Part 8

LXXXVII. It is much to be lamented, that those who are called professors in the schools, do not know more of the nature of things than the vulgar. But what would you think, if I was to say now, they know even less? It would seem, as if I was advancing an extravagant paradox; but notwithstanding this, I assert that the proposition is a most true one, and may be easily proved; for as experience is the only channel, through which a knowledge of nature can be conveyed; they must have the best experimental knowledge of natural things, who in various mechanical occupations, work up various natural entities; and not those who amuse themselves with speculations, and live retired in schools. A fisherman, knows something of the properties of fish; a pilot, of the winds and the tides; a sportsman, of birds and wild animals; and a husbandman, of the generation and increase of plants. But what does the philosopher know? why, he knows how to raise doubts about every thing, and that is all. Thus the school of physics is a theatre, where people are taught to doubt without end. I say without end, because it is scarce possible the period should ever arrive, when they will be able to pass from doubt to certainty. This may be clearly inferred, by their disputing at this day with the same obstinacy, the same questions they disputed two hundred years ago. If any elucidation, or certain knowledge, has been acquired with respect to here and there a physical theorem, we are not indebted for it to the schools, but owe it to the benefit of experience, which comes from the world at large. We may thank the experiments of Torriceli, Monsieur Pascal, Otho Guerricus, and Boyle, for our knowledge that the air is ponderous. If we are certain, that the blood circulates from the heart through the arteries, and is returned by the veins, we owe the discovery to the anatomical observations of Peter Paul Sarpi and William Harvey. If we are clear, that the chyle is not conveyed to the liver, but to the heart; what ascertained this truth, but the diligent and practical scrutinies of John Paqueto, Thomas Bartolino, and the Englishman Lowther? Experience has been the only arbitrator, which has settled some disputes, and banished certain errors from the schools; and wherever matters have been left to speculation and reasoning, the suit still remains depending and undetermined. One age and another passes away, and the world during the whole time, has been accustomed to hear the same vociferations, the same arguments, and the same distinctions; and has seen the obstinacy of the contending parties, transferred, as if it were by hereditary succession, from professor to professor, without the least prospect, either of victory or reconciliation.

SECT. XXIV.

LXXXVIII. From this known ignorance of ours, we may deduce a very useful reflexion, which is, to be firm and steady in observing a due subjection to the sacred dogmas of faith. The inordinate confidence we place in our own reason, is a great enemy to religion. He who estimates his own understanding at an excessive high rate, rests his faith on the edge of a precipice; for this vanity has shewn itself very glaringly, in all the heresies we ever knew. In their pursuits of other vices, mankind have taken different turns, but in this they have been all uniform; for although they have neither been all lascivious, nor all covetous, nor all ambitious; still in this instance, they have all presumed much on their own understanding. And what can be a more efficacious antidote against this mad presumption, than reflecting upon the little or nothing, we have been able to discover in matters of philosophy? how can he, who knows he cannot penetrate the misteries of nature, dare attempt fathoming those of grace? If he reflects, there will result from that reflexion, a distrust of his own reason, and he will submit himself obediently to authority. The philosopher Anaxagoras, whom on account of the extraordinary subtilty of his ingenuity, they by way of eminence, called the soul or spirit of antiquity, after having laboured with infinite industry in philosophy, said, that nature was all surrounded with clouds and darkness. _Anaxagoras pronuntiat circumfussa esse tenebris omnia._ (Lactant. lib. iii. Divin. Instit. cap. 28.) And I must observe, that this philosopher, who knew nature was impenetrable to his understanding, was the first of all the philosophers, if we believe Aristotle, Laertius, and Plutarch, who declared himself convinced of the indispensable necessity of a supreme intelligence, who must be the author and director of the whole. On the other hand, those who boasted, and flattered themselves that they had discovered all the mysteries and profundities of nature, for the most part, denied either the existence, or the providence of a deity.

