CHAPTER X

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1838.

The facility with which the French had taken possession of Mascara and Tlemsen, convinced Abdel Kader of the necessity of having strongholds beyond the easy reach of their incursions. The plan which he projected and carried into effect had the double object of resisting the French invasion, and of cementing his own authority over the Arabs. It bears the highest testimony to his military genius. No better explanation of this design can be given than in the words which Abdel Kader addressed in after times to General Daumas, who had for three years resided at his head-quarters in the capacity of consul.

“With the twofold view of imposing on the turbulent tribes of the Sahara, and keeping myself beyond the reach of your attacks, I had constructed on the limits of the Tell, at great expense and amidst innumerable difficulties, a certain number of forts, which you afterwards destroyed. They were situated, in setting out from the west, at Sebdou; to the south of Tlemsen, at Saida; to the south of Mascara, at Tekedemt; to the south-east of the same town, at Taza; to the south of Miliana, at Boghar; to the south of Medea, at Bel Kherout, south-east of Algiers; and, lastly, at Biskra, to the south of Constantine.

“I was convinced, in fact, that whenever the war re-commenced, I should be obliged to abandon to you all the towns of the central line of the Atlas; but that it would be impossible for you, at least for a long time, to reach the Sahara; because the transports which encumber your armies would be a great obstacle in your way. Marshal Bugeaud proved to me that I was mistaken; but at the time I had only the experience of my

## action with his predecessors.

“Nevertheless, even in face of the system pursued by Marshal Bugeaud, you would have found almost insurmountable difficulties in trying to reach my true line of defence, if the Arabs had only agreed to my proposition of rasing to the ground, and utterly destroying, the towns of Medea, Miliana, Mascara, and Tlemsen: that is to say, the steps of the ladder by which you gradually mounted so high.

“Some argued that the French would soon re-build what I had destroyed; others, that it would be cruel to throw down, merely in view of an eventuality, what it had cost so much to erect. Both sides were wrong: I ought to have followed out my own inspiration.

“Tekedemt, according to my project, was to have become a large town—a binding centre of commerce—between the Tell and the Sahara. The Arabs were pleased with its situation. They came there with much pleasure, because it afforded them great advantages. It was also a thorn I had placed in the eye of the independent tribes of the desert. They could neither escape me, nor incommode me. I held them by their bodily wants. The Sahara producing no crops, they would have been obliged to come to me for food. I had built Tekedemt over their heads. They felt it, and hastened to make their submission.

“In fact, from this time, I could always come upon them unexpectedly with my _goums_ (irregular cavalry), and at least carry off their flocks and herds, if I did not stop to take their tents. The severe examples I made of some of the most distant tribes soon made them give up all hopes of being able to elude me. Thus all had finished by submitting to my authority, and regularly paying the _ashur_ and the _zekka_. I used even to send and count their flocks, and they said not a word.

“There are only four points in the desert which my authority had not reached: Mzab, Ourgla, Tougourt, and the Souf. The Benis Sidi Cheikh, however, had all acknowledged me. It is true I had granted them certain privileges, and I allowed them to pay a reduced impost; but they were a tribe of Marabouts, and it was my duty to pay them a certain degree of deference. As to the _ksours_ (entrenched villages in the Sahara), they paid me little; nor did I care to be strict with them. They looked on my forbearance as a concession to their poverty. At a later period, however, I should have made them amenable to my orders, and have brought them into complete subjection.”

Tekedemt, the town which Abdel Kader raised from its ruins, intending to make it the capital of his kingdom, had been built by the Romans. It is situated sixty miles to the south-east of Oran. Judging from the remains of its walls, it must have been ten miles in circumference. It contained two large temples. During the prosperous days of Arab dominion in Algeria, it was a seat of government, had a college, and produced its doctors and poets. The wars between the Caliphs of Kerouan and Fez, towards the close of the tenth century, doomed it to final destruction and oblivion.

The first stone of the new fortress was laid by Abdel Kader in May, 1836. He himself supplied the plans for the fortifications which were to surround it. He remitted the payment of tribute to all the tribes within a certain distance, on the condition of their sending labourers to assist in the construction of the ramparts. The people of Mascara brought baskets, shovels, and pickaxes. Medea and Miliana sent supplies of cheese and fruits of all kinds, which, with excellent white bread, and occasionally meat rations, formed the food and wages of the workmen. Soon houses and streets arose. A population poured in. Families of Arabs, of Moors, of Kolouglis, from Mascara, Mazagnan, and Mostaganem, came and settled. Old Roman vaults were turned into stores for ammunition, sulphur, saltpetre, brass, lead, and iron; and for all the machines, implements, and utensils which Miloud-ibn-Arasch had bought in France for the sum of £4,000. A musket manufactory turned out eight muskets a day, the work of French mechanics procured from Paris at liberal salaries.

