Part 12

Japanese sailors are very quick in everything. In the Far East brawls between them and Russian sailors, before the war, were very frequent, and though the Russians are physically much the superior, yet, from their quickness, the Japanese were more frequently the victors.

When Japanese sailors are in England, some of our missionary societies keep an eye on them—taking them about, and generally trying to help them. One old lady is particularly kindly remembered by the crews of those destroyers that fitted out at the West India Docks. She gave the crew of one of them a good many texts of the usual ornamental sort when they left. They hung all these up, giving the post of honour to one that said, “The wicked shall be destroyed.” They regarded this as a very kindly compliment and good wish to their destroyer! I do not think that the texts stand any chance of fulfilling a missionary _rôle_—however, there they hung, in the fok’s’le, and over the officers’ bunks in the wardroom also, in the hopes that “the old lady, who had been so good to the men,” would derive some _quid pro quo_ in the way of satisfaction at the sight.

XXI MESSING

In the Japanese Navy, as in ours, there are many messes—admirals being by themselves, captains by themselves, and below them the wardroom, gun-room, warrant officers, and petty officers’ messes.

The officers have three meals a day—

Breakfast at 7.0 to 7.30 a.m. Lunch at 12 noon. Dinner at 7.0 p.m.

The food is alternately English and Japanese—thus, one day there are two meals European and one Japanese; the day following two Japanese and one European. Preference is probably towards our food, but sentiment retains the national diet. At the Japanese meals chopsticks are used. The staple of these meals is rice.

In the way of liquids, our whisky-and-soda has now as great a vogue as anything; but in all ships the national _saki_ still abounds. This is a light wine made from rice—a sort of cross between hock and thin cider—disagreeable at first to most European palates, but for which one soon cultivates a liking. It is apt to play unexpected tricks on the stranger who imbibes it too freely. In the winter time _saki_ is drunk warm.

Japanese tea is always “on tap.” It bears no resemblance to tea as we know it, being a strong green tea made with water just off the boil. Neither milk nor sugar is taken with it—sweets are, however, eaten beforehand.

So far from these national drinks being in abeyance, if a visitor in a Japanese warship elects to take one or the other in place of whisky or champagne, it is taken as a compliment by his hosts.

Japanese sailors are fed entirely, or nearly so, on European food. It was found that they could not work so well on Japanese diet, and they prefer European. They cook it, however, in more or less Japanese fashion, and always eat it with chopsticks.

[Illustration: 24-CM. (9.4-IN.) 36-CALIBRE SCHNEIDER-CANET ON DISAPPEARING MOUNTING FOR THE JAPANESE COAST SERVICE. FIRING POSITION.]

XXII ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

1. GUNS.

The early Japanese warships were equipped with Krupp guns, the Naniwa and Takachiho being so fitted. At a later date Canet guns were introduced, but only for the heavy pieces, and the Matsushima class carried a big 12.6 Canet and Elswick guns for the smaller pieces. Subsequently, with the Fuji and Yashima, Elswick guns alone were employed, and a factory for the construction of guns on the Elswick model was established in Japan. The pieces selected were the 12-in. 40-calibre, the 8-in. 40-calibre, the 40-calibre 6-in., and the 45-calibre 4.7-in. Up to and including the Mikasa, all ships were mounted with these guns.

In 1902-3 the Vickers 50-calibre 6-in. was experimented with and adopted.

[Illustration: 12-IN. GUNS OF THE MIKASA.]

[Illustration: 24-CM. (9.4-IN.) CANET GUN OF 36 CALIBRES ON DISAPPEARING MOUNTING, AS SUPPLIED FOR JAPANESE COAST FORTS. LOADING AND TRAINING POSITION.]

