Part 11
As-Subqi in his Tabakat-ash-Shafaʾiya al Kubra devotes a special section to what is entitled “A List of all the Traditions given by Al-Ghazali in his _Ihya_ which have no _isnad_, or pedigree, _i. e._, Traditions _quoted by him as authoritative and yet which from the standpoint of Moslem criticism are on this account absolutely worthless_.” This section of the book referred to covers many pages and by actual count I found over six hundred Traditions each catalogued by reference to the chapter in which they occur. Now we have no reason to doubt that As-Subqi (d. 771 A. H.) was an admirer of Al-Ghazali and esteemed his teaching, yet what shall we say when in this collection of the lives of the saints so strong an indictment is made of Al-Ghazali’s inaccuracy by one of his own disciples?
When reading this collection of “true sayings” of the Prophet (which are after all often ascribed to him without any authority or foundation) one is shocked both at the credulity and the lack of love for veracity in this greatest of all Moslem apologists. If even Al-Ghazali handled Tradition so carelessly as to ascribe to Mohammed so much that is altogether puerile, fabulous and often immoral, what confidence can we put in other and later tradition-mongers and how can we clear Al-Ghazali from the charge of using pious falsehood?
We add another fact of great interest in regard to his writings. Al-Ghazali exercised a commanding influence on Jewish thought in the Middle Ages. In the appendix is a list of some of the translations of his books made in Hebrew. Jewish students of philosophy, including Maimonides, drew many of their theories from the _Maqasid_ and his other works. Al-Ghazali’s attacks on philosophy were imitated by Judah ha-Levy in his _Cuzari_; but it was chiefly his ethical teaching rather than through his philosophy that Al-Ghazali attracted the Jewish thinkers. Broyde says, “He approached the ethical ideal of Judaism to such an extent that some supposed him to be actually drifting in that direction, and his works were eagerly studied and used by Jewish writers. Abraham ibn Ezra borrowed from Al-Ghazali’s _Mizan al ʿAmal_ his comparison between the limbs of the human body and the functionaries of a king, and used it for the subject of his beautiful admonition _Yeshene Leb_; Abraham ibn Dawud borrowed from the same work the parable used by Al-Ghazali to prove the difference in value between various branches of science; and Simon Duran cites in his _Keshet_ a passage from the _Mozene ha-ʾIyyunim_, which he calls _Mozene ha-Hokmah_.”[63]
The translations of his works into Hebrew were made as early as the thirteenth century. Not less than _eleven_ Hebrew commentaries are known on the _Maqasid_. “Johanan Alemanno recommends Ghazali’s hermeneutic methods, and compares the order and graduation of lights in Ghazali’s theory with those of the theory of the cabalists.”
In regard to science, Al-Ghazali’s views were naturally those of his contemporaries. His world was built on the Ptolemaic system. There are four elements only. Existence has three modes: the world of sense, the world of God’s eternal decree, and the world of ideals or of God’s power. In dreams and visions we are in contact with the two other worlds. Al-Ghazali avoids the difficulties of concrete Moslem teaching by this method. There may be things which are real and actual and yet do not belong to the world of sense.[64]
Doctor Macdonald admirably summarizes his influence on Islam as four-fold. “First of all he led men back from mere scholastic dogma to a living contact with the Koran and the Traditions as the true source of Islam. He might be called a Biblical theologian in our modern use of the word, understanding by ‘Bible’ always the Moslem bible, namely the Koran. Nearly every paragraph of his _Ihya_ begins with a Koran quotation, and his interpretation of the book is not a slavish following of the earlier commentators but a spiritual interpretation of the text.”
“In the second place he reintroduced into Islam the element of fear. In the earliest days, as for example in the Koran itself, the terrors of the day of judgment and the horrors of hell operated in order to lead men to repentance. Al-Ghazali emphasized this part of the Moslem teaching to the utmost, witness his little book _Al-Durra al-Fakhira_, which has to this day great acceptance among pious Moslems.”
In the third place mysticism, already existing in Islam, but looked upon in many quarters as heretical, received its birthright through Al-Ghazali’s life and teachings, and from his day on held an assured position in orthodox Islam.
Lastly, he brought philosophy within the range of the ordinary mind, warning the people against its dangers as well as showing them its fundamental principles and above all illustrating through his writings how true philosophy and true Islam are not contradictory. In this respect he resembles Raymond Lull who also desired to use philosophy as the handmaid of Christianity.[65]
Macdonald thinks that of these four phases of his work and influence the first and the third were undoubtedly the most important. These alone made him a reformer of the first rank in the history of Islam.
