Part 9
IX. Aristotle considered melancholy as a token of ingenuity. But I can’t tell why he did this; for every day’s experience convinces us, that there are melancholy people who are very dull and stupid. If we were to judge of things as they appear to us at first sight, we might be easily induced to confound the stupid with the thoughtful, and to mistake the one for the other. People of dark and gloomy geniuses, have in some measure, the air and appearance of profound thinkers; but if we reflect, we shall be convinced, that insociability is not a characteristic quality appertaining to a rational being. In those who look as if they were always absorbed in thought, the negotiation or operation of the interior part of the soul seems to be inverted. Instead of the understanding surveying and contemplating the species, the species seem to seize upon, and take possession of the understanding; and instead of the mind being master of the object, the object appears as if it was master of the mind; and the species that appear to seize upon it seem as if they bound it down, and kept it confined. A person in this state should not be said to be contemplative, but ought more properly to be compared to a man that is stunned; the immobility of whose thoughts, keeps his reason in a state of suspence. I observe, that there is no brute of a more festive and sociable disposition than a dog; and that there is no one which is endued with a more noble instinct; yet, maugre this experience, I look upon the opposite extreme to excessive gravity to be the worst symptom of the two; for men who are always giggling and bantering, are generally very superficial.
X. But both the silent and the loquacious have their partizans. Some consider men of few words to be the most sagacious, and others give the preference to those who are rather prodigal in their use of them. The talking but little, is occasioned either by excessive caution, or by fear, or else is the effect of modesty, and the want of a ready flow of words; but not, as is commonly thought, does this indicate a want of knowledge. There is no man, who if he was to speak all he thinks, or that occurs to him, would not talk a great deal.
XI. There are some, who observe an artificial medium between talking and holding their tongues, which is very well adapted to attract the veneration of the vulgar; that is, they speak with confidence upon such things as they understand, and take care to be silent upon such as they are ignorant of; but this they do, in a manner as if their silence proceeded from reserve, and an unwillingness to enter upon the subject. By these artifices, men of very moderate capacities, and whose informations are very limited, pass themselves upon the world for persons of deep penetration, and a sort of walking libraries; and although they are possessed of only a very minute or abstracted portion of whatever is the subject of conversation, they engage in the argument in very general terms, always taking care not to advance too far, and to retreat in time; which they do in a manner, as if they were tired of talking further upon the question at present, and therefore would be glad to postpone it, to be discussed more at large another time. In reality, they have said all they know, but behave in this manner, in order to have it thought they have only given a small specimen of their knowledge of the thing; although, like the painter who undertook to paint the eleven thousand virgins, but never finished more than five of them, and declared that all the rest should be supposed coming behind in procession, they would be glad, that what they have already said should conclude the debate; still, if any one, aware of their tricks, should then press them to a further discussion of the point, they either artfully turn the conversation, or affect a scornful dislike to discussing so weighty a matter before so thin an audience; or else get rid of the invitation made to them, with a disdainful smile, and treat both the proposal and the proposer, as if they were beneath their notice. These people are very ready at such sort of expedients, because they study them much, and have a great deal of practice in them.
XII. There are others again, who have recourse to ambiguous and confused expressions; which seem to say a great deal, when in reality they say nothing; and which, like the answers of the oracles of old, are applicable to all kinds of events. In fact, they may be termed the images of those oracles; for although they are listened to with attention, they are little better than mere stocks or stones. The obscurity with which they talk is a dark shade, that conceals what they are ignorant of; and they make use of the stratagem of those who have no other but false money; that is, take care to pass it off under the cover of the night. But notwithstanding all these glaring appearances, there are not wanting weak people, who esteem their embarrassment and confusion as marks of their learning, and who think, that men are like mountains, which the more elevated and sublime they are, the more liable to be covered with clouds, and to cause dark shades which obstruct the fertility, and obscure the chearful appearance of the vallies.
