CHAPTER XII

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1839.

Scarcely had the “Treaty of the Tafna” been signed, when its defects and inconsistencies became apparent. It was impossible that a measure, hurried on by General Bugeaud to a hasty and immature conclusion, solely in order to enable him to send the troops under his command in the province of Oran, that they might take part in the siege of Constantine, could have had any other result.

The General, defending his act in the French Chamber, during the session of 1838, thus expressed himself:—“Much has been said about the defects in the details of the treaty. I frankly avow there were some, but I think their importance has been exaggerated. There is only one of any consequence, and that is the expression, ‘as far as the Wady Kuddra, and _beyond_.’ This word may imply, as far as the province of Constantine. The expression is certainly vague; but it must be remembered that I was hard pushed for time. A steamer was waiting for my dispatch. It was absolutely necessary that I should conclude for war or for peace.”

But it was precisely the doubt hanging over the proper interpretation of this word as it stood in Arabic, which kept open the door for endless disputes and misunderstandings, and ended by nullifying the treaty altogether. So hastily and inconsiderately, indeed, had it been drawn up, that a few days after the peace, when a French detachment had occasion to go from Arzew to Mostaganem, Abdel Kader, without opposing its march, sent to Bugeaud to remark that the French troops had violated his territory. The complaint was perfectly just, inasmuch as no mention had been made in the treaty of the right of passage.

The evils arising from incorrect translations are notorious. In the diplomatic relations, between Abdel Kader and the French authorities, more than one had occurred, which, had they been discovered by the latter, might have entailed serious complications. But Abdel Kader was satisfied, in general, with what he had written in Arabic, and the French authorities with what they had written in French, and no more questions were asked.

One instance may be given. The French had always placed at the head of their treaties, that Abdel Kader acknowledged the sovereignty of France. Abdel Kader never dreamed of making any such admission. It would have cost him his throne. What he had written, in Arabic, in the article he subscribed was, properly translated, “The Emir Abdel Kader acknowledges that there is a French Sultan, and that he is great.” The difference is wide.

In a matter of limits of territory, moreover, such matters become of vital importance; and Abdel Kader was the last person to yield a point, when he felt he was borne out by justice and common sense in maintaining it.

By the French version of the 2nd article of the “Treaty of the Tafna,” France is declared to possess, in the province of Algiers, “Algiers, the Sahel, the plain of the Metija, extending to the east as far as the Wady Kuddra, and _beyond_.” So the French chose to translate the Arabic word “_fauk_,” which really means, “above.” The Gordian knot which the French had made, and which they at last unscrupulously cut with the sword, was this: they had given themselves a limit, and yet wanted to have no limit. All their efforts to make Abdel Kader stultify himself, by subscribing to this solecism, were unavailing.

Because the Arab Sultan maintained the absurdity of such a proceeding, and finally threw down the gauntlet of defiance rather than sacrifice the interests of his subjects and co-religionists, he was held up to execration as a rebel, as a breaker of treaties, as a man of wild and unprincipled ambition. He was treated as if he were contending with the lawful possessors of the land; not fighting, as was truly the case, against invaders, who had come to its shores denying all schemes of aggrandisement, and pledged to achieve the single object for which they came, and then withdraw.

In presence of a treaty, which each party read and construed after its own fashion, political and commercial relations of any durable or confidential nature were clearly impossible. An attempt, at least, to come to some understanding was indispensable. The task of entering on a discussion with Abdel Kader on the subject devolved on Marshal Valée, who assumed the functions of Governor-General in Algiers, on November 30th, 1837.

The Marshal applied to the French Ministry for instructions. The reply thus simply and categorically announces the doctrine of appropriation. “By the words, ‘Wady Kuddra, and _beyond_,’ must be understood, all the country in the province of Algiers which is beyond the Wady Kuddra, up to the province of Constantine. The evidence of right, independent of political considerations, permits no concession on that point. Since we are masters of the province of Constantine, we cannot be without land communication with it.”

The Marshal forwarded this view of the question to Abdel Kader, with his own comments, as follows:—“France has ceded to you all the province of Oran, less the reserved districts; all the ancient Beylik of Tittery, without exception; lastly, all that part of the province of Algiers situate to the west of the Chiffa. But you can have no pretension to any part of that province which lies to the east of that river. As for the Beylik of Constantine, about that there can be no misunderstanding, as it is not even spoken of in the treaty; and, moreover, it was placed under the rule of Achmet Bey when the treaty was signed.”

