Part 10

The document continues as follows: "My visitor laid emphasis on the following fact: that it (the conversation) was not binding on his Government ... and that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign had been consulted." It was thus clearly shown by the British Military Attaché that his communication was simply a conversation; it is, moreover, perfectly well known that Military Attachés have no power to make conventional agreements.

The document further continues: "In the course of another interview, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a _German offensive_, with Antwerp as its object, _and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our (Belgian) country_, in order to reach the French Ardennes"--an additional proof that the object of the conversation was solely to prevent a violation of Belgian neutrality.

Document No. 2 refers to a conversation between the British Military Attaché and Gen. Jungbluth, in which the former said that the British troops would effect a landing "even if we (the Belgians) did not ask for assistance." This is an additional proof that no agreement or convention had been made.

To this the Belgian General replied that "our (Belgium's) consent was necessary," and he added that "we (the Belgians) were, moreover, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium," thus showing his anxiety to preserve the neutrality of Belgium.

Dr. B. Dernburg claims that England would have sent troops into Belgium in any event, even if Germany had not invaded Belgium. Affirmations which are not based upon any evidence cannot destroy the text itself of the documents.

In a letter of Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of England, addressed to the British Minister to Belgium, on the 7th of April, 1913, the British statesman declares in the most formal way, that: "As long as Belgium's neutrality was not violated by any other power, we (the British) should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."

The full text of this important letter is as follows:

In speaking to the Belgian Minister today I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, from a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible dispatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and, as long as it was not violated by any other power, we would certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory. I am, &c.,

(Signed) E. GREY.

Document No. 3 contains, according to Dr. B. Dernburg, the personal views of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, but it does not, in any way, indicate the existence of an agreement between Belgium and England against Germany.

It is impossible to say that these documents constitute a proof of an agreement between England and Belgium against Germany, unless one accepts the idea that Germany had a right to violate Belgium's neutrality and that all measures taken as a precaution against violation of neutrality must therefore have been taken against Germany.

The documents contain merely conversations between military officers in regard to a possible future co-operation of their armies in the event of violation of Belgian territory by Germany. They never even resulted in an agreement between those Governments; Military Attachés have no authority to make such agreements.

The events that happened last August and the sudden invasion of Belgium by Germany show that the British Government was fully justified in fearing the violation of Belgian territory by Germany. It seems incredible, after what has passed, that the German Government should denounce the British Government for approaching Belgian military officers and taking precautions against the very thing which eventually happened.

If further proof should be necessary, the documents published in the "Gray Book" show as clearly as possible that, when the war broke out, Belgium had no such agreement with any of the powers.

On July 24 the following letter was sent by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the various Belgian Legations concerned, with instructions to communicate the same to the powers as soon as said Legations should have received telegraphic orders to do so:

Mr. Minister:

The international situation is serious; the eventuality of a conflict between several powers cannot be set aside from the anxieties of the Government of the King.

Belgium has observed with the most scrupulous exactness the duties of a neutral State which are imposed on her by the Treaties of April 19, 1839. These duties, whatever the circumstances may be, _will be resolutely fulfilled by her_.

The friendly disposition of the powers toward her has been so often affirmed that Belgium has the confidence that her territory will be untouched by any attack if hostilities should break out on her frontiers.

All the necessary measures have nevertheless been taken, in order to assure the observance of her neutrality.... It is scarcely necessary to insist upon their character.... These measures _are not and can not have been inspired by a design to participate in an armed struggle of the powers, nor by any sentiment of defiance toward any one of them_.

Belgium declared that she would not fail to fulfill all of her duties, that she had not a single agreement of alliance with any one, and that she wanted to remain absolutely neutral.

Seven days later the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated to the Belgian Legations his answer to the question which Sir Edward Grey had asked Belgium in the name of England:

"Mr. Minister:

"The British Minister requested to see me very urgently and communicated to me the following:

"'Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments, separately, whether each of them was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium.

"'In view of the existing treaties, I am also instructed to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium that _Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality_.'

"I immediately thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government appreciates very highly, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations, guarantors of our independence, might be sure that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which we have always enjoyed with them, would observe and maintain this neutrality."

