Chapter xii now proceeds to the typical adaptations offered by the

several fields of oratory: the deliberative, the forensic, and the occasional.[82]

It must not be forgotten that one style is appropriate to one kind [of oratory], another style to another. Style for writing is not the same as style for debate, nor style for public debate the same as style for legal pleading. Both [style for writing and style for debate] have to be known: the latter, as command of correct (or idiomatic) utterance; the former, as deliverance from the necessity of keeping silence when one wishes to communicate—[an inhibition] which those suffer who do not know how to write. Style for writing is the most precise; style for debate, the most histrionic (the best adapted to delivery). The latter is [adaptation] of two sorts: expression of character, and expression of emotion. This is why actors also seek such plays, and dramatists such personæ [as give expression to character and emotion].

The distinction here between style for writing (to be read aloud) and style for speaking (for immediate utterance) is general, as appears in the following reference to asyndeton and in the comparison of public speaking to the broad brush work of fresco; but it is also particular. It distinguishes occasional, or panegyric oratory as demanding a style more literary. “Style for writing,” above, must from its context refer to panegyric; and below Aristotle adds: “The style of occasional oratory is best suited to writing; for its function is to be read.”[83]

The final section[84] of Book III deals with the larger parts of a speech: exordium, statement of facts, proof, peroration. This discussion of τάξις (_dispositio_) is both meager and perfunctory, hardly more than a rehearsal of those definitions and counsels which were already familiar in teaching and apparently in manuals,[85] and which were to be handed on by later tradition. Its importance is therefore primarily historical. It has little other significance, little of the Aristotelian discernment and suggestiveness. What the modern teacher of rhetoric misses, both here and throughout the later classical discussions of _dispositio_, is some definite inculcation of consecutiveness. That consecutiveness was achieved in the best practise there can be no doubt; how it was taught we are left to guess. As to movement in this larger sense, what we commonly mean by composition, Aristotle’s _Poetic_ is more definite and more suggestive than his _Rhetoric_.

He begins[86] by saying that the only essential parts of a speech are proposition and proof. It is presently apparent that by “parts” here he means components, or elements, of any and every sort of speech. The statement of facts, for instance, is not a part in the sense of a distinct division except in forensic; and Aristotle rightly objects[87] to subdivisions by “parts” which are neither distinct nor applicable generally. Even refutation, as he shows later,[88] is not a distinct part, either in function or in method or in place. The most that can be allowed are four: proposition and proof as essential, exordium and peroration as usual.

With the same common sense he shows that the first function of the exordium[89] is to put the hearers in a position to understand; its second, to win their sympathy.[90] Chapter xvi[91] passes to the recital of facts (διήγησις). The common rendering of this term by _narrative_ has been widely misleading. True, the corresponding Latin term is _narratio_, and the thing is narrative in the sense of being sometimes, though not always, chronological; but _narrative_ in our modern use, and especially in our modern text-books, is associated with objects and methods which Aristotle is not here considering at all, and which he rightly relegated to poetic. The Greek term διήγησις and the corresponding Latin _narratio_ mean exactly what is called in a modern lawyer’s brief the “statement of facts,” as distinct from the following “argument.” It therefore belongs properly, as a distinct part having a distinct place, to forensic. When used in occasional oratory,[92] it should on the contrary be broken up, not as in forensic continuous. In deliberative oratory[93] it has least scope, i.e., it hardly appears as a separable part.

But the recital of facts, though it corresponds to the “statement” of a brief in substance, need not be so limited in style. A speech is not a brief; and the pleader, ancient or modern, must make his facts live.[94]

Speak also from the emotions, reciting what goes with them (i.e., their physical expression), both what is familiar and what is characteristic of yourself or your opponent: “He left me with a scowl”; or, as Æschines said of Cratylus, “hissing and shaking his fists.” [Such descriptive suggestions are really] elements of persuasion; for the familiar images become tokens of what you are trying to impress. Many such expressions are to be had from Homer: “So she spoke, and the old woman covered her face with her hands,” as we commonly put our hands to our eyes when we begin to weep.

As to persuasion by argument[95] Aristotle begins with a mere hint of that determination of the main issue and character of the case which was afterward elaborated into the classified doctrine of the στάσις (_status_).

