CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH DURING THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ

Before proceeding to demonstrate the wide-spreading results of the fall of the great Estremaduran fortress, it is necessary to follow the movements of the French armies which had been responsible for its safety.

Soult had been before Cadiz when, on March 11, he received news from Drouet that troops were arriving at Elvas from the North, and on March 20 the more definite information that Wellington had moved out in force on the 14th, and invested Badajoz on the 16th. The Marshal’s long absence from his head-quarters at Seville at this moment, when he had every reason to suspect that the enemy’s next stroke would be in his own direction, is curious. Apparently his comparative freedom from anxiety had two causes. The first was his confidence that Badajoz, with its excellent governor and its picked garrison, could be relied upon to make a very long defence. The second was that he was fully persuaded that when the time of danger arrived he could count on Marmont’s help--as he had in June 1811. On February 7 he wrote to his colleague[289] that he had just heard of the fall of Rodrigo, that Wellington’s next movement would naturally be against Badajoz, and that he was glad to learn that Montbrun’s divisions, on their return from Alicante, were being placed in the valley of the Tagus. ‘I see with pleasure that your excellency has given him orders to get in touch with the Army of the South. As long as this communication shall exist, the enemy will not dare to make a push against Badajoz, because at his first movement we can join our forces and march against him for a battle. I hope that it may enter into your plans to leave a corps between the Tagus and the Guadiana, the Truxillo road, and the Sierra de Guadalupe, where it can feed, and keep in touch with the troops which I keep in the Serena [the district about Medellin, Don Benito, and Zalamea, where Daricau was cantoned]. I am persuaded that, when the campaigning season begins, the enemy will do all he can to seize Badajoz, because he dare attempt nothing in Castille so long as that place offers us a base from which to invade Portugal and fall upon his line of communications.... I am bound, therefore, to make a pressing demand that your left wing may be kept in a position which makes the communication between our armies sure, so that we may be able, by uniting our disposable forces, to go out against the enemy with the assurance of success.’

[289] The letter is printed in Marmont’s _Correspondance_, iv. pp. 304-5.

This was precisely what Marmont had intended to do. He was convinced, like Soult, that Wellington’s next move would be against Badajoz, and he placed Montbrun and the divisions of Foy, Brennier, and Sarrut about Talavera, Monbeltran, and Almaraz, precisely in order that they might be in easy touch with Drouet. On February 22 he wrote to his colleague explaining his purpose in so doing, and his complete acquiescence in the plan for a joint movement against Wellington, whenever the latter should appear on the Guadiana[290]. His pledge was quite honest and genuine, and in reliance on it Soult made all his arrangements. These, however, appear to have been rather loose and careless: the Marshal seems to have felt such complete confidence in the combination that he made insufficient preparations on his own side. No reinforcements were sent either to Badajoz or to Drouet, whose 12,000 men were dispersed in a very long front in Estremadura, reaching from Medellin and Don Benito on the right to Fregenal on the left. This is why Graham, when he moved forward briskly on March 17th, found no solid body of the enemy in front of him, but only scattered brigades and regiments, which made off in haste, and which only succeeded at last in concentrating so far to the rear as Fuente Ovejuna, which is actually in Andalusia, and behind the crest of the Sierra Morena. We may add that having been advised by Drouet as early as March 11th[291] that British troops were accumulating behind Elvas, Soult ought to have taken the alarm at once, to have moved back to Seville from Santa Maria by Cadiz, where he lay on that date, and to have issued orders for the concentration of his reserves. He did none of these things, was still in front of Cadiz on March 20[292], and did not prescribe any movement of troops till, on that day, he received Drouet’s more definite and alarming news that Wellington was in person at Elvas, and had moved out toward Badajoz on the 16th. Clearly he lost nine days by want of sufficient promptness, and had but himself to blame if he could only start from Seville with a considerable field-force on March 30. All that he appears to have done on March 11 was to write to Marmont that the long-foreseen hypothesis of a move of Wellington on Badajoz was being verified, and that they must prepare to unite their forces. Jourdan has, therefore, some justification for his remark that he does not see why Soult should have been before Cadiz, amusing himself by throwing shells into that place[293] as late as March 20th.

