chapter ii

above, pp. 54, 55.

Soult, therefore, was justified in his wrath when he wrote to Marmont that he had been given a promise and that it had been broken, ‘if there had been the least attempt to concert operations between the armies of Portugal and the South, the English army would have been destroyed, and Badajoz would still be in the power of the Emperor. I deplore bitterly the fact that you have not been able to come to an arrangement with me on the subject.’ But the wrath should have been directed against the Emperor, not against his lieutenant, who had so unwillingly been forced to break his promise. The only censure, perhaps, that can be laid upon Marmont is that he should have made it more clear to Soult that, by the new directions from Paris, he was rendered unable to redeem his pledge. Soult was not, however, without warnings that something of the kind might happen: Berthier had written to him on February 11th, and the letter must have arrived by the middle of March, that the Emperor was displeased to find him appealing for troops of the Army of Portugal to be moved to Truxillo, and that he ought to be more dependent on his own strength[300]. It would have been better if the Emperor’s trusty scribe had explained to Soult that Marmont was expressly forbidden, in a dispatch written that same day, to keep more than one division on the Tagus, or to worry himself about the danger of Badajoz.

[300] Berthier to Soult, Feb. 11. The same date as the fatal dispatch sent to Marmont, who was given a copy of that to Soult as an enclosure.

Marmont’s original plan for joining Soult via Almaraz might have failed--he himself confesses it in one of his replies to Berthier. But it was the only scheme which presented any prospect of success. By making it impossible Napoleon rendered the fall of Badajoz certain. For it is no defence whatever to point out that his dispatch of March 12th, which reached Salamanca on March 27, finally gave Marmont the option of going southward. By that time it was too late to try the move:--if the Duke of Ragusa had marched for Almaraz and Truxillo next morning, he would still have been many days too late to join Soult before April 6th, the date on which Badajoz fell.

Summing up the whole operation, we must conclude that Wellington’s plan, which depended for its efficacy on the slowness with which the French always received information, and the difficulty which they always experienced in concentrating and feeding large bodies of troops in winter or early spring, was bound to be successful, unless an improbable conjunction of chances had occurred. If Marmont and Soult had both taken the alarm at the earliest possible moment, and had each marched with the strongest possible field army, Soult with the 25,000 men that he actually collected, Marmont with the three divisions that lay on the Tagus on March 1st, and three more from Castile[301], they might have met east of Merida somewhere about the last days of March. In that case their united strength would have been from 50,000 to 55,000 men: Wellington had as many, so that he would not have been bound down to the mere defensive policy that he took up on the Caya in June-July 1811, when his numbers were decidedly less than now. But the chance that both Marmont and Soult would do the right thing in the shortest possible time was unlikely. They would have had terrible difficulties from the torrential rains that prevailed in the last ten days of March, and the consequent badness of the roads. Marmont’s (if not Soult’s) food-problem would have been a hard one, as he himself shows in several of his letters. Soult got his first definite alarm on March 11th: Marmont could hardly move till he had learnt that Wellington had started for Estremadura in person: till this was certain, he could not be sure that the main body of the Anglo-Portuguese army was not still behind the Agueda. Wellington only left Freneda on March 5th, and Marmont did not know of his departure till some days later. If the two marshals had each issued prompt concentration orders on March 11, it still remains very doubtful if they would have met in time to foil Wellington’s object. As a matter of fact Soult (as we have seen) delayed for nine days before he determined to concentrate his field-force and march on Badajoz, and this lateness would have wrecked the combination, even if Marmont had been more ready than his colleague.

[301] More probably he would have brought only _two_ divisions from north of the mountains, as he had to leave Bonnet to look after the Asturians, and Souham’s single division would hardly have sufficed to contain the Galicians, the Portuguese, and the Guerrilleros.

Still there was some chance that the armies might have joined, if Napoleon had not intervened with his misguided refusal to allow Marmont to keep three divisions in the valley of the Tagus or to ‘worry about affairs that did not concern him.’ Wellington could not know of these orders: hence came his anxieties, and his determination to hurry the siege of Badajoz to a conclusion at the earliest possible date. He was never--as it turned out--in serious danger, but he could not possibly be aware of the fact that Marmont was fettered by his instructions. It was only the gradual accumulation of reports proving that the Army of Portugal was moving against Ciudad Rodrigo, and not on Almaraz, that finally gave him comparative ease of mind with regard to the situation. As to Soult, he somewhat over-estimated his force, taking it at 30,000 or even 35,000 men rather than the real 25,000: this was, no doubt, the reason why he resolved to fight with his ‘covering army’ ranged on the Albuera position, and not farther forward. If he had known that on April 1 Soult had only 13,000 men at Monasterio, and was still separated from Drouet, he might possibly have been more enterprising.

No signs of Marmont’s arrival being visible, Wellington could afford to contemplate with great equanimity Soult’s position at Villafranca on April 7th. If the Marshal moved forward he would be beaten--but it was almost certain that he would move back at once, for, as it will be remembered, precautions had been taken to give him an alarming distraction in his rear, by means of the operations of Penne Villemur and Ballasteros[302]. This combination worked with perfect success, far more accurately than Blake’s similar raid on Seville had done in June 1811. Ballasteros, it is true, did much less than was in his power. He started from his refuge under the guns of Gibraltar, passed down from the Ronda mountains, and reached Utrera, in the plain of the Guadalquivir less than twenty miles from Seville, on April 4. But he then swerved away, having done more to alarm than to hurt the French, though he had a force of 10,000 infantry and 800 horse[303], sufficient to have put Seville in serious peril. But Penne Villemur and Morillo, though they had not half the numbers of Ballasteros, accomplished all that Wellington required: having slipped into the Condado de Niebla almost unobserved, they pushed rapidly eastward, and occupied San Lucar la Mayor, only twelve miles from Seville, on April 4, the same day that Ballasteros appeared at Utrera. Their cavalry pushed up so boldly toward the suburbs that they had to be driven off by cannon-shot from the _tête-de-pont_ at the bridge of Triana. General Rignoux, governor of Seville, had a very motley and insufficient garrison, as Wellington had calculated when he sent Penne Villemur forth. The only organized units were a battalion of ‘Swiss’ Juramentados--really adventurers of all nations--and a regiment of Spanish horse, making 1,500 men altogether: the rest consisted of convalescents and weakly men belonging to the regiments in the Cadiz Lines, and of 600 dismounted dragoons. These made up some 2,000 men more, but many were not fit to bear arms. In addition there were some companies of the recently raised ‘National Guards.’ The enormous size of Seville, and the weakness of its old wall, compelled Rignoux to concentrate his force in the fortified Cartuja convent, leaving only small posts at the gates and the bridge. He sent at once, as Wellington had hoped, pressing appeals to Soult, saying that he was beset by 14,000 men, and that the citizens would probably rise and let in the enemy.

