CHAPTER IV

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1833.

The enthusiasm excited in France by the taking of Algiers was of short duration. A revolution had overthrown the dynasty of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon, under whose auspices the conquest had been achieved. The dark cloud of hatred and execration which enveloped the departed tyranny, threw its ominous shadow over the glories of that brilliant feat of arms.

Willingness to abandon the fruits of a triumph obtained under such circumstances became the prevalent feeling. In the French Chambers a large party denounced the contemplated occupation of Algeria as costly and useless. Some suggested that the sea-coast towns should be held, not so much with views of aggrandisement, as from a desire of saving the national honour.

None understood, and few troubled themselves to investigate, the nature of the country which was the subject of debate. All knew that Algeria was a nest of pirates, that the governors were barbarous Turks, and that the government were degraded Arabs. But what was the condition of the interior, what were the manners, customs, and social characteristics of the people, what kind of government would best replace the one which had been overthrown, what system of administration should be adopted, no one attempted duly to consider. On all these points the ignorance and indifference was complete.

Fluctuating in its plans, and unwilling to release its grasp, the French ministry, at an early period, reduced its army in Algeria to 10,000 men. For a long time afterwards, all its measures were marked by weakness and indecision. In the space of six years, no less than ten governor- generals were sent over to experimentalise on new theories of legislation. The thread of official experience was constantly broken by the arrival of successive neophytes in the art of governing. Each new actor appeared on the stage with his peculiar crotchets, which he crudely endeavoured to carry into execution.

In the autumn of 1830, Marshal Clausel, the Governor-General, proposed to entrust the provinces of Oran and Tittery to princes of the family of the Bey of Tunis, on the condition of their becoming vassals of France. He gave Oran, accordingly, to Prince Sidi Achmet, for an annual tribute of one million francs. The prince, uncertain as to his reception by the Arabs of that province, prudently sent before him a deputy, named Heir- ed-deen, to feel the way. This functionary, on his arrival, found the city nearly deserted, and the magazines void of provisions.

Nevertheless, he proceeded to feel his ground. He issued a proclamation to the Arabs, giving them the most flattering assurances of his future intentions. They were told that the French had not the slightest desire to interfere with their established usages and customs; that they would confine themselves to the occupation of the sea-coast towns; and that the tribes in the interior should be governed by native chiefs of their own selection. Some Arab sheiks, seduced by these promises, came in, and received pelisses, and other marks of honour. They returned to their tribes, but to become objects of ridicule. The plan proved utterly abortive. It neither awakened hopes, nor dispelled fears. After a few weeks, the agent of the prince withdrew.

To the immense advantages which accrued to him from the fluctuations and failures which embarrassed the councils of the French government, Abdel Kader was daily adding those solid results which arose from his own energy and courage. The fruits of the impulse which he had imparted to his countrymen were becoming more apparent. Confidence, if not victory, followed everywhere in his train. The Arab character was developing long-concealed virtues from its inmost depths. Patience, constancy, perseverance, concentration of purpose, and a spirit of union, had all been summoned to the surface under the presiding genius of Abdel Kader.

His principal care was to get rid of all the causes likely to endanger the common weal, or to disturb his general line of action. The edict which he had issued, forbidding all commercial transactions with the French, had borne heavily on some of the tribes, who had long been accustomed to trade with the towns now in French possession. The fruits of a traffic exercised from generation to generation, and the enormous profits actually reaped, were advantages not easily foregone. But, by the influence of certain Marabouts, who, by the order of Abdel Kader, were moving constantly amongst them, more patriotic feelings were made to prevail. The Arabs ceased to frequent the French markets.

The system of blockade enforced by Abdel Kader had a telling effect on the French garrisons. They depended almost entirely on the Arabs for the necessaries of life. The sea brought them little or nothing, and only at rare intervals. Hence the nervous anxiety, leading to acts of violence, with which, like birds of prey, they scented and pounced upon their food in the interior. Whilst Desmichels was revolving in his mind in what manner he could, without lowering his dignity, bring about negotiations with Abdel Kader, and relieve him from his pressing wants and necessities, there occurred an event which opened the door to a transaction.

