CHAPTER XIV.
HERODOTUS AS THE HISTORIAN OF THE GREAT WAR.
A history of the war would be incomplete unless the writer made an attempt to render an account of the evidence which the narrative affords of the methods employed by the great historian to whom the knowledge of almost all that is worth knowing concerning it is due. The story of the war is the climax of Herodotus’ work. All the manifold information which he gives of the times preceding it is merely an overture to the history of the struggle in which the fate of Greece, and it may be of Europe, was decided. But this preliminary portion of his work, though intensely interesting from a critical point of view, and though artistically one with the purely Hellenic part of his narrative, does not fall within the scope of a criticism which aims mainly at summing up the results of an inquiry as to the amount of light which the land of Greece at the present day casts upon the work of an author of more than 2000 years ago.
The term “father of history,” commonly applied to Herodotus, is of no small significance in relation to the circumstances under which his work was done. Of itself it implies a genius that overcame many difficulties, and which was peculiarly creative, in that it introduced into the educated world a form of literature of which no previous example can be said to have existed.
But this is not all. Under his hand the new literature was given a form which, though modified by later writers, must still serve as a pattern to those who write with twenty centuries of experience behind them. #INFLUENCE OF CONTEMPORARIES.# It is easy to point out defects in Herodotus’ work as a whole,—lack of arrangement, and what not,—and it is demanded by the interests of history that such defects should be pointed out; but, in so doing, it should be remembered that the work criticized is not merely the foundation but a large part of the edifice of that school of experience which renders such criticism possible, and that the apparatus for it is largely supplied by the many excellences of the historian’s method.
◆Contemporary colouring.◆
Any attempt to examine the work of a writer of history must, if it is to be in any sense successful, take into account the contemporary colouring of time and place under which the work was composed. This, true of every age of the world, is peculiarly demanded in the case of a work of the fifth century before Christ, when the local colouring was of such peculiar vividness as to affect to an unusual degree the view of those who lived and wrote under its influence. There are many sides to this question, a full discussion of which would demand much time, and would not be wholly apposite to the purpose of this chapter. It will be sufficient to speak of those aspects which must affect a judgment of Herodotus as historian of the Persian War.
As the pioneer in a new form of literature, he was peculiarly liable both to affect, and to be affected by, the interests of the audience for which he wrote; and the latter tendency could not fail to be emphasized by the extreme susceptibility which the Greek displayed to the feelings of his contemporaries. The interests of an audience uneducated in history must necessarily be limited. A writer writing for such an audience would naturally tend towards a form of composition in which the narrative dealt mainly with such incidents as are especially calculated to excite men’s interest. Hence it arises that the two great historians of the fifth century were, above all, historians of the military events of their time; and their work as writers of history in the larger sense is made subservient to the more limited scope of their main design.
◆Research.◆
Herodotus started on his task as a military historian with little or no practical experience, but with an immense capacity for taking pains. Excellence and defect alike have left their impress on his work; but it may be said without prejudice that his diligence of research has more than counterbalanced his lack of experience. The general result is that he has given to the world the data necessary for a true understanding of the events of the time of which he wrote, though he has in many instances failed to grasp their significance, and in a few instances has evidently misinterpreted them.
A reference has been made to “prejudice” in judging Herodotus. No author has perhaps suffered more than he from the existence of this feeling in the minds of those who have criticized him. The very lovableness of the man, so transparent in his writings, seems to have been the cause which has produced exaggerated appreciation of his work, whose very exaggeration has, human nature being what it is, called into existence depreciations at least equally unsound.
On the general question, before entering into details, this much may be said: that the main lesson which is conveyed to one who prosecutes inquiry in Greece at the present day on such points as are calculated to throw light upon the nature of his work is that, while it would be a mistake to regard him as a paragon of accuracy, he in many cases attained to an accuracy which was wonderful, considering the means at his disposal.
In examining the work of any historian, great or small, the inquiry must resolve itself into three sections: (1) the influence of the personal character of the historian on his work; (2) the influence on his work exerted by the associations of the time at which he wrote; (3) the nature of the materials which lay to his hand. The purely Hellenic history in Herodotus’ work throws considerable light on all these three points.
Theoretically it is, for the sake of dearness, desirable to keep these sections distinct: practically it is not possible to do so, since they must necessarily overlap.
◆Influence of personal character.◆
The most prominent personal characteristic of the historian which influenced his work was the absolute honesty with which he stated what he believed to be the truth, and the infinity of the pains which he took to arrive at it. #DILIGENCE IN INQUIRY.# It does not follow that what he believed to be true was true, but he did all that he could to get at the facts; and there is no single instance in his history of the war in which he can be shown to have deliberately perverted them. He had, like other men, his prejudices and predilections. He was affected, as all men must be, by the views held at the time at which he wrote concerning the time of which he wrote; and it is to these influences, and not to historical dishonesty on his part, that any fair judgment of him must attribute the obvious or suspected misstatements which are found in his Hellenic history. If this is not the case, he was one of the strangest compounds of the true and the false that ever lived. The dishonest historian does not want to know the truth; whereas it can be shown, not merely from Herodotus’ own language, but from actual facts existent at the present day, that Herodotus ardently desired to do so. Perhaps the most marked examples of this desire are afforded by the demonstrable care and pains which he devoted to his inquiries into the topography of the scenes of two events which are of peculiar interest,—the battles of Thermopylæ and Platæa. There can be no real question that he visited both places, and, not merely that, but that his examination of them was extremely careful. Whatever defects there are in the narrative of those two great battles are not of a topographical character, but are due almost entirely to difficulties in obtaining information. It may be argued that a man who took such pains to discover the truth of topographical detail, would be likely to take similar pains with details not topographical.
◆Deliberate omissions.◆
Another remarkable characteristic of his work is the way in which he will deliberately leave an important story incomplete, rather than insert details for which he had no real foundation of information. There are several examples of this. The history of the Ionian revolt, the most important section of the preliminary part of his work, is very defective. There are serious omissions, and the whole story is excessively fragmentary. A dishonest historian would have been tempted to round off the tale: an unscrupulous one would not have hesitated to do so.
But the most remarkable narrative of the incomplete type is that of Marathon. The best of raconteurs is content to give a mutilated account of what was reckoned, by the Athenian at any rate, one of the greatest events of Greek history; and the omissions are of such a character that it is almost impossible to believe that they can have been unconscious. Nor can it be supposed but that any amount of information of a certain type was available to him at the time at which he was at Athens. He must have rejected a large mass of the traditional evidence as unsatisfactory; otherwise the amount of descriptive narrative which he could have devoted to the battle would have been much greater than it is. The evident mistakes in such parts of the tradition as he does reproduce show the difficulty he experienced in arriving at the facts relating to the events of that time. The ten years of the past which had intervened between the campaign of Datis and Artaphernes and the great war made, no doubt, a world of difference to an author of later date, who was obliged to rely largely for his facts on contemporary oral evidence.
◆Prejudice.◆
Another class of narratives bearing on the question of the author’s honesty consists of those which contain matter suggestive of the suspicion that personal prejudice led him to deliberate perversion of facts. The question is not in the present instance as to the fact of perversion; but as to whether it was or was not of a deliberate character. There can be but little doubt that personal prejudice of various kinds did colour his views, and led him to do injustice to some of the men and events of the time.
In the story of the Ionian revolt he displays a most marked antipathy to the Ionians. He has hardly a good word to say of them in any department of life; their literary men are very inferior persons; their kinsmen across the sea were ashamed to claim connection with them; they were pusillanimous, if not actually cowardly, in their conduct during the war. Not one of these judgments can be regarded as sound, and the last and most severe is conspicuously refuted by the plain fact that it took Persia nigh seven years to crush their resistance, and that only at the expense of very serious loss to herself.
#SOURCE OF “PREDUDICES.”#
If these were untruths due to mere malignity on the part of the historian, statements which he knew to be untrue, it might be expected that he would display the same animus against the Ionians in all other parts of his history in which they are prominent. This is, however, very far from being the case. He specially records their bravery at Salamis. This record might be interpreted as intended to prejudice them in the eyes of the Greeks, did not his account of Mykale bring into prominence their services to the Greek cause on that occasion. It is, therefore, probable that the variation in his attitude towards the race is due largely to the variety of the sources of his information, combined, no doubt, with a strong personal feeling on his own as to their action on different occasions. His information on the subject of the revolt was certainly obtained from sources unfriendly to them, among which it may be presumed that the tradition current in his own time in Halikarnassos and the Dorian cities of Asia generally was not the least prominent. These cities certainly played no great part in the revolt; they probably stood aloof altogether; and those who have failed to fight the fight of liberty are not apt to be well disposed to those who have fought and failed. Moreover, they may have regarded the revolt as a colossal political blunder; and Herodotus may have acquired this view, which he held most strongly himself, from the older men of his native city who remembered the terrible time.
In Ionia itself, in Herodotus’ own day, the traditions of the revolt were probably highly contradictory. It is plain from the reliable material in his account, that its failure would lead to mutual recrimination between the members of the various cities which had taken part therein; and such recriminations would inevitably tend to confirm the low opinion which Herodotus had heard expressed in his home-land concerning the conduct of the Ionians at the time of the revolt. His impressions were wrong; but it is perhaps not unnatural that he should have formed them.
He displays the bias of his personal opinion very decidedly in his references to Themistocles. In this case also it is probable that he adopted views which he had frequently heard expressed by others. The Themistocles legend which he followed seems to have been originally a separate tradition which he has interwoven into the general traditions relating to the war of 480. It was probably created by the political party opposed to Themistocles, with members of which Herodotus must have come into contact during his sojourn in Athens. Themistocles’ services at the time of Salamis were too notorious to be wholly buried in oblivion; but the legend as Herodotus received it left nothing unsaid which might discount their value. The suggestion that the Greeks should fight in the strait is attributed to Mnesiphilos; and Themistocles is represented as having adopted it without acknowledgment.
In like manner his persuasion of the Athenians to use the increased proceeds of the mines at Laurion for the purposes of the fleet is ascribed, not to a foresight which foresaw the coming of the storm from Asia four years before it burst, but to the immediate necessities of the war with Ægina.
Further tales to his discredit are those of his financial corruptibility at Artemisium and Andros, and the self-seeking intent of his message to Xerxes with respect to the Hellespont bridge. All three contain elements of inherent improbability which, while they do not refute them, render them of doubtful credibility.
Was Herodotus honest in his conviction of the truth of these ill-tales?
No author that ever lived has been at less pains to conceal his individuality in what he wrote. His narrative is peculiarly personal. It is, therefore, far more easy in his writings to judge of the mental attitude of the writer than is usually the case in literature, and especially in historical literature, whether ancient or modern.
He was not merely conscious but absolutely convinced of the reign of moral law in human affairs. #PRESENT COLOURING OF PAST EVENTS.# He would, therefore, feel extreme repugnance for such moral weakness as that with which Themistocles was charged; and this very characteristic would lead him, if once convinced of the general existence of such weakness, to give credence to any and every tale which might be adduced to illustrate it. The tales, too, were mere rose-water stories compared with some of the charges which Aristophanes does not hesitate to bring against political opponents, and may have seemed to Herodotus to be stamped with the moderation of truth when compared with some of the political gossip in the Athens of his day.
The whole question of this Themistocles legend is one of the most difficult in Greek history. It is certain, on the one hand, that Herodotus had a distinct animus against the man. It seems also certain that the version of it which the historian followed was either the creation of political opponents or, at any rate, was strongly infected with the feeling which Themistocles’ conduct during the latter years of his life, as interpreted by the Athenians, must inevitably have aroused with regard to him.
◆Influence of contemporary feeling.◆
There are other parts of Herodotus’ narrative of the war which are manifestly coloured by the events of later years. Compelled, no doubt, to resort to Athens for many of his materials, he would inevitably reflect largely in his history the Athenian political feeling of the time at which he wrote.
The most noticeable instance of its influence upon him is shown in his treatment of the Corinthians. This people could not be accused of having played an unpatriotic part during the war, and yet no opportunity is lost of placing their conduct in an unfavourable light. They are represented as being foremost in opposition to such measures as after-events proved to have been of the greatest benefit to the national cause, and finally a distinct, and almost certainly unfounded, charge of cowardice at Salamis is brought against them. That Herodotus thought the war policy which they advocated, the defence of the Isthmus, a mistaken one, is evident; but this view of his is not sufficient to account for his treatment of them. That can only be attributed to an Athenian tradition which had been strongly influenced by the bitter and long-continued hostility which arose between Athens and Corinth some twenty years after the events of 480.
There are other passages in his history which must be attributed to the use of materials drawn from a similar source, similarly infected. The story of the behaviour of the Greek centre after the withdrawal from the second position at Platea, in which the Corinthians and Megareans are brought into special prominence, is probably one of them. To a like origin may be ascribed the various tales to the discredit of the Æginetans in reference to the events immediately following the battle. The case of the Æginetans is especially interesting, because the author’s treatment of them resembles his treatment of the Ionian Greeks. He records their noticeable bravery at Salamis. This diversity of treatment affords strong evidence that the animus displayed by him had its origin in the sources from which he drew his history, independent of personal feeling.
◆Sources and records.◆
It is easy to say that he might have guarded against accepting _ex parte_ statements as history. But those who realize the magnitude of the difficulties under which he worked will be rather inclined to marvel at the success with which he managed to overcome them, than to moralize on the instances in which he succumbed. He was writing the history of a period many years after it had closed. Of official records but few can have existed; and the instance of the inscription on the tripod, commemorating the battle of Platea, shows that such records were not always trustworthy. The semi-official records in the shape of copies of oracular responses were still more unreliable. And what was there beyond these? Current traditions, some perhaps pan-Hellenic, but the majority originating in different Greek states, with an amount of local colouring as varied as the variety of their sources. Some of the traditions may have been committed to writing. But who could have reconciled the truth of the numerous versions of the same story on which the lively imagination of the Greek had had full play for many years? #EFFECT OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS.# Lastly, there was the purely oral evidence of those who had been present at events; and it says much for the critical capacity and diligent inquiry of the historian that, despite the notorious difficulty of dealing with evidence of this kind, much of his work which may be proved at the present day to be accurate must have been drawn from such a source. Could a skilled historian of the nineteenth century have done much better work with such materials at his disposal? The history of the campaigns of 1805 and 1806, composed under like conditions, not less than thirty years after they took place, would have been strange reading.
◆Religious feeling.◆
The strong individuality which is impressed on, and expressed by, almost every page he wrote was so marked, that it could not fail to affect in some form or other his character as an historian. His personal piety has left indelible trace in his writings. His critical capacity was deliberately laid aside wherever he saw, or thought he saw, the hand of God at work in the world. This is most noticeably displayed in his treatment of the oracles relating to events of the time of which he wrote. His attitude towards them is very remarkable. This ultramontane of the fifth century before Christ never lost faith in them, despite the fact that he records instances of their fallibility and even of their actual dishonesty.
Such an attitude could not fail to introduce a specific element of unreliability into his work.
But this personal characteristic affected his writings in another way. It made him at times anxious not merely to inform, but to instruct,—to show men the better way as he understood it. He consequently preferred a tale with a moral to one without; and oftentimes when he gives two versions of the same story, he expresses his personal belief in the less probable of the two, evidently for no other reason than that the moral conveyed by it is either more obvious or more impressive.
The mere fact, again, that he does give in many instances two versions of the same story shows that he was anxious to do justice to those who were affected by them. The two versions of the conduct of Argos at the time of the war are, perhaps, the most striking instance of his wish to deal fairly with all those whom he brought upon the stage of history. His attitude towards the unpatriotic Greeks renders it certain that, had he always allowed his personal bias undue weight in the balance of historical writing, the conduct of Argos would not have been represented as open to two possible interpretations, one of them much more favourable than the other.
◆Unprejudiced judgments.◆
The expressions of his own personal judgment on historical questions which arise in his narrative are for the most part stated with reference to the motives which prompted certain actions, and are of very various value. On purely military questions they are, with the striking exception of his statement of opinion as to the motive of the withdrawal of the army from Thessaly, as a rule of little weight. He did not possess that practical knowledge of war and of command which alone could have rendered his personal views on such questions a matter of serious consideration. His excellence as a military historian is not on that side. It lies in his having been a diligent, accurate, honest recorder of facts, in so far as a man could be who wrote under the circumstances under which he wrote.
◆Rhetoric and drama.◆
It is very fortunate for the world that he was not appreciably affected by that craze for rhetoric which prevailed in the Athens of the last years of his life,—that rhetoric which was to play such havoc with the written history of a later age. He was probably too old to be largely influenced by that which seemed to the older men of the time an undesirable or, when they suffered from its exercise, even pernicious fad, even though certain sides of it might appeal strongly to his literary instinct. If contemporary writing did at all influence this creator of literature in a new form, it is perhaps in the works of the great dramatists that the source of such influence is to be sought. In any case, it was not sufficiently strong to affect his reliability as an historian. The reports of speeches in his work in what profess to be the actual words of the speaker, in cases in which it is certain that the actual words cannot have survived, is to be attributed to dramatic rather than to rhetorical feeling; and the absence of the latter influence in his work generally is shown by the conspicuous absence of a fundamental canon of rhetoric,—the ordered arrangement of topic.
#SOURCES.#
◆Sources.◆
To discuss fully the possible sources of information to which Herodotus had recourse in various parts of his work would in itself lake up a volume, wherein much of the matter would be highly controversial.
It will be sufficient here to point out as briefly as possible those sources which are indicated either clearly or with high probability as lying behind his narrative of the war and its immediate prelude:—
1. The historian’s personal observation and personal inquiry;
2. Records, official and semi-official;
3. Tradition [some preserved in previous authors].
Under the heading of personal observations may be included—
(_a_) His topographical inquiries.
(_b_) His inquiries from persons who had taken part in or had witnessed events.
Among records, the following sources may be suggested:—
(_a_) Inscriptions set up in various cities;
(_b_) (Probably) official lists other than inscriptions;
(_c_) Records of oracular responses.
The traditions, of which he manifestly made important use, are of great variety of origin. Sometimes he mentions their source; more frequently the nature of his information clearly indicates it.
(_a_) Pan-Hellenic, or Patriotic Greek;
(_b_) Athenian (Pan-Athenian; Aristocratic);
(_c_) Spartan (Official; Popular);
(_d_) Argive;
(_e_) Arcadian;
(_f_) Sicilian;
(_g_) Macedonian;
(_h_) Asiatic Dorian;
(_i_) Ionian;
(_k_) (Possibly) Persian sources;
(_l_) Delphic.
This list, long as it is, is absolutely confined to the sources for the story of the war, and that, too, of its main incidents. Were the sources for the history of Greece before the opening of the fifth century, for the non-Hellenic history, or even for minor incidents of the war, to be taken into consideration, their discussion would extend to many chapters.
The most remarkable general characteristic about this aspect of his work is the composite, sometimes extremely composite, nature of the sources employed in drawing up the account of any single one of the main incidents. A second characteristic, hardly less remarkable, is that those parts of his work whose truth is most conspicuously demonstrable originate in the majority of cases in the historian’s personal observation and personal inquiry.
