CHAPTER IV.

PERSIAN OPERATIONS IN EUROPE: B.C. 493–490. MARATHON.

There had been a passive as well as an active side to the revolt. Its effects had been more far reaching than its activities. On the European side the Hellespont region,[49] Thrace and Macedonia had thrown off the Persian yoke, but there is no record of their having joined in the offensive against the Persian. The Hellespontine cities on the Asiatic shore had been already reduced. ◆H. vi. 33.◆ The fleet now proceeded to the reduction of the further shore of the Propontis. Miltiades’ principality in the Thracian Chersonese, Perinthos, the forts Thraceward, together with Selymbria, Byzantion, and Kalchedon were subjugated once more. From Byzantion and Kalchedon the inhabitants fled to the Pontus, whither the Phœnicians did not, possibly dare not, follow them. These towns were burnt.

The position of Miltiades during the years of the revolt is another of the many obscure points of the history of the time. ◆H. vi. 40.◆ According to Herodotus, he had been driven out of his principality somewhere about the year 496 by a Scythian raid, which is alleged to have been an act of revenge for Darius’ expedition; and had only been restored to it subsequently by the aid of the Dolonki, the race which had originally handed over the district to the rule of his family. He appears at Marathon as a practised general; yet there is no trace whatever of his part in the revolt having been other than purely passive. His act seems, indeed, to have been rather defection than revolt.[50]

On the evidence available, nothing is clear but that Miltiades considered that he had hopelessly compromised himself with the insurgents; so much so, that, when he heard the Persian fleet was at Tenedos, he placed his movable property on five triremes and set sail for Athens.

His position as ruler of this little principality must have been a very difficult one while the revolt was in progress. On the one hand, he had to watch the wild Thracian tribes on the north; and this may account for his apparent inactivity at the time. On the other hand, he had to decide between the prospective dangers of defection from Persia and the more immediate peril of an attack from the Ionian fleet, when, early in 497, it appeared in the Hellespont. The sense of the certain danger of the moment seems to have overcome whatever feeling he may have had with regard to the risk of throwing off the Persian yoke.

Of his five ships, four reached Athens in safety; but the fifth, with his son Metiochos on board, was overtaken by the Phœnicians, and captured. The youth was sent up to Darius at Susa, who treated him with kindness.[51]

◆H. vi. 42.◆

The hostilities upon the Asian coast had been brought to a close by the complete submission of the Ionian districts. #REORGANIZATION OF GREEK ASIA.# The peculiar enlightenment of the Persia of this age in contrast with other Oriental monarchies is shown by the settlement of affairs in Asia made when the fighting was all over. There seems to be a certain irony in the attitude taken towards the Greeks. It is assumed that the Ionian cities had been, if not their own, at any rate each other’s worst enemies; and the most prominent feature of the reorganization is the regulation of their relations to one another.

Artaphernes summoned representatives from the various cities to Sardes, and compelled them to make mutual agreements providing means for the settlement of disputes, whether public or private, between the states, and for the discontinuance of raids on neighbour’s property. The last provision casts a somewhat lurid light on the unruly character of these subjects of the empire.

He further caused a survey to be made of the territories of the cities, on which was founded a new assessment of tribute, which, so Herodotus says, differed but little from the previous assessment, and continued in force until his own time.[52]

The reconquest of Thrace and Macedonia was the next object of the king. The absence of evidence as to the nature of the attitude of these regions towards Persia at the time of the revolt, renders it impossible to say whether they had actually thrown off the yoke, or whether it had not rather fallen from them in consequence of the European shore being denuded of Persian troops for the operations in Asia. They seem to have lapsed rather than revolted. This view is supported by the fact that, though they had to be reconquered, that reconquest, apart from a disaster due to natural causes, seems to have been carried out without much difficulty, and yet effectively.

It might have been supposed that the large naval and military force which must have been present in Western Asia during the last year of the revolt, would have been sufficient for the operations in Europe; but, apart from the inevitable losses in the war, a large number of the available troops may have been required for the occupation of the recently conquered districts.

◆H. vi. 43.◆

Be that as it may, very large reinforcements came westward from Susa in the spring of the year 492, under the command of Mardonios, that general who was destined thirteen years later to meet his death on the field of Platæa. He superseded Harpagos, Otanes, and the other unnamed generals in the command, so Herodotus says. It is, on the whole, unlikely that they were actually dismissed from their positions. The truth may be that Mardonios appeared as commander-in-chief.

After arriving in Cilicia, he went on board the fleet, and sailed to Ionia along the coast, while his army marched overland.

His first reported act on arrival in Ionia is the deposition of “all” the Ionian tyrants, and the establishment of democracies in the cities. Herodotus adduces this as a proof of the credibility of a story of his that, after the assassination of the pseudo-Smerdis, a proposal was actually made by Otanes, one of the conspirators, that Persia should be constituted as a democracy.

That democracies were established in “all” the states is not the case. There were certainly exceptions, as the evidence of Herodotus himself indicates.[53] But that the measure was a wide one is shown by the great rarity of the instances in which any such tyrants appear in subsequent history, compared with the prominence of the part played by them in previous times.

This measure seems to have been carried out by direct commission from Darius.[54]

#POLICY OF DARIUS.#

The severity meted out to the cities immediately on the suppression of the revolt is so strikingly in contrast with the consideration shown them in the years immediately following it, that it suggests the suspicion that the two modes of treatment were the outcome of two policies, one of which was that of the satraps and commanders in the West, and the other that of Darius himself. The reversal of policy shown in the settlement of Ionia by Artaphernes makes it appear as if the great satrap were acting under orders from Susa; and the further measures taken upon Mardonios’ arrival on the coast are certainly carried out in consequence of the instructions he had received.[55]

The nature of the measures taken indicates some of the causes of unrest in the Greek cities previous to the revolt; namely, unfairness, real or alleged, in the incidence of the tribute; the absence of any peaceable means of settling disputes between the towns, except by the obviously unpopular method of appeal to the satrap; and, above all, the hated system of ruling them by means of tyrants who acted as political agents for the Persians.

Darius was not an ordinary Oriental despot. He was a ruler who, considering the time at which he lived, displayed extraordinary enlightenment and moderation in his dealings with the subject races. This laudable feature of his government cannot be ascribed wholly to his philanthropy. It was largely the outcome of a policy of caution. He was strongly averse to placing large bodies of troops at the disposal of the satraps of the outlying provinces, unless circumstances actually demanded it. The measure taken by Artaphernes, [probably, as it would seem, by Darius’ direct orders,] with regard to the establishment of a system of arbitration between the towns, does of itself show how inadequate under ordinary circumstances were the means at the disposal even of a great satrap for the repression of acts of war against one another on the part of sections of the subject populations within the provincial area. The elimination of causes of discontent among the peoples of the empire was a necessary derivative of Darius’ policy towards the satraps.

The main task, however, which Mardonios was commissioned to perform lay in Europe. Herodotus’ description of the design of the expedition is remarkable.

◆H. vi. 43, 44.◆

“Having crossed the Hellespont in ships, they proceeded on their march against Eretria and Athens. These places were the pretended objects of the expedition. But as they intended to subdue as many of the Greek cities as possible, they in the first place reduced the Thasians with their fleet without resistance, and then with the army added the Macedonians to the number of those in servitude. All the tribes on the near side of Macedonia had been already reduced.”

It is noteworthy that all this had been achieved before serious disaster fell on the expedition. It was _after_ the reduction of Macedonia,—a conquest which the history of subsequent years shows to have been genuine and complete,—that the fleet, coming from Thasos and Akanthos, was caught in a storm off Mount Athos, the easternmost of the promontories of the peninsula of Chalkidike. The _reported_ loss, says Herodotus, was 300 ships and 20,000 men, his language implying that he was disposed to regard the number as exaggerated.

Another disaster of a minor character befel the land forces. They were attacked at night by a tribe in Macedonia called the Brygi; Mardonios himself was wounded, and the Persian losses are said to have been considerable; but Herodotus expressly adds that—

◆H. vi. 45.◆

“Not even the Brygi escaped slavery at the hands of the Persians; for Mardonios did not leave the region until he had reduced them. After subduing them, he took his expedition back [to Asia], for the army had met with disaster at the hands of the Brygi, and the fleet had suffered terribly off Athos. So the expedition went back to Asia, after meeting with disgraceful reverses.”

The two main questions with regard to this expedition are—

(1) As to its intent;

(2) As to its practical results.

Herodotus is plainly of opinion that it was ultimately aimed against European Greece.

