Chapter VIII

., will discover in the foundation given by me to Ethics a logical consecution, a rounded completeness, wanting to all other theories; to say nothing of the consonance of my view with the facts of experience,--a consonance which he will look for in vain elsewhere. For only the truth can uniformly and consistently agree with itself and with nature; while all false principles are internally at variance with themselves, and externally contradict the testimony of experience, which at every step records its silent protest.

I am perfectly aware that the truths advanced in this Essay, and

## particularly here at the close, strike directly at many deeply rooted

prejudices and mistakes, and especially at those attaching to a certain rudimentary system of morals, now much in vogue, and suitable for elementary schools. But I cannot own to feeling any penitence or regret. For, in the first place, I am addressing neither children, nor the _profanum vulgus_, but an Academy of light and learning. Their inquiry is a purely theoretical one, concerned with the ultimate fundamental verities of Ethics; and to a most serious question a serious answer is undoubtedly expected. And secondly, in my opinion, there can be no such thing as harmless mistakes, still less privileged or useful ones. On the contrary, every error works infinitely more evil than good. If, however, it is wished to make existing prepossessions the standard of truth, or the boundary beyond which its investigation is not to go, then it would be more honest to abolish philosophical Faculties and Academies altogether. For where no reality exists, there also no semblance of it should be. <hr class="r5" />

[1] Cf. _Jeremiah_ xiii. 23.--(_Translator._)

[2] Virtue would appear not to come naturally (_i.e_., through the physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in whomsoever it dwells, there it is present, _apart from the intellect, under divine ordinance. [V_. Platonis _Opera_, edit. Didot, Paris, 1856; Vol. I. _Meno_, 96 and 99, _ad fin_.-- (_Translator_.)

[3] _It is not in our power_ to be either good or bad.

[4] For it appears that the different characters of all men are in some way implanted in them _by nature_; if we are just, and temperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so _straightway from our birth._

[5] _V_. Joannis Stobaei _Florilegium_, edit. Meineke, publ. Lipsiae, Teubner, 1855; Vol. I., p. 33,1. 14, sqq.--(_Translator_.)

[6] For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and demonstration, ought to be called sciences. By the term "virtue" we mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of _the soul's unreasoning part_. This disposition determines the character which we show, and in accordance with which we are called generous, just, or temperate.

[7] Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly good by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal faculty, without law, without reason, without precedent?

[8] The good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and the evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil.

[9] _V_. Note on "intelligible," Part. II.,