◆Autopsy, and the evidence of eye-witnesses.◆
The most noticeable examples of the accuracy of his personal observation, and of the diligence and care of his inquiries from persons who were present at events, is afforded by the correctness with which he describes the topography of Thermopylæ and Platæa, and the close agreement of the incidents of those battles as recorded by him with the nature and accidents of the ground at the present day. There is no single statement of pure fact in his accounts of those battles upon which suspicion is thrown by a minute examination of the areas within which they were fought. The majority of them are positively capable of proof by the results of such an examination. The manifest errors in these two accounts do not lie in statement of fact, but in statement of motive, and are fully explicable by the circumstances under which the story was told. In neither case does he produce any evidence that he was able to get information as to the motives which influenced those in command. The story of the fighting in both cases is a soldier’s story. The details of the first two days of the defence of Thermopylæ were derived from some one who was present at, or a spectator of, the fight, of which there were many survivors. Those of the final scene are of the same character, though in that case it is more difficult to conjecture who was the informant. #AUTOPSY AND TOPOGRAPHY.# From certain indications in the story, it seems that parts of it at any rate may have been derived from some one who viewed it from the Persian side, possibly some Malian who had been temporarily impressed as a servant, and with whom Herodotus conversed when he visited the spot in later years. Such are the details (vii. 208) with regard to some of the Lacedæmonians being hidden from view of the Persian scout by the interposition of the wall, and some of the information given with reference to Epialtes (vii. 213). It is quite beyond question that Herodotus had traversed the ground. His topographical information can be followed in detail by any one who visits the region at the present day.
The only uncertainty concerns the exact sites of one or two places which he mentions outside the area of fighting, such as the Amphiktyonic temple; but even these are identifiable with high probability; and it is the use of the spade, not Herodotus’ information, which is wanting.
The rest of his information with regard to Thermopylæ, with the sole exception of the copies of the inscriptions on the monuments, is traditional in origin, emanating from Sparta.[232]
Artemisium he may have seen in the distance in the course of a land journey from the north. The knowledge which he displays of Halos, in his account of Xerxes’ visit to the place, renders it probable that he had traversed the route which leads round the east end of Othrys on to the Malian plain, and in going that way he would pass in full view of Aphetæ and Artemisium. His topographical description of these places is, in so far as it is called for, accurate enough. That is, however, the only portion of the Artemisium story which can be set down to aught of the nature of personal examination. Nor, indeed, can any part of that story be safely attributed to the evidence of an eye-witness of events. The list of the contingents of the Greek fleet may be taken from official records of some sort; the rest of the story seems to be drawn from tradition.
The tale of Salamis is, perhaps, the most extraordinary in the whole of his history. There can be little doubt that when he wrote it he had in his possession notes of information given him by some one who was present at the battle. Probably he never compiled its history of the battle until some years after he had taken the notes, at a time when his informant was not within his reach, possibly dead and gone. He must have known the topography of the strait; he could hardly have lived in Athens without doing so.
How did he come to make the serious error which he undoubtedly did make? There may be differences of opinion as to the nature of the error, still more as to its cause; but as to the existence of it the topographical evidence, as well as the contemporary account of the eye-witness Æschylus, leave no reasonable doubt. The mistake does not appear, in so far as can be judged, to have existed in his original information. His account, despite the confusion inevitable to the nature of his mistake, points to its being founded on evidence which may have been in all essential particulars in accord with that of Æschylus and Diodorus. The matter has already been discussed at length in reference to the battle itself. Suffice it now to say that the most probable explanation of it is that, using his notes of information some time after they had been given him, he mistimed a movement mentioned in them, and by so doing threw his narrative out of gear.
In the Salamis story, as elsewhere, the traditional element is present in various forms. As in the case of Artemisium, the list of the ships may be founded upon an official basis.
The story of Platæa is, perhaps, the most remarkable that he wrote. How he ever arrived at the truth with regard to that scene of confused fighting must excite the wonder of every student of history. #FACTS AND JUDGMENTS.# It is plain that he was peculiarly well satisfied with his evidence, for he was not in the habit of treating at length incidents whose description rested on testimony with which he was dissatisfied, however important these incidents might be. His account of Marathon affords proof of that; and there other ominous silences in his narrative which can only have been due to lack of reliable information. His topographical evidence on Platæa is undoubtedly due to autopsy. Not merely are his direct statements on the subject marvellously correct; but the whole of the topography implied in his account of the many incidents of the battle is marvellously correct also. His information was manifestly derived from one who had fought at Platæa; and the character of the story is such as to render it possible that he not merely visited the scene of it himself, but visited in company with one who had fought there. His account exemplifies in a peculiar way both his excellences and his limitations as a military historian. His own diligent inquiry led him to make the best use possible of the evidence at his command; but that evidence was not obtained from one who was conversant with the plans of those who directed the operations, nor had the historian himself such knowledge and experience as would enable him to form sound inductions as to the nature of those plans from information of the kind which was at his disposal.
The traditional element in his account of Platæa is probably far less in proportion than that in any one of the longer sections of his history. Of official record only the list of the Greek contingents shows probable traces.
Such are the major parts of his history in which the evidence of autopsy on his part, or on the part of his sources of information, is most strikingly displayed.
One minor passage, that relating to Xerxes’ visit to the vale of Tempe, must be mentioned. The considerations on the physical geography of Thessaly, which are put into the mouth of the Great King, are almost certainly those of the historian himself, derived from his personal knowledge of the region. This view is further supported by the remark he makes on his own authority in reference to the withdrawal of the Greek force from that region, that he believes it was due to the discovery that Tempe was not the only pass into the country from the north.
With regard to the other two great battle-grounds of this period, the evidence of autopsy is doubtful Herodotus’ account of Marathon makes it probable that he had not seen the ground. His account of the battle, such as it is, is marked by certain mistaken deductions, probably his own, resting on a basis of misinformation. The remainder of it is obviously traditional in origin.
Whether Herodotus had ever seen the ground at Mykale is very doubtful. He certainly had never examined it in detail. It is, however, quite possible that some of his information with regard to it was drawn from an eye-witness.
◆Oracles.◆
Mention has already been made of certain traces of the use of official records of a secular origin. It now remains to consider those oracular responses, whose actual wording in their official written form came under his notice, whether at the place at which they were delivered, or in the city to which they were given. The great difficulty is to determine whether, in the individual cases in which he quotes oracles, his quotation is drawn from an official version, or from a version accepted by tradition. Positive cases of the latter mode of quotation are more easy to recognize than positive cases of the former; though in nearly all cases alike he gives what purports to be, and may be, the actual wording of the response. Nevertheless, the two kinds of quotation demand that the material quoted, even if identical in form, should be regarded as coming under two different classes of evidence. It must not be necessarily assumed that an oracle copied from an official record at Delphi is better historical evidence than one preserved in the memory of those to whom it was delivered. It is too probable that the opposite is the case. There are many strong reasons for the suspicion that in certain instances the hand of the editor brought the record up to date by alterations and additions made in the light of after-events. The oracles relative to Salamis are a case in point. #ORACLES.# Delphi did no doubt possess sources of information with regard to Greek politics generally, which rendered it able to give very useful advice to those who consulted it; but it is impossible to believe that either at Delphi, or anywhere else, the course of the war could have been so far calculated before the actual struggle began, as that the circumstances which made it so imperative to fight at Salamis should have been foreseen.
It is in the history of the period at which apparently this oracle was delivered, when the Greek states to which the council of defence had appealed for help were making up their minds what attitude to adopt in the coming war, that Herodotus makes most use of the evidence of oracles. There is no reason, save in the case of the Salamis oracle above mentioned, to suspect that those which he quotes are in aught but their original form. They show that Delphi had a definite policy at the time, founded upon the conviction that Athens, and Athens alone, was the goal of the Persian expedition; and even after the war was over Delphi might have argued with some show of reason, though not on the solid basis of fact, that, had its advice been followed, its conviction would have turned out true.
One other very important oracle quoted by Herodotus with reference to the history of the war, is that which was alleged to have brought about the self-sacrifice of Leonidas. From the way in which the historian mentions it, it is obvious that he did not draw it from any source independent of the tradition of the battle, to which, indeed, it supplied the main motive.
◆Traditions.◆
It is often very difficult to trace with anything approaching certainty the exact source of the various traditions which Herodotus followed in different minor sections of his history. In some cases it is only possible to make a guess at their origin; and a discussion of them, not in itself very profitable, is but too apt to lead to even less profitable results. It is quite certain, as has been already said, that in many parts of his narrative he combined information of very diverse origin and of very various value.
A statement in a sentence in the midst of a long passage oftentimes shows that its origin differs from that of its context. It is not proposed to deal with such variations of the general pattern, but to seek rather to arrive at some definite conclusion as to the “provenance” of the chief authorities lying behind the main sections of the historian’s work.
The account of the Ionian revolt is, as it would appear, drawn largely from traditional sources. It is, of course, probable that Herodotus in his early years actually talked with men who had played a part in it; but it is also probable, on the other hand, that he had not at that period of his life any formed intention of writing his history. The traditions which he followed were undoubtedly unfavourable to the Ionians. They were also defective in information. Their origin must certainly be attributed to the Asiatic coast of the Ægean; and this fact, together with these two main characteristics above mentioned, points to the Dorian Greeks of the cities of the Carian coast, of which Halikarnassos, Herodotus’ birthplace, was one, as having been mainly responsible for them.
The attitude of these Dorians at the time of the revolt would be only too calculated to make them unfavourable to those who had taken part in it. Such information as Herodotus could get from Ionian sources would be coloured by mutual recriminations, and would not, consequently, be calculated to disabuse his mind of its first impression.
Some few examples of the use of official records and inscriptions are apparent, but they are few and far between.
The Marathon story seems to be almost wholly traditional, derived from two Athenian sources of opposite tendency,—the one aristocratic, wherein the services of the Miltiades were brought into prominence, the other democratic, wherein the medizing tendencies of the Alkmæonidæ were, in so far as possible, disguised and excused. These two versions, with additions of his own, Herodotus has combined into his narrative; but there must have been a large mass of matter in both traditions which he has rejected as unreliable, probably owing to the absolute impossibility of reconciling the statements in the one version with those in the other.
#PARTIALITY OF GREEK TRADITION.#
The confused history of the wars between Athens and Ægina, one of which falls within the decade between 490 and 480, is related on the basis of an Athenian version, which the historian himself has probably edited in certain parts: but the whole tradition was so confused that he has evidently been able to make comparatively little out of it.
The sources for the period immediately preceding the war of 480 are, as might be expected in the history of a time at which many of the less prominent of the Greek states appear on the stage, of a very varied character. To the employment of the records at Delphi in this part of the historian’s work reference has been already made; but, in addition to these official records, he appears to have made use of tradition surviving at Delphi itself, especially with reference to the relations of the oracle with Athens at that particular time.
The main basis of his account of the negotiations with Gelo and of the events in Sicily in the period immediately succeeding them is a tradition which was current throughout European Greece, whose manifest tendency was to exclude the Sicilian tyrant from all participation, direct or indirect, in the struggle for Hellenic freedom. He expressly mentions, indeed, that there was a Sicilian version which differed from it in certain respects; but he evidently attached but little importance to it. That he made a mistake in his choice of authority there can be little doubt; but, apart from the natural predisposition of one who knew the tale of tyranny on the Asiatic coast, and had every reason to dislike it, the Greek version had probably taken firm root by the time at which he collected his materials. The Sicilian version, with its probable exaggerations, is preserved in Diodorus.
In discussing the attitude of Argos at this time, he expressly reproduces two traditions, giving his preference to that of local Argive origin. The other was probably that which was carried current among the Greeks who had been patriotic, though certain details in it suggest that it was originally from an Athenian source; and part of it originated more than thirty years after the war, at the time of the negotiations which led to the mysterious Peace of Kallias.[233]
The tale of the negotiations with Corcyra, as well as of Corcyra’s attitude at the time of Salamis, rests on a tradition which was in all probability current among all the patriot Greeks. Corcyra was never popular. The social Greek hated its individualism as a state in the Hellenic world.
The tradition which Herodotus reproduces relating to the motives which prompted the advice given by Themistocles to the Athenians regarding the mines at Laurion is all part of that Themistocles legend which he has consistently followed. Its origin has been already attributed to the aristocratic party in Athens.
The absence of any attempt to tone down the picture drawn of the medism of the Northern states points to the fact that the materials for it were furnished by tradition current among the patriot Greeks.
The tale of Thermopylæ is one of the few stories of greater length in the history in which the traditional element is homogeneous throughout. The actual facts of the fighting were probably obtained from examination of the ground, combined with the evidence of eye-witnesses. But the whole motive of the story—the causes, that is to say, which produced these facts—was drawn from a tradition, one and indivisible, and that tradition was of Lacedæmonian origin. It was more than that; it was no popular tale, but an official version of events. It became pan-Hellenic, for the very good reason that the extraordinary circumstances of the battle did not render the existence of any other version possible. It would be mere repetition of a long argument to recapitulate the reasons for this view: they have been already stated in dealing with the account of the battle itself. The oracular element contained in it was quite sufficient to prejudice Herodotus in its favour; but even he does not seem to have been satisfied with the reasons put forward for leaving Leonidas to his fate; and he was evidently in doubt as to the true facts of what occurred on the last day of the defence of the pass.
The tale of Artemisium would appear to have been drawn from two sources, both of them Athenian. #PERSIAN SOURCES.# The Themistocles legend of aristocratic origin is interwoven with a pan-Athenian version, whose object was to emphasize in every possible way the services of Athens to the national cause at this period of the war, and the many difficulties she encountered in combating the fatal policy of withdrawal to the Isthmus.
The same pan-Athenian tradition, combined with the Themistocles legend, shows itself in the account of the events between Artemisium and the actual fighting at Salamis.
Alike in the accounts of Thermopylæ and Salamis, descriptions are given of events which occurred on the Persian side; even discussions which took place in the Persian Council of War are reported in what profess to be the actual words used. The latter may be dismissed with the remark that they are instances in which the dramatic instinct got the better of the historical sense of the historian. But it is impossible to say that the matter in the description and discussions is wholly unhistorical. The prominence of Artemisia in one of them suggests that it is founded on a Halikarnassian tradition of his own day. The remainder may rest partly on traditions carried back to Asia by Greeks who were with Xerxes’ army. Herodotus himself, who had relations with Persians in high positions in later times, may have derived incidental information from them. But these Persian tales in his history of the war must be regarded as indicating only the drift of the truth.
The tale of Salamis, in so far as it is not founded on notes from a personal narrative, suggests an origin in pan-Hellenic tradition. The credit given to the Æginetan on the one side, and to the Ionians on the other, can only have been the outcome of general consent. No doubt, the more or less personal details of the fighting are drawn from a variety of sources, Ionian, Halikarnassian, Athenian, and what not; and the tale of the would-be Corinthian cowardice shows unmistakably the traces of the cloven foot of later Athenian enmity.
The comparative briefness of the tale of Mykale suggests that Herodotus had not the opportunity of getting much information with regard to that important battle. As it stands, it presents no certain trace of origin, but is probably the version of the story which was generally current in Greece. Despite its brevity, it is, in contrast with the story of Marathon, one which raises no difficulties. The evidence was not evidently large in quantity; but, such as it is, it has all the appearance of having been sound. It affords, moreover, another example of that fact, to which reference has been already made on several occasions, that Herodotus did not write history on the basis of testimony with which he was not satisfied.
The view adopted in this volume on the right use of Herodotus’ work as a basis for history is not likely to commend itself to extremists. It is perhaps due to the strong personality of the old historian that his critics have at all times shown a tendency to divide themselves into two camps, one of which champions not merely his honesty, but his absolute accuracy, while the other bitterly assails both. In a work so great and so extensive as his, it is almost inevitable that the amount of accuracy obtained in various parts of it should vary very greatly. The multiplicity, too, of his sources of information would necessarily promote the same tendency.
As an historian he has suffered alike from his admirers and detractors. He has been credited with a kind of inspiration. He has been decried as a forger of history. It would be waste of time to discuss views so extreme. Any one acquainted with the conditions under which his history must have been composed will understand the ♠impossibility of attaining complete accuracy under such circumstances. Any one who takes the trouble to examine the proofs of the charges of forgery brought against him will know that they have often been founded on mistaken premisses, and are in no single instance convincing.
♠ “impossibilty” replaced with “impossibility”
But there is an intermediate attitude taken towards his work by a certain section of the learned world, about which a few words must be said. #MODERN CRITICISM.# There is a widespread tendency to adopt the view that, whatever the inaccuracies contained in his writings, they represent the high-watermark of knowledge attainable at the present day concerning the period of Greek history of which he wrote; and that, therefore, fertile criticism of his work aiming at any reconstruction of the story is impossible. Such reconstructions are, moreover, frequently stigmatized as attempts to read the ideas of the nineteenth century after Christ into the history of the fifth century before Christ. A charge, of the kind can only be founded on the assumption that Herodotus was qualified not merely to record the acts of the men of the period of which he wrote, but to appreciate to the full the ideas and motives which produced the acts of those who were presumably the most skilled men of their day in special departments of life.
The evidence which is given in this volume, with respect at least to the military history of this period, does not support such an assumption. Putting aside detail, the general conclusions to which it points are three in number:—
1. The extraordinary accuracy of statements of fact in Herodotus;
2. His lack of information as to the motives of those in command;
3. His lack of experience such as might have enabled him to form deductions as to those motives.
If the evidence on which the first of these conclusions is founded be held to justify it, it is not too much to assert that the modern world is provided with the means of forming a sound judgment as to the causes underlying the history of the most critical years of the fifth century.
The debt of civilization to Herodotus does not require exaggeration.
INDEX.
A
Abæ, 349, 436
Abdera, 220
Abydos, 110, 213 _n._, 214 ff., 217, 253, 272, 418, 430, 530 f.
Acarnania, 241
Achæans, 226, 229 _n._
Achæmenes, 344
Achæmenids (family of), 33, 38, 41, 83
Achaia, 379
Achaia, Phthiotis, 259, 279
Acilius Glabrio, 260 _n._, 264 _n._
Adeimantos, 328, 329, 364 f., 368, 405
Adramyttion, 217
Æakes, 129 f., 134
Ægaleos, Mt., 372, 375, 385, 392, 398 _n._, 452
Ægina, Æginetans (wars with Athens), 53, 77, 154 ff., 158 _n._, 202, 204, 205, 240, 320, 353, 354 and _n._, 355 _n._, 362, 365 f., 367 f., 373, 376, 378, 388, 389, 393, 397, 400, 401, 405, 406, 431, 433, 469 _n._, 514–516 and _n._, 562, 577
Ægospotami, 532
Ægosthena, 446
Ænianians, 226, 229 _n._
Ænos, 218
Æolian Greeks, 51, 91, 137, 140, 218, 219
Æschines, 162
Æschylus, 354 _n._, 369 ff., 377 and rest of chap. ix. _passim_, especially 391, 392, 394, 397, 570
Ætolia, 241, 260 _n._, and 262 _n._, 263 _n._
Africa. African, 425
Agathyrsi, 58
Agora, 218
Agrieliki, Mt., 163 ff., 174
Akanthos, 152, 220, 221
Akragas [Agrigentum], 246, 254, 423, 427 f.
Alamana Bridge, 279 f., 284 f.
Aleuadæ, 207, 227 f., 230 _n._, 252
Alexander (of Macedonia), 68, 231, 257, 436 ff., 476 and _n._, 488, 546
Alexander the Great, 426
Alkmæonidæ, 23, 77, 157, 166 ff., 175, chap. iv. _passim_, 201 _n._, 202, 307, 574
Alpenos (oi), 290 f., 300, 303, 311 _n._, 312
Alyattes, 14, 18, 19
Amanus, Mt., 426
Amasis, 36
Amathus, 101 ff.
Ambrakiots, 354 _n._, 469 _n._
Amompharetos, 487, 492, 499, 504, 510, 516, 520
Amorges, 115
Amphictyony, 262, 284 f., 569
Amphipolis, 66, 116
Amphissa, 348 ff.
