CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SALAMANCA

The dawn of July 23rd revealed to Wellington that the French army had passed the Tormes at the bridge and forts of Alba, and that nothing remained on the western bank of the river save small parties of fugitives and wounded, who had lost their way in the forest. Some of these were gleaned up by Anson’s and Bock’s brigades of cavalry, who were pushed forward to search the woods and seek for the enemy. Anson’s patrols reached the bridge, and found a French rearguard watching it. This was composed of Foy’s division, to whom Clausel had committed the covering of his retreat. It cleared off, after firing a few shots. Foy had been told to block the passage till 9 o’clock, but went off long before, when the disordered main body had got a good start. On the report that he was gone, Wellington sent Anson’s squadrons across the bridge of Alba de Tormes, while Bock forded the river lower down at La Encina. The state of the roads, strewn with baggage and wounded men, showed that the French had used all the three roads leading east from Alba[603], and were on their way to Arevalo, not towards their base at Valladolid: to have marched in that direction would have brought them right across the front of the advancing British army. Wellington sent out detachments on all the roads which the enemy had taken, but urged the main pursuit by the central and most important road, that by Garcia Hernandez on Peñaranda. Contrary to his wont, he pushed on this day with great celerity, riding himself with the head of the column formed by the main body of Anson’s light dragoons. This vanguard was followed, at some distance, by the 1st and Light Divisions. Those infantry units which had fought hard on the previous day were allowed a rest. About seven miles beyond Alba de Tormes Anson’s patrols came upon a regular rearguard of the enemy, behind the Caballero brook (a tributary of the Almar), in and about the village of Garcia Hernandez. This was, of course, Foy and the French 1st Division, the only troops in Clausel’s army which had not been seriously engaged in the battle. They were accompanied by a battery and a brigade of Curto’s _chasseurs_. Around and about the formed troops scattered parties were visible--the village was full of men drawing water from the wells. On the approach of the British cavalry column--the infantry were still miles behind--Foy prepared to resume his retreat, the cavalry drew up on a rising ground, to the north of Garcia Hernandez, to cover the movement: the leading regiments of the foot started off at once along the high-road, the others halted for a space, to the right of the _chasseurs_, out of sight of the British, whose view of them was intercepted by the slope on which the French cavalry were drawn up.

[603] See Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 190. He gives the three roads used as (1) Alba, Mancera de Abaxo, Junialcon; (2) Alba, Garcia Hernandez, Peñaranda; (3) Encina, Zorita, Cebolla [names all badly spelled]. It is doubtful whether the troops on the last road were not disorderly masses of fugitives only. The bulk of the army certainly went by Peñaranda.

Wellington, as it seems, saw only the hostile squadrons, and resolved to drive them off without delay, in order to be able to press in upon the infantry columns which were retiring farther away. He directed Anson to attack the _chasseurs_ with so much of his brigade as was up at the front: several squadrons were absent, some guarding the prisoners of yesterday, others exploring on distant roads. Two squadrons each of the 11th and 16th Light Dragoons delivered the frontal attack on the French brigade, while the leading squadrons of Bock’s brigade, which was coming up rapidly from the flank, and was not yet formed in line, were to turn its right wing.

The French light cavalry, which had been much mauled on the preceding day, and was evidently in no fighting mood, gave way precipitately before the attack of the Light Dragoons, and rode off in confusion to their own right rear. There was no time for Bock’s Germans to come up with them: but the leading squadrons of the 1st Heavy Dragoons of the Legion, pushing on in pursuit, received, to their surprise, a heavy volley in their flank from a French battalion in square, which they had not noticed in their advance.

There were, in fact, two regiments of infantry to the right of the routed _chasseurs_, and by the sudden flight of their comrades they found themselves suddenly uncovered and engaged. They were the 6th Léger and 76th Line, each two battalions strong, and counting together about 2,400 bayonets. Of these the unit nearest the cavalry was a battalion of the 76th in square: it was the fire of this body which had struck the leading German squadron in flank, and thrown it into disorder as it was charging the routed French horse. Farther to the east were the other battalion of the 76th and the two of the 6th Léger, on the slopes above the road, which here winds below the small eminence which the French cavalry had occupied and the hill of La Serna, a long and fairly steep height, which gives its name in many histories to the combat that ensued.