At the decisive moment, the attitude of Belgium was thus irreproachable. She was not bound to any other nation; she had her hands free. She declared that she was ready to make the necessary sacrifices to defend her neutrality and to resist any aggression from whatever source, and she added that, trusting in her friendly relations with the powers, she was unwilling to believe that any of them would violate her neutrality.

On Aug. 3, at 7 A.M., after having received the ultimatum from Germany, Belgium declared that she refused to repudiate her engagements.

The next day, the 4th of August, at 3 P.M., the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs received from Sir F. Villiers, Minister of England in Brussels, the following note:

BRUSSELS, Aug. 4, 1914.

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany exercises pressure for the purpose of compelling Belgium to abandon her position of a neutral country, the Government of his Britannic Majesty expects Belgium to resist by every possible means. The Government of his Britannic Majesty is ready, in that event, to join with Russia and France, _if desired by Belgium_, to offer to the Belgian Government, at once, common action for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to offer a guarantee to maintain the independence and the integrity of Belgium in the future.

England offered her help _but did not impose it_. She did not intend to send troops into Belgian territory as a preventive measure. She expressly subordinated her assistance _to the desire of Belgium_.

It was only on the 4th of August, during the evening, after having vainly hoped and waited for a change in the attitude of Germany, that Belgium called England, France, and Russia to co-operate, as guarantor powers, in the defense of her territory.

In the preface published by Dr. B. Dernburg, with the documents, it is said that "only the prompt action at Liége that put this important railway centre, commanding the railway connections to France and Germany, into German hands, prevented the English landing and invading Belgium."

It is impossible to conceive how the taking of Liége prevented the English from landing and invading Belgium. That statement is hardly a compliment to the intelligence or the geographical knowledge of the American people. The fact is that Liége was taken a long time before the British troops landed at Calais, and it is still today in the hands of the Germans without in the least interfering with the arrival of British reinforcements in France and in the territory still left in the possession of Belgium. The fact is that Liége was not taken to prevent the British from entering Belgium, but because it was part of the plan of the German General Staff to invade Belgium at once, to march across her territory, to crush the army of France as soon as possible, and then to turn and attack the Russians on the east.

It is interesting to recall here the famous conversation held between the British Ambassador in Berlin, on one side, and the Chancellor of the Empire, Mr. Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. von Jagow, on the other side, at the time of the invasion of Belgium by the German troops. These conversations prove, indisputably, the premeditated intention of Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality:

To the request of Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador in Berlin, to be allowed to know if Germany would pledge herself to respect the neutrality of Belgium, the German Secretary of State replied that "this neutrality had already been violated by Germany." Herr von Jagow went again into the "reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death to them, for, if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would mean time gained by the Russians for the bringing up of their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was the inexhaustible supply of troops." (Official report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to the British Government.)

This conversation preceded by a few minutes that in which the German Chancellor, giddy at the sight of the abyss into which Germany was falling, uttered these celebrated words: "Just for a word, NEUTRALITY, a word which in war times has been so often disregarded; just for A SCRAP OF PAPER, Great Britain is going to make war on a kindred nation. At what price would that compact (neutrality) have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" Sir Edward Goschen replied that fear of consequences would hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking a solemn engagement. (Official report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to his Government.)

Finally, the solemn avowal of the German Chancellor, during the sitting of the Reichstag on Aug. 4, 1914, settles this question definitely: "We are in a state of legitimate defense. NECESSITY KNOWS NO LAW. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already penetrated into Belgium. This is against the law of nations."

The truth is that every step taken by Germany was a clear indication of her intentions against Belgium. Her strategic railroads are concentrated on the Belgian frontier, and her military writers, von Bernhardi, von Schliefenbach, and von der Goltz, made no secret of her plan to carry on her war by means of an invasion of Belgium's neutral country. Events have shown how, long before the war, preparations had been made to carry this plan into effect.

Dr. B. Dernburg says that the one-sidedness of the Belgian inclination is indicated by the placing of all Belgian fortresses on the eastern frontier. The distinguished statesman (apparently confused by the ardor of discussion) has already in another article, published in The Independent of Dec. 7, 1914, placed Antwerp at the mouth of the Rhine; today he places Namur on the German frontier, whereas that fortress is situated near the frontier of France. There are three fortresses in Belgium--Antwerp, Liége, and Namur. Antwerp is in the north, Liége in the east, and Namur in the south. Namur, being near the French frontier, could menace Germany only in case the Germans should have penetrated about one-third of Belgium. It is, in fact, a fortress against France.

