Part 44
III. Never venture into the world without having solemnly committed yourself to the grace of Christ. Trust your soul afresh in the hands of Jesus every morning, that he may keep you true to himself all the day. All the divine motives you have learned, and all the solemn engagements under which you lay your own souls, will prove but a weak defence to virtue without faith and prayer. Commit yourselves to him who is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless. Your hearts, your lips, and your lives must be in his keeping, if you would have them true to God or man. Your adversary the devil is watchful and busy with all his wiles to tempt you to falsehood and inconstancy; none but he who has conquered the devil can be your sufficient guardian. And when and wheresoever we find frailty and folly in ourselves, O may the strength of Christ appear in our weakness, and be glorified in our preservation!
Thus I have finished all that I proposed concerning the first duty recommended in my text, Whatsoever things are true—think on these things.
There may be perhaps some other instances wherein this divine character of truth, uprightness, or integrity, ought to appear in the conduct of christians which do not so directly and immediately fall under the general heads which I have before named: But they may be easily reduced to one or another of them. There are various other methods of deceit and falsehood practised in the world, which break in upon this sacred character of truth, which I have not expressly mentioned before; such as subscribing with the hand to testify our assent to opinions, which we do not believe; counterfeiting the names or writings of other persons without their knowledge, consent, or approbation; adding or blotting out any thing from divine writings; or doing the same to the writings or men in civil affairs or contracts, whereby one party or another may receive damage; practising fraud or deceit, or any criminal concealment in matters of traffic, or in matters of trust; and, in general, forgery and knavery of all kinds whatsoever: some of these may, by natural and easy consequences, be reduced to the heads I have spoken of, and are effectually precluded by the large description of moral truth, which I have given: Others of them fall as naturally under the general head of justice and injustice, which will be the subject of one of the following discourses.
AN APPENDIX _To the three foregoing Sermons, wherein two important Questions about_ TRUTH _and_ LYING, _are debated at large_.
Question I. If I have a good and valuable end in speaking, and my design is to serve the glory of God, or the good of my neighbour, may I not then use the art of lying, or speak a known falsehood, without sin? Did not Rahab the harlot practise this; Josh. ii. 4, 5. when she hid the spies of Israel, and told the messengers of the king of Jericho, that she knew not whence they came, nor whither they went? And yet she is commended by the apostle Paul; Heb. xi. 31. That _by faith the harlot Rahab perished not with unbelievers, when she received the spies in peace_.
Answer I. When any action, considered in itself, is utterly unlawful, it is not possible that the goodness of the end or design, can so change the law of God, or alter the nature of things, as to make that action lawful. The apostle Paul brings the same objection; Rom. iii. 7. _If the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a sinner?_ But in the next verse, he speaks of it with indignation, as a heinous slander cast upon him, that he should maintain this pernicious doctrine, _Let us do evil that good may come_: And he adds concerning these slanderers, or concerning those who hold this doctrine of doing evil with a good design, that _their damnation is just_; ver. 8.
Answer II. The case of Rahab is easily adjusted in this manner, without allowing a lie to be lawful: Rahab, though she was a woman of evil fame in Jericho, yet had heard of the promise of God to Israel, to establish them in the land of Canaan; she believed this promise, and under the influence of this faith she entertained the spies, and thereby assisted the Israelites in the conquest of that city; so far her action is approved of God, and mentioned with honour: But she used a very sinful method in compassing this design, when she told a plain lie to the messengers of the king. The timorousness of her temper was a sore temptation to her; and though she fell into a criminal action, yet God so far excused the ill conduct, as to forgive the falsehood, and thereby put a more signal honour upon the eminence of her faith. Her name stands therefore recorded with honour in scripture among believers. But the lie, though it was pardoned, remains still a blemish to her character.
There may be also a reason given why the scripture does not particularly make any sharp remark upon this falsehood of Rahab: for the great degree of her ignorance does much lessen her fault, though not cancel it. A woman of her character, living in a heathen country, may well be supposed to have had little knowledge of the sinfulness of so beneficial a lie as that was, and no scruple about it.