Examples [παραδείγματα, he goes on] are more suited to deliberative oratory; enthymemes, to forensic.[96]... Do not speak in enthymemes seriatim, but mix them in [with other means of persuasion]; or they will impair one another. There is a quantitative limit.... Do not seek an enthymeme for everything; or you will write like some philosophers; ... and do not speak in enthymeme when your immediate aim is emotional ... or ethical.

The peroration[97] consists: (1) of disposing the hearer well toward oneself and ill toward one’s adversary; (2) of enhancing and disparaging; (3) of stirring the hearer to emotion; (4) and of recapitulation.... [For this last function] the primary idea is that what was promised has been given in full, so that we must tell both what [we have said] and why. This is told by comparison [of our own case] with our opponent’s.... Asyndeton[98] befits the final words, that they may be peroration, not oration: “I have spoken; you have heard; you have it; judge.”

With no less abruptness Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ stops. It can hardly be said to conclude; and certainly it has no peroration.

FOOT-NOTES:

[1] _Text_, edited with notes, commentary, and index, COPE, E. M., and SANDYS, J. E., 3 volumes, Cambridge, 1877.

_Translations_ (the best recent ones in English), WELLDON, J. E. C., with analysis and critical notes, London, 1886; JEBB, R. C., edited with introduction and supplementary notes by SANDYS, J. E., Cambridge, 1909. Welldon’s tabular view is valuable. Jebb’s rendering of technical terms is generally more discerning.

_Criticism._ Aristotle having engaged the attention of nearly every important writer on rhetoric—and of many quite unimportant—for over two thousand years, a list of the commentaries and criticisms would be endless and bewildering. Nor would any addition here to the bibliographies already available be especially suggestive. The history of Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ will emerge incidentally throughout this work. The best single exegesis in English, especially of the relations of the _Rhetoric_ to the Aristotelian philosophy, remains E. M. Cope’s _Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric_, London, 1867.

[2] Quoted from the author’s article on Aristotle in the _Cyclopedia of Education_.

[3] 1354 a.

[4] 1355 a.

[5] 1355 b.

[6] 1355 b τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν, or, as the preceding context puts it, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανά.

[7] αἳ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αἳ δ’ ἔντεχνοι. Cope, _Introduction_, page 150, translates “unscientific and scientific”; Welldon, “inartistic or artistic”; Jebb, “inartificial or artificial.” None of these translations is satisfactory in connotation. _Scientific_, or _artistic_, or _artificial_ suggests associations not borne out by the context and ultimately misleading. Aristotle says simply “means that lie outside of the art and means that lie within it.” The means that lie within are hardly, in fact or in his intention, _scientific_. They are _artistic_ in the broadest sense of being attainable by art, not in the narrower sense of belonging to fine art, nor in the colloquial sense of being pretty. _Artificial_ they are not at all, except when they are misapplied.

[8] 1356 a.

[9] 1356 a.

[10] 1357 a.

[11] 1356 a.

[12] 1358 a.

[13] 1358 b.

[14] Of the various translations of Aristotle’s ἐπιδεικτικός, “demonstrative” is flatly a mistranslation, “oratory of display” is quite too narrow a translation, and “epideictic” is not a translation at all. The nearest word in current use is “_panegyric_,” which is right as far as it goes. But English use, though it lacks a single equivalent word, is none the less familiar with the thing. The kind of oratory that Aristotle means is the oratory of the Gettysburg Address, of most other commemorative addresses, and of many sermons. The French equivalent is _discours de circonstance_.

[15] Chapter iv. 1359 a.

[16] 1359 b-1360 a.

[17] 1360 b-1361 b.

[18] Chapter vi. 1362 a-1363 b.

[19] Chapter vii. 1363 b.

[20] Chapter viii. 1366 a.

[21] Chapter ix. 1366 a-1368 a.

[22] τὸ καλόν, treated again in Book II from the point of view of the audience.

[23] Chapters x-xv. 1368 b-1377 b.

[24] Chapter i. 1377 b. “In regard to πάθη and ἤθη, which move juries, the most important part is to know how these emotions are aroused and allayed. This alone, judging that it is none of their business, the rhetors have not borrowed from Aristotle, though they have borrowed everything else.” Philodemus, _Rhetorica_, trans. Hubbell, Transactions of the Connecticut Academy, vol. 23 (September, 1920), page 338.