Towards the end of October, 1833, an Arab, named Kudoor, of the Borgia tribe, came to Arzew and sold some cattle. On his departure he asked the French commanding officer to give him an escort, as he dreaded the Sultan’s scouts, whom he knew to be on the look-out. An escort of four horsemen was given him. At the distance of about a league from the town the escort was attacked by a large force of Arabs. One man was killed; the three others were taken prisoners and carried to Mascara.

Desmichels, only too happy to have a plausible pretext for writing to Abdel Kader, now addressed him the following letter:—

“I do not hesitate to make the first advances to you. My position, strictly speaking, does not allow me to do so, but humanity compels me. I reclaim the liberty of those Frenchmen who, while engaged in escorting an Arab, fell into an ambuscade. I cannot suppose that you will make their release dependent on conditions, since, when by the fate of war some of the Zmelas and Gharabas were not long since brought in to me, as prisoners, I at once sent them back to their tribes, without any stipulation, and treated them, moreover, with the greatest kindness.

“If, therefore, you wish to be considered a great man, I hope you will not be behind me in generosity, and that you will immediately release the Frenchmen who are now in your power.”

Abdel Kader returned the following reply:—

“I have received the letter, in which you express your hope that the prisoners to whom you allude will be liberated. I understand its contents. You tell me that, notwithstanding your position, you have consented to make me the first advances. It was your duty to do so, according to the rules of war. Between enemies, each has his turn: one day the chances are for you, another for me. The mill turns for both, and always crushing new victims.

“As for myself, when you have taken prisoners, I never troubled you with reclamations in their behalf. I was pained, as a man, for their unhappy fate; but, as a Mussulman, I looked upon their death, if it occurred, as a new life. You tell me that your Frenchmen were employed to protect an Arab. That is no reason with me. Protectors and protected were alike my enemies; and all Arabs who are found with you are bad believers, ignorant of their duty.

“You boast that you gratuitously liberated some of the Gharabas and Zmelas. That is true. But you surprised men who were living under your protection, and who were actually supplying your own markets. Your troops robbed them of all they had. If, instead of falling on those who were doing you a service, you had advanced beyond your lines; if you had attacked men who were anxiously waiting for you, such as the Beni Amers and the Hashems, then you might, with justice, talk of your generosity, had you taken prisoners from them, and set them free.

“Then you would have deserved the praises you claim for yourself for having pillaged the Zmelas, and setting about the report that I had fallen into your hands. When you march two days beyond the walls of Oran I hope we shall behold each other; and then it will be seen which of us will remain master of the field.”

This haughty challenge would, under other circumstances, have aroused in the breast of the French general the loftiest feelings of chivalry. The drums would have been beat, the trumpets sounded, the standards fluttered, and the Arab champion would have been swiftly summoned to the test. Desmichels retorted by again attacking and plundering the Douairs and Zmelas. Abdel Kader was amongst the Beni Amers when he heard of the incursion.

He was instantly at the head of 5,000 cavalry, and rushed to the rescue. With slackened reins and thundering hoofs, the Arab horse traversed a distance of fifty miles in less than three hours. Not more than one-half of the men, on his arrival, were fit for duty. But with these troops Abdel Kader charged. The French, utterly confounded by this unexpected apparition, hastily retreated, abandoning the women and children, whom they had taken with them, as hostages. Fresh troops come up to their relief, with more pieces of artillery; but, despite the galling fire to which he was exposed, Abdel Kader followed up the enemy, and hovered round them, to the very outskirts of Oran.

On his return to the Arab encampment he ordered the Douairs and Zmelas to prepare for immediate departure from a spot where temptations to transgress his edict were constantly held out to them, and where they were as continually exposed to vile and cruel assaults. He marched them off, with all their flocks and herds, and located them on a large plain behind Tlemsen.

Desmichels, paralysed by the boldness and ubiquity of his redoubtable foe, and finding his resources failing, his supplies cut off, and famine ready to swoop down on his men, saw no alternative before him but evacuation or peace. In this dire necessity he thus appealed to Abdel Kader:—

“You will never find me deaf to any sentiments of generosity, and if it would be convenient to you to grant me an interview, I am quite ready to consent, in the hope that we may be able, by the most sacred and solemn treaties, to stop the effusion of blood between two peoples destined by Providence to live under the same dominion.”

