Part 2
The 10th of July 1917, at about 8 o’clock p. m., after a regular bombardment of more than 10 hours duration, all along the Nieuport sector, the enemy rushed the positions held, only since a few days, by the British Infantry. The fight lasted the whole night long and after the most bloody hand to hand fights, the attackers succeeded to enter the British trenches between the beach and the Geleïde and throwing the occupants in the channel, those who swam across escaped from death or capture.
From up the 11 July onward the Nieuport front was running along the channel right up to Geleïde river, where it was hinged to the primitive front, which determined attacks had successfully brought to its original point.
Later the “Redan” and its surrounding area were subjected to almost daily bombardments, which soon gave them a bloody fame.
The powder-mill of the old work, thanks to the superimposed vaults, which were forming its ceiling, managed to resist to all kind of German shells, which made it deserve the nickname of _Rubber house_. It was occupied during the operations both as battle headquarters and as advanced dressing station.
In March 1918, the Belgian front had to be stretched out, in order to relieve allied divisions. To avoid the weakening of our resistance, our front having been thus considerably lengthened and the occupation having become very thin, the G. H. Q. decided to stretch a further inundation which allowed to gain up several outposts.
At Nieuport, the Redan became the front line. It was hooked North by the “huitrière” (oyster-pond), fronting the West bank of the channel, and South at “Dupuis and de Luc” trench.
Those three points d’appui formed an important point of resistance: they were covering the locks. They were garrisoned by a battalion; its duty was to hold at all costs and it did it.
At last, the Belgian offensive was launched from up the southern part of our front on the 28^{th} of September 1918. North of Dixmude our troops remained momentarily waiting and the position of Nieuport had still to suffer severe bombardments. But the last occupants of the Redan stood them up lightly, only anxiously waiting their turn to rush victoriously over the parapet. The kick off was given on the 17^{th} of October and the very same day they were able to admire with a legitimate pride the magnificent enemy artillery, which had made them suffer so much and that the Germans had left them, the guns still loaded.
7.—Karnak battery at Oost-Dunkerke.
English battery composed of two 9.2 inches, guns. That battery was situated at about 1 kilometer East of Oost-Dunkerke and at 200 meters South of Oost-Dunkerke bath and Nieuport bath road.
Its interest lies in the reason of its having been constructed underneath the great dunes, from that emplacement the battery drew the three fold advantages in regard to camouflage, protection and mainly in creating great difficulties to the German counter-battery; indeed the latter was deprived of any aiming point whatever, and the shell craters were rapidly leveled up by the sand.
Karnak battery, which was manned by British gunners had been placed under the Orders of the O. C. of the Nieuport sector, who utilized it for momentous counter-battery and destruction fires.
8.—Levelcrossing guard shelter at Ramscappelle with machine-gun-pit.
Ramscappelle was the only point West of the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line that ever was trod on by the invader. After the taking of St-Georges on October 24^{th} 1914, the foe in order to widen his success rushed on the 26^{th} for the Noordvaart and compelled our troops after a night of fierce struggle to withdraw on the railway track, on which they clung without much difficulty up to the 29^{th} of October.
During the evening of the 29^{th}, two attempts of the enemy against the railway line facing Ramscappelle failed. The 30^{th}, at 4.45 a. m. a new trial was again pinned down. And finally round 5.30 a. m. after a terrific artillery preparation, a last and more powerful attack than the previous ones, forced the resistance at a point South of the halt of Ramscappelle, the enemy linked himself on the railway line which he now enfilades and thus proceeding northward, reached the village.
The 5^{th} and 6^{th} line Regiments, which had battled with the finest determination, withdrew and took a strong position at the Koolhofbrug and Jockveld farm from whither they managed to prevent the enemy to emerge from out the village, thus stemming the rush for good and all.
Lieutenant General Dossin, in command of the 2^d Army Division, ordered the counter-strike to be organized at once. Accordingly at the beginning of the afternoon a force composed of four French Battalions and five Belgian ones plus a machine-gun company, and, with in support two Belgian and two French battalions, went slowly forward, encircled the village altogether northward, westward and southward. When that move had been completed, the assault was launched; it was then 7 o’clock p. m.
The group of houses on the southern side of the wind mill and the wind mill itself were carried out at the first jump, thanks to the fighting spirit of the men and also to the efficient artillery fire of N^o 26^{th} Belgian Field Battery, which, in spite of a hurricane of machine-gun bullets had been brought as far forward as the Pelican bridge.
The fighting ground being of a very close nature permitted but a very slow progression of the wings. But nothing daunted, the attack however reached the nearer outskirts of the village, bar the eastern side of the brook, called Ramscapelleleed excepted.
The night was spent in carrying out violent musketry fire, and to goad the enemy several reconnaissances were pushed in the village while a section of a French and Belgian bridging company was erecting a foot bridge on the Ramscappelleleed. The artillery kept hammering the enemy’s defences into ruins.