[25] “The import of these ‘characters,’ as of the ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν in I. 8. 6, and the use to which they are to be applied, may be thus expressed in other words. Certain ages and conditions of men are marked by different and peculiar characteristics. A speaker is always liable to be confronted with an audience in which one or other of these classes forms the preponderating element. In order to make a favorable impression upon them, he must necessarily adapt his tone and language [Aristotle means rather his method and arguments] to the sentiments and habits of thought prevailing amongst them, and the feelings and motives by which they are usually influenced. And for this purpose he must study their characters, and make himself acquainted with their ordinary motives and feelings and opinions. And the following analysis will supply him with topics for this purpose.” Cope, _Introduction_, foot-note to page 248.

[26] Certain difficulties here in the text, with the principal emendations proposed, are discussed by Cope in his _Introduction_, and more largely in the Cope and Sandys edition. Vahlen was so convinced of an error in transmission that he proposed to restore what he considered the original order by transposing bodily Chapters xviii-end and Chapters i-xvii. But in spite of difficulties of detail, the present order shows sufficiently clear progress if we remember that these latter chapters (xviii-end) are written, as all the rest of the book is written, from the point of view of the audience. So viewed, what has seemed repetition and expansion of Book I is seen to be distinct, and not merely additional, but progressive.

[27] 1391 b.

[28] τὸ δυνατόν. Chapter xix.

[29] παράδειγμα. Chapter xx.

[30] πράγματα προγεγενημένα.

[31] γνῶμαι. Chapter xxi.

[32] 1395 b.

[33] Chapters xxii-xxiv.

[34] Opening of Chapter xxiii.

[35] Chapters xxv-xxvi.

[36] 1403 b.

[37] λέξις. It should be observed that Aristotle is not here divorcing “manner” from “matter.” Book III opens a third approach, which presupposes the preceding approaches. This seems to be insufficiently considered by H. P. Breitenbach (The _De compositione of Dionysius of Halicarnassus considered with reference to the Rhetoric of Aristotle_), who regards Book III as a deviation from the philosophic position of the preceding books.

[38] τάξαι.

[39] The fifth traditional item, memory, he omits altogether.

[40] Chapter i, 1354.

[41] 1404 a.

[42] φαντασία.

[43] Welldon’s translation “rhetorical actors” can hardly stand. The phrase τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν means rather _acting orators_, or, more exactly, orators who practise the art of the actor, who are skilled in delivery. Their advantage appears in their winning prizes for written speeches, which can be memorized and declaimed and which are sometimes _tours de force_, showing more style than thought. Such speeches—I think Aristotle cites them as an extreme case—show the separable value of style, including delivery.

[44] 1404 a.

[45] At the close of this first chapter Welldon’s translation “rhetorical style” is misleading. Aristotle says, as Jebb correctly translates, “that style of which we are speaking,” i.e., prose style, the style of public address. “The other style,” he adds, “has been treated in the _Poetic_.”

[46] 1404 b.

[47] 1406 a.

[48] τὰ ψυχρά.

[49] 1406 b.

[50] 1407 a.

[51] Style (λέξις, _elocutio_) consists of:

(1) choice of the right word (ἐκλογή, _electio_);

(2) the movement, rhythm, or pace of sentences and clauses (σύνθεσις, _compositio_). Chapters v-xii deal with (2).

[52] ὄγκος. Chapter vi, 1407 b.

[53] Chapter vii, 1408 a.

[54] Chapter viii, 1408 b.

[55] The Greek word σχῆμα is quite general, applicable to any sort of guiding principle, outline, system, or plan. Our English words _outline_, _plan_, etc., though otherwise fairly equivalent, have visual, graphic, static associations quite foreign to the context. Aristotle’s images for style are drawn not from architecture or painting, but from music and other modes of movement. By _the_ diction he means—indeed, he says later—prose diction.

[56] Literally, “all things are measured by number.”

[57] λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. Cope and Welldon translate “conversational harmony.” The literal sense of the phrase is “speech harmony,” “harmony of diction, or of style”; but since Aristotle can hardly mean to say that the heroic measure lacks harmony of diction _in verse_, and since he is talking of prose, I translate “prose harmony.” Ἁρμονία may be taken either in the general or in the particular (musical) sense of harmony; but in the latter sense its application is restricted to melody.

[58] 1409 a.

[59] For a modern scientific discussion of prose rhythm see W. M. Patterson, _The Rhythm of Prose_, New York, Columbia University Press, 1916. See also Morris W. Croll, _The cadence of English oratorical prose_. Studies in Philology, 16:1, University of North Carolina, January, 1919.