_Majoresque cadunt altis de montibus umbræ._
XIII. This deception, is commonly kept up and assisted by a persuasive carriage, and by certain mysterious gestures and distortions of the features; such as wrinkling the forehead, knitting the eye-brows, rolling the eyes, swelling out the cheeks, thrusting forth the under-lip, and shaking the head; all which affected tokens of wisdom and importance, are displayed and accompanied, with a kind of disdainful countenance. These are a sort of men, who have more than half the wisdom they seem to possess lodged in their features and muscles, which serve them to exhibit and express these symptoms of profundity. Tully very justly ridiculed this artifice in Pison in the following words: _Respondes, altero ad frontem sublato, altero ad mentem depresso supercilio, crudelitatem tibi non placere._
SECT. IV.
XIV. Men, by affecting to despise others who know more than themselves, make use of the most vile and mean artifices imaginable; but notwithstanding this, it is the most sure method, to make them pass for persons of great knowledge, among people of groveling and plebeian minds. There can be no greater injustice committed, nor a vainer effort made, than that, of an envious man’s attempting to transfer the merit which he has purloined from another person to himself. It is true, that a small cloud may obstruct the splendor of the sun; but this obstruction does not prevent this luminary from being the illustrious torch of heaven, nor can such a circumstance be of more consequence than a speck in the atmosphere; nor does it require any science or learning, to enable a man to cast a thousand reflections and blemishes upon other people’s doctrines and writings. When there is no reason to conclude that such behaviour proceeds from envy or malevolence, we ought to suppose that it springs from pure ignorance. I remember to have read in a Treatise intitled The Man of Letters, written by Father Daniel Bartoli, that an ass once happening to stumble over the Iliad of Homer, he in a passion tore it to pieces with his teeth. Thus, in order to outrage, abuse, and destroy a noble writing, nothing is better qualified than a beast.
XV. Being tenacious, insolent, and overbearing in argument, is also another means, which, although it is equally base and bad with the beforementioned, is sometimes very efficacious to gain a person the reputation of being a learned man.—Foolish people, such as the Megalopolitans, of whom we have an account in Pausanias, pay greater veneration to Boreas the god of the north-wind than to any other deity, and are apt to adore tumultuous geniuses as beings of supreme intelligence; and although it is absolutely irreconcileable and incompatible with it, to look upon barefaced arrogance as the child of superior learning. To this we may add another thing, that may have an effect to make them pass for wise and able persons, which is, that those who are truly learned, avoid as much as possible, all controversy or dispute with people who are of this tenacious overbearing disposition; and this prudent declining to contend with them, is often construed into fear of engaging them; as if it was necessary for men of learning, in order to shew their spirit, to encounter reptiles and venomous snakes. Cato’s lamentation, or repentance, was just and generous, when he regretted having led his troops into the burning deserts of Africa, where they had no other enemies to encounter but asps, horned serpents, vipers, fiery serpents, and basilisks. The horrors of the civil war in the plains of Pharsalia, where they engaged the invincible troops of Cæsar, appeared to him less frightful, than those they experienced among the burning sands of Libya, where the most vile and abominable reptiles fought on Cæsar’s side,
_Pro Cæsare pugnant_ _Dipsades, et peragunt civilia bella Cerastæ._
XVI. He who can reconcile it to himself, to be inflexible in argument, and to dispute without end, and with all his might, never suffering himself to be convinced by reason, has made a large stride towards being reputed an Aristotle among the vulgar; for they, with respect to the wars of Minerva, as well as those of Mars, are apt to declare the victory, in favour of him who remains longest in the field, and, in their opinion, he never fails to come off conqueror, who has the last word. This is the way the vulgar judge; but he who would be thought superior to that class of people, must permit himself to be convinced by reason, for, if he does not, instead of acquiring the reputation of a learned man by such conduct, he lets himself down to the level of a brute.
