CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST SUBMARINE WARSHIP

IT WAS SMALL AND INEFFECTIVE, BUT IT CONTAINED THE GERM OF A MIGHTY POWER THAT IS AS YET UNDEVELOPED--WHEN NICHOLAS BIDDLE DIED--HE WAS A MAN OF THE SPIRIT OF AN IDEAL AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICER--FOUGHT HIS SHIP AGAINST OVERWHELMING ODDS TILL BLOWN OUT OF THE WATER--THE LOSS OF THE _HANCOCK_--AN AMERICAN CAPTAIN DISMISSED FOR A GOOD REASON--CAPTAIN RATHBURNE AT NEW PROVIDENCE--LOSS OF THE _VIRGINIA_--CAPTAIN BARRY’S NOTABLE EXPLOIT--WITH TWENTY-SEVEN MEN TO HELP HIM, HE CAPTURED A SCHOONER OF TEN GUNS BY BOARDING FROM SMALL BOATS IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, ALTHOUGH THE SCHOONER WAS MANNED BY 116 SAILORS AND SOLDIERS.

One of the most striking features of the American naval service during the war of the Revolution was its irregularity. There was a navy continuously in existence, but the services rendered by individual men and ships were extremely irregular. It has already been told how John Paul Jones, after his successful cruise to the Cape Breton waters, had to remain idle for many months. After his famous cruise in the _Ranger_ he was again idle until the king of France furnished him a ship. Captain Gustavus Connyngham, who gained such a reputation in the _Surprise_ and the _Revenge_ on the British coasts, was actually obliged to seek service in a privateer, after his return to port, for lack of other employment. Jones had an excellent offer to do this also, but he refused on the ground that he was not fighting for money, but for the “Honour of the American flag.” If men like Jones and Connyngham were left to shift for themselves, and without pay at that, it follows that others were treated in like manner.

The cause of this condition of affairs is readily found by the student in the method of caring for the navy adopted by the Congress. It was a method in keeping with a deal of the work done then. First, there was a Marine Committee of the Congress to buy ships and send them on a single “cruise eastward.” Later, there was a Marine Board, part congressmen and part plain citizens, “but no two of whom shall be from the same State.” There was a “Continental Naval Board.” There was a “Board of Admiralty.” There were naval agents. The powers and duties of all these were changed so often that no one can follow them in less space than a large volume, and a more wearying volume than that would be is difficult to imagine. There was, in short, an utter lack of system in naval affairs throughout the whole Revolution. Worse yet, the Congress was as lacking in funds as in system.

The first result of this state of affairs was to prevent the development of an _esprit de corps_ among the officers. As already told, Capt. Thomas Thompson of the _Raleigh_ ran away and left the _Alfred_ to her fate when the _Ariadne_ and _Ceres_ overhauled her. When John Paul Jones was towing the _Drake_ into Brest he saw a sail, and left the _Drake_ for a time to examine the stranger. While he was away the American officer in the _Drake_ tried to carry her off to another port, hoping to get her fitted out and sent on a cruise with himself in command, independent of Captain Jones. The list of offences of this class--the clashing of officers where they would in this day stand shoulder to shoulder--is distressingly long.

Another very serious result of the mismanagement was in the effect on the common sailors. It was very difficult to get men for the national ships, because the life on the privateers was more to their liking, and the chances of getting prize money very much greater.

And all this is worth relating because the men of the navy won glory and were indispensable to the ultimate victory of a growing nation, in spite of it. The record of the naval men as a whole was as brilliant as the congressional management was inefficient, and that is a condition of affairs that has since been known in the navy.

To return to the American coast and give an account of the more interesting naval doings there during the time that the old flag was winning glory in Europe, it is found that considerable losses were sustained, though the story is not by any means wholly depressing.

For instance, there is the story of Capt. Nicholas Biddle. “Liberty never had a more intrepid defender” than Nicholas Biddle. It will be remembered that he was one of the original captains of the navy, and was appointed to the brig _Andrea Doria_, in which he gained reputation. So, when the first of the thirty-two-gun frigates, which Congress ordered in 1775, was completed, Captain Biddle was placed in command. She was called the _Randolph_, and she sailed from Philadelphia in February, 1777. Off Hatteras she sprung her masts in a gale, and put into Charleston for repairs. Then she sailed again, and within a week brought in six prizes, including a twenty-gun ship called the _True Briton_. Unfortunately, a blockading squadron appeared off Charleston at this time, and until March, 1778, he was held there.