Amyntas, 68
Anaktorians, 469 _n._
Anaua, 213
Anaxandros, 295
Anaxilas, 254 _n._
Androkrates, Temenos of, 464, 465 ff.; site, 466 _n._, 470, 497
Andros, 374, 412 ff., 417, 419, 562
Anopæa, 268, 269 _n._, 271 _n._, chap. vii. _passim_ (descn., 300 ff.), 542
Antandros, 56, 69, 217
Anthele, 280–284, 296 _n._
Anticyra, 280 f.
Antigonus, 263 _n._
Antiochus, 264 _n._
Aphetæ, 320 _n._, 326 ff., 342, 343, 569
Apidanos, R., 259
Apollonia, 51
Apotripi Springs, 454, 465 ff., 470, 478 _n_., 505, 506
Aráchova, 350
♠ “Arachova” replaced with “Aráchova”
Arcadia, 273, 306, 444, 567
Arderikka, 192
Ardys, 12
Argilos, 220
Argiopian country, 494 ff., 499
Argos, Argolis, 226, 235, 237, 240, 243 f., 250 _n._, 253, 351, 353, 379, 444, 545, 565, 567, 575
Ariamnes, 404
Aristagoras, 47, 78, chap. iii. _passim_, 159, 299
Aristides, 202, 386, 388 ff., 403, 461, 470, 496, 547
Aristocratic traditions, 170, 175, 203
Aristodemos, 274 f., 312
Aristomenes, 12
Aristophanes, 170, 179 _n._, 523, 563
Aristotle, 175, 177 f., 255, 358, 420
Artabanos, 209, 217 f.
Artabazos, 428 ff., 475, 476 _n._, 508, 514, 518, 546
Artaphernes, 42, 69, 74, 76, 78 ff., chap. iii. _passim_, 147 ff., 159, 201 _n._
Artaphernes (younger), 160, chap. iv. _passim_, 200
Artauktes, 531 ff.
Artemisia, 113 _n._, 220, 374, 402 f., 410, 577
Artemisium, 265 f., 270, 271, 276, 298, chap. viii. _passim_, 351, 353 f., 355, 358, 359, 374, 383, 404, 441 _n._, 538, 541, 562, 569, 576 f.
Artybios, 105
Asea, 444
Asia Minor, Geographical, 7, 13
Asopos, R., Bœotia, 448 and chap. xi. _passim_, especially 470 and _n._, 473
Asopos, R., Malis, 260 ff., 277 ff., 299 ff., 345 f., 348
Assyria, 8 f., 10, 12, 14–16, 39
Astyages, 16, 17
Atalanta, 261, 279, 309, 346, 349
Atarneus, 140 f., 217
Athens, Athenians,
Ægina, 53, 98, 154 f., 158 _n._, 202, 240, 562, 574 f.
Army, 431, 461, 468, 469 _n._, at Platæa, 500 ff., 503 ff., 519; at Mykale, 527, 529–532
Constitutional, 174 ff., 389, 431
Fleet, 93, 198, 203 ff., 237, 265, 270 f., 320, 337, 351, 354, 355, 365, 368, 393, 405, 552 f.
General, Delphi, 232, 240, 262 _n._; siege, 356 ff., 436 ff., 530, 545
Internal politics, 76 f., 166 ff., 199, 201 ff., 388, 416, 419, 563
Ionian revolt, 92–98, 133, 167
Persia, 72, 74, 76, 77 f., 81, chap. iv., 214, 224 ff., 232, 241 f., 357, 546
Strategy, 270 f., 275, 359 f., 523, 549, 550 f.
Trade, 367
Athenian sources, 54, 98, 155, chap. iv., 319, chap. viii. _passim_, 321, 324, 340, 341, 405, 477, 491 f., 508 _n._, 510, 563, 567, 574, 575, 576
Athos, Mt., 151, 153, 212, 221
Atossa, 72
Attaginos, 517
Attica, 159, 162, 234 f., 353, 355, 356, 358, 372, 444, 445, 526, 549
Atyadæ, 6
Avlona (valley), 164 f., 174, and chap. iv. _passim_
Axios, R., 221
B
Bactrians, 418
Bakchylides, 28
Bithynia, 18, 60
Bœotia, Bœotians, 77, 228, 229 and _n._, 231, 252, 257, 262 _n._, 275, 346 f.; routes, 346, 347, 350, 374, 407, 410, 439, 440, 445, and chap. xi. _passim_ (especially 452, 455, 471, 477, 498, 505, 507, 512, 513, 519 ff.), 527, 544, 547, 549
Bosphorus, 50, 115
Boudenitza 265, 276, 346
Branchidæ [Temple of the], 22, 89
Brennus, 262 _n._, 265, 268 _n._, 281
Brygi, 150 f.
Bury, Prof., 357 _n._, 389, 390 _n._
Busolt, 155 _n._
Byzantion, 49, 50 _n._, 51 _n._, 56, 69, 99, 120 f., 135, 145, 518
C
Cadmus, 254 _n._
Cambunian Mts., 231, 257
Cambyses, 36 f., 55, 255, 538
Cappadocia, 213
Caria, 18, 29, 31, 91, 99 ff., chap. iii. _passim_, 219, 338
Carrhæ, 426
Carthage, Carthaginians, 131, 245 ff., 254 ff. _n._, 355, 421–428, 523, 540
Cenchrea, 379
Chabrias, 456 _n._
Chæronea, 347, 544
Chalkidike, 151, 429
Chalkis, 77, 134, 162, 265, 277, 320, 323 ff., 331, 332 and _n._, 342 f.; route, 347, 354 _n._, 469 _n._
Charadra, 163 f. and chap. iv. _passim_
Charopinos, 94
Chileos, 442
Chilon, 344
Chios, 30, 83, 118, 120, 125, 129, 136 ff., 433, 530
Chronology, 107 f., 111, 114; revolt, chap. iii. _passim_, and 142–144, 151, 172 f., 197 _n._, 198, 203 _n._, 229, 235, 237, 239, 240, 250, 251, 253 _n._, 271 f., 272 _n._, 319 f., 320 _n._, 330 f., 332 and _n._, 342, 343, 377, 388, 390 _n._, 417, 427, 448
Cilicia, Cilicians, 106, 123, 148, 160, 219, 336 _n._, 343, 393, 402
Cimmerians, 10, 12
Clinton (Fasti), 203 _n._
Constantine, 515
Constantinople, 515
Corcyra, 240 ff., 355 and _n._, 369 _n._, 576
Corinth, 21, 37, 77, 78, 205, 241, 270, 273, 306, 320, 328, 329, 339, 354 _n._, 355, 364 f., 367 f., 389 f., 398 _n._, 405, 469 _n._; at Platæa, 506, 517, 528, 535, 543, 563 f.
Cornelius Nepos, 184 _n._
Corsica, 131
Creasy, Sir Edward, 407
Crete, Cretans, 235, 237, 240, 242
Crœsus, 18–28, 55, 97, 214, 349
Croiset, 362
Cyaxares, 15
Cyclades, 82
Cyprus, 36, 99 _n._, 100 ff., 123, 125, 219, 393, 402
Cyrene, 74, 75
Cyrus, 16, 17, 33
D
Dardanos, 110, 217
Darius (special references), organization, 39 ff.; policy, 58, 148 f., 160, 201 _n._; last years and death, 200, 201, 205, 206, 362
Daskylian satrapy, 428
Datis, 160 ff., chap. iv. _passim_, 200
Daulis, 349
Daurises, 110 ff., 115
Dekeleia, 448, 449
Delbrück, 210 _n._, 267 _n._
Delian League, 530
Delos, 161, 433, 524, 529
Delphi, Delphic Oracle, 11, 14, 22, 25–27, 77, 197; war, 232–240, 242, 243, 244, 246 f., 262, 305, 307, 347, 348; topography, 349 f., 353, 356, 419, 514, 515, 567, 572 f., 575
Demaratos, 77, 154 f., 220, 296, 344 f.
Demarete, 428
Demokedes, 72 f.
Demophilos, 306
Demosthenes, 262 _n._
Diodorus, 27, 228 ff. _n._, 244, 250; sources, 250 _n._; 251, 255 f., 272, 275, 294, 329, 330 _nn._, 334, 336 _n._, 337, 357, 369 ff.; sources, 373, 377, chap. ix., 378 onwards _passim_ (especially 388, 392, 393, 394, 404, 406, 421–428), 498; on Platæa (518, 519 _n._), 570, 575
Dionysios (of Phokæa), 31, 126 ff., 334 _n._
Dionysios (of Halikarnassos), 203
Dirphys, Mt., 453
Dolonki, 145
Dolopians, 226, 229 _n._
Dorians (of Asia), 18, 29, 31, 99, 219, 220, 561, 574
Doris, Dorians, 257, 261, 264 _n._, 267 _n._, 302, 345 f., 348 and _n._, 374, 567
Doriskos, 212, 218, 220
Drakospilia (old), 301, 303
Drakospilia (new), 303–305, 307, 309 f., 312 _n._
Dryoskephalæ, 356, 447–449 452, and chap. xi. _passim_ (especially 475, 493 _n._)., 538
Dyras, R., 278 ff., 281
E
Eclipses, 15, 217 and _n._, 443 _n._
Egypt, Egyptians, 24, 32, 35, 36, 46, 74, 75, 123, 201 f., 205, 209, 211, 214, 219, 381 and _n._, 387, 523, 538
Eion, 212, 220, 419
Elatæa, 265, 276, 346
Eleusinian Demeter, temple of, site, 494 ff., 503, 507, 508, 520
Eleusis, 352, 371, 375, 385, 391, 447, 452 and _n._, 549
Eleutheræ, 447, 452 _n._, 456 _n._, 465 _n._
Elis, Eleians, 513, 514
Enneahodoi, 220
Epaminondas, 195
Ephesus, 14, 94, 98, 101, 108, 122, 125, 130, 535
Ephoros, 197 _n._, 249, 250 _n._, 254 _n._ f., 294 f., 518 _n._
Epialtes, 268, 299 f., 310, 569
Epidaurus, 320, 354 _n._, 469 _n._
Epirus, 241
Eretria, 72, 94, 98, 142 ff. (_i.e._ chap. iv. _passim_), 320, 336 _n._, 354 _n._. 434, 469 _n._
Eryihræ (Asia), 125
Erythræ (Bœotia), 447, 449 _n._; site, 458 and _n._, 459 ff., 465 _n._, 467 _n._, 512, 518 _n._
Ethiopia, 38
Eubœa, 82, 161 f., 183, 257, 263 _n._, 265, 318, and chap. viii. _passim_; “Hollows,” 335 and _n._, 343, 374, 384, 453, 538
Euesperides, 74
Euphrates, 426
Euripus, 162, 228, 261, 264, 265, 269, 276, 277, chap. viii. _passim_, 347, 542
Eurybiades, 320, 328 ff., 355, 362 ff., 376, 389, 413, 543, 545 f.
Euxine (colonies), 54, 56, 57
Euxine (Sea), 58, 120, 145, 215 _n._
Evænetos, 229, 231
Evalkides, 98
G
Gargaphia Spring, 454, 463, 465 ff.; site, 465 _n._; 470, 478 and _n._, 480, 485, 489, 499
Gauls, 262 _n._, 267 _n._, 281, 288
Gaumata, 38
Gelo, 240, 244–256, 355, 421–428, 575
Geraneia, Mt., 369, 375, 378, 446
Getæ, 51, 59
Giona, Mt., 260
Goodwin, Professor, 370 ff.
Gorgo, 92
Gorgos, 101 f.
Gourgo-Potamo, 278 f., 282
Greeks of Asia, character, 45 ff., 85, 118; literature, 133
Greek legend in history, 32, 48
Grote, 371, 373, 385
Gyges, 10 ff.
H
Hæmus, 51
Haliartos, 544
Halikarnassos, 113 _n._, 220, 402, 561, 577
Halos, 228, 231, 259, 279, 567
Halys, 12, 13, 15, 23, 96 f., 213
Hamilcar, 254 _n._, 421–428
Harpagos, 31, 140 f., 148
Hauvette, 155 _n._, 187 _n._, 278, 362
Head [Hist. Numm.], 428
Hebros, R., 218, 221
Hecatæus, 89, 91, 116
Hegesistratos, 524
Helicon, Mt., 347, 452, 544
Hellespont [region], 18, 56, 57, 64, 83, chap. iii. _passim_, 145 and 219, 527, 530 ff.
Hellespont, 7, 212; bridge, 214 ff. and _n._, 250 _n._; wind, 324, 408, 412, 414, 418, 562
Heraklea Trachinia, 261, 263 _n._, 264 _n._, 268 _n._, 282 f., 430, 525
Herakles, Precinct of, 164, 174, 179, 181 ff., 190
Hermionians, 354 _n._, 469 _n._
_Herodotus_,
Anachronisms, 127, 156, 333 _n._
Autopsy. 213, 220, 277 ff., 313, 436, 457, 472, 569, 571 f.
Fact and motive, 85, 291 ff., 293, 306, 308, 323, 326, 338, 568
Historical element in fiction, 102 ff., 208, 218, 433 f.
Influence of his contemporaries, 292, 294, 328, 334 _n._, 345, 360, 369 _n._ 444, 515, 516, 557, 559, 563 f.
Judgments, 93, 101, 103, 125, 129, 132, 231, 244, 431, 441 _n._, 518, 529, 561, 566
Omissions, 79 f., 156, 256, 451, 538, 549 f., 559 f.
Prejudice, 80, 86, 89, 104, 115, 116, 126 ff., 137, 328, 329 _n._, 340 f., 358, 360, 362, 400, 401, 411 f., 413 f., 490 f., 501 _n._, 506, 510, 511, 516 _n._, 536, 560, 561 ff., 564
Rationalization, 16
Religion and philosophy, 55, 195 f., 209, 226, 247 f., 274, 293, 306 f., 338, 358, 562, 565
Sources of information, 53, 65, 69, 70, 80, 98, 104, 113, 125, 127 and _n._, 128 f., 146 _n._, 162 _n._, 167, 175, 197, 198, 203, 206, 210 _n._, 213, 214, 218, 219, 232, 245, 249, 254 _n._, 266 f., 273, 314, 318 f., 321, 324, 332 _n._, 344 f., 360, 373, 374, 414, 417, 428 f., 436, 457, 472, 477, 501 _n._, 508 _n._, 509, 510, 514, 516 and _n._, 560 and chap. xiv. _passim_ (especially 564 ff.)
Topography, 216, 223, 267, 277 f., 291 f., 335 _n._, 457, 468, 506 f., 559, 568
Treatment of evidence, 89, 110, 156 f., 169, 180 f., 184, 189, 190 f., 193 f., 267, 273, 332 _n._, 340 f., 373, 374, 377, 382, 383, 386, 405, 428, 457, 458, 558, 565, 567
Himera, 246, 251, 254 _n._, 422 ff.
Hipparchos, 168
Hippias, 49 _n._, 74, 77 f., 81, 92, 159, 166, 168 f., 173
Histiæa, 339, 374
Histiæotis, 257
Histiæus, 54 f., 66, 68 f., chap. iii. _passim_; character, 141–2
Hogarth, 262 _n._
Hunt, Irving, 520 _n._
Hyampolis, 262 _n._, 346, 349
Hydarnes, 196, 269 _n._, 299 f., 309, 311 _n._, 313, 317, 419
Hymeës, 110, 115
Hypata, 278
Hysiæ, 456, 459 _n._, 463, 464; site, 464 _n._, 467 _n._, 497
I
Iatragoras, 91
Ida, Mt, 216, 217 and _n._
Ilium, 217
Imbros, 69
India, Indians, 32, 418
Ionian Greeks, 51, 54 f., 102 f., 119, 124 ff., 137, 147, 148 ff., 159, 208, 213, 218, 219, 338, 339, 385, 393, 401 f., 405 f., 408, 414 _n._, 433 ff., 517, 522, 525 ff., 535, 560 f.; sources, 567, 577
Ionian revolt, 47, 48, 53, chap. iii., 146, 147, 199, 210, 242, 434, 528, 560 f., 574
Ionian Sea, 247
Isagoras, 74, 166
“Island” at Platæa. _Vide_ Nesos
Ister, 51 ff.
Isthmus (of Corinth), 226, 228, 238; defence, 253, 257, 270, 272–275, 295, 298, 351, 352, 353, 355 ff., 369, and chap. ix., _passim_ (especially 404), 440 ff., 446, 449, 451, 452, 506, 515, 541, 544, 546, 549
Italiot Greeks, 131, 255, 355, 421
Italy, 365
J
Jason (of Pheræ), 227
Justin, 184
K
Kaïkos, R., 140, 217
Kalamoi, 524
Kalauria, 353
Kalchedon, 50, 58 _n._, 56, 69, 145
Kale Akte, 134
Kallatebos, 214
Kallias, 243, 575
Kallidromos, Mt., 261, 286, 289, 312
Kallimachos, 174 ff., and chap. iv. _passim_
Kalyndos, 402
Kandili, Mt., 324; 325 _n._
Kane, 217
Kardia, 218
Karystos, 161 f., 374, 416, 417
Kasthanea, 322
Kaukasa, 83
Kaunos, 99
Kelænæ, 213
Keos, Keians, 320, 354 _n._
Keos (Salamis), 383 ff.
Kephallenia, 469 _n._
Kephisia, 164
Kephissos, R., 348
Kimon (elder), 49
Kimon (younger), 105, 198, 524, 552
Kissians, 297
Kithæron, Mt., 252, 351, 410, 443 _n._; passes of Kithæron-Parnes, 445–448, 449 _n._, 451, 453 f., chap. xi. _passim_, 527
Klazomenæ, 14, 115
Kleidemos, 519
Kleisthenes, 74, 166, 175, 177
Kleisthenes (of Sikyon), 166
Kleombrotos, 379, 443 and _n._
Kleombrotos (younger), 456 _n._
Kleomenes, 74, 76, 77, 91 ff., 154 f., 243, 253, 299
Knemis, Mt., 261
Koës, 52, 66, 91
Kokla, 484
Kolophon, 11, 14
Kolossæ, 213
Konvelo, 283
Kopais, L., 347, 351, 452, 544
Koresos, 94
Koronea, 347
Kotroni, Mt., 180
Kourion, 106
Krannon, 227, 258
Kreusis, 347, 446
Kriekouki, 446 _n._, 454, and chap. xi. _passim_
♠ “Kreikouki” replaced with “Kriekouki”
Kritalla, 213
Kroton, 73, 133 f. 354 _n._, 355
Ktesias, 52, 56, 409 _n._
Kybebe, 97
Kydrara, 214
Kyme, 14, 30, 115, 430
Kynosura (Marathon), 163, 180, 384
Kynosura (Salamis), 371, 375, 383 ff., 392 ff., 403
Kythera, 128, 344 f.
Kytinion, 349 f.
Kythnians, 354 _n._
L
Labraunda, 113 f.
