by reversing its position therein; that is, putting the canister in the compartment of the knapsack made for the face piece and putting the face piece in the other compartment. Some of our own officers and enlisted men were sent to England to work with the British on this and an order given them for 200,000 of the protected canisters. They improved on the methods of the British and as it was found that sulfate paper was very scarce, investigations were made to see if any of it could be manufactured in France. Very soon thereafter such a place was located near the city of Nancy. Following this a cablegram was sent to the United States giving complete specifications for making this diphenylchloroarsine protection. From this cablegram successful samples were made though somewhat more bulky than those developed in England. Very few, however, of these were made in the United States due, we were informed, to the poor quality of the sulfate paper. Work was however begun energetically in the United States on other methods of protection against diphenylchloroarsine.

=Numbers of Chemists Needed.= It was figured that out of a total force of some 1,400 gas officers there would be needed in the A. E. F., exclusive of those in regiments, approximately 200 chemists, i.e., about 15 per cent of the whole. We arranged to have a good chemist on each Division, Corps and Army Staff, and a certain number with the gas troops. It was proposed to put 20 to 40 in the laboratory in Paris and not to exceed 20 at the experimental field. This subject of personnel is touched on for the reason that a few people seem to have the idea that the Chemical Warfare Service should be made up of chemists exclusively. This is very far from being true. It was and is believed that the Chemical Warfare Service should be composed of men from every walk of life. In three positions out of every four in the field a good personality combined with energy, hard work and common sense count for more than mere technical training.

=Hanlon (Experimental) Field.= As early as December 15, 1917, it was decided that an experimental field in France was necessary, and a letter was written to the General Staff requesting authority to establish one. After considerable delay the authority was granted and search for a site begun. This was no easy task. While the French were loading millions of gas shells at the edge of Paris, they appeared unwilling at first to have us establish a gas experimental field except in abandoned or inaccessible spots. Finally a very good site was found and agreed to by the French some 7 miles south of General Headquarters. Just when we were ready to start work the French discovered that the proposed field included a portion of one of their artillery firing ranges. They then suggested another site within 3 miles of General Headquarters. This was a rather fortunate accident as the site suggested was a better one than at first picked out. The field was roughly rectangular from 7 to 8 miles in length, and 3 to 4 miles in width. The total area was about 20 square miles. The work of this experimental field proved a great success and was rapidly becoming the real center of the Gas Service in France.

The old saying that the history of a happy country is very brief applies to this story of the Technical Section of the Gas Service in France. Its work did not begin as early as that of the other sections, and as considerable of it was of a nature that could be put off without immediate fatal effects, the Section was enabled to grow without the very serious drawbacks encountered by other Sections of the Gas Service.

Nevertheless its usefulness was very great. Those of the Technical Section either at the experimental field or at the laboratory were charged with the opening of all sorts of known and unknown gas and high explosive shells, fuses and similar things to determine their contents and their poisonous or explosive qualities. This was work of a very technical nature, and at the same time highly dangerous.

As stated elsewhere, the determination of the life of the masks became one of the problems which the laboratory was trying to solve. Hundreds of canisters were tested, and hundreds per month would have continued to have been tested throughout the remainder of the war had the war gone into 1919. It was on the Technical Section that devolved the duty of determining at the earliest possible moment the physical properties as well as the physiological effects of any new gas.

Also on that Section fell the preliminary reports as to the probable usefulness in war of a new gas whether sent over by the enemy or suggested by our own Technical men, or those of our Allies. This was indeed a task by itself, as it required a wide knowledge of the methods of using gases, methods of manufacturing them, and methods of projecting them on the field of battle.

In addition, it was the duty of the Technical Section to keep the Chief of the Service fully informed on all the latest developments in gases and to get that information in shape so that the Chief with his increasingly wide range of duties would be enabled to keep track of them without reading the enormous amount ordinarily written.

A much earlier start on technical work would have proved of immense advantage. In case of another war, the technical side of chemical warfare should be taken up with the very first expedition that proceeds to the hostile zone. Had that been done in France, we would have had masks and gases and proper shells and bombs at least six months before we did.

INTELLIGENCE

While Intelligence was for a long time under the Training or Technical Divisions, it finally assumed such importance that it was made a separate Division. It was so thoroughly organized that by the time of the Armistice the Chief of the Division could go anywhere among the United States forces down to companies and immediately locate the Gas Intelligence officer.