[Illustration: MAP OF THE AMERICAN COAST,

Showing Principal Battles and Forts during the Revolutionary and French Wars. ]

Meantime, however, his success had fired the hearts of the South Carolinians, and while he was there he had the satisfaction of seeing them fit out four State cruisers carrying, all told, sixty-four guns. This work completed, Captain Biddle, with the State fleet as consorts, sailed out to look for the blockading squadron, but it had sailed away.

So Captain Biddle took his little squadron down along the Caribbean coasts. Here, east of the Barbadoes, they happened to fall in with the British ship-of-the-line _Yarmouth_, Captain Vincent.

To properly understand what followed, it must be known that a ship-of-the-line was built of such heavy timbers that nothing smaller than a twelve-pounder could seriously damage its hull. The only guns in Biddle’s squadron that could hope to penetrate her hull were Biddle’s own, and his ship had but thirty-two guns to the _Yarmouth’s_ sixty-four, and they were smaller at that; so Captain Biddle signalled the State cruisers to run for it while he, in spite of the vast superiority of the enemy, sailed boldly up to her, broadside to broadside.

Better yet, for one full hour he was able to maintain the contest with his thirty-two small guns against sixty-four large ones. He was wounded, but he refused to allow his men to carry him below, and while he was thus directing the battle from the quarter-deck, the powder in the _Randolph’s_ magazine was in some way fired, and the ship was literally blown out of the water. Pieces of the wreck, in flames, fell on the _Yarmouth_, while an American ensign, rolled up ready to be sent aloft, in case the one flying should be shot away, fell, unsinged, upon her forecastle.

It was at 10 o’clock on the morning of March 7, 1778, that this disaster occurred. The _Randolph_ had on board 315 men at the time. The people of the _Yarmouth_ supposed that all hands had perished, and made sail after the rest of the Yankee squadron, though without success. On March 12th the _Yarmouth_ happened back over the very water where the fight had taken place, and there found a piece of the _Randolph_ floating about with four seamen upon it, who were, of course, picked up. Captain Vincent of the _Yarmouth_ reported five men killed and twelve wounded.

The little brig _Cabot_, of fourteen guns, that made such a brave fight in the first cruise of the first squadron, came to grief on the coast of Nova Scotia. She was in command of Capt. Joseph Olney. The British frigate _Milford_, with which John Paul Jones had had so much fun, happened along, and as the _Cabot_ was even slower than she, Captain Olney ran her ashore to keep her from the enemy. The crew barely had time to get ashore, but they fired the _Cabot_ before leaving. Once on shore, they were, of course, afoot and friendless in the enemy’s country, but Captain Olney and his men captured a schooner and returned home in her.

This occurred in March, 1777. On April 9th, following, Capt. Dudley Saltonstall, in the _Trumbull_ of twenty-eight guns, captured two British transports off New York harbor that were laden with military stores for the British army, and so more than retrieved the loss of the _Cabot_. The _Trumbull_ lost seven killed and eight wounded. The only record of the loss on the transports says that “the enemy suffered severely.”

The year 1777 was noted for the building of the first American submarine torpedo boat. David Bushnell, of Saybrook, Connecticut (he moved to Peekskill, New York, later), a most ingenious mechanical engineer, devised a turtle-shaped cask large enough to hold a man and carry a torpedo containing 150 pounds of powder, with mechanism to fasten it to the wooden bottom of a ship and to fire it when so fastened. Because this was the first attempt to use a submarine vessel for the purposes of war, and because Bushnell’s invention, fearsome as it was, is not even yet developed to anything like the degree of which it is capable, the description which he wrote of the thing is well worth giving in full, as follows:

“GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF A SUBMARINE VESSEL, COMMUNICATED BY DAVID BUSHNELL, OF CONNECTICUT, THE INVENTOR, A LETTER OF OCTOBER, 1787, TO THOMAS JEFFERSON, THEN MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES AT PARIS.

“The external shape of the submarine vessel bore some resemblance to two upper tortoise shells of equal size, joined together; the flue of entrance into the vessel being represented by the openings made by the swells of the shells at the head of the animal. The inside was capable of containing the operator, and air sufficient to support him thirty minutes, without receiving fresh air. At the bottom opposite to the entrance was fixed a quantity of lead for ballast; at one edge, which was directly before the operator, who sat upright, was an oar for rowing forward or backward; at the other edge was a rudder for steering. An aperture, at the bottom, with its valve, was designed to admit water for the purpose of descending, and two brass forcing-pumps served to eject the water within, when necessary for ascending. At the top there was likewise an oar, for ascending or descending, or continuing at any particular depth. A water-gauge or barometer determined the depth of descent; a compass directed the course, and a ventilator within supplied the vessel with fresh air, when on the surface. The entrance into the vessel was elliptical, and so small as barely to admit one person. This entrance was surrounded by a broad elliptical iron band, the lower edge of which was let into the wood whereof the body of the vessel was made, in such a manner as to give its utmost support to the body of the vessel against the pressure of the water. Above the upper edge of this iron band there was a brass crown or cover, resembling a hat with its crown and brim, which shut water-tight upon the iron band. The crown was hung to the iron band with hinges, so as to turn over sideways when opened. To make it perfectly secure when shut, it might be screwed down upon the band by the operator, or by a person without.