A mint struck off silver and copper coins, ranging in value from five shillings to twopence, and bearing on one side the inscription, “It is the will of God: I have appointed him my agent;” on the other, “Struck at Tekedemt, by the Sultan Abdel Kader.” Finally, twelve pieces of cannon and six mortars frowned from the ramparts; and the defences were complete.

Abdel Kader superintended all the works by constant personal inspection. M. de France, who was one of his prisoners during the time that these works were in their highest activity, thus describes what he saw:—“After having visited the ruins, we came to a redoubt which Abdel Kader was erecting at about two hundred paces from his citadel. We approached the Sultan, who was reclining, in company with Ibn About, his secretary, and Miloud-ibn-Arasch, on the ground recently thrown up from a ditch which some men were busily digging.

“His costume is so simple, that one can hardly distinguish him from the labourers. He wore a large straw hat, plaited with palm leaves. The brim, tied up to the body of the hat with woollen cords and tassels, must have been three feet in circumference. The hat itself was at least a foot and a half in height, and looked like a tunnel terminating in a peak.

“As I passed the Sultan, he saluted me with that incomparable grace and fascinating smile for which he is so remarkable, and waved his hand for me to be seated. ‘To judge by the ruins,’ I remarked, ‘the town which was formerly here must have been large and flourishing.’ ‘Yes, it was very fine and very powerful,’ he answered. ‘Does the epoch of its foundation remount to a very ancient date?’ ‘Tekedemt is a very ancient town.’ ‘Do you think I shall be able to discover any stones with inscriptions?’ ‘You will find none. This town was never Christian. It was one of the first cities built by the Arabs. The sultans, my ancestors, who had their residence at Tekedemt, ruled from Tunis to Morocco.’

“The Sultan then asked me what I thought of the construction of the fortifications. I replied that they appeared to me to be well proportioned and ably laid out, and that it was evident he had profited by a critical examination of our block-houses. He seemed quite pleased with my answer.

“‘Yes,’ he resumed, ‘with animation, I hope yet to restore Tekedemt to its ancient splendour. I will gather the tribes in this place, where we shall be secure from the attacks of the French; and when all my forces are collected, I will descend from this steep rock, like a vulture from his nest, and drive the Christians out of Algiers, Bona, and Oran.

“‘If, indeed, you were content with those cities, I would suffer you to remain there; for the sea is not mine, and I have no ships. But you want our plains and our inland cities, and our mountains. Nay, you even covet our horses, our tents, our camels, and our women; and you leave your own country to come and take that in which Mohammed has placed his people. But your sultan is not a horseman or a saint; and your horses will stumble and fall on our mountains, for they are not surefooted like our horses; and your soldiers will die of sickness; and those whom the pestilence spares, will fall by our bullets.’”

Had Abdel Kader been allowed time to complete his intentions, it was his design to have made Tekedemt not merely a place of strength, but a seat of learning; to have established a library and founded a college. “But,” to use his own expression, “God did not so will it. The books which I had brought from all parts of the east for this institution, were taken when the king’s son seized my smala; and to my other misfortunes was added that of being able to mark the traces of the French column, on their return to Medea, by the torn and scattered leaves of the books which it had cost me so much time and pains to collect.”

During the years 1838 and 1839 Abdel Kader pushed on his plans of reform and improvement with wonderful rapidity. His army, his police, his schools, his local tribunals of justice, were all fully constituted. His projected fortresses were completed. Manufactories conducted by Europeans were in full operation in all his principal towns. At Tlemsen, a Spaniard superintended a cannon foundry, which turned out twelve and six pounders.

In Miliana, an eminent French mineralogist, M. de Casse, established a musket manufactory and powder-mills. Iron was procured from a mine in the neighbourhood. Cloth of superior quality was also manufactured. Mines of saltpetre, sulphur, iron, and brass, were diligently worked. Europeans were invited to come and settle in the country, with the right of holding freehold property. The land seemed to be waking up from a long slumber. The spirit of European civilisation everywhere percolated the torpid mass, lighting up the dark places, and piercing its way into the strongholds of ignorance and superstition.