#THE EXPEDITION OF 492.#

There can be little doubt that Herodotus is right in his view that the ultimate goal of the expedition was European Greece. The fact that so great a fleet formed part of it indicates that (1) the numbers were very large; (2) that its goal was distant. Other considerations support these indications. The forces, naval and military, in Western Asia, which were very considerable indeed before ever Mardonios came down, must have been largely available for service in Europe after the revolt was suppressed; and the reinforcements which Mardonios brought down with him are expressly stated to have been very large. The fleet at Ladé is reported to have amounted to six hundred vessels. This fleet was presumably still greater, and the numbers of the land force would, in accordance with Persian custom, be proportionately great. (3) If Herodotus’ narrative of the sequence of events is to be taken as trustworthy, Macedonia was subdued before the fleet attempted to round Mount Athos. The fleets of those days, especially in that particular sea, where sudden storms are notoriously frequent, did not attempt to round promontories such as Athos without having good reason for so doing. If Macedonia had been already subdued before it attempted the passage, the Thermaic gulf cannot have been its goal. It may be urged, perhaps, that the incident of the Brygi indicates that the subjugation of Macedonia was not so complete as Herodotus says. But does Herodotus, by the order in which he mentions this incident, wish to imply that it occurred subsequent to the disaster? It would seem not. All he wishes is to bring the minor disaster on land into juxtaposition with the major disaster at sea; and, so far as chronological setting is concerned, his statement that the Brygi were ultimately subdued would, taken with his previous general statement, place the incident of the Brygi in its proper position in the course of events—that is to say, prior to the disaster off Athos. Moreover, in any case, the reduction of Macedonia was actually effected without the fleet proceeding beyond Athos, and therefore the presence of the fleet in the Thermaic gulf was not necessary for the operations in that country. The road across the north of Chalkidike was short and easy, and from an anchorage near Akanthos, the commissariat of the army in Macedonia could be efficiently maintained.

But the fleet; after the disaster, was evidently not in a condition for further advance; possibly because the actual loss of supplies had been great, possibly because it was left too weak in numbers and equipment to face the inevitable fighting in Greek waters which would result, should any large scheme of conquest be attempted in Greece itself.

Herodotus’ statements as to the greatness of the objects of this expedition of Mardonios would not of themselves be convincing did not its magnitude, when compared with the expedition of 490, imply that its aims were infinitely more ambitious. The fleet which took part in the earlier expedition seems to have been at least as large as that of two years later; and, in addition to the fleet, Mardonios had, as has been said, a very large land army, for he had brought down with him a considerable number of troops over and above those already in West Asia which the suppression of the revolt would render largely available. The punishment of Athens and Eretria was an essential part of the programme of this expedition; but it was only a part. The dictates of policy would render it advisable for Darius to show the European Greeks that they could not with impunity interfere in the affairs of Asia. But the expedition was not, like that of 490, limited in its scope to Athens and Eretria. It threatened Greece as a whole.

The results of Mardonios’ campaign were that Macedonia and Thrace (the southern part of it) were re-conquered, and remained passive in the hands of Persia for thirteen succeeding years. Thasos was also annexed.

Herodotus’ estimate of its result is coloured by the failure of the design in so far as Greece was concerned; but, on his own showing, the campaign was a success in so far as the operations in Macedonia and Southern Thrace were concerned.

Darius, now definitely prepared to carry out his schemes against the liberty of European Greece, was in no way diverted from them by the disaster off Mount Athos. He only altered his plan of action.

#STRATEGY OF 492 AND 490.#

Alike on the north and east of the Ægean, circumstances had been in 492, for the first time in Persian history, favourable for the prosecution of his plans west of that sea. The events of the past twenty years had only served to emphasize some of the more important considerations which must have been present in his mind when the plan was originally formed. He knew, he must have known, that, unless he were prepared to adopt the dangerous policy of entrusting the commanders in the West with a large permanent force, the recurrence of a rising on the part of the ever-restless Greek might be looked for so long as the liberty of his brethren across the sea contrasted with his own servitude in Asia.

He greatly under-estimated the difficulties of the conquest of European Greece; but that he regarded it as a serious undertaking is shown by the magnitude of the expedition which was despatched to Europe under Mardonios.

The strategic plan of that campaign was similar to that adopted in the expedition of 480. The disaster off Athos modified his design. It showed him the dangers attendant upon the voyage of a large fleet by that circuitous route in those stormy seas,—a voyage which would be protracted by the necessity of keeping touch with the slow advance of the army on land.

He determined, therefore, that the plan of the co-operation between army and fleet must be renounced, and that the attack must be made by the short sea-route through the islands of the Ægean.

This change of design brought a further modification in its train.

The transport of the huge numbers of a Persian levy of the first magnitude was out of the question in the vessels of those times; and so the new expedition was expressly limited in its _apparent_ scope to the punishment of those states which had taken part with the Ionians.

In accordance with the methods of Persian policy under such circumstances, it was sought to minimize the danger of the expedition by detaching as many of the states as possible from the defence before the attack was actually made. So in the year 491 Persian heralds were despatched to the various cities of Greece with orders to demand earth and water from them. Messengers were also sent to the tributary states on the Asiatic coast, ordering them to prepare warships and transports. Herodotus says that many of the states of the European mainland, and all the islands to which application was made, obeyed the demand; but it is noticeable that he does not mention any by name, save only the island of Ægina.

The action of Ægina provoked alarm at Athens, and this, coupled with the desire to get an old enemy into trouble, caused Athens to make representations at Sparta with regard to the conduct of the Æginetans.[56]

To follow the confused details given by Herodotus of the relations between Athens and Ægina is no part of the purpose of this work, except in so far as they affect the larger question of the relations with Persia. In the present instance Kleomenes, of the senior branch of the Royal house of Sparta, did interfere in Ægina in consequence of the Athenian representations. His first visit to the Island was ineffective. The Æginetans objected that he was acting solely on his own authority, and not on that of the Spartan Government; otherwise, so they said, the other king would have accompanied him. This objection was suggested to them in a letter of Demaratos, his colleague in the kingship.[57]

#ALLEGED MEDISM OF ÆGINA.#

The action of Demaratos rendered the relations between the two kings so hostile, that Kleomenes intrigued to bring about the deposition of his colleague and rival. In this he was successful, and Leutychides succeeded to the kingship which Demaratos had held.

◆H. vi. 73.◆

Accompanied by Leutychides, Kleomenes paid a second visit to Ægina, and received ten of the chief citizens as hostages for the good behaviour of the state. These he gave into the charge of their “greatest enemies,” the Athenians.

It is impossible to say with confidence that the story is historical in all its details. The fact, however, remains that Ægina was absolutely passive during the Marathonian campaign, and that her attitude at the time can only be attributable to the fact that Athens had these hostages at her mercy.

Though Athenian tradition magnified Marathon into one of the greatest events in Hellenic history, till references to it became a tedious commonplace in Greek diplomacy, the actual records of the time are very meagre.[58]

The most remarkable characteristic of Herodotus’ account of the campaign is its brevity. It cannot, however, be supposed that he suffered in this instance from want of information. Of that there was, doubtless, enough and to spare. Herodotus must have found in Athens material sufficient for a much longer chapter in his history, had he chosen to make use of all that came to his hand. He had every temptation to do so. The Marathonian legend was regarded in his day as one of the most glorious pages in Athenian history. A full reproduction of it would have been an attractive feature in the historian’s work, when presented to an Athenian audience.

The cause or causes of this striking abstention may not have been simple or uniform.

Much of the material must have been unreliable. Popular imagination would be certain to come into play in dealing with the story of an event which, whatever its real nature, did greatly increase the reputation of Athens, raising her suddenly from a position of comparative obscurity into a place among Greek states but little inferior to that of Sparta itself.

What has become of all this mass of legend?

Herodotus has certainly rejected the greater part of it as unworthy of reproduction in history. It has survived in fragmentary references in the works of the orators of a later age. Its existence provoked historians like Theopompos to exaggerate on the side of depreciation.

◆Frag. Hist. Græc. Theop. 167.◆

The difficulty of dealing with it at the time at which Herodotus wrote must have been very great. It cannot be said that he has been wholly successful. He has been led, in the process of rejection, to omit details crucially necessary for the understanding of his narrative; he fails, for example, to quote the most notable instance, to account for the absence of the Persian cavalry at Marathon.

He has, again, in the process of adoption, inserted details about the command at Marathon, one of which is a demonstrable anachronism, while others render the exact position of affairs very uncertain.

#HERODOTUS’ ACCOUNT OF MARATHON.#

But there is a further motive which must be taken into account in a full consideration of the causes which modified his narrative.

◆H. vi. 121 _ff_.◆

To his tale of the campaign is appended a defence of the Alkmæonidæ, which shows that the current Marathonian tradition charged that great Athenian family with having been in collusion with the Mede.

The _possible_ effect of this feature of the tradition on the narrative of an author writing in the days of the greatness of Pericles the Alkmæonid cannot be ignored; though its _actual_ effect, other than these apologetic chapters, is not traceable.

It is, however, evident that the main part of the material for the history of the campaign up to the point where this apology begins, is taken from a version emanating from an “aristocratic” source—that is to say, from that party which was most bitterly opposed to Pericles at the time at which Herodotus wrote.

It has already been pointed out that the Persian expedition of 490 was organized on a less ambitious scale than that of 492, and that it must consequently be concluded that its objects were less ambitious.

How far Herodotus was able in later days to obtain authentic information from the Persian side with regard to the end which Darius had in view, it is impossible to say; but there is a remarkable accord between one of his statements of the Persian motives and his actual narrative of facts. This feature of his account would not be so striking, were it not conspicuously absent from other important parts of his history.

The motives of the expedition seem to have been twofold—

(1) A declared motive,—the punishment of Athens and Eretria.

(2) A motive which the Persian had good reason for keeping, in so far as possible, in the background,—the establishment of a _tête-du-pont_ on the European shore in Attica.

The first of these is expressly stated by Herodotus. Of the existence of the second he appears to have had an inkling.

