Part 4

When the Belgian front was stabilized (November 1914), it was in part covered by floods, before which our posts soon became powerful main-guards.

Two well distinctive floods had been spread; the first during the battle of the Yser, was extended between the river and the railway line Nieuport-Dixmude having the paved road Oostkerke kilometer 16 of the Yser as Southern limit; the second, subsequent to the fall of Dixmude was created at the request of the French troops from the 14^{th} of November 1914. All the land situated at the East of the Yser, between the Houtensluisvaart and the road embankment of Knocke to Drie Grachten was flooded (this was realised, thanks to the great difference of water level of the two river-banks. The one on the right bank being inferior to the one on the left).

Between the kilometer 16 of the Yser and Houtensluisvaart the obstacle of water did not exist. The enemy, at Dixmude occupied the right bank of the Yser, which alone separated the adversary lines. At the South of the railway line of Dixmude to Zarren, the German positions followed a course almost parallel to the road of Woumen, comprising the strongly organized points such as the cemetery of Dixmude, the Castle of kilometer 19 and several farms. Our troops continued to follow the left bank of the river.

After the victory of the Yser, the constant idea of our staff was to reconquer the most ground possible. The Belgian army built on all practicable spots; posts of various degrees of importance, and this principle was applied to the sector of Nieucappelle on a very large scale.

It was decided to establish on the right bank of the Yser, at the South of Dixmude, towards kilometer 19, to the close contact of the enemy a bridge-head which would be afterwards widened, in order to create a starting position to permit our army to take and offensive. It was Major Panhuys who was charged with this perilous operation, with a group composed of his own battalion (the 1^{st} battalion of the 2^d foot jagers), re-enforced with a company of machine-gunners and a company of cyclists. It was important to take the enemy unawares. All was put in action to that end, each one having his definite mission to accomplish. During the night of the 21^{st} to the 22^d of December 1914, a night cold and dark, the group crossed the river in two places and managed to instal itself on a position uniting the little wood of the peninsula of kilometer 19.500 with a bend to the North, facing the cemetery of Dixmude. The enemy being taken by surprise, could not till dawn offer an efficient resistance: but already our troops had organized the ground and maintained their positions in spite of firing, counter-attacks and severe bombardments.

[Illustration:

Bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 of the river Yser in June 1915. ]

The heroïc group, who had performed the operation with such valour and spirit, was mentioned in despatches by decision of the H. M. the King.

It was of the utmost importance to strengthen the occupation, but there could be no question of working by day, the enemy holding the watch and sway over the land, and especially over the knoll of Woumen (castle of kilometer 19). So our troops were kept to the task without respite.

Afterwards the extension of the bridge-head to the South, for months saw added to the companies on guard, picket companies and detachments of pioneers, nightly erecting parapets and communication trenches, building shelters, casting footbridges over muddy ground, covering the positions with wire netting work, regulating the current of the waters at Sparken and Waalevaardeken by locks and dams, multiplying and rebuilding the footbridges on the river etc., in a word executing the thousand and one labours required by an advanced position to render it strong and powerful, durable if not comfortable and give to the troops of the principal resisting position real and positive security.

Then, arose the question of progressing towards the East and towards the North. The works of extension were commenced, but it was soon realised what a great effort and incessant sacrifice such an enterprise would demand, that about Mai 1915 the bridge-head was brought back to its former line. During the course of the war, the evolution of fighting methods altered and likewise the mission of the advanced positions and the effective forces of the garrisons which held them. For this reason, when the bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 was created, and which had to resist to the utmost, it required more than one battalion to guard it; and in 1918, a few posts of section or squad sufficed, the mission of the advanced ones having simply become at this place, for watching purposes in case of a defensive, or kick off in the case of an offensive.

To give one an exact idea of the enormous effort that the bridge-head of the kilometer 19 cost, one needed to see the development and extension it had taken in May 1915 and be equally penetrated with the idea, that all the work had been done at the price of heavy losses, although it had been done by night, under the bullets and shrapnells, in bad weather and often with reduced means. This bridge-head contributed greatly to maintain an offensive spirit in the minds of the infantrymen, it served also as a base to many patrols towards the enemy’s organizations and notably to a famous raid on the castle of kilometer 19 on the night of the 28^{th} to the 29^{th} of October 1917, which was a brilliant success, led by Captain Dendal, who brought back materials and prisoners.

Several times the Germans tried to rush the bridge-head of kilometer 19, but without any result whatever.

And then during the offensive of September 1918, it served as a starting trench to the troops of the Belgian 4^{th} division, for the victorious assault which ended by the liberation of Dixmude.

21.—Observation-post near the Church of Clercken.

