Chapter 2 of 7 · 13472 words · ~67 min read

II.

THE WHITE ERA.

The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887 mostly centred around the _Polyphemus_, and her charging a boom at Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report upon them, especially with regard to the following points:--

“The feasibility or otherwise of maintaining an effective blockade in war of an enemy’s squadron or fast cruisers in strongly fortified ports, including the advantages and disadvantages of--

(a) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets off the ports to be blockaded with an inshore squadron.

(b) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets at a base, with a squadron of fast cruisers and scouts off the blockaded ports, having means of rapid communication with the Fleet.

(c) In both cases the approximate relative number of battleships and cruisers that should be employed by the blockading Fleet, as compared with those of the blockaded Fleet.

“The value of torpedo-gunboats and first-class torpedo boats both with the blockading and blockaded Fleets, and the most efficient manner of utilising them.

“As to the arrangements made by B squadron for the attack of commerce in the Channel, and by A squadron for its protection.

“As to the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on an enemy’s coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying contribution.

“As to the claims and counterclaims made by the Admirals in command of both squadrons with regard to captures made during the operation.

“As to any defects of importance which were developed in any of the vessels employed, and their cause.”

As Supplementary Instructions there were:--

(1) As to the behaviour and sea-going qualities of, or the defects in, the new and most recently commissioned vessels, as obtained from the reports of the Admirals in command of the respective squadrons.

(2) The general conclusion to be drawn from the recent operations.”

A summary of the findings[9] is as follows:--

“That to maintain an effective blockade of a Fleet in a strongly fortified port a proportion of at least five to three would be essential and possibly an even larger proportion, unless a good anchorage could be found near the blockaded port which could be used as a base, in which case a proportion of four to three might suffice, supposing the blockading squadron to be very amply supplied with look-out ships and colliers.”

Torpedo boats were condemned as being of little value to blockaders, though useful to the blockaded. For blockade purposes the torpedo-gunboats of the _Rattlesnake_ class were highly commended.

Attention was drawn to the large number of deck hands employed down below on account of the insufficient engine-room complements, and the excess of untrained stokers. The case of the _Warspite_ was specifically mentioned. In order to break the blockade at sixteen knots she sent thirty-six deck hands down below at a time when every available deck hand would have been required above had the operations been real war.

A special supplementary report was called for as to the sea-going qualities of the ships. Considerable historical interest attaches to this particular report, and the following extracts are especially interesting:--

_Admiral_ class.

“So far as could be judged, these vessels are good sea-boats, and their speed is not affected when steaming against a moderate wind and sea; but we are of opinion that their low freeboard renders them unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with the Fleet, as their speed must be rapidly reduced when it is necessary to force them against a head sea or swell.

“On the only occasion on which the _Collingwood_ experienced any considerable beam swell she is reported to have rolled 20 degrees each way; this does not make it appear as if the _Admiral_ class will be very steady gun-platforms in bad weather.

“They are said to be ‘handy’ at 6 knots and over.

“In the _Benbow_ much difficulty was experienced in stowing the bower anchors. This is the case in all low freeboard vessels, more or less, but the evil appears to have been intensified in this instance by defective fittings, and by the fact of her being supplied with the old-fashioned iron-stocked anchors instead of improved Martins.

“Serious complaints are made from these ships that the forecastles leak badly, and that the mess-deck is made uninhabitable whenever the sea breaks over the forecastle at all; it would seem that this defect might be remedied.”

This opinion was not shared by Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, who commented as follows:--

“I cannot concur in this opinion, my view being that the objects of primary importance to be fulfilled in a first-class battleship are: (1) That, on a given displacement, the combined powers of offence and defence shall be as great as can be given; (2) that she shall be handy and possess good speed in ordinary weather, combined with sea-worthiness; (3) that she shall have large coal-carrying capacity. I certainly do not consider that the _Admiral_ class, which, on account of their comparatively low freeboard forward, must have their speed reduced when steaming against a heavy head sea or swell to a greater extent than is the case with the long, high freeboard, older armour-clads, as the _Minotaur_, _Northumberland_, _Black Prince_ are for this reason rendered unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with a Fleet. The power of being able to force a first-class battleship at full speed against a head sea is not, in my opinion, a point of the first importance, although in the case of a fast cruiser it certainly is. Admiral Tryon draws an unfavourable comparison between the speed of the new battleships and that of the long ships of the old type, when steaming against a head sea. I admit at once that vessels like the _Minotaur_ class would maintain their speed and make better weather of it when being forced against a head sea than would the _Admirals_; but this advantage, under these exceptional conditions, cannot for a moment be compared with the enormous increase in the power of offence and defence possessed by the _Admirals_.”

[Illustration:

_Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._

SIR WILLIAM WHITE.]

The _Conqueror_ and _Hero_ were reported to roll a great deal. Being short they felt a head sea quickly, and on account of their low freeboard it was found impossible to drive them against a heavy sea at anything approaching full speed. Incidentally these ships were known as “half-boots.”

Here, again, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood dissented. In connection with these points, Admiral Tryon submitted a report in which he emphasised, as he had done with the _Admirals_, that however fast these short ships might be in smooth water, their speeds fell off rapidly in a seaway.

The _Mersey_ class were described as being handy, steady gun platforms and able to fight their guns longer than most ships.[10] The captain of the _Severn_, however, reported a view that the 8-inch guns should be removed and lighter pieces substituted. Admiral Baird agreed with this. Sir Arthur Hood, in his comments, stated that he was “decidedly opposed” to any reduction of armament, both in this case and that of the other cruisers.

The _Arethusa_ type were reported to roll so heavily when the sea was abeam or abaft that “accurate shooting would be impossible and machine guns in the tops would be useless.”

The Committee concurred with Admiral Baird that the armament of these should be reduced.

For the _Archer_ class it was unanimously suggested that lighter guns should be fitted forward. Sir Arthur Hood agreed with this view, which, however, was never carried into effect.

