Part 11
On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. One month later, the sponsoring powers of the UNAEC revealed that the consultations between them “had not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the other five powers.”
Despite this, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1949, asked that the permanent members of the Commission continue their consultations and keep the Commission and the General Assembly informed of their work. On the same day, Vishinsky revealed that the Soviets no longer entertained favorably the principle of quotas.
On January 19, 1950, consultations came to an end when the Soviet Union withdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the Chinese Government.
C THE ATOMIC IMPASSE
Regarded in fundamental terms, the deadlock in international control negotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the responsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy.
All nations except the Soviet Union and her satellites “put world security first, and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.”
This basic variance in the objectives of the Soviet Union and the other members of the United Nations is mirrored in the majority and minority control proposals.
The specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows:
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION
_United Nations._—Complete and continuing inspection by international personnel, including aerial and ground surveys, and inspection of atomic facilities.
_Soviet Union._—Periodic inspection of declared plants. Special investigations when there exist “grounds for suspicion”—not that the control agreement has been violated—but that the convention outlawing atomic weapons has been violated. (This could mean that only if a nation were subjected to surprise atomic attack would the necessary “grounds for suspicion” enter into existence.)
INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
_United Nations._—International ownership or management of dangerous facilities and international ownership of source materials and their fissionable derivatives—in order to prevent diversion of such material from existing plants.
_Soviet Union._—Complete opposition to international ownership or management provisions.
STRATEGIC BALANCE (QUOTAS)
_United Nations._—National quotas to be incorporated into international control treaty.
_Soviet Union._—Sees in quotas an instrument for “American domination.”
SANCTIONS
_United Nations._—No veto to protect those who violate stipulated provisions of international agreement.
_Soviet Union._—All decisions require unanimous consent of permanent members of Security Council.
The permanent members of the UNAEC have summarized the differences between the Soviet plan and the world plan in the following fashion:
“The Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive atomic materials.
“The other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials as atomic weapons.
“The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own, operate, and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of such materials.
“The other five Powers believe that, under such conditions, it would be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials for use in atomic weapons.
“The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic inspection of facilities the existence of which the national government concerned reports to the international agency, supplemented by special investigations on suspicion of treaty violations.
“The other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent clandestine activities.”
D POSSIBLE QUESTIONS REGARDING H-BOMBS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL[1]
_The answers to many of the questions which follow are obvious. The answer to other questions are less obvious. Each question has been selected to suggest and to illustrate the kind of problem which may be involved, whether easy or difficult of solution. It should be emphasized that the original United States proposals and the existing United Nations plan foresee and carefully take into account the possibility of an H-bomb, as evidenced by the language they contain. The same is true of the McMahon Act for domestic control of atomic energy within the United States._
Footnote 1:
All material in this appendix, except those paragraphs headed “Author’s Comments,” has been prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
1. IS THE HYDROGEN BOMB A MORE OR LESS IMPORTANT WEAPON THAN THE ATOMIC BOMB? MIGHT HYDROGEN BOMBS PROVE TO BE DECISIVE IN WAR, OR HAS THEIR SIGNIFICANCE BEEN EXAGGERATED?
Dr. Harold Urey, a Nobel Prize winner in [chemistry], has suggested that the H-bomb would be militarily decisive; Dr. Hans Bethe, [and other noted physicists, have] indicated that the step from A-bombs to H-bombs is as great as the original step from conventional to atomic explosives. However, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, a former AEC Commissioner, states that—
while it [the H-bomb] is a terrible weapon, its military effectiveness seems to have been grossly overrated in the minds of laymen.
Some of the questions which may bear upon this difference of opinion are as follows:
(1) _Shock effect._—To what extent do H-bombs excel A-bombs in permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time?
(2) _Comparative numbers._—What quantity of A-bombs are required to do the same job as a given number of H-bombs?
(3) _Neutron economy._—How much fissionable material for A-bombs is sacrificed by using the neutrons available in reactors for making H-bomb materials?
(4) _Deliverability._—Under various combat conditions, is the delivery of H-bombs cheaper and surer than delivery of an “equivalent” number of A-bombs?
