Part 1

OCELLUS LUCANUS

ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE;

_&c. &c. &c._

OCELLUS LUCANUS ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE.

TAURUS, THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER, ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD.

JULIUS FIRMICUS MATERNUS OF THE THEMA MUNDI; IN WHICH THE POSITIONS OF THE STARS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SEVERAL MUNDANE PERIODS IS GIVEN.

SELECT THEOREMS ON THE PERPETUITY OF TIME, BY PROCLUS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINALS BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Αρχα και αιτια και κανων εντι τας ανθρωπινας ευδαιμοσυνας α τω θειων και τιμιωτατων επιγνωσις.

_i. e._ The knowledge of divine and the most honourable things, is the principle and cause and rule of human felicity.—ARCHYTAS.

LONDON: PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATOR; AND SOLD BY JOHN BOHN, HENRIETTA-STREET; HENRY BOHN, YORK-STREET; AND THOMAS RODD, GREAT NEWPORT-STREET. MDCCCXXXI.

PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

INTRODUCTION.

The Tracts contained in this small volume will, I trust, be perused with considerable interest by every English reader who is a lover of ancient lore; and whatever innovations may have been made in the philosophical theories of the ancients by the accumulated experiments of the moderns, yet the scientific deductions of the former will, I am persuaded, ultimately predominate over the futile and ever-varying conclusions of the latter. For science, truly so called, is, as Aristotle accurately defines it to be, the knowledge of things eternal, and which have a necessary existence. Hence it has for its basis _universals_, and not _particulars_; since the former are _definite_, _immutable_, and _real_; but the latter are _indefinite_, are so incessantly changing, that they are not for a moment the same, and are so destitute of reality, that, in the language of the great Plotinus, they may be said to be “shadows falling upon shadow[1], like images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream.”

With respect to Ocellus Lucanus, the author of the first of these Tracts, though it is unknown at what _precise_ period he lived, yet as Archytas, in his epistle to Plato (apud Diog. Laert. viii. 80.), says “that he conversed with the descendants of Ocellus, and received from them the treatises of this philosopher On Laws, On Government, Piety, and the Generation of the Universe[2],” “we cannot be a great way off the truth,” as my worthy and very intelligent friend Mr. J. J. Welsh, in a letter to me, observes, “if we say that he lived about the time Pythagoras first opened his school in Italy, B.C. 500; which would give him for contemporaries in the _political_ world, Phalaris, Pisistratus, Crœsus, Polycrates, and Tarquin the Proud; and in the _philosophical_ world, the seven sages of Greece, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Democritus of Abdera, &c. &c.”

All that is extant of his works is the treatise On the Universe[3], and a Fragment preserved by Stobæus of his treatise On Laws. And in such estimation was the former of these works held by Plato and Aristotle, that the latter, as Syrianus observes (in Aristot. Metaphys.), “has nearly taken the whole of his two books on Generation and Corruption from this work;” and that the former anxiously desired to see it, is evident from his Epistle to Archytas, of which the following is a translation:

“Plato to Archytas the Tarentine, prosperity.

“It is wonderful with what pleasure we received the Commentaries which came from you, and how very much we were delighted with the genius of their author. To us, indeed, he appeared to be a man worthy of his ancient progenitors. For these men are said to have been _ten thousand_[4] in number; and, according to report, were the best of all those Trojans that migrated under Laomedon.

“With respect to the Commentaries by me about which you write, they are not yet finished. However, such as they are, I have sent them to you. As to guardianship, we both accord in our sentiments, so that in this particular there is no need of exhortation.”

“In the Preface to the Marquis d’Argens’ French translation of this Tract, he says: ‘I have often thought that it would be much more advantageous to read what some of the Greek authors have said of the philosophy of the ancients, in order to obtain a knowledge of it, than to consult modern writers, who, though they may perhaps write well, are in general too prolix[5].’

“In 1762 the Marquis d’Argens published Ocellus Lucanus, and afterwards Timæus Locrus, both writers, who according to Chalmers’ Biography had been neglected by universal consent. To show, however, the glaring absurdity and outrageous injustice of what Chalmers says of this Tract of Ocellus, it is necessary to observe, that independently of the approbation of this work by those two great luminaries of philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, an enumeration of the various editions of it will be sufficient. Ocellus was first printed in Greek at Paris 1539, and afterwards with a Latin version by Chretien 1541; by Bosch 1554 and 1556; by Nogarola, Ven. 1559; by Commelin 1596; at Heidelberg 1598; Bologna, 1646, and revised by Vizanius 1661; and lastly, by Gale, Cambridge, 1671. Here are ten editions, the last of which is only 49 years prior to the year 1700; so that the universal consent had not yet been given to neglect this work. Let us see when it could have taken place afterwards. D’Argens’ translation appeared in 1762. A new French translation by the Abbé Batteux was printed in 1768; and he made it without knowing of the other. D’Argens’ version was reprinted in 1794; and an amended Greek and Latin text by Rudolph was printed at Leipsic in 1801; so that there are in all fourteen known editions, of which Gale’s is the best. This book has certainly been read in Greek, Latin, and French, and it most certainly will be read in English, if any competent translator will favour us with a good version.