## Particular interest attaches to the _Rattlesnake_[11] class of

torpedo-gunboats--these vessels being really prototypes of the destroyers of the present day. They were reported as “safe, provided they were handled with care.” Their handiness was unfavourably reported on. It was strongly urged that the 4-inch gun mounted forward should be removed. This, however, was never done.

With reference to any new vessels of this type, the Committee reported as deserving immediate consideration:--

(1) Generally strengthen the hull in this type of vessel.

(2) Raise the freeboard forward.

_or_ (3) “Turtle-back” the forecastle.

In the gunboats that followed the freeboard forward was considerably raised; but when destroyers came to be built several years later, it is interesting to observe that the turtle-back forecastle was adopted, and it was not till after over a hundred had been built that the high forecastle, recommended so long before, appeared in the _River_ class.

The report concluded:--

“The proportion of untrained (2nd class) stokers which were drafted to several of the ships appears to have been too large; in point of physique they are reported as unequal to their work, and in many instances the experience of these men in stokehold (or any other work on board ship) was nil.

“As a means of affording opportunities for training newly-raised stokers we recommend that at least one year should be served by them as supernumerary in a sea-going ship before they are considered fit to be draughted as part complement to any vessel; we further are of opinion that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the sufficiency or otherwise of the complements allowed in the steam department of each class of ship, the proportion of 2nd class stokers which should be borne, and the amount of training which they should be required to undergo before they can usefully be borne as part complement in a fighting ship.”

An agitation as to the state of the Navy, which was commenced in the year 1887, mainly by the initiative of the _Pall Mall Gazette_,[12] finally resulted in the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. This provided for the construction of a total of seventy vessels, consisting of ten armoured ships, nine first-class cruisers, twenty-nine second-class cruisers, four third-class and eighteen torpedo gunboats, to be built as quickly as possible at the estimated cost of £21,500,000.

The substantial part of the programme of 1886 had consisted of two big turret ships, the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, and two armoured cruisers, _Immortalité_ and _Aurora_ of the _Orlando_ class. In 1887 nothing larger than second-class cruisers was laid down; and in 1888 the most important vessels on the programme were only the protected cruisers, _Blake_ and _Blenheim_. There was, therefore, ample material for panic.

Details of the _Blake_ class:--

Length (_p.p._)--375 ft.

Beam--65 ft.

Guns--Two 9.2 in., 22-ton B.L.R., ten 6-in. Q.F., eighteen 3-pdr.

H.P.--20,000.

Designed speed--22.0 kts.

Coal--1500 tons.

Builder of Ship--_Blake_, Chatham; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks.

Builder of machinery--_Blake_, Maudsley; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks.

Launched--_Blake_, 1889; _Blenheim_, 1890.

Special features of these ships were a combination of the armament of the _Orlando_ class with greatly increased speed secured by the development of deck armour in place of the belts of the _Orlando_ class. In so far as a special type of ship may be said to be the development of some predecessor, the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ may be described as enlarged _Merseys_. They were, however, unique on account of their relatively great length and great increase of displacement as compared with preceding vessels. In them the armoured casemate, a leading characteristic of nearly all Sir William White’s ships, made its first appearance. It was employed in the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ for four main deck guns, the upper deck guns being behind the usual shields.

The coming of the casemate, curiously enough, attracted little attention, compared to its importance. It may be said to have rendered possible the return to main deck guns in unarmoured ships. In the _Orlando_ class, ten 6-inch guns were all bunched together on the upper deck amidships. Since these ships were designed the 6-inch quickfirer had made its first appearance, and the largest possible distribution of armament was therefore desirable. The adoption of the two-deck system of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ secured this much larger distribution, rendering it impossible for a single shell to put more than one of the five broadside 6-inch out of action, whereas in the _Orlando_ class at least three guns were at the mercy of a single shell.

Another novelty of the type was the introduction of a special armoured glacis around the engine hatches. This system had, of course, been used before in the Italian monster ships _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, but it was first introduced in the British Navy in the _Blakes_.[13]

The ships were very successful steamers, for all that neither made her expected twenty-two knots on trial.

Trial results:--

_Blake_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,525 = 19.4 knots.

_Blenheim_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,925 = 20.4 knots.

_Blake_: Four hours’ force draught, mean I.H.P.--19,579 = 21.5 knots.

_Blenheim_: Four hours’ forced draught, mean I.H.P.--21,411 = 21.8 knots.

The principal item of the Naval Defence Act was eight first-class and two second-class battleships. All these ships were designed by Sir William White, and may be described as battleship editions of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_, so far as the disposition of their armament was concerned. For the rest they may be described as attempts to combine in one ship the best features of the Read and Barnaby ideals. In place of the low freeboard of the _Admiral_ class, seven of the _Royal Sovereigns_ were given high freeboard fore and aft, with the big guns about twenty-three feet above water. The eighth ship, the _Hood_, was modified to suit the ideals of Admiral Hood, and was to some extent an improved _Trafalgar_, her big guns being in turrets some seventeen feet above the water, in turrets instead of _en barbette_, with guns exposed as in the rest of the class.

In them, among other special features, 18-inch torpedo tubes were first introduced instead of 14-inch, and a stern torpedo tube appeared.

The original idea of end-on torpedo tubes was torpedo attack from the bow in place of the ram. The _Polyphemus_ was the first ship in which an end-on tube appeared (submerged). In cruisers of a later date the bow tube was found to injure speed, and there was always the danger of a ship over-running her own torpedo. On this account the bow-tube never secured in the British Navy that vogue which it obtained, and still has, in Germany.

The stern-tube appears to owe its origin to an idea that a defeated or overpowered ship, running from an enemy, might save herself by it: dim ideas of “runaway tactics” had also begun to appear.

Sir William White never claimed for himself that he had anticipated the future in any way in his torpedo armament, even when defending himself against criticisms, to the effect that he “gave too little for the displacement.” Yet his torpedo innovations, besides discounting the future, all helped to swell the total weight; as also did many internal strengthenings of the kind which do not show on paper. Possibly he did not realise his own greatness as the designer of a class of ship which was so much better than any contemporary vessel, that even in these days of “Super-Dreadnoughts” the _Royal Sovereigns_ are still looked back upon with respect, and invariably regarded as marking the beginning of an entirely new phase in ship construction.