[302] See above, p. 229.

[303] Infantry divisions of Cruz Murgeon (5,400 men) and the Prince of Anglona (4,300 men) and five squadrons of horse, besides irregulars.

On the 6th Ballasteros received false news that Conroux was marching against him with the troops from the Cadiz Lines, and drew back into the mountains. It is said that he was wilfully deceived by persons in the French interest; at any rate he must have been badly served by his cavalry and intelligence officers, who ought to have been able to tell him that there was no foundation for the report. Penne and Morillo, however, though disappointed at failing to meet their colleague’s army, made a great parade of their small force under the walls of Seville, and skirmished with the French at the bridge-head of Triana, and under the walls of the Cartuja, so boldly that Rignoux expected a serious attack. They could only have accomplished something more profitable if the people of Seville had risen, but no disturbance took place. After remaining in front of the place all the 7th and 8th of April, they disappeared on the 9th, having received news of the fall of Badajoz, and drawn the correct deduction that Soult would turn back to hunt them when freed from his other task. Wellington, indeed, had written to give them warning to that effect on the very morning that they retired[304]: but they anticipated the danger, and were safely behind the Rio Tinto when Soult turned up in hot haste at Seville on the 11th, after four days of exhausting forced marches.

[304] Wellington to Col. Austin from Badajoz, April 9.

The Marshal had left the two divisions of Drouet and Daricau with Perreymond’s cavalry in Estremadura, to act as an observing force, and had marched with his remaining 13,000 men to save Seville, which owing to Ballasteros’s timidity had never been in any real danger. But the Spanish diversion had nevertheless had precisely the effect that Wellington had expected and desired. During Soult’s short absence of twelve days great part of the open country of Andalusia had fallen out of his control, the communications with La Mancha and King Joseph had been cut off, and the guerrilleros had blockaded all the smaller French posts. The hold of the invaders upon the kingdom was never so secure as it had been before the fall of Badajoz.

Ballasteros, after his fiasco in front of Seville, made two fruitless attempts against isolated French garrisons. He failed at the Castle of Zahara on April 11th. One of his columns in an assault on Osuna two days later got into the town and killed or captured 60 of the defenders, but failed to take the citadel, where the remainder defended themselves till Pierre Soult was reported to be at hand, and the Spaniards withdrew[305]. He ended his campaign of raids, however, with a more successful stroke. Hearing that the brigadier Rey, with three battalions and some dragoons, was marching from Malaga to relieve the garrison of Ronda, he fell upon him at Alhaurin on the 14th with his main body, encompassed him with fourfold strength, and drove him in rout back to Malaga, capturing his two guns and inflicting more than 200 casualties upon him[306]. Ballasteros then hoped to seize on Malaga, where the French were much alarmed, and prepared to shut themselves up in the citadel of Gibalfaro. But the news that Pierre Soult and Conroux were approaching with a strong column caused the Spaniards to retire to the mountains above Gibraltar [April 19th]. Thus the operations in Andalusia, which had opened with Soult’s march to Badajoz, came to an end, with no ruinous disaster to the French, but with a diminution of their prestige, and a distinct weakening of their hold on the kingdom. In the Condado de Niebla Soult made no attempt to reoccupy lost ground, and east of Granada his line of posts had recoiled considerably on the Murcian side: Baza and Ubeda had been abandoned for good. It was but a vain boast when the Marshal wrote to Berthier that, after he had set all things to rights in the central parts of Andalusia, he intended to organize a general concentration to crush Ballasteros, and that his next task would be to lay siege for a second time to Tarifa, ‘the loss of which place would be more injurious to the English and the Insurgents than that of Alicante, or even that of Badajoz--against which last-named fortress I ought to make no attack till I shall have finished matters on the Tarifa side, and so have nothing to fear on my left flank[307].’

[305] Napier, I know not on what authority, says that Osuna was only defended by ‘Juramentados’ who made a gallant resistance against their own countrymen. But Soult, in a letter to Berthier dated April 21 from Seville, says that Osuna was held by some companies of the 43rd Line and a detachment of the 21st Dragoons. He cannot be wrong. Moreover, the 43rd shows losses at Osuna, April 13, in Martinien’s tables.

[306] Martinien’s tables show three officers killed and nine wounded at ‘Alora near Malaga’ on this date, in the 43rd, 58th Line, and 21st Dragoons. Soult’s dispatch makes out that only Rey’s advanced guard under Maransin was cut up, and that the main body defeated the Spaniards. If so, why did they retreat on Malaga?

[307] Soult to Berthier from Seville, April 17, 1812.

To complete the survey of the fortunes of the Army of the South in April, it only remains that we should mention the doings of Drouet, now left once more with his two old divisions to form the ‘corps of observation’ opposite the Anglo-Portuguese. Soult during his retreat had dropped his lieutenant at Llerena, with orders to give back on Seville without fighting any serious action, if the enemy should pursue him in force, but if he were left alone to hold his ground, push his cavalry forward, and keep a strong detachment as near the Upper Guadiana as possible. For only by placing troops at Campanario, Medellin, and (if possible) Merida, could communication be kept up via Truxillo and Almaraz with the Army of Portugal.