“In addition to the testimonies of Plato and Aristotle in favour of this work, Philo, the platonizing Jew, says: ‘Some are of opinion, that it was not Aristotle, but certain Pythagoreans, who first maintained the eternity of the world; but I have seen a treatise of Ocellus, in which he says, the world was not generated, and is imperishable, and indeed he proves it by most exquisite reasoning. Censorinus also, De Die natali, cap. ii. says, ‘that the opinion that the human race is perpetual, has for its authors Pythagoras the Samian, Ocellus Lucanus, and Archytas of Tarentum.’ He is likewise mentioned by Jamblichus in his Life of Pythagoras; by Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys.; by Proclus in his Commentary on the Timæus of Plato, who, as we have shown in the Notes on Ocellus, demonstrates that he was wrong in ascribing two powers only instead of three to each of the elements; and in the last place, this Tract is cited by Stobæus in Ecl. Phys. lib. i. c. 24: all which testimonies clearly prove that Chalmers is a man who cannot say with Socrates (in Plat. Gorg.) that he has bid farewell to the honours of the multitude, and has his eye solely directed to truth[6].”

To the treatise of Ocellus I have subjoined a translation of a Fragment of Taurus, a Platonic philosopher, On the Eternity of the World[7]; and also a translation of the Mundi Thema, or _Geniture of the World_, from the celebrated astrological work of Julius Firmicus Maternus, because it not only admits with Ocellus the perpetuity of the universe, but unfolds the position of the stars at the commencement of each of the periods comprehended in the greater mundane apocatastasis, which consists of 300,000 years; the first period after a deluge and conflagration, being, as it were, a reproduction of the world.

I have likewise annexed a translation of select theorems from the 2nd Book of Proclus on Motion, in which the perpetuity of time, and of the bodies which are naturally moved with a circular motion, is incontrovertibly proved, and is demonstrated by what Plato calls “_geometrical necessities_” (γεωμετρικαις αναγκαις).

In the last place, I have added copious Notes to these treatises, in order that nothing might be wanting to render the meaning of them perspicuous to the unprejudiced and intelligent reader.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] viz. falling on _matter_, or the general receptacle of all sensible forms. See my Translation of the admirable treatise of Plotinus “On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures.”

[2] Περι νομου, περι βασιλειας και ὁσιοτητος, και της του παντος γενεσεως.

[3] It is rightly observed by Fabricius, “that this work of Ocellus was originally written in the Doric dialect, but was afterwards translated by some grammarian into the common dialect, in order that it might be more easily understood by the reader.”—Vid. Biblioth. Græc. tom. i. p. 510.

[4] In all the editions of Plato, μυριοι, conformably to the above translation; but from Diogenes Laertius, who, in his Life of Archytas, gives this epistle of Plato, it appears that the true reading is Μυραιοι, i. e. Myrenees, so called from Myra, a city of Lycia in Asia Minor, (see Pliny, v. 27. Strabo xiv. 666.) This 12th epistle of Plato, though ascribed by Thrasyllus and Diogenes Laertius to Plato, yet is marked in the Greek manuscripts of it as spurious.

[5] Of the Philosophy of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, very few of the moderns have any accurate knowledge, and therefore on this subject they may be prolix, but they cannot write well. See this largely and incontrovertibly proved in the Third and Fourth Books of my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle.

[6] For nearly the whole of what is contained in the above three paragraphs, I am indebted to my excellent friend Mr. J. B. Inglis, who has also read Ocellus with great attention, and made Notes upon it; another proof that the work is not neglected.

[7] This Taurus flourished under Marcus Antoninus, and the original of the above-mentioned Fragment is only to be found in the treatise of Philoponus against Proclus, “On the Eternity of the World.”

OCELLUS LUCANUS ON THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP. I.

Ocellus Lucanus has written what follows concerning the Nature of the Universe; having learnt some things through clear arguments from Nature herself, _but others from opinion, in conjunction with reason_[8], it being his intention [in this work] to derive what is probable from intellectual perception.