In April, 1889, their designer read a paper about them at the Institution of Naval Architects, in which the principal points which he claimed were that much superior command of guns was given, and that the auxiliary armament was nearly three times the weight of that of the _Trafalgars_. The following points were also mentioned by him:--

“(_a_) ‘That (it was officially decided that) it was preferable to have two separate strongly protected stations for the four heavy guns, rather than to have a single citadel.’

“(_b_) ‘That on the whole the 4-inch armour amidships, from the belt deck to the main deck, associated as it would be with the internal coal bunkers, sub-divided into numerous compartments, might be considered satisfactory; but that if armour weight became available, it could be profitably utilised in thickening the 4-inch steel above the middle portion of the belt.’

“I would draw particular attention to the first of these conclusions, since it expresses a most important distinction between the two systems of protection.

“With separate redoubts, placed far apart, the two stations are isolated, and there is practically no risk of simultaneous disablement by the explosion of shells, or perforation of projectiles from the heaviest guns. Each redoubt offers a small target to the fire of an enemy, and its weakest part--the thick steel protective plating on the top--is of so small extent that the chance of its being struck is extremely remote. Serious damage to the unarmoured turret bases therefore involves the perforation of the thick vertical armour on the redoubts.

“With a single citadel, extending the full breadth of a ship, the case is widely different.

“Over a comparatively large area of the protective deck-plating in the neighbourhood of each turret, perforation of the deck, or its disruption by shell explosions at any point, involves very serious risk of damage to the turret bases and the loading apparatus. In fact, such damage may be effected and the heavy guns put out of

## action while the thick vertical armour on the citadel is uninjured.

Moreover, as the turrets stand at the ends of a single citadel, there is a possibility of their simultaneous disablement by the explosion of heavy shell within the citadel.

“This last risk may be minimised (as in the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_) by constructing armoured ‘traverses’ within the citadel; but it cannot be wholly overcome, so long as both turrets stand in one armoured enclosure.

“It may be thought that the risk of damage to a 3-inch steel deck situated 11 ft. above water is remote; but I think the facts are as stated, when actions at sea are taken into account.

“For example, if a ship of 70 to 75 ft. beam is rolling only to 10 degrees from the vertical, which is by no means a heavy roll, she presents a target having a vertical (projected) height of 13 to 14 ft. to an enemy’s fire, and even if she is a steady, slow-moving ship, she will do this four or five times in each minute.

“Now, at this angle of inclination, assuming the flight of projectiles to be practically horizontal, even the thickest protective steel decks yet fitted in battleships are liable to serious damage from the fire of guns of moderate calibre, and this danger is increased by the employment of high explosives. Of course, I do not mean to say that this damage is to follow from fire intentionally aimed at the protective deck; but with a great and sustained volume of fire, such as is possible with a powerful auxiliary armament, and especially with quick-firing guns, it is obvious that there is a very real danger of chance shots injuring seriously the wide expanse of the protective deck at the top of a long citadel.

“Again, it must be noted that the chances of damage to a deck placed 10 or 11 ft. above water, and with large exposed surfaces in the neighbourhood of the turrets when a ship is inclined or rolling, are greater far than those of a deck 7 or 8 ft. lower, and with 5-inch armour on the sides protecting the deck from the direct impact of shells containing heavy bursters. It is for the naval gunner to estimate these chances of injury; but, unless I am greatly mistaken, their verdict will be that a far greater number of shots are likely to strike at a height of 8 to 10 ft. above water than at a height of 4 to 5 ft.

“These considerations, I submit, amply justify the selection of the separate redoubt system, in association with the thin side armour above the belt, and the lowering of the protective deck to the top of the belt in the new designs.

“It may be urged that, if the redoubt system be adopted, it should be associated with side armour and screen bulkheads of greater thickness than 5-inch steel, and more strongly backed. This is perfectly practicable, but necessarily costly, involving an additional load of armour, and a corresponding increase in the size of the ship.”

The designs were vigorously criticised by Sir Edward Reed, whose chief objections centred on the fact that the lower-deck protection was thin armour only. Sir William White combatted this idea, and proved very conclusively that, according to the needs of the moment, his views were correct. It is, however, worthy of record that at a later date with the _Majestic_ class (see a few pages further on), he effected modifications which brought his ships more into line with what Sir Edward Reed had advocated. It should, however, be mentioned that this was not done until improvements in armour construction rendered possible things that were certainly impossible in the days of the _Royal Sovereigns_.

In connection with the later career of the _Royal Sovereign_ class these items may be added. On completion they were found to be singularly simple in all their internal arrangements, and extraordinarily strong. When they went to the scrap-heap in 1911–12, they were, constructionally, practically as good as when built. They proved to be good sea boats, but at first rolled very badly, which resulted in their getting an unenviable notoriety in this respect. This was, however, completely cured by the fitting of bilge keels, after which the ships were everything that could be desired in the way of being steady gun platforms.

The ever increasing vogue of the quickfirer tended to render them rather quickly obsolescent over things which to-day would count much less than they did in the past. The defects of the _Sovereigns_, as realised not very long after completion, were:--

(1) That the big guns’ crews were practically unprotected, and easily to be annihilated by the newly-introduced high explosive shells of the secondary armament of an enemy.

(2) Only four of the ten 6-inch were armour protected, which also was considered a fatal drawback.

In the first case nothing was ever done; but in the second, about the year 1900, casemates were fitted for the upper-deck guns of all ships except the _Hood_,[14] which on survey was found unsuitable for such reconstruction.

The only thing that remains to add is that although in the course of years the ships lost the speeds for which they were designed, up to the very end they proved capable of doing about thirteen knots indefinitely.

In addition to the _Sovereigns_ two “second-class battleships” were built, the _Centurion_ and _Barfleur_, of which details are:--

Displacement--10,500 tons. Complement, 620.

Length--(Waterline) 360ft.

Beam--70ft.

Draught--(Maximum) 27ft.

Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 4.7-inch, eight 6-pounders, twelve 3-pounders, two Maxims, two 9-pounder boat guns. Torpedo tubes (18-inch)--two submerged and one above water in the stern.

The _Barfleur_ was laid down at Chatham in November, 1890, launched in August, 1892, and completed two years later. The _Centurion_, laid down at Portsmouth in March, 1891, was launched a year later, but completed before her sister.

The ships were armoured generally on the _Royal Sovereign_ plan, with 12-inch belts which, however, were only 200ft. long, instead of 250ft. The bulkheads were six inches only, and the upper belt (nickel steel) an inch less than in the big ships. The barbettes were reduced to nine inches only, but on the other hand were made circular instead of pear-shaped, and 6-inch shields were provided for the big guns--probably as the result of criticisms of the unprotected big guns of the _Sovereigns_. With a few early exceptions as to the shape of the base, and with certain variation in form, this kind of “turret” has been adhered to ever since in the British Navy and copied into every other.

Both ships were engined by the Greenock Foundry Company, and designed for 13,000 H.P., with forced draught, giving a speed of 18.5 knots, which speed both exceeded on trial. This high speed and their coal endurance--they carried a maximum of 1,125 tons, sufficient for a nominal 9750 mile radius--makes them something more than the “second-class battleships” which they nominally were.

Compared to the _Sovereigns_ they were:--

From which the existence of an elementary conception of the “battle-cruiser” of to-day seems fairly apparent. To-day the battle-cruiser, instead of having guns of reduced calibre, carries a reduced number, but the general principle of “moderate sacrifices for increased speed” obtains.

The _Barfleur_ and _Centurion_ proved excellent steamers and good sea-boats. Their defect was their weak armament, and in 1903 it was decided to remedy this. In that year they were “reconstructed.” Their 4.7’s were taken out and 6-inch guns substituted, and the six on the upper deck were put into casemates. As a species of make-weight the foremast was taken out of both ships; but this made little difference. The “improvements” were a total failure; the ships were immersed far below what they had been designed for, and they never thereafter realised much more than about sixteen knots. Within seven years they were removed from the Navy List altogether, and such service as they performed after modernising was entirely of a subsidiary order.

For the first-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act reduced examples of the _Blenheim_ were decided on. These vessels were the _Edgar_, _Endymion_, _Grafton_, _Hawke_, _St. George_, _Gibraltar_, _Crescent_, and _Royal Arthur_ (formerly designated as the _Centaur_). They were launched between 1891 and 1892, averaging 7,350 tons (unsheathed) and 7,700 tons (sheathed and coppered, in the case of the last four mentioned). Except the two last, all had the _Blenheim_ armament of two 9.2 and ten 6-inch. The two latter had a couple of extra 6-inch on a raised forecastle substituted for the forward 9.2.

No attempt was made to obtain the high speed of the _Blenheims_--19.5 knots being the utmost aimed at. Not only, however, did the _Edgar_ class exceed expectations on trial, but they proved most remarkably good steamers in service. No engine-room defects of moment were ever encountered in any of them, and twenty years after launch most were still able to steam at little short of the designed speed. Like the battleships, they were given 18-inch torpedoes in place of the 14-inch of the _Blenheims_.

In the course of their service careers, the _St. George_ (or rather her crew) earned distinction in the Benin Expedition. The _Crescent_ was served in by King George V, and the _Hawke_ achieved notoriety by ramming the _Olympic_ in the Solent in 1911.

The lesser cruisers of the Naval Defence Act numbered altogether 28. Of these twenty belonged to the _Apollo_ class of 3,400 tons (unsheathed) and 3,600 tons (sheathed). They were _Apollo_, _Andromache_, _Latona_, _Melampus_, _Naiad_, _Sappho_, _Scylla_, _Terpsichore_, _Thetis_, _Tribune_ (unsheathed), and _Aeolus_, _Brilliant_, _Indefatigable_ (named _Melpomene_ in 1911), _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Pique_, _Rainbow_, _Retribution_, _Sirius_, and _Spartan_ (sheathed).

In all, the armament was two 6-inch and six 4.7, with lesser guns, and, above-water, 14-inch torpedo tubes. The speed was twenty knots in the unsheathed, and a quarter of a knot less in the sheathed ones.

When built all proved able to steam very well, but after some years service certain of them fell off very badly in speed. Others, however, remained as fast as when they were built--the _Terpsichore_, in 1908, averaging 20.1 knots, and the _Aeolus_, in 1909, nearly nineteen knots.

During their service, the _Melampus_ was commanded by King George as Prince George, while the _Scylla_, under Captain Percy Scott, gave birth to the “dotter,” and the “gunnery boom” which followed. In 1904 and onwards seven of them, scrapped from regular service--the _Latona_, _Thetis_, _Apollo_, _Andromache_, Iphigenia, _Intrepid_, and _Thetis_--were totally or partially disarmed and converted into mine layers.

[Illustration: SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA. NOW CONVERTED INTO A MINE-LAYER]

The remaining eight cruisers of the Act--_Astræa_, _Bonaventure_, _Cambrian_, _Charybdis_, _Flora_, _Forte_, _Fox_, and _Hermione_--were increased in size up to 4,360 tons, and given a couple of extra 4.7, and 18-inch in place of 14-inch tubes. Instead of their 4.7’s being mounted in the well amidships, they were placed on the upper deck level, a much better position in a sea-way, but they never proved themselves quite such good ships for their size as did the earlier type. They served to illustrate the general rule that slight improvements on a design are rarely satisfactory, and that while every staple design has its defects, it is extremely difficult to remove one drawback without creating another. Moreover, such improvements invariably cause increased cost, and an essential with the small cruiser is that she shall be cheap enough to be numerically strong. Four _Astræas_ cost as much as five _Apollos_. They were rather more seaworthy, but no faster--if as fast. The total broadsides obtained were only _one_ 4.7 more and _two_ 6-inch _less_.[15] A considerably greater possible bunker capacity was obtained; but the normal supply (400 tons) was the same for both.