Abdel Kader replied;—“As regards the Beylik of Constantine, there can be no difficulty: on that point we are agreed. But it is not so as regards the province of Algiers. Remember what happened at the time of the treaty. I wished to limit you to the plain of Algiers. General Bugeaud begged me to extend this limit, and I consented. I ceded the country as far as the Wady Kuddra towards the east, and as far as Blidah, inclusively, towards the south. The expression, ‘as far as the Wady Kuddra and above,’ must have a value. If not, why was it inserted in the treaty? If it signifies anything, it must mean that you are limited to the east, as you are to the west.

“To justify your interpretation, you base your reasoning on the necessity there is for you to have a land communication between Constantine and Algiers. But you admit, in the same breath, that Constantine was not yours when the treaty was signed. Consequently, you clearly could not have reserved for yourself a tract of country in anticipation of an event which had not yet happened. Besides, is it anything extraordinary, that you should have done towards the east, what you have done towards the west?

“Arzew and Mostaganem belong to you; yet you have not claimed or appropriated the tract of country which lies between those two towns. Do not let us fling ourselves into interpretations. Let us keep to the text; and let us frankly say, that all that portion of the province of Algiers which is not included between the Chiffa on the west, and Wady Kuddra on the east, and the first chain of mountains on the south, belongs to me.”

“But,” answered the Marshal, “your interpretation is erroneous; for you forget the word _beyond_, which is also in the treaty. ‘As far as Wady Kuddra, and _beyond_’—which evidently meant, at the signing of the treaty, up to the very limits of the province of Algiers in that direction. But since that time we have taken Constantine. It means now, therefore, as far as the _frontiers of Tunis_.”

Nowithstanding this pat of the lion’s paw, Abdel Kader retorted with the coolness of a logician.

“The word _beyond_,” he wrote, “signifies something; but the Arab word _fauk_ translated as you translate it—_beyond_—means nothing at all. Let us make an experiment. Take any twenty Arabs you choose to select, and ask them the meaning of the word _fauk_. If they say that the natural interpretation of this word can, by any twisting of meaning, be made to signify ‘_beyond_,’ I will accept your interpretation. Take all the territory between Wady Kuddra and the province of Constantine. But if, on the other hand, they all decide that the word, what you translate ‘_beyond_,’ really and strictly means _above_, accept the proposal I make you. This proposal is to give over to you, as a limit towards the east, the first crest of mountains which rises _above_ the Wady Kuddra.”

The Marshal prudently declined the test. He might have declared war at once; but war with Abdel Kader was not so enticing as to be lightly undertaken. A better mode of getting over the difficulty suggested itself. Abdel Kader was ardently engaged in the task of organisation. Peace was indispensable to him. Attentions, flatteries, cajolements—or, these failing, petty annoyances and harassing vexations—might mollify or weary out his tenacious spirit. Both were tried; but both ineffectually.

In the mean time Abdel Kader was firmly establishing himself in all the districts to the south of Tittery. With a boldness and rapidity of movement, which paralysed and subdued, he laid his iron hand on all the tribes on the borders of the province of Constantine, who were known or even suspected of intriguing with the French. He boldly occupied the disputed territory beyond the Wady Kuddra. More than that, he made it the scene of one of those acts of uncompromising severity, with which he visited all traitors to the faith.

A colony of Kolouglis had lately settled there, trusting for their security to French protection. Their kaid, a Turk, had received French investiture. Abdel Kader summoned them to break off their treasonable connection. They refused. The French supplied them with arms and ammunition to resist. Abdel Kader swept down on them, crushed them, and cut off the Frenchified kaid’s head. All the tribes of the vast district of Sebaou instantly sent in their adhesion; and the Sultan appointed Achmet Ibn Salem to be his Khalifa over them.

In the midst of these successes, Abdel Kader was threatened with a rival. Achmet Bey, when turned out of Constantine, had taken refuge in Mount Aures. He had commenced agitating amongst the tribes of the district of Zab. Biskara, its capital, was in the possession of his most implacable enemy, Farhat-ibn-Said. This chief applied to the French for assistance to defend the country against the Bey, promising that, in case of success, it should be made to submit to French domination. The French were lukewarm; and so he turned to Abdel Kader.

Before entering the Zab country by force of arms, Abdel Kader considered it expedient to inform the French Governor at Constantine of his intention. As the friend and ally of France, he said, he was going to quell the disturbances which had arisen there, and save it from anarchy. Since agitation so near a French province might prove contagious, he considered it was in the interest of France that he undertook the expedition.