Labynetos, 15
Ladé, 50 _n._, 122 _n._, 124 ff., 135, 151, 334 _n._, 406
Lamia, 258 f., 277, 279, 347
Lampon, 514
Lamponium, 56, 69
Lampsakos, 110
Larisa, 207, 258, 347
Laurion, 203, 205, 368, 562
Leake, Preface, 281 ff., 285, 291, 301 f., 310 _n._, 449 _n._, 456 _n._, 458 _n._, 466 _n._, 471 _n._. 481, 482 f., 484, 498, 520
Lebadeia, 436
Lechæum, 379
Lemnos, 69
Leonidas, 272 _n._, and chap. vii. _passim_, 329, 514, 544, 573
Leontiades, 295
Lepreans, 469 _n._
Leras, 116
Lesbos (Mytilene), 66, 69, 91, 120 f., 125, 130, 135, 137, 140 f., 530
Leukadians, 354 _n._, 469 _n._
Leuke Akte, 212
Leuktra, 195, 471 _n._, 481
Leutychides, 155, 431, chap. xii. _passim_, 548
Libya, Libyans, 38, 254 _n._, 422
Ligyes-Ligurians, 254 _n._
Limni, 325 _n._
Livy, 260 _n._, 264 _n._, 279, 335 _n._
Locri (Opuntii), 229 _n._, 231, 232, 257, 273 ff., 293, 300 and _n._, 306, 313, 320, 354 _n._, 374
Lolling, 165
Lycia, 31, 219, 393, 402
Lydia, Lydians, 5 ff., 28, 29–31, 95, 97, 166, 214, 529
Lykides, 440
Lykos, 213
Lysagoras, 196
M
Macan, Herodotus, iv., v., vi., 65 _nn._, chap. iii. various notes, 155 _n._, 161 _n._
Macedonia, 65, 70, 145 ff., 207, 212, 221, 226, 262 _n._, 268 _n._, 279, 450, 523, 533, 555, 567
Mæandrios, 37
Magna Græcia, 367
Magnesia (near Sardes), 11, 31, 37
Magnesia, Magnetes (Thessaly), 226, 229 _n._, 320 _n._, 322, 326
Malea, Cape, 355 _n._
Malene, 140
Malis, Malians, 226, 229 _n._, 257, 264 _n._, 267 _n._, 277 ff., 299, 300, 303, 320 _n._, 348 _n._, 354 _n._, 551
Mantinea, Mantineans, 273, 306, 493 _n._, 513, 514
Marathon, 50 _n._, 53, 72, 79, 145, chap. iv. _passim_; topography, 155 _n._, 204; legend, 224 f., 353, 362, 389, 407, 415, 476, 511, 535, 560, 574
Mardonius [expedition of 492], 48, 148 ff., 159, 206–208, 211, 219, 407, 409 f., chap. x. _passim_, chap. xi. _passim_; death, 502, 503, 515, 545 ff., 549 ff.
Marengo, 513
Marsyas, R., 113 and _n._ f.
Masistios, 461 f., 488, 519
Mausolos, 113 _n._
Mavra-neria, 278, 282
Mazares, 30, 31
Media, Medes, 15, 219, 297, 418, 426
Medism, 166 ff., 201, 207, 226 ff., 270, 272, 275 f., 294, 347 f., 439 f., 444, 450, 505, 516 f., 530, 547 f., 550
Megabates, 83 ff.
Megabazos 64 ff.
Megara, Megareans, 262 _n._, 320, 354 _n._, 365, 366, 368, 378, 387, 393, 445, 446, 448, 449, 456, 461, 469 _n._, 507, 519, 564
Megistios, 306, 313
Mekistos, Mt., 324 _n._, 453
Melas, R., 218
Melas, R. (Malis), 278 f., 293
Mesembria, 51
Mesembria (on N. Ægean), 220
Messenia, 442 _n._
Metiochos, 146
Miletus, 14, 29, 37, 54, 80, chap. iii. _passim_, 168, 526, 528
Miltiades, 49, 52 f. (trial), 55, 56, 145, chap. iv. _passim_, 195–199, 204
Mnesiphilos, 363 ff., 562
Moloeis, R., 494 ff., 499
Munro, 155 _n._, 172 _n._
Munychia, 385, 395 _n._
Murmex, 324 f.
Mykale, 124, 130, 163 f., 184 _n._, 267, chap. xii. first part _passim_, 551, 555, 561, 572, 577 f.
Mykenæ, 273, 306, 469 _n._
Mykonos, 197 _n._
Mylassa, 113, 115
Myrkinos, 66, 68 f., 116 f.
Mysia, 18, 115, 217
Mytilene. _Vide_ Lesbos
Myus, 125
N
Nabonidus, 16, 24, 27, 32
Naxos, 47, 69, 81–89, 158, 161, 354 _n._
Nebuchadrezzar, 15, 16
Neokles, 456 _n._
“Nesos” at Platæa, 466 _n._, 472, 479; site, 480–487, 488, and rest of chap. xi. _passim_ (especially 507, 519)
Nicæa, 262 _n._
Nikias, 345
O
Oarus, 52
Œroë, R., 450, 454, 455 _n._, 467, 480, 481, 484 ff.
Œta, Mt., 226, 227, 232, 252, chap. vii. _passim_; description, 257 ff., 345 f., 452, 542, 551
Œtæans, 261, 264 _n._, 300 _n._, 348 _n._
Olympia, 514, 515
Olympos, Mt., 221, 228; passes, 231
Olynthos, 429 f.
Onesilos, 101 f.
Onomakritos, 206
Orchomenos [Arcadia], 273, 469 _n._
Orchomenos [Bœotia], 346
Orestheion, 442 _n._, 444, 452
Orœtes, 37, 39
Oropos, 162
Ossa, Mt., 221
Otanes, 65, 69 f., 71, 76, 83, 110, 115, 148, 219
Othrys, Mt., 258, 303
P
Pæeonians, 66 ff., 93
Pagæ, 446, 448
Pagasætic Gulf, 228, 321 ff.
Paisos, 110
Paktyas, 30
Pallene, 429
Pamphylia, 100, 109, 125, 219, 393, 402
Pan, Cave of, 190
Panakton, 445, 447
Pangæus, Mt., 70, 220
Panormos, 422
Panopeus, 356
Parapotamii, 346, 349, 356
Parasopia, 449 _n._, 455
Parnassus, Mt., 348 ff., 452, 471
Parnes, Mt., 351, _Vide_ Kithæron
Paros, 196 ff., 201, 205, 416 f.
Pausanias (Sparta), 105, 443, and chap. xi. _passim_, 548, 555
Pausanias (author), 165, 190, 192 and _n._, 262, 265, 267 _n._, 281, 286, 288, 306, 312, 355 _n._, 448, 449 _n._, 456 _n._, 459 _n._, 463 _n._, 465 _n._, 485, 496, 497, 515, 520
Pedasos, 114 ff., 119, 123, 134
Peisistratidæ, 158, 201, 206, 307
Peisistratos, 166, 168
Peloponnesus, Peloponnesians, strategy, 232; hegemony, 243; strategy, 270 ff., 298, 321, 329, 344, 351, 359, 379, 391, 514, 530
Peloponnesian League, 78, 154 _n._, 544
Peloponnesian War, 273, 334 _n._, 345
Peneius, R., 221, 231, 321
Perikles, 157, 176
Perinthos, 65, 145, 212
Perkote, 110
Perrhæbi, 226, 229 _n._
Persia, Persians, 16; civilization, 33–35; organization, 39 ff., 82, 147, 211, 222, 249; army, 44, 49, 50, 109, 113, 121, 160 (Marathon), 184 _n._, 186, 200 (B.C. 480), 210 f., 211 _n._, 217, 218 f.; policy, 58 f., 64, 66, 146 and _n._, 147 ff., 153, 158, 208, 218, 232 ff., 249, 411; fleet, 50, 101, 151, 153 f., 160, 204 (B.C. 480), 218 ff., 222, 276, 374, 406, 430, 524; strategy, 368, 406, 409 f., 451, 471, 540; army, 222, 374, 554; policy, 449 ff., 535; fleet, 538; organization, 537 f.; sources, 577
Phalæcus, 262 _n._
Phalara, 259
Phaleron, 186, 190 ff., 374, 376 ff., 404, 412, 545
Philaid family, 146
Philip of Macedon, 262 _n._, 268 _n._
Philip of Macedon (younger), 263 _n._
Philippides, 172, 173
Philius, 273, 306, 469 _n._, 507
Phocis, Phocians, 257, 262 _n._, 265, 273, 274 ff.; wall, 287–289, 293, 299 ff., 345 ff., 347 f., 450, 471, 477, 508
Phœnicia, Phœnicians, 35, 36, 99 ff., 119, 129, 131 ff., 145 f., 214, 219, 249, 250, 254, 255 f., 373, 385, 393, 397, 400, 402, 405 f., 523, 524, 525
Phœnix, R., 280–284
Phokæa, 31, 125, 126 ff.
Phormio, 395, 398 _n._
Phrygia, 6, 7, 10, 213
Phrynichos, 133, 167
Phyle, 447
Pieria, 220, 272, 292
Pindar, 167, 249, 254 _n._
Pindus, Mt., 241, 258
Piræus, 371, 374, 375, 385
Platæa, 163, 179 ff., 184 _n._, 211, 230, 267, 320, 356, 407, 410, 418, 427, chap. xi. _passim_ (especially 469 _n._, site of town, 489 _n._), 526, 527, 537, 538, 554 f., 568, 579 f.
Pliny, 525
Plutarch, 95, 100, 173 _n._, 204, 205, 294 f., 358, 362, 369 ff., 388, 392, 398, 467 _n._, 468 _n._, 496, 497 f., 519, 520 _n._, 521
Pogon, 353 _n._
Poikilé Stoa, 190
♠ “Poikile” replaced with “Poikilé”
Polichne, 137
Polybius, 216, 263 _nn_.
Polykrates, 35–37, 55, 72
Potidæa, 429 ff., 469 _n._
Potniæ, 496
Prasias, Lake, 67 and _n._, 68
Priene, 14, 31, 125
Propontis, 64, 70, 99, 107, 214
Pseudo-Smerdis, 38, 148
Psyttaleia, 372 ff., 375, 382, 384, 385, 392 ff., 403
Pteria, 15, 27
Ptoon, Mt., 436, 453
Pythios, 213
R
Rawlinson, 282
Rhegion, 254 _n._
Rheitoi, 452
Rhodope, Mt., 220
Rhoetion, 217
Romans, 268 _n._
Routes, Ephesus to Sardes, 94; Ægean, 35, 153; Marathon, 164 f., 174; Asia Minor, 213 ff.; Thrace, 220, 221; North Greece, 221 f.; Thessaly, 231; North Greece, 232; Greece to Sicily, 241; Mount Othrys, 258 f.; Thessaly, 258 f.; Mount Œta, 260, 261; Delphi, 262; road through Thermopylæ, 288–289; Thermopylæ to Thebes, 345 f.; Thermopylæ to Delphi, 349, 350; Schiste, 349; Thermopylæ-Phocis, 349 _n._; Bœotia, 356; Geraneia, 378; Ægean, 431; North Ægean, 437; Lakonia, 442 _n._; Peloponnese, 444; Attica and Bœotia, 445–448; Kreusis to Isthmus and Megara, 446; Platæa-Megara, 446 and _n._; Platæa-Athens, 446 f.; Thebes-Eleusis-Athens, 447; Thebes-Phyle-Athens, 447 f.; Athens-Dekeleia-Bœotia, 448; South Bœotia, 448; Eleutheræ-Eleusis-Athens, 452 _n._; Platæa-Athens, 456 _n._; Platæa-Megara, 456 _n._; Thespiæ-Dryoskephalæ, 460; Dryoskephalæ-Thebes, 462; Platæa-Thebes, 467 _n._; Leuktra to Dryoskephalæ, 505; Platæa-Megara, 515
S
Sakæ, 57, 189, 219, 418
Salamis (Cyprus), 101 ff., 577
Salamis (Attica), 205, 236, 238 f., 251, 267, 352, chap. ix. _passim_; topography, 375 ff., 408–412, 419, 431, 434, 440, 441 _n._, 443 _n._, 452, 508, 516, 518, 522; general strategy, 544 ff., 561, 570
Salmydessos, 51
Samos, Samians, 31, 35–37, 51 _n._, 81, 106, 125 ff., 161, 401, 430, 433, 522 f., 534 f., 529, 530
Samothrace, 218, 220, 400, 406
Sandokes, 327
Sardes, 25, 27, 30, 68, 69 f., 70, 74, 82, 94 f., 108, 213 f., 228, 240, 535, 537
Sardinia, 116, 118, 254 _n._, 422
Saromata, Mt., 303
Saronic Gulf, 253, 352, 538, 545
Sarpedon, 218
Salræ, 220
Scythians, 10, 57, 145
Scythian expedition, 48 ff., 70, 72, 75, 85, 146 _n._, 209, 210, 415, 535
Selinus, 424
Selymbria, 145
Sepias, 322, 323 ff., 342, 374
Seriphians, 354 _n._
Sestos, 56, 215, 218, chap. xii. latter part. 538, 551
Sicily, 131, 134, 244–256, 321, 355, 367, 421–428, 540, 567, 575
Sideroporto, 263 _n._, 264, 268 _n._, 282
Sidon, 73, 219
Sigeon, 49 _n._, 78
Sikinnos, 379
Sikyon, 320, 354 _n._, 469 _n._, 528
Simonides, 313
Siphnians, 354 _n._
Siris, 365, 369 _n._
Sisimakes, 115
Skiathos, 318, 321 f., 331, 335 _n._, 342, 384
Skione, 429
Skironid Way, 378
Skolopœis, 525
Skolos, 449 and _n._, 463, 496
Skopadæ, 227
Skyllias, 331, 343
Smerdomenes, 219
Smyrna, 14
Soli, 106
Soros (at Marathon), 165 ff.
Spaniards, 425
Sparta, 25, 29, 37, 76, 91 ff., 154 f. and _n._, 159, 168, 172 f., 182, 193, 220, 225 f.; Tempe 229, 231, 237, 240; Argos, 243; Sicily, 245, 252; Argos, 253; Sicily, 254 _n._; strategy, 271; Thermopylæ, chap. vii. _passim_; people and government, 315; fleet, 320, 344, and North Greece, 348 _n._; fleet, 354 and _n._, 385, 401, 420, 433, 438; policy, 440 ff.; army, 442 and _n._, 443, 456, 469 _n._; at Platæa, 492 ff.; army, 493; at Platæa, 498 ff., 508, 512 ff.; at Mykale, 527 ff.; characteristic, 530, 531, 541; strategy, 549; sources, 567, 569 _n._, 576
Spercheios, R., 258, 263 _n._, chap. vii. _passim_
Sphendale, 449
Stagiros, 220
Stamata, 164
Stein, 282, 389, 443 _n._
Stentoris, Lake, 218
Stesenor, 106
Stesilaos, 190
St. George Island, 371 f., 375, 384, 386, 405
Strabo, 23, 52, 106 _n._, 113, 215, 283, 335 _n._, 525
Strategic questions, Artemisium, 318, 331 f.
Attica. 440, 445
Bœotia, 544
Cyprus, 105
Eubœa, 265
General, 113, 124, 153, 157, 266 f., 267 _n._, 298 f., 321, 351, 359 ff., 365, 406, 409 f., 413, 415, 416, 422, 432, 437, 449 ff., 462, 522, 524, chap. xiii. _passim_
Greece, 159, 171 f. (Marathon), 178, 179 ff., 185, 193, 226
Hellespont, 530
Isthmus, 378
Kithæron-Parnes, 445–448, 450, 451
North Greece, 268
Œne, 447
Peloponnesian, 270 ff.
Peloponnesus, 345, 444
Persian, 344 f.
Platæa, 473 ff., 476 _n._, 488, 492, 510, 511
Platæa town, 446
Salamis, 352, 380 f., 386
Thebes, 347
Thermopylæ, 263 ff., 269, 298, 316
Thermopylæ and Artemisium, 543
Thessaly, 230 _n._, 232, 541
Thracian Chersonese, 531
West Asia, 7, 13, 90, 96, 105, 112
Strattis, 433
Stryme, 220
Strymon, 66 ff., 72, 120, 136, 139, 212, 220, 221
Stylida, 259, 327 _n._
Styreans, 320, 354 _n._, 469 _n._
Suidas, 179 _n._, 183 _n._, 184 _n._
Sunium, Cape, 181 ff., 190, 376
Susa, 69, 72, 75, 76, 102 f., 109, 121, 141, 149, 243, 537
Sybaris, 133 f., 369 _n._
Syloson, 37
Synetos, 229 _n._
Syracuse, 244 ff., 421–428
Syria, 219
Syrtis, Greater, 255
T
Tabalos, 30
Tacitus, 62, 63, 149 _n._
Tactics and equipment, 92, 126, 129 f.; Marathon, 183 ff., 193, 195, 208, 269 _n._, 270 f., 297, 299, 322, 334 and _n._; Salamis, 386, 394, 396, 399, 400, 425–427, 437, 441, 442, 462, 473 ff., 477, 478, 500, 501, 502, 508, 510, 512 ff., 525, 528, chap. xiii. _passim_
Tanagra, 448, 449, 451 _n._
Tanais, 52
Tarentum, 73
Taurus Mountains, 7 f., 12, 15, 24, 426
Tearos, 51
Tegea, Tegeans, 273, 306, 468, 469 _n._, 471, 494, 500, 502, 509
Tempe, Vale of, 221, 228 and _n._ and ff., 231 f., 235, 252, 253 ff., 257, 271 _n._, 279, 294, 541, 571
Tenedos, 141, 146
Tenos, 161, 374, 389
Teos, 125
Terillos, 246, 254 _n._
Thasos, 137, 139, 141, 152, 220
Thaumaki, 258 f., 279, 298, 453
Thebes, 179, 273, 293; attitude at Thermopylæ, 294–296, 306, 308 f., 313, 314, 347, 356, 439, 445, 447, 448, 451, 456, chap. xi. _passim_ (especially 476, 505, 512, 516 ff., 518 _n._), 527, 546
Thebes in Pthiotis, 258, 279
Themistocles, 203 ff., 229 _n._, 231, 236, 238 f., 270, 328 ff., 337 ff., 343, 352 and rest of chap. ix. _passim_ (especially 358, 359 ff., 368, 369 _n._, 391). 411 ff., 417, 419 f., 431, 543 ff., 561 ff.
Theomestor, 401
Theopompos, 156
Therma, town sand gulf, 151, 221, 228, 319, 320 _n._, 321 f., 327 _n._, 331
Thermopylæ, 128, 163, 223, 227, 229, 232, chap. vii. _passim_; description, 277 ff., 318 ff., 320 _n._, 323, 328 f., chap. viii. _passim_. 345 ff., 351, 374, 441, 514, 516, 541 ff., 568; sources, 569 _n._, 576
Thero, 246, 254 _n._, 423
Thespiæ, 273, 293, 306, 308 f., 313, 314, 356, 460
Thesprotis, 287
Thessaly, 207, 221, 223, 226 f., 229 _n._, 239, 252, 257 f., 271, 272, 276, 287, 298, 299, 346 ff., 347 f., 359, 369, 384, 410, 417, 419, 437, 439, 450, 453, 472, 516 f., 518, 541, 546, 566
Thirlwall. 55
Thrace, Thracians, 50, 60, 64 ff., 69, 93 f., 118, 120, 136, 141, 145 ff., 218–220, 418, 450, 532, 551
Thracian Chersonese, 49, 54, 65, 145 f., 218, 531
Thriasian Plain, 166, 441, 447, 452 _n._
Thucydides, 116, 161 _n._, 174 _n._, 241, 261, 264 _n._, 273, 298, 333 _n._, 345, 360 ff., 459 _n._, 460 _n._, 465, 466 _n._, 493 _n._, 498, 555
Thurii, 369 _n._
Thyreatic Plain, 444
Tigranes, 525
Timegenides, 475, 517
Timo, 197
Timodemos, 420
Timon, 236
Tithorea, 348
Tmolos, Mt., 94
Torone, 429
Trachis, 260, 264 _n._, 277 ff., 280; site, 281 f., 286, 293, 300, 348 _n._
Trade questions, 53, 94, 97 _n._., 105, 120, 134, 198, 241, 249, 367, 369 _n._, 434, 435, 523, 529, 530, 552
Trœzen, 320, 321, 353 and _n._, 354 _n._, 469 _n._, 528
Tyrants (Greek), 52, 54 ff., 86, 87, 91, 124 ff., 148, 169, 202, 247 f., 252
Tyras, 52
Tyrodiza, 212
Tyrrhenians, 131
V
Valerius Maximus, 335 _n._
Vergutiani Spring, 456, 472, 485, 520
Villa, 446 _n._
Vischer, 481 ff., 487
Vrana, 164
W
War, the great, issues, 1 ff., 21
Woodhouse, W. J., 467 _n._
X
Xanthippos, 198, 431 f., 531 ff., 548 f., 551 f.