Nothing has been brought forward to show that, if Germany had not invaded Belgium, France or England would have done so. The exact contrary is clearly indicated by the documents.

Dr. B. Dernburg cites a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and attempts to apply it to the case of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality and to justify Germany by the law of necessity. The example chosen (the Chinese question) does not involve massacres, bombardments, nor the burning of towns. It is not an analogous case. The following would be a closer analogy to Germany's action in regard to Belgium: A man pretending that he has been attacked in the street by a powerful enemy, claims that he is justified in killing an innocent person, if by doing so he can gain an advantage over his adversary.

It would be difficult for any one to produce a decision of the Supreme Court justifying a crime on the plea that the perpetration of the crime was advantageous to the culprit who committed it.

When a nation has to resort to such arguments to defend its actions it must realize that its case is desperate.

Germany has converted smiling and peaceful Belgium into a land of sorrow, of mourning, and of ruins. There is not a family that does not mourn one of its dear ones. In the face of the indignation which has aroused the world, Germany, today, endeavors to refute the accusation which rises against her from so many tombs, and she endeavors to throw upon the innocent the terrible responsibility of her own crimes.

It is not probable that this course of action will win back to Germany the sympathy which she has lost throughout the world.

The foregoing documents show clearly that Belgium had made no agreement with England for attacking Germany, nor even an agreement for British military defense of Belgian neutrality.

[Having replied to the representations made in the German indictment drawn by Dr. Dernburg, the Belgian authorities proceeded to compile a pamphlet, the contents of which are reproduced on the following pages, purporting to show from original documents the manner of the German violation of Belgium's neutralized territory.]

* * * * *

THE BIG AND THE GREAT

By WILLIAM ARCHER.

[From King Albert's Book.]

The Big and the Great When they to History's judgment seat shall come, Which will shine glorious in the eyes of men, Huge Germany or heroic BELGIUM? Which will be hailed Great, Wilhelm or ALBERT, then?

* * * * *

[The following title and article are reproduced from the second pamphlet referred to in the letter from the Belgian Legation at Washington to THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY, appearing on Page 1110.--EDITOR.]

[BELGIAN LEGATION ARTICLE NO. 2.]

"Why Belgium Was Devastated"

"As Recorded in Proclamations of the German Commanders in Belgium"

"_Necessity knows no law_."

--BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

"_The wrong that we are committing we will endeavor to repair as soon as our military goal has been reached._"

--BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

EXTRACT FROM A PROCLAMATION TO THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES OF THE CITY OF LIÉGE.

Aug. 22, 1914.

The inhabitants of the town of Andenne, after having declared their peaceful intentions, have made a surprise attack on our troops.

It is with my consent that the Commander in Chief has ordered the whole town to be burned and that about one hundred people have been shot.

I bring this fact to the knowledge of the City of Liége, so that citizens of Liége may realize the fate with which they are menaced if they adopt a similar attitude.

The General Commanding in Chief. (Signed) VON BUELOW.

NOTICE POSTED AT NAMUR, AUGUST THE 25TH, 1914.

(1) French and Belgian soldiers must be surrendered as prisoners of war at the prison before 4 o'clock. _Citizens who do not obey will be condemned to enforced labor for life in Germany._

_A rigorous inspection of houses will begin at 4 o'clock. Every soldier found will be immediately shot._

(2) Arms, powder, dynamite, must be surrendered at 4 o'clock. Penalty: death by shooting.

The citizens who know where a store of arms is located must inform the Burgomaster, _under penalty of enforced labor for life_.

(3) Each street will be occupied by a German guard who will take ten hostages in each street, whom they will keep in custody.

If any outrage is committed in the street, _the ten hostages will be shot_.

(4) Doors must not be locked, and at night after 8 o'clock three windows must be lighted in each house.

(5) It is forbidden to remain in the street after 8 o'clock. The people of Namur must understand that there is no greater nor more horrible crime than to endanger the existence of the city and the life of its inhabitants by attacks upon the German Army.