“There were in the brass crown three round doors, one directly in front and one on each side, large enough to put the hand through. When open they admitted fresh air. Their shutters were ground perfectly tight into their places with emery, and were hung with hinges and secured in their places when shut. There were likewise several glass windows in the crown for looking through and for admitting light in the daytime, with covers to secure them. There were two air-pipes in the crown; a ventilator which drew fresh air through one of the air-pipes, and discharged it into the lower part of the vessel.

“The fresh air introduced by the ventilator expelled the impure air through the other pipe. Both air-pipes were so constructed that they shut themselves, whenever the water rose near their tops, so that no water could enter through them. They opened themselves immediately after they rose above the water. The vessel was chiefly ballasted with lead fixed to its bottom. When this was not sufficient, a quantity was placed within, more or less, according to the weight of the operator. Its ballast rendered it so solid that there was no danger of its oversetting. The vessel, with all its appendages and the operator, was of sufficient weight to settle it low in the water. About two hundred pounds of the lead at the bottom for ballast, could be let down forty or fifty feet below the vessel. This enabled the operator to rise instantly to the surface of the water in case of accident.

“When the operator desired to descend, he placed his foot upon the top of a brass valve, depressing it, by which he opened a large aperture in the bottom of the vessel, through which the water entered at his pleasure. When he had admitted a sufficient quantity, he descended very gradually. If he admitted too large a quantity, in order to obtain an equilibrium, he ejected as much as was necessary by the two brass forcing-pumps which were placed at each end. Whenever the vessel leaked, or he desired to ascend to the surface, he also made use of these forcing-pumps. When the skilful operator had obtained an equilibrium, he could row upward or downward, or continue at any particular depth, with an oar placed near the top of the vessel, formed upon the principle of the screw, the axis of the oar entering the vessel. By turning the oar in one direction he raised the vessel, by turning it the other way he depressed it. A glass tube, eighteen inches long and one inch in diameter, standing upright, its upper end closed, and its lower end, which was open, screwed into a brass pipe, through which the external water had a passage into the glass tube, served as a water-gauge or barometer.

“There was a piece of cork, with phosphorus on it, put into the water-gauge, condensing the air within, and bearing the cork on its surface. By the light of the phosphorus, the ascent of the water in the gauge was rendered visible, and the depth of the vessel ascertained by a graduated scale.

“An oar formed on the principle of the screw was fixed in the fore part of the vessel; its axis entered the vessel, and, being turned in one direction, rowed the vessel forward; but being turned in the other, rowed backward. It was constructed to be turned by the hand or foot.

“A rudder to the hinder part of the vessel, which commanded it with the greatest ease, was made very elastic, and might be used for rowing forward. The tiller was within the vessel, at the operator’s right hand, fixed at a right angle on an iron rod which passed through the vessel.

“A compass marked with phosphorus directed the course above and under water.

“The internal shape of the vessel, in every possible section of it, verged toward an ellipsis, as near as the design would allow; but every horizontal section, although elliptical, was yet as near to a circle as could be admitted.

“The body of the vessel was made exceedingly strong; a firm piece of wood was framed parallel to the conjugate diameter, to prevent the sides from yielding to the great pressure of the incumbent water in a deep immersion. This piece of wood was also a seat for the operator.

“Every opening was well secured. The pumps had two sets of valves. The aperture at the bottom for admitting water was covered with a plate perforated full of holes, to receive the water and prevent anything from closing the passage or stopping the valve from shutting. The brass valve might likewise be forced into its place with a screw. The air-pipes had a kind of hollow sphere fixed round the top of each, to secure the air-pipe valves from injury. These hollow spheres were perforated full of holes for the passage of air through the pipes; within the air-pipes were shutters to secure them, should any accident happen to the pipes or the valves on their tops. All the joints were exactly made, and were water-tight.

“Particular attention was given to bring every part necessary to performing the operation, both within and without the vessel, before the operator, so that everything might be found in the dark. Nothing required the operator to turn to the right hand or the left.

