CHAPTER VI
THE WAR WITH SPAIN
For almost a century, the Spanish possession of Cuba had been regarded with disfavor by certain elements in the United States. Reasons for this attitude varied from those of acquisition on grounds of "manifest destiny," to those of the highest altruism. When the Spanish American republics won their independence during the early years of the nineteenth century, Porto Rico and Cuba remained in the possession of Spain.
Thomas Jefferson advocated the acquiring of Cuba and its annexation as a state, chiefly for fear that it would be acquired by England. Later, pro-slavery leaders wanted to take the island in order to extend slave territory, as had been done in the case of Florida and Texas. Cuba's annexation was a part of the "manifest destiny" program which was rampant in the years preceding the Civil War. Many filibustering expeditions were sent there with annexation in view. The Cubans themselves often came to the United States, became naturalized citizens of this country, and would return to Cuba with an unfriendly attitude toward Spanish authority, counting for protection on their American citizenship, in case of trouble.
There had often been spasmodic rebellions or outbreaks in Cuba before 1895. In 1868, there broke out what is known as the "Ten Years' War" which lasted until 1878, but the causes of these conflicts were never clearly understood by the participants on either side. Sugar cane was the principal source of Cuban wealth. According to the customary policy of trade barriers, Spain imposed duties on goods coming from the United States and the United States imposed high duties on Cuban sugar. These duties severely hurt Cuban economic life, and as economic depressions as well as prosperities are always attributed to the party in power regardless of the real causes, the Cubans, no exceptions to this rule, blamed the political power then in authority.
During this "Ten Years' War" many filibustering expeditions were secretly fitted out in the United States by and for the Cubans. In 1873, a ship, the _Virginius_, sailing under American colors, carrying men and supplies to the Cuban insurgents Was captured by a Spanish gunboat. The crew and passengers were given a trial which resulted in the execution of fifty-three, of whom eight claimed to be American citizens. Immediately, the war cry Went up in the United States. But, due to the wise policy of President Grant, it never gained headway.
Finally, in 1878, Spain agreed to forget the past, abolish slavery in Cuba, and admit delegates from Cuba to the Spanish Cortes or Parliament. The Cubans agreed, and hostilities ceased. All men in Cuba were given the ballot if they paid taxes to the amount of $25.00 annually, which still excluded the poorer classes. Of the representatives sent by the island to the Spanish Cortes or Parliament in Madrid, about one-fifth were Cuban born. This arrangement lasted as long as the economic life of Cuba was normal.
But in February, 1895, a new war for independence broke out, which was caused by a severe depression of the sugar industry resulting from the repeal in 1894 of the McKinley Tariff which had permitted the free entry of Cuban sugar into the United States, giving the Cuban sugar industry access to the United States market. The closing of the United States to Cuban sugar was a great blow to Cuba's sugar industry. Spanish authority in Cuba was held responsible, and warfare was soon established between the insurgents and Spanish authorities. A humane governor-general tried to suppress the insurrection peaceably, but without satisfactory results. Accordingly, General Weyler became Governor-General of Cuba, on February 16, 1896, and inaugurated the concentration policy, by which the inhabitants of Cuba were assembled or crowded within certain military camps, for it was impossible to distinguish the loyalists from the insurgents. As a result of this, there was great suffering and destruction.
Gomez was leader of the insurgents. He destroyed all the property he possibly could, in an endeavor to compel the United States to intervene. By attempting to destroy Spanish authority, Gomez hoped to secure the help of the United States. The insurgents were often led by Cubans who had come to America, obtained United States citizenship, and returned to the island claiming the privilege of their acquired citizenship. Between February 24, 1895, and January 22, 1897, seventy-four persons claiming to be citizens of the United States were arrested by Spanish authority, because of their activities as insurgents. But fully three-fourths of those arrested were Cubans or sons of Cubans who had been naturalized in the United States. Often, the insurgents developed their plans on American soil and secured military aid here. The federal government took precautions to prevent this, but many expeditions were made in spite of action taken to prevent them.
Our Department of State protested to Spain against the concentration policy in Cuba carried out under Governor-General Weyler, but Spain contended that her methods in suppressing rebellion in Cuba were no more severe than the methods employed by our federal government during the Civil War. Attention was called by Spain to the Sherman march through the south and to Sheridan's activities in Virginia. Spain also called attention to the Cuban Junta in New York, and claimed that the principal insurgent assistance came from American soil.
Congress appropriated $50,000 for the relief of Americans in Cuba, but up to the fall of 1897, only $6,000 of the $50,000 had been used, so little need was there for it.
In this war in Cuba between insurgents or rebels and Spanish authority, both sides destroyed all the property possible, although the insurgents destroyed more than the Spanish authorities. It was not nearly so destructive as our Civil War, yet what should we have thought had Spain protested against the conditions of our Civil War? Such a protest would have been treated with contempt. We had no more legal ground for questioning Spanish authority in Cuba, than Japan today would have in questioning or protesting against our policy in the Philippines. In fact, two years later, in our guerrilla warfare with the natives of the Philippines, we adopted the same concentration policy, as we shall see, against which we then protested in Cuba.