◆H. vi. 94.◆

He says that the expedition was due to Darius’ desire for revenge, and to the charges and importunities of the Peisistratidæ. He further says that Darius wished “on this pretext” (_i.e._ the representations made by the Peisistratidæ) “to subdue those people in Greece which had not given earth and water.” From an historical point of view, exception must be taken to one phase of this last statement; in fact, in other words in the same chapter Herodotus narrows it down to a noticeable extent. He omits all mention of the recalcitrant states, and says that Darius appointed Datis and Artaphernes to the command “with orders to enslave Athens and Eretria, and to bring the slaves into his presence.”

The facts with regard to the expedition make it evident that Darius was anxious to limit, in so far as possible, the declared scope of it. It did not aim at a large measure of conquest in Greece. The contrast in point of numbers between it and the expedition of Mardonios has been already referred to. The Persian war policy of this age is characterized by one invariable feature—a large numerical margin relative to the end to be attained. Darius’ recent experiences in Ionia were not likely to make him grossly underestimate the forces requisite for any large design of conquest in Greece.

If this be recognized, certain features of the Persian policy at this particular time become explicable. Let it be assumed that ◆H. vi. 49.◆ Herodotus’ statement as to the wide nature of the demand for “earth and water” is correct.[59]

It was made before the expedition started; and presumably its results were known before the fleet sailed from the Asian coast. #OBJECTIVE OF EXPEDITION OF 490.# Thus the Persian commanders knew what they had to expect; and, if Herodotus’ statements be correct, a large number of states had been detached from the possible defence.

Then there was Hippias. His presence with the expedition served a double purpose. He was an outward and visible sign of the limitations of the Persian intentions. He was to be re-established as tyrant in Athens. But the Persian might expect more from him. His presence might detach Sparta from the defence. Was it not Sparta which had, not so many years before, called the Peloponnesian states together and proposed the forcible reinstatement of Hippias?

Everything, in fact, points to the correctness of one of the views entertained by Herodotus, that this expedition was aimed against Athens and Eretria alone.

It was in a sense the completion of the work done in the suppression of the revolt, and a precaution against the recurrence of such an outbreak. Not merely must the European Greeks be taught the danger of interfering in the affairs of the empire, but the subjugation of the interfering states must show the Ionians that in future they could not expect help from their free kinsmen beyond the seas.

It is, however, impossible to suppose that the Persian design ended here, and that, had a footing been once won in Attica, the Persian Government would have contented itself with the punishment of that state, and then have withdrawn its troops. ◆H. vi. 96.◆ The action with regard to Naxos and the other Islands on the passage of the Ægean shows that Persia intended to acquire this most effective line of communication; in other words, that the second motive of this expedition was identical with that which had made Artaphernes the satrap so keen to take up the design of Aristagoras in 500 B.C., the desire to acquire a base in the Western Ægean against European Greece. The expedition was to be the preliminary step in larger schemes of conquest.

It was in accord with Persian practice at this time that the command of the new venture should be entrusted to some other general than the leader in 492. ◆H. vi. 94.◆ Mardonios was deposed, says Herodotus, because he had mismanaged the previous expedition. That, as has been seen, had not been the case; and the change of leadership seems to have been simply an instance of the regular policy of Darius with regard to high military command.

The new generals were Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, the son of the great satrap of the same name, and nephew of Darius.

From Susa the army was conducted to the Aleian plain in Cilicia, where the fleet and transports met it. On these vessels it was embarked and sailed to Ionia.

Herodotus never mentions the number of the force. It is a somewhat strange omission on his part, the more so as it is his habit to give some estimate of the strength of the Persian armies on important expeditions. It is probable that, defective as is his appreciation of numbers, he could not accept the exaggerated estimates of later tradition. ◆H. vi. 95.◆ He says that the number of triremes was 600.[60] Whether this be correct or not, it is probable that if it errs, it errs on the side of exaggeration. But assuming it to be correct, the numbers of the expedition were extraordinarily small for a Persian enterprise. Special transports were, indeed, provided for the horses; but the men of the land army were embarked on board the fleet.[61] When the smallness of the ships of those days, the largeness of the crews necessary to work the oarage, and the fact that in the present instance a considerable amount of room was taken up by the horses, are taken into consideration, it is impossible to suppose that the average number of men on board each vessel effective for service on land can have amounted to more than a hundred; it is probable that it amounted to considerably less.

The available force in that case was 60,000 at most, and may not have been more than 40,000.[62]

#PERSIANS AT NAXOS AND DELOS.#

From Samos the fleet sailed past Ikarios, and through the Islands. It first touched at Naxos, and attacked it. There the success was partial. The town and its temples were burnt; but the mass of the population escaped to the hills.

It is noticeable that the Naxians seem to have been caught unprepared for the defence. There is no resistance such as had been successful ten years before. Up to this time the preparations of the Greeks to meet the storm had not passed the initial stage of vague anticipation. Naxos doubtless warned Athens and Eubœa. Even the preparations of Athens seem to have been made in a hurry.

Forewarned by the events in the neighbouring island of Naxos, the inhabitants of sacred Delos fled to Tenos. Datis, however, treated the pan-Hellenic sanctuary with marked consideration, and is reported to have offered sacrifice there. This was in accord with the manifest intention of the Persians to give the Greeks generally the impression that the expedition aimed merely at vengeance on those states which had been guilty of _lèse-majesté_ against the Great King; Naxos by its resistance in B.C. 499; Eretria and Athens by their interference in B.C. 498. Nor would such an impression have been a false one, in so far as the _immediate_ circumstances were concerned.

◆H. vi 98.◆

After the departure of Datis, there was an earthquake at Delos, the first and the last, so Herodotus says, up to the time of his writing.[63]

◆H. vi. 99.◆

From Delos the fleet went round the islands collecting men, and finally came to Karystos, in South Eubœa. This town refused a contingent, until the ravaging of its territory brought it to terms.

◆H. vi. 100.◆

Meanwhile Eretria had heard of the coming expedition, and had sent to Athens begging help. Athens did not turn a deaf ear to the appeal; and, though she could not spare men from Attica, she ordered the 4000 Athenian settlers (Kleruchs), who held the lands of that Chalkis which had been conquered sixteen years before, to go to the help of Eretria.

The tale of what followed, as told by Herodotus, is not wholly consistent; and it may be suspected that part of it was intended by its creators to cloke the cowardice of these Kleruchs.[64]

Opinions in Eretria, so the story runs, were divided. One party wished to leave the city and take refuge in the heights of Eubœa; the other planned treason and surrender to the Persian. A prominent citizen of Eretria, Æschines, the son of Nothos, warned the Kleruchs of this unsound state of things, and advised them to go home. They did more than this, for they crossed over to the mainland, and took refuge at Oropos. Then the tale becomes inconsistent; for, on the Persians landing and disembarking their cavalry, the Eretrians elect to stand a siege, and for six days make a brave defence against every attack, losing many men themselves, but also inflicting severe losses on the enemy.

After that treachery did its work. Two prominent citizens admitted the Persians into the town. The temples were burnt “in retaliation for the burning of the temples at Sardes,” and the population was enslaved “according to the commands of Darius.”

◆H. vi. 102.◆

After reducing Eretria, and waiting for a few days, the Persians sailed to Attica in hot haste,[65] thinking to treat the Athenians in the same way as they had treated the Eretrians. #TOPOGRAPHY OF MARATHON.# Hippias, the son of Peisistratos, led them to Marathon, as being the most suitable ground in Attica for cavalry, and nearest to Eretria.

[Illustration: MARATHON: FROM THE “SOROS,” LOOKING TOWARDS LITTLE MARSH.

1. Euripus. 2. Little Marsh. 3. Slope of Mount Agrieliki.

[_To face page_ 163.

]

It may be well, before seeking to account for the choice of Marathon as a landing-place, to describe briefly the plain and its surroundings, as well as its lines of communication with Athens.

_The Topography of Marathon._

The plain of Marathon is situated on the east coast of Attica, on the shores of the southern Euripus, at a distance by road of about twenty-four miles from Athens. It is one of those alluvial plains which have been formed by the _débris_ brought down by torrents at the head of a broad bay. This bay is sheltered on the north-east by the long, narrow, rocky promontory of Kynosura, which projects for more than a mile from the general line of the coast. Longitudinally the plain runs from north-east to south-west, having a length of from four and a half to five miles. Its breadth from the shore of the bay to the foot of the hills which surround it is from a mile and a half to two miles. These hills are not, save on the south-west side, very lofty, or very steep; but their surface is of that peculiarly rugged nature characteristic of Greek mountain slopes.

At either extremity of the plain is a marsh. That on the north-east is very extensive, reaching from the mountains all but to the sea. That on the south-west is small; but being at the extreme end of the plain where Mount Agrieliki comes within a half or three-quarters of a mile from the coast, it renders the passage from the south along the foot of this hill very narrow. This little marsh, though, of course, much drier in summer than in winter, was not, I should say, traversable in August, 1899; and this, too, after a prolonged period of drought. The interval between the two marshes is a little more than three miles.

The interval of ground is traversed near its centre by the torrent known as the Charadra, the bed of which is sufficiently marked to form an appreciable military obstacle.

Herodotus’ description of Marathon is noticeable for its absence of topographical detail, and in this respect is in strong contrast with his descriptions of Thermopylæ and Platæa. Topographically speaking, he knows more even of Mykale than he does of Marathon.

There is, in fact, no evidence, direct or indirect, of his ever having visited the field; and the absence of all descriptive detail is strong presumptive evidence that he never had done so.

