book 6
, but as they do not fall in with what remains of the text, I have placed them here. I have divided these fragments into two classes: (A) those which seem to have some distinct reference which can be recognised or guessed: (B) those which though fairly complete in themselves cannot be so classed. A good many more, generally quoted by Suidas for the sake of some one word, did not seem worth putting in an English dress. The numbers in brackets are those of Hultsch’s text._
_A_
I (6, 2)
[Sidenote: B.C. 751.]
I believe Rome to have been founded in the second year of the 7th Olympiad.[266]
II (6, 2)
[Sidenote: B.C. 672.]
Polybius, like Aristodemus of Elis, informs us that the register of the athletic victors at the Olympic games began to be kept from the 27th Olympiad, at which Coroebus of Elis was first registered as conqueror in the stadium; and this Olympiad was regarded as an era by the Greeks from which to calculate dates.[267]
III (6, 2)
The Palatine was named after Pallas, who died there. He was the son of Heracles and Lavina, daughter of Evander. His maternal grandfather raised a barrow as his tomb on this hill, and called the place after him the Pallantium.
IV (6, 2)
Among the Romans women are forbidden to drink wine; and they drink what is called _passum_, which is made from raisins, and tastes very like the sweet wine of Aegosthena or Crete. This is what they drink to quench their thirst. But it is almost impossible for them to drink wine without being found out. For, to begin with, the woman has not got the charge of wine; and, in the next place, she is bound to kiss all her male relatives and those of her husband, down to his cousins, every day on seeing them for the first time; and as she cannot tell which of them she will meet, she has to be on her guard. For if she has but tasted wine, there is no occasion for any formal accusation.[268]
V (6, 2)
[Sidenote: Ancus Marcius, Livy, 1, 33.]
He also founded Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber.
VI (6, 2)
[Sidenote: Lucius Tarquinius Priscus comes to Rome.]
Lucius, the son of Demaratus of Corinth, came to Rome relying on his own ability and wealth, and convinced that the advantages he possessed would place him in the front rank in the state: for he had a wife who, among other useful qualities, was admirably suited by nature to assist in any political enterprise. Arrived at Rome, and admitted to citizenship, he devoted himself to flattering the king; and before very long his wealth, his natural dexterity, and, more than all, his early training, enabled him so to please the king’s taste that he gained his cordial liking and confidence. As time went on his intimacy became so close that he lived with [Ancus] Marcius, and assisted him in managing his kingdom. While so engaged, he contrived to make himself useful to every one. All who were suitors for anything found in him an active supporter and friend: his wealth was spent with noble liberality and judgment on various objects of national importance; and thus he secured for himself the gratitude of many, and the goodwill and good word of all, and finally obtained the throne.[269]...
Every branch of virtue should be practised by those who aim at good training, from childhood, but, above all, courage....
(6, 1)
An impossible lie admits of no defence even.
(6, 1)
It is the act of a wise and sensible man to recognise—as Hesiod puts it—“how much greater the half is than the whole.”[270]
VII (6, 1)
To learn sincerity towards the Gods is a kind of image of truthfulness towards each other.
VIII (6, 1)
It generally happens in the world that men who acquire have a natural turn for keeping; while those who succeed to wealth, without any trouble to themselves, are apt to squander it.
IX (10)
The strongest fortifications are in general dangerous to both sides; which may be illustrated from what occurs in the case of citadels. These last are regarded as contributing greatly to the security of the cities in which they stand, and to the protection of their freedom; but they often turn out to be the origin of slavery and indisputable misfortunes.[271]
X (13)
Some few approved of his doing so, but the majority objected, saying, some that it was folly, and others that it was madness for a man thus to risk and hazard his life, who was quite unacquainted with the kind of fighting in use among these barbarians.[272]
XI (16)
“Secure retreat in case disaster fall.”
One ought always to keep this line in mind. From failing to do so Lucius the Roman[273] met with a grave disaster. So narrow is the risk of destruction to the most powerful forces when the leaders are unwise. A sufficient illustration to thoughtful men is furnished by the headstrong invasion of Argos by Pyrrhus king of the Epirotes,[274] and the expedition through Thrace of king Lysimachus against Dorimichaites, king of Odrysae;[275] and indeed many other similar cases.
XII (23)
Marcellus never once conquered Hannibal, who in fact remained unbeaten until Scipio’s victory.[276]
XIII (25)
No darkness, no storm however violent, turned him from his purpose. He forced his way through all such obstacles; he overcame even disease by resolute labour, and never once failed in an object or experienced a variation in his uniform good fortune.
XIV (29)
In old times single combats among the Romans were conducted with good faith [but in our days many contrivances have been hit upon].
XV (31)
The horse, from the agony of the wound, first fell forward, and then galloped furiously through the middle of the camp.
XVI (42)
Seeing that the superstitious feelings of the soldiers were roused by these portents, he exerted himself to remove the scruples of the men by means of his own intelligence and strategic skill.
XVII (63)
SHIPS WITH SIX BANKS OF OARS
These vessels appear to be as swift sailers as penteconters, but to be much inferior to triremes; and their construction has been abandoned for many years past. Polybius, however, is supposed to lay down the measurements of such vessels, which the Romans and Carthaginians appear to have often employed in their wars with each other.[277]
XVIII (64)
Getting completely drunk, and all flung on the ground in the various tents, they neither heard any word of command nor took any thought of the future whatever.[278]
XIX (66)
In consultations of war, as in those relating to bodily sickness, one ought to take as much account of the symptoms that have since arisen as of those originally existing.
