Part 10

War is not a parlor game. A great deal of destruction is inevitable in the nature of war, and sometimes in wars of the past commanders have deliberately laid waste large sections of beautiful country to handicap the enemy, and the results have justified this destruction. A ten per cent social and economic loss is gladly borne by a nation at war for a ninety per cent military gain. Perhaps a commander is even justified in inflicting a forty-nine per cent social and economic loss on his country for a fifty-one per cent military gain. But the deliberate ravaging of Poland and the Baltic provinces was a ninety per cent social and economic loss for a ten per cent military gain--something that is never justifiable.

[Sidenote: Relief should meet refugees.]

It is very difficult for a general to remember that there are other factors in war besides the military factors, and we must not be too severe in our criticism of the Russian General Staff because it saw only the ten per cent military gain and overlooked the ninety per cent political and economic loss. The order which made a desert of thousands of square miles of the best territory in Russia was countermanded, anyway, but not until the harm had been done. But now the only concern of Russia and of the friends of Russia should be to confine the damage to the irremediable minimum. To that end it is necessary to handle the great streams of refugees intelligently. The influx into Petrograd and Moscow should be stopped. Relief organization should go out from these cities toward the front, stop the refugees where they meet them, and there make provision for them to spend the winter. To this purpose hundreds and thousands of sleeping barracks and soup kitchens like those in Petrograd must be built along the provincial highways. Thousands of these people will never again see the familiar environment where they have lived all their lives, even if Russia regains her lost provinces. But more of them will be able to return eventually, and there will be less suffering among them this winter, if they are stopped where they are and are not allowed to flow into the two Russian capitals, so terribly overcrowded already, and into the colder country north and east of Petrograd and Moscow.

[Sidenote: Russia unable to handle situation.]

I understand that this policy has been adopted by the Tatiana Committee. But Russia alone cannot handle the situation; she must have generous aid from outside.

[Sidenote: America a synonym for service.]

A young American, Mr. Thomas Whittemore, who was in Sofia when Bulgaria went to war, left there declining an invitation of the Queen of Bulgaria to head a branch of the Red Cross, because his sympathies were with the Allies, and is now in Russia working out a programme for the relief of Russia's refugees under the auspices of the Tatiana Committee. He is out on the roads in an automobile constantly, meeting the incoming human flotsam and jetsam of war, and his recommendations will have the weight of authority. America has become a synonym for service in France, Belgium, and Servia, but thus far America has done next to nothing for Russia. Shall America, who responded so splendidly to the appeal of Belgium and Servia, ignore the needs of the stricken people of Poland and the Baltic provinces, whose sufferings are greater than the sufferings of the Belgians, certainly as great as the sufferings of the Servians?

[Sidenote: War's most moving sight.]

There are many pathetic things in war--soldiers wasted with disease, blasted in arm and leg with explosive shell, withered in eye and lung by the terrible gas; but none of these things is so moving as the sight of little children, homeless, parentless, and with clothing worn and torn by travel, sleeping in empty freight cars, cold railway stations, or on the very blizzard-swept sidewalks of Russian cities, and slowly dying because they have no food.

* * * * *

Rumania hesitated long before entering the war. The sympathies of her people were strongly with the Allies, for military and economic reasons connected with German domination of her resources made her actual military participation with the Allied Armies difficult and dangerous. The decision, however, was made in the late summer of 1916, and an attack was made by the Rumanian army against Austrian forces. This was followed by successes which continued until Bulgaria began hostilities against the Rumanian army. Shortly after, a German army under General Mackensen against Rumania was started which ended in the capture of Bucharest in December, 1916.

THE TRAGEDY OF RUMANIA

STANLEY WASHBURN

Copyright, Atlantic Monthly, December, 1917.

[Sidenote: What it meant for Rumania to fight.]

More than a year has now elapsed since Rumania entered the war. What is meant for this little country to abandon neutrality is not generally realized. Here in America we know that so long as the British fleet dominated the seas we were safe, and that we should have ample opportunity to prepare ourselves for the vicissitudes of war and to make the preparations that are now being undertaken and carried out by the administration of President Wilson. Canada and Australia likewise knew that they were in no danger of attack.

[Sidenote: War's terrible cost.]

But the case of Rumania was far different. She knew with a terrible certainty that the moment she entered the war she would be the target for attack on a frontier over twelve hundred kilometres long. The world criticized her for remaining neutral, and yet one wonders how many countries would have staked their national future as Rumania did when she entered the war. In a short fourteen months she has seen more than one half of her army destroyed, her fertile plains pass into the hands of her enemies, and her great oil industry almost wiped out. To-day her army, supported by Russians, is holding with difficulty hardly twenty per cent of what, before the war, was one of the most fertile and prosperous small kingdoms of Europe.