This may be simply due to the fact that Marathon, unlike Thermopylæ and Platæa, is not on any of the main roads of Greece; but, as it is only twenty-four miles from Athens, and as Herodotus shows himself peculiarly anxious to give topographical details wherever he is describing events of first-rate importance, it would seem as if he did not regard Marathon as being of so much significance as the Athenians made it out to have been. Of purely physical features he says not a word. Of other details he simply mentions the place of the encampment of the Athenians, the sacred precinct of Herakles, the site of which has been discovered high up that valley of Avlona which leads up among the hills from the south-west verge of the plain.

South of the Charadra the plain is highly cultivated, mainly with the vine. If it was so in 490 B.C., it would not have been by any means unimpeded ground for cavalry, as the Greek habit of allowing the vine-tendrils to run along the surface renders the vineyards of the country troublesome, if not dangerous, obstacles to the passage of a mounted man going at more than a foot’s pace. North of the Charadra the cultivation is more sparse and the ground more open.

From the plain two roads lead to Athens:

(1)

An upper one, which leaves the plain in two branches, one of which goes up the valley of the Charadra past the modern Marathona, and then bends W.S.W. through the hills in the direction of Athens. About a mile and a half beyond Marathona it is joined by the second branch, which, leaving the plain near the modern Vrana, goes up the valley of Avlona and through the site of the precinct of Herakles, which is situated near, though not at the point of junction of the two.

From this point the road proceeds over the mountains, and, passing the modern Stamata, descends into the Athenian plain near Kephisia, whence it goes direct to Athens.

It is a rugged track, though not very difficult, and is certainly that which was used by the Athenians in their advance to Marathon.

[Illustration: THE “SOROS” AT MARATHON.

[_To face page_ 165.

]

(2)

A lower road, practically coincident with the modern carriage road from Marathon to Athens. It is much easier than the upper one. The country it traverses is easy. There are no steep gradients. It passes through a long stretch of thin pine forest. It leaves the plain by the narrow passage between the little marsh and Mount Agrieliki.

The important feature of this road is that it is, and must always have been, easily traversable by cavalry. I mention this, because some emphatic statements to the contrary have been made in some modern treatises on the subject of the battle.

The only two landmarks on or near the field which can be said to be in any way decisive as to the history of the battle are both artificial in origin.

They are—

(1)

The precinct of Herakles, already mentioned. The site was determined by Lolling in 1876.[66]

(2)

The soros, or mound, raised over the Athenian dead.

The absence of any mention of this by Herodotus is of itself significant evidence that he had never visited the ground.

It stands, as will be seen from the map, about half a mile from the shore, and about a mile and a quarter south of the Charadra.

Pausanias (i. 32. 3–5,7) mentions it in his description of the neighbourhood. That description bears all the traces of being founded on autopsy.

Of the grave of the Athenians he says, “There is a grave of the Athenians in the plain, and on it are columns with the names of the dead upon them, according to their tribes.”

He also mentions the important negative fact that he could not find any tomb or mound marking the burial-place of the Medes.

The soros, in its present state, is an earthen mound with rather steep sides, between twenty and thirty feet high. The fact of its being a tomb has been proved by recent excavation.

Why the Persians landed at Marathon has always been a matter of dispute. The reason given by Herodotus, namely its suitability for cavalry, is not convincing, because the plain of Athens itself, not to speak of the Thriasian plain, is more suitable for cavalry operations. Moreover, the Persians made no use of this arm during the battle.

The plan of the Persian campaign, as far as Athens was concerned, was based on calculations dependent on circumstances other than purely military, to which it is necessary to turn, in order to account for the adoption of a design for which no adequate reason of a purely strategic nature can be suggested.

Very little is known of the history of the internal politics at Athens during the decade between 500 and 490 B.C. In the previous decade there had been a fierce struggle between the aristocratic and democratic parties under Isagoras and Kleisthenes respectively, which, after several turns of fortune, had apparently ended in the victory of the democrats. But in spite of the absence of direct reference to this special side of history in the records of the first ten years of the fifth century, certain well-attested incidents show that the struggle for supremacy between the parties had not been decided before the new century began.

Greek cities were rarely free from intrigue; and it would seem to have been unusually rife in the Athens of 490. It has already been pointed out that in a version of the tale of Marathon current in Herodotus’ own time the Alkmæonidæ were accused of having been in league with the Persian. Herodotus’ defence of them, by its manifest weakness, is strong evidence against them. They were conspicuous for their hatred of tyranny, he says. They had driven out Hippias. He might have added that they had also driven out Peisistratos, but had been instrumental in restoring him.

He ignores their relations with Peisistratos, not to say anything of those with Kleisthenes of Sikyon. He forgets for the moment that they had been in the pay of a Lydian king.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF MARATHON

London: John Murray, Albemarle St.

_Stanford’s Geog^l. Estab^t. London._

]

#POLITICAL PARTIES AT ATHENS.#

The charge made with regard to their conduct at this time was that they signalled to the Persian fleet at Marathon by means of a shield, that Athens, in the absence of the Athenian army, lay open, and that a party within the city would admit the invaders.

Herodotus does not deny the shield incident. He confines himself to asserting that the Alkmæonidæ could not have had anything to with it. It is noticeable that he makes no charge against any one else, for the apparent reason that tradition did not accuse any one else of the treachery.

The defence he gives is probably that of the Alkmæonidæ themselves.

The charge against the Alkmæonidæ does not seem to have been a late interpolation into the Marathon tradition. ◆Pind. Pyth. vii. 15.◆ Pindar, in one of his odes, which bears traces of having been composed shortly after 486, hints strongly that sinister reports on this subject were existent even at that time.

It is possible to fail to recognize the wide difference between the mental attitude of the European Greek to the Persian before and after the decade of 490–480. Before 490, Medism had not acquired the loathsome significance of twelve years later.

Nor, again, if the Alkmæonidæ and the faction which they led did Medize on this occasion, was the act without precedent in the case of Athens herself. Between fifteen and twenty years before, Athenian ambassadors had given earth and water to Artaphernes at Sardes. Their act had, indeed, been condemned upon their return; but there is no reason to suppose that the condemnation was unanimous; and there is every reason to believe that they would never have so acted, had they not had good grounds for thinking that a majority or a party of their fellow-country-men would approve of what they had done.

The sudden withdrawal of Athenian assistance from the Ionian revolt within a year of that assistance having been granted is most explicable on the assumption that within that year a philo-Medic party had once more acquired the ascendency.

The punishment of Phrynichos for his drama on the capture of Miletus looks very much like the work of the same party.

It seems clear that the democrats in Athens had not found that the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias had brought unmixed blessings in its train. They were thereafter face to face with a strong internal opposition, in the shape of a powerful aristocratic party; and threatened from outside by a Sparta which repented of the part it had played in Hippias’ expulsion, and was exasperated at having been fooled by Delphi at the instigation of the Alkmæonidæ. It is not, then, strange that the democrats should look abroad for help of which they saw no prospect nearer home.

The situation of the democratic party had been very unstable. Its sympathies had been balanced on a razor’s edge, ready to incline to the one side or the other on the slightest shifting of the weights in the political scale. The severities of the last years of the rule of Hippias, after the murder of Hipparchos, had been sufficient to make it passively acquiesce when the intrigues of the Alkmæonidæ against the tyrant were brought to a successful termination by the agency of Sparta; but they had not wholly blotted out the memory of the fact that the triumph of Peisistratos had been in a very real sense the triumph of democracy.

By the reforms of Kleisthenes, however, the Alkmæonidæ had made a strong and successful bid for popular favour; and from 509 onward the fortunes of the democratic party were closely linked with those of this powerful clan.

The opposition, backed by the influence of the repentant Sparta, was dangerously strong. First one side and then the other held the upper hand; but, in the years immediately preceding Marathon, the political fortunes of the democrats seem to have been at a low ebb. There had been one great trial of strength. Miltiades had arrived in Athens in 493, an exile from his tyranny in the Thracian Chersonese, driven out by the Persians. #POSITION OF THE DEMOCRATS IN 490.# He was not likely to sympathize with any party which had shown leanings towards Persia; he seems, indeed from the moment of his return, to have set himself up and to have been recognized as the champion of the aristocratic and anti-Persian party. As such he was attacked by the democrats, being prosecuted on a charge of “tyranny” in the Chersonese. His acquittal was a great victory for the aristocrats, and a severe blow for their opponents.

From 493 to 490 his party seems to have been in power. It is quite evident, at any rate, that he was the foremost man in Athens at the time of Marathon.

The outlook for the democrats was gloomy. It is not strange if they began to regret the past. The “golden age” of Peisistratos gained in glory from its being far. His tyranny had been more of a blessing than a curse to the mass of the people. The yoke it had laid upon them had been light; and, in return for their submission to it, they had attained to a prosperity they had never before enjoyed.

The present was full of possibilities in great contrast to that past. The reforms of Kleisthenes, that great measure, or series of measures, which had purchased their oblivion of a beneficent tyranny, seemed likely to be undone. The Demos was not bound any longer to forget, if it was like to be robbed of the price of forgetting.

Thus, not unnaturally, the thoughts of a section of the Athenians, headed by the Alkmæonidæ, turned to Hippias. His restoration would be a lesser evil than a return to the old oppressions of the days before Peisistratos.

It is a satisfactorily attested fact in the history of this time that there was “treason” at Athens; in other words, that there was a party in the state which would have welcomed the return of Hippias. Herodotus would have denied it if he could honestly have done so; but he emphatically admits the truth of it.[67]

Apart from the general political circumstances of the time, Hippias and the Peisistratidæ might reckon on the assistance of many old family adherents in Athens.