In the British Navy, in 1908–11, a precisely similar thing obtained. It was probably inevitable. In the German Navy, between 1897 and 1907, displacement for small cruisers rose from 2,645 to 4,350 tons, with practically the same armament. But here the horse-power rose from about 8,500 or less to 20,000, and designed speeds in proportion, from a twenty-one knots (not made) to a 25.5, which, on trial, turned out to be 27,000 I.H.P. and over twenty-seven knots.

Here, however, there was a definite aim--increased speed, with only trivial improvements in any other direction. With similar British cruisers the defect has invariably been “general improvements” on what the original design _might have been_ if plotted a year or two later than it actually was. There is no question--or very little--but that Germany in its ultra-conservative policy gauged the situation better than any British Admiralty ever did till just before the war.

Minor cruisers _must_ be cheap to construct. Any improvement in them _must_ have a definite intrinsic value. Lacking that, it is worth very little. The _Astræas_, as cited, indicated how a supposed advantage may even be a real deficit from another point of view.

The value of increased speed cannot be put into £ s. d., but armament easily can be. Like reconstruction, minor “improvements” on a design rarely pay. With the original conception the naval architect is given certain data for which he arranges accordingly. Ordered to improve upon it in any direction he can only add displacement and upset the balance of everything.

The Naval Defence Act also included a certain number of third-class cruisers--_Pallas_, _Pearl_, _Philomel_, and _Phœbe_--for the ordinary service, and five similar ships for the Australian station, originally named _Pandora_, _Pelorus_, _Persian_, _Phœnix_, and _Psyche_. These were later altered to Australian names, _Katoomba_, _Mildura_, _Wallaroo_, _Tauranga_, and _Ringarooma_. They were of 2,575 tons, with 2½ decks, armaments of eight 4.7-inch and four above-water 14-inch tubes. The designed speed was 19 knots.

Thirteen torpedo gunboats, improved _Rattlesnakes_, were laid down under the Act, corresponding to nine others of the normal Programme, of which two were for Australia. The Naval Defence boats were _Alarm_, _Antelope_, _Circe_, _Gleaner_, _Gossamer_, _Hebe_, _Renard_, _Speedy_--all laid down in 1889, as also were the _Whiting_ (afterwards _Boomerang_) and _Wizard_ (renamed _Karahatta_) for Australia. Those laid down normally in the previous year were the _Salamander_, _Seagull_, _Sheldrake_, _Skipjack_, _Spanker_, _Speedwell_, for the British Navy. Two others, _Assaye_ and _Plassy_, were built for the Indian Marine at and about this time. All carried a couple of 4.7-inch guns, were of about 750–850 tons displacement, and were first known as “catchers.” They were all intended to steam at 19 knots or over with locomotive boilers; but in service none ever did. At a later date, reboilered with water-tubes, many reached or exceeded the designed speed, and the majority of them are still in service for auxiliary purposes--many being specially fitted as mine sweepers, and the rest used as tenders for various services.

They are of considerable interest on account of the fact that the destroyers of 1909–12 were practically the same displacement and general shape, with a not very dissimilar armament--two 4-inch instead of two 4.7. The modern destroyers, however, were approximately ten knots faster--an interesting commentary on engineering improvements in the course of twenty years!

More interesting still, however, is the fact that Sir William White should have evolved twenty years ago almost exactly what--except in the matter of modern speed possibilities--is to-day the recognised ideal for destroyers.

In the British Navy the torpedo gunboats never get beyond the “catcher” stage--they never had the opportunity; but it is worthy of note that the first two ships to be torpedoed under anything like modern war conditions--the Chilian _Blanco Encalada_ and the Brazilian _Aquidaban_--were both sunk by vessels of almost exactly the same type as the “catchers,” and not by torpedo boats.

So far as the British Navy was concerned, the “catchers” tested in the “secret manœuvres” of 1891 did uncommonly well. They hung about off the torpedo bases, and though only about one to four, accounted for at least 90 per cent. of the hostile torpedo boats. To this very success, perhaps, was due the fact that in their own day they were not thought of as an offensive arm against big ships--destruction of the torpedo boat was then the principal aim in view. This they fulfilled. The South American Republics discovered their “other uses,” and so really led the way to the evolution of the destroyer of a later era.

Perhaps the only nation which really read the lesson involved was Germany. So long ago as 1895 she had launched the 2,000-ton “small cruiser” _Hela_; in 1898 the _Gazelle_ of 2,645 tons was set afloat. For years Germany added to the _Gazelle_ class, at a time when all the rest of the world had decreed that “third-class cruisers” were useless. Not for many a year did the British Admiralty discover that Germany had seen the matter of the _Lynch_ and the _Sampaio_[16] better than any other Power.

Neither of these ships in attacking got hit. They got home without. But they might have been hit. Germany evolved something that even if hit badly would still float long enough to get off her torpedoes.

Till the Chilian “catchers” in 1891 proved their offensive abilities, no one had ever considered that side of the question. To this day Germany has never really received her meed of credit for perceiving that a small third-class cruiser has potentialities with torpedoes against a battleship at night.

[Illustration:

HOOD. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. BARFLEUR. RENOWN. MAJESTIC. LONDON. KING EDWARD.

BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA.]

So late as the present day much comment about German small cruisers being inadequately gunned, a clear indication that just as in the past there was a difficulty in conceiving of the torpedo-gunboat for other than her nominal use, so the possibilities of the small cruiser in the role of destroyer were still apt to be generally overlooked.

In February, 1893, there was laid down the _Renown_, the only armoured ship of the 1892–93 Estimates; an improved _Centurion_, with thinner belt armour. Harvey armour--three inches of which had the resisting value of four inches of compound or six inches of iron--was adopted in this ship for the first time. Influences other than taking advantage of the reduced weight required for a given protective value were, however, at work, for in the _Renown_ sacrifices were made at the water-line in order to secure better protection to the lower deck side.

Details of the _Renown_:--

Displacement--12,350 tons.

Length (between perpendiculars)--380ft.

Beam--72⅓ft.

Draught--(maximum) 27ft.

Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 6-inch 40 cal., twelve 12-pounders, four submerged 18-inch tubes, and one above water-line in stern.

Armour--8--6in. belt, 200ft. long amidships, 6in. side above. Bulkheads 10--6in., barbettes 10in., casemates, main deck ones 6in., upper deck ones, 4in.

Horse-power--12,000 = 18 knots.

Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,760 tons = nominal 7,200 miles at ten knots.

Built at Pembroke; engined by Maudslay; she was launched in May, 1895, and completed for sea in April, 1897, having taken no less than 4¼ years to build. Cost, £746,247.

She proved one of the best steamers ever built for the Navy. On a four-hour trial she made 18.75 knots, with 12,901 I.H.P. Her economical speed proved to be fifteen knots. She always steamed well, and after thirteen years’ service did 17.4 knots with ease.

The special feature of this ship was that in her instead of the ordinary flat deck on top of the belt, a sloping deck behind the belt was first introduced. This system--rigidly adhered to in the British Navy ever since, and copied eventually into every other Navy--was based upon the idea of reinforcing the deck-protected cruiser with side armour. The principle involved was that at whatever angle the belt might be hit and penetrated, the incoming projectile would then meet a further obstruction at a 45° angle, calculated to present a maximum of deflecting resistance. Professor Hovgaard and others have since indicated that, weight for weight, three inches of inclined deck armour, having to be spread more, represent as much or more tons as six inches of vertical armour (the nominal equivalent), and protective decks behind armour are to-day much thinner than of yore and little better than “splinter decks.” The principle, however, remains, as originated by Sir William White, and is, perhaps, the most characteristic feature of his era: seeing how universally the idea was copied.

The French were the last to adopt it. Instead, they used the flat deck below the belt in addition to the one on top of it. This was made use of so late as the _République_ and _Liberté_ class. While ideally better for resisting projectiles which might penetrate the belt, it was impossible of really practical application amidships on account of the difficulty of keeping the engines entirely below it.

[Illustration:

PROTECTED CRUISER. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. RENOWN. SUFFREN (FRENCH)

SYSTEMS OF WATER-LINE PROTECTION.]

The _Renown_ was the first ship to carry all her secondary guns in casemates. She was fitted as a flagship, and first served on the North American Station. When Admiral Fisher went from there to the Mediterranean he took the _Renown_ with him as flagship, presumably with the idea that speed was better than power in a flagship. The _Renown’s_ fighting power was small even then, but she was well fitted for the social side of flagship work--so nicely, indeed, that the flash-plates of the big guns had been taken up so as not to interfere with ladies’ shoes in dances!

After leaving the Mediterranean the _Renown_ was still further converted into a “battleship yacht,” the six-inch guns being removed. She was painted white, and used to convey the then Prince of Wales to India. Thereafter she practically disappeared from the effective list and eventually became a training ship for stokers.

The _Renown_ was followed by the ships of the Spencer programme, nine battleships of the _Majestic_ class, which were spread over the 1893–94 Estimates, and those of the next year. The _Majestics_ were in substance amplified _Renowns_, their special and particular feature being that in place of the two amidships belt of varying thickness a single belt of 16ft. wide of a uniform 9in. thickness was substituted.

In the _Majestics_, the 13.5, which had been for so long the standard gun for first-class battleships, disappeared in favour of a new type of 12-inch, a Mark VIII. of 35 calibres. The two types compare as follows:--

=====+=======+=======+===========+================================= | | | |Maximum Penetration against K.C. Bore.|Length.|Weight.|Projectile.| (capped projectiles). Inch.| Cals. | Tons. | lbs. | at 5000 yds. | at 3000 yds. | | | | in. | in. -----+-------+-------+-----------+-----------------+--------------- 13.5 | 30 | 67 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | | | | | 12 | 35 | 46 | 850 | 11½ | 14½ =====+=======+=======+===========+=================+===============

The new gun was, therefore, superior in everything except weight of projectile, and that was not considered much in those days. To-day, of course, it has quite a special meaning.

In the _Majestics_, except in the first two, all-round loading positions for the big guns were introduced in place of the cumbersome old system whereby, after firing, the guns had to return to an end-on position, tilt up, and at a fixed angle take their charges at what was little but an adaption for breechloaders of the loading system evolved twenty years before for the old _Inflexible_.

Details of these ships:--

Displacement--14,900 tons.

Length--(between perpendiculars) 390ft., (over-all) 413ft.

Beam--75ft.

Draught--(mean), 27½ ft., (maximum) about 30ft.

Armament--Four 12-inch 35 cal., twelve 6-inch 40 cal., sixteen 12-pounders, twelve 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes (18-inch), four submerged and one above water in stern.

Armour (Harvey)--Belt, (220ft. by 16ft.) 9in. Bulkheads, 14in. Barbettes, 14in. with 10in. turrets. Casemates, 6in.

Horse-power--12,000 = 17.5 knots.

Coal--(normal) 1,200 tons; (maximum) 2,200 tons = nominal radius of 7,600 miles at 10 knots and 4,000 at 15 knots.

The ships were built, etc., as follows:--

Mostly they were completed inside two years, the only ones which took appreciably longer being the _Hannibal_ and the _Illustrious_. In these and the _Cæsar_ an innovation introduced in the others--the placing of the chart house round the base of the foremast with the conning tower well clear ahead--was done away with, and the old system of the bridge over the conning tower reverted to. In the _Cæsar_ and _Illustrious_, laid down later than the others, an improvement was effected by the introduction of circular instead of pear-shaped barbettes. The _Majestic_, _Magnificent_, and _Cæsar_ were built in dry dock instead of on slips--the first instance of this since the days of early coast-defence monitors.

The total cost was approximately a million per ship.

On trials most of them exceeded the designed speed, but all were light on trials. They proved very handy ships, with circles of 450 yards at fifteen knots. Coal consumption was always high.