As it turned out, Drouet was not to be permitted to occupy such a forward position as Soult would have liked. He was closely followed by Stapleton Cotton, with Le Marchant’s and Slade’s heavy and Ponsonby’s[308] light cavalry brigades, who brought his rearguard to action at Villagarcia outside Llerena on April 11th. This was a considerable fight. Drouet’s horse was in position to cover the retirement of his infantry, with Lallemand’s dragoons in first line, and Perreymond’s hussars and chasseurs in support. Lallemand evidently thought that he had only Ponsonby’s brigade in front of him, as Le Marchant’s was coming up by a side-road covered by hills, and Slade’s was far out of sight to the rear. Accordingly he accepted battle on an equal front, each side having three regiments in line. But, just as the charge was delivered, the 5th Dragoon Guards, Le Marchant’s leading regiment, came on the ground from the right, and, rapidly deploying, took the French line in flank and completely rolled it up[309]. The enemy went to the rear in confusion, and the pursuit was continued till, half-way between Villagarcia and Llerena, the French rallied on their reserve (2nd Hussars) behind a broad ditch. Cotton, who had not let his men get out of hand, re-formed Anson’s brigade and delivered a second successful charge, which drove the French in upon Drouet’s infantry, which was in order of battle to the left of Llerena town. It was impossible to do more, as three cavalry brigades could not attack 12,000 men of all arms in a good position. But a few hours later the whole French corps was seen in retreat eastward: it retired to Berlanga and Azuaga on the watershed of the Sierra Morena, completely abandoning Estremadura.

[308] This officer was in command of the brigade of Anson, then absent on leave, which at this time consisted of the 12th, 14th, and 16th Light Dragoons.

[309] There is a good account of all this in the admirable diary of Tomlinson of the 16th, which I so often have had to cite. He has an interesting note that the 16th in their charge found a stone wall in their way, and that the whole regiment took it in their stride, and continued their advance in perfect order (p. 150).

The French (outnumbered, if Slade’s brigade be counted, but it was far to the rear and never put in line) lost 53 killed and wounded and 4 officers and 132 rank and file taken prisoners. Cotton’s casualties were 14 killed and 2 officers and 35 men wounded: he insisted that his success would have been much greater if Ponsonby had held back a little longer, till the whole of Le Marchant’s squadrons came on the field--Lallemand would then have been cut off from Llerena and his line of retreat, and the greater part of his brigade ought to have been captured, though the light cavalry in the second line might have got off[310]. However, the affair was very creditable to all concerned.

[310] Soult only acknowledges a loss of three officers and about 110 men in his dispatch of April 21 to Berthier, adding the ridiculous statement that the British had 100 killed and many more wounded, and that the 5th Dragoon Guards had been practically destroyed. Martinien’s tables show four French officers wounded and one killed, but (of course) take no account of unwounded prisoners. The British lost two missing, men who had ridden ahead in the pursuit into the French infantry.

Hill’s infantry did not follow the retreating French, and had halted about Almendralejo and Villafranca, only the cavalry having gone on in pursuit to Llerena. The rest of the Anglo-Portuguese army was already in movement for the North, as Wellington had given up the idea, which had somewhat tempted him at first, of pursuing Soult to Seville and trying to upset the whole fabric of French power in Andalusia. Of this more in its due place. Suffice it to say here that he fell back on his old partition of forces, leaving Hill in Estremadura as his ‘corps of observation’, with precisely the same force that he had been given in 1811, save that one British cavalry brigade (that of Slade) was added. The rest of the corps consisted of the 2nd Division, Hamilton’s two Portuguese brigades, Long’s British and John Campbell’s Portuguese horse[311]. The whole amounted to about 14,000 men, sufficient not only to hold Drouet in check, but also to keep an eye upon the French troops in the valley of the Tagus, against whom Wellington was now meditating a raid of the sort that he had already sketched out in his correspondence with Hill in February.

[311] This was the brigade formerly under Barbaçena, 4th and 10th regiments.

So much for the Army of Andalusia and its fortunes in April 1812. We must now turn to those of Marmont and the Army of Portugal during the same critical weeks.

The Duke of Ragusa, as it will be remembered, had been caught at Salamanca, on March 27th, by Napoleon’s dispatch giving him an over-late option of detaching troops to the relief of Badajoz. But being already committed to the invasion of Portugal prescribed by the Emperor’s earlier letters, and having his field-force and his magazines disposed for that project, he had resolved to proceed with it, though he had no great belief in the results that would follow from his taking the offensive[312]. As he informed his master, there was nothing at which he could strike effectively. ‘It would seem that His Majesty thinks that Lord Wellington has magazines close behind the frontier of northern Portugal. Not so. These magazines are at Abrantes, or in Estremadura. His hospitals are at Lisbon, Castello Branco, and Abrantes. There is nothing of any importance to him on the Coa.’ And how was Almeida or Ciudad Rodrigo to be assailed in such a way as to cause Wellington any disquietude, when the Army of Portugal had not a single heavy gun left? ‘General Dorsenne had the happy idea of leaving in Rodrigo, a fortress of inferior character on the front of our line, the whole siege-train prepared for this army at great expense, so that new guns of large calibre must actually be brought up from France.’

[312] Mes dispositions étant faites pour une marche de quinze jours sur l’Agueda, déjà commencée, je continue ce mouvement, sans cependant (je le répète) avoir une très grande confiance dans les résultats qu’il doit donner.’ Marmont to Berthier, March 27.

Marmont’s striking force was not so large as he would have wished. Bonnet was, by the Emperor’s orders, beginning his advance for the reoccupation of the Asturias. Foy was in the valley of the Tagus. Souham had to be left on the Esla, to observe the Army of Galicia. This left five divisions for active operations: but the Marshal came to the conclusion that he must split up one more (Ferey’s) to hold Valladolid, Salamanca, Zamora, Toro, Avila, Benavente, and other places, which in an elaborate calculation sent to Berthier he showed to require 4,910 men for their garrisons. He therefore marched with four infantry divisions only [Clausel, Maucune, Sarrut, Brennier] and 1,500 light cavalry, about 25,000 men in all: his division of dragoons was left behind in Leon, to keep open communication between his various garrisons. A rather illusory help was sought by sending to Foy, who then lay at Almaraz, orders to the effect that he might push a detachment to Plasencia, and give out that he was about to join the main army by the pass of Perales. But Foy’s real concern, as he was told, was to keep up communication with the Army of the South, and to give any help that was possible on the side of Truxillo, if (by some improbable chance) the Army of the Centre should be able to lend him the aid of any appreciable number of battalions.