“DESCRIPTION OF A MAGAZINE AND ITS APPENDAGES DESIGNED TO BE CONVEYED BY THE SUBMARINE VESSEL TO THE BOTTOM OF A SHIP.

“In the fore part of the brim of the crown of the vessel was a socket, and an iron tube passing through the socket; the tube stood upright, and could slide up and down six inches. At the top of the tube was a wood-screw, fixed by means of a rod, which passed through the tube and screwed the wood-screw fast upon the top of the tube. By pushing the wood-screw up against the bottom of a ship, and turning it at the same time, it would enter the planks. When the wood-screw was firmly fixed, it could be cast off by unscrewing the rod which fastened it upon the top of the tube.

“Behind the vessel was a place, above the rudder, for carrying a large powder magazine. This was made of two pieces of oak timber, large enough, when hollowed out, to contain an hundred and fifty pounds of powder, with the apparatus used in firing it. A rope extended from the magazine to the wood-screw above mentioned; when the wood-screw was fixed, and to be cast off from its tube, the magazine was to be cast off likewise, leaving it hanging to the wood-screw. It was lighter than water, that it might rise up against the object to which the screw and itself were fastened.

“Within the magazine was a clock, constructed to run any proposed length of time under twelve hours; when it had run out its time, it unpinioned a strong lock, resembling a gun-lock, which gave fire to the powder. This apparatus was so pinioned that it could not possibly move till, by casting off the magazine from the vessel, it was set in motion.

“The skilful operator could swim so low on the surface as to approach very near a ship in the night without fear of being discovered, and might, if he chose, approach the stem or stern with very little danger. He could sink very quickly, keep at any necessary depth, and row a great distance in any direction he desired without coming to the surface. When he rose to the surface he could soon obtain a fresh supply of air, and, if necessary, he might then descend again and pursue his course.

“EXPERIMENTS MADE TO PROVE THE NATURE AND USE OF A SUBMARINE VESSEL.

“The first experiment I made was with about two ounces of powder, which I exploded four feet under water, to prove to some of the first personages in Connecticut that powder would take fire under water.

“The second experiment was made with two pounds of powder, enclosed in a wooden bottle, and fired under a hogshead, with a two-inch oak plank between the hogshead and the powder; the hogshead was loaded with stones, as deep as it could swim. A wooden pipe, descending through the lower head of the hogshead and through the plank into the powder contained in the bottle, was primed with powder. A match put to the priming exploded the powder with a great effect, rending the plank into pieces, demolishing the hogshead, and casting the stones and ruins of the hogshead, with a body of water, many feet into the air, to the astonishment of the spectators. This experiment was likewise made for the satisfaction of the gentlemen above mentioned.

“I afterwards made many experiments of a similar nature, some with large quantities of powder.

“In the first essays with the submarine vessel, I took care to prove its strength to sustain the great pressure of the incumbent water, when sunk deep, before I trusted any person to descend much below the surface; and I never suffered any person to go under water without having a strong piece of rigging made fast to it, until I found him well acquainted with the operations necessary for his safety. After that I made him descend and continue at particular depths without rising or sinking; row by the compass; approach a vessel; go under her, and fix the wood-screw into her bottom, etc., until I thought him sufficiently expert to put my design into execution. I found, agreeably to my expectations, that it required many trials to make a person of common ingenuity a skilful operator. The first I employed was very ingenious, and made himself master of the business, but was taken sick in the campaign of 1776, at New York, before he had an opportunity to make use of his skill, and never recovered his health sufficiently afterwards.

“After various attempts to find an operator to my wish, I sent one who appeared more expert than the rest from New York, to a fifty-gun ship, lying near Governor’s Island. He went under the ship and attempted to fasten the wood-screw into her bottom, but struck, as he supposes, a bar of iron. Not being well skilled in the management of the vessel, in attempting to move to another place, he lost the ship, and after seeking her in vain for some time he rowed some distance and rose to the surface of the water, but found daylight had advanced so far, that he durst not renew the attempt. On his return from the ship to New York, he passed near Governor’s Island, and thought he was discovered by the enemy; he cast off the magazine, as he imagined it retarded him in the swell, which was very considerable.

“After it had been cast off one hour, the time the internal apparatus was set to run, it blew up with great violence.

“Afterwards, there were two attempts made in Hudson’s River, above the city, but they effected nothing. Soon after this the enemy went up the river, and pursued the vessel which had the submarine boat on board, and sunk it with their shot. Though I afterwards recovered the vessel, I found it impossible to prosecute the design any further. I had been in a bad state of health from the beginning of my undertaking, and was now very ill. The situation of public affairs was such, that I despaired of obtaining the public attention and assistance necessary. I therefore gave over the pursuit for that time and waited for a more favorable opportunity, which never arrived.