[Sidenote: Why nations went to war.]

[Sidenote: America's reasons.]

When America entered the war she assumed, in a large measure, the obligations to which the Allies were already committed. It seems of paramount importance under these circumstances that the case and the cause of Rumania be more thoroughly understood in this country. Other countries entered the war through necessities of various sorts. America committed herself to the conflict for a cause which even the cynical German propaganda, hard as it has tried, has been unable to distort into a selfish or commercial one. We are preparing to share in every way the sacrifices, both in blood and wealth, which our allies have been making these past three years. And as our reward we ask for no selfish or commercial rights, nor do we seek to acquire extension of territory or acquisition of privilege in any part of the world. We have entered the war solely, because of wrongs committed in the past, and with the just determination that similar wrongs shall never again be perpetrated. No country and no people on this globe are more responsive to an obligation, and more determined to fulfill such an obligation when recognized, than are the American people.

[Sidenote: The author in Rumania.]

For nearly two years prior to the entrance of Rumania into the war I had been attached to the Russian Imperial Staff in the field, as special correspondent of the London "Times." I went to Rumania in September, 1916, directly from the staff of the then Tsar, with a request from the highest authority in Russia to the highest command in Rumania that every opportunity for studying the situation be given me. These letters gave me instant access to the King and Queen of Rumania, to the Rumanian General Staff, and to other persons of importance in the Rumanian administration. I remained in that country until late in the autumn, motoring more than five thousand kilometres, and touching the Rumanian front at many places. My opinion, then, of the Rumanian cause is based on first-hand evidence obtained at the time.

[Sidenote: An interview with the King.]

When I arrived in Rumania, in September, the army was still at the high tide of its advance in Transylvania and the world was lauding without stint the bravery and efficiency of Rumanian troops. Two days after my arrival I lunched with the King, and had the first of a series of interviews with him on the status of the case of Rumania. Inasmuch as without the consent of its sovereign the entrance of Rumania into the war would have been impossible, I should first present the King's view of her case as His Majesty, after several conversations, authorized me to present it.

[Sidenote: The King of Rumania decides for war.]

The King himself, as all the world knows, is a Hohenzollern. His personal feelings must, therefore, in a measure, be affected by the fact that most of his relatives and friends are fighting on the German side. There is, however, not the slightest evidence to indicate that he has ever allowed the fact of his German blood to weigh against the true interests of Rumania. A conversation which illustrates the attitude of the King at this time is one which the Princess ----, one of the most clever and best-informed women in Rumania, related to me in Bucharest. The day before the declaration of war the most pro-German of the Rumanian ministers, who had the name of being the leader of the pro-German party in the capital, spent several hours putting forth every effort to prevent the declaration of war by the King. The minister, making no headway, finally said, "The Germans are sure to win. Your Majesty must realize that it is impossible to beat a Hohenzollern." The King replied, "I think it can be done, nevertheless." To this the defender of the German cause answered, "Can you show me a single case where a Hohenzollern has been beaten?" The King replied, "I can. I am a Hohenzollern, and I have beaten my own blood instincts for the sake of Rumania."

[Sidenote: Personality of the King of Rumania.]

One beautiful autumn afternoon, at the royal shooting-box outside of Bucharest, the King talked freely about his motives and the cause of his people. We had finished luncheon and he had dismissed his suite. He and the Crown Prince and myself were left in the unpretentious study. Here, over a map-strewn table, it was the custom of the King to study the problems of the campaign. A tired, harassed-looking man of about sixty, clad in the blue uniform of the Hussars of his Guard, he paced the floor, and with deep emotion emphasized the case of his country and the motives which had induced Rumania to enter the war.

This earnest presentation of his opinion I placed in writing at that time, and the sentences quoted here were a part of the statement published in the London "Times." So far as I know, this is the only occasion on which the King outlined in a definite way his personal view of the Rumania case.

His Majesty began by laying stress on the necessity for interpreting Rumania truthfully to the world, now that her enemies were doing their utmost to misrepresent her; the necessity for understanding the genius of the people and the sacrifices and dangers which the country faced. He urged that Rumania had not been moved by mere policy or expediency, but that her action was based on the highest principles of nationality and national ideals.

[Sidenote: The nation moved by ties of race and blood.]

[Sidenote: The Bulgar a menace.]