But it is by no means a sufficient justification of her conduct, that the scripture does not directly censure her for lying; for there are many actions recorded in scripture, both of saints and sinners, which are utterly unlawful in the sight of God, which yet have not an express censure passed upon them. Rahab’s being an harlot is not censured in any part of her history; nor Judah’s defiling Tamar his daughter-in-law; nor Jacob and Rebecca’s complication of lies to gain the blessing; nor the most express and wicked lie of the old prophet in Bethel, though it was the cause of the death of another prophet; 1 Kings xiii. yet surely these were crimes of heinous guilt. The plain commands or prohibitions of scripture are the rules to govern our practice: Nor can we fetch the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any matter of fact from the mere silence of the historical part of scripture about it.
Question II. If there are some persons who have not a right to truth, may we not lawfully speak falsehood to them? Now to prove that some have not a right to truth, it is urged, that truth or veracity is a virtue or duty of the social life: But there are many questions may be asked in the social life which the speaker has no right to be informed of, and therefore he has no right to truth when they are answered; may we not then answer them with falsehood? There are also some characters of persons who seem to have no part in the social life, as children who are not capable of judging for themselves, nor acting regularly in society; may we not speak a falsehood to them for their good? There are some who practise no social virtue, such as knaves and cheats, thieves, and pilferers; surely these have no right to truth, who are ever dealing in falsehood; and may we not cozen them who would cozen us? I will first offer two or three general answers to the question, and then descend to consider the particular instances.
Answer I. Truth seems to be a matter of eternal right and unchangeable equity. And there are general and express commands given us in scripture to speak the truth, and there are as express prohibitions of falsehood and lies. Now if there were any such exceptions as these against the general rule, I think God would have given us some plainer evidence of these exceptions in so important a point as truth is, upon which the welfare of mankind so necessarily depends: But I cannot find any such evident exceptions given in the whole word of God.
Answer II. When we say a person has no right to truth, it may signify one of these two things:
1. That he has no right to demand of me a direct answer to his enquiry: And I will readily grant it in this sense, there are thousands who have no right to the truth; and therefore I may wave the question, I may give them an insufficient answer, or I may be silent, and boldly refuse to give them any answer at all. But 2, If his having no right to truth, be intended to signify, that the character of his person, or the nature of his question, is such as releases me from all obligation to truth in answering him, and that therefore I may lawfully tell him a falsehood; then I deny the propositions: For my obligation to speak truth doth not all depend on the nature of his question, nor doth it depend merely on the character of the enquirer, but on the eternal rule of equity, and the command of God. And I think this appears from hence, that though I were alone, it would not be warrantable in me to assert with my lips a known falsehood: and in this case the right or claim of man can have no place nor consideration.
Answer III. If this exception be made to the plain law of God, that we may speak a direct and express falsehood to any persons who in our esteem have no right to the truth in their enquiry; this seems to break all the bands of human society, violate all the faith of men, and render the divine commands of veracity, and the prohibitions of falsehood almost useless. The consciences of men would find a way of escape from the greatest part of the bonds of duty, and yet think they committed no sin.
For let us consider, who it is that must judge whether the person to whom we speak has a right to truth or no. Is it not the speaker himself who will be the judge? Now if the speaker must judge whether his neighbour has a right to truth, there is no case, wherein the speaker’s interest may be any ways endangered by the truth, but his own sinful heart will readily whisper to him, that the hearer has no right to truth in such a question: and conscience will easily be warped aside, and comply to pronounce a known falsehood, under the colour and pretence of this exception: As for instance; if the buyer asks the seller, how much he gave for any merchandize? The seller by this rule may tell him double the price that it cost; for he will say, the buyer has no right to truth in such a question as this is. So if I ask an artificer, how he fashions his work, or what tools he uses in it? He may by this rule give me a very false answer, under pretence that I have no right to truth.
I readily grant in these cases, that the enquirer has no right to demand and claim an answer to such questions; therefore the seller or the artificer may refuse to inform him. But it is surprising to think that any man should persuade himself, that such a question being once asked, gives him a right to tell a lie! That any person should ever believe, that the mere enquiry of a thing improper to be told, absolves the answerer from all the obligations of truth, which his duty to God and man have laid upon him! Surely such a rule of conduct as this, had need have better arguments to establish it. But those who maintain this principle, must rather recur to the character of the person who makes the enquiry: and here indeed they give a little better colour to their cause.