“In the year 1777, I made an attempt from a whale-boat against the _Cerberus_ frigate, then lying at anchor between Connecticut River and New London, by throwing a machine against her side by means of a line. The machine was loaded with powder to be exploded by a gun-lock, which was to be unpinioned by an apparatus, to be turned by being brought alongside of the frigate. This machine fell in with a schooner at anchor, astern of the frigate, and concealed from my sight. By some means or other it was fired, and demolished the schooner and three men, and blew the only one left alive overboard, who was taken up very much hurt.

“After this, I fixed several kegs under water charged with powder, to explode upon touching anything as they floated along with the tide. I set them afloat in the Delaware, above the English shipping at Philadelphia, in December, 1777. I was unacquainted with the river and obliged to depend upon a gentleman very imperfectly acquainted with that part of it, as I afterwards found. We went as near the shipping as we durst venture. I believe the darkness of the night greatly deceived him, as it did me. We set them adrift, to fall with the ebb upon the shipping. Had we been within sixty rods, I believe they must have fallen in with them immediately, as I designed; but as I afterwards found, they were set adrift much too far distant, and did not arrive until after being detained some time by the frost; they advanced in the daytime in a dispersed situation and under great disadvantages.

“One of them blew up a boat with several persons in it, who imprudently handled it too freely, and thus gave the British that alarm which brought on the ‘Battle of the Kegs.’ The above vessel, magazine, etc., were projected in the year 1771, but not completed until the year 1775.

“D. BUSHNELL.”

The man who handled the submarine boat in New York harbor was Sergeant Ezra Lee, and the ship mentioned was the sixty-four-gun liner _Eagle_. It is a great pity that a full record of Bushnell’s experiments and of the experiences of Sergeant Ezra Lee, who handled the strange craft, was not made for the benefit of subsequent inventors, because much useless labor would have been saved. For instance, every inventor who has since worked on the idea has had to learn for himself that it is utterly impossible to see through the water after he has been once submerged, while other matters of little less importance have been worked out over and again.

The attack on the _Cerberus_ mentioned above was described by the British captain as follows:

“Wednesday night, being at anchor to the westward of New London, in Black Point Bay, the schooner I had taken, at anchor close by me, astern, about eleven o’clock at night, we discovered a line towing astern that came from the bows; we immediately conjectured that it was somebody that had veered himself away by it, and began to haul in; we then found that the schooner had got hold of it (who had taken it for a fishing line), gathered it near fifteen fathom, which was buoyed up by little bits of sticks at stated distances, until he came to the end, at which was fastened a machine, which was too heavy for one man to haul up, being upwards of 100 cwt.; the other people of the boat turning out, assisted him, got it upon deck, and were unfortunately examining it too curiously, when it went off like the sound of a gun, blew the boat to pieces, and set her in a flame, killed the three men that were in the stern; the fourth, who was standing forward, was blown into the water; I hoisted out the boat, and picked him up much hurt; as soon as he could recollect himself, he gave me the following description, as near as he could remember. It was two vessels shaped like a boat, about twenty inches long, and a foot broad, secured to each other at the distance of four feet, by two iron bars, one at each end, and an iron tube or gun-barrel in the centre, which was loose (as he had himself turned it round with his hand); they swam one over the other, the upper one keel upwards; the lower swam properly, but was so under water as just to keep the upper one a few inches above the surface; to the after iron bar hung a flat board, to which was fixed a wheel about six inches in diameter, and communicated itself to one on the upper side of the boat, of a lesser diameter; opposite to these was another wheel, on the flat of the under one or loaded vessel, which had likewise communication with the wheels of the upper boat; it was covered with lead, and the keel heavily loaded in order to keep it down in the water.

“The fatal curiosity of the seamen (who unfortunately had been bred in working in iron) set this wheel agoing, which it did with great ease backwards and forwards, and during their looking at it, which was about five minutes from the time of its being first put in motion, it burst. Upon examining round the ship after this accident, we found the other part of the line on the larboard side buoyed up in the same manner, which I ordered to be cut away immediately for fear of hauling up another machine, which I concluded was fast at the end, and might burst when near the ship.

“The mode these villains must have taken to have swiftered the ship, must have been to have rowed off in the stream a considerable distance ahead of the ship, leaving one of their infernals in shore, and floating the other at the distance of the line, which, from the quantity that we have got on board (near 70 fathoms), and what the man tells me they saved in the schooner, which was upwards of 150 fathoms more, must have been near 500 fathom; they at the length of this line put the other in the water, and left it for the tide to float down, which in this place runs very strong.

