Chapter VIII

., to which I therefore beg to call

## particular attention. It is there that the explanation, which otherwise

would now follow, found a natural place; because the matter is closely connected with Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion that, once the motives are brought into play, the _Operari_ (what, is done) is a thing of absolute necessity; consequently, Freedom, the existence of which is betokened solely by the sense of =responsibility=, cannot but belong to the _Esse_ (what one is). No doubt the reproaches of conscience have to do, in the first place, and ostensibly, with our acts, but through these they, in reality, reach down to what we are; for what we do is the only indisputable index of what we =are=, and reflects our character just as faithfully as symptoms betray the malady. Hence it is to this _Esse_, to what we =are=, that blame and merit must ultimately be attributed. Whatever we esteem and love, or else despise and hate, in others, is not a changeable, transient appearance, but something constant, stable, and persistent; it is that which they are. If we find reason to alter our first opinion about any one, we do not suppose that he is changed, but that we have been mistaken in him. In like manner, when we are pleased or displeased with our own conduct, we say that we are satisfied or dissatisfied with ourselves, meaning, in reality, with that which we are, and are unalterably, irreversibly; and the same is true with regard to our intellectual qualities, nay, it even applies to the physiognomy. How is it possible, then, for blame and merit to lie otherwise than in what we =are=? As we saw in Part II.,