=Intelligence Division.= This work was started by Lieutenant Colonel Goss within a month after he reported in October, 1917. The Intelligence Division developed the publication of numerous occasional pamphlets and also a weekly gas bulletin. So extensive was the work of this Division that three mimeograph machines were kept constantly going. The weekly bulletin received very flattering notice from the British Assistant Chief of Gas Service in the Field. He stated that it contained a great deal of information he was unable to get from any other source.

Among other work undertaken by this Intelligence Division was the compilation of a History of the Chemical Warfare Service in France. This alone involved a lot of work. In order that this history might be truly representative, about three months before the Armistice both moving and still pictures were taken of actual battle conditions, as well as of numerous works along the Service of Supplies.

Without going into further detail it is sufficient to say that when the Armistice was signed there were available some 200 still pictures, and some 8,000 feet of moving picture films. Steps were immediately taken to have this work continued along definite lines to give a complete and continuous history of the Chemical Warfare Service in France in all its phases.

The intelligence work of the Gas Service, while parallel to a small extent with the General Intelligence Service of the A. E. F., had to spread to a far greater extent in order to get the technical details of research, manufacture, development, proving, and handling poisonous gases in the field. It included also obtaining information at the seats of Government of the Allies, as well as from the enemy and other foreign sources.

The most conspicuous intelligence work done along these lines was by Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Zanetti, who was made Chemical Warfare liaison officer with the French in October, 1917. He gathered together and forwarded through the Headquarters of the Chemical Warfare Service to the United States more information concerning foreign gases, and foreign methods of manufacturing and handling them, than was sent from all other sources combined. By his personality, energy and industry he obtained the complete confidence of the French and British. This confidence was of the utmost importance in enabling him to get information which could have been obtained in no other way. Suffice to say that in the 13 months he was liaison officer with the French during the war, he prepared over 750 reports, some of them very technical and of great length.

As a whole, the Intelligence Division was one of the most successful parts of the Chemical Warfare Service. Starting 2½ years after the British and French, the weekly bulletin and occasional papers sent out by the Chemical Warfare Service on chemical warfare matters came to be looked upon as the best available source for chemical warfare information, not alone by our own troops but also by the British.

MEDICAL

The Medical Section of the Chemical Warfare Service was composed of officers of the Medical Department of the Army attached to the Chemical Warfare Service. These were in addition to others who worked as an integral part of the Chemical Warfare Service, either at the laboratory or on the experimental field in carrying out experiments on animals to determine the effectiveness of the gases.

The Medical Section was important for the reason that it formed the connecting link between the Chemical Warfare Service and the Medical Department. Through this Section, the Medical Department was enabled to know the kinds of gases that would probably be handled, both by our own troops and by the enemy, and their probable physiological effects.

Colonel H. L. Gilchrist, Medical Department, was the head of this Section. It was through his efforts that the Medical Department realized in time the size of the problem that it had to encounter in caring for gas patients. Indeed, records of the war showed that out of 224,089 men, exclusive of Marines, admitted to the hospitals in France, 70,552 were suffering from gas alone. These men received a total of 266,112 wounds, of which 88,980, or 33.4 per cent, were gas. Thus ⅓ of all wounds received by men admitted to the hospital were gas. While the records show that the gas cases did not remain on the average in the hospitals quite as long as in the case of other classes of wounds, yet gas cases became one of the most important features of the Medical Department’s work in the field.

The Medical Section, through its intimate knowledge of what was going on in the Chemical Warfare Service as well as what was contemplated and being experimented with, was enabled to work out methods of handling all gas cases far in advance of what could have been done had there been no such section. One instance alone illustrates this fully. It became known fairly early that if a man who had been gassed with mustard gas could get a thorough cleansing and an entire change of clothing within an hour after exposure, the body burns could be eliminated or largely decreased in severity. This led to the development of degassing units. These consisted of 1,200 gallon tanks on five-ton trucks equipped with a heater. Accompanying this were sprinkling arrangements whereby a man could be given a shower bath, his nose, eyes and ears treated with bicarbonate of soda, and then be given an entire change of clothing. These proved a very great success, although they were not developed in time to be used extensively before the war closed.

There is an important side to the Medical Section during peace, that must be kept in mind. The final decision as to whether a gas should be manufactured on a large scale and used extensively on the field of battle depends upon its physiological and morale effect upon troops. In the case of the most powerful gases, the determination of the relative values of those gases so far as their effects on human beings is concerned is a very laborious and exacting job. Such gases have to be handled with extreme caution, necessitating many experiments over long periods of time in order to arrive at correct decisions.

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