LXXXIX. I can with truth say of myself, that next to the divine grace, a conviction of my own ignorance with regard to natural things, is the most powerful weapon I could ever discover, wherewith to overcome all those difficulties or objections, which natural reason suggests, against the mysteries of faith. I often say to myself, good God! how can I understand those wonders, which by using his extraordinary power, are wrought by the omnipotent hand, if I cannot comprehend, the common effects of his ordinary power? It is true, I am ignorant how, or by what means, a divine person can unite himself to human nature; but I am also ignorant, how a spiritual soul can be united to a material body. Notwithstanding which, this is a matter of fact, and happens within myself. Neither do I perceive, how the same water which falls from heaven, should be converted, not only into here and there a particular body, but into all the animal and vegetable substances upon earth. In the most plausible part of theological controversy, I find myself exceedingly embarrassed; for if I take the side of providence, I am assailed with the forcible arguments in favour of liberty; and if I put myself on the side of liberty, they wage powerful war against me with the arguments in favour of providence. But do not I see the same arguments, urged with greater vehemence, in the vulgar philosophical controversy respecting the composition and unity of universal space, in which, whatever sentiment is maintained, they instead of answering their opponents arguments, perplex the dispute with a multiplicity of words? If I defend, with Aristotle, the infinite divisibility of universal space, although to avoid being concluded, I don’t do it with my mouth, I cannot in my mind, help acknowledging the unity of a great number of its parts; and if with Zeno I acquiesce in the indivisibility, the mathematical arguments derived from the diagonal of a square, two concentric wheels united, and many other principles, not only leave me without an answer, but in a manner strike me dumb.

XC. I say again, if in those natural things that are open to our view, and which we touch with our hands every day, there occur a thousand difficulties, that are insuperable to, and beyond the reach of our understandings, have we not the greatest reason to suppose, that the same thing happens with respect to supernatural matters, they being totally superior to the sphere of our senses? If, maugre all my prying, I can’t perceive how God does an infinite number of things, which I see him do every day, would it not be madness in me, to deny or to doubt the existence of revealed things, only because I can’t descry how God executes those things?

If there was a man so short-sighted, that he could not see objects that were very near him, and should pretend that he saw those which were at the distance of a hundred miles from his eyes, or else should take it into his head to insist, that such objects, although they are well known to be _in esse_, do not exist, only because he can’t see them, would not all the world pronounce him a lunatic? This is exactly the same sort of madness as that of those who deny there are divine mysteries, only because they can’t comprehend or pry into them. Little vain stupid man, if the fabric of those material compositions which are ever before your eyes, and are at all times familiar to your touch, is totally impenetrable to your short and limited capacity, how can you expect to comprehend the ineffable manner, in which Omnipotence performs those supernatural wonders? You will tell me, that you can find no solution of the arguments, which the Gentile urges to you against the mystery of the Trinity, or against that of the Incarnation; and I answer, that neither can you find any, to those the philosopher urges against the composition of universal space, take which side of the question you will, and suppose it to be made up, of either divisible, or indivisible matter; but would you conclude from thence, that it is not composed of either one or the other? you certainly would not; and it would be equal, if not greater delirium, to deny the truth of those mysteries, only because you can’t answer, and remove the objections that are made to them. Is it fit, that an Infinite Power should proportion his works, to the limited measure of your understanding? or is it reasonable to suppose that God can do nothing, which you can’t comprehend?

XCI. No north wind, so quickly disperses the clouds which interrupt the rays of the sun, as these reflexions clear up the doubts, which natural reason opposes to the mysteries of faith. Leave then the presumptuous dogmatists to chew their scepticism, and to make the most of the objections it furnishes against religion. But the sort of scepticism, which is precisely limited and confined to physics, is so far from prejudicing faith, that it serves to confirm and rivet it; by removing the obstacles, which the presumption of natural reason throws in the way, to interrupt the effect of that humble docility, which is so necessary, to preserve the understanding in a due state of subjection to the authority of revelation.

XCII. Those men do great injury, not only to philosophy, but to the church also, who rashly endeavour, to interest the doctrine of revelation in the defence of their particular philosophical opinions. This the heretics lay hold of, to calumniate us with converting philosophical sentiments, into articles of faith; and by this artifice, they persuade their followers, that our belief is arduous, and unnecessarily complicated. Upon this presumption, some strangers found their assertions, when they accuse us of countenancing idiotism, and mixing it with religion. It is but a little while ago, that one of them declared in his writings, that the opinions of men in Spain were not more free, than their persons were in Turkey. In order to preserve a due respect for sacred things, it is necessary, not to confound them with profane ones; whoever should begin to erect habitations in temples, would be the author of temples losing that respectful reverence that ought to be preserved in them. There are judges appertaining to the church, whose province it is, to determine what doctrines are useful, what pernicious, and what indifferent. Let us then leave the decision of those matters to them, and don’t let those who sincerely seek the truth, be terrified and disturbed by those scare-crows that are set up by partiality and faction, and sometimes by the pride of those, who have given their names to particular schools, or by the envy of others, who could not arrive at doing so much.

SECT. XXV.