The guns at present mounted in the Japanese fleet, excluding a few old pieces about to be replaced or already removed, are as follows:—

----------+-----------+-----+----------+----------+------+---------+ Nominal | | | | | | | calibre. | — |Long.| Initial | Initial |Shell.| Weight | | | |velocity. | energy. | | of gun. | ----------+-----------+-----+----------+----------+------+---------+ in. cm. | |cals.|foot secs.|foot tons.| lbs. | tons. | 12.6 32 |Canet[36] | 40 | 2306 | 35220 | 990 | 66 | 12 30.5|Elswick[37]| 40 | 2423 | 34600 | 850 | 49 | | | | | | | | 12 30.5|Krupp[38] | 20 | 1755 | 14750 | 725 | 35.4 | | | | | | | | 10.2 26 |Krupp[39] | 25 | 1640 | 8400 | 450 | .. | 8.2 21 |Krupp | 30 | 1935 | 6167 | .. | 13 | | | {| 2242 | 7319 | 210 |} | 8 20.3|Elswick | 40 {| 2068 | 7413 | 250 |} 15½ | | | | | | | | 6 15 |Vickers | 50 | 3000 | 6240 | 100 | 8 | 6 15 |Elswick | 40 | 2500 | 4334 | 100 | 6½ | 6 15 |Elswick | 40 | 2220 | 3417 | 100 | 6 | 6 15 | .. | 35 | 1958 | 2554 | 100 | 5 | | | | | | | 4.7 12 |Elswick | 40 | 2150 | 1442 | 45 | 2 | 4.7 12 |Elswick[40]| 32 | 1938 | 900 | 36 | 1⅔ | | | | | | | | 3 7.5|Elswick | 40 | 2200 | 420 | 12 | 2 | | | | | | | | ----------+-----------+-----+----------+----------+------+---------+

[36] Matsushima class.

[37] In Fuji to Mikasa.

[38] Chin Yen.

[39] Hei Yen, Naniwa, Takachiho.

[40] Matsushima class.

All guns of 40-calibres and over—that is to say, all the modern pieces—fire a smokeless nitro-cellulose powder of Japanese invention, and the maximum service velocities of all, save the 50-calibre Vickers, are now up to the nominal initial velocity.

A.P. shot, A.P. shell, and common shell are fired by all guns, and, in addition, those of 8 ins. or less calibre fire a special Japanese high explosive of the lyddite type.

In smaller pieces, a 2½-pounder exists, which is to a certain extent a Japanese invention; but it differs from models existing elsewhere only in a few minor details of a semi-automatic nature. From what I have seen of it, the piece would be better without these innovations.

[Illustration]

[Illustration: VICKERS 50-CALIBRE 6-IN. JAPANESE GUN.]

[Illustration: THE VICKERS 6-IN. AND 7.5-IN. OF 50 CALIBRES.

(_The former is adopted, the latter under consideration._)]

The maximum penetrations of the larger pieces through Krupp cemented armour at 3000 yards are as follows:—

Capped. Uncapped. Schneider-Canet 12.6-in. 16 13 Elswick 12-in. 15½ 12½ Elswick 8-in. 7½ 6 Vickers 6-in. 6½ 5 Elswick 6-in. 4 4

For coast defence, Schneider-Canet guns are mostly employed, many 9.4’s on disappearing mounting having been supplied for forts.

2. GUNNERY ACCESSORIES.

The Barr and Stroud range-finder is used in all Japanese ships, and acted excellently at the bombardments of Port Arthur in February, 1904.

The Barr and Stroud transmitters are also fitted to all first-class warships. By means of these the range, projectile, and so forth is telegraphed from the conning-tower to a dial in each turret and casement. Without some such device a range-finder is of no particular service, as by the time the range is passed down it will have altered.

The Grenfell system of transmission is also understood to be under experiment. This differs in details from the Barr and Stroud, but in general principle is much the same thing.

The theoretical objection to the Barr and Stroud is that the electric leads may be cut by a hostile shot. They might be, but as the wires are carried in duplicate under the armour deck the chances of failure are about one in a million! Throughout the war with Russia all these instruments have worked perfectly, and proved particularly serviceable in the bombardments of Port Arthur.

[Illustration: CANET 27-CM. (10.6-IN.) JAPANESE COAST GUN OF 36 CALIBRES.]

3. TORPEDOES.

The Japanese service has three torpedoes:—

14-in. Whitehead, for torpedo boats and small cruisers. 18-in. ” for destroyers and large ships. 24-in. ” for defence of channels.

This last torpedo has an effective range of over 3000 yards. It is not, however, carried on shipboard.

The Whiteheads are identical with those in the British service. So, too, are the above-water tubes. The submerged ones are of Elswick pattern—Mark I., which was not satisfactory at high speeds in the Fuji, Yashima, and Shikishima; Mark II., which delivers fairly well at all speeds in the later ships. All ships that carry submerged tubes—that is, all first-class battleships or cruisers—have four fitted: two forward on the broadside and two bearing 45° abaft the beam, just abaft the after barbette.

