Part 50
_Soc._ Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.
_Al._ But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.
_Soc._ Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.
[Sidenote: _Alcibiades is puzzled._]
_Al._ And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?
[Sidenote: The way to clear up difficulties is to answer questions. Alcibiades is willing to have recourse to this method of improvement.]
_Soc._ Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.
_Al._ If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.
_Soc._ And first of all, that we may not peradventure be 128 deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?
_Al._ I should think so.
_Soc._ When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?
_Al._ I do not understand.
_Soc._ Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And the shoe in like manner to the foot?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?
_Al._ I do not comprehend, Socrates.
_Soc._ But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And taking proper care means improving?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And what is the art which improves our shoes?
_Al._ Shoemaking.
_Soc._ Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?
_Al._ By some other art.
[Sidenote: _He is learning by examples._]
_Soc._ And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?
_Al._ Very true.
_Soc._ Which is gymnastic?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?
_Al._ Very true.
_Soc._ And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?
_Al._ Clearly.
[Sidenote: It has been shown by examples that a man does not take care of himself, when he only takes care of what belongs to him.]
_Soc._ Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?
_Al._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?
_Al._ Clearly not.
_Soc._ And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?
_Al._ I cannot say.
_Soc._ At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?
_Al._ Impossible.
_Soc._ Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?
_Al._ That is true.
[Sidenote: A man must know himself before he can improve himself or know what belongs to him.]
_Soc._ And can we ever know what art makes a man better, 129 if we do not know what we are ourselves?
[Sidenote: _The knowledge of self._]
_Al._ Impossible.
_Soc._ And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?
_Al._ At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.
_Soc._ But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.
_Al._ You say truly.
_Soc._ Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ As I am, with you?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And Alcibiades is my hearer?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And I in talking use words?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?
_Al._ To be sure.
_Soc._ And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?
_Al._ What do you mean?
_Soc._ I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?
_Al._ Of course not.
[Sidenote: _More analogies and examples._]
_Soc._ And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?
_Al._ It is.
_Soc._ Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?
_Al._ I do.
_Soc._ Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?
_Al._ With his hands as well.
_Soc._ He uses his hands too?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?
_Al._ He does.
[Sidenote: He is distinct from what he uses; and therefore distinct from his own body.]
_Soc._ And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?
_Al._ Clearly.
_Soc._ And does not a man use the whole body?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And that which uses is different from that which is used?
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ Then a man is not the same as his own body?
_Al._ That is the inference.
_Soc._ What is he, then?
_Al._ I cannot say.
_Soc._ Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And the user of the body is the soul? 130
_Al._ Yes, the soul.
_Soc._ And the soul rules?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.
_Al._ What is it?
[Sidenote: But he must be one of three things:—Soul, body, or the union of the two. What is the ruling principle in him? Clearly the soul.]
_Soc._ That man is one of three things.
_Al._ What are they?
[Sidenote: _The true self or being of a man._]
_Soc._ Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?
_Al._ Yes, we did.
_Soc._ And does the body rule over itself?
_Al._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ It is subject, as we were saying?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
_Al._ It would seem not.
_Soc._ But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?
_Al._ Very likely.
_Soc._ The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?
_Al._ Just so.
_Soc._ Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?
_Al._ Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.
[Sidenote: There remains a question of absolute existence, which has not been considered by us, or rather is being considered by us when we speak of the soul.]
_Soc._ And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.
_Al._ What was that?
_Soc._ What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?
_Al._ There is nothing.
[Sidenote: You and I are talking soul to soul.]
_Soc._ Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?
_Al._ Very true.
[Sidenote: _The man and his belongings._]
_Soc._ And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?
_Al._ That appears to be true.
[Sidenote: But if the soul is the man, he who knows only the arts which concern man does not know himself.]
_Soc._ He whose knowledge only extends to the body, 131 knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?
_Al._ He does not.
_Soc._ The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?
_Al._ I agree.
_Soc._ And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?
_Al._ Quite true.
_Soc._ Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?
_Al._ I agree.
_Soc._ Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?
_Al._ True.
[Sidenote: The lover of the soul is the true lover.]
_Soc._ And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ But he who loves your soul is the true lover?
