Part 5

One may visualize the masters of the Kremlin gnashing their teeth in impotent rage at what they no doubt regard as a diabolical plot on our part to sabotage their A-bomb effort. Indeed, there can be no question that our decision to proceed with the H-bomb was an answer to Russia’s challenge to our atomic supremacy, and it appears quite plausible that one of the motives behind the decision was the knowledge that it would force Russia either to build great additions to her atomic plants, at great expense in money and materials and at the loss of considerable precious time, or to curtail her production of A-bomb material. And while any such motive could not possibly have been the determining factor, the ultimate effect of our decision was the same as though we had succeeded in getting a team of expert saboteurs behind the Iron Curtain to plant a good-sized monkey wrench in the Soviet atomic machinery.

With this in mind we begin to appreciate how dangerous a move it would be, to ourselves and to world peace, if we were to make a solemn declaration at the outset, even before we have a single H-bomb, that we will never use it, “no matter how righteous our cause,” unless it is used first against us or our allies. By making such a unilateral declaration, without even making it conditional upon Russia issuing a similar solemn renunciation, we would, in effect, be saying to Russia: “We humbly beg your pardon. We did not realize that we would be putting a nasty monkey wrench in the machinery of your vital A-bomb program. We shall remove the wrench at once so that you may proceed with your program unhindered by us in any way.”

The masters of the Kremlin would, indeed, have every right to laugh long and loud, and to take such foolhardy action on our part as further evidence of what they call “the decadence of the bourgeois democracies.” For, once we make such a magnanimous unilateral solemn renunciation of the one weapon that promises to become the greatest single deterrent against war, without even bothering to ask Russia publicly to do likewise, Russia could then proceed calmly at her leisure to build up her A-bomb stockpile, with the complete assurance from us that she need not worry about our H-bomb as long as she does not use one against us or our allies. After she has accumulated an adequate A-bomb stockpile—and fifty to one hundred would be adequate from her standpoint—she would then be in a position, already attained by us now, to proceed with her H-bomb program, knowing full well that we would never use H-bombs against her while she is still without them. And while she obviously could not use anything she does not have, she could well afford to make aggressive war even before she has an H-bomb, or to bide her time until she does, the choice being entirely hers. And if she waits until she has the H-bomb, the decision whether to use it or not would still be entirely hers, so that she could use it whenever she decides it is to her advantage to do so, whereas we should have to wait on her pleasure, having morally bound ourselves, without qualification, not to use it first, even if our very existence depended on it.

It can thus be easily seen that this “after you, my dear Alphonse” gesture on our part in a matter that may involve our very existence would be more than quixotic. It is likely to prove suicidal. It will not improve the prospects of world peace; on the contrary it will weaken them. It will not enhance our moral stature, since the world does not have much respect for starry-eyed dreamers with their heads in the clouds.

But while we must keep our feet planted on the ground, we need not lose sight of the stars. Our refusal to expose ourselves by giving Russia the great advantages mentioned, does not mean that we retain the right to use the H-bomb indiscriminately as though it were just another weapon. There are, I shall presently show, both legitimate and illegitimate uses to which the H-bomb can be put, and it is the failure so far, even by eminent scientists, to distinguish between these two types of possible uses that is responsible for a great deal, if not all, of the confusion and much futile debate that have followed the President’s announcement of his directive to continue work on the hydrogen bomb, and for the flood of verbiage that will continue to plague and bewilder us until we take time to acquaint ourselves with the facts about the H-bomb.

One of the major difficulties in our approach to the subject stems from the general tendency to talk about the H-bomb as though it were just one weapon, which obviously it is not. As we know, it is several weapons in one package, which can be designed for various uses, depending on the intent of its designer. It is, on the one hand, a weapon that can cause total destruction by blast over a radius of ten miles, or an area of more than 300 square miles, with graduated lesser damage over a much larger area. Secondly, it is a weapon that can produce fires and severe flash burns over a radius of twenty miles—that is, over an area of more than 1,200 square miles. These two functions, destruction by blast and by fire, go together. They are inseparable as far as the bomb itself is concerned, though their relative effects can be regulated by the height from which the bomb is dropped, by the terrain over which it is used, and by its mode of delivery other than by air.