What followed on the unexpected discovery of the French infantry was the effect not of Wellington’s direct orders, nor of the leading of the short-sighted Bock, who had hardly realized the situation when his subordinates were already making their decision. It was entirely the exploit of the gallant squadron-leaders of the two regiments of German dragoons. They were coming up in a sort of échelon of squadrons, the first regiment leading, so that when the fire of the French square struck and disordered the leading unit, the responsibility for action fell on the officers commanding the others. Captain von der Decken who led the 3rd squadron determined without hesitation to charge the French square--his men were already getting up speed, and the enemy was but a short distance from him. Shouting to the squadron to throw forward its right wing and ride home, he led it straight at the French. The first fire of the square, delivered at eighty yards, brought down several men and horses, and wounded (mortally as it proved in the end) von der Decken himself. He kept his saddle, however, and only fell when the second fire was given, at twenty yards range. This volley was destructive, but did not break the impetus of the squadron, which charged right home. In most cases where cavalry reached the bayonets of a square during the Peninsular War, it had proved unable to break in, and had recoiled with loss--like Craufurd’s squadrons at the combat of Barquilla[604], and Montbrun’s at Fuentes de Oñoro. Here, however, the rare feat of riding down well-formed infantry was performed--it is said by several eye-witnesses that the breach was originally made by a mortally-wounded horse, which reared right on top of the kneeling front rank of the French, and then rolled over kicking, and bore down six or eight men at once. Several dragoons leapt the bank of struggling and overthrown soldiers, and broke into the rear ranks--thereupon the whole square fell to pieces in disorder. Many of the Frenchmen were hewn down, but the majority dropped their muskets and surrendered unhurt. The lists of prisoners at the Record Office give the names of sixteen officers of the 76th sent to England, of whom only two were wounded. Of the rank and file not more than fifty, it is said, got away[605]. Observers who came on the field later in the day noted with curiosity the long lines of muskets laid down in orderly rows. This was an astonishing achievement for a single squadron of 120 men--they had captured or cut down five times their own numbers of veteran troops of Ney’s old 6th Corps.

[604] See vol. iii. p. 255.

[605] I took the trouble to work out the names from the immense list of prisoners at the Record Office, in order to test the truth of the statement that the whole battalion was captured. The following names appear from the 76th--Bailly, Cavie, Catrin, Demarest, Denis, Duclos, Dupin, Dupont, Dusan, Gautier, Guimblot, L’Huissier, Richard, Ravenal, besides two wounded officers, Lambert and Martinot. In addition, one officer (Lebert) was killed, and in Martinien’s _Liste des officiers tués et blessés_ we have five more down as wounded, Dessessard, Lanzavecchia, Massibot, Norry, Rossignol. These may have died of their wounds, and so never have reached England; or they may have escaped, though wounded. The twenty-two names must represent practically the whole of the officers of the battalion.

Some way to the right of this unlucky battalion were two more, forming the 6th Léger. Seeing the havoc made of his comrades, and noting the remaining squadrons of the Germans sweeping across the slope toward him, the colonel of this regiment ordered his men to retreat uphill and climb the steep slope behind. He hoped to get upon ground where cavalry could not easily follow. The two battalions, still in column, for they had not (like the 76th) formed square, moved hastily upwards: the voices of officers were heard shouting, ‘_allongez le pas, gagnons la hauteur_[606].’ The nearest enemy to them was the second squadron of the 1st Dragoons K.G.L., led by Captain von Reizenstein, who put on the pace when he saw the French scrambling higher, and came up with the rearmost battalion before it was very far from the road. The two rear companies faced about when the dragoons drew near, and delivered a fire that was fairly effective, when it is considered that the men had been going as hard as they could trot, and were halted and put into action at a second’s notice. But it did not suffice to stop the dragoons, who rode in, at the cost of many killed and wounded, and cut up the companies that had stood to meet them: many men were sabred, more taken prisoners. The rear of the column, however, scrambled uphill in a mass, and there joined the other battalion of the 6th Léger, which formed square on the sky-line. They had on their flank a squadron or so of _chasseurs_, apparently a fragment of the brigade that had given way so easily before Anson’s attack twenty minutes before.

[606] All this from Schwertfeger, i. p. 381.

Against this mass charged the leading squadrons of the 2nd Heavy Dragoons K.G.L., which had at last come up to the front, and some of the officers and men of the 1st, who had already done such good work lower down the hill. The French square was not perfect or regular--apparently it was disordered by the fugitives from the broken battalion, who ran in for shelter, and formed up as best they could. The charge of the Germans was delivered with splendid impetus--though the regiment had been galloping for 300 yards uphill--and was completely successful. The French _chasseurs_ rode off without engaging: the ill-formed square crumpled up: many of the men threw down their arms and surrendered, the rest dispersed and ran in coveys along the slopes of the plateau, towards the nearest friendly troops. These were the four battalions of the 39th and 69th Line, the surviving regiments of the division. Foy himself was in one of the squares; his surviving brigadier, Chemineau, in the other.

Intoxicated with the glorious successes that they had gained, a large but disordered mass of the victorious dragoons rode after the fugitives, and charged the nearest of the French squares--one of the 69th Line. The enemy held firm, their fire was given with effect, and killed the officer who led this last effort (Captain von Uslar) and many of his men. The rest swerved back, and rode away under a pelting fire from the battalion that they had attacked and from the other three, which lay close on its flank.