The ingenious Doctor Luis Rodriguez, being asked what sort of a man a shallow physician was with whom he had been arguing, answered pleasantly, (although we must allow his wit favoured of the arrogance which is rather too common with the Portuguese) _He is so great an ass, that goad him ever so much, it is impossible to make him get on, or be the better for any reasoning that is bestowed on him._
XVII. It is also a very common artifice with those who know but little, to bring the conversation to turn upon that little they are informed of. This is very easy for people of power or authority to do. I knew a person of this sort myself, who, whatever conversation happened to arise in company, was used to train the subject of it insensibly, to fall on the few points relative to it, which he had been reading or studying that day, or the day before, by which piece of management, he generally used to appear more learned than the rest of the company. Even in scholastic disputes, this art is often practised. I have more than twice in my life, seen a good theologian foiled by a novice; who, by artfully sliding some chimerical proposition into the dispute, has drawn the argument from its proper object, and caused it to fall into a sumulistical labyrinth of amplifications, restrictions, alienations, oppositions, conversions, and equipolations; the rules of which were fresh in the young man’s memory, and which the old theologian had forgot. This was adopting the craft of the rogue Cacus, who, having artfully drawn Hercules into his own cave, rendered his arms and superior strength of no use to him, by blinding him with the smoak he continued to eject out of his mouth.
SECT. V.
XVIII. Besides the visionary wise people, or those which are such in appearance only, there are others who have credit given them for being men of profound knowledge, merely from the mistakes and misapprehensions of others. He who studies logic and metaphysics in the schools, together with those other matters, which under the denomination of philosophy are taught there, notwithstanding the sounding names, of these faculties, and his being supposed to know every thing, in reality, knows but little more than nothing. It is commonly said, that such a man is a great philosopher, when in truth he is no philosopher at all, either great or little. All the ten categorical principles, together with the whole contents of the eight books on physics, and their two adjuncts _on generation and corruption_, put into a logical alembic, would not produce a drop of true philosophical spirit, that would assist us to explain the most vulgar phenomenon in the sensible world. The Aristotelic ideas, have no more to do with physics, than the Platonic ones; and the physics of the schools, are pure metaphysics. All that the Peripatetics have hitherto written or disputed concerning motion, has not determined, what is the line of reflection, by which a ball returns back that is struck against a wall, or what is the degree of velocity, with which a heavy body descends by an inclined plane. He who by the ordinary metaphysical reasonings, thinks to attain a true knowledge of nature, is as mad, as he who should fancy himself master of the world, because he is possessed of a map of it.
XIX. The great advantage of these philosophers in name, if in the schools they manage with dexterity the rules of science, consists in this, that in virtue of the four species or rudiments of theology or medicine they acquire there, they are enabled to dazzle the eyes of mankind, and to pass in the world, for great theologians and doctors of physic. With respect to theology, the mistake in this matter is not so great; but with regard to medicine, it cannot be greater. By the rule, _Ubi desinit physicus, incipit medicus_, it seems as if it should follow of course, that a good philosopher is easily made a good doctor of physic. Upon this supposition, when people see a practising physician, who has twenty syllogisms at his fingers ends, ready to explain and demonstrate, whether privation is a principle annexed to a natural entity, or whether the united mass or the whole, can be of a distinct or different texture from the parts, they fancy he is possessed of all the requisites and recommendations, that are necessary to establish and fix him as a most able, or first rate man in his profession.
XX. That most learned commentator upon Discorides, Andrew de Laguna, says, that if it could conveniently be done, it would be good policy to send those flaming young physicians, who are just come from the university, brimful of the bragadocio arrogance of _ergo_ and _probo_, to practise physic in those nations we are at war with, for that it would be attended with a great saving, both of men and money, to our own country.
XXI. I can with confidence affirm, that there is no art or faculty, that can be less conducive to the acquisition of medicinal knowledge, than the physics of the schools. If all the philosophers that are, or ever were in the world, could be convened together, and remain in consultation for a hundred years, they would not in all that time, by the mere help of philosophical speculations, be able to instruct us how we should cure a chilblain; nor from that tumultuous consultation, should we obtain any maxim, that ought not to be prohibited as contraband, and refused admittance into the chamber of a sick person. Good sense joined to experience, either acquired by a man’s own, or the practice of other reputable people, are both the father and mother of medicinal knowledge; nor has physics, that is to say the physics of the schools, the least share in the propagation of this species.