Compared to the _Sovereigns_, the following figures are of interest:--

=============+============+=========+==========+=======+======== | | | Weight of| | |Displacement|Weight of|Armament &| |Normal Name. | (tons). | Armour |Ammunition| | Coal | | (tons). | (tons). | H.P. |(tons). -------------+------------+---------+----------+-------+-------- _Majestics_ | 14,900 | 4260 | 1500 |12,000 | 1200 _Sovereigns_ | 14,100 | 4600 | 1410 |13,000 | 900 =============+============+=========+==========+=======+========

The total dead weight carried in armament, armour, and coal thus works out at practically the same figure, despite the rise of 800 tons in displacement. On these grounds certain attacks were made upon the ships, mainly by those who argued against the unarmoured ends. The criticisms were, however, mainly of the captious order--the ships were certainly the finest specimens of naval architecture of their day.

At a later date electric hoists were fitted to the 6-inch guns, and 400 tons of oil fuel were added to the fuel capacity (the maximum coal capacity being reduced by 200 tons). The first ship to be so fitted was the _Mars_. Another innovation was shifting the torpedo nets, first in the _Mars_, then in all the others, from the upper deck to the main deck level; the idea being to keep the nets clear of the 6-inch guns.

The _Majestic_ and _Magnificent_ served for a long time as flagships in the Channel Fleet. Admiral Sir F. Stephenson and Sir A. K. Wilson flew their flags in the _Majestic_, of which ship Prince Louis of Battenberg was at one time captain.

It was during the early service of the _Majestics_ in the Channel Fleet that “invisible” colours for warships first came into consideration, all ships up to that date being painted with black hulls, white upper works, and yellow masts and funnels. For these experiments the _Magnificent_ was painted black all over, the _Majestic_ and _Hannibal_ were given grey and light green upper works respectively. The latter was really the more “invisible” of the two, but both ships were left with black hulls. Ultimately a grey, a little darker than that which the Germans had long used, was adopted as the regulation, though for some time it varied greatly between ship and ship, following the old system under which a good deal of latitude in painting was allowed.[17]

To this era, 1894–95, belong two groups of protected cruisers, the _Powerfuls_ and the _Talbots_. The latter, nine in all, were merely enlarged (5,600 tons) editions of the later cruisers of the Naval Defence Act, and call for no comment. The former group were the _Powerful_ and _Terrible_, “replies” to the Russian _Rurik_ and _Rossiya_. They displaced nearly as much as the battleships--14,200 tons--and ran to the then unheard of length of 500ft. between perpendiculars. They carried no belt armour whatever, but were given stout protective decks, no less than 6in. on the slopes amidships. The two big guns (40 calibre, 9.2) were given 6in. Harvey barbettes, the twelve other guns[18] (6-inch) being in 6-inch casemates. Sixteen 12-pounders were disposed about the upper works. Designed horse-power 25,000 = 22 knots. Total bunker capacity of 3,000 tons, equal to a nominal 7,000 miles at fourteen knots. Both ships were laid down in 1894, the _Powerful_ by Vickers and the _Terrible_ at Clydebank. They were launched in the following year.

In service the _Powerfuls_ proved capable of keeping up a speed of twenty knots almost indefinitely. For the rest, they were unhandy ships with large turning circles. At the time of the South African War, both of them were at the Cape, and did service with landed naval brigades. Of these, one from the _Powerful_, with some 4.7’s on special Percy Scott gun-carriages, materially assisted in the defence of Ladysmith.

During the year 1911 the decision was come to that it was not worth while preserving either ship, on account of the large crews required and their comparatively small fighting value under modern conditions.

Two considerable novelties were embodied in these ships. The first of these was the adoption of electrical gear for the big guns. The other and more far-reaching was the adoption of Belleville boilers.

_THE BATTLE OF THE BOILERS._

Owing to favourable reports of their use in the French Navy, Belleville boilers were in 1895 experimentally fitted to the _Sharpshooter_, torpedo gunboat; but the decision to adopt them in large ships was taken from French rather than any British experience. Trouble and failure were freely predicted. With the result frequently attending lugubrious predictions, very little trouble has ever been experienced with any type and then only in the very early stage when the water-tube boiler was an almost unknown curiosity to the engine-room staff.

The chief advantages claimed for Belleville boilers were the higher working pressures, economy in maintenance and fuel consumption, saving of weight, rapid steam raising, and great facility for repairs.

[Illustration: WHITE ERA BATTLESHIPS OF THE MAJESTIC CLASS]

The Belleville was the first water-tube boiler to come into prominence; other types, however, soon appeared. In the period 1895–98, torpedo gunboats were experimentally fitted as follows:--_Sharpshooter_, Belleville; _Sheldrake_, Babcock; _Seagull_, Niclausse; _Spanker_, Du Temple; _Salamander_, Mumford; _Speedy_, Thornycroft--these three last being of the small tube type. Other existing types were the Yarrow, White-Foster, Normand, Reed, Blechynden, all these being of the small tube type also, and regarded as suitable for small craft only.[19]

In the matter of big ships, so far as the British Navy was concerned, “water-tube boiler” for some years meant Bellevilles only, whence it came that in the insensate “Battle of the Boilers,” which presently broke out, Bellevilles were the main object of attack in Parliament and elsewhere. Actually, of course, the whole principle was in the melting pot. All the elements opposed to change in any form rallied to the attack, led on and influenced in some cases by those whose interests were bound up with the old style cylindrical boilers. It was all over again the old story of the fight for the retention of the paddle against the screw propeller, with an equal disregard for facts.

Unfortunately the party of progress played somewhat into the hands of the reactionaries. In fitting the Belleville type only, they had not much alternative, other types being then in a less forward state. The error made was that in the wholesale adoption of a new type of steam generator, requiring twice the skill and intelligence necessary for the old type, it was practically impossible to train quickly enough a sufficiency of engineers and stokers. Hence troubles soon arose. An even greater error was that the boilers were mostly built in England to the French specifications, without, in many cases, sufficient experienced supervision; and minor “improvements,” such as fusible plugs and restricting regulations, were introduced by more or less amateur Admiralty authorities--which also produced trouble.