Having sent this communication, Abdel Kader ordered Ibn Berkani, his Khalifa at Miliana, to collect his forces, and march on Biskara. Farhat received him with open arms. A combined attack was made on Achmet Bey, who was defeated, and hid himself in the Sahara. Farhat expected to be named the Sultan’s Khalifa over the Zab. To his disgust, the latter appointed one of his own chiefs, Ben Azouz, to that post. In revenge, he immediately began to correspond with the French. The correspondence was intercepted. Of his treason there could be no doubt. He was seized, and sent in chains to Tekedemt.

Abdel Kader was now absolute sovereign of two-thirds of Algeria. The country which he had newly occupied, to the south-east of the province of Algeria, was one of the greatest utility to the French, since the garrison of Constantine drew from it its provisions, and they could not but feel that Abdel Kader could now at any moment stop the supply.

Well aware that all those movements would awaken the jealousy, if not excite the alarm, of the French authorities in the regency, Abdel Kader made a step towards setting himself right with the French Government at home. After the treaty of the Tafna, Louis Philippe had sent him a magnificent present of costly arms. These gifts Abdel Kader had forwarded, as usual, to the Sultan of Morocco. The arms he prized but little; but they enabled him to pay a graceful tribute to one, on whose friendship and assistance he greatly relied.

Miloud-ibn-Arasch and Durand, the Jew, were now sent to Paris to return the compliment. They took with them six splendid Arab horses, as a gift to the King of the French. The presentation of this complimentary peace- offering was the ostensible object of their mission. But their secret instructions were to soften down any acrimonious feeling which might exist on the part of the French Government towards their master—to explain away his recent conduct in such a manner as to leave a favourable impression—and to procure, if possible, a confirmation of his reading of the disputed article in the Treaty of the Tafna.

Marshal Valée was fully cognisant of the whole of this proceeding. In fact, he had contrived to see Ibn Arasch for a short half-hour, on his way, at Algiers; and during this interview he had immediately began to argue about the true meaning of the article. Divining the real object of the ostentatious embassy, he had written to his Government, warning it against making any concessions which might interfere with his own course of negotiation. The Arab envoys, consequently, were graciously received; their horses were admired and praised. They themselves were brilliantly entertained. All the sights of Paris were shown them; and, in the French phrase of the time, they were the “lions” of the day. But when they broached the subject of the disputed article, their mouths were stopped with an evasion or a compliment.

On their return to Algiers, after their fruitless mission, the envoys were summoned by the Marshal to an interview. He drew out of his pocket an amended version of the treaty, in which the ground contested was given over to the French, Abdel Kader receiving in exchange the districts of the Beni Djead, Hamza, and Oranougla; whilst, at the same time, the measures of corn and barley which by the treaty he had engaged to furnish, were remitted to him. Ibn Arasch declared he was not authorised to negotiate.

The envoy was still further pressed, and he at last offered to affix his own seal to the document, to show that personally he acceded to the stipulation. But he positively refused to be answerable for his master’s approval. The perplexity of the affair was mitigated by a proposal on the part of the French to send a commission to the Sultan, and accordingly a commission started. On reaching Miliana, the Khalifa there refused to allow the French commissioners to proceed, without instructions from the Sultan. Ibn Arasch feigned illness, and escaped to Mascara.

The Marshal was again thrown on his own resources. He propitiated the Emir by friendly offices. He sent him cannon and ammunition to assist him in the siege of Ain Maadi. These timely succours arrived there most opportunely; in fact they turned the scale of fortune, then trembling in the balance. But no concession was obtained. Abdel Kader felt himself in the right. He would not be put in the wrong.

He returned to Tekedemt, January 10th, 1839. His envoy, trembling and doubtful as to the reception he should receive, presented himself, to give an account of his late proceedings. When Abdel Kader learnt that he had affixed his seal to a document which gave away all for which he had been so long and so persistently contending, he was almost beside himself with vexation and anger. “Never,” he exclaimed, “never will I ratify a convention which gives the French a land communication between Constantine and Algiers, and thus lose all the advantages I have gained by their oversight in circumscribing Algiers within a circle formed by the sea, the Chiffa, and the summits of the lesser Atlas, immediately above the Wady Kuddra.”

The vacillating policy of the French Government had hitherto prevented it from taking any decisive step for the settlement of this interminable dispute. Now, it talked of confining the French occupation to Bona, Algiers, and Oran. Anon, it announced its intention of asserting its rights in the interior by force of arms. In the meantime Abdel Kader was hourly extending his dominion. Where was all this to end? The momentous question could no longer be avoided, and the French Government at last determined to act. Abdel Kader it could not reach. But his agents were within its grasp. It determined to operate on him through them.