XX (90)
Cappadocia extends from Mount Taurus and Lycaonia up to the Pontic Sea. The name is Persian and arose thus. A certain Persian [named Cappadocus?] was present at a hunt with Artaxerxes, or some other king, when a lion sprang upon the king’s horse. This Persian happened to be in that part of the hunting company, and drawing his sword rescued the king from his imminent danger and killed the lion. This Persian therefore ascending the highest mountain in the neighbourhood received as a gift from the king as much territory as the human eye could take in, looking east, west, north, and south.[279]
XXI (95)
The Celtiberians have a peculiar manœuvre in war. When they see their infantry hard pressed, they dismount and leave their horses standing in their places. They have small pegs attached to their leading reins, and having fixed them carefully into the ground, they train their horses to keep their places obediently in line until they come back and pull up the pegs.
XXII (96)
The Celtiberians excel the rest of the world in the construction of their swords; for their point is strong and serviceable, and they can deliver a cut with both edges. Wherefore the Romans abandoned their ancestral swords after the Hannibalian war and adopted those of the Iberians. They adopted, I say, the construction of the swords, but they can by no means imitate the excellence of the steel or the other points in which they are so elaborately finished.[280]
XXIII (102)
The Roman praetor Marcus[281] wished to get rid of the war against the Lusitani, and laying aside war altogether, to shirk—as the saying is—“the men’s hall for the women’s bower,” because of the recent defeat of the praetor by the Lusitani.
(103)
But those of the Ligurians who fought against Mago were unable to do anything important or great.
XXIV (113)
A _mora_ consisted of nine hundred men.[282]
XXV (117)
A general needs good sense and boldness; they are the most necessary qualities for dangerous and venturesome undertakings.
XXVI (154)
The second king of Egypt, called Philadelphus, when giving his daughter Berenice in marriage to Antiochus king of Syria, was careful to send her some Nile water, that the young bride might drink no other water.
XXVII (156)
I say this to point out the wisdom of the Romans, and the folly of those who despise the practice of making comparisons with the habits of foreign nations, and believe themselves competent to reform their own armies without reference to others.[283]
XXVIII (157)
The Romans were wont to take great care not to appear to be the aggressors, or to attack their neighbours without provocation; but to be considered always to be acting in self-defence, and only to enter upon war under compulsion.[284]
XXIX (166)
When Scipio Africanus, the younger, was commissioned by the Senate to settle the kingdoms throughout the world, and see that they were put in proper hands, he only took five slaves with him; and, on one of these dying during the journey, he wrote home to his relations to buy another and send him to take the place of the dead one.[285]
XXX (184)
If one ought to speak of _Fortune_ in regard to such things; for I fear she often gets credit of that sort without good reason; while the real fault lies with the men who administer public business, who sometimes act with seriousness and sometimes the reverse.
_B_
XXXI (1)
But not making at all a good guess at the king’s mind, he acted in a most inconsiderate manner.
XXXII (2)
Want of civilisation appears to have an extraordinary influence on mankind in this direction.
XXXIII (3)
But the general being unable to endure the unfairness of those who made these assertions....
XXXIV (5)
But he determined to hold out to the last, trusting to the supplies from Egypt.
XXXV (6)
But having fallen in with him he gained an extremely fortunate victory.
XXXVI (7)
In all these things the Aetolians had been deceived.
XXXVII (8)
And some he honoured with gold cloths and spears, because he wished that his promises should agree with his performances.
XXXVIII (11)
He wrote in bitter and frantic terms, calling them fiends and murderers in his letter, if they abandoned the positions thus disgracefully, before they had suffered or witnessed any hardship.
XXXIX (12)
There is a courage in words too which can despise death.
XXXIX (14)
Before he had been rejoined by the stragglers of the skirmishing
## parties.
XL (27)
Being utterly at a loss, at last he rested his chance of escape from the difficulty which was upon him on some such hope as this.
XLI (30)
None of the citizens being aware of what was taking place owing to the distance, for the city was a large one.
XLII (32)
But trusting to them he undertook the war against Ariarathes.
XLIII (34)
Harpyia is a city in Illyria near Encheleae, to which Baton, charioteer of Amphiaraus, removed after the latter’s disappearance.
XLIV (35)
And he waited for the coming of Hasdrubal.
XLV (36)
Hearing all this through the curtain the king laughed.
XLVI (39)
Foreseeing and fearing the fierce temper and obstinacy of the men.
XLVII (40)
At that time, persuaded that he was enduring a fiery test, he was released from the suspicion.
XLVIII (43)
He thought therefore that it was dangerous to have shared in their enterprise when their plan had failed and come to an end.
XLIX (44)
Having urged the soldiers to make haste, and exhorted the tribunes to engage.
L (46)
Thinking it better and safer not to be present at the hour of the enemy’s opportunity, nor when they were under the influence of popular excitement and fury.
LI (47)
Whenever it is possible to obtain satisfaction from those who have wronged us either by law or by any other settled forms of justice.
LII (54)
Having drawn his army from the pass he encamped.
LII (55)
And then they took up some sort of order, as though by mutual consent, and fought the battle in regular formation.
LIII (56)
That which causes the most pain at the time involves also the most signal revulsion of joy.
LIV (57)
Having ordered the pilots to steer the ships as fast as they could to Elaea.
LV (61)
They not only drove themselves off the stage, but ruined also all Greece.
LV (62)
But he, from his long experience of war, did not all lose his presence of mind.
LVI (67)
He persuades them by reckoning all the wealth he considered they would gain in the battle.
LVII (68)
The Romans had been inspired by some divine influence, and having fortified their courage with irresistible might....
LVII (69)
To signalise some by favours, and others by punishments, that they might be a warning to the rest.
LVIII (72)
And they, being persuaded, and throwing themselves in the way of the enemy’s charge, died gallantly.
LIX (73)
He tried to take the city by an intrigue, having long secured a party of traitors within it.
LX (74)
He brought up the transports, by lading which with rocks and sinking them at the mouth of the harbour he planned to shut out the enemy entirely from the sea.