At dawn of the 31^{th} of October, the german resistance weakened and a general attack carries the village up bringing in one jump the assaulting troops right up the railway line, scattering the remaining defenders and pushing them back toward the river Yser.
The german fled, leaving their dead and wounded behind them, they also abandoned in the inundation the two famous “Minenwerfer”, which only seven days ago had annihilated a whole Belgian battalion, which was defending the Yser crossing at the Union Bridge.
During the whole war, the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line formed in the “Ramscappelle sector”, the main line of resistance. When the water had retired a little, the sector was guarded by two main-guards i. e. Rijkenhoek and Beverdijk, particularly famous as kick off points for the numerous attacks and raids of our troops against the Violette and Terstille farms.
That line offered numerous and well constructed shelters affording to our men relatively comfortable dwellings. Here and there, at places offering good field of fire or permitting to sweep main-traffic passages concrete machine pits (such as the one at the station) were built. In the hut of the railway guard an artillery observation-post was also constructed.
9.—Machine-gun shelter facing the Pervyse railway station.
10.—Observation-post at the Pervyse railway station.
From up the 26^{th} of October 1914, date at which our troops were compelled to leave the Beverdijk, the Dixmude railway track outlined in front of Pervyse our first front line.
On the 30^{th} of October meanwhile the foe was rushing for Ramscappelle he hurled detachments against the Pervyse station. That attack miserably failed under the violent rifle firing of the 1^{st} Battalion of the 12^{th} line Regiment which had been swiftly reinforced by few sections of the 2^d Bat.
The assailants fled seeking refuge in the houses bordering the Schoore road opposite the railway station, where they were made prisoner in the course of the day. The rest managed to retire back to their former position but had to fight their way through the inundation in order to rally their line.
[Illustration:
PERVYSE.—The inundation facing the railway station (September 1916). ]
[Illustration:
OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE.—The Tower (November 1914). ]
[Illustration:
OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE.—The Tower (February 1917). ]
The above assault was to be the only one the first line of Pervyse ever had to grapple with.
The main-guard of Schilderbrug with its advanced posts, (one outlook post on the road and two sentry posts on the water with the intermediate ones) gave the troops a sufficient security to allow the men, in spite of the rafale fires which from time to time poured upon the line, to say: “It is fine in Pervyse”.
The line was organized since the early days of its occupation, then was gradually improved to become during the last years of war a model of stabilized trench warfare area.
Even the station itself, where an artillery observation-post had been constructed, was wedged in a powerful stronghold whose solid concrete shelters for machine-guns were forming the bastions.
One of the above mentioned machine-gun pits, that of the south eastern angle may still be seen and will give a thorough idea of the organization.
The observation-post of the railway station, one of the main O. P. s. of the Belgian front, had a vast field of view and was provided with visual apparatus of the highest precision.
It was connected in 1917, by means of two telephone wires with alternative courses, to Dunkirk signalling post and that, in order to warn the city of the firing intended for her by the Leugenboom gun.
The report of the monster, perceived at Pervyse was at once communicated to Dunkirk where the receiving station was to alert the town by means of the powerful steam-whistles or other such alarm signals.
11.—Battalion commander’s Headquarters at Km. 4.400 of the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.
That concrete dug-out served as battle Headquarters to the major commanding the Oud-Stuyvekenskerke subsector. It was of that type adopted for such shelters prompted along the railway line.
These emplacements were generally constructed in the years 1916 and 1917 to take the place of the far less resisting ones whose walls as well as roofings were formed by beams and logs in juxtaposition. The roof had been rendered waterproof by means of tarred board, while a more or less thick layer of bags filled with concrete rendered them safe against small shells.
These which replaced them, some of which are still remaining such that of kilom. 4.400, were very well conceived. They often contained several different rooms, the number of which were varying according the need of the sector: major’s orderly room, major’s and adjutant’s lodging, visual signalling and very-light posts, telephone central, etc....
12.—The base of the tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.
The old tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke has not been able to resist to the amount of projectiles poured upon it by the Germans, throughout the whole campaign. Its emplacement however, and the concrete bloc which has taken its place are interesting as marking the extreme advance of the enemy in the region, it also brings back to memory the terrific bombardments and fights which that corner of Flanders witnessed.
[Illustration:
DIXMUDE.—Aerial photo (Mai 26^{th} 1917). ]
[Illustration:
DIXMUDE.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the “Death trench”. (June 1^{st} 1917). ]
[Illustration:
DIXMUDE.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the Riderswork. (June 1^{st} 1917).
The Queen examining private J. Vermeire’s helmet, which had just been pierced by a German bullet. ]
At the end of the Yser battle, after the 29^{th} of October 1914, Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was only occupied for a few days by weak German detachements, whilst our line of defence had been brought back upon the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line and rejoining the Yser at the kilometer 16 by a line running through Roode-Poort farm and the houses of the Burg.