Xenophon, 188 _n._, 297, 299, 446, 487, 542
Xerxes (special references), 205 f., 214, 398, 403, 408, 509
Z
Zanklé, 134
♠ “Zankle” replaced with “Zanklé”
THE END.
* * * * *
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.
[Illustration: PASS OF THERMOPYLAE
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.
_Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London._
]
[Illustration: BATTLEFIELD OF PLATAEA
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.
_Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London._
]
Footnotes.
[1] See note at the end of the Preface.
[2] It would be misleading to claim any exact accuracy for the chronology of this period. All that can be said is that the dates given are nearly correct. It is, therefore, undesirable to use the preposition “in” when the preposition “about” represents in reality the extent of our knowledge.
[3] Herodotus, speaking probably of the earlier part of the reign, mentions twenty. The Behistun inscription enumerates twenty-three; the inscription of Naksh-i-Rustem twenty-eight.
[4] Any date after 511 is highly improbable, because in that year Hippias was driven out of Athens and retired to Sigeum. Had the expedition taken place after his arrival there, it is almost certain that he would have accompanied Darius. Other considerations tend in the same direction.
[5] Herodotus says seven hundred thousand men and six hundred ships. This would imply that somewhat more than the ordinary general levy of the Empire was called out for the expedition. The numbers are almost certainly exaggerated.
The number of ships, viz. six hundred, as stated by Herodotus, is somewhat suspicious. The Persian fleet at Ladé is stated to have been six hundred (H. vi. 9). At Marathon it is the same (vi. 95). These may be mere vague calculations without any real foundation; it may be that six hundred was the ordinary official number of vessels that belonged to the Persian war fleet, and that Herodotus has assumed that on each of these occasions the whole fleet was employed. In the present instance, he does not mention any save the Greek contingents. It is extremely unlikely that the Greeks could furnish six hundred vessels. They could only raise three-fifths of that number at the time of the battle of Ladé. Still, Herodotus knows so little about the present expedition, that his omission to mention other contingents, if not a mere oversight, may be due to the want of information.
♠ “at Lade” replaced with “at Ladé”
[6] As it is important to note the exact nature of the traceable evidence on which Herodotus bases the various details he gives of the campaign, it may be pointed out in the present case that he states that Darius set up pillars with bilingual inscriptions at the point of crossing, and that the Byzantians removed them to their city, and used them for the altar of the temple of Artemis Orthosia. One stone, covered with Assyrian letters, was left in the temple of Dionysus.
This is apparently the statement of one who has seen them there; and the sentence which follows, in which Herodotus gives his own view as to the position of the bridge, tends to confirm this impression.
Those who have seen the terrific current off Seraglio Point at Constantinople will understand that the bridge could hardly have been constructed opposite Kalchedon.
Herodotus’ residence at Samos would enable him to obtain some sort of information with regard to the work of a Samian architect. He must have seen, too, the picture of the bridge, with the accompanying inscription, dedicated by Mandrocles, the engineer, in the temple of Hera.
[7] Probably further up, since there are great marshes on the north side of the river near the mouths of the Sereth and Pruth. It is more probable that it was between Tchernavoda and the great bend to the Delta.
[8] An examination of the map will show that this point, though its exact identification has not yet been satisfactorily ascertained, must have been on or close to the direct route from Byzantion northwards.
[9] It may seem strange to suppose for one moment that the words could apply to those cities whose subjection to Persia is certainly _implied_ in the earlier part of the account of the Scythian expedition. It must be remembered, however, that Herodotus never mentions the circumstances or even the fact of their previous reduction.
[10] I take it that the Lake Prasias of Herodotus is to be identified with the lower of the two lakes of the Strymon, and not with the Upper, as in Kiepert’s recent Atlas.
[11] Οὐκ ... ἀρχὴν Translation very uncertain, _vide_ Liddell & Scott’s Lexicon. _May_ mean “not originally,” or even “not at all.”
[12] I would refer those who wish to examine it in detail to the excellent notes on the subject in Macan’s “Herodotus,” vol. i p. 162, _ff_.
[13] Macan, _ad loc. cit._
[14] Manuscript text ἄνεως or ἄνεος gives no sense. Restorations proposed ἄνεσις or ἀνανέωσις. _Vide_ Macan, note, vol. i. p. 170.
[15] In attempting to write the history of the revolt, I have been immensely aided and considerably influenced by the acute analysis of that section of Herodotus’ history which is contained in Mr. Macan’s edition of H. iv., v., vi. I have not in all cases, as will be seen, adopted his conclusions in detail. The very excellence of Mr. Macan’s work renders it all but impossible to avoid plagiarism in matter if not in actual words. But if I am guilty, I am guilty of the sincerest form of flattery.
[16] Cf. H. v. 96, _ad fin_. and 97, where Herodotus clearly _implies_ that the demand had been made no long time before Aristagoras arrived at Athens, which was, of course, after the events at Naxos, and after the die of revolt had been cast.
[17] As Macan points out, the story was in all probability a celebrated story of the period; and “the man with the tattooed head” played the same part in Greek legend as “the man with the iron mask” in that of later days.
[18] _Vide_ Macan, “Herod.”
[19] Cf. H. v. 49. Ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι.
[20] The detail of the “guides” is improbable. The road the expedition followed was the high road from Ephesus to Sardes.
[21] The ἐβοήθεον τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι in H. v. 102 is a somewhat remarkable expression. It might have been thought that it was Artaphernes, cooped up in the citadel of Sardes, who would be first in the thoughts of the Persian commanders. Did the Lydians still remember against the Greek the betrayal of Crœsus? Or had Persia been favouring the Lydian against the Greek trade, and so forwarded the conspiracy of revolt? It appears as if we have a faint trace of one of those numerous lost motives of the history of the fifth century.
[22] The προπυνθανόμενοι indicates that they had early information of the attack. It cannot, however, have reached them prior to the landing near Ephesus, for Artaphernes was caught unprepared, and it cannot be supposed that he received later intelligence than the commanders farther inland.
[23] Another possible cause may have been a change in the preponderance of political parties at Athens during this year.
[24] Cf. opening words of v. 103.
[25] Mr. Macan attributes the spread of the revolt from Cyprus to Byzantion to the autumn of 498 (vol. ii. p. 69). I do not understand his reasons for so doing. Herodotus (v. 103) seems to cite the expedition to Byzantion as an example of the energy which the Ionians threw into the revolt in spite of the refusal of the Athenians to give further aid, a refusal which must be attributed to the winter of 498–97.
[26] I am fully aware of the significance of the words ὡς καὶ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἐπύθετο ἀπεστάναι. But I would suggest that, reading them with their context, they point to the beginning of a plot of revolt, rather than to its actual outbreak.
[27] Mr. Macan proposes an Athenian origin for this tale of the events at Susa. Yet the Athenians were not likely to suggest to the world that they had brought on Greece all the trouble of the period of the great war. Herodotus may have simply reproduced, with additions by himself, a pan-Hellenic version of a famous tale.
[28] Herodotus applies the name to a promontory, but Strabo, 682, says that the Keys are two islands off the east coast of Cyprus.
[29] To show the utter confusion of Herodotus’ narrative in this respect, it is only necessary to point out that he implies that Daurises immediately (v. 116) after the battle near Ephesus proceeded to reduce part of the Hellespontine district, which, if his previous account of the course affairs is to be credited (v. 103) did not revolt until months after the battle. Moreover, Daurises (v. 117) wins rapid successes in this region, and then is recalled by the revolt in Caria, which cannot have been brought about (v. 103), at the most moderate calculation, within six months of the battle near Ephesus.
[30] My view, stated briefly, is that the events recounted in H. v. 116, _ff_., cannot be earlier than 496.
[31] Ταύτας μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἡμέρῃ ἑκάστῃ αἵρεε.
[32] Not the celebrated stream of the Marsyas legend.
[33] Herodotus mentions Pixodaros of Kindys, a son of Mausolos, as proposer of the first of those alternative plans. The connection of the name Mausolos with Halikarnassos a century later, 377–353 (_vide_ Macan), suggests the possibility that this man had also a connection with Herodotus’ native town, and that the story, like those tales of Artemisia in the narrative of the campaign of 480, is a part of the historian’s work which can be definitely assigned to a Halikarnassian source.
[34] H. v. 120, Μιλήσιοι τε καὶ οἱ τούτων σύμμαχοι cannot mean a Pan-Ionian force. The nearness of Labraunda seems to have encouraged the Milesians and their nearest neighbours to venture on an attempt to save Caria. The other Ionians, in all probability, had their attention occupied by a Persian army sufficiently large to make it necessary for them to stay and guard their homes.
[35] On the manifest improbability of Hecatæus having proposed anything of the kind, _vide_ Macan, vol. i., note on p. 267.
[36] Ἐπιστάμενος seems to be used emphatically.
[37] I think it best to postpone the discussion of the evidence on this point until, taken in its chronological order, it is complete.
[38] The taking of Miletus is evidently assumed by Herodotus to have occurred in the same campaigning season as the battle of Ladé. There is no trace of a winter intervening between the battle and its capture. Cf. H. vi. 18.
[39] Ἀγνωμοσύνῃ τε διεχρέωντο.
[40] Chapter 17.
[41] The existence of such a tale in Herodotus suggests the possibility that his anti-Ionian bias was founded on something more than Halikarnassian or Dorian prejudice; that it was, indeed, largely based upon the colouring given to the story of the revolt by those sections of the populations of the Ionian towns who were dissatisfied with the way in which the operations were carried on, or whose conduct had been such as to excite the criticism of those insurgents who had shown a more persistent courage.
[42] Cf. Οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως συγγράψαι; ἀλλήλους γὰρ καταιτιῶνται.
[43] “In column,” probably a detail in accordance with Herodotus’ previous statement as to the “manœuvre of cutting the line;” in fact, a conjecture of the historian’s own. The Chians are described as “διεκπλέοντες” in the course of the battle. Had Dionysios of Phokæa, then, so convinced them of the value of this manœuvre that they practised it, in spite of the fact that they had forty marines on board each vessel, _i.e._ were prepared for a wholly different form of tactics?
[44] As Macan and others point out, this dedication was probably made after Mykale.
[45] H. vi. 23, 24.
[46] The emphatic mention of these Lesbians in this passage has suggested the idea that this attack on Chios was an act of spite on the part of the Æolian Lesbians against the Ionian Chians.
Those who maintain this view seem to leave out of account two difficult questions which it must raise:—
(1) What conceivable object can the Lesbians have had—
(_a_) In making such an attack for such a motive; (_b_) In running the great risk it involved at a time when the victorious Phœnician fleet was within a few hours’ sail of Chios?
(2) Taking Herodotus’ tale as it stands, who are the Ionians (Chap, xxviii., _ad init._) who accompany Histiæus and the Æolians in their attack on Thasos, if they are not from Chios?
[47] _Vide_ Kiepert’s most recent map of Asia Minor.
[48] Artaphernes there, and therefore campaigning season probably over.
[49] Like many other geographical names of ancient and modern times, this was used in both a wider and a narrower sense. It is applied by Herodotus in some passages to the whole region from the Pontus to the Hellespont; in others to the immediate neighbourhood of the Hellespont. It is used here in the wider sense.
[50] The practical difficulties of the history are rendered all the greater by the uncertainty of the interpretation of the text in the opening of H. vi. 40.
[51] The all but complete absence of any details of Miltiades’ life between the time of the Scythian expedition and the end of the Ionian Revolt seems to me to support the view that there is very little _documentary_ evidence underlying Herodotus’ history, save that of inscriptions and of other official documents, demonstrable instances of whose use are rare. Had the historian made large use of private memoirs, supposing such existed, it is unlikely that he would have omitted to have recourse to the records of the Philaid family.
[52] The significance of this last assertion is very striking. The reference is to the Ionian towns especially, which, on the indication of purely general evidence, might be supposed to have been tributary to Athens at the time to which Herodotus refers.
The question raised belongs obviously to a period much later than 479 B.C., and must be left for discussion in a work dealing with the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.
Meanwhile I would refer English students of Greek history to the long note on the subject in Macan, “Herod.” iv., v., vi., vol. i. p. 302.
[53] _E.g._. Strattis of Chios., H. viii. 132.
[54] Cf. H. vi. 43.
[55] The employment of Mardonios on this political business, in a case in which Artaphernes might have been expected to be the agent for the carrying out of this particular act of policy, suggests that Darius had in his mind considerations similar to those which are described by Tacitus as having influenced the Roman Government in the settlement of Britain after the revolt of the Iceni: “Missus igitur Petronius Turpilianus tanquam exorabilior et delictis hostium novus, eoque pœnitentiæ mitior” (Tac. Agric. xvi.).
[56] It has sometimes been assumed that this was, on the part of Athens, a direct recognition of Sparta, not merely as the chief power in Greece, but as exercising some sort of control over Athens itself. The assumption is possible, but not necessary.
[57] The second part of the objection seems inconsistent with Herodotus’ own statement, v. 75, that a law had been made some years before in Sparta to the effect that the two kings might not both accompany a military expedition. It is, however, possible that this law applied merely to the command of the army in time of war (_cf_. the circumstances under which it was made), and that when other important Government business abroad was on hand, the custom of the Spartan constitution provided that both kings should take part in it, that each might act as a check upon the other. It is evident in this instance that Kleomenes was not in a position to enforce his demands, and even on the second occasion there is no suggestion of armed interference.
[58] It is not a part of the design of this chapter to discuss in detail either (_a_) the various palpably unhistorical references to incidents of the campaign made by the orators of the fourth century, as well as by later classical authors;
or (_b_) the numerous and varied reconstructions of the history of the time which have been attempted by modern writers.
The policy thus adopted with regard to the latter is not due to want of respect, but to want of space. Any full discussion of these theories would make a book in itself.
They are very fully explained and discussed in—
(1) Busolt’s “Griechische Geschichte;”
(2) Macan, Herod. iv.–vi, vol. 2, Appendix 10,
(3) Hauvette’s “Hérodote;”
and to these I would refer any student who wishes to survey the whole field of possible and impossible theory.
I owe much to these able summaries of critical discussion, as well as to other papers which I have read at different times in various German periodicals.
A very valuable article on the constructive side of the history of the campaign is that by Mr. J. A. R. Munro, in the _Journal of Hellenic Studies_, vol. xix., Part II., 1899.
With respect to the ancient authorities, the majority of modern critics seem to be in agreement that the amount of reliable evidence outside Herodotus is very small.
The topographical details observable at the present day which have a bearing on the history of the actual fight are few, though important.
[59] It must at the same time be pointed out that the statement is not above suspicion in certain respects. Herodotus says, for instance, that “many of the continentals” and “all the islanders” gave earth and water. ◆_Cf_. H. vi. 96.◆ Did Naxos give “earth and water”? It is a very remarkable exception. Who were these “continentals”? Of all the states only one is mentioned by name—Ægina. Did Ægina really Medize at this time, or was it merely that Athens feared she might do so, or might, at any rate, take the opportunity afforded by a Persian attack to pay off old scores?
[60] The same number as on the Scythian expedition, and at Ladé; and therefore not on this account very reliable.
[61] Cf. H. vi. 94: Ἐσβαλόμενοι δὲ τοὺς ἵππους ἐς ταύτας [τὰς ἱππαγωγοὺς νέας] Καὶ τὸν πεζὸν στρατὸν ἐσβιβάσαντες ἐς τὰς νέας, ἔπλεον ἑξακοσίῃσι τριήρεσι ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην.
[62] Various exaggerated estimates of these numbers are given in later historians. Modern authorities have formed estimates varying from 30,000 to 50,000.
6400 Persians fell at Marathon, when the Persian centre must have been almost wiped out, but when not more than half the Persian army was engaged in the battle. This would suggest 20,000 as the number of Persians at Marathon, and about 40,000 as the number of the whole expedition.
[63] Thuc. ii. 8 is, of course, irreconcilable with this statement. I do not propose to discuss a question which really does not admit of any certain solution. There is, of course, a mistake somewhere, but we cannot pretend at the present day to say where it lies. For discussion, _vide_ Macan, vol. i. p. 353.
[64] The tale, or, at any rate, certain elements of it, manifestly originate in a source at Chalkis.
[65] I adopt Stein’s suggestion that κατέργοντες is used intransitively, as being the most probable of the suggestions which have been made with regard to the translation or amendment of this doubtful passage.
[66] _Vide_ “Zur Topographie von Marathon” in the Mittheilungen des Deutschen Archæologischen Instituts, i. pp. 67–94 (1876).
[67] H. vi. 124: ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἀσπίς· καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ἐγένετο γάρ· ὃς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας, οὐκ ἔχω προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τούτων.
[68] Sparta, doubtless, would not act with the Alkmæonidæ.
[69] As represented in some histories of Greece.
[70] As the object of this chapter is not to refute the theories of others, but to examine and explain the evidence bearing on the campaign, I do not propose to point out defects in theories which differ from my own. I am most nearly in agreement with Mr. J. A. R. Munro. I had formed my opinions on the main questions of the campaign before I read his article, but it has supplied me with arguments of an important character which certainly had not occurred to me before I read it.
[71] In the accepted text of Herodotus the name is Pheidippides, which is almost certainly a textual error.
[72] These chronological details are important, as they enable us to construct a diary of events, which is not without its significance in the narrative of the truce.
[73] It is impossible to say how far this excuse for delay was genuine.
[74] The Persian dead are still unburied when the Spartans visit the field. ◆H. vi. 120.◆ They leave Sparta on the 15th, and arrive at Athens on the 17th. A period of several days intervened between the arrival of the Athenians at Marathon and the battle.
Plutarch (De Herod. Malign. 26) asserts that the battle took place on the 6th of Boedromion. He accuses Herodotus of suppressing the fact that the Athenians held a festal procession in honour of the battle on the 6th of this month.
It is true that the festival did take place on this date; but the day was chosen, not because it was the date of the battle, but because it was the festival of Artemis Agrotera, to whom a vow had been made in case of success, probably before the army started from Athens.
[75] Cf. (Arist.) Athen. Polit. 22.
[76] The original passage in which this is mentioned is the scholion on Aristophanes, Knights, 778: ἐν Μαραθῶνι: τόπος τῆς Ἀττικῆς εἰς ὃν ἐνώρμησαν Δᾶτις καὶ Ἀρτάβαζος Μηδικοὶ σατράπαι, etc.
Suidas, a very late author in the 10th and 11th centuries of our era, reproduces the information, drawing it evidently from the above-mentioned source.
[77] The fact that the Persians were in battle array seems to invalidate the theory which has been put forward, that the Persians, when the Greeks rushed upon them, were marching towards the lower road, with intent to reach Athens that way. If that had been so, it is not possible to imagine that the battle could have been the set battle which it appears to have been according to Herodotus’ description. His description of the main incidents of the fight seems the most absolutely reliable part of his narrative.