The Commandant of the City. (Signed) VON BUELOW.

Namur, 25th of August, 1914. (Imprimerie Chantraine.)

LETTER ADDRESSED ON AUG. 27, 1914, BY LIEUT. GEN. VON NIEBER TO THE BURGOMASTER OF WAVRE.

On Aug. 22, 1914, the General commanding the Second Army, Herr von Bülow, imposed upon the City of Wavre a war levy of three million francs, to be paid before Sept. 1, as expiation for its unqualifiable behavior (contrary to the law of nations and the usages of war) in making a surprise attack on the German troops.

The General in command of the Second Army has just given to the General commanding this station of the Second Army the order to send in without delay, this contribution which it should pay on account of its conduct.

I order and command you to give to the bearer of the present letter the two first installments, that is to say, two million francs in gold.

Furthermore, I require that you give the bearer a letter, duly sealed with the seal of the city, stating that the balance, that is to say, one million francs, will be paid, without fail, on the 1st of September.

I draw the attention of the city to the fact that in no case can it count on further delay, as the civil population of the city has put itself outside the law of nations by firing on the German soldiers.

_The City of Wavre will be burned and destroyed if the levy is not paid in due time, without regard for any one; the innocent will suffer with the guilty._

PROCLAMATION POSTED AT GRIVEGNEE, Sept. 8, 1914.

_Commune of Grivegnee. Very Important Notice._

The Major Commandant Dieckmann, at the Château des Bruyeres, requests me to bring the following statement to the knowledge of the inhabitants:

Dieckmann Battalion, Château des Bruyeres, Sept. 6, 1914.

Present at the discussion:

(1) The Curé Fryns of Bois de Breux. (2) The Curé Franssen of Beyne. (3) The Curé Lepropres of Heusay. (4) The Curé Paquay of Grivegnee. (5) The Burgomaster Dejardin of Beyne. (6) The Burgomaster Hodeige of Grivegnee. (7) Major Dieckmann. (8) Lieut. R. Reil.

Major Dieckmann brought to the knowledge of the persons present the following orders:

"(1) Before the 6th of September, 1914, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, all arms, munitions, explosives, and fireworks which are still in the hands of the citizens must be surrendered at the Château des Bruyeres. _Those who do not obey will render themselves liable to the death penalty. They will be shot on the spot, or given military execution, unless they can prove their innocence._

"(2) All inhabitants of houses in Beyne-Heusay, Grivegnee, Bois de Greux, and Fleron must remain at home after sunset, (at present 7 o'clock P.M., German time.) The aforesaid houses must be lighted as long as any one remains up. The entrance door must be shut. Those who do not conform to the regulations expose themselves to severe penalties. Any resistance to these orders will be followed by sentence of death.

"(3) The Commandant should meet no opposition whatever in these domiciliary visits. Each inhabitant must open all the rooms of his house without even a summons. Whoever makes any opposition will be severely punished.

"(4) Beginning Sept. 7, at 9 o'clock in the morning, I will permit the houses of Beyne-Heusay, Grivegnee, Bois de Breux, to be occupied by persons formerly dwelling in them as long as no formal prohibition to frequent these places shall have been issued against the inhabitants above referred to.

"(5) In order to be sure that this permission is not abused, the Burgomasters of Beyne-Heusay and of Grivegnee shall immediately draw up a list of persons who shall be held as hostages, at the fort of Fleron, in twenty-four-hour shifts; on Sept. 6, for the first time, from 6 o'clock in the evening until midday, Sept. 7.

"_The life of these hostages will depend upon the population of the aforesaid communes remaining pacific under all circumstances._

"During the night it is strictly prohibited to make any luminous signal whatever. The circulation of bicycles is only allowed from 7 A.M. until 5 P.M., German time.

"(6) I will designate from the lists submitted to me the persons who will be detained as hostages from noon of one day to noon of the next day. If the substitute does not arrive in time, the hostage will remain another twenty-four hours. _After this second period of twenty-four hours, the hostage incurs the penalty of death if the substitution is not made._

"(7) Hostages will be chosen, primarily, from among priests, Burgomasters, and other members of the civic administration.