Then the flood forced the foe to withdraw up to the bank of the river.
On the 3^{rd} of November 1914, the Belgian G. H. Q. ordered to push forward reconnaitring parties all along our army front; advanced posts were then placed which, little by little were multiplied untill they formed a complete defence line of advanced guards, acting as outposts screen to the whole defence scheme. The main-guards were all on duty beyond the inundations, the mean of access to the main-guards being long duck boards placed on threstle stuck in the soil. The one leading to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was particularly dangerous because the Germans had aimed a fixed rifle on it, which was sweeping its whole length. The losses there sustained have been very heavy, mainly when relieves were on. To cut the casualties down the 4^{th} line Regiment erected concrete shields against bullets and shell splinters.
The main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was protecting the left flanc of the organization of the Dixmude sector and that by keeping under its fire the whole of the ground stretching itself in front of their advanced posts. Besides, the hamlet which was situated on a little knoll, was thus affording great advantages for the creation of observation-posts.
In connection with this “War-Site” there is a name which is closely associated with every details of its life. Known as the “Burgomaster of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke”, R. Father Martial Lekeux, Artillery Commander, spent the first years of the war in the tower, then when latter tumbled down, he moved in the gable front of a farm where he organized a remarkable observation-post. The name of Martial Lekeux deserves to be mentioned here, because his dogged determination and pluck, unidentified themselves with that main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.
Three momentous German posts, were facing it, i. e. the farms n^o 1, “den Toren and Van de Woude”, which owed many a tragic days to the keen eyes of the Belgian observer.
For four years on end of trench warfare the main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke held fast. It held under storms of iron, it held against assailants who, at renewed attempts endeavoured to overrun it. These different rushes, the one of March 1918 against our cyclist carabiniers and the 1^{st} foot jagers as well as that of June of the same year against the 22^{nd} line regiment have disclosed the stubborn energy and enthusiastic courage which moved our men of 1918, classing them amongst the best fighting elements of the great allied armies.
13.—Death Trench and the “Cavalier” field work.
When the battle of the Yser was over, our first front line was running along the river in front of Dixmude in a direction due North-West up to the kilometer 16. There the river Yser, makes a sudden bend and our front was leaving the river side to prolonge itself westward, leaning on the Roode-Poort farm thus joining the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.
That particular point of kilometer n^o 16, which ought to have been on the early days of stabilized warfare, a stronghold of our defensive scheme, struck our high command, as being rather weak. The decision was then taken to strengthen it.
A line of main-guards already covered the Belgian positions from Nieuport up to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke, when General Jacquet decided, in order to cover himself at the kilometer n^o 16, to prolonge that line by adding to it an element, the advanced posts of which would be placed along the river Reigersvliet and that right up to its mouth.
To carry that mission through it was thought necessary to rush the petrol tanks, the mystery of which, more than their power had already given to the sector a fair renown.
[Illustration:
Death trench and Riders’work-Operations which took place from up May to October 1915 North and East of kilometer 16 of the river Yser. ]
The 1^{st} foot jagers, shouldered by the 3^{rd} divisional artillery and accompanied by detachements of pioneers, tried the operations.
A keen fight developed for three long days, from up the 9^{th} to the 12^{th} May 1915[2], in a horrible ground, the main part being under water, and cut up by deep and broad ditches and shell holes full of water, offering no shelter whatever to the rafales of machine-guns and the harassing fires of the artillery which were hacking our gallant boys down. The attack failed in spite of their courage, and the losses endured.
Footnote 2:
At the same time, the 3^d foot jagers began the fight on the right bank, succeeding to establish a bridge-head South-East of kilometer 16. The enemy clung against it and the daily casualties were such that it was decided to reduce its development and manning. In 1917 few portions of trenches running along the right bank remained solely held and were the starting point of the raids carried on against the enemy’s organizations, right up to the end of the war. A few shelters, last witnesses of our occupation, are still standing and will be kept up for the future.
The 1^{st} foot jagers alone had lost in that action 10 officers and five hundred and fifty men, killed or wounded. The plan was not given up, but tactics was changed. The ground which had been captured was hurriedly fitted up, while a platoon of a tunneling company was set at task on the bank of the Yser to resume the advance by sap-work. The mining was progressing satisfactorily when it was realized that on the German side a similar work was on, which, in less than a fortnights time reduced to few yards the distance separating the Belgian saphead from the enemy’s.
On the 27^{th} of May 1915, during the relieve, and taking the advantage of a pitch dark night and protected by a violent bombardment, a group of Germans jumped in our trench placing a machine-gun section in it. The enfilading fire of those guns caused heavy casualties to the 9^{th} line regiment which delivered a counter-attack.