(5) _Aiming accuracy._—How superior is a weapon which need strike only within a number of miles in order to destroy its target over one which must strike within 1 or 2 miles?
(6) _Psychology._—As compared with the A-bomb, to what extent might the H-bomb impair an enemy’s will to resist and accelerate recognition of defeat?
(7) _Tactical employment._—What is the relative value of A-bombs and H-bombs in tactical situations—when used against troops in the field, guerrilla fighters, forces preparing for amphibious invasion, a fleet, a string of air strips or submarine bases, atomic facilities, underground installations, etc.?
(8) _Definition of “military effectiveness.”_—Would the use of H-bombs to destroy large urban centers containing no armaments plants have no “military effectiveness,” or would such destruction aid the attacker and therefore represent “militarily effective” use of the weapon? Is it possible to distinguish, in an era of total war, between “military” and “nonmilitary” targets?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
The answer to (1) becomes obvious in light of the answers to (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), all of which must be considered together. We know that a standard H-bomb would be the equal to ten nominal A-bombs in its power to destroy by blast and to as many as thirty A-bombs in its incendiary effects. In terms of total area, the H-bomb can destroy by blast an area of more than 300 square miles, as compared with an area of only ten square miles for the nominal A-bomb, and more than 1,200 square miles by fire and burns, as compared with only four square miles for the early A-bomb model. As for neutron economy, we have seen that this vast increase in power could be achieved at a cost in fissionable A-bomb material possibly as low as one twelfth, and no higher, at the most, than the plutonium required (according to Professor Oliphant’s estimate) for just one A-bomb. It thus becomes obvious that such a weapon not only is much cheaper, in terms of destruction and cost of materials, than the conventional A-bomb, but is much more easily and safely delivered, since it would still be highly effective as a blasting weapon if exploded more than five miles from its target, while as an incendiary it would still be highly effective as far as fifteen miles away. Hence there can be no question that H-bombs vastly excel A-bombs in permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time, and that its psychological effect in impairing an enemy’s will to resist is also incalculably greater.
Its vastly greater range of destructiveness, its economy of material, and its surer delivery also make the H-bomb vastly superior to the A-bomb as a tactical weapon. Neither the H-bomb nor the A-bomb appears to be practical for use against guerrilla fighters, except possibly as a threat.
As already discussed at length in Chapter III, there could be no possible justification, on moral as well as military grounds, for using the H-bomb as a strategic weapon to destroy large urban centers, especially those containing no armaments plants, except in retaliation for such use against us or our allies.
2. IF THE H-BOMB IS DEEMED TO BE DECISIVE OR FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE A-BOMB, SHOULD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF HYDROGEN WEAPONS TAKE PRIORITY OVER CONTROL OF ORDINARY ATOMIC WEAPONS? SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROPOSE A SEPARATE PLAN EXCLUSIVELY DESIGNED TO REGULATE H-BOMBS?
The official United Nations proposals for international control of atomic energy apparently involve the assumption that A-bombs are so unique technically and so menacing as to set them apart from conventional weapons and to justify separate consideration in the United Nations and a separate regulatory system. If the step from A-bombs to H-bombs is considered to be as great as the step from conventional weapons to A-bombs, does it follow that hydrogen warfare should become the subject of a separate control proposal and should receive separate consideration in the United Nations?
Are the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately related that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled? Are the political facts such that the two problems must be regarded inseparably?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
Since the H-bomb requires the A-bomb as a trigger, it becomes obvious that the two problems are inseparable.
3. IS THE EXISTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TECHNICALLY ADEQUATE TO CONTROL H-BOMBS?
The United Nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an international agency would possess discretionary authority in defining and controlling materials and processes that may be employed to manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
For instance, the _Second Report_ of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission defines “atomic energy” as including “all forms of energy released in the course of, or as a result of, nuclear fission _or of other nuclear transformation_.” “Source material” is taken to mean “any material containing one or more key substances in such concentration as the international agency may by regulation determine.” “Key substance” is defined to mean “uranium, thorium _and any other element from which nuclear fuel can be produced, as may be determined by the international agency_.” (p. 71). Similarly, the report defines “nuclear fuel” as “plutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium enriched in U-235, material containing the foregoing, _and any other material which the international agency determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material_.” (p. 71.) The _report_ likewise observes that: “Dangerous activities or facilities are those which are of _military significance_ in the production of atomic weapons. The word “dangerous” is used in the sense of _potentially dangerous to world security_.” (p. 70). [Italics supplied throughout.]