VII
His Ethics
“The religion of Christ contains whole fields of morality and whole realms of thought which are all but outside the religion of Mohammed. It opens humility, purity of heart, forgiveness of injuries, sacrifice of self to man’s moral nature; it gives scope for toleration, development, boundless progress to his mind; its motive power is stronger, even as a friend is better than a king and love higher than obedience. Its realized ideals in the various paths of human greatness have been more commanding, more many-sided, more holy, as Averroes is below Newton, Haroun below Alfred, and ʾAli below St. Paul. Finally, the ideal life of all is far more elevating, far more majestic, far more inspiring even as the life of the founder of Mohammedanism is below the life of the Founder of Christianity.”
—_“Life of Mohammed,” R. Bosworth Smith._
VII
HIS ETHICS
Martensen defines Christian ethics as “the science of morals conditioned by Christianity.” But the three fundamental concepts of Christian ethics are all of them challenged by the teaching of Islam. The Mohammedan idea of the Highest Good, of Virtue and of the Moral Law are not in accord with those of Christianity. This is evident both from the character of Mohammed himself and from his recorded sayings. Ideal virtue is to be found through imitation of Mohammed. And the moral law is practically abrogated because of loose views as to its real character, its teaching and finality. “The ethics of Islam bear the character of an outwardly and crudely conceived doctrine of righteousness; conscientiousness in the sphere of the social relations, faithfulness to conviction and to one’s word, and the bringing of an action into relation to God, are its bright points; but there is a lack of heart-depth, of a basing of the moral in love. The highest good is the very outwardly and very sensuously conceived happiness of the individual.”[66]
This statement needs no proof to those who know Islam from its original sources, the Koran and Tradition. Professor Margoliouth uses language which is strong but not unfair when he says in regard to the saints of the Moslem calendar—that is the companions and followers of Mohammed—“Those who recount the history of Islam have to lay aside all ordinary canons of morality, else the picture would have no lights; they could not write at all if they let themselves be shocked by perfidy or bloodthirstiness, by cruelty or lust, yet both the Koran and Tradition forbid the first three, and assign some limits to the fourth.” A stream cannot rise higher than its source; a tower cannot be broader than its foundation. The measure of the moral stature of Mohammed is the source and foundation of all moral ideals in Islam. His conduct is the standard of character. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the ethical standard is so low even in Al-Ghazali, although he ofttimes rises high above the Koran and the Prophet.
In nearly every one of his books on morals the Prophet of Arabia is held up as the highest ideal of character. In his “Precious Pearl,” however, there is a passage quoted from a tradition in which he pays this high tribute to Jesus Christ (page 24, Cairo Edition), “_Go to Jesus, on Him be peace, for He is the truest of those who were sent as apostles, and who knew most of God, and the most ascetic in life of them all, and the most eloquent of all in wisdom, perchance He will intercede for you._” The quotation, however, refers to the day of resurrection when the various nations seek God’s favour and forgiveness.
When we consider the age in which Al-Ghazali lived and his Moslem education in ethics, Macdonald says,[67] “the position of Al-Ghazali is a simple one. All our laws and theories upon the subject, the analysis of the qualities of the mind, good and bad, the tracing of hidden defects to their causes, and the methods of combating these causes,—all these things [Al-Ghazali teaches] we owe to the saints of God to whom God Himself has revealed them. Of these there have been many at all times and in all countries,—God has never left Himself without a witness,—and without them and their labours and the light which God has vouchsafed to them we could never know ourselves. Here as everywhere, comes out clearly Al-Ghazali’s fundamental position that the ultimate source of all knowledge is revelation from God. It may be major revelation, through accredited prophets who come forward as teachers, divinely sent and supported by miracles and by the evident truth of their message appealing to the human heart; or it may be minor revelation—subsidiary and explanatory—through the vast body of saints of different grades to whom God has granted immediate knowledge of Himself. Where the saints leave off, the prophets begin; and, apart from such teaching, man, even in physical science, would be groping in the dark.”
But we must add to this clear statement of Al-Ghazali’s theory of ethics, _lest it be wholly misunderstood_, that the revelation referred to is the Koran and that “the saints” were the Moslem saints of the early Caliphate, and their followers.
Moslem doctors of jurisprudence, including Al-Ghazali, define sin as “a conscious act of a responsible being against known law.” Therefore sins of ignorance and of childhood are not reckoned as real sin. They divide sin into “great” and “little” sins. Some say there are seven great sins: idolatry, murder, false charge of adultery, wasting the substance of orphans, taking interest on money, desertion from _Jihad_ and disobedience to parents. Others say there are seventeen, and include wine-drinking, witchcraft and perjury among them. The lack of all distinction between the ceremonial and the moral law is very evident in the traditional sayings of Mohammed, which are, of course, at the basis of ethics. Take one example: “The Prophet, upon him be prayers and peace, said, One _dirhem_ of usury which a man takes knowing it to be so is more grievous than thirty-six fornications, and whosoever has done so is worthy of hell-fire.”