XCIII. We having shewn now, that we possess no physical science or demonstrative knowledge of natural things, we may entertain a reasonable doubt whether we shall ever be able to attain any such. The most learned Valles, is clear that we shall not; because physical knowledge is confined to singular things, and alledges that from singular things, you can’t derive a science. But as we have observed before, this argument is ill founded, and insufficient.

XCIV. We might lay more stress upon two authorities the sceptics alledge in their favour, which are taken from the Ecclesiastes. The first is from Chap. III. in these words. _Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniat homo opus, quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem._ The second is more formal and precise, and taken from Chap. VIII. _Et intellexi, quod omnium operum Dei nullam possit homo invenire rationem eorum, quæ sunt sub sole: et quantò plus laboraverit ad quærendum, tantò minus inveniat, etiamsi dixerit sapiens se nosse, non poterit reperire._ But in truth, these texts, when they affirm the impossibility of discovering the causes and reason of natural effects, may be understood to allude to the providential, and not to the natural or physical ones. In fact, this is the sense in which some fathers and expositors understand them.

XCV. Others again argue, that the desire of knowing the causes of natural effects, is natural to, and implanted in man by nature itself; and as a natural desire can’t prompt a man to an impossible inquiry, it follows, that attaining the science we are speaking of, is within the compass of possibility. To this argument, Valles replies, it is absolutely possible; and although not in this life, it is in that to come, at which period, the blessed will see with God all things most clearly. This solution is attended with the following difficulty, that a natural desire can’t be directed to an impossible object; neither can it terminate in a supernatural one; and the knowledge the blessed will have of supernatural things, must be entitively supernatural, because it will depend immediately on the light of glory. Upon the whole, we may suppose, that there may belong to the soul in a state of separation from the body, abstracted from the supernatural blessing of the light of glory, a certain knowledge of all material things, in consequence of the species, infused in the course and order of nature; which is the sentiment of Egidius Romanus, Father Saurez, and others; and this knowledge being natural, may possibly be the effect of the thirst we possess for acquiring it in this mortal life.

XCVI. But we can’t help remarking, that the foregoing argument does not stand in need of this solution, because it proceeds upon a false supposition not adverted to by Valles; which is, that the desire of knowing things philosophically, is a principle implanted in man by nature. If this was so, all men would be impressed with this desire, which is not the case; for the greatest part of them seem to have no passion at all for physics; and many despise philosophical speculations, as useless, vain, and by no means entertaining. It is true, that all men are desirous of knowledge, but this desire is not directed in all of them to the same object, or to the same species of objects. Generous souls are naturally lovers of truth; but the majority, are only anxious to understand those things, the knowledge of which, may contribute to the gratification of their passions.

XCVII. We have seen the little force of the arguments urged on both sides, with respect to the doubts we have been canvassing. On which account, I won’t venture to give sentence in the question. Nor do I, nor can any one else without the assistance of Revelation, know the just limits of the human understanding with regard to natural things. And although the various philosophical systems which have hitherto been invented, are exposed to great doubts, or are impeachable of containing manifest nullities in them, who knows but that, in future some one may be discovered so compleat, and so well founded, that the understanding may be convinced of the truth of it. My opinion is, that if this is ever to be accomplished, it must be done by pursuing the plan and method prescribed by my Lord Bacon. It is true, that this is so laborious and prolix, that the execution of it may be apprehended to be morally impossible; for although the monarchs of two very powerful kingdoms, France and England, for the space of more than a hundred years, have caused four hundred able men, at a great expence, and under proper regulations, to be employed in making innumerable experiments, and in reasoning upon, and explaining them, the work is not yet far advanced; when then may we expect to see it accomplished? The Academy of Sciences at Paris, and the Royal Society of London, don’t amount to more than a shred of my Lord Bacon’s extensive project.

On the Shew or Affectation of Learning and Knowledge.

SECT. I.

I. Science, like Virtue, has its imitators and its hypocrites; and the vulgar are as much imposed upon by the one as the other. The numbers of unlearned people who pass for men of literature, is considerable; and the false appearances they put on, becomes a copious source of errors, both particular and common. In this earthly region which we inhabit, apparent learning is as much reverenced, and often-times as much respected, as true. There are those, who are very expert at putting on the semblance of learned men, and of imposing themselves as such upon the world, although the portion of literature they possess is but very small; however, if they have the address to make their copied imitation of it appear an original painting, the copy will often make the same impression on mens minds, as if it actually was an original. When Zeuxis with his pencil imitated grapes, the birds flew with as much eagerness to eat the painted, as if they had been real and natural grapes.