Clercken Ridge was very precious to the enemy to whom it gave the opportunity to establish a lot of natural observation-posts which had not the vulnerability of the confined kite balloons and which assured more stability to the observation. Many of these posts were destroyed during the war, especially by the destructive fires which preceded the great offensive in Flanders on the 28^{th} of September 1918. Others, such as the mill of Clercken, are already rebuilt, so offer no longer any historical interest.

[Illustration:

German observation-post near the church of Clercken.

Sketch showing the directions of the villages seen from this observation-post. ]

However the one which is situated near the church of Clercken, and still exists in the same state as when abandoned by the Germans (see sketch), shows how easily the enemy could see into our lines, in spite of all the efforts made by the Belgian Army to counteract their observations, such as: diverse dissimulations, plantations of all kinds, artificial masks in linen, sandbags, reeds and straw, etc....

22.—“Grand-Père” concrete dug-out.

23.—“Castel Britannia”.

24.—Hoekske.

The southern part of the Belgian front may be classed as one of the most agitated sectors of the Western front. The short communications of the press which announced in their brief laconic style: “Bombing actions at het Sas and at Steenstraat; duel of artillery in the region of Noordschote”, said nothing of the horror of certain days of guard where the blood marked the ground of trenches, a hundred times turned over and as many times reestablished and always defended by our heroical troops. Drie Grachten, le Passeur, Steenstraat, Merckem, all these names resound, like as many bugle calls proclaiming the heroism of our soldiers and the glory of our arms.

It was in July-October 1917 that the Franco-British offensive gave us back, in that region, a corner of Belgian land. A few Belgian units participated on the 27^{th} of October to the last assault which drove the enemy back beyond Luyghem, Kippe, Aschoop and reached, on the right, the outskirts of Houthulst forest. The effort had to be followed up, our troops had to extend to the North of Dixmude, the progression of the Allies; our artillery preparation was ended, the Belgian army only waited for the signal!

But a run of unfavourable circumstances: the russian defection, the Caporetto incidents and the continual rain obliged the allies’ chief staff to suspend the offensive. One had to be resigned and wait, but it was a great deception to the Belgian soldier.

The 11^{th} of November 1917, the 4^{th} army division relieved a French division at Merckem. The state of the field after the battle, is depicted in the following extract from the order of the division commander dated the 14^{th} of November. “In order to avoid, during the relieves, the sinking of the men in the excavations which are hollowed out all over the track, it is advised to gather the men in groups of five, holding one to one another with a rope and thus lending each other mutual help.”

Nineteen hundred and seventeen was, in fact, the year of offensives with long artillery preparations, which transformed the battle fields into masterpieces of devastation. The soil ploughed up by thousands of projectiles formed a vast field of hollows, filled with water by the autumn rains. Nothing else was seen in this desolate landscape but a few cut down trunks of trees and the monstrous concretes of the Germans, which were sometimes demolished and overturned.

However, it was absolutely necessary to remain on the chaotic ground. The positions had to be established strong enough to repulse the counter-attacks. At first it was only a system of shell holes surrounded by blocks of concrete which had been deserted by the enemy. It was a dreadful hard winter for the 4^{th} army division. When the engineers and infantrymen at the price of terrible labour, had repaired and rebuilt the roads and tracks which facilitated and rendered possible the relieves, the rational and defensive organization of the sector was undertaken. Successive lines showed themselves, and were bound between by intermediate lines and a well organized plan of defence was able to be applied.

The “Grand-Père” (Grand-father) concrete dug-out, the remains of which have been preserved, was one of the posts best known among of the advanced positions of Merckem. It formed a rather prominent salient which was always a temptation to the enemy and provoked him to many sudden attacks, generally preceded by violent artillery fires demolishing all the surroundings.

The 4^{th} army division managed to repulse two attempts and that at two days’ interval: one on the night 26–27 and the other 28–29 of November 1917. They were more like trials on the part of the enemy to stake out our advanced positions.

During the occupation of the sector by the 3^d army division, the raids became real attacks to reconquer the “Grand-father”. The 15^{th} of February 1918, the enemy was thrown back in his own lines; but on the 7^{th} of March, he managed to take a footing and bring machine-guns in the concrete shelter, from where our counter-attacks drove him out on the evening of the 8^{th}.

It was decided then, to rectify the advanced line by suppressing the salient of the grand-father, and also the one, constituted by three little posts of Aschoop, which also was subjected to the enemy’s fires.

The last german raid on the “Grand-father” was on the 27^{th} of March 1918, which hastened the decision, taken on the 29^{th} of the same month, to abandon after destruction the salients of the Grand-father and Aschoop.

The “Grand-father” was again occupied by our troops the 9^{th} of September 1918 after the taking of the german position of Kwaebeek brook. A centre of resistance was established there and was occupied till the offensive of the 28^{th} of September 1918.