“As the ingenuity of these people is singular in their secret modes of mischief, and as I presume this is their first essay, I have thought it indispensably my duty to return and give you the earliest information of the circumstances, to prevent the like fatal accident happening to any of the advanced ships that may possibly be swiftered in the same manner, and to forbid all seamen from attempting hauling the line, or bringing the vessel near the ship, as it is filled with that kind of combustible that burns though in the water.

“I am, sir, etc., “J. SYMONS.”

David Bushnell was born in Saybrook (now Westbrook), Connecticut, in the year 1742. He entered Yale College in 1771, and graduated in 1775. During his collegiate career he turned his attention to submarine warfare, and after leaving college devoted his time and patrimony entirely to the subject. He was noted for his studious habits, great inventive genius, and eccentricity. The unfortunate issue of his projects rendered him very dejected. Disappointed by his failures and the neglect of the government, he went to France at the close of the war, where he remained for a number of years, when he returned and settled in Georgia, under the assumed name of Dr. Bush, desiring thus to conceal his identity and connection with the early efforts of his life. There he was placed at the head of one of the most respectable schools in the State, but subsequently engaged in the practice of medicine, by which he amassed a considerable fortune. He was much beloved and respected by all who knew him, and died at the age of ninety years, in the year 1826. By his will his proper name became known; his executors were required to make inquiries in the town of Saybrook for persons of the blood and family of Bushnell, and whoever in the opinion of the executors was found to be most worthy, on the score of moral worth, should be regarded as the sole legatee. But should none of the kindred be found to fulfil the condition set forth in the will, the estate was to be transferred to Franklin College, Georgia. Legatees were found in Connecticut.

[Illustration: Signatures of John Manly and Hector McNeil.]

The loss of the American frigate _Hancock_ of thirty-two guns followed the capture of the two valuable transports off New York. It was in May that the _Hancock_, under Capt. John Manly (he who in the Massachusetts schooner _Lee_ worked such havoc on the British store-ships off Boston in 1775), sailed from Boston on a cruise, having in company the _Boston_ of twenty-four guns under Capt. Hector McNeil. When four days out they overhauled a strange sail, and Captain Manly, after a bit of veering to and fro to determine the enemy’s speed and power, gave him a broadside. At this the stranger tried to run for it, and with stern chasers strove to disable the _Hancock’s_ rigging. But the _Hancock_ was then one of the swiftest American ships, and Captain Manly held his fire until alongside, when he gave him a broadside.

Although manifestly of inferior strength, the enemy fought back bravely for an hour, and then, the _Boston_ having arrived within range, he struck his colors. It proved to be the frigate _Fox_ of twenty-eight guns, Captain Fotheringham. The _Hancock_ lost eight in killed and wounded, and the _Fox_ thirty-two.

Having placed a prize crew on the _Fox_, Captain Manly made the mistake of sailing too close to Halifax, the principal British naval station in America. Here, on June 1st, he fell in with three British ships, the _Rainbow_ of forty-four guns, commanded by Sir George Collier; the frigate _Flora_ of thirty-two guns, and the sloop-of-war _Victor_ of eighteen guns.

[Illustration]

[Illustration]

[_Over_]

Facsimile of a Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Captain McNeil.]

When the enemy was discovered the _Boston_ was well out to sea, and having the weather gauge, she down with her helm and sailed away. The _Hancock_ and the _Fox_ were close in shore, and they were soon hard pressed. Manly, seeing himself deserted, at once began throwing overboard all unnecessary weights, and so lightened his ship that he was in a fair way to escape, when the wind failed him, although the enemy still held enough to draw within easy range and in a position to rake. He was thus under the guns of the _Rainbow_ of forty-four guns and the _Victor_ of twenty, and could not turn his ship in any direction. Of course he surrendered.

Meantime the _Flora_ had recaptured the _Fox_, although the prize crew, few as they were in number, made a good fight.

It was the belief of Captain Manly that had the _Boston_ come down to engage the _Flora_ and so pitched the _Victor_ against the _Fox_, he would have been able to account for the _Rainbow_, and when the affair came before Congress Captain Manly’s view prevailed, and Captain McNeil was dismissed from the service for running away.

On the theory that ships are sent to sea to fight to the last gasp, the fate of Captain McNeil was merited, even though one prominent naval historian tries to justify his conduct. Had a Biddle or a John Paul Jones had the _Boston_, one can well believe that the whole British squadron would have been carried into port.

