Part 7

_History._--Europe was probably first peopled from Asia, but at what date we know not. The first authentic history begins in Greece at about 776 B.C. Greek civilization was at its most flourishing period about 430 B.C. After Greece came Rome, which by the early part of the Christian era had conquered Spain, Greece, Gaul, Helvetia, Germany between the Danube and the Alps, Illyria, and Dacia. Improved laws and superior arts of life spread with the Roman Empire throughout Europe, and the unity of government was also extremely favourable to the extension of Christianity. With the decline of the Roman Empire a great change in the political constitution of Europe was produced by the universal migration of the northern nations. The Ostrogoths and Lombards settled in Italy, the Franks in France, the Visigoths in Spain, and the Anglo-Saxons in South Britain, reducing the inhabitants to subjection, or becoming incorporated with them. Under Charlemagne (771-814) a great Germanic empire was established, so extensive that the kingdoms of France, Germany, Italy, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Navarre were afterwards formed out of it. About this time the northern and eastern nations of Europe began to exert an influence in the affairs of Europe. The Slavs, or Slavonians, founded kingdoms in Bohemia, Poland, Russia, and the north of Germany; the Magyars appeared in Hungary; and the Normans agitated all Europe, founding kingdoms and principalities in England, France, Sicily, and the East. The Crusades and the growth of the Ottoman power are amongst the principal events which influenced Europe from the twelfth to the fifteenth century. The conquest of Constantinople by the Turks (1453), by driving the learned Greeks from this city, gave a new impulse to letters in Western Europe, which was carried onwards by the invention of printing and the Reformation. The discovery of America was followed by the temporary preponderance of Spain in Europe, and next of France. Subsequently Prussia and Russia gradually increased in territory and strength. The French revolution (1789) and the Napoleonic wars had a profound effect on Europe, the dissolution of the old German Empire being one of the results. The most important events in European history from the revolution of 1789 to 1914, the beginning of the European War, were: the establishment of the independence of Greece; the disappearance of Poland as a separate state; the unification of Italy under Victor Emmanuel; the Franco-German War, resulting in the consolidation of Germany into an empire under the leadership of Prussia: and the partial dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. The European War, 1914-8 (q.v.), revolutionized the continent and altered the map of Europe. The chief results were the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy and of Russia, the abolition of the German Empire, and the deposition of hereditary rulers in the smaller German states, which instituted republican Governments. The following new states were formed from the constituent parts of Russia and Austria-Hungary: Albania, Armenia, Azerbijan, Czecho-Slovakia, Esthonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Yugo-Slavia, and Ukraine. Poland, dissolved in the eighteenth century, was again reconstituted. France regained Alsace and Lorraine, Turkey lost almost all her possessions in Europe, whilst Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Roumania were greatly enlarged, acquiring new territories. All these alterations of boundaries and additions of territories were based on ethnological grounds, the new states being inhabited by peoples belonging to the same ethnical group and speaking the same language. See articles on the various countries.--BIBLIOGRAPHY: E. A. Freeman, _General Sketch of European History_; A. Hassall (editor), _Periods of European History_; _European History Chronologically Arranged_; A. S. Rappoport, _History of European Nations_; O. Browning, _General History of the World_; H. S. Williams, _The Historian's History of the World_.

EUROPEAN WAR, 1914-8. The European War, which began in Aug., 1914, and involved the greater part of the globe before the last shot was fired in Nov., 1918, had its ostensible origin in the assassination of the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, at Serajevo, capital of Bosnia, once part of the ancient kingdom of Serbia. This crime was committed by a Bosnian student, but Austria-Hungary held Serbia responsible, and, inspired by Germany, sent an ultimatum on 23rd July, amounting to a demand that Serbia should surrender her independence. Two days later, notwithstanding that Serbia conceded every demand, with two reservations which she offered to submit to the Hague Tribunal, Austria-Hungary declared war on her. Germany, who had seen in the Serajevo tragedy a pretext for making her long-premeditated bid for world dominion, "knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter", as the German Ambassador in Vienna frankly told the British representative at the time; and when Russia, as the traditional protector of the Slavs, mobilized her southern armies to save Serbian independence if necessary, she threatened instant mobilization on her own part unless Russia stopped these military measures within twelve hours. It was technically impossible for Russia to do anything of the kind, but her protest to this effect was unavailing. Germany declared war on Russia on 3rd Aug., and as this inevitably involved war at the same time with Russia's ally France, she sent a note on the following day to Belgium demanding safe passage for German troops through Belgian territory, though Prussia as well as Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria had guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Belgium by the treaty of 1839, repeatedly confirming this on subsequent occasions. When the British Ambassador in Berlin protested against the threatened violation of treaty rights, the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, repudiated the treaty as a mere "scrap of paper".