The irregular force at Abdel Kader’s disposal, during the early part of his career, amounted nominally to nearly 60,000 men. This included all the contingents which the tribes could, on emergency, supply. But rarely more than a third of that number ever assembled at one time, for the purpose of carrying out a military operation. A finer irregular cavalry did not exist.

But Abdel Kader soon discovered the incompetency of such warriors to compete with the disciplined legions of the great military power he confronted. But to raise regular troops amongst a people who, even in the days of Turkish rule, had never been harassed by a conscription, and whose nature revolted at the very idea, was a hazardous experiment, requiring great tact and circumspection. Such a design could only be hinted at as a suggestion, not promulgated as a command.

Accordingly, the following friendly invitation was posted up in all the towns and douairs:—“Whoever wishes to be clothed in fine cloth, and to become the son of the Sultan, let him come and engage himself: he shall be well paid, and indulged in everything.” Several young men were tempted by the inducement thus held out to present themselves for enlistment; and the formation of a regular army almost imperceptibly began.

Abdel Kader thus describes his military organisation:—“Besides the contingents of tribes who rallied at my call, or that of my Khalifas, and which constituted a powerful auxiliary force, although merely temporary, inasmuch as I was never able to keep them away from their tribes for any great length of time, I had latterly a regular army of 8,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry or spahis, and 240 artillerymen. I had twenty field-pieces, without reckoning a large store of cannons both in iron and brass left by the Turks, many of which, however, it is true, were unfit for service.

“I could thus afford to give each of my Khalifas 1,000 infantry, 250 horsemen, two or three pieces of cannon, and thirty artillerymen. My infantry was recruited only by volunteers; but they were sufficient, considering my pecuniary means and the arms at my disposal. Later, if time had been afforded me, I should have used the French mode of raising soldiers. My religion would not have prevented me, for a Sultan may have recourse to enrolments to sustain the honour of his flag, and to save his country from Christian invasion.

“The instructors of my regular infantry were soldiers of the _nizam_, from Tunis and Tripoli, and French deserters. The latter became so numerous at last as to form a battalion of themselves, and fought against their own countrymen with a fury and desperation which was hardly rivalled by my own Mussulmans. I distributed them amongst my Khalifas.

“As for my regular cavalry, they refused to be placed under instructors. In their style of war they were led by an independent pride which disdained to acknowledge a master. They knew they were worth nothing for a shock; but they thought themselves unrivalled in single combat, in ambuscade, surprise, and light skirmishing. It was no dishonour to them to fly before even inferior forces; their flight being often a mere feint. To do as much injury as possible to the enemy without exposing themselves to loss—that was the principle I inculcated on them.

“All my regulars were armed with French or English muskets. I got them in battles, from deserters, or by purchase from Morocco. Every Arab found with a French musket in his possession, was obliged to sell it to me for a sum amounting to two English pounds sterling. He then provided himself with a _fusil_ as best he could, either in the bazaars, or, when the tribe of the desert, coming to the Tell, inundated the country with arms from Tunis, from Tougourt, from the Mzab, and the Oulad-Sidi- Cheikh. I made my own powder at Tlemsen, Mascara, Miliana, Medea, and Tekedemt. I bought a good deal, also, from Morocco, where I also procured flints, of which our own country was completely destitute. Sulphur came from France. Saltpetre I found everywhere.

“During the peace, the French sea-coast towns supplied me with lead; Morocco yielded me a considerable quantity; and I worked a lead mine in the Ouarsenis. But all this was very costly; so I was very sparing in my distribution of the stores of the Beylik amongst the Arabs, who squander away their powder without reflection, in their festivities and games. I only deviated from this principle in favour of those who were employed in blockading the French garrisons, or when, on the field of battle, the ammunition ran short. I then distributed cartridges on the spot.

“At the seat of government of each of my Khalifas, I had placed tailors, armourers, and saddlers, to make the clothing of my troops, repair their arms, and keep up their horse-equipments. I had also distributed many such workmen amongst the tribe, so as to make them also ready and efficient at a moment’s call. To meet the expenses of my administration, where everything had to be created, and though confining myself to what was strictly necessary, heavy imposts were indispensable.

“I ordered my Khalifas to watch, personally, over everything connected with such an important matter. They made their tours twice a-year; once in the spring to collect the _zekka_, and during the harvest to gather the _ashur_. During these tours, they were expected to inspect and regulate the administration of the Aghas, to report to me any complaints made against them, and to superintend the working of the properties of the Beylik.