On the 30th the French army appeared in front of Rodrigo, and Carlos de España, leaving 3,000 men as garrison there, under General Vives, retired with the small remainder of his division towards the Portuguese frontier. He was pursued and molested by the enemy’s cavalry, not having been covered or assisted, as Wellington had directed, by Victor Alten’s regiment of German Hussars. That officer, neglecting his orders in the most flagrant fashion, did not retire slowly and in a fighting posture, when the French drove in his line of vedettes in front of Rodrigo, but collected his regiment and rode hard for Castello Branco, without concerning himself in the least as to the safety of the Spanish and Portuguese forces in his neighbourhood, or the procuring of intelligence as to the strength and the purpose of the French army. His carelessness or shirking of responsibility, which was to be displayed in still worse form as the campaign went on, drew on him such a sharp and bitter rebuke from Wellington that it is a wonder that he was not sent home forthwith[313].

[313] Wellington to V. Alten, April 18, ‘You were desired “not to be in a hurry,” to give them (España and General Baccelar) your countenance so far as might be in your power, and to tell them that you were left in the front for a particular object.... I beg you to observe that if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at Pastores on March 30 and April 1, the Agueda being then scarcely fordable for cavalry, you could have kept open the communications between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.... You wrote on the seventh from Castello Branco that you knew nothing about the enemy! and instead of receiving from you (as I had expected) a daily account of their operations, you knew nothing, and, from the way in which you made your march, all those were driven off the road who might have given me intelligence, and were destined to keep up the communication between me and Carlos de España.’

Marmont looked at Rodrigo, but refused to attempt anything against it, though he was informed that the garrison was undisciplined and dispirited. Without siege artillery he held that it was useless to attack the place. After sending in a formal summons to Vives (who gave the proper negative answer in round terms), and throwing into the streets a few shells from the howitzers attached to his field-batteries, he told off Brennier’s division to blockade Rodrigo, as also to guard a flying bridge which he cast across the Agueda at La Caridad, a few miles up-stream.

His next move was to send forward Clausel with two divisions to investigate the state of Almeida. He had heard that its walls were unfinished, and thought that there might be some chance of executing a _coup-de-main_ against it. The general, however, came back next day, reporting that he thought the scheme impossible. He had apparently been deterred from pressing in upon the place both by the defiant attitude of the governor, Le Mesurier, whose outposts skirmished outside the walls for some time before allowing themselves to be driven in, and still more by the sight of a considerable force of Portuguese troops encamped close to the town on the other side of the Coa. This was Trant’s militia, the first detachment that had got to the front of the various bodies of troops which Wellington had told off for the defence of the Beira. They had taken up the strong position behind the bridge of the Coa, which Craufurd had so obstinately defended against Ney in July 1810.

On the alarm being given on March 29th that Marmont was marching against that province, and not against Galicia or the Tras-os-Montes, Wellington’s orders suiting that contingency were carried out with more or less accuracy. Silveira, with the Tras-os-Montes militia and his small body of regular cavalry, began to move on Lamego, where Baccelar, the chief commander in the North, had concentrated the regiments from the Oporto region and the Beira Alta, even before Marmont had left Salamanca. General Abadia had been requested to press forward against the French on the Esla, so as to threaten the flank and rear of the invading army. He did not accomplish much, being convinced that the forces left opposite him were too strong to be lightly meddled with. But he directed a raid to be made from the Western Asturias towards the city of Leon, and the division at Puebla de Senabria threatened Benavente. Both movements were executed too late to be of any importance in affecting the course of the campaign.

Baccelar had been ordered to avoid committing himself to a general

## action with any large body of the enemy, but to show such a mass of

troops concentrated that Marmont would have to keep his main body together, and to act cautiously on the offensive. His primary duty was to cover, if possible, the large magazines at São João de Pesqueira and Lamego on the Douro, and the smaller ones at Villa da Ponte, Pinhel, and Celorico. To these Wellington attached much importance, as they were the intermediate dépôts from which his army drew its sustenance when it was on the northern frontier, and he knew that he would be requiring them again ere many weeks had passed. As long as Marmont remained near Almeida, it was necessary to keep a force as far forward as possible, behind the very defensible line of the Coa, and Trant was advanced for this purpose, though he was directed not to commit himself. His presence so close to Almeida was very valuable, as he would have to be driven off before the Marshal formally invested the place. Le Mesurier, the governor, was not at all comfortable as to his position: though he had a proportion of British artillery left with him, the whole of the infantry of the garrison consisted of Beira militia, who had no experience under arms. On taking over charge of the place, on March 18, the governor had complained that though the walls were in a sufficient state of repair, and there were plenty of guns forthcoming, yet few or none of them were mounted ready for service, the powder magazines were insufficiently sheltered, and many details of fortification (palisades, platforms, &c.) had to be completed in a hurry[314]. However, the place looked so sound for defence when Clausel reconnoitred it, that--as we have seen--he made no attempt to invest it, and promptly withdrew, reporting to his chief that Almeida was not to be taken by a _coup-de-main_.

[314] For complaints by Le Mesurier as to the defects of the place when he took over charge of it on March 18, see his letter of the 28th of the same month, to Wellington, in the Appendix to Napier, iv. pp. 450-1.

Marmont then made the move which Wellington had most desired, and which in his dispatch to Baccelar he had specified as the happiest thing that could come about. Instead of sitting down before Almeida or Ciudad Rodrigo, or making a push against the dépôts on the Douro, he turned southward towards the Lower Beira, and (leaving Brennier behind to guard communications) marched with three divisions to Sabugal via Fuente Guinaldo. This policy could have no great results--the Marshal might ravage the country-side, but such a movement with such a force could not possibly alarm Wellington overmuch, or draw him away from the siege of Badajoz if he were determined to persevere in it. There was nothing of importance to him in central Beira--only minor dépôts at Celorico and Castello Branco, much less valuable than the larger ones at Lamego and São João de Pesqueira on the Douro. ‘He can do no more,’ as an acute observer on the Portuguese staff remarked, ‘than drive off some cattle, burn some cottages, and ruin a few wretched peasants[315].’ For the country about the sources of the Zezere and round Castello Branco is one of the most thinly peopled districts of Portugal.

[315] The observation comes from D’Urban’s unpublished Journal.