Abdel Kader seeing his adversary in the attitude of a suppliant, affected indifference. He left the letter unanswered. At the same time he employed a Jew, named Mordecai Amar, his agent at Oran, to pacify the French general with excuses, if any complaint were made as to his silence, and to suggest the advisability of more explicit and categorical propositions. After a month had transpired, Desmichels penned a third dispatch:—

“Not having received any answer to the letter I lately wrote to you, I prefer supposing that it has never reached you, to imagining that you have not chosen to give it your attention.”

The general terminated his reasonings by imploring for peace as follows:—“If you wish to maintain the exalted position to which circumstances have raised you, in my opinion you could not do better than accept my invitation, in order that the tribes may devote themselves to the cultivation of their lands, and enjoy the fruits and the blessings of peace, under the shadow of treaties binding us firmly together.”

The young and victorious Sultan, with this document in his hand, could now show his subjects that the enemy had been the first to crave for a suspension of hostilities. There was no occasion for any further delay, and he sent the following answer:—

“I have received your letter, and fully understand its contents. It gives me great satisfaction to find that your sentiments agree with mine. I feel quite assured of your loyal intentions; and you may feel assured that any engagements into which we may enter shall be faithfully observed on my part. I send you two superior officers of my army—Miloud ibn Arasch and Ould Mahmoud. They will confer, outside Oran, with Mordecai Amar, and will make known to him any proposition. If you accept them, you can send him on to me, and then we will draw up a treaty, which shall obliterate the hatred and enmity now severing us from each other, and replace them by an indissoluble friendship. You may count upon me, for I have never been unfaithful to my word.”

The proposed interview took place February 4, 1834. The Jew Amar was accompanied by the whole of the French staff. A long discussion ensued on various propositions made by Desmichels. The Sultan’s agent, Ibn Arasch, then left, saying he would report what had passed to his master, and return. He took with him a paper containing a draft of the propositions, but without the general’s signature.

On the 25th, Ibn Arasch returned to Oran, bearing this draft, approved and sealed by Abdel Kader, with another paper, containing the propositions of Abdel Kader. He was instructed not to deliver the former until the latter had been signed and sealed by Desmichels. Abdel Kader conceived that these documents, mutually exchanged, would constitute the Treaty. Their substance was as follows:—

CONDITIONS OF GENERAL DESMICHELS.

“1. Hostilities shall cease between the French and the Arabs from this day.

“2. The religion and usages of the Mussulmans shall be respected.

“3. French prisoners shall be given up.

“4. The markets shall be free.

“5. Every French deserter shall be given up by the Arabs.

“6. Every Christian travelling in the interior shall be furnished with a passport sealed with the seal of Abdel Kader’s consul, and that of the General.”

CONDITIONS OF THE SULTAN ABDEL KADER.

“1. The Arabs shall be at liberty to buy and sell powder, arms, sulphur; in a word, everything necessary for war.

“2. The commerce of the port of Arzew shall be under the jurisdiction of the Prince of the Faithful. No cargoes shall be shipped except in that port. Mostaganem and Oran shall merely receive such articles of merchandise as are necessary for the wants of their inhabitants. To this there shall be no opposition. Those who wish to ship goods must repair to Arzew.

“3. The General shall give us up all deserters in chains. He shall not harbour criminals. The general commanding at Algiers shall have no power over Arabs who may come to him with the consent of their chiefs.

“4. No Mussulman shall be prevented returning home when he wishes.”

To the paper containing these conditions of Abdel Kader, Desmichels, who dreaded nothing so much as the breaking off of the negotiation, at once affixed his seal and signature. The former naturally thought that, by virtue of the 2nd Article, he had secured a monopoly of commerce.

On the 26th February, 1834, Desmichels proposed to Ibn Arasch, that a homogeneous treaty should be drawn up, embodying the substance of both documents, but stating the French conditions more at large. Ibn Arasch made no difficulty, never conceiving for a moment that such a document could be intended to abrogate the conditions already conceded to his master, in the paper which had just been signed and sealed by the general. Hence arose the “Treaty of Desmichels,” which afterwards gave rise to so many difficulties and complications.

TREATY OF GENERAL DESMICHELS, _February_ 26, 1834.