“My Khalifas were followed by a regular battalion, their Spahis, and their irregular cavalry. The Arab people are so constituted, that if they had not seen a display of force, they would have refused to pay the impost. After a temporary defeat, what difficulty have I not often experienced to raise again the proper return of contributions! ‘The Sultan,’ they would say, ‘is occupied with the Christians; he cannot compel us. Do not let us pay; let us see what will happen.’ What invariably happened was, that they had eventually to pay up everything, with arrears; but nothing corrected them. The Arabs only look to the present moment.

“At the same time that I demanded from the tribes what was necessary to support the Beylik, I endeavoured, as much as possible, to reconcile their interests with those of the State. My Khalifas were instructed to accept, in lieu of the impost or of fines, articles for consumption, mules, camels, and especially horses. With the horses I remounted my cavalry; the mules and camels gave me means of transport; with the provisions, I supplied my troops, or filled my magazines.

“My resources were also augmented by _razzias_, which I made whenever the tribes appealed to arms to fight out their differences. I was resolved to be the sole arbiter of these differences, and I had laid it down as a rule, that not a shot should be fired without my permission. The horses, mules, or camels which I did not immediately require were distributed amongst the tribes, under the charge of agents, who, while they were liberally paid, were so checked, as to be unable to defraud.

“It was well I looked to the future; for the number of horses I had to replace in my regular cavalry was immense. There is not a man amongst these troops who had not had seven or eight horses killed under him, or rendered unserviceable. Indeed, it was not uncommon to find men who had lost from twelve to sixteen. Ibn Yahia—that noble soldier who, rather than survive my misfortunes, threw himself on certain death, in my last battle with the Maroccians (Dec., 1847)—had had eighteen horses killed under him. The emulation in this point was such, that any horseman who passed a year without being wounded or having a horse killed under him, was looked on with contempt.

“As far as lay in my power, I also replaced the horses which my _goums_, or irregular cavalry contingents, lost in battle. They have had from me more than six thousand. But latterly, when I could no longer give them horses, I allowed them, in lieu of a horse, two camels, or thirty sheep, or a good mule. They sold those animals, and then with the price remounted themselves at their leisure. But, at last, I became so straitened as not even to be able to give them this indemnity.

“To form an idea of the consumption of horses—in one year alone I gave 500 to the Gharabas of Oran, and nearly as many to the Hagouts in the plains of Algiers. At the same time, there were many which I never attempted to replace, either because their proprietors were rich, or because I had no longer the means.

“The flocks and cattle which came from the _zekka_ were entrusted to the tribe, under the superintendence of their Kaids. It was the duty of these officials to take account of them and appoint them shepherds, as well as to feed and take care of them. These animals, in the government of each Khalifa, served to defray the cost of guests, to support the poor, to assist the _tholbas_ (men of letters), and to supply my army, who had meat twice a-week. By these means, I had begun to establish complete order in the administration of the revenues of each Beylik. But when the war broke out again, I was often defrauded, and the Arabs on every side took advantage of my preoccupations. The only two Khalifas who maintained order to the last were Abou Hamadi and Ibn Hallal; they were dreaded from their severity.

“The precautions which I have mentioned did not always suffice for the nourishment of my army, at all the points on which it was called on by the necessities of war to act. Therefore, as I did not wish to burden the population with extra expenses, that might have indisposed them towards me, I ordered _silos_ (underground vaults for corn) to be made in the territory of each Beylik. These _silos_, placed under the responsibility of the Kaid of each tribe, and so disposed as to escape the researches of the enemy, contained the grain of the _ashur_, or of the state lands, which were cultivated partly by forced, partly by paid, labour.

I thus proved to the Arabs, who, from their nature, were always suspicious, that I took nothing for my personal wants from the imposts. I obliged them to pay for the general welfare, and they rendered me justice for it. The _silos_, in fact, postponed my fall. Their discovery and destruction by the French columns decided it. When once deprived of my stores of provisions, I was obliged to exhaust the resources of the tribe. When they felt the pressure from both sides fall heavy upon them, their ardour for the holy war relaxed.

“As to me, what occasion was there for me to resort to the public treasury to defray my expenses? Never, up to the moment when my private property fell into the hands of the French, did I touch the smallest fraction of what the Arabs gave me for the public expenses; and since that, I have only taken what was absolutely necessary. My clothes were made by the women of my household; my little income sufficed for the wants of my family. Even the small surplus which was left me, I spent in assisting the poor, the traveller, and more especially the needy among my brave companions-in-arms who had been wounded in the holy war.