[Sidenote: _Socrates, the only true lover of Alcibiades._]
_Al._ That is the necessary inference.
_Soc._ The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?
_Al._ True.
[Sidenote: He only remains and goes not away, so long as the soul of his beloved follows after virtue.]
_Soc._ But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?
_Al._ Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain.
_Soc._ Then you must try to look your best.
_Al._ I will.
_Soc._ The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?
_Al._ That is true.
[Sidenote: And Socrates will never desert Alcibiades so long as he is not spoiled by the Athenian people.]
_Soc._ The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true 132 self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechtheus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.
_Al._ What caution?
_Soc._ Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm’s way.
_Al._ Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.
_Soc._ Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.
[Sidenote: _How is a man to take care of himself?_]
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?
_Al._ Very good.
[Sidenote: He who would take care of himself must first of all know himself.]
_Soc._ But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
_Al._ What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
_Soc._ I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.
_Al._ What do you mean?
[Sidenote: The eye which would see itself must look into the pupil of another, which is the divinest part of the eye, and will then behold itself.]
_Soc._ Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, ‘See thyself,’ as you might say to a man, ‘Know thyself,’ what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?
_Al._ Clearly.
_Soc._ And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?
_Al._ Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.
_Soc._ Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which 133 is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?
_Al._ That is quite true.
[Sidenote: _The argument recapitulated with some corrections._]
_Soc._ Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?
_Al._ That is evident.
_Soc._ But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?
_Al._ Very true.
_Soc._ Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?
_Al._ True.
[Sidenote: And the soul which would know herself must look especially at that part of herself in which she resembles the divine.]
_Soc._ And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?
_Al._ I agree, Socrates.
_Soc._ And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?
_Al._ There is none.
_Soc._ Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?
_Al._ Clearly.
_Soc._ And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?
_Al._ True.
_Soc._ But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?
_Al._ How can we, Socrates?
_Soc._ You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?
_Al._ It would be quite impossible.
[Sidenote: He who knows not himself and his belongings, will not know others and their belongings, and therefore he will not know the affairs of states.]
_Soc._ Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?
_Al._ How could we?
_Soc._ And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?
_Al._ Clearly not.
_Soc._ Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.
[Sidenote: _Happiness without virtue impossible._]
_Al._ So much may be supposed.
_Soc._ And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?
_Al._ Very true.
_Soc._ And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?
_Al._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ Then such a man can never be a statesman?
_Al._ He cannot.
_Soc._ Nor an economist?
_Al._ He cannot.
_Soc._ He will not know what he is doing? 134
_Al._ He will not.
_Soc._ And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?
_Al._ Assuredly.
[Sidenote: And, if he knows not what he is doing, he will be miserable and will make others miserable.]
_Soc._ And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?
_Al._ Yes, indeed.
_Soc._ And failing, will he not be miserable?
_Al._ Very.
_Soc._ And what will become of those for whom he is acting?
_Al._ They will be miserable also.
_Soc._ Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?
_Al._ He cannot.
_Soc._ The bad, then, are miserable?
_Al._ Yes, very.
_Soc._ And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?
_Al._ Clearly.
_Soc._ Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue[60]?
[Sidenote: _The divine mirror._]
_Al._ Indeed they do not.
[Sidenote: He must give the citizens wisdom and justice, and he cannot give what he has not got.]
_Soc._ And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ But can a man give that which he has not?
_Al._ Impossible.
_Soc._ Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.
_Al._ Clearly.
[Sidenote: If he acts wisely and justly he will act according to the will of God.]
_Soc._ You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?
_Al._ Certainly.
_Soc._ As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?
_Al._ Yes.
[Sidenote: In the mirror of the divine he will see his own good and will act rightly and be happy.]
_Soc._ In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And so you will act rightly and well?
_Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ In which case, I will be security for your happiness.
_Al._ I accept the security.
_Soc._ But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.
_Al._ Very possibly.
_Soc._ For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for 135 example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?
[Sidenote: _The conversion of Alcibiades._]
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?
_Al._ Yes; I see that they will all perish.
_Soc._ And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?
_Al._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: Not power, but virtue, should be the aim both of individuals and of states: and he only is a freeman who has virtue.]
_Soc._ Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.
_Al._ That is true.
_Soc._ And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children[61]?