To meet Marmont’s southern move Baccelar brought up Trant’s and Wilson’s militia by a parallel march to Guarda, while Le Cor, with the two regiments of the Beira Baixa, held on at Castello Branco till he should be evicted from it. To Wellington’s intense disgust[316], Victor Alten, whose orders directed him to fall back no farther than that town, continued his precipitate retreat with the German Hussars to the bridge of Villa Velha on the Tagus, and began to take measures to destroy that all-important link of communications between north and south. Fortunately he was stopped before he had done the damage. The bridge was only taken over to the south bank, not committed to the flames.

[316] Wellington to Alten, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 69. ‘You were positively ordered by your instructions to go to Castello Branco and no farther. The reason for this instruction was obvious. First the militia of Lower Beira would be there in the case supposed [that of Marmont’s making an invasion south of the Douro], and they _were_ there. Secondly, as soon as I should be informed of the enemy’s approach to the Coa, it would be necessary for me to assemble a force at Castello Branco--of which the foundation would be the 1st Hussars K.G.L. Yet notwithstanding my orders you marched from Castello Branco on the 8th, and crossed the Tagus on the 9th. Till I received your letter I did not conceive it possible that you could so far disregard your instructions.’

Halting at Sabugal, on April 8th, Marmont sent out flying columns, which ravaged the country-side as far as Penamacor, Fundão, and Covilhão, and dispatched Clausel with a whole division against Castello Branco, the one important place in the whole region. Le Cor evacuated it on April 12th, after burning such of the magazines as could not be removed in haste: and Clausel--who occupied it for two days--did not therefore get possession of the stores of food which his chief had hoped to find there. In revenge the town and the small proportion of its inhabitants who did not take to the hills were badly maltreated: many buildings, including the bishop’s palace, were burnt.

Hearing that Marmont had dispersed the larger portion of his army with flying columns, and was lying at Sabugal, on the 12th, with only a few thousand men, Trant conceived the rash idea that it would be possible to surprise him, at his head-quarters, by a night march of his own and Wilson’s combined divisions from Guarda. The distance was about twenty miles over mountain roads, and the scheme must have led to disaster, for--contrary to the information which the militia generals had gathered--the Marshal’s concentrated main body was still stronger than their own, despite of all his detachments[317]. ‘You could not have succeeded in your attempt, and you would have lost your division and that of General Wilson[318],’ wrote Wellington to Trant, when the scheme and its failure were reported to him a week later. It was fortunately never tried, owing to Baccelar’s having made objections to his subordinate’s hare-brained plan.

[317] I cannot resist quoting here, as an example of Trant’s over-daring and reckless temperament, his letter to Wilson, urging him to co-operate in the raid, which was lent me by Wilson’s representative of to-day:--

GUARDA, 11th _April_, 1812.

MY DEAR WILSON,--I arrived last night. Hasten up your division: there never was a finer opportunity of destroying a French corps, in other words and in my opinion, their 2nd Division: but I have no certainty of what force is the enemy. At any rate send me your squadron of cavalry, or even _twenty_ dragoons. I am very ill-treated by Baccelar in regard to cavalry. Push on yourself personally. You know how happy I shall be in having you once more as the partner of my operations. Order up everything you can from Celorico to eat: here there is _nothing_.--Yrs. N. T.

The French 2nd Division was Clausel’s, as it chanced, the one that was precisely _not_ at Sabugal, but executing the raid on Castello Branco.

[318] Wellington to Trant, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 73.

But the best comment on the enterprise is that on the very night (April 13-14) which Trant had fixed for his march, he was himself surprised by Marmont, so bad had been his arrangements for watching the country-side. The Marshal had learnt that there was an accumulation of militia at Guarda threatening his flank, and resolved to give it a lesson. He started with a brigade each from Sarrut’s and Maucune’s divisions and five squadrons of light cavalry--about 7,000 men--and was, at dawn, on the 14th, at the foot of the hill of Guarda, where he had the good luck to cut off all Trant’s outposts without their firing a shot--so badly did the militia keep their look-out. ‘Had he only dashed headlong into the town he might have captured Wilson’s and my divisions without losing probably a single man,’ wrote Trant. But the ascent into Guarda was long and steep, and Marmont, who had only cavalry up, did not guess how careless were his adversaries. He took proper military precautions and waited for his infantry: meanwhile the Portuguese were roused, almost by chance as it seems. ‘My distrust of the militia with regard to the execution of precautions,’ continues Trant, ‘had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bedroom door, in readiness to beat to arms. This was most fortunately the case on the night of April 13, 1812, for the first intimation that I had of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak on the 14th. He said that there was such a report in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling at the alarm rendezvous. I instantly beat to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer in the place, Marmont, who was at that very moment with his cavalry at the entrance of the town, held back. I was myself the first man out of the town, and he was not then 400 yards away[319].’

[319] Narrative of Trant in Napier’s Appendix to vol. iv. p. 451.

The Marshal, in his account of the affair, says that the Portuguese formed up on the heights by the town, apparently ready to fight, but drew off rapidly so soon as he had prepared for a regular attack on the position. Wise not quite in time, the two militia generals sent their men at a trot down the steep road at the back of the place, with the single troop of regular dragoons that they possessed bringing up the rear. It had now begun to rain in torrents, and Trant and Wilson having obtained two or three miles start, and being able to see no distance owing to the downpour, thought that they had got off safe. This was not the case: Marmont realized that his infantry could not catch them, but seeing their hurry and disorder ordered his cavalry--his own escort-squadron and the 13th Chasseurs--to pursue and charge the rearguard of the retreating column. They overtook it by the bridge of Faya, three miles outside Guarda, where the road to Celorico descends on a steep slope to cross the river. The leading French squadron scattered the forty dragoons at the tail of Trant’s division, and rode on, mixed with them, against the rearguard battalion (that of Oporto). The militiamen, startled and caught utterly by surprise, tried to form across the road and to open fire: but the rain had damped their cartridges, and hardly a musket gave fire. Thereupon the battalion went to pieces, the men nearest the French throwing down their guns and asking for quarter, while those behind scattered uphill or downhill from the road, seeking safety on the steep slopes. The charge swept downhill on to the battalion of Aveiro, and the other successive units of the Oporto brigade, which broke up in confusion. Five of their six colours were taken, and 1,500 prisoners were cut off, while some tumbled into the Mondego and were drowned, by losing their footing on the steep hillside. Hardly a Frenchman fell, and not very many Portuguese, for the _chasseurs_, finding that they had to deal with helpless militiamen who made no resistance, were sparing with the sabre[320]. The greater part of the prisoners were allowed, in contempt, to make off, and only a few hundred and the five flags were brought back to Marmont at Guarda. The pursuit did not penetrate so far as Wilson’s division, which got across the Mondego while Trant’s was being routed, and formed up behind the narrow bridge, where the _chasseurs_, being a trifling force of 400 men, did not think fit to attack them. The French infantry had marched over twenty miles already that day, and were dead beat: Marmont did not send them down from Guarda to pursue, in spite of the brilliant success of his cavalry.