When it came to a question as to the possible means of bringing about the restoration, neither Hippias nor his adherents had any choice.[68] It could only be accomplished through the instrumentality of the Persian—a dangerous means, perhaps, but the only means; and those who risked the danger were not, before 490, in a position to estimate the full extent of it. The real policy of Persia cannot as yet have been known to the Greeks.

Before proceeding to show in what way these political circumstances affected the strategy of the campaign, it may be well to glance at the general form which the Marathonian tradition took in later days.

Marathon greatly enhanced the reputation of Athens. Nor can there be any doubt that the Athenians were not slow in discovering this. Therefore the process of evolution by which the tradition became a tale of a great national effort would be an eminently natural one. As such the Athenian would present it to those outside the bounds of Attica. The ugly features of the story would certainly be, in so far as possible, suppressed in all editions of it given to the world in general.

Those features would, however, be certain to survive in an edition evolved in the party struggles within Athens itself, and the aristocrat would regard Marathon as excellent material whereon to base an attack on a political opponent.

Aristophanes, nearly three-quarters of a century after the battle, was much more inclined to emphasize its importance as a triumph of aristocracy over democracy, than as a victory of Greek over barbarian. With him the “party” tradition had more weight than the “national.”

Is it, then, to be assumed that the Athenian democrat had no honest claim to a share in the victory? This is a question which, on the extant evidence, is very difficult to answer.

One negative fact is quite certain. Marathon was _not_[69] a crowning victory for the new democracy. The opposite was rather the case.

#MEDIZING TENDENCIES OF THE DEMOCRATS.#

At the same time it is quite conceivable that, at the last moment, certain circumstances saved a large number of those in the plot from themselves, and so brought about its failure.

The Persians made a gross blunder in treating Eretria as they did, above all at that particular time. The news of what had happened there reached Athens before even the Persians landed at Marathon. The effect of the news would necessarily be to show the party supporting Hippias their error in supposing that the Persians intended, in case of success, to allow anything but their own feelings and their own interests to dictate their policy towards the conquered states. Such a disclosure must have given the resistance a solidarity which it would otherwise have lacked. Many of those originally in the plot must have been present in the army at Marathon. It is quite certain, apart from the necessities of the military levy, that Miltiades would not have left any considerable body of the malcontents in Athens. Yet there is no mention of any difficulties in the army itself when at Marathon; nor is there any “voluntary cowardice” in the battle. There the democrat seems to have fought just as well as his political opponent.

The fate of Eretria was a lesson which the Athenian democrat never forgot. Persia had undeceived him once and for all. The shock of awaking to the terrible nature of the danger in which he had involved his country by supposing his own interests to be identical with those of Persia was so rude that its effects were permanent.

But the Persians went to Marathon in the expectation that disaffection in Athens would do its work.

The position at Marathon offered several advantages.

(1) They could afford to bide their time there until they received word that the conspiracy in Athens was ripe for fulfilment, because the fact of the ground being suitable for cavalry would either deter the Greeks from attacking them, or would give them a great advantage in case they did so.

(2) If, as they no doubt hoped, and might well expect, the Greek army marched thither to meet them, the conspiracy in Athens might proceed unimpeded; and, when it was ripe, they might leave part of their army at Marathon, a long day’s march from Athens, to occupy the attention of the Athenians, while with the remainder they sailed round to occupy the capital.

This last seems, at any rate, to have been the plan which they attempted to carry out. It may or may not have existed in whole or in part at the time of the landing at Marathon.

The Persian did not want to _fight_ at Marathon, though he was prepared to do so in case the Athenians decided to attack on ground of his own choosing.[70]

His great object was to get the Greek army as far as possible from Athens, and, if possible, to keep it there.

The fact that the Persians did not, in spite of their knowledge of the treachery within the town, attempt a direct assault on Athens, points to the same conclusion, which is suggested by other considerations, namely that the expedition was not on a very large scale. It was, indeed, formed, and it acted throughout, upon the assumption that it would receive a large measure of assistance from Athens itself.

◆H. vi. 103.◆

On hearing that the Persians had landed at Marathon, the Athenian army marched to that place.

Before leaving the city, the generals had despatched a professional despatch runner named Philippides[71] to Sparta, to summon assistance. ◆H. vi. 106.◆ He made a marvellously quick journey, for he is stated to have arrived at Sparta on the day after leaving Athens; and if, as would be presumably the case in a matter so urgent, he communicated his message immediately to the Spartan authorities, he arrived there on the 9th day of the month, and thus left Athens on the 8th.[72]

#ATTITUDE OF SPARTA.#

◆H. vi. 106.◆

It is unnecessary to insist on the verbal accuracy of the message which is put into his mouth by Herodotus; but the matter of it contains what are, no doubt, the historic facts:—

(1) That the news of the fall of Eretria reached the Athenians _before_ they started for Marathon.

(2) That Philippides was despatched after this news arrived, but (inasmuch as there is no mention of the landing of the Persians in Attica) before the news of their landing had reached Athens.

The appeal to Sparta, and the Spartan answer, show that there must have existed some agreement between the two states, to the effect that Sparta would come to the aid of Athens in case of invasion. If, then, the Persians had reckoned that the presence of Hippias with their army would be sufficient to ward off Spartan interference, they had reckoned on the stable policy of a government whose policy was in those years most markedly unstable and uncertain.

But, though expressing themselves willing to come to the aid of Athens, the Spartans alleged that they could not, without breaking the law, start before the full moon; in other words, that their coming would be delayed at least a week.[73]

On what day of the month the Athenians received the news of the landing at Marathon, Herodotus does not say; but, inasmuch as the battle must have taken place about the 16th,[74] and the armies were face to face with one another for several days before the engagement took place, the news can hardly have arrived later than the 10th day of the month.

On receipt of it, the Athenians started for Marathon. It would be a long day’s march, and a hard journey over the rugged upper road. On arriving there they encamped in the sacred precinct of Herakles.

◆H. vi 108.◆

An examination of the map will show how well the position was chosen. It lay high up the rocky valley of Avlona, so near the point where the two forks of the upper road to Athens from the Marathonian plain join one another, that it commanded them both. Moreover, the army in this position would threaten the flank of any body of troops who tried to march on Athens by the lower road, which left the plain between the foot of Mount Agrieliki, (to use its modern name), and the little marsh.

Herodotus’ account of the system of command existent at this time in the Athenian army service is confused, and contains at least one serious anachronism. It leaves the reader in a state of uncertainty as to whether the polemarch Kallimachos or the “general” Miltiades was the actual commander-in-chief.*

* * * * *

_On the Command at Marathon._

*He says (ch. 103): “They were led by ten generals, of whom Miltiades was the tenth.” The last phrase closely resembles the quasi-official phraseology of Thucydides, where he is mentioning the generals in command of an expedition, and wishes to indicate the one who had been appointed first in command. Though the phraseology of Herodotus does not exactly correspond with that of the later author, yet the resemblance is so close that it seems probable that he was under the impression that the “strategi” of 490 held a position more closely analogous to that of the strategi of his own day than was actually the case. #THE COMMAND AT MARATHON.# It seems to imply that the command of the army lay with them, and that in 490, as in later times, one of them was appointed to be first in command for a particular expedition.

This last was certainly not the case. The ten strategi or “generals” in 490 seem to have been the commanders of the contingents of the ten tribes which Kleisthenes had instituted less than twenty years before; and, in so far as the control of the army as a whole was concerned, to have formed, under the presidency of the polemarch, a council of war.

In a later chapter (110), Herodotus says that each held a πρυτανηίη τῆς ἡμέρης. In whatever sense the term πρυτανηίη may have been used, it is plain from the context that Herodotus intends to imply that each of the strategi in rotation commanded the army for one day.

It is quite certain that Herodotus is mistaken in this view; but it is not easy to say how the mistake arose. The most probable explanation is that he was trying to account for the prominent part played by Miltiades in the version of the battle which he followed, by assigning him a much higher official position in the army than he actually held. Herodotus’ account of the events at Marathon is obviously taken from a source wholly different to that of his defence of the Alkmæonidæ. The former is a current tradition, relating the story from an aristocratic point of view. The other is an Alkmæonid (and therefore, in a sense, democratic) denial of a charge preserved in the “aristocratic” tradition.

Herodotus had more difficulty in understanding the position of Miltiades than we have at the present day.

His mistake with regard to Miltiades precludes him from giving any definite account of the position of the polemarch Kallimachos. He does not make any positive, direct statement as to his military rank, though he represents him (chap. 109) as a sort of chairman of the council of the strategi.

He evidently _supposes_ that he is not commander-in-chief, though he mentions that he commanded the right wing, the post of honour, in the battle.

He further speaks of the polemarch as an official “chosen by lot.”

◆Arist. Ath. Pol. 22.◆

We know from the “Constitution of Athens” this choice of lot was not introduced into the selections for the archonship till 487. Herodotus’ statement is therefore an anachronism.

So far, then, as Herodotus’ meaning can be unravelled from the confused account which he gives of the system of command at this time, he seems to have supposed it to have been constituted on the following lines:—

1. Supreme Control—Board or Council of War. Composed of—10 strategi + 1 polemarch (chosen, like the other archons, by lot), who is apparently President of the Board.