As for Manly, it must be told that, in spite of the record he had made when he was in the service of Massachusetts--a record that had induced Congress to put him third on the list of captains when it made its first revision of the list--he was permitted to leave the navy for the privateer service after he was exchanged and returned to port.

The naval record for 1778 opens in January, when, on the 27th, in the _Providence_, armed with twelve four-pounders, Capt. John P. Rathburne descended on New Providence island in the Bahamas. He landed at 11 o’clock at night with twenty-five men (half of his crew) and released thirty odd American prisoners confined on shore. Then he captured Fort Nassau with its cannon and ammunition and 300 stand of muskets. At daylight he captured, without a fight, an armed vessel of sixteen guns, together with five merchantmen and another fort. A British sloop-of-war (ship) having appeared off the port, she was fired on from the shore, when she made haste to sail away.

After holding the place two days and getting all the portable munitions of war on board and spiking the cannon, Captain Rathburne burned two of the prizes and carried four home.

The loss of one of the new American frigates which the Congress had ordered, the _Virginia_, of twenty-eight guns, followed. She was coming down Chesapeake Bay and grounded at night. In the morning two British warships were seen near by, and her commander, Capt. James Nicholson, with his crew, took to the boats and escaped ashore. The congressional inquiry that followed cleared Nicholson of blame. It is said that he went ashore not to escape a fight, but because of very important papers he was carrying.

[Illustration: A Typical Nassau Fort--Fort Fincastle.

_From a photograph by Rau._]

The next exploit of note was that of Capt. John Barry, who, while in command of the brig _Lexington_, had had an honorable career. It will be remembered that the command of the _Effingham_, then building in the Delaware, was given to him and that the British captured Philadelphia before the ship could get away to sea. To keep the ship out of the British hands she was moved up the river to White Hill, New Jersey, and by order of Mr. Hopkinson of the Navy Board was sunk. Barry and Hopkinson had a very loud dispute over the sinking of the _Effingham_, for Barry was confident that, with the ten guns already on board and the thirteen guns on the frigate _Washington_ that was in company with her, a good fight could be made against any of the force the British were able to send. Hopkinson became personal in his remarks, and Barry’s Irish blood got hot, and some things not quite courteous were said in return; but Barry, to his great disgust, had to sink the ship, and afterwards, on the order of Congress, withdraw the offensive remarks, although time had proved him entirely right in the matter of sinking the ship.

However, while charges were pending against him in this matter, he led a boat expedition down the river, carrying four rowboats manned by twenty-seven men, all told, past the British ships and soldiers at Philadelphia, and arrived safely off Port Penn, which was then in the hands of the Americans. On the opposite side of the river lay two ships, the _Mermaid_ and the _Kitty_, with two others not named, laden under convoy of the large schooner _Alert_ armed with ten guns. The ships were loaded with food supplies for the British at Philadelphia.

The run past Philadelphia had been made at night, of course, and so Port Penn was reached in broad daylight. But in spite of the fact that the British were already astir and the Americans in plain view, Barry with his gallant band made a dash at the schooner, and before the British could rally for a defence clambered over the rail, cutlass in hand.

At that the British dropped everything and fled below, leaving Barry to put on the hatches and keep them there. In view of the many occasions on which the British historians charge the American sailors with cowardice it must be told here that this “wild Irishman” with his twenty-seven men beat down under the hatches one major, two captains, three lieutenants, ten soldiers, and 100 seamen and marines--he captured 116 armed men with just twenty-seven.

When he had secured them he stripped and burned the transports, and carried the schooner over to Port Penn. This was on February 26, 1778.

The British sent a frigate and a sloop-of-war down the river to recapture the schooner, and so, finding he could not get her away to sea, Barry was obliged to destroy the vessel, which he did by pointing his guns down her hatch and shooting holes through her bottom. But he had in the meantime for two months patrolled the lower Delaware and cut off the British supplies to such an extent that there was actual suffering in the British camp. He gave them a taste, at least, of what Washington’s brave hosts were suffering that winter at Valley Forge. He returned to White Hill by travelling through the forest that then surrounded Philadelphia.

Having by this effort once more commanded the attention of the authorities, he was sent to the _Raleigh_ at Boston, and on September 25, 1778, sailed away with two merchant ships in convoy. Three days later he was a wanderer in the unbroken forests of Maine.

The little fleet got to sea early in the morning. At noon two sails were seen in the south, and Captain Barry, after signalling the convoy to steer close-hauled, ran down for a look at the strangers. Because the wind was light it took him the whole of the afternoon to learn their character, but at sundown he found they were two English frigates. At this Captain Barry ordered the merchantmen back to port, cleared his ship for action, and thereafter for forty-eight hours engaged in a game of hide-and-seek with the enemy wherein he had, now and again, the darkness of night, the horizon, and sundry fog-banks to conceal him.