Above-water tubes are condemned, and several of those in existence were under orders of removal when the Russian war broke out.

Above-water bow tubes were condemned on account of the seas that they took in. As such as exist in armoured vessels are protected by 6-in. armour, they did not improve seaworthiness, the weight in the extreme bow being inconvenient.

[Illustration: PLAN OF CIRCUITS OF THE ELSWICK TUBE.]

[Illustration: CANET 15-CM. (6-IN.) JAPANESE COAST GUN.]

4. ARMOUR.

An armour-plate factory has been established at Kobé, but it is not yet in a position to turn out much except gun shields.

A characteristic of the Japanese has been their readiness to adopt new processes.

Thus the Fuji and Yashima were designed for compound armour, but the Harvey process coming in while the ships were building, it was at once adopted in preference to compound. So, too, in later ships the improved Harvey, “Harvey-Nickel,” was at once used, and in the Iwate and Idzumo belts were shortened a little and speed reduced, so that the Krupp process might be employed for the water-line plates.

In the Mikasa great expense was undertaken solely in order to apply Krupp cemented to curved surfaces instead of the non-cemented and less tough Krupp plates usually so employed. There is some doubt whether this experiment was successful; if Krupp cemented plates are “fiddled with” their special virtue departs. It is also stated, however, that the Mikasa’s plates were made on a special process somewhat analogous to the Krupp, but differing from it in certain details, and less liable to injury in bending.

5. ENGINES AND BOILERS.

The engines of Japanese warships are, save in the case of a few small vessels, of British manufacture, and the same as those of British ships.

In boilers, the Belleville type was adopted with the Shikishima, and several older vessels have been re-boilered with it. Almost the first warship to be fitted with this type was the Chiyoda.

With some remarkable exceptions, Japanese naval engineers have not succeeded very conspicuously in securing the very economical coal results which have been obtained with Bellevilles in the British Fleet. A remarkable instance to the contrary was the Idzumo; the Mikasa also did well. The Asahi, when first commissioned, did badly, but, when the art of coal spreading on scientific lines was mastered, suddenly became very economical.

No trouble of any sort has been experienced, and the Japanese have shown themselves singularly adapted to the management of water-tube boilers.

[Illustration: THE LATEST PATTERN ELSWICK SUBMERGED TUBE.]

When the Yaeyama was re-boilered, Niclausse generators were fitted to her, but with indifferent success. Consequently, in order to continue experiments on the lines of the British Navy, this type was fitted to the Niitaka and Tsushima, and ordered for one of the new battleships. Apparently the experiment is to be continued to other types, following the example of the British Navy, though the majority of the engineers are averse to such a procedure, both on account of the success obtained with the Belleville and because of the extreme difficulty involved when many types exist, and many of the men sent to a ship are used to some other type of boiler than the one that they are called on to work.

[Illustration: BELLEVILLE BOILER WITH ECONOMISERS.]

A water-tube boiler of Japanese design exists—a species of cross between the Belleville and Yarrow, with a little Niclausse thrown in. It does not appear to promise well, and though designed to possess the virtues of each type, seems more likely to embody their weaker points than their strong ones. Such, at least, appears to be the general verdict.

There is also another water-tube boiler of Japanese origin, something like the Thornycroft, which is in the hands of the Temperley Transported Company; but I have not heard of any practical tests of it as yet, its invention being quite recent.

In any case, neither is likely to oust existing types, as most of the valuable points in a boiler are already patented all over the world. The inventors of new types are, therefore, hampered much like inventors of new systems of wireless telegraphy are—some one has been before them. In addition, a water-tube boiler requires some years of practical service before it can be classed as out of the experimental stage. The great advantage possessed by the Belleville, which “in theory” is one of the worst of boilers, lies in the numerous features introduced by years of practical experience. In rough-sea work theory and practice rarely go together; the thing that is ideal on paper is apt at sea to fail unexpectedly. The water-tube boilers fitted in Japanese ships are as follows:—

BELLEVILLE. NILAUSSE.

Chiyoda (old type). Niitaka. Itsukushima. Yaeyama. Matsushima (old type). Tsushima. Shikishima (old type). Kashima. Asahi. Katori. Hatsuse. Mikasa. Yakumo. Azuma. Iwate. Idzumo. Takasago.

