CHAPTER III

THE WAR OF 1812

There were two different causes of the war with Great Britain in 1812, and it is necessary to examine each separately. These causes were maritime rights and land hunger.

The general European upheaval from 1789 to 1815, known as the French Revolution, soon developed into a war between Great Britain and Napoleon. All Europe was divided into two camps, with Great Britain and Napoleon as the leaders on their respective sides. Almost a decade before 1812 Great Britain began issuing decrees known as Orders in Council. These "Orders in Council," issued in the name of the king, attempted to prohibit neutral nations from shipping goods to France. In this manner, a blockade was proclaimed against France, and ships attempting to get through the lines were subject to capture and confiscation.

Napoleon issued similar decrees, known as the Berlin and Milan Decrees, declaring that any ships en route to Great Britain would be subject to capture, for France had also blockaded Great Britain. But as neither blockade could be fully enforced, they were both to a large degree disregarded. Both Great Britain and Napoleon were attempting to cut off each other's trade and not primarily trying to disregard the rights of neutrals. All goods attempting to run these blockades were subject to capture.

The principal losers through these captures were the New England traders, but they preferred losing occasional ships to joining in a war which would involve them with their principal customer, Great Britain. There had been no serious crisis since 1807, five years before war was declared. Napoleon was then losing fast and it seemed evident that it would be only a short while before the causes of friction would be over. The flagrant disregard of the "rights" of neutral trade had taken place before 1807. In 1812, the solution or end of the problem was in sight. In 1810, our registered tonnage in foreign trade was 981,019 tons, which high mark it was not to reach again till 1847. Our foreign trade was not ruined, and the New England merchants who sustained the loss wanted nothing done. They were Federalists and would have preferred a war with France rather than a war with England, because they regarded Napoleon as the real cause of all the trouble. The Federalists were pro-British, while the Democrat-Republicans were pro-French. Early in 1811 our minister, William Pinkney, left London, and thus the United States was cut off from a knowledge of the movements in England. England was attempting to avoid war with America because such a war would naturally hurt her foreign trade and domestic prosperity. By the spring of 1812 England was ready to revoke the Orders in Council as soon as it could be done with dignity, but this fact was unknown to America. On June 23, 1812, the orders were revoked. But this was five days after the war of 1812 had been declared. England did not know war was declared when the orders were revoked, and the United States did not know till a good while later in the season that the orders had been revoked. Perhaps modern cable communication would have prevented this war.

Another source of friction lay in the impressment of seamen and sailors. During this period Great Britain was hard pressed for men in her naval campaign against Napoleon. Many sailors deserted English ships and came to America because of the higher wages paid by the owners of American ships. Every British warship anchoring in American waters would lose a good part of its crew, who would secure positions on American ships. Great Britain demanded the return of these deserters, who would often become naturalized citizens. Great Britain, however, at that time regarded citizenship as a contract between citizens and government which could not be broken without the consent of both, disqualifying the sailor from citizenship in the United States, without her consent. This European custom has now disappeared, of course, and one can change citizenship at will.

When the United States refused to return these men, the British ships would search American vessels on the high seas to see if any British sailors were on board. This policy of impressment waned, however, after 1805, because Napoleon had been defeated on the sea and Great Britain was not in such great need of sailors. Impressment was not made a cause of war until after the war had begun and President Madison had learned that the Orders in Council had been revoked. President Madison in 1812 estimated the number of impressments at 6,057, but the Massachusetts legislature appointed a committee to investigate the situation, which reported that the Madison estimate was "three or four times too large." Great Britain took the position that the United States was acting as a harbor for her deserters from the British navy and merchant ships, and that therefore the search was warranted as a defensive measure.

The British "Orders in Council" prohibiting the trading of neutral powers with France, and the British impressment of fugitive sailors from English ships, were the maritime controversies which resulted in the War of 1812. Both policies on the part of Great Britain were adopted as necessary measures in her conflict with Napoleon.

The New England Federalists were the people principally concerned in the United States, but they opposed the war. War was declared by a vote of 79 to 49 in the House, and 19 to 13 in the Senate. There was open discouragement of enlistment in New England. The Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to honor President Madison's call for the militia. Henry Adams estimated that the New England bankers loaned more money to Great Britain than to the United States for war purposes. Of the $17,000,000 in specie in the country in 1812, about $10,000,000 was in the hands of the New England Federalists. They subscribed less than $3,000,000 to the United States war loan. Thus, strangely, enough, the War of 1812 was fought in spite of the protest of those for whom it was presumably fought.