On 3rd Aug., when Germany formally declared war on France--though her troops had already invaded French territory at various points--Belgium refused Germany's demands, and called on Great Britain and France for assistance. It was this call, and Germany's refusal on the following day to accede to the British demands that Belgian neutrality should be respected--declaring war on Belgium instead and violating her territory early that morning--which decided Great Britain to range herself wholly on the Franco-Russian side. The German Ambassador in London had already been warned (on 31st July) that we should be drawn into the struggle if Germany persisted in her threatened attack on France. Two days previously Germany had made the 'infamous bid' to Great Britain that if she would remain neutral no territory would be taken from France herself, though no undertaking could be given with regard to the French colonies. British mobilization orders were issued on 4th Aug., and at 11 p.m. on that date Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Fortunately the British navy was ready for any emergency, with the Grand Fleet--the command of which was given to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe--still assembled in full strength at Portland, after the manoeuvres, the order for its dispersal having been countermanded on 27th July. Lord Kitchener, home on leave from Egypt, had also been stopped by a telegram from Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, as he was stepping on the Channel boat at Dover on his return journey (3rd Aug.), and two days later was appointed Secretary of State for War. Meantime the Austrians had already bombarded Belgrade (29th July); Italy had declined (1st Aug.) to be drawn into the conflict with her Austro-German partners of the Triple Alliance on the grounds that their war was an aggressive one; and German troops, as already mentioned, had invaded France at several points on 2nd Aug., before formally declaring war on that country.

_Western Front, 1914_

The struggle on the Western front began in earnest on the following day, when war was declared on France and the Germans captured Trieux, near Briey, and Luneville was bombarded by German aeroplanes. The German system of mobilization had been quicker than the French and Russian, but the opening moves filled the Allied commanders with too-confident hopes. Although slower to mobilize than the Germans, a Russian army under Rennenkampf succeeded in invading East Prussia in force; the Belgians made a magnificent stand for their frontier fortresses when the Germans, denied the right of way which they had demanded, endeavoured to force the great highway of Western Europe which passes through Liege; and the French, besides checking the enemy at Dinant, had already recovered part of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine.

On 16th Aug. the First British Expeditionary Force, under General Sir John French, completed its landing at Boulogne, and four days later had arrived and concentrated on the line Avesnes-Le Cateau, on the left or exposed flank of the French Fifth Army under General de Lanzerac. It consisted of 50,000 infantry with its artillery, and five brigades of cavalry--some 70,000 troops altogether, a mere drop in the ocean compared with the millions of men who were marching to battle for the great military powers, but destined to play a part in the forthcoming struggle out of all proportion to its size.

The position at this juncture was, briefly, as follows: the Germans having at length captured the last forts of Liege, with its gallant commander General Leman, were overrunning Belgium. Brussels had just been evacuated (20th Aug.), and the main Belgian army, menaced by greatly superior forces of the enemy, and disappointed in its hope of effective support from the Franco-British troops, was retiring to seek the protection of the forts of Antwerp. Having occupied Brussels on the 20th, the German Higher Command appointed Baron von der Goltz as Governor. A reign of terror in Belgium had already been inaugurated as part of Germany's deliberate policy of 'frightfulness', including the ruthless execution of civilians on unsubstantiated charges of shooting at the invaders.

The French armies, under the supreme command of General Joffre, who, like Lord Kitchener, had been an engineer student when the Franco-Prussian War broke out, and had been Chief of the General Staff since 1911, were now disposed for the double purpose of meeting the threatened German onslaught and preparing the counter-offensive on which French doctrines of strategy had been based. Starting from the Swiss frontier there were nine divisions forming the Alsace force, the main offensive group, consisting of the French First and Second Armies, being extended along the Lorraine frontier, and the Third Army about Verdun. The Fourth Army formed the mass of manoeuvre held in reserve behind the centre, while the Fifth, whose left wing was now extended by the British Expeditionary Force, faced the Ardennes as far as the Belgian frontier.

Germany was not seriously alarmed by the spectacular advance of the French into their lost provinces. It suited the strategy of her War Staff to keep the French mass of manoeuvre as far as possible from the point at which it would soon be sorely needed; and their feint attacks in the direction of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort were designed to strengthen the belief that their real offensive would come in the frontal assault which the French dispositions had assumed. Germany, however, had always intended to strike through Belgium when the time came to deliver the knock-out blow to France before Russia had time to mobilize her millions.