"In Rumania as in Russia," said the King, "the tie of race and blood underlies all other considerations, and the appeal of our purest Rumanian blood which lies beyond the Transylvanian Alps has ever been the strongest influence in the public opinion of all Rumania, from the throne to the lowest peasant. Inasmuch as Hungary was the master that held millions of our blood in perpetual bondage, Hungary has been our traditional enemy. The Bulgar, with his efficient and unquestionably courageous army, on a frontier difficult to defend, has logically become our southern menace, and as a latent threat has been accepted secondarily as a potential enemy."

[Sidenote: German friendship an asset.]

[Sidenote: Rumania's long frontier.]

After stating that, although at the beginning of the war Rumanian sympathy had leaped instantly to France and England, the Rumanians had realized that, economically, the friendship of Germany was an asset in the development of Rumanian industries, the King added that, nevertheless, as the Great War progressed, there had developed in Rumania a moral issue in regard to the war. The frightfulness and lawlessness practiced by the Central Powers had a profound effect upon the Rumanian people, and the country began to feel the subtle force of enemy intrigue endeavoring to force her into war against her own real interests. Let us remember, when we would criticize Rumania for her early inactivity, that she was, in the words of her King, "a small power with a small army surrounded by giants"; that she had a western frontier 1,000 kilometres long--greater than the English and French fronts combined--and a Bulgarian frontier, almost undefended and near her capital, stretching for other hundreds of kilometres on the south. With Russia in retreat, Rumania would have been instantly annihilated if she had acted. She had to wait till she could be reasonably sure of protecting herself and of being supported by her allies. She waited not a moment longer.

[Sidenote: Prisoners and noncombatants well-treated.]

After pointing out the great risks which Rumania had run, as a small country, and the deterring effect of the fate of Serbia and Belgium, the King continued, "Notwithstanding the savagery with which the enemy is attacking us and the cruelty with which our defenseless women and children are being massacred, this government will endeavor to prevent bitterness from dominating its actions in the way of reprisals on prisoners or defenseless noncombatants; and to this end orders have been issued to our troops that, regardless of previous provocation, those who fall into our hands shall be treated with kindness; for it is not the common soldiers or the innocent people who must be held responsible for the policy adopted by the enemy governments."

The interview ended with the King's assurance that Rumanians would not falter in their allegiance to England the just, to France, their brother in Latin blood, and to Russia, their immediate neighbor.

"With confidence in the justice of our cause, with faith in our allies, and with the knowledge that our people are capable of every fortitude, heroism, sacrifice, which may be demanded of them, we look forward soberly and seriously to the problems that confront us, but with the certainty that our sacrifices will not be in vain, and that ultimate victory must and will be the inevitable outcome. In the achievement of this result the people of Rumania, from the throne to the lowliest peasant, are willing to pay the price."

[Sidenote: Rumanians realized their danger.]

When it is realized that these conversations took place in September and the first days of October, it must be clear, I think, that neither the King nor the Queen had ever felt that Rumania entered the war in absolute security, but that they always realized the danger of their situation and moved only because their faith in the Allies was such as to lead them to believe that they had at least a fair chance to cooperate with them without the certainty of destruction.

To emphasize further the fact that both realized this danger even before the war started, I would mention one occasion some weeks later, when the fear of the German invasion of Rumania was becoming a tangible one. During a conversation with the King and the Queen together, in regard to this menace, the Queen turned impulsively to the King and said, "This is exactly what we have feared. We, at least, never imagined that Rumania was going to have an easy victory, and we have always felt the danger of our coming into the war."

The King looked very tired and nervous, having spent all that day with the General Staff weighing news from the front which was increasingly adverse. "Yes," he said, as he pulled his beard, "we were never misled as to what might happen."

So much then for the psychology of the sovereigns of Rumania as I received it from their own lips.

[Sidenote: Russian efforts to aid Rumania.]

Ever since the loss of Bucharest the world has been asking why Rumania entered the war. It seems to be the general opinion that her action at that time was unwarranted and that she had been betrayed. There has even been a widely circulated report that Germany, through the King, has intrigued to bring about this disaster. Again, I have heard that the Russian High Command had purposely sacrificed Rumania. At this time, when much of the evidence is still unattainable, it is impossible for me to make absolutely authoritative statements, but immediately after leaving Rumania I spent three hours with General Brussiloff discussing the situation. A few days later I had the privilege of meeting the former Tsar at Kieff (to whom the Queen had given me a letter), and I know from his own lips his feelings in regard to Rumania. Subsequently, I was at the headquarters of the Russian High Command and there learned at first hand the extraordinary efforts that Alexieff was making to support Rumania. The British efforts to cooperate with Rumania and prevent disaster I knew thoroughly at that time.