But in recent years another cause of the war and the chief cause has been discovered. This was land hunger.

The United States entered the conflict at the insistence of the south and west, despite the opposition of the northeastern states. The inland section overruled the opposition of the maritime section. At that time, there was an ardent expansionist sentiment along the whole western and southern border looking towards the annexation of Canada and Florida, with a vaguer idea of seizing all of the Spanish possessions of North America. Spain then owned Florida. Spain and Great Britain were allies against Napoleon, and a war with one was looked upon as a war with both. The belief that the United States would some day annex Canada had existed continuously since the Revolution. Benjamin Franklin had advocated the buying of Canada by the United States, since we failed to take it during the Revolution. The Continental Congress made an effort to capture Canada, but our armies were repulsed. Washington had objected to leaving Canada in British hands. In 1803 Governor Morris of Pennsylvania wrote that at the time of the Constitutional Convention he knew "that all North America must at length be annexed to us--happy indeed if the lust of dominion stop there." This idea, however, was a vague dream till about 1810.

There had been friction in the northwest between the Americans and British. The British retained trading posts in the northwest after they had agreed to give them up by the treaty of 1783 recognizing the independence of the United States. These were held to compensate the Tories for their property confiscated during the Revolutionary War, which had not been done. For this reason, the British held the northwest posts until 1796, when they were given up by the Jay Treaty. All the Indian trouble in that section was attributed to British propaganda, which incited the Indians against the United States. The Canadian traders made friends with the Indians to get their trade while the Americans were aggressively pushing them back from their land. The result was that the Indian was more friendly to the British in Canada than to the United States.

The idea of annexing Canada was intensified after 1810 because of the belief that the Indians were being turned against the United States by the British. The south was almost unanimous in its demand for the annexation of Florida, while the southwest was taking a lively interest in Mexico. This land hunger was making its appearance rapidly, but it was several years later that the phrase "manifest destiny" was to come into general use.

President Madison and Secretary of State James Monroe were eager to annex Florida. Thomas Jefferson was interested in the annexation of Canada, Florida and Cuba. Jefferson considered the acquisition of Canada only a "question of marching," with Florida and Cuba easy prey from Spain. These expansionists were in favor of declaring war, while the rest of the country opposed the idea.

When Congress met in 1811, Henry Clay was elected Speaker of the House. He was leader of the war group known as "war hawks." Clay was the first Speaker of the House of Representatives to recognize the great power he could exercise over legislation through his appointment of committees. He was the first "Czar" of the House. On the Foreign Relations Committee, Clay appointed Peter B. Porter, Chairman, Calhoun of South Carolina, Grundy of Tennessee, Harper of New Hampshire, and Desha of Kentucky. All these were ardent expansionists and reliable war men. They represented the frontier section of 1812, and Clay had been chosen Speaker by the representatives from that section. In December, 1812, while on the Foreign Relations Committee, Porter said in discussing trouble with Great Britain, "We could deprive her of her extensive provinces lying along our border to the north." Grundy and Rhea, ardent expansionists from Tennessee, agreed.

R. M. Johnson of Kentucky during the same session made the statement, "I shall never die contented until I see her (Great Britain's) expulsion from North America, and her territories incorporated with the United States," and Harper of New Hampshire said in Congress: "To me, sir, it appears that the Author of Nature has marked our limits in the South by the Gulf of Mexico, and in the North by the regions of eternal frost."

These statements were representative of the sentiments of the members in Congress from the western section. The Federalist Party consisted chiefly of the mercantile and financial interests of the coast towns. They were solidly against expansion, which would give the economic advantage to the western section of the country.

The winter of 1811-1812 saw a great expansionist wave sweep over the west, clamoring for the annexation of Canada. Contemporary newspapers were filled with editorials demanding annexation. The cry came up from the whole frontier, New Hampshire to Kentucky, to expel the British from Canada. At a Washington's birthday dinner given at Lexington, Ky., on February 22, 1812, the toast proposed was "Canada and our arms." Although the frontier claimed that the British were inciting the Indians against the United States, L. M. Hacker in "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812" proves that the Indian menace was greatly exaggerated, but that land hunger was the real motive.