The name of _Castel Britannia_ was given to the place occupied by the enemy’s batteries which oppressed up till 1917 our positions of the sector of Steenstraat. Thick concrete masses protected them. They served under the Belgian occupation as observation-posts and battle posts.

The cross road of _Hoekske_ is situated at the crossing of Steenstraat to Dixmude road with the road of Merckem. It marks nearly the centre of the subsector which bears its name, and is celebrated by the numerous bombardments it has been subjected to. Heavy pieces of german artillery have been sunk in its vicinity.

These three sites are destined to perpetuate the remembrance of the defence of Merckem sector, organized by the 4^{th} army division at the price of the greatest difficulties during the winter of 1917, and brilliantly defended by the 3^d army division in April 1918, and the gallant fields of action of the 1^{st} army division at the time preceding the offensive of the 28^{th} of September. These sites will remain it that region, the witnesses of the _battle of Merckem_, which was fought the 17^{th} of April 1918 in the neighbourhood of Kippe near Langemark, and where the 3^d army division, under general Jacques, and the 4^{th} army division, under general Michel, were covered with glory.

The Germans, who were in immediate contact with the 3^d army division at Kippe, made a sudden and abrupt irruption in the lines of this division and advanced up to the front of the Merckem and Hoekske trenches, where they were stopped.

Brilliant and heroical counter-attacks cleverly upheld by the artillery, drove them back disabled in their positions.

On the side of the 4^{th} army division, the enemy, who, before approaching the front had to descend the slope at the North-East-bank of the Broenbeek and although vigorously welcomed by infantry and artillery fires, managed to push through a corner between the main-guards of Champaubert and Montmirail, whose wings were turned over to form a hook. Held in that way, the efforts of the Germans to open the breach further were vain. Crushed by violent musketry fires and the precise firing of the artillery, the enemy could not hold the positions reached and had to retire.

The battle of Merckem which had not procured to the Germans one atom of land, nor advantage, cost them many dead and wounded, eight hundred prisoners and the loss of numerous material, which was left in the hands of the 3^d army division. The order of Leopold was granted to the 9^{th} regiment of the line and to the 1^{st} jagers.

The inscription of “Merckem” on the regimental Colours of the 3^d army division, and on those of the 13^{th} and 19^{th} of the line (4^{th} army division) and also on the shields of the guns, rewarded the bravery of the troops who won the battle.

As regards the moral point of view, the victory of the 17^{th} of April in which our regiments had overthrown whole divisions of enemies, revealed to the General Staff, the offensive worth and power of our army and gave to it the full due, of its conscientiousness and strength and the ardent desire to go forward.

From the 17^{th} of April, our soldiers at Merckem felt themselves masters of the sector. Patrols and audacious raids were undertaken, sometimes on Kloostermolen, sometimes on the trenches of the Kwaebeek position or on the Little-son and on Italy, Portugal and Epernon farms.

The numerous prisoners brought back from these expeditions supplied our Staff with informations, which were the more interesting because, at that time, the allied armies had begun to drive back the enemy from the French front.

At last, on the 9^{th} of September, at dawn, a brilliant attack was executed without great loss by the 3^d line regiment. The position of Kwaebeek, entirely taken, was organized, and, when a few days later, the enemy who had recovered, attempted with the aid of great reinforcement to drive back our troops in their former lines, the success was of short duration, for the enemy had to let go.

It was from the position of Kwaebeek, that the 1st Infantry division, started the 28^{th} of September 1918 to the signal for the great liberating offensive.

25.—The big german gun of Leugenboom at Couckelaere near Moere.

Not having succeeded, in spite of their brutal effort and the use of asphyxiating gas, which till then had never been made use of, to pierce the front at Steenstraat, in April 1915, the Germans who had foreseen every thing, began to bombard Dunkirk, this permitted to their press to hide the check, to cry out loudly “Victory, our artillery is bombarding Dunkirk”.

A marine gun of 380 mm. installed in a public house called “In het Predikboom” (kilometer 12^{th}, road Dixmude-Poelcappelle) had just started, to execute its first shot. That was on the 26^{th} of April 1915.

A powerful counter-battery action was soon organized and proved a success. Twice the gun was disabled, the first time for a period of forty two days and the second time for forty eight. The 9^{th} of August 1915 registered its last shot.

Nevertheless the counter-battery maintained its firing in order to prevent the Germans rebuilding the place and arming it.

In October 1916, an extraordinary activity was shown at the former emplacement of Predikboom. Numerous and deliberate firings were executed by the counter-batteries; and one might well ask if this German activity was not a new dodge. Another place, in fact was being built at Leugenboom (3200 meters to the North of Couckelaere).

The emplacement of Leugenboom was noted for the first time the 7^{th} of May 1917 by Captain Jaumotte while making one of his aerial reconnoitrings. He took a photograph of it, which clearly showed the advanced state of the works, the switch line, grafted on a point to a normal gauge, thus forming the junction at Eerneghem, to the state railway line Ostend-Thourout.