William Randolph Hearst, who was then the leader of American yellow journalism, had at this time developed his chain of newspapers from California to Boston. Early in 1897, he began advocating intervention. Appeals were made daily. Stories, crimes, and conditions were pictured in his papers and greatly exaggerated. Mr. McKinley, opposed to intervention, became President on March 4, 1897. Mark Hanna who had elected Mr. McKinley President, now wished to be compensated by an appointment to the United States Senate from Ohio. To create a vacancy in the Senate, Mr. McKinley appointed as his Secretary of State Mr. John Sherman who was then Senator from Ohio, and Mr. Hanna was appointed by the Governor of Ohio to the United States Senate. Mr. McKinley's appointment of John Sherman as Secretary of State was a great blunder. Mr. Sherman was then very old and rapidly declining. His work was left in the hands of his assistants in the Department of State.
United States citizens owned wealth in Cuba, to the amount of $50,000,000 and our commerce with Cuba amounted to $100,000,000 annually. These interests, of course, demanded intervention. Our Department of State in its correspondence with Spain estimated that $16,000,000 worth of American property had been destroyed in Cuba at the close of 1897, for which property Spain was held responsible. This was a greatly exaggerated figure, for at the close of the war a claims commission was created by Congress to investigate those claims, and this commission recognized as valid claims amounting to only about $362,252.
In October, 1897, Spain recalled Governor-General Weyler, and appointed in his place Blanco. The concentration order was revoked. Spain offered the natives a larger share of self-government, with their own constitution and legislature. Autonomy was granted. If it had been offered three years before, this would, no doubt, have solved the problem. But now it was difficult to reconcile the two factions in Cuba. The native Spaniards in Cuba opposed home rule, as it would give the Cubans too much power. The Cubans wanted independence, and were unwilling to co-operate with the Spaniards in home rule. A Cuban parliament was called on May 4, 1898.
The Hearst newspapers were then demanding intervention on the part of the United States and moulding public opinion in that direction. Although the election of 1896 was over, and it had settled the issue of free silver, yet other social elements had entered American politics through the election and campaign of 1896, and it was in the interests of some people to make use of a "vigorous foreign policy" to keep public attention away from the new issues. This is an old device for obliterating home issues or differences. Lincoln had been advised to precipitate the United States into a foreign war as a means of preventing the Civil War.
On February 9, 1898, the _New York Journal_, a strong advocate of intervention, violated the sanctity of the United States mails by securing through criminal methods a private letter written by Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, to a friend. In this letter Lome severely criticised McKinley, and spoke of him with contempt. This letter was published by the _New York Journal_. It excited public opinion, and was, of course, made use of by the jingo press. However, it had nothing to do with the case, for a foreign minister naturally has a perfect legal and moral right to have any opinion of the President or any other public official he likes, and to express it privately to a friend. The actual crime was in stealing the letter from the United States mails, but that action was never investigated or punished by the United States, which should have been done. Lome's criticism of McKinley may have been unjust, but he had a personal right to it.
In the midst of the great excitement created by the Lome letter, another incident took place of advantage to the war party. On January 24, 1898, the _Maine_ was ordered to Cuba on a "friendly visit." This trip was accepted officially as a complimentary visit, but privately both Spain and the United States regarding it in the opposite light. After being in Havana harbor for three weeks, the _Maine_ was blown up on February 15, 1898. "Remember the Maine" now became the slogan of the war party. Spain denied any connection with its destruction, and no one now believes it was blown up by Spain. The actual cause of the explosion is not known, but it is now believed to have been done by the rebels in Cuba for the purpose of securing the intervention of the United States. It may have been an accident with which Spain could in no way be connected, yet, at the time, in the eyes of the public, Spain was held responsible.
McKinley, during this period, opposed intervention, but the war party, supported by the Hearst papers, was growing rapidly. Our able minister in Spain, General Woodford, was also opposed to our intervention. Congress, however, held the opposite attitude. A senator said to Assistant Secretary of State Day: "Day, doesn't your President know where the war-declaring power is lodged? Tell him that if he doesn't do something, Congress will exercise the power." Congressman Boutelle, who was opposed to the war, says that forty or fifty Republican members of Congress held a caucus and sent a committee to the President stating that unless he asked for a declaration of war, they would propose a resolution for war and carry it through. Secretary of War Alger, who was a notorious spoilsman, said to a senator: "I want you to advise the President to declare war. He is making a great mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the Republican party by standing in the way of the people's wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll get run over and the party with him." Rhodes, in "McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations," on page 64, says: "McKinley feared a rupture in his own party, and on account of that fear, had not the nerve and power to resist the pressure for war. We may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been President, there would have been no war with Spain."
McKinley was opposed to the war up to the last of March, 1898. Only two members of his cabinet were in favor of war. Also, the Vice-President was against it, as was Mark Hanna, the Speaker of the House, and nearly all the leading Republicans of the Senate.