[60] Chapter ix, 1409 a.

[61] 1409 b, ἡδεῖα δ’ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής. The translation of Cope and of Welldon, “easily learnt” is amiss; and Welldon’s foot-note thereon about learning speeches by heart is still more misleading. The εὐσύνοπτον (end of 1409 a), “easily grasped as a whole,” of the preceding sentence does not imply writing and reading; and there is no other word in the context even to suggest this except the reference to memory, which in the classical rhetoric is rarely applied to memorizing. The translation “easily learnt” is precluded both by the general trend of the passage and by the specific figures of walking, running, and breathing. Here, as throughout the _Rhetoric_ and the _Poetic_, Aristotle avoids speaking of style in the visual terms common to modern generations of writers and readers. His terms, whether literal or figurative, are generally auditory and motor. When he uses others, it is to distinguish something special, as in Chapter xii (below) the exceptional, literary opportunity of such compositions as those of Isocrates. Not only does his _Rhetoric_ deal primarily and generally with oral composition, but in particular this section on σύνθεσις (_compositio_) deals with movement almost exclusively. Not until he has explained the period rhythmically does he add our modern definition that it should _also_ be concluded with the sense, i.e., with the syntax. Meantime he finds the period superior to the loose sentence—for oratory—first because it satisfies the ear by being heard as a definite rhythm, and secondly because it satisfies the mind by being intended and apprehended as a definite unit of thought.

[62] 1409 b.

[63] The admirable rendering of Jebb.

[64] 1409 b (toward end).

[65] 1409 b.

[66] For the contrast between the two movements in modern prose, see my _College Composition_, pages 184-188; for the effect of a passage of short sentences vs. that of a passage of long sentences, pages 69-71. Though the sentence unit, in our modern logical sense, is not always clear from the punctuation of even modern editions of ancient texts, it will usually be clear from the conclusion of the rhythm. In the earlier stages of modern prose, on the other hand, it is sometimes so dubious as to suggest that it was not always felt distinctly. The artistic development of modern prose, in other words, is partly the progressive distinction of periods.

[67] Chapter ix, 1410 a.

[68] Chapter x, 1410 b.

[69] 1404 b.

[70] τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα, lively and pleasing, smart and popular.

[71] Chapter xi, below.

[72] σχῆμα.

[73] ἐνέργεια.

[74] 1411 a.

[75] 1411 b.

[76] ἐνεργοῦντα. Here, perhaps, is the suggestion for Lessing’s famous doctrine in the _Laokoön_ as to Homeric description.

[77] 1412 a.

[78] 1404 b.

[79] 1406 a.

[80] 1413 b.

[81] Chapter vii, 1408 a.

[82] For this division see Book I, Chapter iii, 1358 b.

[83] ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις (1414 a). The intervening reference to Chæremon, a poet said to have been better to read than to hear, as “precise as a professional speech-writer,” should not deviate us here into consideration of speeches written out to be memorized. For a full discussion of the professional speech-writer (λογογράφος) see Cope and Sandys on Book II. xi. 7. Here Aristotle is discussing something different, the adaptation of occasional oratory as nicer and more literary in sentence movement. Perhaps he implies too that such speeches had better be composed, as well as elaborated, in writing. Certainly this kind of oratory, from Isocrates down, regularly included many compositions which we should call essays and which were not even intended to be spoken.

[84] Chapters xiii-xix.

[85] τέχναι. See Cope, _Introduction_, page 331.

[86] Chapter xiii, 1414 a.

[87] 1414 b.

[88] 1418 b.

[89] Chapter xiv, 1415 a.

[90] 1415 b-1416 b.

[91] 1416 b.

[92] Chapter xvi, 1416 b. The counsel is too often forgotten by panegyrists in Congress, perhaps because they are lawyers.

[93] 1417 b.

[94] See above on style in general (1404 a), on the vividness of the concrete (1404 b), on visualizing metaphor (1410 b), and on describing in action (1411 b).

[95] Chapter xvii, 1417 b. For the place of Chapters xvii and xviii in relation to the whole work see foot-note 5 to page 197 of Jebb’s translation.

[96] 1418 a.

[97] ἐπίλογος. Chapter xix, 1419 b.

[98] 1420 a.