LXI (80)
Though I have much more to say, I fear lest some of you may think that I am unnecessarily diffuse.
LXII (81)
They are reserving themselves for an opportunity, and are quite ready to meet them again.
LXIII (85)
To be eager for life and to cling to it is a sign of the greatest baseness and weakness.
LXIV (86)
He was feeling something like starters in horse races, which are started by the raising of torches.
LXV (88)
Their boldness transgresses the bounds of propriety, and their actions are a violation of duty.
LXV (91)
Seeing that the Carthaginians had obeyed all injunctions in the most honourable spirit.
LXVI (92)
To have fifty ships built entirely new, and to launch fifty of those already existing from the docks.
LXVII (100)
Lucius being appointed to go on a mission to the Lapateni and speak to them in favour of an unconditional surrender, was unprepared for the task before him.
LXVIII (101)
Of all the determining forces in war the most decisive of failure or success is the spirit of the combatants.
LXIX (104)
Having mentioned summarily the defeats they had sustained, and putting before them the successes of the Macedonians.
LXX (105)
For he perceived that the Macedonian kingdom would become contemptible, if the rebels succeeded in their first attempt.
LXXI (109)
Therefore it was intolerable that the Romans even then should make their way into Macedonia unobserved.
LXXII (110)
He, if any one of our time has done so, has examined all that has been said scientifically on tactics.
LXXIII (111)
Metrodorus and his colleagues, frightened at the threatening aspect of Philip, departed.
LXXIV (112)
The Romans made no show of bearing a grudge for what had taken place.
LXXV (113)
But putting both spurs to his horse he rode on as hard as he could.
LXXVI (114)
Being annoyed at the treaty, Nabis paid no attention to its provisions.
LXXVII (120)
It was neither possible to examine the man closely in his state of physical weakness, nor to put a question to him for fear of worrying him.
LXXVIII (122)
The Pannonians having seized the fort at the beginning of the war, had taken it as a base of operations, and had fitted it up for the reception of booty.
LXXIX (124)
But wishing to point the contrast between his policy to those who trusted and those who disobeyed him, he commenced the siege.
LXXX (126)
So that those in the assembly were thunderstruck and unable to collect their thoughts, sympathising with the poignant sorrow of those thus dispossessed of their all.
LXXXI (131)
They immediately sent a courier to Perseus to tell him what had happened. (132) It was Perseus’s design to keep it close, but he could not hide the truth.
LXXXII (133)
In other respects he was well equipped for service, but his spear was limp.
LXXXIII (134)
Publius was anxious to engage and avail himself of the enthusiasm of the barbarians. (135) He put in at Naupactus in Aetolia. (136) He escorted Publius out with great respect. (137) Having received Publius and Gaius with kindness and honour.
LXXXIV (140)
It was the deliberate intention of the Romans to fight at sea.
LXXXV (141)
While they were still together and were fighting at close quarters with their swords, taking his stand behind them he stabbed him under the armpit.
LXXXVI (151)
This man presented Prusias with many silver and gold cups during the banquet.
LXXXVII (153)
Taking a wise view of the future, he came to the conclusion to get rid of the garrison sent by Ptolemy.
LXXXVIII (158)
On that occasion both Romans and Carthaginians bivouacked on the embankment.
LXXXIX (159)
Not being able to persuade him again, owing to that king’s cautious and inactive character, he was forced to offer five hundred talents. And so Seleucus agreed to give the aid.
XC (161)
Chance and Fortune, so to speak, enhanced the achievements of Scipio, so that they always appeared more illustrious than was expected.
XCI (162)
One must not pass over even a minor work of his, as in the case of a famous artist.
XCII (163)
Scipio counselled him either not to try, or to do so in such a manner as to succeed at all risks. For to make an attempt on the same man twice was dangerous in itself, and was apt to make a man altogether contemptible.
XCIII (164)
But being jealous of Scipio they tried to decry his achievements.
XCIV (168)
Fixing the stocks upright in the ground in a semicircle touching each other.
XCV (170)
The important point of their resolution was that they would not admit a garrison or governor, and would not give up their constitution as established by law.
XCV (177-179)
He said that we should not let the enemy escape, or encourage their boldness by shirking a battle....
Conceiving a slight hope from the besieged garrison, he made the most of it....
Pretending warm friendship, he tried every manœuvre whereby he might promote the enemy’s interests, and surround us by the gravest perils....
XCVI (182)
As the rock caused them difficulty because they were obliged to bore a hole in it, they completed the mine which they were making by using wooden bolts.
XCVII (183)
He did not think it right to leave the war in Etruria, and give his attention to the cities in that part of the country. He feared that he should waste all the time, which was not very long to begin with, in less important details.
XCVIII (185)
And having got his boats and hemioliae dragged across the Isthmus he put to sea, being anxious to be in time for the Achaean congress.
XCIX (191)
Philip was annoyed at the request of the Corcyreans.
C (192)
Since circumstances debar Philip, the king wishes to give that man the credit of the achievement, making the proposal to him in the light of a favour.
CI (193)
Philip, having given out that he was about to serve out rations, made a proclamation that a return should be made to him of all who had not provisions for more than thirty days.
CII (195)
After two days from starting for the seat of war Philip passed the order to make two rations three, whenever he wanted an additional day, and sometimes to make two four. (? Cp. Livy, 35, 28.)
CIII (195)
A swipe (φρεατοτόπανον) is one of the implements mentioned by Polybius. (See 9, 43, Hultsch.)
CIV (199)
It was impossible to convey the equipments and provisions for the legions by sea or upon beasts of burden; they must carry ten days’ provisions in their wallets.
II.—GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES QUOTED BY STEPHANUS AND OTHERS AS HAVING BEEN USED BY POLYBIUS
Achriane, a town in Hyrcania.