[Sidenote: Lack of vision and foresight.]

I never saw the slightest evidence that either Russia or her allies had any intention whatever of disregarding their duties or their responsibilities to this little country. That there was lack of vision and foresight on all sides is quite apparent. But that there was bad faith on the part of any of the contracting parties I do not believe. It is probably true that the reactionary government in Petrograd was glad to see the Rumanian disaster, but it must be realized that this was a military situation primarily, and that ninety per cent of it in the first three months was in the hands, not of the Petrograd politicians but of the military authorities at the front. Brussiloff and Alexieff are men incapable of intrigue or bad faith. The Emperor, with whom I talked at Kieff, and the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlowna nearly wept at the misfortune of Rumania, and I am certain that the former Tsar was in no way a party to any breach of faith with this little ally.

[Sidenote: Military conditions prior to Rumania's venture.]

[Sidenote: Failure of Germans at Verdun.]

I have said that there was not bad faith toward Rumania on the part of the Allies when they induced her to enter the war, and that there was not lack of intelligence on the part of Rumania when she followed their advice. In order to understand the point of view of the Allies it is necessary to have clearly in mind the military conditions existing in the whole theatre of operations during the six months prior to Rumania's fatal venture. In February the Germans had assembled a large portion of their mobile reserves for their effort against Verdun. The constant wastage of German human material continued almost without intermission into May, with spasmodic recurrences up to the present time. Hundreds of thousands of Germans were drawn from the visible supply of enemy manhood by these offensives. By early May the failure of the Verdun venture had probably become manifest to the German High Command, and there is evidence that they were commencing to conserve their troops for other purposes.

[Sidenote: General Brussiloff's offensive.]

On the 5th of June there began in Galicia and Volhynia the great offensive of General Brussiloff which lasted, almost without intermission, on one or another part of his front, until October. By the middle of June this drive of the Russians began to divert German troops for the defense of Kovel. In July started the British-French offensive in the West.

[Sidenote: German troops diverted to Eastern front.]

With their reservoirs of men already greatly reduced by the Verdun attacks, the Germans, by the middle of July, were compelled to find supports to meet the continuous offensives on both the Eastern and Western fronts. I cannot estimate the number of troops required by them against the French and British, but I do know that between the 5th of June and the 30th of August a total of thirty divisions of enemy troops were diverted from other fronts against Brussiloff alone. This heavy diversion was the only thing that prevented the Russians from taking Kovel in July and forcing the entire German line in the East. So continuous and pressing were the Russian attacks that more than two months elapsed before the enemy could bring this offensive to a final stop on the Kovel sector. Enemy formations arriving were ground up in detail as fast as they came, and by the middle of July it was clear to us, who were on the fighting line in Volhynia, that the Germans were having extraordinary difficulties in filling their losses from day to day. In June their first supports came by army corps; in July they were coming by divisions; and early in August we checked the arrival of single regiments, while the Austrians were often so hard pressed that they sent isolated battalions to fill the holes in their lines.

[Sidenote: Teuton losses.]

In the meantime the Russians had cleared the Bukovina of the enemy. It was believed that Rumania could put in the field twenty-two divisions of excellent troops. The enemy losses in prisoners alone, up to the first of September, from Brussiloff's offensive, were above four hundred thousand and over four hundred guns. It seemed then that these extra twenty-two divisions thrown in by Rumania could meet but little resistance.

[Sidenote: The Allied plan of operation.]

[Sidenote: Munitions to come daily from Russia.]

In order that the Rumanian attempt to cooperate might be safeguarded in the highest degree, a coordinated plan of operations on the part of the Allies was agreed upon with Rumania. The allied force in Saloniki under General Sarrail was to commence a heavy offensive intended to pin down the Bulgarian and Turkish forces to the southern line, thus protecting the Rumanian line of the Danube. Brussiloff's left flank in Galicia was to start a drive through the Bukovina toward the Hungarian plain, thus relieving the Rumanians from any pressure on the south. A Russian force of fifty thousand men in the Dobrudja was to protect the Rumanian left. This, in view of the apparent shortage of enemy reserves, seemed to protect the army of Rumania on both flanks in its advance into Transylvania. In addition Rumania was to receive certain shipments of munitions of war daily from Russia. It was the opinion of the military advisers in Rumania that under no circumstances could the Germans divert against her within three months more than sixteen divisions, while some of the experts advising her placed the number as low as ten.

[Sidenote: Bulgar and Austrian attack.]

[Sidenote: Rumanians on defensive.]