By the treaty of the Tafna, Abdel Kader was clearly entitled to nominate what agents he pleased, to reside near the French authorities in all places occupied by French garrisons. These agents were now, under various pretences, arbitrarily ignored, or assailed with studied affronts. Some inoffensive Moors who wanted to go and settle on Abdel Kader’s territory—a privilege which the treaty had secured to all Mussulmans—were rudely treated and violently detained within the French lines. A wheelwright whom Abdel Kader had long been in the habit of employing to make gun-carriages for him in Algiers, had his shop closed and was expelled the town.

By the 7th Article, Abdel Kader was entitled to be furnished with whatever arms or ammunition, or materials for war, he might require, by the French authorities, at cost price. His agent at Algiers was expressly instructed to facilitate such a transaction. He had been further useful in procuring for his master French mechanics from Paris, to superintend his various internal improvements, in strict conformity with the 10th Article. The agent was now suddenly arrested, put into chains, and sent to France. Abdel Kader appealed to Marshal Valée against such monstrous infringements of his rights. He was told the Marshal had unlimited authority, and could do what he pleased.

His consul at Algiers was a certain Italian, named Garavini, who was also consular agent for the United States of America. For nearly two years this agent had exercised this double function without molestation. He was now informed that the French Government refused to acknowledge him in the first capacity. Abdel Kader had just returned from Ain Maadi when he received this notification. He immediately penned the following letter to Marshal Valée:—

“The Prince of the Faithful, who defends by arms the cause of God, Il Hadj Abdel Kader, son of Mehi-ed-deen (whom God preserve in his holy keeping), to the Governor of Algiers. Grace be to those who conform themselves to the will of God.

“Our consul, Garavini, has informed us that he is no longer allowed to occupy himself with our affairs. You have written him a letter, of which he has sent me a copy. This letter we have read, and we have understood it. It prescribes to him to leave our service, and announces that you wish his place to be supplied by an Arab.

“In the first place, we cannot find any Arab who could perform his functions in such a manner as to give satisfaction to our two nations, and promote their reciprocal interests. Garavini is a wise and discreet man, who only upholds what may be advantageous to both parties. In the next place, France has no right to force us to take a consul against our will and inclination. It is for us to judge what is best for us to do. If you wish to name an Arab as your consul with us, do so. We shall offer no objection. Why do you interfere with our choice of agents? Do we interfere with yours? Your way of acting violates the sacred principles of honour which ought to animate our respective modes of proceeding.

“It would almost seem that you were desirous of seeing disorders once more prevail in the districts of Algiers and Oran. Individuals wishing to come and reside on our territory have not only been arbitrarily prevented, but have been fined, and thrown into prison. When our consul, Garavini, protested against such proceedings, you disdained to reply to him; you would have nothing to say to him. Such conduct denotes violence of character. It shows that you desire to provoke misunderstandings between us and the French Government. We have chosen a Christian out of your own town, and you reject him!

“However, since usages are thus violated, since we are thwarted in what regards the good of our service, since there is evidently a design to lower us, we are ready for a rupture as soon as it may please you. All the world knows that we have chosen Garavini. We shall choose no other. Write to your ministry, therefore, that we mean to keep our consul Garavini. We expect an immediate answer.

“We hope France will send a more moderate man to command in Algiers, a man who will let us enjoy the fruits of peace, a man who will do what is just and reasonable. We had hoped that your mode of acting would not have been like that of some of those erring men who have preceded you. But if you choose to tread in the steps of such persons, God, be assured, will make us victorious over our enemies, over those who unjustly seek to molest us. God has said, ‘Let injustice fall on the head of its author;’ He has also said, ‘It is better to be the oppressed than the oppressor.’ As for us, we will not deviate an inch from the treaty, if you will only abide by it.”

All the satisfaction Abdel Kader could obtain in reply to this able and spirited remonstrance, was that the French Government understood the 15th Article to mean that the consuls named by the Emir should be taken from amongst the Arabs, in the same way as the consuls named by the French Government were taken from amongst the French.

The extensile qualities of the Treaty of the Tafna seemed, in the eyes of the French authorities, to be as illimitable as their own powers of constructive reasoning. But they were, as yet, as far from their object as ever. Abdel Kader would neither be cajoled nor bullied. All their devices had failed. Matters had come to a dead lock.

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