Adrane, a town in Thrace.
Aegosthena, a town in Megaris.
Allaria, a town in Crete.
Ancara, a town in Italy.
Aperanteia, a city and district in Thessaly.
Apsyrtus, an island off Illyricum.
Ares, plain of, “A desolate plain in Thrace with low trees.”
Arsinoe, a town in Aetolia and in Libya.
Atella, a town of the Opici, in Campania. “The Atellani surrendered.”
Badiza, a town in Bruttium.
Babrantium, a place near Chios.
Cabyle, a town in Thrace.
Calliope, a town in Parthia.
Candasa, a fort in Caria.
Carthaea, one of the four cities of Ceos.
Corax, a mountain between Callipolis and Naupactus.
Cyathus, a river in Aetolia, near Arsinoe (a tributary of the Achelous).
Dassaretae, an Illyrian tribe.
Digeri, a Thracian tribe.
Ellopium, a town in Aetolia.
Gitta, a town in Palestine (Gath).
Hella, in Asia, a port belonging to Attalus.
Hippo (Regius), a town in Libya.
Hyrtacus, a town in Crete.
Hyscana, a town in Illyria.
Ilattia, a town in Crete.
Lampeteia, a town in Bruttium.
Mantua, in N. Italy.
Massyleis, a Libyan tribe.
Melitusa, a town in Illyria.
Oricus (m.), a town in Epirus, “The first town on the right as one sails into the Adriatic.”
Parthus, a town in Illyria.
Philippi, a town in Macedonia.
Phorynna, a town in Thrace.
Phytaeum, a town in Aetolia.
Rhyncus, in Aetolia.
Sibyrtus, a town in Crete.
Singa, a town in Libya.
Tabraca, a town in Libya.
Temesia, a town in Bruttium.
Volci, a town in Etruria.
Xynia, a town in Thessaly.
APPENDIX I.
THE DIVISIONS OF THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE AFTER THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER THE GREAT, OB. JUNE B.C. 323.
Justin, 12, 16; Arrian, _An._ 7, 28.
{Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) half-brother of Alexander, οἱ βασιλεῖς { ob. B.C. 317. {Alexander IV. (posthumous son of Alexander by Roxana).
Successive Guardians {Perdiccas, killed B.C. 321. (οἱ ἐπιμεληταί) {Arrhidaeus and Python (for a few months), resigned B.C. 321.
Hipparch ... Seleucus. Captain of the Bodyguards ... Cassander. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Macedonia and Greece. Antipater.
Egypt, and parts of Libya and Asia. Ptolemy s. of Lagus.
Pamphylia(1). Lycia. Greater Phrygia. Antigonus.
Caria. Cassander.
Thrace. Lysimachus.
Paphlagonia. Cappadocia. Eumenes.
Media Major. Python.
Syria. Laomedon.
Phrygia Hellespontiaca. Leonnatus.
Lydia. Meleager.(2)
Cilicia. Philotas.
Media Minor. Atropatos.
_Bactria ulterior._ Unchanged.(3)
_India._ Unchanged.
_Indian Colonies._ _Pithon s. of Agenor._
_Punjaub._ _Taxiles._
_Parapamisos._ _Oxyartes._
_Arachossi_ and _Cedrussi._ _Silyrtias._
_Draucae_ and _Arei._ _Stasanor._
_Bactria._ _Amyntas._
_Sogdiani._ _Stasandros._
_Parthians._ _Philip._
_Hyrcani._ _Phrataphernes._
_Carmani._ _Tleptolemus._
_Persis._ _Peucestes._
_Babylonians._ _Archon._
_Mesopotamia._ _Arcesilaus._
---------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) Justin gives Pamphylia and Lycia to Nearchus.
(2) Justin calls him Menander.
(3) The provinces and governors printed in italics are not mentioned by Diodorus here, who merely says that they were unchanged, But the list given by Justin agrees with that of Diodorus in the next settlement, with certain exceptions, which may be regarded as changes arising from death or other causes.
SECOND ARRANGEMENT, B.C. 321.
οἱ βασιλεῖς { Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) ob. 317 B.C. { Alexander IV. (son of Alexander by Roxana).
Regent with absolute powers ... Antipater, ob. B.C. 318. ” ” ... Polysperchon, B.C. 318-315.
Strategus of the Empire ... Antigonus.
Chiliarch ” ... Cassander (s. of Antigonus). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- B.C. 321. SECOND ARRANGEMENT OF THE PROVINCES. Diod. 18, 39. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
(Unchanged.) Macedonia and Greece. (Unchanged.) Antipater.
(Unchanged.) Egypt & parts of Libya & Asia. Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.
Greater Phrygia, Lycia, & Susiana added. Antigonus.
(Unchanged.) Cassander.
(Unchanged.) Thrace. Lysimachus.
(Unchanged.) Media. Python.
(Unchanged.) Syria. Laomedon.
Cilicia. Philoxenus.
Babylonia. Seleucus.
Cappadocia. Nicanor.
Lydia Cheiton.
Phrygia Hellespontiaca. Arrhidaeus.
Mesopotamia and Asbelitis. Amphimachus.
The other provinces as in the previous list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------- THIRD ARRANGEMENT, B.C. 312-311.
King ... Alexander IV. (in charge of Roxana).
Strategus in Europe till the king comes of age ... Cassander.
---------------------------------------------------------------------- B.C. 312-311. THIRD ARRANGEMENT OF THE PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE. Diod. Sic. 19, 105. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Egypt. Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.
Thrace. Lysimachus.
Macedonia. Cassander.
All Asia (ἀφηγεῖσθαι). Antigonus.
Babylonia. Seleucus Nicanor.
Greece nominally free, B.C. 307 Demetrius (s. of Antigonus) becomes Master of Athens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------- B.C. 311. Alexander IV. and Roxana murdered by order of Cassander.