[320] There is an account of this rout from the French side in the _Mémoires_ of Parquin, of the 13th Chasseurs, an officer mentioned in Marmont’s dispatch as having taken one of the flags. Parquin calls it that of the regiment of _Eurillas_. There was no such corps: those which lost standards were Aveiro, Oliveira, and Penafiel. A lengthy account may be found also in Beresford’s _Ordens do Dia_ for May 7, where blame and praise are carefully distributed, and the curious order is made that the disgraced regiments are to leave their surviving flags at home, till they have washed out the stain on their honour by good service in the field.

The day after the ‘Rout of Guarda’ Marmont pushed an advanced guard to Lagiosa, half-way to Celorico, where Trant and Wilson had taken refuge, with their ranks short of some 2,000 men scattered in the hills. Thereupon the militia generals set fire to the stores, and evacuated Celorico, falling back into the hills towards Trancoso. But finding that the French were not coming on, they halted; and when they ascertained that the enemy was actually returning to Guarda, they came back, extinguished the fires, and rescued great part of the magazines. Marmont’s unexpected forbearance was caused by the fact that the news of the fall of Badajoz reached him on the 15th, along with a report from Clausel (who had just evacuated Castello Branco) that Wellington’s army had already started northward, and that its advanced guard was across the Tagus at Villa Velha.

This was startling, nay appalling, intelligence. Badajoz had been reckoned good for a much longer resistance, and the news had come so slowly--it had taken nine days to reach Marmont--that it was possible that the British army was already in a position to cut off his expeditionary force from its base on the Agueda. Wherefore Marmont hastily evacuated Guarda, and was back at Sabugal by the 16th, where Clausel and the other dispersed fractions of his army joined him. Here he regarded himself as reasonably safe, but determined to retire behind the Spanish frontier ere long, raising the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. ‘My troops,’ he wrote to Berthier on that day, ‘have used up the little food to be gathered between the Tagus and the Zezere; and now that the enemy is on the Tagus I cannot possibly remain on the Mondego, as I should be leaving him on my line of communications. I shall fall back to the right bank of the Agueda. If the enemy resolves to pursue me thither I shall fight him. If not I shall fall back on Salamanca, because of the absolute impossibility of feeding an army between the Agueda and the Tormes.’

Marmont remained at Sabugal and its neighbourhood for nearly a week--by the 22nd he had drawn back a few miles to Fuente Guinaldo--with about 20,000 men. His position was more dangerous than he knew; for on the 18th the heavy rains, which began on the day of the combat of Guarda, broke his bridge over the Agueda at La Caridad, so that he was cut off from Brennier and from Salamanca. He was under the impression that Wellington had only brought up a couple of divisions against him, and that these were still south of Castello Branco[321], whereas as a matter of fact seven had marched; and on the day that he wrote this incautious estimate Wellington’s headquarters were at Penamacor, the Light and 3rd Divisions were closing in on Sabugal, the 4th and 5th were a full march north of Castello Branco, and the 1st, 6th, and 7th were at Losa, quite close to that city. Thirty-six hours more of delay would have placed Marmont in the terrible position of finding himself with a broken bridge behind him, and 40,000 enemies closing in upon his front and flank.

[321] Marmont to Berthier: Fuente Guinaldo, April 22. ‘Les rapports des prisonniers sont que trois divisions de l’armée anglaise reviennent sur le Coa. Mais cette nouvelle ayant été donnée avec affectation par les parlementaires, et n’ayant vu jamais autre chose que le seul 1er de Hussards Allemands, qui était précédemment sur cette rive, et point d’infanterie, ni rien qui annonce la présence d’un corps de troupes, je suis autorisé à croire que c’est un bruit qu’on a fait courir à dessein, et qu’il n’y a pas d’Anglais en présence. Je suis à peu près certain qu’il a parti de Portalègre deux divisions, qui se sont portées à Villa Velha: mais il me paraît évident qu’elles ne se sont beaucoup éloignées du Tage.’ The actual situation was 1st Hussars K.G.L. Quadraseyes in front of Sabugal: Light Division, Sabugal: 3rd Division, Sortelha: 4th Division, Pedrogão, 5th Division, Alpedrinha; 1st, 6th, 7th Divisions, Losa: Pack’s Portuguese, Memoa. The map will show what a fearful situation Marmont would have been in had he halted for another day.

To explain the situation, Wellington’s movements after the capture of Badajoz must now be detailed. It had been his hope, though not his expectation, that Soult might have remained at Villafranca after hearing of the disaster of the 6th April; in this case he had intended to fall upon him with every available man, crush him by force of numbers, and then follow up his routed army into Andalusia, where the whole fabric of French occupation must have crumpled up. But Soult wisely retreated at a sharp pace; and the idea of following him as far as Seville, there to find him reinforced for a general action by all the troops from the Cadiz Lines and Granada, was not so tempting as that of bringing him to battle in Estremadura. On the day after the fall of Badajoz Wellington formulated his intentions in a letter to Lord Liverpool. ‘It would be very desirable that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against Marshal Soult, before he could be reinforced.... But it is not very probable that he will risk an action in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid; and it is necessary for him that he should return to Andalusia owing to the movements of General Ballasteros and the Conde de Penne Villemur ... if he should retire into Andalusia I must return to Castille[322].’

[322] Wellington to Liverpool, April 7, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 43.