Orthodox Moslems divide sins into greater and lesser. Al-Ghazali quotes one who said, “There are no greater and lesser sins, but everything which is contrary to God’s will is a great sin,” but gives Koran passages contradicting this and then escapes the moral difficulty by showing that the smaller sins may become great if we continue in them: “like the dropping of water wearing away a stone”; and “when the servant of God reckons his sin great, God reckons it small, and when he reckons it small, then God reckons it great.”
He divides the sins which overcome the heart into four classes: egoistic, satanic, brutal and cruel. Under the first he puts pride, conceit, boasting, selfishness, etc.; envy, hatred, deceit, malice, corruption and unbelief, belong to the second; while greed, gluttony, lust, adultery, sodomy, theft, and the robbing of orphans are classed as brutal sins; and anger, passion, abuse, cursing, murder, robbery, etc., are cruel.
Yet in all of Al-Ghazali’s works on ethics and many of his smaller treatises are on this subject, there is no clear distinction made between the ritual and the moral law. In fact one word used for ethics in Arabic (_ʾadab_) refers to propriety of conduct, etiquette, politeness, and decency in outward behaviour, reverence in the presence of superiors, rather than to the keeping of the ten commandments or of the principles that are fundamental to noble character. This becomes very clear when we study the contents, for example, of one of his shorter books entitled _Al-ʾAdab fi Din_ (Ethics in Religion).
The book begins by giving the basis of ethical teaching in these words: “Praise be to God who created us and perfected our creation, and taught us morals and beautified our morals, and honoured us by sending His Prophet Mohammed (upon whom may God’s blessing rest), and hath taught us how to honour him. Truly the most perfect element in character and the most elevated, and the best of good works, and the most glorious, is correct behaviour as regards religion, which teaches what a true believer should know of the work of the Lord of the worlds and the Creator of the prophets and apostles; and God hath taught us and clearly enlightened us concerning this in the Koran, and hath given us the example of conduct in his Prophet Mohammed according to his Traditions. He is our example, and likewise are his companions and immediate followers. These have shown us what it is necessary for us to follow in their conduct, which we have here recorded for all those who would follow.”
The paragraphs or sections of this handbook are entitled: Ethics of the believer in the presence of God; of the teacher; of the pupil; of those who hear the Koran read; of the reader; of the school-teacher; of those who seek to understand Tradition; of the scribe; of the preacher; of the ascetic; of the nobleman; ethics of sleeping; of night-watching; of fulfilling a call of nature; of the bath; of washing; of entering the mosque; of the call to prayer; of prayer; of intercession; of the Friday sermon; of the feast-days; of conduct during an eclipse; of conduct during drought; of sickness; of funerals; of almsgiving; of the rich and the poor; of fasting; of pilgrimage; of the merchant; of the money-changer; of eating and drinking; of marriage (this has several subdivisions); of sitting by the wayside; of the child with its parents; of the parent with the child; of brothers; of neighbours; of the master with the servant; of the Sultan with his subjects; of the Judge; of the witness; of the prisoner. The final chapter of this interesting treatise deals with miscellaneous maxims on polite behaviour under all circumstances.
A translation of the section on eating, which is about the same length as the other paragraphs, will give a clear idea of the contents: “One should wash one’s hands before partaking of food and after, and pronounce the name of God before beginning to eat, and eat with the right hand. Take small portions from the dish, chew the food thoroughly, and do not look into the faces of the other guests while you are eating; nor should you recline nor eat to excess beyond the demands of hunger; and you should ask to be excused as soon as you have had enough, so that your guest may not be embarrassed or any one who has greater need. And one should eat from the edge of the platter and not from the middle, and wipe his fingers after the meal, and return praise to God. Nor should one mention death at dinner for fear of bringing bad luck upon those who are present.”
All this is interesting and important, for the Moslem child, as table etiquette. Obedience, humility in outward behaviour, reverence in the mosque, respect “to those above us in age or station,” and many other social virtues are likewise commended. But the omissions of the Book surprise us. There is nothing on truth, heart-purity, moral courage or the nobility of chivalry—_the things that make a man_.
One section of the _Ihya_ (Vol. III, p. 96 ff.) deals with the question as to when lies are justifiable, and clearly shows that according to Al-Ghazali, in the realm of truth at least, the end justifies the means. “Know,” he says, “that a lie is not _haram_ (wrong) in itself, but only because of the evil conclusions to which it leads the hearer, making him believe something that is not really the case. Ignorance sometimes is an advantage, and if a lie causes this kind of ignorance it may be allowed. It is sometimes a duty to lie. Maimun Ibn Muhran said, ‘A lie is sometimes better than truth: for instance, if you see a man seeking for another in order to kill him, what do you reply to the question as to where he is? Of course you will reply thus, for such a lie is lawful. We say that the end justifies the means.’