I come therefore now to give particular answers to the instances alledged; 1. Concerning children. 2. Concerning knaves and cheats.
Instance I. Will you say, that children have no right to truth, because they are not capable of civil society?
But I reply, they are capable of knowing what truth and falsehood are, and of being influenced by the one or the other; they are capable of being deceived, and of knowing when they are deceived, they are capable of judging when they are treated with truth and sincerity, and acting according to the things you tell them; or else to what purpose do you speak falsehood to them instead of truth, and try to impose a lie upon them?
They are capable of resenting your conduct, when they find out the falsehood; and of refusing to believe you another time; For the very reason why they believe your falsehood at first, is, because they suppose you speak truth to them, and would not deceive them: And it is only upon this very principle that you yourselves can attempt to impose upon them.
Again, They are capable of learning from you and imitating your conduct, and they will be so much more ready to practise lying, and to deceive you with it, when they have found you practising lies, in order to deceive them. Suppose a mother has now and then persuaded a child to take a wholesome bitter medicine, by saying, it is not bitter, or has allured it to bed or to school by some of the arts of falsehood, and this child should imitate the mother’s example, and grow up to a confirmed liar; what inward and piercing reflections must the mother feel? Alas! I have taught my child this sinful practice, I myself have led it into the ways of the devil: How can I chide and correct by my reproof that vice, which I have taught by my example!
It is sufficiently evident therefore, that though children are not capable of half the duties of the social life, yet they are so far capable of them, as to know what truth and falsehood are, and to resent, and to practise accordingly: And this is sufficient to the present argument, and fully answers the objection. I think therefore it is infinitely better to allure those, whose understandings are weak, and whose wills are obstinate, to the practice of duty, by all the gentle arts of softness and fondness, of persuasion and love, than by venturing to make an inroad upon our own sincerity, and to trifle with so sacred a thing as truth.
But the querist may say, Suppose these softer arts have been tried, and have no effect, and children may be in danger of destroying themselves, if they are not immediately prevented by some plain and express falsehood; is it then unlawful to preserve their lives by a lie? Answer. It is a command of God indeed to preserve life, but it must be done by lawful means. May a man rob on the high-way, to get money to feed and clothe him? Surely we ought to trust the kind care and providence of God with our own lives and others in the way of duty, and not do evil that good may come, as was said under the former question.
Thus much shall suffice for the case of children, on pretence of their being incapable of civil society. But the querist will insist still on the next instance:
Instance II. Cheats, and knaves, and thievish criminals, have no right to truth; for they have broken the bonds of civil society, though not by a public renunciation of them, and therefore we may use all manner of deceit toward them, and treat them with express falsehood and lying, wheresoever it may promote our own interest and safety.
To this I reply, that the rule of Christ is, _Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also that unto them_; Mat. vii. 12. But this licentious doctrine cancels this divine rule, and substitutes another in the room of it, _viz._ _Whatsoever men do unto you, do ye also that unto them_; which is as widely different from the sacred rule of Christ, as light is from darkness, or heaven from hell. By this new rule we are no longer bound to practise that truth, that justice, that goodness to others, which we think reasonable they should practise towards us; but we have leave to practise that falsehood and knavery, that fraud, and injustice, and mischief to others, which they do actually practice towards us, or which we suspect they design to practise.
If one half of a city or a nation were fallen into knavish practices, through the great degeneracy of the age, or were become thievish pilferers, the other half would, by this rule, practise knavery with licence toward them, and deal out falsehoods to them by divine permission. And then the charge would quickly be just and universal, _There is no truth in the land_, as Hos. iv. 1.
There is indeed scarce any censure of a degenerate and corrupt age under the Old Testament, but fraud and deceit, lies and falsehood, make a considerable part of the accusation or complaint; and surely God would never allow any principles or practices that have so pernicious a tendency. Hear how the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah lament their multiplied transgressions in _conceiving and uttering from the heart words of falsehood_: _Truth is fallen into the street, yea, truth faileth, and equity cannot enter_; Is. lix. _This is a nation that obeyeth not the voice of the Lord. Truth is perished, and is cut off from their mouth. They deceive every one his neighbour, and will not speak the truth; they bend their tongues like their bow for lies_; Jer. vii. and ix. Now if this licentious principle were allowed, neither God nor his prophets would ever want matter of complaint.