2. Command in the field—Held by each of the strategi in rotation for one day at a time.

3. Post of honour in the battle—Held by polemarch, as commanding the right wing.

It may be doubted whether Herodotus took any very great interest in the question of organization. It is quite certain that he had great difficulty in getting reliable information about the matter. It would, in fact, seem as if he had deduced the general system of command in 490 from—

(1) The system of command prevalent in later times.

(2) Two circumstances in his own narrative—

(_а_) The prominent part played by Miltiades; (_b_) His belief that the polemarch and other archons were selected by lot as early as 490.

From (1) he drew the conclusion that the supreme control lay with the board of strategi, as it did in his own time.

From (1) and (2_a_) he concluded that the system prevalent in his time of appointing one of the strategi as superior to his colleagues in the command of some special expedition or department prevailed at the time of Marathon; that is to say, that Miltiades was in a position analogous to that which Perikles had held on several occasions in Herodotus’ own time.

Still, he is evidently uncertain on this point; and he accounts for Miltiades’ position by assuming a system of diurnal rotation in the command, ◆H. vi. 110.◆ and by representing that some of Miltiades’ colleagues surrendered their days of command to him.

From (2_b_) he draws the very important conclusion that the polemarch was no longer commander-in-chief.

He has ante-dated this particular application of the system of lot by three years. It is obvious that the Athenian citizen would not entrust his life when serving in the field to a commander appointed by such a method. His belief in Providence, as represented by the lot, had its limitations. Herodotus was probably well aware that, from the moment of the introduction of the lot into the election of the archons, the polemarch had ceased to command the army.

Perhaps, after all, the main difficulty which would be experienced by an inquirer in the latter half of the fifth century into the system of command existent in 490, would arise from the fact that that year fell within what was a comparatively brief period of transition in the Athenian army system, intermediate between the old organization existent before the reforms of Kleisthenes, and the completely new organization which was introduced between 490 and 480, probably in 487, and prevailed with hardly any modification during the rest of the century.

The reforms of Kleisthenes, by substituting ten tribes for four, had rendered a certain amount of army reorganization necessary. Thereafter the army was constituted in ten tribal regiments, each commanded by one of the strategi:[75] “they chose the generals by tribes, one from each tribe.” What other _novelties_ there were in the system we do not know; but of the system itself, as existent at Marathon, we derive a certain amount of knowledge from the Aristotelian treatise on the Constitution of Athens, and with its aid we may now proceed to set in order the confused and mistaken account of Herodotus.

That treatise distinctly states (Ch. 22) that the polemarch was chief-in-command at Marathon. This is, perhaps, a conclusion at which a close student of Herodotus’ uncertain account would arrive. ◆H. vi. 109.◆ The attitude of Miltiades towards him at the celebrated Council of War is that of an official inferior. His command of the right wing would argue that he was, at least _de jure_, the chief of the army.

Of the position of the strategi the treatise says but little. It seems certain, however, that, in addition to commanding the tribal contingents, they formed, as Herodotus implies, a council of war presided over by the polemarch.

This council of war seems to have had considerable powers. The more important and general questions of war policy seem to have been decided by its vote, rather than by the orders of the polemarch.

It is, perhaps, to this feature that we may attribute the undoubted power which Miltiades exercised at this time. Herodotus sought to account for it by ascribing to him a higher official position than he actually possessed. He had not made up his mind what that position was, and limited himself to making two vague and inconsistent suggestions with regard to it. It is possible, however, to see that Miltiades’ prominence at the time arose from his being the author of a plan which he persuaded the council of war to adopt. It may be even the case that Kallimachos and the council, when once the plan was definitely adopted, left him with a free hand to carry it out; and that this feature in the history of the time has survived in Herodotus’ tale of the surrender to Miltiades by the other generals of their days of command.

* * * * *

The historian himself makes no positive pronouncement on the matter. He is aware that the victory was due to Miltiades, and he therefore seeks to invest that general with special powers such as could be conferred on particular generals at the time at which he wrote. Until the discovery of the treatise on the “Constitution of Athens,” an Aristotelian work, if not a work of Aristotle, the explanation of the difficulties in Herodotus could only be a subject of conjecture.

◆Arist A. P. 22.◆

That treatise, however, states definitely that the polemarch was commander-in-chief at Marathon, and that the ten generals were elected one from each tribe. They were, in fact, commanders of the tribal contingents.

But they were more than this. They formed a council of war at which the polemarch presided. The major decisions with regard to all operations were made by the council and not by the polemarch; and Miltiades’ prominence at the time was due to his having persuaded the council to adopt his strategic and tactical plans. He seems, furthermore, to have been given, either by Kallimachos or by the council, a free hand in carrying them out.

It is not unnatural that this should have come to pass.

The plan was good enough to recommend itself; it seems, indeed, to have been one of the ablest designs traceable in the history of Greek warfare; and it was very ably carried out.

#PERSIAN POSITION AT MARATHON.#

The designer was, moreover, at the time the most prominent and most powerful man in Athens. He probably enjoyed a far greater military reputation than any of his contemporaries, as having seen more service than any one else, and, above all, as being acquainted with Persian methods of warfare. He was eminently a man to whom Kallimachos might defer, although his titular position was not higher than that of the other generals.

◆H. vi. 108.◆

While the Athenians were encamped at the sacred precinct of Herakles, they were joined by a contingent from the Bœotian town of Platæa.

Some twenty-nine years before this time the Athenians had taken the little city under their protection against its formidable neighbour Thebes, which had tried to force it to become a member of the Bœotian confederacy. It was out of gratitude for the aid then given, and for the protection afterwards extended to them, that the Platæans now shared the perils of their benefactors.

While the Athenian position at Marathon is clearly determined by the identification of the precinct of Herakles, the station taken up by the Persian army must remain a matter of uncertainty. No topographical detail by which it can be identified has survived. The “Soros” shows, indeed, where the actual fight took place; but it does _not_ define the position of the Persian army during the days of waiting before the battle was fought. The only detail preserved in the various traditions of the battle which can be said to cast any light on the position of the original encampment of the Persian force is that the Persian fleet was “anchored” at Marathon, not drawn up on shore.[76]

The truth of the detail is rendered probable by the general history of events, in which it is conspicuously shown that the Persian design demanded that a portion, at least, of their fleet should be ready to start at a moment’s notice.

Except at the northern end, where the promontory of Kynosura forms a natural breakwater, the bay of Marathon is open and exposed. As an anchorage for vessels the northern end would naturally be chosen. It may be presumed that the army would be encamped in the immediate neighbourhood of the fleet; and, if so, its original position must have been north of the Charadra, hidden from the Greek encampment by the rise of the modern Mount Kotroni. Doubtless both sides had outposts in view of the enemy’s camp.

◆H. vi. 109.◆

On their arrival at Marathon the Athenians held a council of war. Herodotus’ account of it, though it must be regarded as a valuable contribution to the history of the time, is somewhat distorted by the evident fact that he did not understand the nature of the circumstances by which the Greek generals were faced. He represents the question under discussion as having been of an absolute character, namely, whether the Athenians should take the offensive or remain on the defensive. He involves himself consequently in an inconsistency. Miltiades urges the immediate offensive, lest delay may give treachery time to do its work in Athens itself. The opinions of the ten generals are divided on the question; and it is to Kallimachos the polemarch, who has the deciding vote, that the earnest appeal of Miltiades is addressed. Kallimachos is persuaded, and not only that, but the four generals who have voted for Miltiades’ plan hand over their days of command to him. The latter, however, with singular inconsistency, though he has urged the immediate offensive, defers the attack until his own day of command has come round.

There can be no doubt that Herodotus, or the creator of the traditions which he followed, has misunderstood the position at the time. The question of the offensive, as discussed by the Athenian council of war, was not an absolute question, but was relative to circumstances which might at any moment supervene. Nor is it difficult to see what those circumstances were. It is also clear that the Greek generals must have been cognizant of them.

#THE ATHENIAN COUNCIL OF WAR.#

The Persians must have landed at Marathon some forty-eight hours before the Greeks arrived there. The news of their landing had to be carried to Athens; then the army had to march twenty-four miles over a rugged road to reach its position at the Herakleion. The Athenian generals must have started under the impression that the Persian army intended to march from Marathon upon Athens. Scouts would, however, inform them in the course of the march that the Persians showed no signs of moving. Arriving near Marathon, they would find the strong defensive positions in the passes leading from the plain unoccupied. Surely this would convince the quick-witted Greek that the Persian design was not what he had supposed it to be,—an immediate advance on Athens,—but that either the landing at Marathon was a mere feint, _or_ that the Persian wished to choose his own ground for the battle. Once at the Herakleion the position would further develop.

Strategically the Greek had attained a highly advantageous position.

The Persian could not advance on Athens by land without _either_ exposing his flank in an attempt to pass along the lower road, _or_ committing himself to an assault on the strong position at the Herakleion, where he could not use his cavalry, and where the heavy-armed Greek would have an immense advantage.

Nor, on the other hand, could he embark and attempt the sea passage round Sunium, without exposing himself to serious danger in the process of embarkation.

From the purely military point of view, there was absolutely no reason why, unless circumstances developed in one of these two directions, the Greek should not bide his time. The only risk involved in so doing was the possible working of treachery in Athens, a risk which must have been very sensibly decreased since the arrival of the news of the fate of Eretria. On the other hand, every day’s delay rendered the arrival of the Spartans more possible.