Without a doubt the firing on Dunkirk was going to begin again.

The Belgian artillery staff, started at once a plan of action against that urgent threat. The said staff obtained of the 36^{th} French army corps, which was operating on the Belgian front the aid of two guns of A. L. V. F. (artillerie lourde sur voie ferrée, i. e. Heavy railway battery) two magnificent naval guns of 305 (12 inch.).

These two pieces will be the soul of the counter-battery, they will be upheld in their action by a special group of numerous heavy batteries which will make opposition on all german batteries opening fire on the two heavy guns.

The plan was prepared, but to realise it, important and preliminary works had to be executed, which took five days after Captain Jaumotte’s reconnoitring.

These works consisted thus: first of all, the building of firing emplacements for the heavy artillery; establishing many telephone connections, needed since the creation of the special group, connections which had to perform not only the centralisation of the command, but also a perfect understanding between the director of the firing, the batteries and the observation-posts and the cross registering section, as well as the creation of antennas to receive the messages of aerial observations.

The railway battalion, pushed on after three days of splendid and extraordinary efforts, the works sufficiently far to render the point of Eggewaertscappelle capable of bearing the firing of the heavy guns. The group of telegraphists and telephonists accomplished at the same time, grand and important works of liaison, which altogether constituted the tool of the firing director.

A firing program was elaborated, a program which led the action on Leugenboom and on the Tirpitz battery (see site n^o 4) at the same time. The firing on the Tirpitz was assured by two heavy guns of 305 in position on the point of Coxyde-Bains.

The 13^{th} of May, the two heavy guns of 305 were brought to the place of firing which had been chosen—the switch-point of Eggewaertscappelle—and a nice clear day was waited to open action. That beautiful day was longed for right up to the 20^{th} of May 1917.

The execution of the genuine program was preceded by an independant firing directed on the German observation-post installed in the belfry of Eessen, with a 240 (10 inch.) gun in position at the East of Burg Molen, upheld by the special group. The tower was partially demolished.

About 11 o’clock, the heavy guns of 305 of Eggewaertscappelle fired their first shot on Leugenboom, while the gun of Burg Molen continued its demolishing and blinding work on the enemy’s observation-post. A little while after the guns of Coxyde-Bains entered in action in their turn against Tirpitz battery. The observation of these firings were both terrestrial and aerial.

The firing program was continued the following days when the weather was favourable for observation.

On the 25^{th} of May, an aerial photograph of Leugenboom position was taken. It did not disclose the least damage to the concrete block, but its clearness sufficiently noted the gun carriage not yet armed, in the centre of the honeycomb which formed the platform.

In order to parry, as might be the case, to a more accurate enemy counter-battery, the railway battalion built or layed out sucessively several sites for heavy artillery firing. It is so, that two sites on the switch point of Eggewaertscappelle, a third at the station of Moerhoek and a fourth on the point of Isenberghe, served as reserve, and were occupied in turns.

The Leugenboom heavy gun entered in action the 27^{th} of June 1917. Between 5 and 10 o’clock, it bombarded Malo-on-sea and Dunkirk. This first action made numerous victims. The shells were of 380 mm.

One shell, amongst others, the first, it is thought, fell on the Casino of Malo, where the general staff of the XV^{th} British army corps was established: it made twenty four victims, eleven dead and thirteen wounded.

In July 1917, there were several bombardments to be noted on different objectives: Furnes, Dunkirk, Coxyde, Forthem and Alveringhem.

The bombardments of Dunkirk, threatening to become very frequent, alarmed the authorities, and it was decided from the 19^{th} of July 1917 to create two direct telephone lines at different courses which would join Dunkirk to the Pervyse railway station observation-post, which was particularly well situated.

The starting shots of Leugenboom, heard at the railway station at Pervyse, were in that way instantly communicated to Dunkirk, where the reception posts gave the alert to the town by powerful horns and other alarm engines, thus permitting the population to take refuge in the concrete shelters specially built for that purpose.

In spite of the well studied counter-battery, the Leugenboom gun still continued firing. The lulls, which lasted often long time, gave the hope that a positive result had been obtained. Then after a lapse of one and sometimes two months, the rage of the Germans revived and Dunkirk was again subjected to further attacks.

In 1918, bombardments were very frequent. At certain times, they became even daily, but Dunkirk was not always the objective. In May and notably in June, the firing of Leugenboom was directed on Klein-Leysele and the 27^{th} of September 1918 on Bergues.

The offensive of Flanders, at last lights up. But the enraged Germans will hold on till the last minute.

It is only on the 16^{th} of October at 20 minutes to three that the heavy cannon of Leugenboom is for ever silenced. In its last spasms of agony it dealt terrible blows to the localities situated behind the front of attack.