“The General commanding the French troops in the town of Oran, and the Prince of the Faithful, Sidi-il-Hadj Abdel Kader-ibn-Mehi-ed-deen, have decided on the following conditions:—

“Art. 1.—Hostilities shall cease between the French and the Arabs from this day. The General commanding the French troops and the Emir Abdel Kader will neglect nothing to maintain that union and friendship which ought to exist between two peoples, destined by God to live under the same dominion. To this end, representatives on the part of the Emir shall reside at Oran, Mostaganem, and Arzew; and, to prevent collisions between the French and the Arabs, French officers shall reside at Mascara.

“Art. 2.—The religion and usages of the Arabs shall be respected.

“Art. 3.—All prisoners shall be immediately given up, both on one side and the other.

“Art. 4.—Freedom of commerce shall be complete and entire.

“Art. 5.—Military men belonging to the French army, who desert their colours, shall be brought back by the Arabs. In like manner, all Arab malefactors, who, to avoid punishment, fly from their tribes and seek refuge with the French, shall be immediately seized and delivered over to the Emir’s representative, in the three maritime towns occupied by the French.

“Art. 6.—Every European, having occasion to travel in the interior, shall be furnished with a passport countersigned by the representatives of the Emir, and approved by the General in command, in order that they may find assistance and protection throughout the province.”

These conditions, written in parallel columns of Arab and French, were signed and sealed by both parties. Nothing is said in this treaty of a monopoly of commerce. But Abdel Kader had his bond, and was content. Desmichels, proud of what he considered a diplomatic triumph, hastened to send the grateful tidings of a peace to the French ministry, and allowed himself to indulge in the following strain:—

“I have to announce to you the _submission_ of the province of Oran, the most considerable and warlike of the regency. This great event is the result of the advantages which have been obtained by the troops of my division.”

Abdel Kader might well repose on his laurels. He had compelled his enemy to sue for peace; he had made his own terms; he paid no tribute; his territory was not limited; the French general had acknowledged his independence by offering him the power to appoint and receive consuls. The French were to load at one port alone, and were to submit to his tariff.

In virtue of the monopoly secured to him by his own terms, Abdel Kader now issued orders, prohibiting the Arabs from selling corn, or barley, or agricultural produce, of any kind whatever, to Christians, whether native or foreign. His agents were declared to be the sole authorised buyers and sellers, and by them the prices in the markets were to be fixed.

The French merchants at Arzew complained loudly to Desmichels of the restriction. Abdel Kader appealed to his bond. Desmichels affected to ignore it. He adhered to his homogeneous treaty, in which commerce was declared free. Abdel Kader agreed to the test, but contended that though the market _places_ (or _sook_) were free, he had the sole right of supplying them.

One of the French merchants, acting upon the view of the question, as put forward by the French general, bought a large quantity of corn and barley from an Arab of the tribe of Hamian. The agent of Abdel Kader went over and seized it. The merchant complained to the French local authorities, but he was told that no interference could be tolerated with the regulations of the Emir.

Desmichels, embarrassed with fresh complaints, and pressed for explanation by General Voirol, the governor-general, to whom all this misunderstanding was utterly incomprehensible, adopted a middle course. He declared that the authorisation given to the Emir to make a monopoly of grain, extended only to the grain raised on his own private property. Abdel Kader ridiculed the subterfuge. He knew nothing of the exclusive interpretation which Desmichels chose to put upon his treaty; he only knew that he had the General’s seal and signature to a document granting him a monopoly; and this monopoly he was determined to enact. The French were not in a position to dispute his verdict; and he carried his point.

Abdel Kader, free at length from external molestation, devoted his earnest attention to the internal affairs of his kingdom. Difficulties and trials were yet before him. Jealousy of his successes on the part of some, envy at the eminence he had attained on the part of others, insinuations malevolently propagated by his rivals, and readily entertained by the fanatical party, that he had betrayed the sacred cause by making peace with the infidels—all combined, as disturbing elements, to affect, more or less, the stability of his government.

But his retort was ready. To the taunting demand, “Where is now the leader of the Djehad—where the lofty tone which breathed nothing but battle and defiance, and invoked death rather than submission?” he replied by calmly pointing to the French garrisons, confined to the walls on which their cannon was planted; to the plains freed from infidel marauders; to the cities unmolested by Frank invaders; and, more than all, to a treaty, dictated at his sword’s point, which now, for the first time in the lapse of ages, gave good warranty for hopes of Arab freedom, and which promised to be the basis of Arab independence.

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