[78] In the late author Suidas there is a note which gives a positive support to this negative fact of Herodotus’ silence. He says that the expression χωρίς ἱππεῖς had become a proverbial expression, originating from the fact that when Datis invaded Attica, the Ionians who were with him informed the Athenians that the cavalry were away, and so Miltiades attacked and won the victory.
[79] The total loss of the Persians is given by Herodotus at 6400. This is not likely to be an understatement in that 6400 must have been included the greater part of the Persian centre, which seems to have been all but annihilated, if the circumstances of the battle be taken into consideration. It is thus against probability that more than 20,000 Persian troops took part in the engagement.
The comparative smallness of the Persian numbers is further indicated by the words which tradition attributed to Miltiades. He is said in the course of his appeal to Kallimachos (ch. 109) to have spoken confidently of success in case the Greeks took the offensive. There is no reason to insist on such words having been actually used by Miltiades. The important historical point is that in the tradition of the battle which Herodotus followed such language was attributed to him, language which could not conceivably have been used had the Persians very greatly outnumbered the Greeks.
[80] Numbers varying from 100,000 to 500,000 are given by various later authors.
[81] Cornelius Nepos, Justin, Suidas, give estimates of from 9000 to 10,000 Athenians, and 1000 Platæans. Herodotus (ix. 28, 29) gives the Athenian numbers at Platæa as 8000 hoplites and 8000 light-armed, and this at a time when many citizens were serving on the fleet at Mykale. The number 10,000 at Marathon is probably an understatement, though not one of a gross character.
[82] The Persian position is indicated by three circumstances:—
(1) The position of the “Soros,” which would presumably be situated where the majority of the Athenians must have fallen, _i.e._ in the centre of the line; and where, too, the decisive blow of the battle was struck.
(2) The fact, expressly mentioned by Herodotus, that the Greek centre was (Chap. 113) driven inland (ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν).
(3) The fact that (Chap. 115) the barbarians who escaped seem to have reached their ships without difficulty.
Hauvette, in assuming the Persians to have been in a position close to the Charadra, parallel to it, and south of it, ignores these three points, and places the Persians in about the most disadvantageous position they could have chosen in the whole plain.
[83] This seems the most probable translation of the word δρόμῳ. Apart from the physical impossibility of a heavy-armed infantryman advancing a space of nearly one mile “at a run,” or “at the double,” the word δρόμῳ seems to be used in a technical sense, taken, as it were, from the Greek infantry “drill-book” of Herodotus’ own time, implying a pace faster than that denominated by the technical word βάδην. (For βάδην, _vide_ Xen. Hell. v. 4. 53, etc.) There cannot be any certainty on this point, because we know so little of Greek infantry drill at this period.
Another possible explanation of the passage may be that Herodotus has ascribed to the whole length of the advance a form of movement which was only adopted when the Greeks came within range of missiles.
[84] Cf. Paus. i 15. 3, where he is describing the picture: Τὸ δὲ ἔσω τῆς μάχης φεύγοντές εἰσιν οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐς τὸ ἕλος ὠθοῦντες ἀλλήλους. Those who met this fate must presumably have belonged to the Persian centre, who would be cut off from the ships by the closing in of the Greek flanks.
[85] Cf. Paus. i. 32. 3: Καὶ ἕτερος [τάφος] Πλαταιεῦσι Βοιωτῶν καὶ δούλοις. ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τότε πρῶτον.
[86] _Ephoros_ [Fragm. 107, Fragm. Histor. Græc.] attributes the raising of the siege to the fact that the Athenian fleet imagined that a signal implied that the Persian fleet was still at the neighbouring island of Mykonos.
He thus seems to assume that the Parian expedition followed _immediately_ upon Marathon.
It cannot be said that the vague direct evidence on the question determines this point. It is, however, in the highest degree unlikely that the expedition was undertaken in the same year as Marathon; and the detail with regard to the Persian ships seems to have been inserted in the story either by Ephoros or his original authority,
either (_a_) in order to rationalize a story in which the motive was inadequate,
or (_b_) because the version followed was one favourable to Miltiades.
Despite his chronological vagueness, Herodotus (vi. 132) clearly _implies_ an interval between Marathon and the Parian expedition, in which Miltiades’ reputation stood very high.
[87] In some histories of Greece, discredit is cast upon Herodotus’ assertion that the preparation for the great invasion was begun in the last years of Darius. In the absence of evidence, this denial of the stated fact must rest on the basis of general probability.
In reference to this point I would urge that the most noticeable feature of Darius’ policy towards the west is its extreme tenacity of purpose. His plans had met with the severest checks in the course of their operation, yet he and his brother Artaphernes had persisted in their designs of conquest and acquisition in Europe, whenever circumstances rendered military and political interference possible.
[88] This is attributed in some Greek histories to the discovery of the treason of the Alkmæonidæ. So far from being caused by that, it took place in spite of it.
[89] Cf. Clinton, “Fasti Hellenici,” 11^3, 26.
The archon’s name recorded for Ol. 71, 4, is Themistocles. His identity with the great Themistocles is highly probable, though not certain.
Dionysius of Halikarnassos says that Themistocles was archon in the official year, 493–492.
[90] This point will be more fully discussed in dealing with the charges of corruption brought against Themistocles in Herodotus’ history of the war.
[91] Cf. Plut. Them. 4. ἔπραξε δὲ ταῦτα Μιλτιάδου κρατήσας ἀντιλέγοντος. ὡς ἱστορεῖ Στμσίμβροτος. Stesimbrotos is a fifth century writer.
[92] _E.g._ Delbrück attributes to Xerxes an army of from 65,000 to 75,000 combatants.
[93] Herodotus (vii. 60) reckons the land army at 1,700,000, and the total effective at 2,641,610 (vii. 185). He (vii. 186) says that this number must be doubled in order to arrive at the full total of the expedition.
[94] Herodotus probably arrived at these numbers from information picked up from various towns all round the Ægean, furnished by persons who had witnessed the passage of the army, or had heard of it from others who had been eye-witnesses. The enormous exaggerations of estimate made by eye-witnesses in estimating the numbers of a crowd of quite moderate dimensions, may easily account for the impossible numbers stated to and by Herodotus.
[95] Those who state a much smaller number than this do not take into account the Oriental reliance on numbers, an Eastern characteristic which the Persian, unless he is much traduced, fully shared.
I hesitate to express any conjecture as to the possible maximum of the land force on this occasion. No evidence on this point can be said to exist.
[96] The description of the route adopted renders it improbable that this body of troops included much more than the local levies of Western Asia. Sardes was the real place of rendezvous, though it is possible that some of the contingents did not join the main force until it arrived at Abydos.
[97] Calculations show that the only eclipses about this time visible at Sardes occurred on October 2, 480 (mentioned H. ix. 10), and February 16, 478.
[98] Herodotus says on the _left_. It is obvious that he has confused his point of view, and is speaking from that of a traveller voyaging in a ship up the coast.
[99] The physical difficulties of the interior of the Balkan peninsula, together with the practical question of commissariat, render it probable that Herodotus is mistaken as to the nature of this inland march, and of the troops which undertook it. The main body of the army must almost certainly have pursued the coast road, which was easy, supplied with depôts of stores, and in touch with the fleet. The divisions which went inland were probably large detachments sent to inspire awe in the breasts of the inland tribes, so as to discourage them from any attempt to cut the line of communications.
[100] _Vide_ also p. 207.
[101] The expedition to Thessaly must have been in the spring of 480. The Thessalian deputies came to the Isthmus “as soon as they were informed that the Persian was about to cross over into Europe” (H. vii. 172). Xerxes spent the winter of 481–480 at Sardes, and started thence “at the beginning of the spring” (H. vii. 37).
[102] _The Expedition to Tempe in Diodorus._—The account of the Tempe expedition as given by Diodorus differs in certain most important particulars from the brief narrative in Herodotus. It is possible that the manifest absurdity of the chronology in the historian’s work has created an undue prejudice against him as a source of evidence, a tendency increased by the second-hand nature of his information. It seems to me, however, that this latter characteristic constitutes a very strong reason for treating his information with respect. There is no reason why a bad historian should be a bad copyist; and whatever the man himself may have been, the writers from whose work he plagiarized so freely may in some cases have been most reliable witnesses. The passage on Tempe is in Bk. XI. ch. ii. 13, and it may be well to note the points in which he agrees with, and in which he differs from, the account in Herodotus.
Diodorus. Herodotus.
1. The Greeks sent ten thousand Gives the same number—ten hoplites to Thessaly to seize the thousand. passes to Tempe.
2. On hearing of the size of the Mentions this as the Persian force. _reported_ cause of _withdrawal_ from Tempe.
3. Synetos was leader of the Evænetos. Lacedæmonians.
4. Themistocles leader of the Same. Athenians.
5. Ambassadors sent by the No mention. Lacedæmonians to the other States, asking them to send forces to join in the defence of the passes.
6. They were eager to include the No mention. whole of the Greek States in the defending forces, and to get them to take part in the war against the Persians.
7. They left Tempe because the Believes the real reason for majority of the Thessalians and the departure to have been the other Greeks in that neighbourhood discovery that there were gave earth and water to Xerxes’ other passes by which Tempe envoys. could be turned.
8. Ænianians, Dolopians, Malians, | Perrhæbians, Magnetes, medize while | army still at Tempe. | Makes no distinction between | the time at which these two 9. Achæans (Phthiotis), Locri, | sets of States medized. (Opuntian), Thessalians, Bœotians, | after the departure of Greek force | from Tempe. |
It is quite plain that the account of Diodorus is not borrowed from Herodotus, nor does it show traces of having had, either in whole or even in part, a common source. In certain respects it is the more probable tale of the two. For example, the comparative smallness of the numbers sent is explained by the fact that the Lacedæmonians and Athenians hoped that the other Greeks would send contingents. Again, the size of the Persian force is given as a reason for going to Tempe, while Herodotus gives it as a reason for leaving the same, though he is inclined to reject the tale. It is inconceivable that the Greeks should at this time have been totally ignorant of the magnitude of the Persian force. Diodorus’ tale admits of the common-sense explanation that, having made up their minds to defend the North, they thought it best to choose a place where the Persian superiority in numbers would be of as little advantage as possible, though it was mainly for political purposes that so advanced a position was taken up.
In speaking of the medization of the States or clans, he evidently uses Θέτταλοι in Chapter II. in a general sense of the population of the region of Thessaly, whereas in Chapter III. he uses it of the Thessalians, properly so-called. There is nothing in Herodotus which contradicts Diodorus’ account of the medization. Both accounts may be true, though that of Diodorus is the fuller one. There is one point in it which is peculiarly supported by what Herodotus says. The Aleuadæ medized; but the mass of their subjects disapproved of this policy, and called in the Southern Greeks. The great Thessalian lords were lords of the plain rather than of the mountain. It was consequently the population of the plain which was opposed to their policy. It is therefore a remarkable fact that the tribes of the Thessalian region, which Diodorus mentions as having medized in the first instance, are those of the bordering mountain region; whereas those of the great plain remained true to the Greek cause until the withdrawal of the army from Tempe left them exposed to the overwhelming flood of the invasion.
[103] Diodorus gives his name as Synetos.
[104] The Thessalian appeal to the Congress at the Isthmus to send a force to Tempe is made to the προβόυλοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, but the expression used by Herodotus in vii. 145 and 172, οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἕλλήνες τὰ ἀμείνω φρονέοντες, has almost an official ring about it.
[105] Cf. language used by the Greek embassy to Gelo at Syracuse (H. vii. 157).
[106] It has been asserted that this passage from Diodorus is drawn from the passage of Ephorus, of which the fragment is a survival. It would seem to me that the essential difference between the two points to a difference of origin, and that they are two pieces of evidence on the question, and not one.
_Note on the Sequence of Events in Relation to the Negotiations with Gelo._
It would, perhaps, be a mistake to lay too much stress on the indications of date in Herodotus with reference to the somewhat crowded incidents of this time. The actual dates cannot be settled, though it is possible to arrive at some idea of Herodotus’ views as to the sequence of events.
(_a_.) The Greek spies were sent to Asia at the time when Xerxes’ army was collected at Sardes (vii. 146).
(_b_.) The embassies to Gelo, Argos, etc., were sent after the despatch of the spies (vii. 146, _ad init._, 148, _ad init_.).
(_c_.) Gelo, _after_ the departure of the joint embassy (vii. 163), and when he heard that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont (_ibid_.), sent the treasure-ships to Delphi.
(_d_.) _Before_ he sent these vessels he knew that he had to expect a Carthaginian attack (vii. 165, _ad fin_.).
The evidence is inconclusive. We lack the means of deciding the sequence of the departure of the embassy and of the acquisition of the information with regard to the coming of the Carthaginian expedition.
[107] Bergk, “Pœtæ Lyrici Græci,” Ed. 4, v. iii. p. 485: Πολλὴν δὲ παρασχεῖν σύμμαχον Ἕλλησιν χεῖρ᾿ ἐς ἐλευθερίην.
[108] _Vide_ Note at end of chapter.
[109] Livy, xxxvi. 15—“Hoc jugum (Œta) ab Leucate et man ad occidentem verso per Ætoliam ad alterum mare orienti objectum tendens ea aspreta rupesque interjectas habet, ut non modo exercitus sed ne expediti quidem facile ullas ad transitum calles inveniant;” and again (Livy, xxxvi. 17), Acilius Glabrio, speaking of Thermopylæ, “Quippe portæ sunt hæ, et _unus_ inter duo maria clausis omnibus velut naturalis transitus est.”
[110] There is considerable mule traffic through it at the present day.
[111] It would, I reckon, be possible for a traveller to go from one plain to the other by this route without attaining a height much over a thousand feet.
[112] It may be well to adduce one or two striking instances of this, apart from the one at present under consideration:—
1. Circ. 350 B.C., Thermopylæ was the great obstacle to Philip’s advance south. His energies were centred in getting hold of the pass. He never attempted an assault upon it, but finally got hold of it by bribing Phalæcus, the Phocian condottiere. He then left a garrison at Nicæa near Thermopylæ (Dem. ad Ep. Phil. 4). There must have been some supreme objection from a military point of view to the Asopos pass, since Philip, who can hardly be suspected of military incapacity, never tried to turn Thermopylæ by using it. He was not pressed for time. He patiently allowed years to elapse before he got hold of Thermopylæ. Thermopylæ was all-valuable to him, and, what is more striking, absolutely necessary, in his opinion, for an advance southwards. (_Vide_ Hogarth, “Philip and Alexander”).
2. In 279 B.C. (Pausanias, x. 20) Brennus, with more than 150,000 Gauls, invaded Greece. The object of the expedition was plunder and nothing else. If he could have got past Thermopylæ that object would have been attained. With such numbers he could have done what he liked, especially if, after getting through the Asopos defile, he had, before going south, turned Thermopylæ by way of Hyampolis and forced the Greeks to evacuate that pass. Pausanias, who seems to have ample information as to the details of this Celtic raid, gives the following list of the defending force:—
Bœotians, 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry; Phocians, 3000 infantry, 500 cavalry; Megareans, 4000 infantry; Ætolians, 7000 infantry, with numerous light armed, and cavalry; Athenians, 1000 infantry, 500 cavalry, with numerous triremes; Mercenaries from Macedonia and Asia, 1000 infantry.
The total cannot have been far short of 25,000 men.
The force was so large that the commanders were enabled not merely to provide for the defence of the pass itself, but were also able to send out cavalry and light armed to dispute the passage of the Spercheios, a move which Brennus, who was, as Pausanias remarks, “not altogether wanting in understanding, nor, for a barbarian, without a certain amount of experience in devising stratagems,” frustrated by sending a number of his men across the bar at the river mouth. On this the Greek advanced guard retreated to the pass. Brennus then had bridges thrown across the river, and attacked Heraklea. The Heraklea of that date was probably situated on the mountain immediately west of the mouth of the Asopos ravine, on a site now known as Sideroporto. He did not take the place; and Pausanias adds in reference to this, that Heraklea was to him “a matter of lesser moment: he considered the main point to be to drive out of the pass those who were in occupation of it, and to make good his passage into Greece south of Thermopylæ.”
It is of course manifest that such a passage as the Asopos ravine would be easily defensible, and the Herakleots may have blocked it. There is no question that, had it been passable, Brennus might have used it. The striking fact is that he did not use it, but spent his strength on a terrific failure at Thermopylæ.
3. In 224 (_vide_ Polyb. xi. 52) Antigonus, wishing to get to the Isthmus, marched with his army by way of Eubœa. “He took this route,” says Polybius, “because the Ætolians, after trying other expedients for preventing Antigonus bringing this aid, now forbade his marching south of Thermopylæ with an army, threatening that, if he did, they would offer armed opposition to his passage.”
It is to be noted that, as at the time of Brennus’ assault, the defenders of the pass were also in possession of Heraklea.
4. In B.C. 208 (_vide_ Polyb. x. 41) the Ætolians, seeking to prevent the passage of Philip of Macedon southwards to aid his allies, “secure the pass of Thermopylæ with trenches and stockades and a formidable garrison, satisfied that they would then shut out Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance of his allies south of the pass.”
In this case also (_vide_ chap. 42) the Ætolians were in possession of Heraklea.
5. In a passage already quoted, Livy (xxxvi. 15) is most emphatic in his statement that the only practicable military route by Œta is that through Thermopylæ. He is describing the attack of the Romans under Acilius Glabrio upon the troops of Antiochus who were defending the pass, and it is again reported that the allies of the defenders were in possession of Heraklea.
We are now in possession of practically all the data which can be obtained from the ancient historians with regard to the exact significance of the Asopos ravine, and the route through it. It must of course be borne in mind that the information of the historian Livy with regard to the topography of the Thermopylæ region was second-hand; but yet, in spite of that, there is a certain consistency about the evidence which enables us to form highly probable conclusions with regard to the exact value of this factor in the strategical geography of the region.
It seems to me to have been a recognized principle in later times that an effective defence of Œta included the occupation of Heraklea as well as of Thermopylæ, and the only conceivable reason for the existence of such a view is that Heraklea commanded the passage of the Asopos ravine.
The site of the Heraklea of this period is to be sought, I venture to think, at the place called Sideroporto, where there are large remains of a strongly fortified town. It is high on the slope of Œta, in an exceedingly inaccessible position, in the angle, as it were, between the Asopos ravine and the line of the Trachinian cliffs.
A local tradition, probably of recent date, and due, like so many traditions of modern Greece, to the visit of some inquirer whom the natives regarded as an authority, attaches the name of Heraklea to certain ruins which stand on the summit of a remarkable flat-topped mountain in the valley at the head of the Asopos ravine, to which reference has been already made, between the plains of Malis and Doris. It is infinitely more probable, however, that this was the stronghold of those Œteans whom Thucydides mentions.
The site is more than two hours distant from the nearest point of the Malian plain, at the outlet of the Asopos ravine.
[113] Cp. H. vii. 175, _ad fin_.
[114] It has been criticized in modern times on strategical principles (_e.g._ by Delbrück), for which a universality of truth has been claimed. It is said that, given two adversaries of equal strength, that one places himself at a disadvantage who attempts to defend the passage of a range of mountains. It is manifest that the assailant can concentrate his efforts on the forcing of one passage, whereas the defender has to distribute his defence among all the practicable passages of the chain. In the particular case of Mount Œta it is urged that there was, besides Thermopylæ, at least one practicable passage, and this is stated to have followed the modern road from Malis into Doris; which passes over the low part of the chain immediately east of the Asopos ravine.