“If lying and truth both lead to a good result, you must tell the truth, for a lie is forbidden in this case. If a lie is the only way to reach a good result, it is allowable (_hallal_). A lie is lawful when it is the only path to duty. For example, if a Moslem flees from an unjust one and you are asked about him, you are obliged to lie in order to save him. If the outcome of war, reconciliation between two separated friends, or the safety of an oppressed depends on a lie, then a lie is allowed. In all cases we must be careful not to lie when there is no necessity for it, lest it be _haram_ (wrong). If a wicked person asks a man about his wealth he has to deny having any; and so if a sultan asks a man about a crime he has committed, he has to deny it and say, ‘I have not stolen,’ when he did steal; ‘nor done any vice,’ when he has done. The Prophet said, ‘He who has done a shameful deed must conceal it, for revealing one disgrace is another disgrace.’ A person must deny the sins of others as well. Making peace between wives is a duty, even by pretending to each of them that she is loved the most, and by making promises to please her.
“We must lie when truth leads to unpleasant results, but tell the truth when it leads to good results. Lying for one’s pleasure, or for increase of wealth, or for fame is forbidden. One wife must not lie for her husband to tease another wife. Lying is allowed in persuading children to go to school; also false promises and false threats.”
We get another view of Al-Ghazali’s ethics in his teaching regarding education. There is a special section in the _Ihya_ (Vol. III, p. 53) which deals with the education of boys and the improvement of their morals. It is not surprising that nothing is said as regards the education of girls, for even now many Moslem authorities consider it inadvisable that they should be taught to read and write. The chapter referred to begins as follows:
“It is most important to know how to bring up a boy, for a boy is a trust in the hands of his father, and his pure heart is a precious jewel like a tablet without inscription. It is therefore ready to receive whatever impression is applied. If he learns to do good and is taught it, he grows up accordingly, and is happy in this world and the next and his parents and teachers will have the reward for their action. But if he learns evil and grows up in neglect like the dumb cattle, he will turn away from the truth and perish, and his sin will be on the neck of his guardian. Allah has said, ‘O ye who believe, guard yourselves and your family from the fire; and even as the father would guard his son from the fire of this world, by how much the more should he guard him from the fire of the world to come? He will guard him from it by chastising him and educating him and teaching him the best virtues. To this end he will only give his boy to be nursed by a good, pious woman who eats the proper food, for the milk from forbidden food has no blessing in it.’”
He then goes on to show that the education of a child consists in teaching him table manners, the avoidance of unclean food, gluttony and impoliteness. He advises parents to dress their children simply and not in costly clothing. To quote once more:
“After teaching him these things it is wise to send him to school where he shall learn the Koran and the pious traditions, and the tales of the righteous and their lives, in order that a love of the pious may be imprinted in his heart; and he should be kept from reading erotic poetry and prevented from mixing with those people of education who think that this sort of reading is profitable and elevating, because, on the contrary, it produces in the hearts of children the seeds of corruption. Whenever the boy shows a good character or an act which is praiseworthy, he must be honoured for it and rewarded, so that he will be happy; and this should especially be done in the presence of others. If, on the contrary, he should act otherwise once and again, it is necessary to take no notice of it, nor to lay bare his fault, as though you imagine no one would dare to do such a thing, especially if the boy himself conceals it, and has determined to hide it; for exposing would only make him more bold in the future. If he should repeat the fault, he can be punished in secret.”
Such is the strange ethical teaching—a mingling of good and bad advice—on the part of one who has always been considered as the pillar of orthodoxy and one of the great authorities on Moslem morals.
The ethics of marriage holds a large place in Moslem literature, and also in the works of Al-Ghazali. Marriage is enjoined upon every Moslem, and celibacy is discouraged. “Marriage,” said Mohammed the Prophet, “is my custom, and he who dislikes it does not belong to my people.” And in another tradition: “Marriage is one-half of true religion.” Even the members of the ascetic orders in Islam are generally married. The vow of celibacy was therefore not known among the mystics. Marriage is defined by Moslem jurists as “a contract by which the husband obtains possession of the wife and is allowed to enjoy her, if there be no legal impediment preventing the same.” “Marriage,” says Al-Ghazali himself, “is a kind of slavery, for the wife becomes the slave of her husband and it is her duty to obey him absolutely in everything he requires of her, except in what is contrary to the laws of Islam.”