B.C. 306. FOURTH ARRANGEMENT. +Kingdoms+ FORMED, AFTER THE NAVAL VICTORY OF DEMETRIUS OVER PTOLEMY. Diod. 30, 53. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
King of Egypt. Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.
King of Syria and Asia. Antigonus.
King of Upper Asia. Seleucus.
King of Thrace. Lysimachus.
King of Macedonia. Cassander.
Demetrius Poliorcetes (s. of Antigonus) also takes the title of _king_, and in B.C. 304 returns to Athens and wages war with Cassander.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
B.C. 301. SETTLEMENT AFTER THE BATTLE OF IPSUS, IN WHICH ANTIGONUS FELL.
(Lysimachus and Seleucus against Antigonus and Demetrius.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
King of Egypt. Ptolemy, s. of Lagus, ob. 283.
King of Syria. Seleucus Nicanor, ob. B.C. 280.
King of Thrace. Lysimachus, ob. 281.
King of Macedonia. Cassander, ob. B.C. 297.
Greece is nominally free, but in B.C. 295 Demetrius takes Athens, and becoming King of Macedonia in B.C. 295 to B.C. 287, he retains Greece as part of the kingdom. In the confusion which followed it was practically free.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX II
THE KINGS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND MACEDONIA, TO THE END OF THE PERIOD EMBRACED IN POLYBIUS’S HISTORY
+---------+-------------------------------------------+ | B.C. | EGYPT | +---------+-------------------------------------------+ | 306-285 | Ptolemy, s. of Lagus | | 283-247 | Ptolemy II. Philadelphus | | 247-222 | Ptolemy III. Euergetes | | 222-205 | Ptolemy IV. Philopator | | 205-181 | Ptolemy V. Epiphanes | | 181-146 | Ptolemy VI. Philometor | | 170-154 | Ptolemy VII. Physcon, joint king with his | | | brother, Ptolemy VI | | 146-117 | Ptolemy VII. sole king | +---------+-------------------------------------------+ | | SYRIA | +---------+-------------------------------------------+ | 306-301 | Antigonus the One-eyed | | 301-280 | Seleucus Nicanor | | 280-261 | Antiochus I. Soter, s. of | | | Antigonus the One-eyed | | 246-226 | Seleucus II. Callinicus | | 226-223 | Seleucus III. Alexander or Ceraunus | | 223-187 | Antiochus III. the Great | | 187-175 | Seleucus IV. Philopator | | 175-164 | Antiochus IV. Epiphanes | | 164-162 | Antiochus V. Eupator | | 162-150 | Demetrius I. Soter | | 150-147 | Alexander Balas | | 147-125 | Demetrius II. Nicator | +---------+-------------------------------------------+ | | MACEDONIA | +---------+-------------------------------------------+ | 323-311 | {Alexander IV. | | 323-317 | {Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) | | 311-306 | Regency of Cassander | | 306-296 | Cassander | | 296 | Philip IV. s. of Cassander | | 296-294 | Antipater} sons of Cassander | | | Alexander} | | 294-287 | Demetrius I. Poliercetes, ob. 283 | | 287-281 | Divided between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus | | 281-280 | {Seleucus, Nicanor | | | {Ptolemy Ceraunus, s. of Ptolemy of Egypt | | 280-277 | [Various claimants] | | 277-239 | Antigonus Gonatas, s. of Demetrius I. | | 239-229 | Demetrius II. s. of Gonatas. | | 229-179 | Philip V. s. of Demetrius II. | | | [Antigonus Doson, nominally his guardian | | | assumes the crown B.C. 229-220] | | 179-168 | Perseus [Macedonia a Roman province] | +---------+-------------------------------------------+
APPENDIX III
1, 21. The capture of Cornelius Asina is ascribed by Livy (_Ep._ 17) to an act of treachery, _per fraudem velut in colloquium evocatus captus est_. He is copied by Florus (2, 2) and Eutropius (2, 10). See also Valerius Max. 6, 6, 2. This is perhaps not incompatible with the narrative of Polybius, which, however, does not suggest it. He must have been released at the time of the entrance of Regulus into Africa, for being captured in B.C. 260, we find him Consul for B.C. 254, without any account of his release being preserved.
1, 32-36.—XANTHIPPUS THE LACEDAEMONIAN
The fate of Xanthippus has been variously reported. Polybius represents him as going away voluntarily, and Mommsen supposes him to have taken service in the Egyptian army. Appian, however, asserts that he and his men were drowned on their way home to Sparta by the Carthaginian captains who were conveying them, and who were acting on secret orders from home (8, 4). Mommsen also regards the account of Polybius of the reforms introduced in the Carthaginian tactics by Xanthippus as exaggerated: “The officers of Carthage can hardly have waited for foreigners to teach them that the light African cavalry can be more appropriately employed on the plain than among hills and forests.” The doubt had apparently occurred to others [Diodor. Sic. fr. bk. 23.] The mistake, however, was not an unnatural one. For other references to Xanthippus see Cicero _de Off._ 3, 26, 7; Valerius Max. 1, 1, 14; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 24.
1, 34.—M. ATILIUS REGULUS
No more is told us of the fate of Regulus, and Mommsen says “nothing more is known with certainty.” Arnold, following Niebuhr, declared the story of his cruel death to be a fabrication. The tradition, however, of his mission home to propose peace, his subsequent return after advising against it, and his death under torture, was received undoubtingly by the Roman writers of the time of Cicero and afterwards. See Cicero, _Off._ 3, § 99; _ad Att._ 16, 11; _de Sen._ § 74; _Paradox._ 2, 16; _Tusc._ 5, § 14. Horace, _Od._ 3, 5; Livy, _Ep._ 18; Valerius Max. 1, 1, 14; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 28. To Appian (8, 4) is due the additional particular of the barrel full of nails, καὶ αὐτὸν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καθείρξαντες ἐν γαλεάγρᾳ κέντρα πάντοθεν ἐχούσῃ διέφθειραν. Against this uniformity of tradition is to be set the silence of Polybius. But on the other hand, in this introductory part of his history, Polybius does not profess to give full particulars (see note to 1, 21); and in the case of Regulus, he has not stated what we learn from Livy (_Ep._ 18) and Valerius Max. 4, 4, 6, that his stay in Africa for the second year was against his own express wish, his private business requiring, as he thought, his presence in Italy.