Could it be proved that such a road ever existed the general criticism would be sound. As a fact, all but demonstrable proof exists that no such road, practicable from a military point of view, ever did exist in ancient times. Leave out of the calculation the Greek of 480 and the Gaul of 279—although in the case of the latter, if Pausanias’ evidence be worth anything, the Malians showed a very pardonable desire to expedite his departure from the region, and would have been most anxious to show Brennus such a road, had it existed—and merely take into consideration the Greek, the Macedonian, and the Roman of later times. For years and years these peoples were fighting in every part of North-East Greece. They knew its topography by heart. The land became the veriest strategic chessboard that ever existed in ancient warfare, on which every move could be calculated to a nicety. And yet Thermopylæ remained the same—that square on the board where king and consul could alike be checked. Could it have been so had such a path existed?
It has already been seen that the holding of Heraklea was regarded as a necessary factor in the defence of Thermopylæ. That Heraklea was almost certainly situated at Sideroporto, commanding the Asopos ravine indeed, but cut off by that very ravine—a mere crack several miles long and nine hundred feet deep—from the line taken by this imaginary road; that is to say, Heraklea would have been absolutely useless for its defence. If it existed, why then did neither Greek, Macedonian, nor Roman use it? Why did Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, shirk the attack on a pass which he could so easily have avoided?
It has already been said that the Greeks have made a new road along that line. It is an excellent piece of work, but so great is the climb to the summit of the pass that a two-horse carriage takes three hours to accomplish it. The gradient of the hill-side can best be imagined when it is stated that after climbing for an hour and a quarter along this road, the traveller finds himself within less than half a mile of the point from which the climb began, and the greater part of that half-mile is vertical.
In criticizing ancient warfare a tendency is but too frequently displayed to ignore the main factor of all warfare—the human element. In criticizing Greek warfare in particular, it is, moreover, too often the case that the critic is either unaware of, or has never realized, the nature of the country with which he is dealing. An ordinary Greek hill-side, though it appears easy of passage when viewed from even a short distance, presents difficulties which can hardly be paralleled in any other country in Europe. Thick, low, strong bush, much of it thorny, covers it just to a sufficient depth to hide the thickly sown, razor-edged rocks beneath. Human nature as represented by the Greek hoplite in his heavy armour could not face it, and progress over it even for a light-armed man is very slow and very exhausting. The strategy and tactics of war are bounded by the difficult rather than by the impossible. There can be no question that the passage over this part of the range of Œta can never have been practicable to anything more than the merest skeleton of a flying column, and could not possibly have been ♠negotiated by any force sufficiently large to affect the defence of Thermopylæ by any turning movement, or sufficiently well provided with provisions to accomplish the long circuit which such a turning movement would have demanded.
♠ “negociated” replaced with “negotiated”
There is one more striking proof that such a road did not exist in 480. Had it existed it must have crossed that path of the Anopæa by which Hydarnes and his men turned the pass. If so, why did he make the long circuit by the Asopos ravine, when a shorter way was practicable?
[115] Cf. the mistake made as to the defensive nature of the position at Tempe; also, the ignorance of the existence of the path of the Anopæa at Thermopylæ.
[116] The expedition to Thessaly was made while Xerxes was at Abydos, certainly not later than April, 480. The departure of Leonidas for Thermopylæ took place a little before the Carnean festival, about the beginning of the month of August.
[117] Diodorus’ account of the circumstances preceding the battle is manifestly an imaginary tale of indeterminate origin concocted after the event.
[118] This seems to indicate that the Persian camp was altogether outside the west gate, and not any part of it in the plain of Anthele.
[119] This shows clearly that the wall was not, as some have supposed, on the low ground at the pass of the middle gate, but on the neck of the first mound (_vide_ note on Topography of Thermopylæ). Had it been on the low ground, the scout would, from the comb of the mass of stream _débris_ of the great ravine, have been able to see over it.
[120] These last words are, I believe, the true translation of the expression in Herodotus. There would be little point in repeating the fact of the river flowing through the ravine as a sort of mark of the identity of a stream whose course the historian had recently described with considerable detail. There is much point in the indication of what investigation at the present day shows to have been the fact, that this path did start from the Asopos ravine.
My own impression is that it sprang into use originally as a means of communication between that upper valley which I have mentioned as existing in the range of Œta, and probably also the Dorian plain, and Thermopylæ, when a flood of the Asopos rendered the ravine impassable. It would also form a direct means of communication between the Œteans and Locrians without passing through Trachinia.
[121] It is of course impossible to deduct the number of killed in the previous fighting, simply because we have no information as to what that number was.
[122] Epialtes’ calculation that the circuit of the path would be completed about the middle of the morning must, judging from the details given of the actual march, have been singularly correct.
[123] Leake says that the descent was not much less than the ascent in actual distance; but that as the ground was better, and the march performed by daylight, the time spent was shorter. Leake is certainly in error. The place were the Phocians were surprised is recognizable with certainty, I think, at the present day. It corresponds with what Herodotus tells us of the incident, and it is absolutely the only place along the whole path where the events narrated could have taken place. When the Persians reached that point, which is probably the highest altitude attained by the path, they would have traversed two-thirds of the whole distance. I must say that Leake’s attempt to reconcile his views with those of Herodotus by saying that the rest of the path is easier than that previously traversed is quite contrary to my own actual experience. From the summit to Drakospilia its character is that of a track winding amid rocks through a thick fir forest. Not until you get close to Drakospilia does the country really open up.
[124] They advanced, that is to say, to a position somewhere near the modern baths.
[125] They had fought, that is, on the low ground at the foot of Kallidromos immediately to the west of the mound.
[126] The statement that they already knew that they must be taken in the rear is in accord with Herodotus’ idea of what took place. It is, however, probable that they heard early from Alpenoi, to which some of their sick had been sent, of the fact that the other division of their army had not succeeded in stopping, or, possibly, had not attempted to stop Hydarnes.
[127] The pillar at Sparta, with their names inscribed upon it, remained standing in Pausanias’ time (iii. 14, 1).
[128] The position was well designed for a last desperate stand. The rear was protected by the small but deep valley between the first and second mound. It is noticeable that they did not attempt to defend the wall. It may seem strange that they should not have done this. The position of the wall, however, running along the neck of land joining the hillock and the slope at Kallidromos, would expose its defenders to an attack from the rear. The Greeks evidently retreated from their position near the modern baths; through the narrows between that and the hillock; and up to the west slope of the latter, passing the wall at the summit of the slope on to the mound itself.
[129] The parallel diary of events as it appears in Herodotus is as follows:—
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Day.| Thermopylæ. | Artemisium. ----+------------------------------+---------------------------------- | Persian army leaves Therma. | | | 12 | | Persian fleet leaves Therma | | and reaches Magnesian coast. | | 13 | | Storm begins in morning. | | 14 | Army reaches Malis. | Storm continues. | | 15 | | Storm continues. | | 16 | | Storm ceases. Fleet moves to | | Aphetæ. Despatch of 200 vessels | | round Eubœa. First sea fight. | | 17 | | Second sea fight after the | | arrival of 53 Athenian ships. | | 18 | First attack on Thermopylæ. | Third sea fight. News of disaster | | at Thermopylæ in the evening. | | 19 | Second attack on Thermopylæ. | | | 20 | Disaster at Thermopylæ. | ---+------------------------------+----------------------------------
[130] Herodotus does not give any indication as to the time at which the Greeks received news of the disaster. It is necessary therefore to make certain calculations as to the earliest possible moment at which the news can have reached them. As far as can be seen from the narrative, the ten Persian scouting vessels started from Therma on the same day as the main body of the fleet, but probably at an earlier hour. It must have been well on in the morning before they came upon the Greek vessels off the mouth of the Peneius, which is fifty miles from Therma. The only conceivable means by which news of the engagement could have reached Skiathos, some seventy miles south of this point, is by the appearance of those ten vessels with the captured Greek ships in their company. That being the case, the Greek fleet at Artemisium cannot have received the news before the evening of the day.
[131] The ancient Mekistos.
[132] It is more probable that it was under the shelter of the great cliffs of Mount Kandili, in the neighbourhood of the modern Limni. There is a sandy shore for many miles at the foot of those cliffs, upon which vessels might be conveniently drawn up.
[133] A nine-knot steamer takes about seven hours from Chalkis to Stylida, which is about the same distance as from Chalkis to Artemisium. There is no question that a trireme could maintain a high rate of speed for hours together. Nor is there reason to doubt Herodotus’ statement that the voyage of the Persian fleet from Therma to the Sepiad strand took but one day, a distance, that is to say, of one hundred and twenty miles in fourteen hours of daylight, over eight miles an hour—even supposing that such a large number of vessels could put out and put in in the dark. The probability is, however, that the fleet never went to Chalkis at all; or, if it did, that it moved up the Euripus after receiving the news of the disaster to the Persian fleet, so as to be ready to go to Artemisium without delay so soon as the storm ceased.
[134] The strong bias which Herodotus displays in his references to Themistocles is of itself sufficient to render the tale of bribery open to suspicion. Furthermore, the sum mentioned, thirty talents, is an extraordinarily large sum for the people of North Eubœa to raise at short notice.
[135] Diod. xi. 12, mentions this, but gives the number of the squadron as three hundred.
[136] Diodorus gives no exact indication of the time of despatch, though he mentions it immediately after describing the arrival at Aphetæ.
[137] Same day as first engagement (_vide_ note over page).
[138] If any calculation can be made from this very defective chapter of Herodotus’ history, this day must have been the eighteenth day. ◆H. viii 14, 15.◆The three combats at Artemisium are represented as having taken place on successive days. The last took place on the day of the disaster at Thermopylæ, _i.e._ the twentieth day. Therefore the first took place on the eighteenth, ◆H. viii. 9.◆ and it is represented as having taken place on the evening of the day on which the council of war was held.
[139] This view is supported by Herodotus’ account of what took place next day. The storm in which the Persian flying squadron is wrecked takes place on the evening of the eighteenth day. When the storm ceased we do not know. But it is certain that the fifty-three Attic vessels must have ridden it out at Chalkis, and that they, after it was over, made the long voyage from Chalkis to Artemisium, where they found the Greek fleet. The storm must have been a brief one; and if, as Herodotus says, there had been a definite resolution on the part of the Greek commanders to move south in the early hours of the morning of the nineteenth day, no reason is apparent why it should not have been carried out. The real design of the Greeks was probably to make an attempt to beat the divided Persian fleet in detail.
[140] Though Herodotus is aware of a connection between the positions at Thermopylæ and Artemisium, there is nothing whatever in his account which suggests that he understood how necessary the connection was for the maintenance of the pass. Had he appreciated this, he would hardly have treated as serious history such parts of the Artemisium tradition of his time as asserted that the responsible Greek commanders ever entertained the idea of such action as must have inevitably sacrificed the lives of the defenders of the pass. He has given the irresponsible gossip and criticism of the Peloponnesian section of the fleet the appearance of responsible and authoritative design, and has served up the whole with copious Attic sauce. There is, however, no reason for supposing that the historian was in any way guilty of historical dishonesty. He simply did not possess that knowledge of military affairs which would have enabled him to see the flaws in the evidence which came to his hand; and this negative defect was further complicated by what was, from the point of view of strict history, the positive one of accepting anything in the tradition of the war which would bring into relief the patriotic services of Athens. If we tone down the intensely Attic colouring in Herodotus’ account of Artemisium, that is to say, such passages as are designed to bring into relief the difficulty of keeping the fleet at its station, we have, in all probability, a good historical account, in so far as it goes, of this part of the campaign of 480.
[141] The manœuvre of the διέκπλους seems one of the most simple things in the world when it has been discovered. Yet in modern times it took the English sailors more than a century of hard fighting to find out its effectiveness. Thucydides, who knows what he is talking about in naval matters, certainly conveys the impression that it was an invention of his own time, or, at any rate, that it had, as a manœuvre, been gradually evolved within the period of the Pentekontaëtia. And yet, here we have it at Artemisium! Nay, more than that, fourteen years earlier, according to Herodotus, Dionysios of Phokæa was trying to teach it to those unappreciative Ionians at Ladé. It is probable that both in this passage and in the one relating to Ladé, Herodotus is guilty of an anachronism in attributing that manœuvre to the naval warfare of the first quarter of the fifth century. The term was probably much in men’s mouths at the time which he wrote, and, in his ignorance of naval matters, he assumed that the ruling idea in the sea tactics of his own day might be safely attributed to the previous generation. Compare also H. viii. 11 with Thuc. ii. 83, _ad fin_.
[142] There is an undesigned consistency between the two accounts of the effects of the storm in North and South Eubœa respectively. A glance at the map will show that, (1) in the North, the driving of the wreckage towards the shores of Aphetæ; (2) in the South, the driving of the 200 vessels upon the Hollows of Eubœa, both indicate a storm from the South or S.S.W.
[143] It seems to have taken some thirty hours to round Skiathos, and voyage down the east coast of Eubœa.
[144] The identity of these bays with Τά Κοίλα has been called in question in modern times. If this passage in Herodotus were the only evidence we possessed, the question of their position would manifestly be a very open one. All that Herodotus’ language seems to indicate is that they were a well-known feature in the geography of South Eubœa. Had they not been so, we should have expected so painstaking a topographer to have given some indications of their actual position. His silence, and the inference to be drawn from it, is not without significance. The Hollows would hardly have been a well-known feature had they been east of the South Cape, away from the line of sea traffic; whereas on the west shore they would be in full view of all vessels using the frequented passage of the Euripus. I think, too, that any one who has seen that coast of Eubœa, either from Attica, or when passing up the channel, cannot but have been struck with the depth of the colour which the retiring coast-line of these bays gives to the Eubœan landscape thus viewed. Their recesses give that appearance of “hollowness” from which the ancient name must have been derived. We are not, however, dependent on Herodotus alone for indications as to their locality. _Vide_ Liv. 31, 47; Strabo, 445; Valer Max. 1, 8, 10.
[145] It is exceedingly unlikely that the Persian squadron would have been able to force the narrows at Chalkis, if, as was almost certainly the case, the fifty-three Attic vessels were ready to defend it. But had they put in at Eretria and blocked the channel south, the position of the main Greek fleet, in case of anything resembling a reverse at Artemisium, would have been very precarious.
[146] The fact that they were able to single out a special contingent for attack confirms, by implication, Diodorus’ statement as to the scattered nature of the anchorage at Aphetæ.
[147] The effect of the engagement on the minds of the Greeks is mentioned in language which is almost, word for word, a repetition of that which he has used on a previous occasion. He says, Δρησμὸν δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.—H. viii. 18. Cf. the expression in viii. 4.
[148] In speaking of Doris, Herodotus says: Ή δὲ χώρη αὕτη ἐστὶ μητρόπολις Δωριέων τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ. That the land had a Dorian population in the fifth century B.C. is undoubtedly the case; but its claim to be metropolis of the Dorians of the south was in all probability set up by the Spartan authorities, as affording a convenient pretext for interference in Greek affairs north of Isthmus. It is probable that this corner of Greece, of which the Malian plain was the centre, contained patches of various peoples which had in different ages traversed the peninsula, or which had been driven into its mountain fastnesses by the passage of invaders:—Dorians, Œtæans, Trachinians, etc., were probably such remains of larger tribes.
[149] Herodotus seems from his language to assume (viii. 31) that the whole army had come south by the Dorian route. That is, either a mistake; or, more probably, the impression his language gives is due to a mere omission. Few details are given of any part of the route of the army.
[150] The position at Delphi, from a military point of view, is by no means weak, provided Amphissa be occupied, and the great pass from the north be thus closed. Under those circumstances, unless the assailant is in a position to land troops at the head of the Krissæan gulf, the only line of attack is along this easily defensible path from the west. It is imaginable that Xerxes, knowing it to be an open town, under-estimated the difficulty of its capture.
[151] Pogon is an almost land-locked harbour between the island of Kalauria and the mainland.
[152] A Comparison of the Lists of Vessels at Artemisium and Salamis respectively.
T. = trireme; P. = pentekonters.
------------------------------+----------------------+-------------- | Artemisium. | Salamis. | | Athenians (some Platæans in | {127 T. | crews at Artemisium) | 53 T. later} 180 T. | 180 T. Corinthians | 40 T. | 40 T. Megareans | 20 T. | 20 T. Chalkidians in Athenian ships | 20 T. | 20 T. Æginetans | 18 T. | 30 T. Sikyonians | 12 T. | 15 T. Lacedæmonians | 10 T. | 16 T. Epidaurians | 8 T. | 10 T. Eretrians | 7 T. | 7 T. Trœzenians | 5 T. | 5 T. Styreans | 2 T. | 2 T. Keians | 2 T.; 2 P. | 2 T.; 2 P. Opuntian Locrians | 7 P. | — Hermionians | — | 3 T. Ambrakiots | — | 7 T. Leukadians | — | 3 T. Naxians | — | 4 T. Kythnians | — | 1 T.; 1 P. Krotonians | — | 1 T. Malians | — | 2 P. Siphnians | — | 1 P. Seriphians | — | 1 P. +--------------------- +-------------- | 324 T.; 9 P. | 366 T.; 7 P. ------------------------------+----------------------+--------------
Æschylus gives 310 as the number of the Greek fleet. Valuable as is the testimony of the poet with regard to those incidents in the battle which he observed as an eye-witness, his evidence on the dry question of numbers is not likely to be exact.
[153] She did, indeed, send sixty vessels, to observe, so said the patriot Greeks, how the war went, but not with any intention of taking part therein. The Corcyræans’ own excuse for their non-participation was that their fleet had been unable to round Malea.
[154] The mistake may be that of a manuscript copyist; but such mistakes are so common in the text of Herodotus, that they afford strong ground for supposing that the historian was, like the men of his time, inaccurate in numerical calculations. The mistake may be in the detailed list. ◆Paus. ii. 29. 5.◆ Pausanias implies that the Æginetan contingent was superior in numbers to that of the Corinthian, that is to say, more than forty. If the number were forty-two, the total given by Herodotus would be correct; and it is noticeable in this reference that he himself, in speaking of the number of ships which Ægina supplied, ◆H. viii. 46.◆ says: “Of the islanders the Æginetans supplied thirty; they had indeed other ships manned; but with these they were guarding their own country; but with the thirty best sailers they fought at Salamis.”
[155] By Professor J. W. Bury.
[156] Macan, Herod, iv., v., vi., “Athens and Ægina.”
[157] _Note on the Reference to Siris in Themistocles’ Speech._—The reference to Siris inevitably suggests that this reported passage in Themistocles’ speech is an invention of later date arising from the colonization of Thurii in or about 443. The rapid growth of Athenian trade in the earlier part of the fifth century, and its peculiar development along the western route, render it possible, however, that an idea of settlement on or near the deserted city of Sybaris may have been long anterior to the actual settlement, and may have been mooted even before 480. If Plutarch is to be believed, Themistocles had direct relations with Corcyra, and gave the name of Sybaris to one, and the name of Italia to the other of his daughters (Plut. Them. 32).
[158] H. viii. 74. τέλος δὲ ἐξερράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον. Cf. also Diod. xi. 16, _ad fin_.
[159] This Council of War must have been held on the morning of the day preceding the battle. It lasted, in all probability, several hours, and, if so, this would indicate the afternoon as the time at which Xerxes received the message of Themistocles. On this point, then, the indications in the narrative of Æschylus and Herodotus are in agreement.
[160] Plut. Them. also mentions the same name; but the testimony is probably dependent on that of Herodotus.
[161] There is a curious triangular concord at this point in the history.
Diodorus says that the Egyptian contingent was sent to block the strait towards the Megarid (xi. 17).
Plutarch says 200 vessels were sent to close the passage round Salamis (Them. 12).
Herodotus mentions that the Egyptian contingent numbered 200 (vii. 89).