Then, of course, there is the third weapon of terror, the tremendous quantities of deadly radioactive particles that the H-bomb may release in the atmosphere, which, as Dr. Einstein said, would bring within the range of technical possibilities “the annihilation of life on earth.” This, however, would depend on the choice and purpose of the designer. If he so chooses, he can design an H-bomb that would produce only slightly greater radioactivity than its A-bomb trigger. Or he can rig it in such a manner that one bomb would release into the atmosphere the equivalent of nearly five million pounds of radium that would poison the atmosphere for thousands of miles, killing all life wherever it goes. The catchword here is “rig,” and the rigging depends entirely, not on the contents of the bomb itself, but on the material of which its outer shell is composed. If, for example, the casing chosen is a material such as steel, the radioactivity produced would be practically harmless. If the shell is made of cobalt, the radiations released would cause untold havoc. The reason for the vast difference is not difficult to understand. The H-bomb, when it explodes, releases tremendous quantities of neutrons, the most penetrating particles in nature. As soon as it is liberated, a neutron enters the nucleus of the nearest element at hand. This may produce a wide variety of changes in the nature of the element penetrated by the neutron, the changes depending on the element. Some elements, such as cobalt, become intensely radioactive, others only mildly so, and still others not at all. Furthermore, each element thus made radioactive has its own characteristic decay period, lasting from seconds to many years, so that the designer of the bomb has a great variety to choose from.

From this it can be seen that, instead of one, there are actually two types of H-bombs—the non-rigged and the rigged. With this vital distinction in mind the problem of its use becomes much more simplified. We are in a position to reach full agreement with the scientists that no nation has the right to use such a “rigged” bomb, no matter how righteous its cause. For the rigged H-bomb would add nothing to the military value of the non-rigged H-bomb, which is already more than enough to achieve any military objective. It would merely be piling horror upon horror for no purpose beyond wanton destruction for its own sake. Its use even in small numbers would ruin large segments of the earth for years. It would, as the scientists said, “be a betrayal of morality and of Christian civilization itself.” There can therefore be no question that when this distinction between the non-rigged and the rigged H-bomb is made clear to the American people—something the scientists failed to do—they would overwhelmingly lend their support to a move on the part of our government solemnly declaring that we would never use the rigged H-bomb first; that our only aim in building it is to prevent its use, and that the only circumstances under which we would find ourselves forced to use it would be in retaliation for its use against us or our allies.

We can, and should, make such a solemn declaration unilaterally, regardless of whether Russia makes a similar declaration. We would lose nothing by doing so from a military or strategic point of view, and we would gain enormously in moral stature and on the battlefront of ideas if we were to do it now. Otherwise we run the risk that Russia might do it first. If she takes advantage of this lost opportunity of ours, we shall have handed her a great moral victory. In fact, the law of nations compels us to make such a declaration. Unlike the A-bomb, in which the radioactivity is part and parcel of the bomb itself, the rigged H-bomb is purposely designed to produce radioactive poisoning in the atmosphere. Since it has to be specially incorporated into the casing of the bomb, it comes under the international convention outlawing the use of poison gas. For there can be no question that a radioactive cloud that may lay waste to whole areas is the most diabolical and deadly poison gas so far invented.

But the twelve scientists do not seem to be satisfied with the mere renunciation of the rigged H-bomb. They ask us to declare that we would not be the first to use even the non-rigged bomb, on the grounds that it “is no longer a weapon of war, but a means of extermination of whole populations.” This requires closer scrutiny.

It has become customary to think of the A-bomb, and now of the H-bomb, as purely strategic weapons for destroying industrial centers producing war materials, thus depriving the armies at the front of the vital sinews of war. It is also regarded as a weapon of superterror to bring a nation to its knees, as the A-bomb did in Japan. Since industrial centers, particularly in the United States, are densely populated areas, and since, conversely, all large cities are also important industrial centers, it has become almost axiomatic that the A-bomb and the H-bomb could be used only in strategic bombing of large centers of population, which, of course, means the wholesale slaughter of millions of civilians and the wiping out of cities with populations of more than 200,000.

