Part 9
_Soc._ Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then,—Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
_Euth._ Yes.
[Sidenote: All which is pious is just:—is therefore all which is just pious?]
_Soc._ And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, 12 pious?
_Euth._ I do not understand you, Socrates.
_Soc._ And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—
‘Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.’
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
_Euth._ By all means.
[Sidenote: We may say, e. g., that wherever there is reverence there will be fear, but not that wherever there is fear there will be reverence.]
_Soc._ I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
_Euth._ Very true.
_Soc._ But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.
[Sidenote: _Euthyphro in the hands of Socrates._]
_Euth._ No doubt.
_Soc._ Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?
_Euth._ Quite well.
_Soc._ That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
_Euth._ No, I think that you are quite right.
_Soc._ Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
_Euth._ Yes, I quite agree.
[Sidenote: Piety or holiness is that part of justice which attends upon the gods.]
_Soc._ In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
_Euth._ Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men.
_Soc._ That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little 13 point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of ‘attention’? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
_Euth._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: _What is the meaning of attention?_]
_Soc._ I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
_Euth._ Yes.
_Soc._ Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
_Euth._ True.
_Soc._ And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?
_Euth._ Yes.
_Soc._ As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
_Euth._ Very true.
_Soc._ In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
_Euth._ Yes.
[Sidenote: Attention to others is designed to benefit and improve them. But how are the gods benefited or improved by the holy acts of men?]
_Soc._ And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman’s art they are benefited and improved, are they not?
_Euth._ True.
_Soc._ As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art, and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?
_Euth._ Certainly, not for their hurt.
_Soc._ But for their good?
_Euth._ Of course.
_Soc._ And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
_Euth._ No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
_Soc._ And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.
_Euth._ You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean.
[Sidenote: _Euthyphro grows impatient of the argument._]
[Sidenote: The attention to the gods called piety is such as servants show their masters.]
_Soc._ Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?
_Euth._ It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
_Soc._ I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods.
_Euth._ Exactly.
_Soc._ Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object—would you not say of health?
_Euth._ I should.
_Soc._ Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?
_Euth._ Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
_Soc._ As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a house?
_Euth._ Yes.
[Sidenote: But in what way do men help the work of God?]
_Soc._ And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.
_Euth._ And I speak the truth, Socrates.
_Soc._ Tell me then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?
_Euth._ Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
_Soc._ Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But 14 the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
_Euth._ Certainly.
_Soc._ Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
_Euth._ Exactly.
_Soc._ And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?
_Euth._ I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
[Sidenote: _Piety a science of asking and giving._]
_Soc._ I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
_Euth._ Yes, I do.
_Soc._ And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?
_Euth._ Yes, Socrates.
_Soc._ Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
_Euth._ You understand me capitally, Socrates.
_Soc._ Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
_Euth._ Yes, I do.
_Soc._ Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
_Euth._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: Men give to the gods, and the gods give to men; they do business with one another.]
_Soc._ And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want.
_Euth._ Very true, Socrates.
_Soc._ Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?
_Euth._ That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
_Soc._ But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they 15 do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.
[Sidenote: _Euthyphro is fairly puzzled._]
_Euth._ And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?
_Soc._ But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?
_Euth._ What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?
_Soc._ Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?
_Euth._ I should say that nothing could be dearer.
_Soc._ Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?
_Euth._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: Again, the argument walks away.]
_Soc._ And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?
_Euth._ I quite remember.
_Soc._ And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?
_Euth._ True.
_Soc._ Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.
_Euth._ One of the two must be true.
[Sidenote: Nevertheless, Socrates is confident that Euthyphro knows the truth, but will not tell him.]
_Soc._ Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.
[Sidenote: _Euthyphro departs._]
[Sidenote: Euthyphro is in a hurry to depart, and finally leaves Socrates to his fate.]
_Euth._ Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
_Soc._ Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had 16 given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.
FOOTNOTES
[13] Cp. 1 Alcib. 111 foll.
APOLOGY.
INTRODUCTION.
[Sidenote: _Apology._]
[Sidenote: INTRODUCTION.]
In what relation the Apology of Plato stands to the real defence of Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in tone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the Memorabilia (iv. 4, 4) that Socrates might have been acquitted ‘if in any moderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;’ and who informs us in another passage (iv. 8, 4), on the testimony of Hermogenes, the friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the divine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, ‘ut non supplex aut reus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum’ (Cic. de Orat. i. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the ‘accustomed manner’ in which Socrates spoke in ‘the agora and among the tables of the money-changers.’ The allusion in the Crito (45 B) may, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy of some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the ideal of Socrates, according to Plato’s conception of him, appearing in the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of tragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed up, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident in the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming want of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a perfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates.
[Sidenote: _The Platonic defence of Socrates._]
Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the recollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his disciple. The Apology of Plato may be compared generally with those speeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the lofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same time furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of view of the historian. So in the Apology there is an ideal rather than a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only Plato’s view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have aimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to be supplemented from the Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon, who belongs to an entirely different class of writers. The Apology of Plato is not the report of what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge in the fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in any case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and some of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is significant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence (Apol. 38 B), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in the Phaedo (59 B). Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp of authenticity to the one and not to the other?—especially when we consider that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed has the appearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates received the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining the world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been famous before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (Riddell, i. p. xvi), and the story is of a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the whole we arrive at the conclusion that the Apology is true to the character of Socrates, but we cannot show that any single sentence in it was actually spoken by him. It breathes the spirit of Socrates, but has been cast anew in the mould of Plato.
[Sidenote: _Analysis 17-19._]
There is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with the Apology. The same recollection of his master may have been present to the mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the Republic (ii. 361 foll., vi. 500 A). The Crito may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to the Apology, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is nevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The idealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the Gorgias (476 foll.), in which the thesis is maintained, that ‘to suffer is better than to do evil;’ and the art of rhetoric is described as only useful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur in the so-called Apology of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because the writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The statements of the Memorabilia (i. 2; iv. 8) respecting the trial and death of Socrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of Socratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon.
The Apology or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three parts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in mitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and exhortation.
* * * * *
The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style; he is, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and =Steph.= 17 knows of no rhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character by making a speech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into 18 two classes; first, there is the nameless accuser—public opinion. All the world from their earliest years had heard that he was a corrupter of youth, and had seen him caricatured in the Clouds of Aristophanes. Secondly, there are the professed accusers, who are but the mouth-piece of the others. The accusations of both might be summed up in a formula. The first say, ‘Socrates is an evil-doer and a curious person, searching into things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the worse appear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.’ The second, ‘Socrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does not receive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new divinities.’ These last words appear to have been the actual indictment (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 1); and the previous formula, which is a summary of public opinion, assumes the same legal style.
[Sidenote: _Analysis 19-23._]
The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, 19 he had been identified with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists. But this was an error. For both of them he professes a respect in the open court, which contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in other places. (Cp. for Anaxagoras, Phaedo 98 B, Laws xii. 967; for the Sophists, Meno 95 D, Rep. vi. 492, Tim. 19 E, Theaet. 154 E, Soph. 265 foll., etc.) But at the same time he shows that he is not one of them. Of natural philosophy he knows nothing; not that he despises such pursuits, but the fact is that he is ignorant of them, and never says a word about them. Nor is he paid for giving instruction—that is another mistaken notion:—he has nothing to teach. But he commends 20 Evenus for teaching virtue at such a ‘moderate’ rate as five minae. Something of the ‘accustomed irony,’ which may perhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking here.
[Sidenote: _Analysis 23-30._]