After useless efforts, the only alternative left was to push actively forward the organization of the remaining portion of the trench so as to render it able to resist, notwithstanding the achievement of the previous object, it is to say the strengthening of the Yser salient at kilometer 16.
From time to time, the enemy tried to attack the trench but each time was repulsed by spontaneous counter-strokes. The enormous casualties suffered, either by the bombardments or by the numerous raids, carried out by the enemy, against the trench, made it deserve the name of: “Death Trench”. (Boyau de la Mort.)
In September 1915, the more urgent works of the Death Trench were nearly finished and could easely suffice to the defence of the left bank of the river at kilometer n^o 16. The attention of the engineers was then driven on to the construction of the “Cavalier”, work which was to complete the above mentioned defence, by securing it against all attempts of the enemy to cross the river.
The characteristic features of the “Cavalier” comes from the working condition it had to be submitted to, it is to say, to combine the defence as to fit or better to match in the most perfect way to the one of the “Death trench” thus forming a center of the highest possible resistance.
The “Cavalier” in itself presents two different and parallel lines, the first one on the level with the ground, to serve the purpose of round way and communication line, the second, above level thus dominating the whole region. The latter trench is the firing one, the overlooking position of which permitting to carry out enfilading and plunging fires upon the two banks of the river Yser as well as in the Death Trench itself, and on the enemy’s organization round kilometer n^o 16.
The dead angles of that position were under machine-gun fire and later, automatic rifles were placed at the entrance of the Death Trench, and also in the one connecting it with the “Cavalier”.
The building up of the “Cavalier” was long and cost to our sappers and infantrymen many a toilsome days and many a casualties. Seeing those provoking works, the German indeed did not remain inactive, they frequently ruined our works with their artillery and minenwerfers, inflicting to our troops awful losses.
The close of 1915 marked the end of the grounding of the accessory defences. The emplacements for trench mortars, machine-guns pits were rising little by little, the dug-out for the officer in Command of the “Cavalier” sector, was gradually coming to shape, and the shelters were rising from out the soil.
It was then decided to reduce the occupation of the “Death Trench”.
On October 11^{th} 1915, the bank of the Yser was blown up by a mine at about 275 meters in front of kilometer 16, thus opening a gap 6 or 8 meters in length, which connected the Yser to the flooded area. The Northern portion of the trench was filled up and then abandoned.
Three bombing teams, garrisoned by day time the thus shortened line.
Our men had become first class bomb throwers and feeling themselves well shouldered by the Van Deuren mortars (Belgian Stokes Guns) were full of confidence and never feared their opponents.
In 1916 the organization of the “Cavalier” completes itself and becomes a real redoubt. The two flights of the work is provided with offensive and defensive weapons, as well as with liaison material of the most diverse nature. Concrete shelters for the men have taken the place of those built with logs, which so often were bombed to ruins by the enemy. A post of visual signalling was placed so as to maintain a constant contact with the commander of the sector.
May 1916 was to be a tragic month for the kilometer 16 sector.
From up the 2^{nd} on to the 22^{nd}, the German switched on the “Death Trench” a fire of the most terrific power, and hurling troops forward they managed to get a foot-hold in our position, but nothing daunted, a counter-attack winged them at once back, by dint of grenades fights and sharp hand to hand struggles.... The enemy fled, he had not even had time to take his dead and wounded back with him.
In July 1916, an artillery observation-post was established at the “Cavalier”. The camouflage section came and erected there a strong steel cabin, loopholed towards the enemy side, and also provided with a periscope. A telephone wire was connecting that post to the Divisional Artillery Commander.
But the month of may with its hard and bloody days the men had to contend with, were not to be forgotten, and a keen wish for vengeance was nursed by every one.
Was the No “One” enemy trench not presenting itself to us in a similar way as our “Death Trench” to him? In fact, we were on the bridge-head on the right bank. The attack and destruction of that line was decided.
On July 18^{th} 1916, after that several reconnaissances had made during the preceding nights, and thorough destruction fire switched on to the trench, a detachment of n^o 4 company of the IV^{th} Bat. of the 2^{nd} line Regiment, under the command of Lieutenants Loyse and Desenfans stormed it. The object of the raid was not to remain there, but the duty of the raiding-party was to “clean the place up” and keep it free of Germans a sufficient length of time to blow all the concrete shelters up, to render them unhabitable. The “cleaning up” was thoroughly done, but unfortunately Lieutenant Loyse having been dangerously wounded, could not give the signal which was to start the blowing of the charges, that sapper sergeant Billiet had placed, after having himself taken an ample share in the first part of the show.
This raid is recorded as an example of the kind. All the dead and wounded of the party were brought back to our lines.
The enthusiasm was at its highest, the confidence kindled, the regiment avenged.
The sector was calm for a good while.