The German advance was proceeding according to the plan which had been worked out in detail as far back as 1904 by the soldier-scholar of the Garde-Ulanen, Count von Schlieffen, who died two years before his great scheme was put into execution. Based on the assumption that Germany and Austria-Hungary would have to fight France, Russia, Great Britain, and Belgium without the aid of Italy, it provided for an immediate attack by the right wing of the German army of such weight and ferocity as to destroy the French left by a single blow, and then roll up the main French armies one after the other. The South and Russian fronts were meantime to be lightly held, everything being staked on the sudden, overwhelming blow in the north through Belgium. One of the bitter controversies in Germany, after the war, raged round the responsibility for the failure of this plan, the execution of which devolved on General von Moltke, nephew of the great strategist of the Franco-Prussian War. The Kaiser believed that the name of Moltke would strike terror into the hearts of Germany's enemies, but the second Moltke lacked the genius of his predecessor, and the course of events proved that he was not equal to the task of carrying out so prodigious a plan.

It was doubly necessary to strike at once with an immediate maximum of strength now that Britain had already ranged herself alongside the Allies. This maximum of strength was attained long before France had completed her mobilization, and enabled Germany to launch her unexpected blow with crushing effect. She had reckoned, however, without the stubborn defence of the Belgians in the opening moves of the game, a defence which clogged the wheels of her mighty war machine at the critical moment; and was wholly unprepared for Britain's great achievement in transporting her 'insignificant' but indomitable army, without a hitch, complete in every detail, and establishing it in its place in the line of battle, hundreds of miles from its base, in less than three weeks from the declaration of war. Clearly there was no time to be lost in solving the military problem on the Western front before the Russians could throw their full weight into the scales.

The secret of Germany's sudden attempt to overwhelm the Allied left by an outflanking movement was well kept. The position in Belgium was obviously grave; but Joffre still clung to the belief that if the Germans attacked the Allied left in force, they would leave their own position in front of the French Fifth Army so exposed as to give him an opening for a successful counter-stroke with de Lanzerac's troops in co-operation with the British. Up to the 22nd General French's preparations were all in the direction of offensive action on these lines; his two corps had taken up their positions through Binche and Mons and along the canal to Conde.

The German tide which now swept through the plains of Belgium entirely upset the Allied calculations. General French woke on 22nd Aug. to find the troops of the French Fifth Army on his right in unmistakeable retreat. The full force of the German blow, delivered by von Buelow's Second Army, had been felt by de Lanzerac's troops on the Sambre at daybreak, and had pressed them back from the river. The British position held by the 1st Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions) under General Sir Douglas Haig, the 2nd Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions) under General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, and the Cavalry Division under General Allenby, became isolated by the retreat of de Lanzerac--"the most complete example", as Lord French long afterwards described him, "of the Staff College pedant whose 'superior education' had given him little idea of how to conduct war". De Lanzerac asked General French if he would attack the flank of the German columns which were pressing him back from the Sambre, but the British Commander, who had received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that his command was to be an entirely independent one, "and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied general", replied that with his own position so seriously threatened by the retreat of de Lanzerac's troops such an operation was impracticable, but he agreed to retain his present position for the next twenty-four hours.

The British army fulfilled this pledge, and the barrier thus held and maintained during the subsequent retreat, though shattered in parts, saved the French left from being outflanked by the invading right wing of the Germans under von Kluck. The whole situation became extremely critical on the following day (23rd Aug.). Namur, the forts of which had been regarded as impregnable, fell before the crushing attack of the heavy Austrian howitzers brought up by the advancing Germans; the French thrust into Alsace-Lorraine had just been countered by the German Fifth Army under the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, which compelled the French to retreat from all but a corner of Alsace; and the main German attack, launched at the other end of the line, forced the French back both from the Sambre and the Meuse. The French Fifth Army, the position of which was considerably weakened by the fall of Namur, was attacked both by von Buelow's army in front, and by a Saxon army under von Hausen on its right. It was forced back until von Hausen found a gap on its right flank, through which he proceeded to pour his Saxons with the object of rolling up the French Third and Fourth Armies under Ruffey and Langle de Cary. These retreated in turn, to recover alignment with de Lanzerac's Fifth Army, which had retreated from the British right. The British army was thus left 'in the air', outflanked not only on the right, where von Buelow was now advancing on it from Charleroi, but also on the left, where von Kluck's right wing was sweeping down in full force from the north-west.