But to think along such lines would be thinking of World War III, which we must do our utmost to prevent, in terms of World War II, which would be just as fatal as thinking in terms of World War I was to the French in World War II. For even a cursory examination of the situation should reveal that strategic bombing of cities may, and very likely would be, as obsolete in the next war as trench warfare was in the last. One does not have to be a military expert to know the reason why. In the last war strategic bombing was resorted to in order to deprive the army at the front of weapons and supplies. Obviously, if you had a superweapon that could wipe out an entire army in the field or on the march at one blow, there would be no further need of depriving an army that was no longer in being.

That is exactly what the non-rigged H-bomb is. As a blast weapon, we have seen, it can cause total destruction of everything within an area of more than 300 square miles. As an incinerator it would severely burn everything within an area of more than 1,200 square miles. It is thus the tactical weapon par excellence. No army in the field or on the march could stand up against it. Had we possessed it at the Battle of the Bulge, just one could have wiped out the entire Bulge. If the Nazis had had it before D-Day, one would have been enough to wipe out our entire invasion army even before it landed; or they could have waited and wiped out our entire Normandy beachhead. In a word, the non-rigged H-bomb has produced a major revolution in tactics and strategy. It has made strategic bombing of cities as obsolete as the trench of World War I, except as a weapon of pure terror and wanton wholesale destruction of life and property. It would be absolutely useless to the victor as well as to the vanquished, as the victor would have no spoils of victory left and would have to rebuild what he had needlessly destroyed.

Viewed in this light, the non-rigged H-bomb, just because it is the weapon for the annihilation of armies, becomes vis-à-vis Russia, the greatest deterrent against war that could possibly be devised in the present state of affairs. For, after all, the only great advantage Russia has over us today is her land army and her great reserve of manpower. The non-rigged H-bomb, supported by a large and up-to-date air force capable of delivering it either by air or from a seized airhead behind the lines, could nullify that advantage in a few hours. At least the threat of such a possibility will always be there. It is therefore doubtful, to say the least, that any group of men would willingly take such a risk.

Since the greatest and most effective use of the non-rigged H-bomb would thus be as a tactical weapon against armies in the field, while its strategic use against civilian populations would be simple wanton destruction from the point of view of both victor and vanquished, then not only morality and Christian civilization but plain common sense would dictate the wisdom of our solemnly declaring right now that we will never be the first to use either the non-rigged H-bomb or even the A-bomb against civilian populations, and that the only circumstance that would compel us to use them so would be in retaliation for their use against us or our allies. In fact, we could renounce strategic bombing altogether. By doing so we would gain one of the greatest moral victories, for then if Russia failed to make a similar declaration, as she most likely would, she would stand before the world as a nation bent on wholesale slaughter of civilian populations. We have nothing to lose and everything to gain by such a declaration, and the sooner we make it the better.

Should we make such a declaration, it would place Russia in an embarrassing position indeed. For while as a tactical weapon the non-rigged H-bomb offers us great advantages as a counterforce to neutralize her huge army, she can use the H-bomb, both the rigged and the non-rigged, as a constant threat against our densely populated cities. As Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, has warned, an H-bomb attack “might incinerate 50,000,000 Americans—not in the space of an evening but in the space of a few minutes.” We have eleven cities of one million or more inhabitants, whereas Russia has only three or four. We have forty cities of 200,000 and over, inhabited by 40,000,000, or 27 per cent of our population, whereas Russia has only twenty cities of 200,000 and over, inhabited by only 20,000,000, or 10 per cent of her population. Furthermore, her industries are now largely dispersed, whereas our industries are highly centralized. Russia would thus get much the worse of the bargain if she were to accept our challenge to renounce the use of strategic bombing, particularly that of the A- and H-bombs, while we still retain the right to use them in tactical bombing against her armies.

Suppose Russia in this dilemma, and recognizing the need to avoid the moral opprobrium of the peoples of the world that her refusal to meet our renunciation would entail, comes forth with a counterproposal to renounce the use of both A- and H-bombs altogether, as strategic as well as tactical weapons, thus exchanging the elimination of the threat of the annihilation of our teeming cities and industries, for the removal of the threat of destruction to her armies. Suppose that at the same time she repeats her demand, frequently voiced by her in the United Nations, that all stockpiles of A- and H-bombs be destroyed and a convention signed to outlaw their uses. The world already knows the answer, for we have already made it again and again.