The reason given by Wellington for his resolve to turn north again was that Carlos de España had informed him that Ciudad Rodrigo, though otherwise tenable enough, had only provisions for twenty-three days, partly from what Wellington called the general policy of ‘Mañana’[323]--of shiftless procrastination--partly from the definite single fact that a very large convoy provided from the British magazines on the Douro had been stopped at Almeida on March 30th. This, in Wellington’s estimation, was the fault of Victor Alten, who, if he had held the outposts beyond the Agueda for a day longer, might have covered the entry of the convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo[324]. Marmont’s operations on the Coa and the Agueda would have been quite negligible from the strategic point of view but for this one fact. He might ravage as far as Guarda or Castello Branco without doing any practical harm, but it could not be permitted that he should starve Rodrigo into surrender: even allowing for a firm resistance by the garrison, and a judicious resort to lessened rations, the place would be in danger from the third week of April onward. Wherefore, unless Marmont withdrew into Spain by the middle of the month, he must be forced to do so, by the transference of the main body of the Anglo-Portuguese Army to the North.

[323] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, April 4, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 29.

[324] Wellington to Alten, April 18, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 68, ‘I beg to observe that if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at Pastores on the 30th March and 1st April ... you would have kept open the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and the convoy would probably have got into the latter place.’

The Marshal, during the critical days following the fall of Badajoz, showed no such intention. Indeed he advanced to Sabugal on the 8th, seized Castello Branco on the 12th, and executed his raid on Guarda upon the 13th-14th. Ignorant of the fall of Badajoz, he was naturally extending the sphere of his operations, under the belief that no serious force was in his front. While he was overrunning Beira Baixa, Ciudad Rodrigo continued to be blockaded by Brennier, and its stores were now running very low.

On April 11th[325] Wellington made up his mind that this state of things must be brought to an end, and he determined that no mere detachment should march, but a force sufficient to overwhelm Marmont if he could be brought to action. The movement began with the march of the 11th Light Dragoons and Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese to Elvas on the afternoon of the 11th April, all being ordered to move on Arronches and Portalegre. On the 12th a larger force started off from the camps around Badajoz and on the Albuera position: the 3rd and Light Divisions moved (following Pack and Bradford) on Portalegre via Arronches, the 4th and 5th, making a shorter move, to Campo Mayor on the same road, the 7th from Valverde to Elvas. The 1st and 6th under Graham, bringing up the rear, went off on the 13th from Valverde and Elvas northward. Orders were sent to Stapleton Cotton, then in pursuit of Drouet in southern Estremadura, to come with Anson’s and Le Marchant’s cavalry brigades to join the main army, leaving only Slade’s and Long’s to Hill. Bock’s Heavy Dragoon brigade of the King’s German Legion was also directed to take part in the general movement.

[325] The date can be fixed from D’Urban’s Journal: ‘Marmont has blockaded Rodrigo, reconnoitred Almeida, and has now made an inroad as far as Fundão: all this obliges a movement toward him. April 11.’

Only Hill, with the troops that had served under him since the summer of 1811, plus one new cavalry brigade, was left behind in Estremadura to ‘contain’ Drouet. It was highly unlikely that Soult would be heard of in that province, as he had his own troubles in Andalusia to keep him employed. Indeed Wellington in his parting message to this trusty lieutenant told him that it was ‘impossible’ that the enemy could assemble enough troops to incommode him at present, and explained that his chief duty would be to cover the repairing of Badajoz, into which three Portuguese line regiments[326] under Power, hitherto forming the garrisons of Elvas and Abrantes, were thrown, to hold it till Castaños should provide 3,000 Spaniards for the purpose.

[326] 5th and 17th from Elvas, 22nd from Abrantes.

The movement of the army marching against Marmont was rapid and continuous, though it might have been even more swift but for the fact that the whole long column had to pass the bridge of Villa Velha, the only passage of the Tagus that lay straight on the way to the Lower Beira: to send troops by Abrantes would have cost too much time. On the 16th the Light and 3rd Divisions crossed the bridge, on the 17th some cavalry and Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, while the 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions were now close to the river at Castello de Vide and Alpalhão, and only the 1st was rather to the rear at Portalegre[327]. Alten’s German Hussars, picked up at Castello Branco on the 18th by the head of the column, were the only cavalry which Wellington showed in his front. This was done on principle: Marmont knew that this regiment was in his neighbourhood, and if it pressed in upon his outposts, it told him nothing as to the arrival of new troops opposite him. As we have already seen, when quoting one of his dispatches[328], he drew the inference that Wellington intended, and so late as the 22nd believed that his adversary’s main army was still behind the Tagus, and that at most two divisions had come up to Villa Velha--but probably no further.

[327] All these movements are taken from the elaborate tables in D’Urban’s Journal for these days.

[328] See above, p. 288.

Steadily advancing, the column, with the 3rd and Light Divisions leading, reached Castello Branco on the 17th. They found that it had been reoccupied on the 15th by Alten’s Hussars and Le Cor’s militia; but it was in a dreadful state of dilapidation owing to the ravages of Clausel’s troops during the two days of their flying visit. Clear information was received that Marmont was still at Sabugal, and his vedettes lay as far south as Pedrogão. The British staff were in hopes that he might be caught. ‘His ignorance (as we hope) of the real force in march against him may end in his destruction,’ wrote D’Urban to Charles Stewart on the 18th, ‘for he has put the Agueda in his rear, which the late rains have made impassable: his situation is very critical. If he discovers his error at once, he may get off by his left down the Perales road, and so reach Plasencia: but if he does not, and waits to be _driven_ out of the ground he holds, I don’t see how he is to get away. Lord Wellington will be all closed up by the 21st; meanwhile he shows little to his front, and avoids giving serious alarm: the fairest hopes may be entertained of a decisive blow[329].’

[329] Letter in the D’Urban Papers.

It looked indeed as if Marmont was waiting over-long: on the 17th-18th his exploring parties came as far south as Idanha Nova, where by an ill chance they captured Wellington’s most famous intelligence-officer, Major Colquhoun Grant, who there commenced that extraordinary series of adventures which are told in detail in the life of his brother-in-law, Dr. McGrigor, Wellington’s chief medical officer. He escaped at Bayonne, and returned to England via Paris and the boat of a Breton fisherman[330].