“By acting thus, I could consistently call on the Arabs to make great sacrifices; for I showed them that the _zekka_, the _ashur_, fines, contributions—all my resources, in fact—were scrupulously devoted to the maintenance of the public welfare. In 1839, when the war recommenced, I called upon the Arabs for an extraordinary loan; but they contributed very slowly. I immediately sold all my family jewels by auction in the bazaars of Mascara, proclaiming publicly that the proceeds were to be sent to the public treasury. The loan was then very soon advanced; and it seemed only to be a question who should pay first.”

As soon as Abdel Kader began to form a regular army, he drew up and published a military code, containing the most minute regulations for the discipline, pay, and clothing of his troops. This code was read out to the different regiments twice a month. It was interspersed with injunctions, and promises of reward for good behaviour, of which the following may be taken as an example:—

“It is indispensably necessary that a chief should be personally brave and courageous; that he should be of a good family, irreproachable in his morals, strictly religious, patient, enduring, prudent, prompt, and intelligent in the hour of difficulty and danger; for the officer is to his men what the heart is to the body; if the heart is not sound, the body is worthless.

“A soldier who throws himself dashingly on the enemy’s ranks, disables and disarms his foe, or, by rallying the men when on the point of retreating, prevents a panic by his example and presence of mind, shall be decorated by the Sultan himself before the whole army; and his heroism shall be proclaimed by beat of drum.”

The decoration thus conferred varied in appearance, according to the bearer’s merits. It consisted of a silver or silver-gilt hand with extended fingers. The number of fingers extended notified the number of acts of bravery performed. Each finger extended entitled the bearer to extra pay, amounting to a shilling a month. In the centre of the decoration was inscribed the words _Nusr-ed-deen_, or “the triumph of religion.” It was worn, not on the breast, but affixed to one side of the hood of the burnous. It was sometimes also given to civilians who had rendered great administrative services.

The uniform of the foot soldier was dark blue, with scarlet pantaloons, a brown capote, and a small cap and turban. His pay amounted to nine francs a month. On the right sleeve of each commanding officer were embroidered the words, “Patience and perseverance are the key to victory;” on the left, “There is no god but God, and Mohammed is his Prophet.” Embroidered on his right shoulder of the Aga, in place of an epaulette, were marked the words, “Nothing profits like piety and courage;” on the left, “Nothing is so injurious as discussion and want of obedience.”

All the officers throughout the army had inscriptions of a like tendency embroidered on their uniforms. The spahis, or regular cavalry, were clothed in scarlet exclusively. Their colonels wore the device, “Trust in God and the Prophet—charge and conquer;” those of the artillery, “I can effect nothing: it is God who directs the shot.” Thus was religion, its duties and its efficacy, placed ever prominently forward by Abdel Kader, not only in his army, but in his whole administration, as the indispensable foundation and support of human exertion.

The following allusion to himself, with which his military code closes, placed him before his officers and men as a model to be copied and emulated. Nor was there any exaggeration in its expressions.

“Il Hadj Abdel Kader cares not for this world, and withdraws from it as much as his avocations will permit. He despises wealth and riches. He lives with the greatest plainness and sobriety. He is always simply clad. He rises in the middle of the night to recommend his own soul and the souls of his followers to God. His chief pleasure is in praying to God with fasting, that his sins may be forgiven.

“He is incorruptible. He never takes anything out of the public funds for himself. All the presents which are brought to him he sends to the public treasury; for he serves the State, not himself. He neither eats, nor drinks, nor dresses, but as religion ordains. When he administers justice, he hears complaints with the greatest patience. A smile is always on his face for the encouragement of those who approach him. His decisions are conformable to the words of the sacred book. He hates the man who does not act uprightly; but honours him who strictly observes the precepts and practises the duties of religion.

“From his boyhood he learned to mount the most fiery horse without a teacher. He never turns before an enemy; but awaits him firmly. In a retreat he fights like a common soldier, rallying his men by his words and example, and sharing in all their dangers. Thus, brave, disinterested, and pious, when he preaches, his words bring tears into all eyes, and melt the hardest hearts. All who hear him become good Mussulmans.

“He explains the most difficult passages of the Koran and of the Hadeeth (Traditions) without referring to books or Ulemahs. The most learned Arabs and the greatest Talebs acknowledge him as their master and teacher. May God increase his nobleness of character, his wisdom, his learning, his understanding, his honour, glory, and success, a thousandfold!”

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