[290] This Soult quotes in his recriminatory letter to Marmont of April 8, and in his angry dispatch to Berthier of the same date (printed in King Joseph’s _Correspondance_, viii. p. 355).

[291] The date is proved by the letter from Soult to Marmont of March 11, printed in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 359.

[292] The date is proved by Soult’s letter to the Emperor of that date from Santa Maria, in which he announces his intention to start, and says that he is writing to Marmont, to get him to unite the armies as soon as possible.

[293] See his _Mémoires_, p. 377.

From the 20th to the 30th of that month Soult was busily engaged in organizing the relief-column which, after picking up Drouet on the way, was to march to the succour of Badajoz. He could not venture to touch the divisions of Conroux and Cassagne, which together were none too strong to provide for the manning of the Cadiz Lines and the fending off of Ballasteros from their rear. But he called off the whole division of Barrois, nearly 8,000 strong[294], Vichery’s brigade of infantry from Leval’s division in the province of Granada[295], and six regiments of Digeon’s and Pierre Soult’s dragoons. This, with the corresponding artillery, made a column of some 13,000 men, with which the Marshal started from Seville on the 30th March, crossed the Guadalquivir at Lora del Rio next day, and moved on Constantina and Guadalcanal. An interesting complication would have been caused if Graham had been allowed to stop with his 19,000 men at Azuaga and Llerena, where he was directly between Soult and Drouet’s position at Fuente Ovejuna, and if Hill from Merida had moved against Drouet’s corps. But as Wellington had withdrawn Graham’s column to Villafranca on March 31, there was nothing left to prevent Drouet from coming in from his excentric position, and joining his chief at Llerena on April 4th, with the 12,000 men of his own and Daricau’s divisions. This gave the Marshal some 25,000 men[296] in hand, a force which would be manifestly incapable of raising the siege of Badajoz, for he knew that Wellington had at least 45,000 men in hand, and, as a matter of fact, the arrival of the 5th Division and other late detachments had raised the Anglo-Portuguese army to something more like 55,000 sabres and bayonets.

[294] To be exact, 7,776 officers and men on March 1. He also brought with him some ‘bataillons d’élite’ of grenadier companies from Villatte’s division.

[295] The 55th, three battalions about 1,500 strong, the fourth being left at Jaen. Soult says in his dispatch of April 8 that he took a whole _brigade_ from Leval, but the states of April 14 show the 32nd and 58th regiments of Leval’s division, and three of the four battalions of the 43rd, all left in the kingdom of Granada. Apparently three battalions of the 55th and one of the 43rd marched, about 2,200 strong.

[296] Though he calls them only 21,000 in his dispatches. But the figures [see Appendix no. VIII] show 23,500. The total in the monthly reports indicate 25,000 as more likely.

Wellington’s orders, when he heard that Soult was in the passes, and that Drouet was moving to join him, directed Graham to fall back on the Albuera position, and Hill to join him there by the route of Lobon and Talavera Real, if it should appear that all the French columns were moving directly to the relief of Badajoz, and none of them spreading out eastward towards the Upper Guadiana[297]. These conditions were realized, as Soult moved in one solid body towards Villafranca and Fuente del Maestre: so Hill evacuated Merida, after destroying its bridge, and joined Graham on the old Albuera ground on April 6th. They had 31,000 men, including four British divisions and four British cavalry brigades, and Wellington could have reinforced them from the lines before Badajoz with two divisions more, if it had been necessary, while still leaving the fortress adequately blockaded by 10,000 or 12,000 men. But as Soult did not appear at Fuente del Maestre and Villafranca till the afternoon of April 7th, a day after Badajoz had fallen, this need did not arise. The Marshal, learning of the disaster, hastily turned back and retired towards Andalusia, wisely observing that he ‘could not fight the whole English army.’ It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if he had lingered five days less before Cadiz, had issued his concentration orders on the 14th or 15th instead of the 20th March, and had appeared at Villafranca on the 2nd instead of the 7th of the next month. His dispatch of April 17 states that he had intended to fight, despite of odds, to save Badajoz: if he had done so, and had attacked 40,000 Anglo-Portuguese with his 25,000 men, he must inevitably have suffered a dreadful disaster. He must have fought a second battle of Albuera with much the same strength that he had at the first, while his enemy would have had six British divisions instead of two, and an equal instead of a wholly inferior cavalry. The result of such a battle could hardly have failed to be not only a crushing defeat for the French, but the prompt loss of all Andalusia; for thrown back on that kingdom with a routed army, and unable to gather in promptly reserves scattered over the whole land, from the Cadiz Lines to Granada and Malaga, he must have evacuated his viceroyalty, and have retreated in haste either on La Mancha or on Valencia.