By this means also it will come to pass, that if a man happen once to get the name and character of a thief or a cheat, all his neighbours will think themselves authorized to have no regard to truth or honesty in all their dealings and discourse with him; for this rule affirms that he has no right to truth. And when any person fancies that he has seen reason to suspect or disbelieve his neighbour’s honesty, he will think himself absolved from all obligations to speak truth to him. But what a wide and dreadful flood-gate would be opened by this means, to let in an inundation of fraud and falsehood, and to practise all manner of deceit!
Let it be remarked also, that this doctrine is near a-kin to the popish abomination, “That no faith is to be kept with heretics; for they are a sort of dangerous men, who would ruin the church, and therefore they have no right to truth.” Now what shameful and horrid perjuries, and what execrable mischiefs, have sprung from this one impious principle of the church of Rome? The word of God gives no manner of indulgence to such licentious principles as these. We must wrong no man, defraud no man; we must not render to any man evil for evil, nor falsehood for falsehood, but overcome his evil with our good: and we must _provide things honest in the sight of men_.
It will be said, perhaps, that the scripture most frequently mentions a neighbour, or a brother, or a fellow-christian, in the prohibitions of lying and falsehood, as in the ninth commandment, _Bear no false witness against thy neighbour_; 1 Thess. iv. 6. _No man defraud his brother._ Eph. iv. 25. _Speak every man truth to his neighbour._ Lev. xix. 11. _Lie not one to another._
But let it be replied, that the scripture demands righteousness for the strangers also; Deut. i. 16. and in several other places. And when God, by his prophet Malachi, forbids _treacherous dealing with a brother_, he gives this reason for it, _Have we not all one Father? Hath not one God created us?_ Therefore all mankind are brethren in this sense. Our duty to speak and practise truth, arises from our obligations to the law of God; and since God has not released us by any such exceptions, the lying and deceitful carriage of men does not authorise us to practise deceit and lying. It is indeed a piece of an old latin verse, that is in the mouth of many, “_Fallere fallentum non est fraus_;” which may be Englished thus, To cheat a knave is no cheating: But I know no verse in scripture that gives us this liberty. And I think we may by the same rule steal from them that would steal from us, or plunder those who would plunder us.
I will readily grant, that when a contract or bargain is made, whereby both parties are obliged mutually to perform something to or for each other, whether this contract be expressed in verbal promises, or implied in the nature of things, and by the known customs of mankind, then if one of the parties fail of performance, the other is thereby released from his promise or engagement: and the reason is most evident, because the promise or engagement was made in a conditional manner; and if the condition on one side be not fulfilled, the agreement or bargain on the other side is void, and utterly ceases; so that a man is innocent in this case, though he does not perform his promise. Now this is so well known to all men by the light of nature, and the easiest reasoning, that there is no need to enlarge upon it.
According to this general and known rule, suppose a merchant order any quantity of goods from his correspondent by the first ship, and promise payment by such a day; if the sending of those goods be neglected, and carelessly delayed, the merchant is not bound to keep his first appointed time for payment. An hundred instances there are of the like nature, which a small degree of reason, and an honest conscience, will easily determine, without intrenching upon truth. Such is the case of all conditional promises and contracts. But if a man be never so great a knave, and I should make him a lawful and an absolute promise of any thing, surely I ought to perform it, and not satisfy my conscience in the practice of deceit and falsehood, under a pretence that he had no right to truth.
There are other cases which may occur in human affairs, and create difficulty in the minds of sincere christians, a solution of which may be found in books written on those subjects: But I think most of them may be easily answered by the general principles before laid down: And, to finish this subject, I add, that I know of no circumstances that can make a plain, and express, and known lie to become lawful: If life itself were in danger, yet the express prohibitions of falsehood and lying in the law of God, make it safer, in point of conscience, to venture the loss of any earthly comfort, and life also, rather than venture upon a plain and solemn lie.
And, in my opinion, that man, who, being assisted by divine grace, maintains the truth boldly, or refuses to speak a known falsehood to a murderer, or a bloody tyrant, and bravely resigns his life upon the spot, he dies a martyr to truth; his name shall be registered with honour among the saints of God on earth, and his soul shall have its place among the martyrs in the upper world.