XXII. The reasoning of naturalists upon all kinds of mixtures, consists, in whether they are constituted of matter and substantial forms according to the doctrine of Aristotle, or of atoms according to that of Epicurus, or of salt, sulphur, and mercury, according to that of the chymists, or of the three elements, according to that of the Cartesians: whether these are composed of undivisible points, or of parts dividable _in infinitum_; whether their action or operation is from their texture, or the motion of their particles, or from some accidental virtues which they call qualities; whether these qualities are of the manifest or the occult kind; and whether they are of the first, second, or third class or species. Now what has all this to do with medicine? I will venture to pronounce no more, or rather less, than it has with geometry or jurisprudence. When a physician goes about to cure a tertian ague, all this farrago of questions applied to the operations or effect of the bark, is of no sort of use to him. The only thing that is of any importance for him to know, is, whether his experience has taught him, that in the present state of the disorder, it will be proper to administer this febrifuge; but this he is to infer, not from the maxims, _dici de omni, dici de nullo_; but from conviction, drawn from experiments he has made himself of its efficacy in the like cases, and also from those, which have been made by physicians of eminence who have wrote on the subject.
XXIII. In no art whatever, is it of any use, to have a physical knowledge of the implements, with, or by which, a man does his business. A man may be an excellent pilot, without being able to explain the directive virtue of the load-stone to the pole; and a great soldier, although he is totally ignorant of the physical component parts of gunpowder, and the metal with which military implements are made; and he may be a great painter, without knowing whether colours consist of intrinsic accidents, or whether they are produced by the various reflections of light. Nor does the being able to argue well upon these points, conduce in the least degree, to make a man either a pilot, a soldier, or a painter. But there is no necessity for my enlarging further, in order to extirpate this common error from the world, as the learned Doctor Martinez, has fully and effectually exploded it in his two volumes, intitled Medicina Sceptica.
SECT. VI.
XXIV. There is another common error respecting the subject-matter of this Essay, although the opinion built upon it, is rather better founded than the one we have just been speaking of, and that is, looking upon every man as wise, able, and skilful, who has studied a great deal. The labour of study, seldom makes any great improvements, if it is not bestowed on a clear and penetrating natural understanding; and may be compared to the toils and expences of cultivation, that are employed upon a poor and nearly barren soil, which seldom produce much fruit. Among mankind, are to be found the turtles and the eagles of the human species. The last, with a speedy and easy flight, ascend to the summit of Olympus; the first, after several days labour, shall not be able to reach to the top of a moderate hill.
XXV. Much time employed in reading, furnishes a man with a deal of matter; but the being able to penetrate, or rightly comprehend that matter, is more a gift of nature, than a production from toil. There are some, who may be termed learned from their memories, but who are not so in virtue of their understandings, and who may be compared to marble tablets with inscriptions engraved on them, which display the letters, but do not perceive them. They are a kind of mental books, that are filled with many texts, which they no more comprehend, or have a right idea of the meaning of, than the leaves on which they are written. If you observe the use or application they make of the species they have acquired, you will perceive, they deduce no proper conclusions from what they have read, nor make any observations on the things they have been perusing, that are pertinent or applicable to the subject-matter of those things. Thus we see, that from the same species or set of ideas, may be formed good reasoning and bad; just as with the same sort of materials, you may build elegant palaces, and rustic habitations.
XXVI. Thus it may also happen, that a man shall know all the works of Saint Thomas by heart, and be a very poor theologian; and that he shall in the same manner, know all the statutes of the civil and canon law, and be a very bad lawyer. And although it is commonly said, that law-knowledge depends almost intirely upon memory, or at least, that it depends more upon memory than understanding, yet I consider this as another common error. With a great many law-cases and maxims at his fingers ends, a man may draw a very bad plea; in the same manner as one, although his memory is stored with a vast variety of texts of scripture, may make a very bad sermon. The choice of the most fit to apply to the subject, depends upon the understanding, and not upon the memory. If men were obliged to do law-business by surprize, and without having time to consider and digest what they were about, a happy memory, in which were treasured up pertinent texts and citations, would be a most essential ingredient, and one, that it is almost indispensably necessary they should be possessed of. But as this, in the regular course of practice, is not the case; he who has attended properly to the best books that have been written on the profession, and has a good general idea of them, will seldom be at a loss where to look for apt cases and authorities, wherewith to support his arguments; and as I observed before, the choice of those which are the most conducive to this end, is more the business of understanding, than memory.