Does such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and source materials needed in the production of H-bombs could be properly controlled, through the existing UN plan?
Since nearly 2 years of work were required to formulate the UN plan, can this plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the control measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly elaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for controlling U-235 and plutonium?
It may also be pointed out that the existing UN plan contains no provision for physically protecting informants who advise the international agency of violations. Might potential informants keep silent for fear of being punished by their national governments? Is this factor important if the existing UN plan were subjected to the added strain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons?
What safeguards would assure that the employees of an international control agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some national government—perhaps a national government other than that of their own country?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
The language makes it obvious that the United Nations plan “foresees and carefully takes into account the possibility of an H-bomb.” In view of Russia’s attitude, however, and to leave no room for future quibbling, the present plan should be explicitly elaborated to include hydrogen weapons. On the other hand, since Russia will have none of the plan, such elaboration would at best be purely academic.
As for protecting informants, certainly no plan could contemplate that citizens would act as spies against their own country, even if they find that their country is violating an international agreement. The plan is designed so that such violations could be detected by the official employees of the international control agency. Obviously, such official employees stationed in any country should not be nationals of that country and should be protected by diplomatic immunity. Each country, in selecting its representatives to the control agency, would naturally subject them to a most careful screening as to their character and loyalty, and would use all necessary checks to make certain that they are faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency.
4. IS CONTROL OVER FISSIONABLE MATERIALS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE PRODUCTION OF HYDROGEN BOMBS? IF SO, IS THE EXISTING UN PLAN ADEQUATE TO THIS TASK?
The technical facts suggest that H-bombs may be regulated in at least two ways: (1) Control over the fissionable material usable as a “trigger” and (2) control over deuterium and tritium.
Perhaps control over _all_ fissionable material would give effective control over hydrogen weapons. However, by way of specific example, the introduction to volume VI of the Scientific Information Transmitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946-October 14, 1946 (see State Department Publication 2661, pp. 151–152), comments as follows:
It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per year or a total of five bombs over any period of time. [This example is chosen because UN documents published later omit concrete illustrations, although the stress which these documents place upon international ownership, operation, and management clearly reflects a determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining or production.]
Considering that five illicit A-bombs might, under certain circumstances, lead to five illicit H-bombs, what margin of inefficiency—if any—in controlling source and fissionable material is permissible? Is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source and fissionable material technically possible? Does the existing UN plan provide absolute or near-absolute protection? Can greater technical protection be secured than under the present UN plan?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
It can be stated unequivocally that, in the absence of complete mutual faith and goodwill on the part of all concerned, neither the existing UN plan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan could be devised that would provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any one year to make at least one atomic bomb. In five years this would mean the secret production of five hydrogen bombs.
5. MUST H-BOMB CONTROLS RELATE TO DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM AS WELL AS TO FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? IF THEY MUST, CAN THE PRESENT UN PLAN FULLY PROVIDE FOR THESE CONTROLS OR DOES IT REQUIRE REVISION OR CHANGES IN EMPHASIS?
Should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium call for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and plutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture furnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than surveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be true? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium? Or is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to take care of light-element control?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
Since H-bombs require either U-235 or plutonium, as well as deuterium and tritium, and since absolute or near-absolute control of U-235 or plutonium is not possible, it becomes obvious that H-bomb controls must relate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material. Since the UN plan does not mention them by name, added safeguards are necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium. No safeguards, however, could be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or near-absolute protection.
6. IS IT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO DETECT THE MANUFACTURE OF HEAVY WATER AND DEUTERIUM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?
The manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes. They may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales.