It appears, therefore, to me, that the Universe is indestructible and unbegotten, since it always was, and always will be; for if it had a temporal beginning, it would not have always existed: thus, therefore, the universe is unbegotten and indestructible; for if some one should opine that it was once generated, he would not be able to find anything into which it can be corrupted and dissolved, since that from which it was generated would be the first part of the universe; and again, that into which it would be dissolved would be the last part of it.

But if the universe was generated, it was generated together with all things; and if it should be corrupted, it would be corrupted together with all things. This, however, is impossible[9]. The universe, therefore, is without a beginning, and without an end; nor is it possible that it can have any other mode of subsistence.

To which may be added, that everything which has received a beginning of generation, and which ought also to participate of dissolution, receives two mutations; one of which, indeed, proceeds from the less to the greater, and from the worse to the better; and that from which it begins to change is denominated generation, but that at which it at length arrives, is called acme. The other mutation, however, proceeds from the greater to the less, and from the better to the worse: but the termination of this mutation is denominated corruption and dissolution.

If, therefore, the whole and the universe were generated, and are corruptible, they must, when generated, have been changed from the less to the greater, and from the worse to the better; but when corrupted, they must be changed from the greater to the less, and from the better to the worse. Hence, if the world was generated, it would receive increase, and would arrive at its acme; and again, it would afterwards receive decrease and an end. For every nature which has a progression, possesses three boundaries and two intervals. The three boundaries, therefore, are generation, acme, and end; but the intervals are, the progression from generation to acme, and from acme to the end.

The whole, however, and the universe, affords, as from itself, no indication of a thing of this kind; for neither do we perceive it rising into existence, or becoming to be, nor changing to the better and the greater, nor becoming at a certain time worse or less; but it always continues to subsist in the same and a similar manner, and is itself perpetually equal and similar to itself.

Of the truth of this, the orders of things, their symmetry, figurations, positions, intervals, powers, swiftness and slowness with respect to each other; and, besides these, their numbers and temporal periods, are clear signs and indications. For all such things as these receive mutation and diminution, conformably to the course of a generated nature: for things that are greater and better acquire acme through power, but those that are less and worse are corrupted through imbecility of nature.

I denominate, however, the whole and the universe, the whole world; for, in consequence of being adorned with all things, it has obtained this appellation; since it is from itself a consummate and perfect system of the nature of all things; for there is nothing external to the universe, since whatever exists is contained in the universe, and the universe subsists together with this, comprehending in itself all things, some as parts, but others as supervenient.

Those things, therefore, which are comprehended in the world, have a congruity with the world; but the world has no concinnity with anything else, but is itself co-harmonized with itself. For all other things have not a consummate or self-perfect subsistence, but require congruity with things external to themselves. Thus animals require a conjunction with air for the purpose of respiration, but sight with light, in order to see; and the other senses with something else, in order to perceive their peculiar sensible object. A conjunction with the earth also is necessary to the germination of plants. The sun and moon, the planets, and the fixed stars, have likewise a coalescence with the world, as being parts of its common arrangement. The world, however, has not a conjunction with anything else than itself.

Further still[10], what has been said will be easily known to be true from the following considerations. Fire, which imparts heat to another thing, is itself from itself hot; and honey, which is sweet to the taste, is itself from itself sweet. The principles likewise of demonstrations, which are indicative of things unapparent, are themselves from themselves manifest and known. Thus, also, that which becomes to other things the cause of self-perfection, is itself from itself perfect; and that which becomes to other things the cause of preservation and permanency, is itself from itself preserved and permanent. That, likewise, which becomes to other things the cause of concinnity, is itself from itself co-harmonized; but the world is to other things the cause of their existence, preservation, and self-perfection. The world, therefore, is from itself perpetual and self-perfect, has an everlasting duration, and on this very account becomes the cause of the permanency of the whole of things.

In short, if the universe should be dissolved, it would either be dissolved into that which has an existence, or into nonentity. But it is impossible that it should be dissolved into that which exists, for there will not be a corruption of the universe if it should be dissolved into that which has a being; for being is either the universe, or a certain part of the universe. Nor can it be dissolved into nonentity, since it is impossible for being either to be produced from non-beings, or to be dissolved into nonentity. The universe, therefore, is incorruptible, and can never be destroyed.

If, nevertheless, some one should think that it may be corrupted, it must either be corrupted from something external to, or contained in the universe, but it cannot be corrupted by anything external to it; for there is not anything external to the universe, since all other things are comprehended in the universe, and the world is _the whole_ and _the all_. Nor can it be corrupted by the things which it contains, for in this case it will be requisite that these should be greater and more powerful than the universe. This, however, is not true[11], for all things are led and governed by the universe, and conformably to this are preserved and co-adapted, and possess life and soul. But if the universe can neither be corrupted by anything external to it, nor by anything contained within it, the world must therefore be incorruptible and indestructible; for we consider the world to be the same with the universe[12].