Randolph, of Virginia, who was opposed to the war, said in 1812 on the floor of Congress: "Ever since the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations came into the House, we have heard but one word--like the whippoorwill with but one eternal monotonous tune--Canada! Canada! Canada!"

The south and southwest were interested in the annexation of Florida and possibly Texas. To them, a war with Great Britain meant a war with Spain also, since the British and Spain were then in alliance.

President Madison and Secretary of State Monroe, in their eagerness to acquire Florida, had helped a General George Mathews to instigate a revolution in Florida. In 1812 General Mathews took American troops to Florida, with the co-operation of the War Department and also the support of Governor Mitchell of Georgia. This territory was held for a year, although Congress twice refused to authorize the President to hold it. Finally Madison was forced to repudiate the act because of the opposition of the Federalists and the northern members of his own party. Senator Crawford, of Georgia, was active in his support of southern expansion; Jefferson wished to annex Cuba as a state, and Madison and Monroe were eager to annex Florida although they were not concerned with the appropriation of Canada.

The interest of the southwest in Mexico was a spirited one. McCaleb, in his book on "The Aaron Burr Conspiracy" points out that Burr simply attempted to do in 1806 what the whole southwest was dreaming of. He was conspiring against Spain in Mexico and not against the United States as is usually supposed. "Lands, water-ways, and Indians" was the cry of men desiring to drive out Spain.

In the Nashville _Clarion_ of April 28, 1812, there appeared a long article advocating the annexation of all America, closing with the statement: "Where is it written in the book of fate that the American republic shall not stretch her limits from the capes of the Chesapeake to Nootka Sound, from the Isthmus of Panama to Hudson Bay?" The paper then editorially commended the article to its readers and followed it up with a series of historical and descriptive articles about Mexico.

The War of 1812 continued for two years. Troops were raised to invade Canada but interest in the venture was slight. Many of the militia refused to march out of American territory, as it was understood then that the militia could not be ordered to foreign soil. The expansionists could have united to declare war, but plans of expansion collapsed. The northern states opposed the annexation of Florida without Canada. The troops could never take Canada. Madison and Monroe were interested in Florida, not Canada. The British repulsed the troops from Canada. The south had no desire to acquire northern territory.

The War of 1812, in fact, was a complete failure from every angle. Our troops were defeated. General Winfield Scott declared that the army officers were "generally sunk in either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking," "swaggerers, dependents, decayed gentlemen utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever."

Muzzey in "The United States of America through the Civil War," Vol. I, page 253, says: "The War of 1812 was a blunder. It was unnecessary, impolitic, untimely, and rash." It was primarily the work of Henry Clay. If the United States had been in any condition to fight, we should have been of great aid to Napoleon who at that time was being defeated by Great Britain.

In the peace treaty of 1814, which brought the war to a close, the causes of the war were not mentioned. The War of 1812 was a war of paradoxes. It was waged ostensibly in defense of maritime commercial interests, but the merchant states themselves threatened to secede so as to stop it. The English Orders in Council, the alleged cause of the war, were repealed five days after war was declared and before news of its declaration reached England. The most important battle of the war, the Battle of New Orleans, was fought after the treaty of peace had been signed. The United States did not get any of the desired territory; was defeated in nearly every campaign; and the capitol was burned by the English. The land was not gained and the rights on the sea were not granted. England never yielded the right of impressment, which remained a diplomatic controversy as late as 1842.

In order to save its reputation, the Administration published an "Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War," prepared by A. J. Dallas, in which it was denied that the administration had ever tried to acquire Canada. Madison was a great scholar but not a strong executive, and it was the war hawks led by Clay who forced the war upon him and the nation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Henry--_John Randolph_.

Hocker, L. M.--"Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812; A Conjecture". _Mississippi Valley Historical Review_, Vol. X, pages 363-395.

Johnson, Allen--_Union and Democracy_. Chapter 11.

Lewis, H. J.--"A Re-analysis of the Causes of the War of 1812." _American Historical Magazine_. Vol. VI, pages 306-316, 577-584.

Muzzey, D. S.--_The United States of America Through the Civil War_. Vol. I, chapter 5.

Pratt, J. W.--_The Expansionists of 1812_.

Simons, A. M.--_Social Forces in American History_. Chapter 13.