Part 40
_Soc._ Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.
_Cal._ That, Socrates, is only your opinion.
_Soc._ And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?
_Cal._ Indeed I do.
_Soc._ Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?
_Cal._ By all means[40].
[Sidenote: Callicles, having admitted that pleasure and good are the same, is led to make the further admission that pleasure and knowledge and courage are different.]
_Soc._ Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?
_Cal._ There is.
_Soc._ And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?
_Cal._ I was.
_Soc._ And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?
_Cal._ Certainly I was.
_Soc._ And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?
_Cal._ Not the same, O man of wisdom.
_Soc._ And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.
[Sidenote: _The law of contradiction._]
_Cal._ And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he assent to this, or not?
_Soc._ He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?
_Cal._ What do you mean?
_Soc._ Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
_Cal._ To be sure. 496
_Soc._ But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?
_Cal._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?
_Cal._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
_Cal._ Very.
[Sidenote: A man may have good and evil by turns, but not at the same time.]
_Soc._ I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Or swiftness and slowness?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation[41]?
_Cal._ Certainly he has.
_Soc._ If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration.
[Sidenote: _The law of contradiction._]
_Cal._ I entirely agree.
_Soc._ Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
_Cal._ I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.
_Soc._ I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And thirst, too, is painful?
_Cal._ Yes, very.
_Soc._ Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?
_Cal._ I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.
_Soc._ Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word ‘thirsty’ implies pain?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And the word ‘drinking’ is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ There is pleasure in drinking?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ When you are thirsty?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And in pain?
_Cal._ Yes.
[Sidenote: But he may have pleasure and pain at the same time.]
_Soc._ Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
_Cal._ It is.
_Soc._ You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
_Cal._ Yes, I did.
[Sidenote: _The dialectical process_]
_Soc._ But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also 497 have pleasure?
_Cal._ Clearly.
[Sidenote: Therefore pleasure and pain are not the same as good and evil.]
_Soc._ Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
_Cal._ I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
_Soc._ You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
_Cal._ Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
_Soc._ Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
_Cal._ I do not understand what you are saying.
_Gor._ Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to hear the argument out.
_Cal._ Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
_Gor._ What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion.
_Cal._ Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
_Soc._ I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?
_Cal._ True.
_Soc._ And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
_Cal._ Very true.
_Soc._ Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted:—do you still adhere to what you said?
_Cal._ Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
[Sidenote: _to the man of the world is foolishness._]
[Sidenote: Another point of view.]
_Soc._ Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
_Cal._ Yes, I have.
_Soc._ And a foolish man too?
_Cal._ Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
_Soc._ Nothing particular, if you will only answer. 498
_Cal._ Yes, I have.
_Soc._ And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?
_Cal._ They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
_Soc._ Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
_Cal._ To be sure.
_Soc._ And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?
_Cal._ I should say ‘most’ of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.
_Soc._ No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
_Cal._ Greatly.
_Soc._ And the foolish; so it would seem?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
_Cal._ Both are pained.
[Sidenote: _A far-fetched argument,_]
_Soc._ And are they equally pained?
_Cal._ I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
_Soc._ And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure?
_Cal._ I dare say.
[Sidenote: Good is in proportion to pleasure, and the bad are often as much or more pleased than the good.]
_Soc._ Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]
_Cal._ I really do not know what you mean.
_Soc._ Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?
_Cal._ Yes, I remember.
_Soc._ And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
_Cal._ I should.
_Soc._ Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
_Cal._ Yes.
[Sidenote: _of which Callicles fails to see the drift._]
_Soc._ The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?
_Cal._ I should say that he has.
_Soc._ Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. 499 Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And he who has joy is good?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And he who is in pain is evil?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
_Cal._ Yes.
[Sidenote: Therefore the bad man is as good as the good, or perhaps even better.]
_Soc._ Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?
_Cal._ I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
[Sidenote: Socrates begins again with some obvious truisms.]
_Soc._ Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
[Sidenote: _The unfairness of Callicles who, when beaten,_]
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
_Cal._ To be sure.
_Soc._ And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
_Cal._ To be sure.
_Soc._ And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Soc._ But not the evil?
_Cal._ Clearly.
_Soc._ Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of 500 them?—will you add a third vote to our two?
_Cal._ I will.
_Soc._ Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?
_Cal._ To be sure.
_Soc._ But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
_Cal._ He must have art.
[Sidenote: _pretends that his answers are not serious._]
_Soc._ Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion;—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?
_Cal._ No, I do not.
_Soc._ Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not—do you agree?
_Cal._ I do.
[Sidenote: Socrates repeats his distinction between true arts and flatteries or shams, to which Callicles pretends to give assent.]
[Sidenote: _Callicles grows more and more_]
_Soc._ Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when 501 I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul’s highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.
_Cal._ I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.
_Soc._ And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
_Cal._ Equally true of two or more.
_Soc._ Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?
_Cal._ Yes.
[Sidenote: There are arts which delight mankind but which never consider the soul’s higher interest.]
_Soc._ Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
_Cal._ I assent.
_Soc._ And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about 502 what will give pleasure to the multitude?
[Sidenote: _impatient of the argument._]
_Cal._ There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.
_Soc._ And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?
_Cal._ That is my notion of them.
_Soc._ And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her character?
_Cal._ There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.
_Soc._ And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?
_Cal._ Quite true.
_Soc._ Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech[42]?
_Cal._ To be sure.
_Soc._ And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
_Cal._ True.
_Soc._ And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?
_Cal._ Yes.
[Sidenote: Poetry is of the nature of flattery.]
_Soc._ Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.
[Sidenote: _The two sorts of rhetoric._]
_Cal._ Quite true.
[Sidenote: Oratory, too, as practised regards the interest of the speaker rather than the good of the people.]
_Soc._ Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?
_Cal._ I must distinguish. There are some who have a real 503 care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.
[Sidenote: There might be a higher style of oratory; and Callicles thinks that such really existed in the great days of old, the days of Miltiades and Themistocles and Pericles.]
_Soc._ I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he?
_Cal._ But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.
_Soc._ Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know of such a man.
_Cal._ What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?