Immediately after the close of the last war we declared our readiness to give up the A-bomb. In 1946, at a time when we were the sole possessor of the bomb, when we had every reason to believe that our monopoly would last for a number of years, we submitted a far-reaching plan for the international control of atomic energy, the most generous offer by far ever made by any nation in history. In this historic plan we not only declared our readiness to give up our stockpile of A-bombs and to agree to refrain from further production; we even offered to give up our sovereignty over our multibillion-dollar atomic plants to an international agency. We further agreed to submit to unhindered, free inspection by such an agency to assure the world, and Russia in particular, that we were not manufacturing A-bombs, or A-bomb materials, in secret. No nation in history had ever gone so far in its desire to show its goodwill and its peaceful intentions as to make a voluntary offer to surrender the world’s most powerful weapon of war, and an important part of its sovereignty to boot. The offer still stands. It has been enthusiastically endorsed by all the members of the United Nations except Russia and her satellites. After three years of futile negotiations and discussions Russia still insists that she would not surrender any part of her sovereignty or submit to the only kind of inspection that could assure the world against clandestine production of atomic bombs and materials.

Hence, should Russia demand that we renounce the right to use the A- and H-bombs not only as strategic but also as tactical weapons against her armies in exchange for a similar offer on her part, it would on the face of it be a mere repetition of her earlier efforts to trick us into giving up our greatest weapons while she remained free to produce them in secret, since she insists upon her right to retain ownership of the atomic plants and materials and upon the inspection of only those plants she acknowledges to exist, thus making it impossible to find plants whose existence she does not admit. To accept such an offer would be tantamount to surrender, since our giving up the right to use the H-bomb as a tactical weapon against her armies would leave her free to march into the countries of western Europe. It would then be too late to stop her, for we could not drop the H-bomb on the cities of western Europe. The only time to stop Russia’s armies is before they cross into the territory of our allies, during the crucial period when they are mobilized in large numbers and on the march.

The American people, and the other free peoples of the world, could not agree to such a scheme to disarm them in advance and thus give the masters of the Kremlin a free hand. To do so would not prevent war, it would encourage it. It would not even delay it, it would hasten it. Instead of being preventable, it would become inevitable. We wouldn’t even save our cities from the fate of strategic bombing with A- and H-bombs, since the Kremlin has never kept its promises when they did not suit its purposes. When we had lost our greatest chance to wipe out her armies in one mighty blow, Russia would be in a position to trade our industries and cities for her dispersed and still primitive industrial plants and cities. If at that stage she should offer us, as well as our neighbors to the south and Britain and her Dominions, independence and complete sovereignty, while she assumed hegemony over all of Europe and Asia, could we then refuse, at the risk of the lives of our millions? Supposing the nations of western Europe, overrun by the Red Army, become “people’s democracies,” Russian style, would we risk our millions to liberate nations whose governments would by then have joined the ranks of our enemy?

These are the brutal facts that would confront us were we to renounce the right to use A- and H-bombs as tactical weapons against armies in the field. As long as we retain that right, the chances are good that we could prevent global war, for no nation would be likely to risk such a war in the face of the possibility that the main bulk of its armies might be wiped out at the outset. If we give up that right, we would also prevent war—by surrendering in advance. Russia, of course, might figure that she could still make war, when she decides the time is ripe, taking the calculated risk that we would not use the A- and H-bombs against her armies for fear of her retaliation against our cities and industries. But whether she would consider that calculated risk worth taking would depend on how good our defenses were. Senator McMahon’s warning that an H-bomb attack “might incinerate 50,000,000 Americans ... in the space of a few minutes” would become a possibility only if we allowed ourselves to be surprised for a second time by a “super Pearl Harbor,” which, of course, is inconceivable. While it is generally agreed that it is impossible to decentralize our cities and industries, because of the tremendous cost (estimated at $300 billion) and the short time at our disposal between now and the ultimate showdown, when Russia is expected to be ready to make major moves at the risk of “accepting” war, we have many advantages not possessed by Britain and Germany during the last war as far as defenses against strategic bombing were concerned. Britain, as well as Poland, Holland, and Belgium—little, densely populated countries—were within very short range of Germany’s airfields. So was Germany, in her turn, within easy range from Britain. Radar, as compared with its modern types, was primitive in quality and inadequate in quantity. Automatic antiaircraft guns, interceptor planes, and night fighters were either nonexistent in the early days of the blitz or in a crude stage of development compared with present equivalents.