II. In the eleventh century, Arnoldus Brixiens, who was a man of but little literature, did great mischief with his errors, both in his own country, and even in Rome itself; for as Gunterus Ligurinus observes, that besides being an elegant reasoner, he had the address of giving himself the air and appearance of a man of learning; _Assumpta sapientis fronte, disserto fallebat sermone rudes_; or as Otho Frinsingens remarks, a copious verbosity passed in him for knowledge and erudition; _Vir quidem naturæ non hebetis; plus tamen verborum profluvio, quam sententiarum pondere copiosus._ Thus Vigilantius, although he was an ignorant man, by his art in gaining over to him booksellers and publishers, who were the proclaimers of his fame, so far acquired the reputation of a person of literature, that he had the assurance to write against Saint Jerom, and to accuse him of being an Origenist.

III. The vulgar, who are incompetent judges of men of letters, are apt, although it is against their own interest, to countenance and give credit to unlearned persons, whose deceptions in consequence of this encouragement become formidable. The delusion of popular ignorance is apt to magnify a very small light, into the blaze of a flaming torch; and to fancy it is as luminous, as the lanthorn placed on the top of the tower of Pharos, which Pliny says, at a great distance off, appears like a star to those who navigate the sea of Alexandria.

IV. It may not be improperly remarked, that in order for a man to be esteemed a person of learning with the populace, it is not so necessary that he should really be one, as that he should put on the pompous appearance of such a person. Arrogance and verbosity, if they are accompanied with a small degree of discernment, that helps a man to judge, when are the proper times to talk, and when to hold his tongue, and what are the subjects he should discourse, and what be silent upon: I say, if he has a little discretion to know how to conduct himself in these particulars, such management will have a notable effect. A confident magisterial air in his decisions, and an artificial gesture, which when he sprinkles about the little he understands of the subject he is talking upon, and which seems to indicate that he has an infinitely greater stock of knowledge of the matter treasured up in his inside; such affected appearances, I say, will have great weight and efficacy to fascinate the ignorant vulgar.

SECT. II.

V. On the other hand, men of true learning, are modest and candid; but these two virtues, are enemies, and also great obstacles to the advancement of their fame. He who knows most, is sensible, that what he really knows, falls greatly short of what he is ignorant of. His discretion teaches him this, and his sincerity induces him to confess it; but his acting in this manner, greatly obstructs his gaining the applause of the world; for these confessions have the same effect, that the evidence of those have, who bear witness against themselves; that is, they are readily believed; and although it is impossible for any man to know every thing, the vulgar are very unwilling to esteem him learned, who owns himself ignorant of the least matter in his own profession.

VI. Men of learning, are also most commonly timid, because they are apt to be diffident of themselves; so that although all they say should be divine, if it is pronounced with a tremulous tongue, and a faltering voice, it makes no impression on those who listen to them. A man would gain more credit with the world in general, by talking loud, and making extravagant bold assertions, than by reasoning diffidently, and as if he was not quite clear; for the estimation due to discreet doubts has always been suppressed, and in consequence of this suppression, has contributed to countenance errors, and beget false conclusions. How has a presumptuous ignorant fellow, frequently availed himself of his imposing gesture, and the loudness of his voice? and how much by the strength of his lungs has he often concealed the weakness of his argument? But in truth, the noise made by a vociferous person, ought to render his solidity suspected; because men, like other sonorous machines, are loudest the more hollow and empty they are.

VII. If to these imposing appearances, there happens to be joined a moderate portion of literature, it has a most powerful effect to captivate the vulgar, and to gain popular applause. In the instance of Luther, who although he might truly and properly be stiled a man of learning, still the forcible manner in which he delivered himself, added to his address, may be supposed to have contributed more to the success of his preaching, than his literature.

SECT. III.

VIII. There are qualities also, which give people the reputation of able and learned men, when in reality they are quite the reverse. Gravity and circumspection, whether they are natural or artificial, contribute much to produce this effect. Gravity, says Magdalen Scuderi in one of her moral conversations, is a bodily mystery, invented to conceal the defects of the mind; and if it is carried to excess, elevates the person who wears this appearance, to the rank of an oracle. But I can see no reason why a person on this account, should be esteemed more than a man, because that the nearer he resembles a statue, he in reality is by so much less than a man; nor why risibility, being the distinguished mark of rationality, he should be esteemed the most rational, who is the least addicted to laughter. The ingenious French author Montaigne, says pleasantly, that among the whole brute creation, there is no animal so grave as an ass.