[297] The orders to Hill issued by Wellington on April 4 and 5 (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 30) contemplate two possibilities: (1) Soult is marching with his whole force on Villafranca, and Foy is remaining far away: in this case Hill is to move _en masse_ on Albuera. This is the case that actually occurred; (2) if Foy is moving toward the Upper Guadiana, and Soult is showing signs of extending to join him, Howard’s British and Ashworth’s Portuguese brigades and Campbell’s Portuguese horse will stay at Merida as long as is prudent, in order to prevent the junction, and will break the bridge at the last moment and then follow Hill.

Wellington, when he wrote his first orders of the 4th to Hill, was intending to storm Badajoz on the 5th, and knew, by calculating distances, that Soult could not be in front of Albuera till the 7th. He ultimately chanced another day of bombardment, running the time limit rather fine. But there was no real risk with Graham and Hill at Albuera: Soult could not have forced them.

It is most improbable, however, that Soult would really have ventured to attack the Albuera position[298], in spite of the confident language of his ex-post-facto dispatches. His whole plan of operations depended on his being joined by the Army of Portugal, in accordance with Marmont’s promise of February 22nd. And he was well aware, by a letter sent by Foy to Drouet on March 31st, and received on April 6th, that he could expect no help from the North for many weeks, if any came at all. That Badajoz was never relieved was due, not to Soult’s delay in concentrating (though this was no doubt unwise), nor to his over-confidence in Phillipon’s power of resistance, which was (as it turned out) misplaced. He wrote to Berthier that ‘the garrison wanted for nothing--it had still food for two months, and was abundantly provided with munitions: its total strength was 5,000 men: it had victoriously repulsed three assaults: the men were convinced that, however great a hostile force presented itself before the breaches, it would never carry them: Phillipon had been informed on March 28th that I was marching to his help: the troops were in enthusiastic spirits, though they had already lost 500 men in successful sorties: my advanced guard was at only one long day’s march from the place, when it succumbs!’ It was indeed an _évènement funeste_!

[298] He says in his letter to Berthier of April 8 that he had intended (but for the fall of Badajoz) to move by his right that morning, to the lower course of the Guadajira river--which would have brought on an action near Talavera Real, lower down the stream of the Albuera than the battle-spot of May 1811.

But Soult’s late arrival and miscalculation of the time that the siege would take, were neither of them the causes of the fall of Badajoz. It would have fallen none the less if he had arrived on the Albuera upon April 2nd. The fate of the place was really settled by Napoleon’s dispatches to Marmont, with which we dealt at great length in an earlier chapter[299]. The orders of February 11 and February 21 (received by the Duke of Ragusa on February 26 and March 2 respectively) forbade him to worry about Badajoz, ‘a very strong fortress supported by an army of 80,000 men,’ and told him to withdraw to Salamanca two of the three divisions which he was keeping in the valley of the Tagus, and to reply to any movement of Wellington into Estremadura by invading Northern Portugal. The plan which Soult and Marmont had concerted for a joint relief of Badajoz was expressly forbidden by their master, on his erroneous hypothesis that a thrust at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida must bring Wellington home again. Marmont’s promise of co-operation, sent off on February 22nd to Seville, was rendered impossible--through no fault of his--by the imperial dispatch received four days later, which expressly forbade him to stand by it. ‘The English will only go southward if you, by your ill-devised scheme, keep two or three divisions detached on the Tagus: that reassures them, and tells them that you have no offensive projects against them.’ So Marmont, protesting and prophesying future disaster, was compelled to withdraw two divisions from the central position on the Tagus, and to leave there only Foy’s 5,000 men--a negligible quantity in the problem. Nor was this all--he was not even allowed to send them back, since the whole Army of Portugal was ordered to march into the Beira.

[299] See