So ended the charge of Garcia Hernandez, the most dashing and successful attack made by any of Wellington’s cavalry during the whole war, as Foy--the best of witnesses--formally states in his history[607]. Though not more destructive in its results than Le Marchant’s onslaught on Maucune at Salamanca, it was a far more difficult affair. For Le Marchant had charged troops not in square, and already shaken by conflict with Leith’s division; while the Germans attacked without any infantry support, and fell upon intact battalions, of which two at least had formed square. Moreover, the French were supported by artillery and cavalry, though the former cleared off promptly, and the latter allowed themselves to be routed very easily by Anson’s squadrons. Altogether it was a glorious first experience of war for the Heavy Dragoons--neither of the regiments had ever charged before, and they had seen but a little skirmishing during the six months since their arrival at Lisbon. They were duly granted the battle-honour, ‘Garcia Hernandez,’ which they continued to bear on their guidons as long as Hanover was an independent state. Two Hanoverian cavalry regiments of to-day in the Prussian army continue to show it, as theoretical heirs of the old Heavy Dragoons. The most astonishing feature of the exploit was that it was the sole work of the squadron-leaders--Wellington had only given the general order to attack--Bock had been with the fraction of the 1st Dragoons which charged along with Anson, and was not directing the marvellous uphill ride. It was a regimental triumph, not an exhibition of cavalry tactics by the Commander-in-Chief or the brigadier[608].

[607] Foy, _Guerre de la Péninsule_, i. pp. 290-1.

[608] I have used for the narrative of this interesting fight not only the numerous and valuable K.G.L. sources printed or quoted by Beamish and Schwertfeger, but the letters of von Hodenberg, aide-de-camp to Bock, lent me by his representative, Major von Hodenberg, now resident in Hanover. For this officer’s interesting career see _Blackwood_ for May 1912, where I published large sections from these letters.

[Illustration: SALAMANCA.

Part of the field, showing approximate position at the moment of the advance of the 6th Division about 7 p.m.]

[Illustration: Combat of GARCIA HERNANDEZ (July 23 1812)]

The losses of the victors were very heavy--the 1st Regiment had 2 officers and 28 men killed, 2 other officers wounded (one--von der Decken--mortally), and 37 men. The 2nd Regiment lost 1 officer (von Uslar) killed, with 21 men, and 1 officer and 29 men wounded. In this total the striking figure is the high proportion of killed to wounded--52 to 69--which bears witness to the murderous power of the old musket-ball when delivered point-blank, into the bodies of men who were pressing right up to the muzzles of the infantry in square. There were six men missing to be added to the total of losses--127 in all--whether these were individuals who were taken prisoners in the last attempt to break the square of the 69th, or whether they were mortally wounded men, whose horses carried them far from the scene of

## action and whose bodies were not found, it is impossible to say. The

loss of 127 officers and men out of about 770 present was, however, by no means disproportionately heavy, when the results of the charge are considered.

Of the two French regiments engaged, a whole battalion of the 76th was captured or destroyed--of the 27 officers with it one was killed, 5 wounded, 16 taken prisoners: taking the same proportion of its rank and file, very few out of 650 can have escaped. The 6th Léger was less completely annihilated, but it had its colonel (Molard) and 6 other officers taken prisoners[609], and 8 more wounded, with about 500 rank and file taken or hurt. Allowing for some small losses to the _chasseurs_, the total casualties of the French must have been about 1,100.

[609] Their names were the colonel, Molard (who died, a prisoner, of his wounds, August 4), Baudart, Paulin, Piancet, Turpin, Paris, Bouteille; they were verified in the prisoners-rolls at the Record Office by me.

When the last charge of the Heavy Dragoons was over, Foy led his surviving battalions off, followed at a distance by Anson’s brigade, when it had re-formed. The Germans were too fatigued to do more: the leading British infantry, the Light Division, was only just coming in sight far to the rear. The pursuit, therefore, by the four British squadrons had no further results--if they had chanced to have a horse battery with them it might have been much more effective. Six miles from Garcia Hernandez, Foy was relieved to find, waiting for him by the roadside, the long-expected cavalry brigade from the Army of the North--Chauvel’s 1st Hussars and 31st Chasseurs: these fresh squadrons took up the rearguard duty for the rest of the day, and covered the march of the infantry to Peñaranda.

From this day onward Wellington’s pursuit cannot be said to have been urged with any great vigour. On the morning of the 24th the vanguard entered Peñaranda, to find that the French had started off before dawn. G. Anson’s brigade followed, accompanied this time by Bull’s and Ross’s horse artillery, which had come up from the rear. The tail of the enemy’s column was found at Aldea Seca, a few miles beyond Peñaranda: he started off without firing a shot, and was out of sight before more than two guns had been brought to shell him. It seems that opportunities were lost this day--an intelligent observer remarks that ‘if only the whole brigade and twelve guns had come up, we might have taken 500 of them--great part of the infantry were without arms[610].’