[162] This would account for the fact implied by Æsch. Pers. 400: the two fleets when they started their movement were not in sight of one another, though, very shortly after the movement began, the Persian fleet was visible to the Greeks. The latter would first catch sight of it after it rounded the Kynosura promontory and the island.
[163] Cf. Arist. 8, where the revocation is said to have taken place τρίτῳ ἔτει after the sentence.
[164] Cf. Stein’s brief note on the translation of the words στὰς ἐπὶ τὸ συνέδριον in H. viii. 79.
[165] In so far as I know, this last very important point was first raised by Prof. J. B. Bury in an article in the _Classical Review_ on “Aristides at Salamis.”
[166] This is Professor Bury’s suggestion. It is open to the objection that Herodotus expressly mentions the arrival of this vessel (H. viii. 83) _immediately_ before the battle began. But this objection is not by any means insuperable. It is much more probable, under the circumstances, that Herodotus made a mistake as to the time of its arrival, than that it managed at the time he mentions to force its way through the blockading fleets at either end of the strait.
[167] It would seem as if it were a description of this movement, taken from his notes on, or sources of information for, the details of the battle, which Herodotus has used by mistake in describing the movement of the Persian fleet during the night. He has, of course, intensely confused the original description by reading into it what he knew to be the object of that night-movement—the surrounding of the Greek fleet by blocking the issues both to east and west of it; but, eliminating this motive from his description, it is possible to see that in its original form it must have resembled very closely the description of the advance of the Persian fleet which has been drawn from the details which Æschylus and Diodorus give.
H. viii. 76. “The west wing put out and made a circling movement towards Salamis.” It has been already pointed out that by “west wing” Herodotus evidently means, not the west wing in the original formation, but the west wing when the fleet had completed the movement, and had taken up the position which he imagined it to have assumed when the movement was complete. This “west wing” would be the east wing in the original position. That it cannot have been the original west wing has been pointed out in a previous note.
If this correction be made, Herodotus’ language in describing this movement is peculiarly applicable to the movement of that part of the Persian fleet which entered the strait by the channel east of Psyttaleia—ἀνῆγον κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα; and the applicability becomes still more striking in view of the evidence, which will be given later, that this wing of the Persian fleet got in advance of the other.
The left wing, which would use the channel west of Psyttaleia, is equally referred to in the words: “Those about Keos and Kynosura put out in order,” to which he adds, in accordance with his knowledge that part of the object of the night-movement was the blocking of the straits, “And they occupied the whole strait as far as Munychia with their ships.”
[168] This phenomenon of the morning wind is very common in the Greek seas. It will be remembered that Phormio based his tactics in his first battle with the Corinthian fleet just outside the Corinthian gulf on its occurrence. I have experienced it there; and on the three occasions on which I have been through the Strait of Salamis, once in the summer of 1895, and twice in the summer of 1899, I have experienced it on each occasion. It began in all three cases quite suddenly, a little before seven in the morning, blowing from the west, right down that part of the strait south of Ægaleos. It was extremely violent while it lasted, though it did not raise a dangerous sea. To the inexperienced it gave the impression that it meant the beginning of a very windy day. On two occasions it ceased about 8.30, on the other, shortly after nine, and the dead calm by which it had been preceded ensued once more.
[169] As is shown by the presence of an Attic vessel opposite the Persian left, where her ships must almost certainly have been.
[170] Cf. Æsch. Pers. 724,—Ναυτικὸς στρατὸς κακωθεὶς πεζὸν ὤλεσε στρατόν. Thuc. i. 73, 5.—Νικωθεις γὰρ ταῖς ναυσίν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας οὔσης της δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀπεχώρησεν.
[171] Modern historians have taken this account of the intended or attempted construction of the mole too seriously. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the only point in the strait east of the bay of Eleusis at which it could possibly be carried out, is at the narrows where the island of St. George contracts the width of the channel, and that it is impossible that, under the circumstances as they stood, Xerxes should have been able to bring vessels to that part of the strait. But Herodotus never attempts to give the impression that the operation was ever undertaken seriously; he makes it plain, indeed, that it was not. If that were so, and it was merely designed to give the Greeks a wrong impression, it did not in the least matter whether it was made at a possible or impossible point. Ktesias, Pers. 26, and Strabo, 395, say that the mole was begun before the battle. This would imply that a serious attempt was made to construct it. The notorious unreliability of Ktesias, and the lateness of Strabo’s evidence, render this account of the matter unworthy of consideration.
[172] H. viii. 103. Λέγουσα γὰρ ἐπετύγχανε τὰ πὲρ᾿ αὐτὸς ἐνόεε.
[173] Οὐδεμία συμφορὴ μεγάλη ἔσται σεό τε περιεόντος καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν πρηγμάτων περὶ οἶκον τὸν σόν.
[174] It has been suggested that the real intention was to induce the Ionians to revolt. The behaviour of this contingent in the recent battle was not calculated to encourage such a plan, conceived within a few days of the actual fight.
[175] Ἐπείτε οὐκ ἐπαύετο λέγων ταῦτα ὁ Τιμόδημος, etc.
[176] May it not be suggested that some archæologist acquainted with the extant remains of Phœnician Carthage might confer a distinct service on history by examining the structures at Agrigentum which date from this period? The workman as well as the designer must have set his mark there.
[177] It has already been remarked that his description of Thermopylæ is that of a traveller coming from the north—“from Achaia”—as he himself says.
[178] Herodotus himself (ix. 8) takes this view of the matter. He implies that the Spartans did not care whether the Athenians medized or not after the wall was completed. It is quite out of the question, however, to suppose that the Spartans could have regarded with equanimity the possible transference of the Athenian fleet to the Persian side. They had the experience of Artemisium and Salamis to guide them.
[179] It is sometimes assumed from H. vii. 229, that the usual quota was one helot to each hoplite; but a more probable interpretation of that passage is that the reference is to the personal armed servant who accompanied each hoplite to war, and that it cannot be deduced therefrom that the body of these formed the whole number of the helots present on an ordinary occasion.
Modern criticism of the impossibility of despatching so large a force unknown to the Athenian embassy is not convincing. We do not know the place at which it gathered. It is extremely likely that a large number of helots were drawn from Messenia, and joined the army at Orestheion, where the great route from Messenia meets the route from Sparta by way of the valley of the Eurotas.
[180] His departure from the Isthmus is ascribed by Herodotus to the fact that when he was sacrificing ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ an eclipse of the sun took place. This eclipse has been calculated to have occurred on the 2nd of October, 480. If so, it would be about the time of the Persian retreat from Attica after Salamis, and Stein’s conjecture that the sacrifice had something to do with a plan to harass the Persian retreat, has a certain amount of probability in its favour.
[181] If Sparta had been careless as to whether Athens medized or not, she might, probably would, have despatched troops to the Isthmus at an earlier date. But if she was waiting until pressure of circumstances forced Athens to adopt Peloponnesian views as to the line of defence, then the delay is accounted for. Had her army been at the Isthmus when Mardonius advanced into Bœotia, the Athenians would certainly have called upon it to carry out the agreement, and march to the northward of Kithæron. In that case the Spartan government would have been obliged either to comply, or, by a refusal, to show in the most unmistakeable manner possible the war policy which it intended to adopt.
[182] I was, I confess, surprised to find in August, 1899, that, in spite of the excellent road to Megara from Bœotia by the way of Eleusis, the track on the old line of the Platæa-Megara road is still largely used.
[183] A road has been constructed through it in recent years, running from Kriekouki on the Bœotian side to Villa on the south of the range.
[184] I am inclined to think that the site of Skolos is that which Leake, and others following him, have identified with Erythræ. Paus. ix. 4, 3, says that if before crossing the Asopos river on the road from Platæa to Thebes, you turned off down the stream, and went about forty stades, _i.e._ four and three-quarter miles, you came to the ruins of Skolos. This would place it not far east of the road from Thebes to Dryoskephalæ. He speaks of Skolos in another passage as a village of Parasopia beneath Kithæron, a rugged place, and δυσοικητός. That seems to preclude the idea of its being near the river, which traverses alluvial lands at this part of its course. The ruins identified by Leake as Erythræ cannot belong to that town if the testimony of Herodotus and Pausanias is accurately worded. This point will be discussed in a later note. In actual fact, however, the exact site of Skolos is very difficult to determine. My main reason for suggesting that it stood where Leake places Erythræ is that those ruins are the only ruins in the neighbourhood indicated by Pausanias, and are certainly not the ruins of Erythræ.
[185] It is necessary to pursue so obvious a line of argument, because, for some incomprehensible reason, modern historians have thought it right to judge of the plans of these able Persian commanders as though they were dictated by no higher considerations than such as might occur to an untutored savage.
[186] The weakness of this line in case of attack from the north was conclusively shown twenty years later in the manœuvres which led to the battle of Tanagra.
[187] It is almost certain that an ancient road from Eleusis followed the eminently natural line taken by the modern road from Eleusis to Eleutheræ. There was also, in all probability, a route from Athens to Eleutheræ which did not enter Eleusis at all, but, branching from the Sacred Way near the Rheitoi after traversing the low pass through Mount Ægaleos, went up the Thriasian plain and joined the road from Eleusis among the low hills of Western Attica.
[188] These ridges will be found numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, in the accompanying map.
[189] Marked A 6 in the map.
[190] Called in the map, for purposes of distinction, the Asopos ridge, the Long ridge, and the Plateau.
[191] Those of the streams marked A 4 and A 5 on the map.
[192] During my stay at Kriekouki, in December ’92–January ’93, the rainfall was at times extraordinarily heavy. Nevertheless, I had not on any occasion the slightest difficulty in crossing any of the streams, and it was not even necessary to get wet in so doing. On one occasion also I happened to be following the line of one of the watercourses leading to the Œroë amid a downpour of rain such as we rarely see in England, which had been going on with more or less continuity for the previous fourteen hours; and yet, as I descended the brook towards the plain the water became less and less until, on the plain, there was no water running in the stream bed.
[193] Pausanias knew the roads through these two passes.
(1) Platæa-Athens road.
He says (xi. 1, 6) that Neokles, the Bœotarch, in his surprise of Platæa in the year 374, led the Thebans οὐ τὴν εὐθεῖαν ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβῶν τὴν πεδιάδα, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ Ὑσιὰς ἦγε πρὸς Ἐλευθερῶν τε καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.
There will be occasion to show that Hysiæ was in all probability a small place, on a site just outside the southernmost end of the village of Kriekouki. It was therefore at the eastern side of the opening of the valley through which the road from Platæa to Athens passed. The remains of that ancient road are, however, at the other side of the valley opening; and, therefore, Hysiæ was not upon it. Probably, however, down the valley came a track which is still used, and which, after passing through the village of Kriekouki, goes due north to Thebes in a line parallel to the main road from Dryoskephalæ. This would be the road which Pausanias here mention. It would, in entering the valley to the pass, go close to this site of Hysiæ. Of the identity of this site it will be necessary to speak in a later note.
In 379, after the revolution in Thebes (X. H. v. 4, 14), the Spartans despatched Kleombrotos with a force to Bœotia. As Chabrias, with Athenian peltasts, was guarding “the road through Eleutheræ,” he went, κατὰ τὴν εἰς Πλαταιὰς φέρουσαν.
This is almost certainly the Platæa-Athens pass. Kleombrotos probably did not discover that the Dryoskephalæ pass was guarded until he got to Eleutheræ. After doing so he turned to the left and made his way through the Platæa-Athens pass, exterminating a small body of troops which attempted to defend it.
(2) The Platæa-Megara road.
Pausanias (ix. 2, 3) says, Τοῖς δὲ ἐκ Μεγάρων ἰοῦσι πηγή τέ ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ καὶ προελθοῦσιν ὀλίγον πέτρα· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀκταίωνος κοίτην.
In the previous sentence he has expressly spoken of the road from Eleutheræ to Platæa. The Megara road is therefore a different road. The κοὶτη Ἀκταίωνος can, I think, be determined with sufficient certainty at the present day. It is on the top of a low cliff, probably the πέτρα mentioned, overhanging the sources of the stream O 3. Near the foot of the cliff is an ancient well, known in Leake’s time as the Vergutiani Spring.
[194] Ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπωρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος.
[195] The site of Erythræ.
Colonel Leake identified it with certain ruins which are found at the foot of the mountain slope several miles east of the road from Dryoskephalæ to Thebes. The available evidence seems to me to be strongly against this view.
(1) The traditional site is where I have placed it, though I am afraid that but little stress can be laid on traditions in modern Greece.
(2) Its comparatively frequent mention by Greek writers seems to indicate that, though a small place, its position was of some importance. If Leake’s view be correct this cannot have been the case. If it were where I believe it to have been, it would be at the northern exit of one of the most important passes in Greece. There is an ancient φρουρίον on the bastion of Kithæron to the east of the site. Its remains are so scanty, however, that they do not afford any clue as to its date.
(3) There are remains of ancient buildings on the site. There are also remains of an ancient well, besides which is a heap of stones, from which two stones were obtained a few years ago with inscriptions showing them to have belonged to a temple of Eleusinian Demeter. Pausanias mentions so many temples in the neighbourhood dedicated to that deity, that the discovery contributes but little to the identification of the site. I was informed at Kriekouki last year (August, 1899) that those particular stones were known to have been originally discovered on another site. As neither my informant nor any one else could tell me whence, why, or by whom they were removed, I did not place much credence in the report.
(4) Pausanias says (ix. 2, 1), Γῆς δὲ τῆς Πλαταιίδος ἐν τῶ Κιθαιρῶνι ὀλίγον τῆς εὐθείας ἐκτραπεῖσιν ἐς δεξιὰν Ὑσιῶν καὶ Ἐρυθρῶν ἐρείπιά ἐστι; and further on (ix. 2, 2), he says, referring to the road of which he is speaking: αὕτη μὲν (_i.e._ ὅδος) ἀπ’ Ἐλευθερῶν ἐς Πλάταιαν ἄγει. The road referred to is of course the Athens-Platæa road, on which he is travelling towards Platæa. Can any one suppose that Pausanias would have used the expression quoted, especially the word ὀλίγον, had the ruins of Erythræ, as Leake conjectured, lain some three and a half miles away from the nearest point of this road, and hidden from it, moreover, by the great projecting bastion of Kithæron, which is shown at the south-east corner of the accompanying map?
Leake quotes Thucydides (iii. 24), who says that the two hundred and twelve fugitives from Platæa first took the Thebes road in order to put their pursuers off the scent, and then turning, ᾔεσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὁδόν ἐς Ἐρύθρας καὶ Ὑσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὀρῶν διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Meanwhile the pursuers were searching the road along the ὐπωρέη. This last road would lead the pursuers near the site where I conjecture Hysiæ to have stood, and the objection may be raised that it is unlikely that the fugitives would have gone to a place close to the road along which they could see the pursuers were searching for them. It is, however, to be remarked that Thucydides does _not_ say that they went to either Erythræ or Hysiæ. Had he intended to imply this he would have mentioned those places in their proper order, Hysiæ first and Erythræ second. Whenever he refers to the actual _course_ taken by a body of men, or by a fleet, he invariably mentions the places _touched at_ or _arrived at_ in their geographical order. _Vide_ Th. ii. 48, 1; ii. 56, 5; ii. 69, 1; iv. 5, 2; vii. 2, 2; vii. 31, 2.
The passage seems perfectly comprehensible and in accord with the hypothesis which I put forward with respect to the positions of Hysiæ and Erythræ. These fugitives, turning from the Platæa-Thebes road, took the track which in modern times leads from Pyrgos to Kriekouki, and which in ancient times would be the road from Thespiæ to Hysiæ, Erythræ, and the passes. They did not go _to_ but _towards_ those places, making in reality for those high rugged bastions to the north-east of the pass of Dryoskephalæ.
But, after all, Pausanias’ words in the passage quoted dispose effectively of Colonel Leake’s site. He would not have described a place twenty-five stades away from the road as a _short_ distance to the right of it.
(5) Herodotus (ix. 15) speaks of the Persian camp as ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ Ἐρυθρέων παρὰ Ὑσιάς, κατέτεινε δὲ ἐς τὴν Πλαταίιδα γῆν. These words merely show that Erythræ was east of Hysiæ.
(6) Perhaps one of the strongest pieces of evidence is Herodotus’ statement that the first Greek position was “at Erythræ.” Is it conceivable that the Greek force, especially in its then state of feeling with regard to the Persians, would be likely, after issuing from the pass of Dryoskephalæ, to turn east along Kithæron, leave the pass open, and take up a position with their backs to a part of the range through which there was no passage of retreat?
(7) We are told later that their reason for moving to their second position was the question of water-supply. This accords with the present state of the locality about the traditional Erythræ. The streams in that neighbourhood have but little water in them in the dry season.
(8) The ground in this neighbourhood accords peculiarly with the description given by Herodotus of the first engagement.
[196] Marked ridges 1, 2, 3, 4, in the map.
[197] These positions will be found marked upon the accompanying map. It is necessary, however, to explain the evidence on which they are determined.
[198] The details of the contingents given by Herodotus are:—
Lacedæmonians— Spartans 5000 Periœki 5000 Helots 35,000 Tegeans 1500 Corinthians 5000 Potidæans 300 Orchomenians (Arcadia) 600 Sikyonians 3000 Epidaurians 800 Trœzenians 1000 Lepreans 200 Mykenæans and Tirynthians 400 Phliasians 1000 Hermionians 300 Eretrians and Styreans 600 Chalkidians 400 Ambrakiots 500 Leukadians and Anaktorians 800 Paleans from Kephallenia 200 Æginetans 500 Megareans 3000 Platæans 600 Athenians 8000 Miscellaneous light-armed troops 34,500 ====== Total 108,200
[199] _I.e._ A 1. In the days before scientific survey there was frequently the utmost confusion with regard to the application of names to the head streams of main rivers. This generally took the form of applying the name of the main stream to several of its feeders. The tendency of the local population was to apply the well-known name to that upper tributary which was in their immediate neighbourhood, and was therefore best known to them. Examples of this are frequent in England; the upper waters of the Thames are a case in point. In early sketch maps it will be found that the name Thames is applied with the utmost diversity to the head streams of the river, and even a tributary so far down as the Evenlode is sometimes given the name of the main river. This is, I fancy, what has taken place with regard to the Asopos. The Platæans, with whom Herodotus must have come in contact in the course of his visit to the region, called this stream, A 1, by the name of the main river, and consequently “Asopos” in Herodotus is to be understood to mean this stream up to its junction with the stream which comes from the west, rising not far from Leuktra, and, after that, to refer to what is really the main river. From Platæa itself the course of this stream is plainly traceable in the plain, running along the western base of the Asopos ridge. The stream coming from Leuktra is not visible, and it is quite conceivable that Herodotus never had any definite knowledge of its existence. In Leake’s time (_vide_ his sketch map) the inhabitants of Kriekouki seem to have called the stream, A 6, Asopos. It is not so called at the present day. My own impression is, however, that Herodotus, although he heard the Platæans speak of A 1 as the Asopos, may in one passage refer to the stream from Leuktra with a special attribute: τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα (♠H. ix. 31). A sentence previously, at the end of ♥Chapter 30, he has a reference to the Asopos without any qualification, οὗτοι μὲν νὺν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδἐυοντο, and this reference is undoubtedly to A 1, which is to him, as other references in his narrative show, the upper Asopos “ordinarily so called.”
♠ “H. ix. 26” replaced with “H. ix. 31” ♥ “Chapter 25” replaced with “Chapter 30”
[200] H. ix. 31, _ad init._, πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἶναι ἐν Πλαταιῇσι.
[201] Cf. especially the mention of the Asopos and its context in