1, 60.—LUTATIUS
Lutatius is represented by Polybius as directing the operations at the battle of Aegusa; but it appears that he had received some hurt a few days before, and was confined to his lectica during the action (_lectica claudum jacuisse_). The chief direction therefore devolved upon the praetor, Q. Valerius Falto, who accordingly claimed to share his triumph, but was refused on the technical ground that the victory had not been won under his _auspicia_. Valerius Max. 2, 8, 2.
1, 76.—HAMILCAR
(Vol. i. p. 85.) Dr. Warre writes on the manœuvre of Hamilcar as follows: “Hamilcar’s army is in column of route; elephants leading, then cavalry, then light-armed infantry, and heavy-armed infantry in the rear. He observes the enemy bearing down hastily; gives orders to his whole force to turn about, and then forms line (ἐξέτασις) by successive wheels of his heavy-armed troops. He would thus have changed his heavy-armed from column of route into line by wheeling them while retiring to the right (or left) about. The light-armed apparently passed through the intervals; the cavalry halted when they came to the line now formed up, and at once turned to their front and faced the enemy, and the remainder marched forward to meet them. Polybius does not tell us with what front Hamilcar was marching; but I think it is clear that he was in column of route and not in battle array (ἐκ παρατάξεως). Thus the deployment of his columns, _while retiring, by right (or left) about wheel_ into line by successive συντάγματα, or battalions, would be a very pretty manœuvre, and only such as an able tactician would resort to.”
11, 22-23.—SCIPIO AND HASDRUBAL SON OF GESCO
(Vol. ii. p. 67.) Of this passage Dr. Warre has again favoured me with a note and a translation which I append: “The passage in Polybius is very interesting. It is a good tactical example of an attack on both flanks, refusing the centre, the effect being to keep the enemy from moving the troops in his centre to the assistance of his wings. The inversion of order, by which the right became the left in the case of those troops who had first orders ‘right turn, left wheel from line into column,’ and then ‘left wheel into line,’ is an ordinary instance of doing what might be called ‘clubbing’ a battalion or brigade. It is of course on parade a clumsy mistake to make; but Scipio rightly took no notice of it in battle, as Polybius, who sees the matter with a soldier’s eye, observes. Scipio’s army was inferior in numbers, and so he first moved his Romans _outwards_ while still in line, and then formed for attack with the cavalry, light infantry, and three battalions (cohorts) on each flank.”
[Illustration]
The following is Dr. Warre’s translation:—
“Polybius 11, 22.—On this occasion Scipio seems to have employed two stratagems. He observed that Hasdrubal was in the habit of marching out late in the day, of keeping his Libyan troops in the centre, and of posting his elephants in front of each wing. His own custom was to march out at the said hour to oppose him, and to set the Romans in his centre opposite to the Libyans, while he posted his Spanish troops upon his wings. On the day upon which he determined to decide matters he did the reverse of this, and thereby greatly assisted his forces towards gaining a victory, and placed the enemy at no small disadvantage. At daybreak he sent his aides and gave orders to all the tribunes and to the soldiers that they were first to get their breakfast, and then to arm and to parade in front of the ramparts. This was done. The soldiers obeyed eagerly, having an idea of his intention. He sent forward the cavalry and light infantry, giving them joint orders to approach the camp of the enemy, and to skirmish up to it boldly; but he himself took the heavy infantry, and at sunrise advanced, and when he had reached the middle of the plain formed line in just the opposite order to his previous formation. For he proceeded to deploy the Iberians on the centre and the Romans on the flanks.”
* * * * *
“For a while the Romans remained as usual silent, but after the day had worn, and the light infantry engagement was indecisive and on equal terms, since those who were hard pressed retired on their own heavy infantry and (ἐκ μεταβολῆς κινδυνεύειν), after retreating formed again for attack, then it was that Scipio withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the troops under the standards, and divided them on either wing in rear of his line, first the velites, and in succession to them his cavalry, and at first made his advance _in line direct_. But when distant (? five) furlongs from the enemy he directed the Iberians to advance in the same formation, but gave orders to the wings to turn outwards (to the right wing for the infantry to turn to their right, and to their left to the left). Then he himself took from the right and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius from the left the three leading squadrons of cavalry, and in front of these the usual number of velites, and three cohorts (for this is the Roman term), but the one body wheeled to the left and the other to the right, were led in column against the enemy, advancing at full speed, the troops in succession forming and following as they wheeled....
(They were in line, and the cavalry and velites got the word turn, left wheel, and the infantry right wheel and forward, _i.e._ the light troops and cavalry wheeled from their outer flank, and the heavy infantry from their inner flank.)
“And when these troops were not far off the enemy, and the Iberians in the line direct were still a considerable distance behind, as they were advancing slowly, they came in contact with either wing of the enemy, the Roman forces being in column according to his original intention.
“The subsequent movements by which the troops in rear of these columns came into line with those leading were exactly the reverse, generally, in the case of the right and the left wings, and
## particularly, in case of the light troops and cavalry and the heavy
infantry. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing forming to the right into line were trying to outflank the enemy, but the infantry formed on the contrary to the left. On the left wing the cavalry and light infantry left formed into line, and the heavy infantry right formed into line. And so it came to pass that on both wings the cavalry and light troops were in inverted order, _i.e._ their proper right had become their left. The general took little heed of this, but cared only for that which was of greater importance, the outflanking of the enemy; and rightly so, for while a general ought to know what has happened, he should use the movements that are suitable to the circumstances.”