[Illustration: NICLAUSSE BOILER.]

The Japanese boiler under experiment is the Miyabara, the invention of the Engineer-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy. It is to be fitted to the Otawa, and probably some other ships. It is also in the Hashidate. The inventor recently produced a paper showing its all-round advantages over every other type of water-tube boiler; but this, of course, may be taken _cum grano salis_. However, there is little doubt but that, should it be in any way successful, natural national vanity will lead to its general adoption in preference to European types, just as the 2½-pounder gun has been.

XXIII OTHER NAVIES AS SEEN BY THE JAPANESE

The following expressions of opinion are not necessarily entirely representative, but they certainly coincide with the views of a great many of the more travelled officers, and as such will have, no doubt, some considerable interest.

BRITISH.

“British officers are too fond of golf and other games—they do not study enough. They are very stiff at first, but nice when you know them. They are always very clean, spick and span, and well shaved. On board a British warship it is always very impressive—it is the most impressive navy in the world. And it is more ready than many people think.”

FRENCH.

“The French is a funny navy, and it is hard to say what is good and what is bad in it, for the thing that looks good may be bad, and the thing that looks bad, good. They have some very clever engineers.”

GERMAN.

“The German officers all seem ‘strong.’ To many they seem always overbearing. They hope to be the greatest navy in the world; and plenty of them think that they already are.”

RUSSIAN.[41]

“The Russians are brave—very brave. But not many are good, and they are savages. They can be very polite when it suits them; when not—ah! Russian sailors are miserable people who lie in the snow, who have very little money, which they spend in buying cheap fish. They are very dirty. That is all we know of Russian sailors, who are quite like strange people to us. But we have no fear as to the result of a war with the Polar Bear.”

[41] Expressed before the Russo-Japanese War.

UNITED STATES, AMERICA.

“The Americans have a wonderful navy with wonderful ships. Everything American is more wonderful than anything else in the world, so that we do not know what to believe.”

THEMSELVES.

Of themselves Japanese officers speak little. But it is not difficult to infer from their talk that they do not in any way feel dissatisfied with themselves. Ship for ship, they are firmly convinced that they are the finest navy in the world; and it cannot be said that up to the moment of writing (June, 1904) they have done anything to cause them to retract this opinion. No body of men could have displayed better qualities than they have from all accounts. It may be added that, in my opinion, every Japanese is also of conviction that Japan is going to be the greatest naval power in the world in the future. With that feeling they entered on the present war. It is a very useful feeling to have.

XXIV THE WAR WITH RUSSIA

The war with Russia was the direct outcome of the action of that Power in ousting Japan from Port Arthur. There is little question but that the real object of the Chino-Japanese War was Japan’s determination to be the paramount power in the Far East. The action of Russia, France, and Germany in neutralising all that victory gave her completely checkmated Japan, and from that day onward she made little secret of her preparations for a war, the prize of which would be the control of China, and the foundation of a Far Eastern Empire whose ultimate proportions none can foresee.

The political situation between Japan and Russia needs no comment in a purely naval record of events: Japan made ready with a steady determination, where Russia ignored the obvious.

Not till a month or two before the war did Russia recognise that it was inevitable; she then sought refuge in diplomatic delays, which Japan severed by the sudden rupture of negotiations at a moment favourable to herself. Much has been written of Japan’s “treachery” and Russia’s “duplicity,” but neither accusation is just.

[Illustration: VARIAG.]

Following are the Japanese versions of the various incidents of the war, as officially reported:—

They were prefaced by the Chemulpo incident, in which the Asama, Naniwa, Takachiho, Suma, Chiyoda, and Niitaka annihilated the Russian cruiser Variag and the gunboat Korietz.

As a naval incident, this action has little interest or significance, the Russian ships being abnormally overmatched; indeed, there is nothing in the affair worthy of comment save the admirable strategy displayed by the Japanese in thus ensuring absolute victory without taking any risks. A very high appreciation of the real meaning of sea-power is evidenced here.

The rest of the naval war concentrated around Port Arthur. The Japanese task was in no way an easy one, for Russia made no errors after the first stupendous one by which she lost her two best battleships.

[Illustration: [_Reproduced by kind permission of the “Graphic.”_

ADMIRAL TOGO.]