[330] See the _Life of Surgeon-General Sir Jas. McGrigor_, pp. 284-96. I have before me, among the Scovell papers, Grant’s original signed parole as far as Bayonne, witnessed by General Lamartinière, the chief of Marmont’s staff. It was captured by _Guerrilleros_ in Castile, and sent to Wellington. Accompanying it is the General’s private letter, commending Grant to the attention of the French police, with the explanation that he was only not treated as a spy because he was captured in British uniform, though far in the rear of the French outpost line.

The rear of the column had dropped behind somewhat, owing to the incessant rains which had set in from April 14th, and which had broken Marmont’s bridge four days later. Wellington had given the 4th Division leave to halt for a day, because of the state of the roads and the entire want of cover for the night in the desolate tract between Villa Velha and Abrantes[331]. It reached Castello Branco, however, on the 20th, on which day only (by some extraordinary mismanagement) Wellington got the tardy news of Trant’s disaster at Guarda on the morning of the 14th. And this news was brought not by any official messenger, but by a fugitive ensign of militia, who garnished it with all manner of untrue additions--whereupon Beresford had him tried and shot, for deserting his troops and spreading false intelligence. Clearly Trant, Wilson, and Baccelar between them should have got the true narrative to head-quarters before six days had elapsed.

[331] Wellington to Graham, Castello Branco, April 18, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 70.

The 21st April was the critical day of this campaign. Marmont was still at Fuente Guinaldo, on the wrong side of the Agueda, and his bridge at La Caridad was still broken and not relaid. Though unaware that Wellington was close upon him with an overwhelming force, whose existence he denied (as we have seen) in a letter sent off so late as the 22nd, he was yet feeling uncomfortable, both because of his broken communications, and because he had used up his food. Wherefore he gave orders that his artillery, using very bad side-roads, should pass the Agueda by the bridge of Villarubia, a small mountain crossing quite near its source, which would take it, not by the ordinary route past Ciudad Rodrigo, but by Robledo to Tamames, through a very difficult country.[332] He himself with the infantry stood fast on the 21st and 22nd, unaware of his dangerous position.

[332] Marmont to Berthier, Fuente Guinaldo, April 22 [original intercepted dispatch in Scovell Papers]: ‘J’ai eu la plus grande peine à faire arriver mon artillerie sur la rive droite de cette rivière. Les ponts que j’avais fait construire sur l’Agueda ayant été détruits par les grandes crues d’eau, et n’ayant pas la faculté de les rétablir, je n’ai su d’autre moyen que de la diriger par les sources de cette rivière, et les contreforts des montagnes.’ The wording of Wellington’s intercepted copy differs slightly from that of the duplicate printed in Ducasse’s _Correspondence of King Joseph_, viii. pp. 404-10.

For the allies were closing in upon him--the head-quarters of Wellington were on the 21st at Pedrogão, the 1st German Hussars, covering the advance, had reached Sabugal, and the Light and 3rd Divisions were close behind, as were Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, while the 4th and 5th were both beyond Castello Branco. On the morning of the 22nd the head of the infantry column had passed Sabugal, and the Hussars were in front of them, pushing in Marmont’s vedettes. A delay of twenty-four hours more on the part of the French would have brought the armies into collision, when Marmont gave orders for his infantry to retreat across the Agueda by the fords near Ciudad Rodrigo, where the water on that day had at last fallen enough to render the passage possible, though difficult and dangerous. The leading division marched on the 22nd, the rest on the 23rd: by the night of the latter day all were across the river, and retiring rapidly on Salamanca; for, as Marmont truly observed, there was not a ration of food to be got out of the devastated country between Rodrigo and the Tormes.

The odd part of this sudden, if long-deferred, retreat was that it was made without the slightest knowledge that it was imperative, owing to Wellington’s near approach; in the letter announcing it to Berthier the Marshal reiterates his statement that he does not believe that Wellington has a man north of Castello Branco save the 1st Hussars K.G.L. The retreat is only ordered because it is clear that, with 20,000 men only in hand, it is useless to continue the tour of devastation in the Beira. ‘Your highness may judge that the result of the diversion which I have sought to make in favour of the Army of the South has been practically nil. Such a movement could only be effective if carried out with a force great enough to enable me to march against the enemy with confidence, and to offer him battle, even if he had every available man collected. With 18,000 or 19,000 men (reduced to 15,000 or 16,000 because I have to leave detachments to keep up communications) I could not move far into Portugal without risk, even if I have no one in front of me, and the whole hostile army is on the farther bank of the Tagus. For if I passed the Zezere and marched on Santarem, the enemy--master of Badajoz and covered by the Guadiana--could pass the Tagus behind me, and seize the defiles of Zarza Major, Perales, and Payo, by which alone I could return.... There are several places at which he could cross the Tagus, above and below Alcantara, and so place himself by a rapid and secret movement that my first news of him would be by the sound of cannon on my line of communications--and my position would then be desperate[333].’

[333] Intercepted dispatch in the Scovell Papers, Fuente Guinaldo, April 22, quoted above.

The real danger that was threatening him, on the day that he wrote this dispatch, Marmont did not suspect in the least, indeed he denied its existence. But he moved just in time, and was across the Agueda when, on the 24th, Wellington had his head-quarters at Alfayates, and three divisions at Fuente Guinaldo, which the French had only evacuated on the preceding day, with three more close behind. Only the 1st and 6th, under Graham, were still at Castello Branco and Losa. Evidently if the fords of the Agueda had remained impassable for another twenty-four hours, Marmont’s four divisions would have been overwhelmed by superior numbers and driven against the bridgeless river, over which there would have been no escape. As it was, he avoided an unsuspected danger, and returned to Salamanca with his army little reduced in numbers, but with his cavalry and artillery almost ruined: his dispatch of the 22nd says that he has lost 1,500 horses, and that as many more needed a long rest if they were ever again to be fit for service.

On the 24th Wellington bade all his army halt, the forced marches which they had been carrying out for the last ten days having failed to achieve the end of surprising and overwhelming Marmont, who had obtained an undeserved escape. On the 26th he paid a flying visit to Ciudad Rodrigo, whose safety he had at least secured, and commended General Vives for his correct attitude during the three weeks of the late blockade. The next movements of the allied army belong to a different series of operations, and must be dealt with in a new section.

SECTION XXXIII

THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN

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