34, 5, 10.—PYTHEAS
The date of these voyages of Pytheas is uncertain beyond the fact that they were somewhere in the 4th century B.C. His Periplus, or notes of his voyage, was extant until the 5th century A.D. The fragments remaining have been published by Arvedson, Upsala, 1824. The objection raised by Polybius to the impossibility of a poor man making such voyages is sometimes answered by the supposition that he was sent officially by the Massilian merchants to survey the north of Europe and look out for places suitable for commerce. The northern sea, which he describes as “like a jellyfish through which one can neither walk nor sail,” is referred “to the rotten and spongy ice which sometimes fills those waters.” This is assuming Thule to be Iceland. Tacitus supposed it to be Shetland (_Agr._ 10), and described the waters there as sluggish, and not subject to the influence of the wind. See Elton (_Origins of English History_, pp. 73-74). Elton quotes Wallace (_Concerning Thule_, 31), who comments on Tacitus by saying, “This agrees with the sea in the north-east of Scotland, not for the reason given by Tacitus, but because of the contrary tides, which drive several ways, and stop not only boats with oars but ships under sail.”
34, 10.—THE SUBTERRANEAN FISH
Schweighaeuser in his note on this passage quotes Aristotle _de Anim._ 6, 15, who states that gudgeon thus hide themselves in the earth; and Seneca, _Nat. Q._, 3, 17 and 19, who refers to the fact _piscem posse vivere sub terra et effodi_, and quotes an instance as occurring in Caria. See also Livy, 42, 2, who, among other prodigies occurring in B.C. 173, says, _in Gallico agro qua induceretur aratrum sub existentibus glebis pisces emersisse dicebantur_. Eels and other fish have been found in the mud of ponds long after the ponds have been dried up. The truer account is given in Strabo (4, 1, 6): “There was a lake near Ruscino, and a swampy place a little above the sea, full of salt, and containing mullets (κεστρεῖς), which are dug out; for if a man dig down two or three feet, and drive a trident into the muddy water, he may spear fish which is of considerable size, and which feeds on the mud like the eels.”
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The port of Brundisium was known long before. See Herod. 4, 99. The Romans colonised the town in B.C. 244. See Livy, epit. 19.
[2] See on 3, 66.
[3] Dr. Arnold declares it “all but an impossibility that an army should have marched the distance (not less than 325 Roman miles) in a week.” Livy (26, 42) accepts the statement without question.
[4] Mr. Strachan-Davidson explains this to mean from the sea to the lake, as Scipio’s lines would not have extended right round the lake to the other sea.
[5] Escombrera (Σκομβραρία). I must refer my readers to Mr. Strachan-Davidson’s appendix on _The Site of the Spanish Carthage_ for a discussion of these details. See above 2, 13; Livy, 26, 42.
[6] This seems to be the distinction between the words γερουσία and σύγκλητος. Cp. 36, 4. The latter is the word used by Polybius for the Roman Senate: for the nature of the first see Bosworth Smith, _Carthage and the Carthaginians_, p. 27. It was usually called “The Hundred.” Mommsen (_Hist. of Rome_, vol. ii. p. 15) seems to doubt the existence of the larger council: its authority at any rate had been superseded by the oligarchical gerusia.
[7] This and the following chapter were formerly assigned to the description of Scipio’s proceedings in Spain and followed, ch. 20. Hultsch, however, seems right in placing them thus, and assigning them to the account of the tactics of Philopoemen.
[8] On the margin of one MS. the following is written, which may be a sentence from the same speech, or a comment of the Epitomator: “A confederacy with democratic institutions always stands in need of external support, owing to the fickleness of the multitude.”
[9] See 5, 44.
[10] This goddess is variously called Anaitis (Plut. _Artax._ 27) and Nanea (2 Macc. 1, 13). And is identified by Plutarch with Artemis, and by others with Aphrodite.
[11] This proverb perhaps arose from the frequent employment of the non-Hellenic Carians as mercenaries. Cp. Plato, _Laches_, 187 B; _Euthydemus_, 285 B; Euripides, _Cyclops_, 654.
[12] See 9, 11.
[13] This passage does not occur in the extant treatise of Aeneas; but is apparently referred to (ch. 7, § 4) as being contained in a preparatory treatise (παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος).
[14] The grouping of these letters will be as follows:—
1 2 3 4 5
1 α ζ λ π φ 2 β η μ ρ χ 3 γ θ ν σ ψ 4 δ ι ξ τ ω 5 ε κ ο υ
[15] Polybius confuses the Tanais (Don) with another Tanais or Iaxartes flowing into the south-east part of the Caspian.
[16] King of Bactria, see 11, 34.
[17] See Livy, 27, 39.
[18] Livy, 27, 44.
[19] There is nothing to show positively that a Rhodian is the speaker: but Livy mentions envoys from Rhodes and Ptolemy this year. For the special attempts of the Rhodians to bring about a peace between Philip and the Aetolians, see 5, 24, 100.
[20] The “Tarentines” were horsemen armed with light skirmishing javelins. See 4, 77; 16, 18; and cp. Arrian, _Tact._ 4, § 5; 18, § 2. Livy, 35, 28; 37, 40.
[21] See on 27, 4.
[22] The text is certainly corrupt here, and it is not clear what the general sense of the passage is beyond this,—that Philopoemen calculated on defeating the enemy, as he did, while struggling through the dyke: or on their exposing themselves to attack if they retreated from the dyke without crossing it.