The onslaught on the British front began shortly after noon with a bombardment of some 600 guns along the whole line of 25 miles; followed by a great frontal attack in mass formation. The British troops, all experts at musketry, used their rifles with such deadly effect that the frontal attack crumpled up. The line held; but with the German tide surging round on either flank the position became increasingly critical. Under the threatened turning movement General Smith-Dorrien withdrew from the Mons salient, and before nightfall took up a fresh line some 3 miles south of the canal. The advanced troops of the 1st Corps had not been seriously engaged, and held their ground. It was not until late that night that the desperate situation on his right was fully revealed to General French; and when news also arrived from Joffre that the British army would probably be attacked the next day by at least three German corps and two cavalry divisions, it became clear that a general and immediate retirement was inevitable. What actually happened was that the enemy attacked with no fewer than four corps, and at least two cavalry divisions.

_The Retreat from Mons_

The great retreat began shortly after dawn on the 24th with a feint attack by the 1st Division, under cover of which the 2nd Corps moved back 5 miles, and then stood in turn to protect the retirement of the 1st Corps. Further withdrawals were effected that day by alternate corps, covered by heavy rear-guard actions, until the 1st Corps had reached the line between Maubeuge and Bavai, with the 2nd Corps extending the line from Bavai to Bry. Von Kluck's army, though kept in check by the retreating troops, followed closely on their heels and round their left flank, their design apparently being to turn the British left and press them back on Maubeuge, the fortress close on their right rear, which, well fortified and provisioned as it was, offered, as General French afterwards pointed out (in _1914_), a terrible temptation to an army seeking shelter against overwhelming odds. Bazaine's example at Metz in 1870, and a shrewd suspicion that the German move was deliberately planned with that end in view, proved sufficient reasons for avoiding the trap. A further retreat was accordingly ordered to the line Le Cateau-Cambrai, some miles farther back.

Tournai, which was held by a French Territorial brigade, fell that day. There was nothing apparently to prevent the German host at this juncture from continuing its course to the coast and seizing the Channel ports as far as the Seine. That, doubtless, would have been included in the programme had the Germans anticipated a campaign of any considerable duration. The Kaiser, however, had promised his troops that they should be home again "before the leaves fall"; and to bring this about it was necessary to settle with the Allied army once and for all. Where von Moltke failed, according to Ludendorff and other critics after the war, was in not striking farther to the north or north-west, and in not throwing still more weight into the scale from his left wing.

On the 25th the French were still retreating all along the line save at Maubeuge, the garrison of which held out until 7th Sept., and at Longwy, north of Verdun, which fell on 28th Aug. The British army, battle-worn and suffering severely from the heat, but resisting all the German efforts to turn its western flank, marched stubbornly back, gallantly assisted by Allenby's cavalry. The French were a day's march ahead of them when the British reached the Le Cateau position. General French decided, therefore, that, sorely as the troops needed rest, there was nothing for it but to resume the retreat at daybreak, and issued orders to that effect. The hardest fighting on the 25th had fallen to the 1st Corps at Landrecies, where Haig's weary troops were violently attacked at nightfall, before they could snatch any rest, by fresh enemy troops sent forward in pursuit in motors and lorries. The German infantry paid dearly for their temerity in advancing through the narrow streets of the town in close order, two or three British machine-guns mowing them down in hundreds. The attack was a disastrous failure.

The 2nd Corps did not reach Le Cateau until ten or eleven o'clock that night, thoroughly exhausted after a hard day's fighting and marching. Smith-Dorrien had lost heavily in the operations, and was so convinced that his troops were unfit to resume the march at daybreak that he elected to stand and abide by the result. The magnificent fight put up by his troops on the following day, assisted by Allenby and Sordet's cavalry, and two divisions of French Territorial troops under d'Amade, which had been detailed to guard the British left flank, saved the situation, and averted, in the considered opinion expressed by General French five years later, "a stupendous repetition of Sedan". The actual result was a total loss of some 14,000 officers and men, about 80 guns, and numbers of machine-guns, as well as quantities of ammunition and material. According to General French, these losses heavily handicapped the British army in the subsequent stages of the retreat, and were felt throughout the first battle of the Marne and the early operations on the Aisne. In his dispatch of Sept., 1914, the British Commander-in-Chief had written of this battle in eulogistic terms. It was not till some time later, he explains, that he came to know the full details of the battle and to appreciate it in all its details. For General Smith-Dorrien it is urged that his stand at Le Cateau broke the full force of the German pursuit, and checked its course in time.

On the 27th the shattered 2nd Corps, having broken off the action, continued the retreat with the 1st Corps. On the 28th Gough, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at St. Quentin, and Chetwode, with the 5th at Cerizy, turned on the leading German cavalry at both these places and threw them back on their main bodies in confusion. For the first time since the retreat began the worn-out British infantry, having reached the line of the Oise between Noyon and La Fere, were able to rest and sleep in peace.