The _Second Report_ of the UN Commission comments as follows:
The international agency shall have the authority to require periodic reports from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the production and use of atomic energy, such as mass spectrometers, diffusion barriers, gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope separation units, very pure graphite in large amounts, heavy water, and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts. In addition, the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having features of size and design, or construction or operation, which, in combination with their location and/or production or consumption of heat or electricity, are peculiarly comparable to those of known atomic facilities of dangerous character (p. 54).
Would inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate deuterium and heavy water plants? Would aerial surveys and aerial photographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce hydrogen as a byproduct and which might therefore be concerned with the manufacture of heavy water or deuterium? Should quantity production of deuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of peacetime reactors such as the Canadian reactor at Chalk River, the French reactor at Chatillon, Swedish reactors under construction, and a research reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory? Is it possible on technical grounds to enforce such a prohibition?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
It would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and deuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of neutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial uses. Furthermore, such a prohibition could never be enforced, since, as stated, the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes that “may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales.” What makes it even more difficult, if not impossible, to detect any violation of such a prohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or deuterium is just plain water.
7. SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT UN PLAN RELATING TO INSPECTION, SURVEYS, AND EXPLORATIONS BE MODIFIED TO CONTROL HEAVY WATER AND DEUTERIUM PRODUCTION?
The United Nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable material cannot be regulated without strict supervision over the mining of source materials such as uranium and thorium:
Without the control of raw materials, any other controls that might be applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the international agency has knowledge of the disposition of _all_ raw material. (_Second Report_, p. 30.)
Whereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce U-235, [U-233] and plutonium, the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation of source materials. Only water, the existence of power, and comparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium. In view of these facts, can the existing United Nations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production?
In commenting upon spot aerial surveys, for example, the _Second Report_ recommends that “the [international] agency shall conduct spot aerial surveys in each period of 2 years over areas not exceeding 5 percent of the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed 2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations apply to spot aerial surveys only)” (p. 68). If aerial surveys were to be used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in spotting deuterium and heavy water plants, must they be carried out more frequently than is provided in the existing plan?
The _Second Report_ also indicates that a UN inspectorate should be compelled to secure permission, through a warrant procedure, before inspecting “private and restricted property not open to visitation by the population in the locality, and in the case of certain ground surveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the agency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization” (p. 60). Do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium production suggest that such a restriction on an international agency’s authority would have to be modified?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
See comment on question 6.
8. WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?
U-235 and plutonium may be used either in weapons or as fuels for peacetime reactors. Here is the reason most frequently cited for requiring that international control include not only inspection but also such further guaranties as United Nations ownership, operation, and management of “dangerous” plants. The potentiality, both for good and evil, that characterizes fissionables does not appear to characterize tritium, which has no known peacetime uses except as a laboratory research tool. Is it therefore possible that the reason for requiring inspection plus other guaranties as regards U-235 and plutonium does not apply to tritium and that inspection alone would answer?
If quantity production of tritium were altogether forbidden—as having no peacetime purpose—the mere act of preparing lithium (the tritium raw material) for irradiation and the mere act of inserting it in a nuclear reactor might be considered a violation. Would such action be impossible to conceal from managers and inspectors stationed at each reactor permitted under the control agreement? Would an illegal reactor itself be impossible to conceal from inspectors enjoying freedom of movement?
A few private commentators have argued that the UN plan fundamentally errs in assuming industrial power to be around the corner. They estimate that this goal is actually a decade or two away and that meanwhile the control problem would be simplified if all high-powered reactors were dismantled. Does the role of reactor-produced tritium in H-bomb production strengthen such an argument?
The UN plan distinguishes between atomic facilities which are sufficiently “dangerous” to require UN management and facilities which may be operated by national governments and merely require international inspection. Since all reactors produce neutrons and hence might be useful in some degree—however small—in manufacturing tritium, is it now necessary to regard certain reactors formerly considered to be “non-dangerous” as now being in the “dangerous” category?
Are there other methods, apart from reactors, for producing tritium? If so, how can they be controlled? Would the right of the international control agency to own, operate, and manage “dangerous” plants and to own and regulate both fissionable materials and “fusionable materials” meet such a situation?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT