Part 20

The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the Phædo of Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power, (or the power which is the source of desire;) but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic. These virtues too follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato

## particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phædo. Prior to these however

are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.

According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the virtues besides these, viz, the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes, as it were, solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the Universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato in the Phædo calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical σκιογραφιαι _adumbrations_, because their possessors only know _that_ the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know _why_ they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the political are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympiodorus adds, the cathartic virtues are denominated from the purification which is used in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that

The soul that uninitiated dies, Plung’d in the blackest mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the virtues. Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.

All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise, prior, to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to that which is disordered? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say, Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered according to their causal subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the Timæus? And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the tower of Saturn, who is a _pure_ intellect.

As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at present no less novel than important, the following discussion of them from the Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, of Porphyry, is added for the sake of the genuinely philosophic reader:

“There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and on this account is called theoretic, and is now a beholder. And there are also other virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterised by following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbours, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these, should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize alone, gives subsistence to prudence; which derives its perfection through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is no resistance [from the irrational part,] justice is produced. The disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformable to nature. But the disposition according to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy;[108] the end of which is a similitude to God.

“Since, however, of purification one kind consists in purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is two-fold; the one arising from an association with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are honorable. But the cathartic are more honorable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case unless conversion, precedes.

“There is therefore another genus of virtues after the cathartic and political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice consists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity to, and energizing according to intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And fortitude is apathy; according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other.

“The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting in intellect; which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[109]]. But fortitude is sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has the less has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the scope of the cathartic virtues, is entirely to obliterate the remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes according to the practical virtues, is a _worthy_ man: but he who energizes according to the cathartic virtues, is _a dæmoniacal man_, or is also _a good dæmon_. He who energizes according to the intellectual virtues alone, is _a God_. But he who energizes according to the paradigmatic virtues, _is the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought especially to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the more honorable virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what degree purification may be extended. For it is a separation from body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may so effected, and to what extent, must now be said.

“In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense[110] in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles, in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. _This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, in order that [the rational part] may not be impeded [in its energies._] Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not co-passive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. _That however which is unpremeditated is imbecile and small._ All fear, likewise, must be expelled. For he who acquires this purification, will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks. Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; _but if this should take place, it must only be as far as to that precipitate imagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the intellectual soul itself of the purified man, must be liberated from all these [corporeal propensities.] He must likewise endeavour that what is moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy, and without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding to its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without opposition. Hence in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason, that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy, for when co-passivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from it. For passion becomes moved, when reason imparts excitation, through verging [to the irrational nature.]”

P. 279. _The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed, as much as possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar, &c. &c._

This Sentence in the original of Arcerius is as follows: των κατα φιλοσοφιαν θεωρηματων απολαυστεον, εφ’ οσον οιον, καθαπερ αμβροσιας και νεκταρος· ακηρατον τε γαρ το απ’ αυτων ηδυ και το θειον το μεγαλοψυχον δυναται τε ποιειν, και ει μη αïδιους, αïδιων γε επιστημονας.

In the edition of the Protreptics by Kiessling, which I did not see, till the greater part of this work was printed, σοφιαν is substituted for φιλοσοφιαν, but in my opinion very erroneously; and this German editor, from not perceiving the necessity of reading ακηρατον τε γαρ το απ’ αυτων ηδυ και θειον, το μεγαλοψυχον, κ. λ. instead of retaining the reading of Arcerius, has made nonsense of this part of the Sentence. For his version of it is: “Nam et sincera est eorum dulcedo, et divinam naturam, animum magnum efficere possunt.”

FOOTNOTES

[1]Οιδα μεν ουν και Πλατωνα τον μεγαν, και μετα τουτον ανδρα τοις χρονοις μεν, ου τῃ μην φυσει, καταδεεστερον, τον Χαλκιδεα φημι τον Ιαμβλιχον, κ. λ. Julian. Orat. IV.

Thus too the celebrated Bullialdus, in his Notes on Theo of Smyrna, speaks of Iamblichus as a man of a most acute genius.

[2]There is a Greek and Latin edition of this admirable work by Gale, under the title of Iamblichus De Mysteriis.