[23] Or, according to another reading “five stades.” Livy, 28, 14, says _quingentos passus_.
[24] The text is imperfect.
[25] Handing it over to L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, Livy, 28, 38.
[26] That is the _Caucasus Indicus_ or Paropamisus: mod. Hindú Kúsh.
[27] Cp. a similar custom of the Lycians, Herod. 1, 173.
[28] He may have been referring to pre-homeric times, cp. Herod. 6, 137, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον σφίσι κω οὐδὲ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἕλλησι οἰκέτας.
[29] The text is very imperfect here.
[30] For this title see on 22, 19. It is found in inscriptions in Thasos, Crete, and Cibyra. C.I.G. 2163, _c_; 2583; 4380, _b_.
[31] Both Curtius and Arrian seem to have found in their authorities that Darius crossed the Pinarus. Curt. 3, 8; Arrian, 2, 8.
[32] Reckoning the stade at 600 feet (Greek).
[33] See note to previous chapter.
[34] The Cilician gates.
[35] That is, sixteen or thirty-two deep.
[36] The text here is in hopeless confusion.
[37] Homer, who is generally spoken of as “the poet.” We may remember Horace (_Ep._ 1, 19, 6) _Laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homerus_.
[38] See 3, 37. The point seems to be that the remark was too commonplace to put into the mouth of a hero.
[39] The text is again hopeless.
[40] The text is uncertain, and I am not at all sure of the meaning of ἐπ’ ὀνόματος, cp. 25 _k_, 27. These public harangues of doctors to attract patients are noticed in Xenophon, _Memorab._ 4, 2, 5.
[41] Tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, B.C. 404-374. See Isocrates, _Orat._ x.
[42] For this proverb see Plutarch, _Nicias_, ch. 9, ἡδέως μεμνημένοι τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι τοὺς ἐν εἰρήνῃ καθεύδοντας οὐ σάλπιγγες ἀλλ’ ἀλεκτρυόνες ἀφυπνίζουσι.
[43] _Ib._ ch. 25.
[44] Homer, _Il._ 5, 890.
[45] Homer, _Il._ 9, 63.
[46] Euripides, fr.
[47] Battle of the Crimesus. See Plutarch, _Timol._ ch. 27.
[48] He refers to the habit of Eastern nations thrusting their hands into long sleeves in the presence of their rulers. See Xenophon, _Hellen._ 2, 1, 8.
[49] Homer, _Odyss._ 1, 1-4; 8, 183.
[50] _Republic_, v. 473 C. vi. 499 B.
[51] The Rhodians had proclaimed war against the Cretan pirates. Philip had secretly commissioned one of his agents, the Aetolian Dicaearchus, to aid the Cretans. Diodor. fr. xxviii.
[52] Heracleides having gained credence at Rhodes by pretending to betray Philip’s intrigue with the Cretans, waited for an opportunity, and, setting fire to their arsenal, escaped in a boat. Polyaen. 5, 17, 2.
[53] The text of these last sentences is so corrupt that it is impossible to be sure of having rightly represented the meaning of Polybius.
[54] These raids on the territory of Megalopolis, however, did not lead to open war till B.C. 202. See 16, 16.
[55] Caepio was commanding in Bruttium, Servilius in Etruria and Liguria. Livy, 30, 1.
[56] Sophanisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gesco. Livy, 29, 23; 30, 12, 15.
[57] Some words are lost from the text.
[58] παρενέβαλλε, which Schweig. translates _castra locavit_: but though the word does sometimes bear that meaning, I cannot think that it does so here. Scipio seems to have retained his camp on the hill, only two and a half miles’ distant, and to have come down into the plain to offer battle each of the three days. Hence the imperfect.
[59] The war with Antiochus, B.C. 218-217. See 5, 40, 58-71, 79-87.
[60] A civil war, apparently in a rebellion caused by his own feeble and vicious character. It seems to be that referred to in 5, 107.
[61] Homer, _Iliad_, 4, 437.
[62] Homer, _Iliad_, 4, 300.
[63] A line of which the author is unknown; perhaps it was Theognis.
[64] See Livy, 31, 31; Strabo, 12, c. 4. Philip handed over Cius to Prusias.
[65] That is, from Rhodes and other states.
[66] That is the treaty between Philip and Antiochus.
[67] The word βίαχα in the text is unknown, and certainly corrupt. The most obvious remedy is ὑπόβρυχα or ὑποβρύχια. But we cannot be sure.
[68] _Jam cum Rhodiis et Attalo navalibus certaminibus, neutro feliciter, vires expertus._ Livy, 31, 14.
[69] An inscription found at Iassus [C.I.G. 2683] has confirmed this name which is found in one MS. instead of _Hestias_. Whether the meaning of the title is Artemis of the City, or some local designation, is uncertain.
[70] Called Panion or Paneion. See Josephus _B. Jud._ 3, 10, 7, Ἰορδάνου πήγη τὸ Πάνειον. The town near it was called Paneas, and afterwards Paneas Caesarea, and later still Caesarea Philippi. Scopas, the Aetolian, was now serving Ptolemy Epiphanes; see 13, 2; 18, 53.
[71] See on 4, 77; 13, 1.
[72] See 15, 25.
[73] Ptolemy Philopator had made Gaza his chief depôt of war material; see 5, 68. Antiochus destroyed it in B.C. 198 for its loyalty to the King of Egypt.
[74] Syria was conquered by the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pilezer about B.C. 747, and was afterwards a part of the Babylonian and Persian empires. It does not seem certain to what invasion Polybius is here referring.
[75] That is from the wars undertaken by them against Philip. Livy, 31, 14, 24.
[76] For the Phocians see Pausan. 10, 1, 6. For the Acarnanians see _supra_, 9, 40.
[77] According to Hultsch no fragments or extracts of