On March 29, 1898, McKinley sent his ultimatum to Spain demanding the complete abandonment of the concentration policy, the granting of an armistice to Cuba, and the opening of peace negotiations through himself with the insurgents. Spain replied granting the complete abandonment of the concentration policy and did not refuse to grant the armistice, but told our minister, General Woodford, that she would gladly grant it, if the Cubans, who were the resistors, asked for it, for Spain could not first offer it. Our minister at Madrid then cabled McKinley that the Spanish government and people wished to settle the difficulty without war, and that in a few months' time, he would "get peace in Cuba, with justice to Cuba and protection to our great American interests."
Let us say, for example, that Japan had sent an ultimatum to McKinley during the Philippine insurrection, demanding that he change his policy of coercion and grant an armistice to the Philippines. Such a demand would have been treated with contempt, yet that is what we demanded of Spain.
On April 6, 1898, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Russia, and Italy made an appeal to McKinley to continue peaceful negotiations. The Pope also intervened for peace. He asked the Queen of Spain to comply fully with our ultimatum. Accordingly, on April 10, McKinley was notified by the Foreign Office at Madrid, that Spain would grant the armistice. But on the following day, Monday, April 11, 1898, McKinley appeared before Congress and asked for a declaration of war against Spain, without informing them of the latest concessions made by Spain. It is impossible to explain McKinley's action. Through the efforts of Minister Woodford, at Madrid, and others, a diplomatic victory had been won only to be thrown away by McKinley and Congress. The Spanish minister at Washington was notified that the President in his message to Congress on April 11, would explain the concession made by Spain, but this was not done--a reference only was made to it in his war message.
War was declared on April 18 by a vote of 324 to 19 in the House, and 67 to 21 in the Senate. On March 31, 1898, Woodford had cabled to McKinley: "I believe the ministry are ready to go as far and as fast as they can and still save the dynasty here in Spain. They know that Cuba is lost. Public opinion in Spain has moved steadily towards peace." Then on April 3, 1898, Woodford sent this message to President McKinley: "The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that Spain will go as far and as fast as she can. I know that the Queen and her present ministry sincerely desire peace, and that the Spanish people desire peace, and if you can still give me time and reasonable liberty of action, I am sure that before next October 1st, I will get peace in Cuba." Again on April 10, the day before our declaration of war, Woodford notified our Department of State that before August 1, he could secure autonomy for Cuba, or a recognition of its independence by Spain or a cession of the island to the United States. He then added: "I hope that nothing will be done to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied the present government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it can." It was an open secret that Spain would give up or sell Cuba as soon as she could.
One cannot read the Woodford dispatches and fail to see that the Spanish-American War was thrust upon Spain by our jingo press. President McKinley over-estimated its strength and lost his nerve, fearing the disruption of his party. Spain was not surprised but "stunned" when the United States declared war, a war which cannot be defended on any grounds. Cuba was Spanish territory and we had no more legal right to intervene than Spain, for example, had a right to demand that the United States change her methods of government in Alaska. Morally, the war was indefensible, for Spain was conceding and was ready to go to any extent to avoid war, even to the point of granting independence to Cuba. This conflict with Spain cost $300,000,000, not including the indirect expenses.
The most important result of the war was our acquisition of the Philippine Islands. In February, 1898, about two months before war was declared, Admiral Dewey of the American fleet was ordered to Hongkong, China, and instructed to be prepared to begin operations against the Philippines in case of a declaration of war. Until after the battle of Manila, the American people had practically never heard of the Philippine Islands. These islands were taken, however, and at the peace conference, Mr. McKinley instructed our commissioners not to be satisfied with anything less than the entire group of islands because of the "commercial opportunity,"--they were secured as a trading base in the Orient. At that time, it seemed that China would be dismembered by the European powers and that unless we secured the Philippines, the United States would have no share in the Orient. This was our first step in a policy of imperialism, clothed in mild terms.
For three years after our capture of these islands, the natives put up a guerrilla warfare to resist the United States forces. During this period, the American army resorted to every description of barbaric torture. Among other measures, the policy of concentrating the inhabitants in camps was resorted to, which was the same policy we objected to the use of by Spain in Cuba. Prisoners of war were executed in retaliation for crimes of which they knew nothing. One of our notorious army officers known as "Hell-Roaring" Jake Smith commanded that every building in a certain area be burned and every native over ten years of age be slain.
These three years of guerrilla warfare cost the United States $170,000,000. All of this cost and cruelty, aside from being unjust, was unnecessary, for the natives of the Philippines were willing to co-operate with the United States to develop their civilization by peaceful methods. The resistance was caused by the presence of United States soldiers in the islands.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beard, Charles A.--_Contemporary American History_. Chapter 8.
Chadwick, F. E.--_Relations of United States and Spain_.
Latane, J. H.--_America as a World Power_. Chapters 1-5.
Powers, H. H.--_America Among the Nations_.
Rhodes, James Ford--_The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_. Chapters 3, 4, 5.
Schlesinger, A. M.--_Political and Social History of the United States_. Chapters 14 and 15.
Storey, M.--_The Conquest of the Philippines_.