FIRST ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR

Admiral Togo’s official report of the attack on Port Arthur is dated February 10, 1904, at sea, and is as follows:—

After the combined fleet left Sasebo on the 6th, everything went off as planned.

At midnight, on the 8th, the advance squadron attacked the enemy’s advance squadron, the latter being mostly outside the bay.

The Poltava, Askold, and two others were apparently struck by torpedoes.

At noon, on the 9th, the fleet advanced to the offing of Port Arthur Bay, and attacked the enemy for forty minutes, I believe doing considerable damage.

I believe the enemy were greatly demoralised. They stopped fighting at one o’clock, and appeared to retreat to the harbour.

The Japanese fleet suffered but very slight damage, and its fighting strength has not decreased.

Our casualties were four killed and fifty-four wounded. The imperial princes on board suffered no harm.

The conduct of the officers was cool, and not unlike their conduct at manœuvres.

This morning, owing to the heavy south wind, detailed reports from the vessels have not been received, so I merely report the above facts.

TOGO.

The ships actually torpedoed were the Tsarevitch, Retvizan, and Pallada, none of which were sunk.

The Japanese fleet consisted of all the modern vessels.

The relative small loss inflicted upon the Russians is explained as follows:—

(1) Several of the Japanese boats followed some scouting Russian boats in error. (2) The torpedo is an uncertain weapon at the best.

The Japanese boats got in by imitating Russian signals.

In the battle of the 9th very little harm was done on either side. The Novik and several other Russian ships were struck, but the damages were in no case serious. On the Japanese side the Fuji and Iwate received some hits, but these, though extensive, were not of a really serious nature.

SECOND ATTACK

The official report is as follows:—

On the 13th a division of torpedo-boat destroyers started for Port Arthur during a heavy snowstorm. The boats lost sight of each other and became separated. Only the Hayatori and Asagiri reached Port Arthur. The Asagiri sighted the entrance to the harbour at three o’clock on the morning of the 14th, and was received with a heavy fire by the batteries and scouting torpedo boats. She entered the harbour and discharged a torpedo at a warship from whose funnel smoke was ascending. The Asagiri then emerged safely, returning the fire of the enemy’s torpedo-boats.

The same morning, at five o’clock, the Hayatori approached Port Arthur and discerned two Russian ships, which opened fire on her. The destroyer discharged a torpedo, which was seen to explode. The Hayatori also escaped scathless.

It is impossible to state the definite material results, owing to the darkness, but the moral effect was certainly considerable.

TOGO.

It has not yet been definitely ascertained whether any Russian ship was sunk; if so, it was only a minor vessel. This attack may be written off as a wasted effort.

ATTACK ON VLADIVOSTOK

The next incident of note was the attack on Vladivostok, which, again, was barren of results, as the Russians did not attempt to reply.

The official report of the attack on Vladivostok, from Admiral Kamimura, commanding the second squadron, is as follows:—

As prearranged, the squadron reached the eastern entrance of Vladivostok on the morning of March 6, after passing through the frozen sea. The enemy’s ships were not seen in the outside harbour, and the Japanese vessels approached the batteries on the north-east coast from a point beyond the range of the batteries of the Balzan Promontory and the Bosphorous Strait.

After bombarding the inner harbour for forty minutes from ten minutes to two, the Japanese squadron retired. It is believed that the bombardment effected considerable damage. Soldiers were seen on land, but the Russian batteries did not reply to the Japanese fire.

Black smoke was observed in the eastern entrance about five in the afternoon, and was thought to be from the enemy’s ships, but the smoke gradually disappeared. On the morning of the 7th inst. the Japanese squadron reconnoitred America Bay and Strelok Bay, but nothing unusual was seen. The warships again approached the eastern entrance of Vladivostok at noon, but the enemy’s ships were not visible, and the batteries did not fire.

The squadron then turned towards Possiet Bay, but seeing nothing of the enemy, retired.

The next operations were more exciting, being officially reported as follows:—

An attack on Port Arthur took place on March 10th, as previously planned.

Our destroyers were formed into two separate flotillas. Both of them reached the outside of the harbour at midnight on the 9th and reconnoitred, but no enemy was seen. At dawn the second flotilla laid special mechanical mines in many places, and succeeded in the task, notwithstanding the intermittent fires from the enemy’s forts.