[610] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 191.

That night the British head-quarters and vanguard were at Flores de Avila, but the enemy were quite out of sight. ‘How they get on their troops at such a rate I cannot conceive,’ wrote Wellington, ‘but they left this about two in the morning, and they will arrive in Valladolid to-morrow[611].’ He gave up all attempt at close or rapid pursuit on the 25th, reporting to Lord Bathurst, ‘I find the troops so much fatigued by the battle and their previous and subsequent marches, and the enemy have got so far before our infantry, that I halted this day, and have sent on only the light cavalry and guerrillas.’ After this there was no prospect of doing any further harm to Clausel, or of scattering his demoralized army before it had time to recover its cohesion. ‘This does not look like the quick advance following up a great victory,’ wrote a critical dragoon[612], ‘and I think they will be let off too easily. The peasants report them as in a dreadful state: all their cavalry, except a few for their rearguard, is employed in carrying their sick.’ It may be taken for certain that a general of the Napoleonic school would have urged on his cavalry at all costs--there was plenty of it, and none save Le Marchant’s and Bock’s brigades had suffered any serious loss. Nor can it be doubted that such a hunt would have been richly rewarded by captures. Clausel wrote on the 25th that he could only rally 22,000 men[613]; and as some 48,000 had fought at Salamanca, and the actual losses seem to have been about 14,000, it is clear that he must be allowing for over 12,000 stragglers and unarmed fugitives--whom an active pursuit might have swept up.

[611] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, night of July 24. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 309.

[612] Tomkinson, p. 191.

[613] Clausel to King Joseph from Arevalo. Joseph’s _Correspondence_, ix. p. 54.

Wellington’s defence for the slowness of his movement would undoubtedly have been that a headlong chase might have cost him over-much--he would have lost too many men, and--what was even more important--too many horses by forcing the pace. Clausel’s army had been put out of

## action for some weeks by the battle of Salamanca--to smash it up

still further would give him no such profit as would justify the expenditure of several thousands of his precious British troops. He was looking forward to the possibility of having to fight Soult and Suchet--not to speak of King Joseph--and wished to be as strong as possible for the present. It is probable that he made a mistake in holding back--Clausel, being left practically unmolested, was able to rally his army somewhat sooner than his adversary calculated. By August it was again able to give trouble: in October its strength was sufficient to wreck the Burgos campaign. If it had been well hunted in the last days of July, it would seem that no such reorganization would have been possible--only negligible fragments of it should have reached Valladolid or Burgos. Yet it must always be remembered that economy of men was the cardinal necessity for Wellington--his total British force was so small, the difficulty of getting up drafts and reinforcements was so enormous, the total number of the enemy’s armies in the Peninsula was so overpowering, that he could not afford to thin down his regiments by the exhausting forced marches that were necessary in an active pursuit. It would have been little profit to him if he had exterminated the Army of Portugal, only to find himself left victorious, indeed, but with a force so weak and so tired out that further exertion was impossible. As it was, many of his battalions in August showed only 300 bayonets in line[614], and only recovered their strength, by the reappearance of Badajoz and Salamanca convalescents, and the arrival of drafts, during the following winter.

[614] Already on the day of Salamanca there were eight battalions in the army with less than 400 men present. See the tables in Appendix.

It was at Flores de Avila on July 25th that Wellington received the news that a new factor had come into the game. King Joseph had left Madrid four days earlier with the Army of the Centre, and was marching northward by the Guadarrama Pass and Villa Castin, with the obvious intention of joining Marmont. This move would have been all-important if it had taken place ten days earlier: but when the Army of Portugal was in absolute rout, and flying by forced marches towards the Douro, the appearance of the King was too late to be dangerous. He could not strengthen the beaten army sufficiently to enable it to fight--and he would expose himself to some peril if he continued his forward march, and came any nearer to the British line of advance.

Joseph’s long hesitation and tardy start require a word of explanation. It will be remembered[615] that his last communication which had got through to Marmont was a dispatch dated June 30, in which he had expressed his surprise that the Army of Portugal was refusing battle, and stated that he could offer no immediate help. If Hill, from Estremadura, should march to join Wellington, he had directed that D’Erlon should move up in a similar fashion northward, and he himself would come also, with all or part of the Army of the Centre. But supposing that Hill should remain in the far south, beyond the Guadiana, Joseph gave no promise of coming to Marmont’s aid. Indeed he never mentioned this contingency at all, except to say that if Wellington had not been joined by his lieutenant, ‘you should choose a good position and give battle with all your troops united.’

[615] See