Further still, the whole of nature surveyed through the whole of itself, will be found to derive continuity from the first and most honourable of bodies, attenuating this continuity proportionally, introducing it to everything mortal, and receiving the progression of its peculiar subsistence; for the first [and most honourable] bodies in the universe, revolve according to the same, and after a similar manner. The progression, however, of the whole of nature, is not successive and continued, nor yet local, but subsists according to mutation.

Fire, indeed, when it is congregated into one thing, generates air, but air generates water, and water earth. From earth, also, there is the same circuit of mutation, as far as to fire, from whence it began to be changed. But fruits, and most plants that derive their origin from a root, receive the beginning of their generation from seeds. When, however, they bear fruit and arrive at maturity, again they are resolved into seed, nature producing a complete circulation from the same to the same.

But men and other animals, in a subordinate degree, change the universal boundary of nature; for in these there is no periodical return to the first age, nor is there an antiperistasis of mutation into each other, as there is in fire and air, water and earth; but the mutations of their ages being accomplished in a four-fold circle[13], they are dissolved, and again return to existence; these, therefore, are the signs and indications that the universe, which comprehends [all things], will always endure and be preserved, but that its parts, and such things in it as are supervenient, are corrupted and dissolved.

Further still, it is credible that the universe is without a beginning, and without an end, from its figure, from motion, from time, and its essence; and, therefore, it may be concluded that the world is unbegotten and incorruptible: for the form of its figure is circular; but a circle is on all sides similar and equal, and is therefore without a beginning, and without an end. The motion also of the universe is circular, but this motion is stable and without transition. Time, likewise, in which motion exists is infinite, for this neither had a beginning, nor will have an end of its circulation. The essence, too, of the universe, is without egression [into any other place], and is immutable, because it is not naturally adapted to be changed, either from the worse to the better, or from the better to the worse. From all these arguments, therefore, it is obviously credible, that the world is unbegotten and incorruptible. And thus much concerning the whole and the universe.

CHAP. II.

Since, however, in the universe, one thing is generation, but another the cause of generation; and generation indeed takes place where there is a mutation and an egression from things which rank as subjects; but the cause of generation then subsists where the subject matter remains the same: this being the case, it is evident that the cause of generation possesses both an effective and motive power, but that the recipient of generation is adapted to passivity, and to be moved.

But the Fates themselves distinguish and separate the impassive part of the world from that which is perpetually moved [or mutuable][14]. For the course of the moon is the isthmus of immortality and generation. The region, indeed, above the moon, and also that which the moon occupies, contain the genus of the gods; but the place beneath the moon is the abode of strife and nature; for in this place there is a mutation of things that are generated, and a regeneration of things which have perished.

In that part of the world, however, in which nature and generation predominate, it is necessary that the three following things[15] should be present. In the first place, the body which yields to the touch, and which is the subject of all generated natures. But this will be an universal recipient, and a signature of generation itself, having the same _relation_ to the things that are generated from it, as water to taste, _silence to sound_[16], darkness to light, and the matter of artificial forms to the forms themselves. For water is tasteless and devoid of quality, yet is capable of receiving the sweet and the bitter, the sharp and the salt. Air, also, which is formless with respect to sound, is the recipient of words and melody. And darkness, which is without colour, and without form, becomes the recipient of splendour, and of the yellow colour and the white; but whiteness pertains to the statuary’s art; and to the art which fashions figures from wax. Matter, however, has a relation in a different manner to the statuary’s art; for in matter all things prior to generation are in capacity, but they exist in perfection when they are generated and receive their proper nature. Hence matter [or a universal recipient] is necessary to the existence of generation.

The second thing which is necessary, is the existence of contrarieties, in order that mutations and changes in quality may be effected, matter for this purpose receiving passive qualities, and an aptitude to the participation of forms. Contrariety is also necessary, in order that powers, which are naturally mutually repugnant, may not finally vanquish, or be vanquished by, each other. But these powers are the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist.

Essences rank in the third place; and these are fire and water, air and earth, of which the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, are powers. But essences differ from powers; for essences are locally corrupted by each other, but powers are neither corrupted nor generated, for the reasons [or forms] of them are incorporeal.

Of these four powers, however, the hot and the cold subsist as causes and things of an effective nature, but the dry and the moist rank as matter and things that are passive[17]; but matter is the first recipient of all things, for it is that which is in common spread under all things. Hence, the body, which is the object of sense in capacity, and ranks as a principle, is the first thing; but contrarieties, such as heat and cold, moisture and dryness, form the second thing; and fire and water, earth and air, have an arrangement in the third place. For these change into each other; but things of a contrary nature are without change.