[3]Αλλα και το της λεξεως κομματικον, και αφοριστικον, και το των εννοιων πραγματικον, και γλαφυρον, και ενθουν, κ. λ. See the Testimonies prefixed by Gale to his edition of the above-mentioned work.

[4]This Sopater succeeded Plotinus in his philosophical school.

[5]The exact time of Iamblichus’ death is unknown. It is however certain that it was during the reign of Constantine; and according to the accurate Fabricius, prior to the year of Christ 333. Vid. Biblioth. Græc. Tom. IV. p. 283.

[6]This Sextus is probably the same that Seneca so greatly extols, and from whom he derives many of those admirable sentences with which his works abound. Vid. Senecæ Epistolas, 59, 64, 98, et lib. 2 de Irâ, c. 36, et lib. 3. c. 36.

[7]All these were published in one vol. 12mo. by Mr. Bridgman, under the title of Translations from the Greek, in the year 1804, and well deserve to be perused by the liberal reader.

[8]i. e. Having black leaves.

[9]i. e. It must not be admitted, that Apollo was actually connected with Pythaïs; for this would be absurd in the extreme; but the assertion of Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates must be considered as one of those mythological narrations in which heroes are said to have Gods for their fathers, or Goddesses for their mothers, and the true meaning of it is as follows: According to the ancient theology, between those perpetual attendants of a divine nature called _essential_ heroes, who are impassive and pure, and the bulk of human souls who descend to earth with passivity and impurity, it is necessary there should be an order of human souls who descend with impassivity and purity. For as there is no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that the last link of a superior order, should coalesce with the summit of one proximately inferior. These souls were called by the ancients, _terrestrial_ heroes, on account of their high degree of proximity and alliance to such as are essentially heroes. Hercules, Theseus, Pythagoras, Plato, &c. were souls of this kind, who descended into mortality both to benefit other souls, and in compliance with that necessity by which all natures inferior to the perpetual attendants of the Gods are at times obliged to descend.

But as, according to the arcana of ancient theology, every God beginning from on high produces his proper series as far as to the last of things, and this series comprehends many essences different from each other, such as Dæmoniacal, Heroical, Nymphical, and the like; the lowest powers of these orders, have a great communion and physical sympathy with the human race, and contribute to the perfection of all their natural operations, and particularly to their procreations. “Hence” (says Proclus in MSS. Schol. in Crat.) “it often appears, that _heroes_ are generated from the mixture of these powers with mankind; for those that possess a certain prerogative above human nature, are properly denominated _heroes_.” He adds: “Not only a dæmoniacal genus of this kind sympathizes physically with men, but other kinds sympathize with other natures, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags or serpents.”

Olympiodorus, in his life of Plato, observes of that philosopher, “That an Apolloniacal spectre is said to have had connexion with Perictione his mother, and that appearing in the night to his father Aristo, it commanded him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her pregnancy; which mandate Aristo obeyed.” The like account of the divine origin of Plato, is also given by Apuleius, Plutarch, and Hesychius.

[10]i. e. The priests of Jupiter.

[11]From what has been said in the note, p. 4, respecting the divine origin of Pythagoras, it follows that he was a _terrestrial hero_ belonging to the series of Apollo. Thus too the Esculapius who once lived on the earth, and was the inventor of medicine, proceeded, according to the ancient mythology, from the God Esculapius, who subsists in Apollo, just as the hero Bacchus proceeded from the Bacchus who subsists in Jupiter. Hence the Emperor Julian (apud Cyril.) says of Esculapius: “I had almost forgotten the greatest of the gifts of Jupiter and the Sun, but I have very properly reserved it to the last. For it is not peculiar to us only, but is common also, I think, to our kindred the Greeks. For Jupiter, in intelligibles, generated from himself Esculapius; but he was unfolded into light on the earth, through the prolific light of the sun. He therefore, proceeding from heaven to the earth, appeared uniformly in a human shape about Epidaurus. But thence becoming multiplied in his progressions, he extended his saving right hand to all the earth. He came to Pergamus, to Ionia, to Tarentum, and afterwards to Rome. Thence he went to the island Co, afterwards to Ægas, and at length to wherever there is land and sea. Nor did we individually, but collectively, experience his beneficence. And at one and the same time, he corrected souls that were wandering in error, and bodies that were infirm.”