The question debated by the council of war was not the mere abstract question of the offensive, but whether, in case the Persians attempted to move on Athens by land or by sea, they should be attacked in the attempt; or whether, at the first sign of movement, the Athenians should return to defend Athens.

The position on the Persian side was certainly less advantageous. Their design can only be judged of by the record of what they did and did not do.

Their omission to seize the passes leading from the Marathonian plain towards Athens, although they had plenty of time to do so, must be taken to imply conclusively that they never intended at any time to try to advance by land from Marathon.

Nor does it seem to have been their primary intention to fight the Athenians at Marathon. They were prepared to do so on ground of their own choosing, if the Athenians showed a disposition that way; but their main design was, having attracted the Athenians to Marathon, to keep them there while treachery in Athens had time to do its work. So far, they had everything to gain by delay.

But there was another factor on which they had to reckon, and that was the Spartan army. It is impossible to doubt that they were kept well informed by their friends in Athens of all that had passed. They must have known of the message sent to Sparta, of the reply received, and of the date at which the arrival of the Spartans might be expected. The Spartans would start at full moon, on the 15th of the month. To the Persian, then, the period of possible delay was limited.

During the days which followed the arrival of the Athenians at the Herakleion, the Persians must have waited impatiently for that signal which was to tell them that the conspirators had done their work in Athens,—that signal which never came until too late. Day after day passed, and still there was no sign. The Spartans would be starting now: it was the fifteenth. It was not merely a question of their arrival at Marathon: even if they reached Athens, the game was lost.

It was probably on the 16th day of the month that the Persians made up their minds that something must be done. Unless they acted promptly, they might as well not act at all. #THE PERSIAN FORCE IN THE BATTLE.# The Spartans might be expected at Athens on the 18th or 19th. They arrived there on the 17th, as a fact, making a march rapid beyond expectation.

It was probably on the night between the 15th and 16th that the Persian preparations were made. Herodotus knows little about what happened until the armies faced one another for battle. Yet there are indications and omissions in his story which point to the course which events followed.

On the day of the battle the Greeks in the valley of Avlona found a Persian army facing them in the southern part of the Marathonian plain. ◆H. vi 111.◆ It was evidently drawn up in battle array, for the Greek formation seems to have been modified to suit that of the enemy.[77]

What was this Persian force which faced the Greeks? There are two circumstances in Herodotus’ account which render it practically certain that only a moiety of the land army of the expedition actually fought in the battle. Herodotus never mentions the Persian cavalry as having played any part at all in it. They had been landed in Eubœa at the time of the attack on Eretria. ◆H. vi. 102.◆ Marathon had been chosen as a landing-place, because, says Herodotus, it was suitable for cavalry. Yet in the account of the battle they are never mentioned.[78] Had they been in the battle they must have played a prominent part in it. It must, therefore, be concluded that they were not there. If they were not, where were they? Many conjectures have been made on this subject.

It seems almost certain that they were on the fleet; that they had been already embarked, together with a large, if not the larger, part of the Persian army.[79]

No rational estimate can, on the extant evidence, place the numbers of those who fought on the Persian side in the actual battle at much above 20,000. It might even be reasonably argued that they did not amount even to that sum.

Those numbers grew in the evolution of the tradition, until they reached an enormous magnitude. Herodotus is silent on the subject. He is fond of giving numbers on such occasions. It must be concluded that he was not satisfied with his evidence on this point.[80]

Tradition surviving in various authors later than Herodotus gives the number of the Athenians and Platæans at about 10,000 men. It is probable that few had been left in Athens, so that the major part of the levy would be present at Marathon. If any conclusion can be drawn from the number of Athenians stated to have been present eleven years later at Platæa it would seem as if tradition did not grossly underestimate the number of those present on the Greek side.[81]

#PERSIAN AND ATHENIAN STRATEGY.#

On the available evidence, positive statement as to the proportion of numbers between the two armies which fought in the battle is impossible. All that can be said is that it is highly improbable that the Persians outnumbered the Greeks by two to one, and quite possible that the disproportion between the two armies was not very great.

It may be well now to form a conjecture as to the strategy which prompted the Persian general to make this disposition of their forces. It would seem that, fearing the arrival of the Spartans at Marathon, or even at Athens, they had determined to carry out the plan they had intended to put into operation as soon as they should receive the signal from their Athenian confederates. The signal had not been given; but they could not wait. They must take their chance at Athens, and hope to find the treason there in a sufficiently forward state to render their entrance into the city possible. So they divided their forces, leaving a sufficient number at Marathon to occupy the attention of the Athenians and to make it dangerous for them to move on Athens. These troops had also to cover the embarkation of the major part of the army, including the cavalry. With this latter part of their force they intended to sail round and to attack Athens before either the Athenians could come up from Marathon or the Spartans could arrive from Sparta.

It was for some such eventuality as this that Miltiades had been waiting. He and his colleagues must have seen clearly that the Persians could not afford to continue indefinitely a policy of delay. They must have divined also that the delay could have but one meaning, namely, that the enemy were waiting for a sign from their friends in Athens. It is not difficult to understand the motives which actuated either side at this crisis in the campaign.

The Persian troops left at Marathon had a double duty to perform.

They had to cover the embarkation of the rest of the army.

They had, also, to do everything in their power to detain the Athenian army at Marathon. Had not this second duty devolved upon them, they would doubtless have remained north of the Charadra, and would probably have defended the line of that stream-bed. But in that case the Athenians would have been given so long a start in their retirement upon Athens, that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to harass and delay their march. Thus it became necessary to move nearer to the Athenian encampment. They crossed the Charadra, and took up a position prepared alike for battle or pursuit.

It is probable that the Persian generals reckoned rather on the latter alternative. At this time the balance of military prestige was greatly on their side. The conquerors of a continent were face to face with the army of a canton, and were, moreover, superior in numbers to the enemy. They may well have expected that the Greek would not dare to fight, or, if he did fight, would be badly beaten. The successes gained against them by the Ionians had not been on land; and they doubtless judged of the trained hoplite of European Greece in the light of their experience of the imperfectly trained Ionian hoplite they had recently had encountered in Asia.

It is now possible to conjecture the reasons which had induced them to re-embark their cavalry. The circumstances of transport forbid the supposition that they were numerically very strong in this arm. Had they left it at Marathon, it would not have been of service in pursuing the Greeks along the rugged upper road. Even had it been sent round by the lower road, its strength cannot have been such as to render it a formidable obstacle to a strong unbeaten army making straight for its goal at Athens.

But on board the fleet, cavalry might be of immense value for a dash on the capital immediately on the arrival at Phaleron. There every minute would be of importance; and, furthermore, in the open Athenian plain, it would be able to get round opposition, if unable to sweep it aside.

#THE BATTLE ARRAY.#

There is no evidence on the subject; but it is almost inconceivable that the lower road was not watched and guarded by some body of Athenian troops; and, though the road itself is easy, there are, even at the present day, places in the great tract of woodland through which it passes which an unsupported body of cavalry would find very difficult to force in face of opposition.

[Illustration: MARATHON FROM THE “SOROS.”

1. Valley of Vrana, or Avlona.

[_To face page_ 187.

]

The situation of the Athenian army was more simple, in that the council of war had already provided for it. There was, indeed, as Miltiades had foreseen, no alternative but to attack. An attempted retreat along the rugged upper road, harassed by an enemy superior in numbers and lighter in equipment, might end in disaster, and must end in the army arriving at Athens too late to meet the force which was going round by sea.

Thus the battle was inevitable.

It must have been on the plain immediately off the entrance of the valley of Avlona that the Athenians formed their battle array.

◆H. vi. 111.◆

Kallimachos the polemarch commanded on the right wing, which, together with the centre and left centre, was formed of the Athenian tribal regiments, while on the extreme left stood the Platæans. The length of front was deliberately made equal to that of the Persians. A special formation was however adopted. The centre was weakened, being only a few ranks deep, while the wings were strengthened. The purpose of this becomes evident in the course of the fight.

The position of the Persians seems to have been parallel with the sea-shore, their centre being somewhere near where the “Soros” now stands. They had evidently moved that part of their fleet which was destined to remain behind at Marathon to the shore south of the mouth of the Charadra, where it was drawn up in rear of the army.[82]

◆H. vi. 112.◆

The interval between the two armies, before the movement of attack began, is stated by Herodotus to have been “not less than eight stades,” that is to say, slightly less than one mile—a statement of distance which is in accord with those circumstances which have been already noticed as determining the position of the two armies.

◆H. vi. 112.◆

When they were in array, and the sacrifices became favourable, then the Athenians, in accordance with their orders, advanced at the quick step[83] upon the barbarians.

So rapid a method of advance was unparalleled, so Herodotus says, in Greek warfare up to that time. The Greek hoplite seems to have been incapable of rapid movement. In his equipment everything was sacrificed to the effectiveness of his defensive armour. He was indeed the product of a country in which the extremely limited extent of cultivable land rendered it necessary for the citizens of each state to fight on behalf of their annual produce. ◆Cf. H. viii. 9(2).◆ Hence in ordinary Greek warfare the slow-moving, heavy-armed hoplite could always force a battle on ground suited to his offensive tactics,—the alluvial plain,—and had to be met with a force similarly equipped.

That the Greek advance was not altogether expected by the Persians may well have been the case; they may even have thought, as Herodotus says, that they were rushing upon their destruction. But when the historian adds that the Athenians were the first Greeks to face the Medes and their strange dress, he is obviously quoting the exaggerated Athenian tradition of Marathon.