[Illustration: An English Frigate of Forty Guns.

_From an engraving by Verico._]

On sending the merchantmen toward port Barry took that course himself, until the darkness wholly enveloped the enemy, when he again resumed his course. At dawn next day he found himself in a fog, and during the forenoon nothing could be seen, but at noon the fog disappeared, and then the enemy were again seen to the south on a course parallel to Barry’s.

Seeing this, Barry came up close-hauled and crowded on all sail, while the enemy came on in like dress until 3 or 4 o’clock, when another fog shut them from view. Then Barry headed away eastwardly with a free wind, and ran so until daylight on the 27th, when he furled the canvas and let her drift under bare poles until 6 o’clock, while he searched the horizon for the frigates.

Having seen nothing, Captain Barry made sail, and held a course to the southeast until 9.30, when he again saw the enemy. At this he came up to the wind, tacked about, and heading away to the northwest with “a staggering breeze,” the _Raleigh_ made “11 knots and 2 fathoms on a dragged bowline,” per hour.

That was a pace that the Englishmen could not hold, and the _Raleigh_ soon dropped them behind the horizon, but at noon the _Raleigh_ ran out of the streak of wind, as a sailor might say, while the enemy were still holding it.

The leader of the frigates rapidly overhauled the _Raleigh_ after that, and at 4 in the afternoon the _Raleigh_ tacked to the west to see what the force of the leader was. Captain Barry hoped he might make a good fight with her single-handed before the other could come up, and at 5 in the afternoon “the _Raleigh_ edged away, brailing her mizzen and taking in her staysails.” Crossing the enemy’s bows, the _Raleigh_ dropped down abreast of him, and set the American ensign. The frigate, showing fourteen guns on a side, hoisted the king’s flag, and then the _Raleigh_ gave her a broadside. She replied swiftly, and at the second fire had the good fortune to carry away the _Raleigh’s_ foretopmast and mizzen-topgallantmast. She was now able to outsail the _Raleigh_, and so shot ahead to get clear of the too hot fire of the Yankee, and then began to fire at long range while Captain Barry was clearing away the wreck aloft. Once the wreckage was down, however, Barry bore up and strove to get alongside and board, but with her superior canvas the frigate avoided this. Meantime the other ship was coming near, and Captain Barry, finding he could not, in his crippled condition, maintain a fight with two, decided to run his ship ashore on some islands that were visible, for the fight was made off the coast of Maine.

And then night came on with a still fading breeze. The _Raleigh_, with all sail set, headed for the coast. The frigates followed, and until midnight the two ships drifted along with the red flames spurting from their sides, and the nearing cliffs echoing to the thunder of the conflict.

At 12 o’clock the enemy hauled off for a brief interval, but the other ship having come up, the two renewed the conflict, and then the _Raleigh_ grounded.

The enemy now took positions on the _Raleigh’s_ quarter. Captain Barry kept the four stern chasers working, but lowered his boats forward and went ashore with a lot of his men to fortify the island on which he had grounded, being determined to fire his ship and resist capture in any event. But while he was away a frightened petty officer hauled down the flag.

The _Raleigh_ was eventually put into the British navy, but Captain Barry and his men on the island escaped to the mainland. The ship that made so good a fight against the _Raleigh_ was the _Unicorn_, of twenty-eight guns. Her consort was the _Experiment_, of fifty. The Americans lost twenty-five killed and wounded, and the _Unicorn_ ten killed and an unknown number of wounded--probably twenty-five or thirty.

On the whole, the years 1777 and 1778 were disastrous, and the record was, in a sense, to the discredit of the American navy. Two captains were, indeed, dropped from the naval list for failing to support the flag, and where they failed the record was in part only made good by the heroism of the others. Of the thirteen frigates which the Congress decided to build in December, 1775, but four remained. Some were lost at sea, as already described, and the rest fell into the hands of the British through the operations of the land forces.

But if we compare the American forces with those of the English, the wonder is that the Americans were able to keep the flag afloat at all, for the British navy in American waters in 1778 numbered eighty-nine ships mounting 2,576 guns, while the Americans had fourteen ships mounting 332 guns. And what is of more importance, the British ships were at this time manned by crews that were disciplined, while, as already noted, the Yankee ships were to a very great extent manned by landsmen. A time was to come when, in the matter of training, the superiority was to be on the other decks, but in 1778 it was all in favor of the British.

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