#THE BATTLE.#

◆H. vi. 113.◆

The battle was fierce and stubborn, and lasted a long time. The weak Athenian centre gave way before the best troops of the enemy, the Persians and the Sakæ, who were opposed to them.

Such an eventuality must have been foreseen by the Greek generals; it seems, indeed, almost certain, from the subsequent development of the fight, that the falling back of the centre was a pre-arranged feature in the tactics of the battle. Herodotus, drawing his account largely from popular tradition, and not finding any reference to such a design in the sources of his information, represents the retreat of the centre as a reverse, whereas it was the essential preliminary to that movement which decided the battle.

The strong Athenian wings defeated, not without a severe struggle, the troops opposed to them; but, being kept well in hand, refrained from pursuing them. They wheeled round and assailed the victorious (_sic_) Persian centre on either flank. The deliberate checking of the pursuit of the wings points clearly to the fact that the falling back of the Greek centre was an essential feature of the plan of battle. As has been already said, that retreat was almost certainly a deliberate act, which had been provided for in the orders given to the officers of the wings before the battle began. It would have been difficult to check the pursuit of a victorious citizen force, had not its officers been aware beforehand that this formed an essential part of the whole design of the battle.

It was in this fight that the Persians must have sustained their severest losses, if the term fight can be applied to what, if the numbers of the slain given by Herodotus be near the truth, must have soon degenerated into a massacre.

Such of the Persian centre as escaped,—they cannot have been many in number,—fled to the ships. On reaching the shore, the Greeks called for means of setting fire to the vessels. As the fugitives from the Persian wings must have already reached the shore, and had, no doubt, hauled a large number of the ships into deep water, the success here attained by the Greeks was not great. The enemy seem to have fought with the courage of desperation to save their sole means of escape, and the Athenian losses at this stage of the fight, if not large numerically, included the polemarch Kallimachos and Stesilaos, one of the generals. Other prominent citizens fell in the same combat.

◆Paus. i. 32. 7.◆

Pausanias mentions that part of the Persian army got involved in one of the marshes, and was there slaughtered. This detail is derived from the picture preserved in the Poikilé Stoa at Athens.[84]

The marsh referred to is evidently the great marsh at the north-east end of the plain; for the cave of Pan is mentioned as lying somewhat farther from the plain than the marsh itself. The unfortunates who perished there seem to have been attempting to reach the shore of the bay by making a large circuit.

◆H. vi. 115.◆

Of the result of the fight Herodotus says: “In this way, the Athenians captured seven of the ships. But rowing rapidly out to sea, the barbarians, with the remainder of their vessels, took from the island in which they had left them, the slaves from Eretria, and sailed round Sunium, wishing to reach Athens before the arrival of the Athenians. At Athens it was alleged the barbarians adopted this plan, in accordance with a design of the Alkmæonidæ, who were said to have, by previous arrangement, signalled to the Persians with a shield when the latter were already in their ships. So they sailed round Sunium. ◆H. vi. 116.◆ The Athenians, however, marched with all speed to save the city, and succeeded in getting there before the arrival of the Persians. Having come from the Herakleion at Marathon, they encamped on their arrival in another Herakleion—that at Kynosarges. The barbarians on the high sea off Phaleron, which was at that time the Athenian naval port, anchored their ships off that place, and then sailed back to Asia.”

#THE PERSIAN DASH ON ATHENS.#

The exact interpretation of Herodotus’ meaning in this passage is not quite certain. He seems, however, to incline to the opinion that the whole Persian land force was engaged at Marathon, and that those who escaped to the ships after the disaster, when already on board, received the long-expected signal that the conspirators in Athens had done their work, and so sailed round Sunium to Phaleron in the hope of seizing Athens before the army from Marathon arrived. Nevertheless, though time was all-important to them, they wasted precious moments in removing the Eretrian prisoners from the islands in which they had been deposited.

There can be little doubt that the manifest inconsistencies of this story are due to Herodotus having attributed to the whole Persian fleet what were really the movements of two sections of it, namely of the division which must have started for Athens on the morning of the battle, and of a second division which carried those who survived the fight. The first of these, no doubt, made its way direct to Phaleron; the second, after picking up the prisoners on the island, followed it, and found it at anchor off Phaleron, whence the reunited force made its way to Asia.

The _details_ of the shield incident hardly admit of discussion. The incident itself is obviously a historical fact. Herodotus thinks it took place _after_ the battle, because he is under the impression that none of the Persians embarked before the battle was over.

From Marathon to Phaleron is not less than ninety miles by sea. The data for calculating the pace of a trireme of this period are very imperfect; but even at the most liberal computation of speed, and even under the most favourable circumstances, such a voyage would have demanded at least nine or ten hours; whereas, along, the easy route afforded by the lower road, the Athenians could have reached Athens in seven hours, or perhaps less. In the present instance the circumstances were unfavourable. The vessels were heavily laden with troops, horses, and baggage, to such an extent that their pace must have been reduced by almost one-half; so that, if they started at daybreak on the day of the battle, they cannot have been off Phaleron much before midnight.

It is extremely unlikely that the conspirators would have shown such a signal after the battle was over, and at an hour when the possibility of the Persians reaching Athens before the army would have been hardly existent.

The ships which received the signal carried, doubtless, that part of the force which did not take part in the battle, and whose embarkation was covered by those who fought.

The intention of this embarkation, which must have been evident to the Athenians, accounts for the promptness of their attack.

If nothing of the kind had been going on; if the whole Persian force had been still in front of them, and had shown no disposition to move, there is no reason why the Athenians should not have abided by their policy of masterly inactivity. The conspiracy at Athens could not have become dangerous before the Persians had got into actual touch with the conspirators.

Some time in the morning of that day of the battle, probably while it was still in progress, but not yet decided, the one half of the Persian fleet started, and, immediately after starting, received the long-delayed signal.

The Athenians, by dint of extreme haste, managed, after the battle was over, to reach Athens before the enemy, and the latter never attempted to land.

◆H. vi. 117.◆

The total Athenian losses in the battle amounted to 192 men. How many Platæans fell, Herodotus does not mention; but Pausanias says that he saw on the field a tomb sacred to their memory. Many light-armed slaves must have perished in such a struggle.[85]

The Persian losses amounted to 6400. As has been already said, these must have fallen mainly on the centre, of which, owing to the circumstances of the battle, but few can have escaped.

◆Paus. i. 32. 5.◆

Pausanias says that the place of burial of the fallen Persians was not recognizable in his day.

From Phaleron, Datis and Artaphernes sailed away to Asia, taking with them the unfortunate Eretrian captives, who were sent far inland, and were settled, by orders of Darius, at a place called Arderikka, not very far from Susa.

#GREEK GENERALSHIP AT MARATHON.#

How long Datis and Artaphernes remained at Phaleron, history does not say; but the Athenian army from Marathon cannot have been long at Athens before the Spartan contingent arrived there. It had, presumably, left Laconia on the 15th of the month, the day of full moon; and, making an extraordinarily rapid march, it reached Athens in less than three days. Its numbers are curiously small, only 2000 men; yet the speed with which it travelled shows that the Spartans were in earnest. They must have arrived very shortly after the battle, for they visited the field to view the dead; and it is not conceivable that 6400 corpses would be allowed to rot under a Greek sun, unburied for many days.

Despite its brevity, Herodotus’ account of Marathon contrasts favourably in certain respects with his narratives of the battles of ten years later.

Fewer details are given; but the main tactics employed are far more clearly noted.

The Greek generalship during the brief campaign was, in respect to both strategy and tactics, the best of the century. The difficulties which Kallimachos and his colleagues had to face were great. The danger was extreme. They might have been excused had they erred on the side of caution. The boldest course, taken in the move to Marathon, proved the most effective. It struck at the one weak point in the otherwise admirable Persian design. It placed the Persians in the manifest difficulty of a choice between two strategic evils. They would either have to assail the Greeks at a great disadvantage, or would, in the process of embarkation, have to face attack themselves with only a part of their force.

Marathon has, and must always have, a great place in history. It made a great and immediate impression on those who were its contemporaries. Its story would certainly, in any age of the world, have gained by exaggeration. It is only possible at the present day to surmise the lengths to which that exaggeration went; but chance references in later authors show that it went very far. Little of the exaggeration is found in Herodotus. That honest old historian has winnowed out nearly all the chaff from the crop of legends; though it cannot be doubted that in the process he has cast away some of the good grain also.

The loss may have been unavoidable. The machinery for historical criticism was in his day in its most primitive stage; and the good grain in the material to be dealt with was smothered in valueless dust.

One, and, historically speaking, the most important side of the exaggeration of after-time, must be mentioned. The Greek world, thanks no doubt to the Athenian presentment of the tale, regarded Marathon as a defeat inflicted on the full strength of Persia. It has been shown that such cannot have been the case.

Marathon was sufficiently glorious to its victors to render any exaggeration of the success attained superfluous. For the first time in history the Greek had beaten the Persian on his own element, the land. The army of a little state, possessed of no military reputation worth speaking of, had defeated a superior force of the conquerors of a continent. The Greek had shown himself able to face the best soldiers of his age; and the consciousness of this fact, rapidly permeating through the whole of the Hellenic world in Europe, gave the Greek confidence,—nay, even rendered him all but callous and careless,—in face of the great danger which threatened him ten years later.

Marathon was a greater Vimiero in that war which was to be fought out in the Greek peninsula.