For example, French practice had taught that adding lime to the feed water was desirable; but in many British ships this rule was ignored. Again, one Belleville essential was to throw on coal in very small quantities at a time, in contradistinction to the old cylindrical practice in which shovelling on enormous quantities of coal was the recipe for increased speed. This feature was often disregarded.

The Belleville, ever a complicated and delicate mechanism, if its full efficiency is to be secured, was a worse boiler for the experiments than many of the simpler types of to-day would have been. But no water-tube boiler of any type would have stood any chance of success against the opposition. There were some terrible times in the boiler rooms in those days. One or two ships whose chief engineers had been specially trained in France secured marvellous results, usually by ignoring Admiralty improvements and regulations.[20] But for one success there were many early failures.

[Illustration:

EDGAR. POWERFUL. DIADEM. CRESSY. DRAKE. COUNTY. DEVONSHIRE.

PRINCIPAL CRUISERS OF THE WHITE ERA.]

The agitation triumphed to the extent of a Committee of Inquiry being appointed. An interim report of this Committee made a scape-goat of the Belleville, to the extent of recommending that no more should be fitted. But the victory of the retrogrades ended there. A species of compromise with public opinion inflamed against the water-tube system was temporarily adopted, and absurd mixed installations of cylindrical and water-tube boilers were fitted to some ships. Four large tube types were selected as substitutes for Bellevilles, the Niclausse, Dürr (a German variant of the Niclausse), the Babcock and Wilcox, and the Yarrow large tube.

It may approximately be said that every water-tube boiler is a species of compromise between facility for rapid repair on board ship and complication, and the need of great care in using and working. It is usual to put the Belleville at one end of this scale and the Yarrow (large tube) at the other, this last boiler now requiring little, if any, more care than the old type of cylindrical.

In the course of comparatively short experiments, both the Niclausse and the Dürr were found to possess most of the alleged deficiencies of the Belleville without its advantages; and it was decided to fit all future types of large ships with the Babcock and Yarrow types only. The absurd mixture of cylindrical and water-tube boilers was wisely done away with. Curiously enough, the Belleville boiler, once the agitation had ceased, also ceased to be troublesome. This was no doubt due to the increased experience which had been gained in the interim.

Both the Babcock and Yarrow boilers have been immensely improved since the days when they were first brought out. Something of the same sort is, of course, true of all the standard types, and there is to-day hardly any question as to which of them may be the best or worst. Each type has some special advantage of its own, and in no case, probably, is that advantage sufficiently pronounced to render any one type absolutely the best. When adopted by the Admiralty the Belleville was certainly the best water-tube boiler available. Had it been persisted in and not “improved” by amateurs it would probably have done quite as well as any type adopted to-day. The real issue was mainly not one of type, but of principle. That principle was the water-tube boiler as opposed to the old type cylindrical.

The Estimates for 1896–97 provided for five battleships which were somewhat sarcastically alluded to as “improved” _Majestics_. These ships were the _Canopus_ class, and they mark a species of early striving after the ideal of the battle-cruisers of to-day. That is to say, certain sacrifices were made in them with a view to securing increased speed.

## Particulars of these ships:--

Displacement--12,950 tons.

Length--(over all) 418ft.

Beam--74ft.

Draught--(maximum) 26½ft.

Armament--Four 12in., 35 cal., twelve 6in. 40 cal., ten 12-pounders, four submerged tubes (18in.)

Armour--Harvey-Nickel. Belt amidships 6in. with 2in. extension to the bow and 1½in. skin aft on the water-line. Bulkheads and barbettes 12in. Turrets 8in.

Horse-power--31,500 = 18.25 knots.

Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,300 tons = nominal radius of 8,000 miles at 10 knots.

The adoption of Harvey-Nickel armour, which was of superior resisting power to Harvey armour in the ratio of about 5 to 4, partly, but not entirely accounted for the thinning of the armour of this class. Theoretically, the 9in. armour belt of the _Majestic_ was equal to 18in. of iron, while the belt of the _Canopus_ class was equal to about 15in. of iron. In place of the 4in. deck of the _Majestics_, the _Canopus_ class had only a 2½in. deck. The thin bow (2in.) plating was introduced as a sop to a public agitation against soft-ended ships. Such a belt is, of course, perfectly useless against any heavy projectile, or, for that matter, against 6in., except at very long range indeed. Sir William White never made any secret of his cynical disbelief in these bow belts. They were and always have been what doctors call a “placebo.”

In the following year the sixth ship of this class was built--the _Vengeance_. She differed from the others in the form of her turrets, which were flat sided for the first time. In her also a mounting was first introduced, whereby, in addition to being loaded in any position, big guns could also be loaded at any elevation.

Some other details of the _Canopus_ class are:--

The cruisers of the following year were eight cruisers of the much discussed _Diadem_ class, small editions of the _Powerful_ (11,000 tons), and carrying a pair of 6-inch guns in place of the 9.2’s of the _Powerfuls_. For the first four (the _Diadem_, _Andromeda_, _Europa_, and _Niobe_) a speed of 20.5 knots only was provided, but in the late four (the _Argonaut_, _Ariadne_, _Amphitrite_, and _Spartiate_) the horse-power was increased to 18,000, in order to provide twenty-one knots. At the present time (1912) these ships have for all practical purposes already passed from the effective list, all the weak points of the _Powerfuls_ being exaggerated in them.

In the Estimates for the years 1895 to 1898, provision was made also for eleven small third-class cruisers of the “P” class of 2135 tons and twenty knot speed. The armament consisted of eight 4-inch guns. On trials most of them did well, but in a very short time their speeds fell off, and at the present time, such of them as remain on the active list are slower than the far older cruisers of the _Apollo_ class.

In the Estimates for 1897–98, in addition to the _Vengeance_, already mentioned, three improved copies of the _Majestic_ were provided. These ships were:--

The only difference between them and the _Majestics_ lies in advantage being taken of improvements in gunnery and armour to increase the offensive and defensive items. The absurd 2-inch bow belt of the _Canopus_ was repeated in them, but raised within 2½ft. of the main deck. A 40-calibre 12-inch was mounted, also a 45-calibre 6-inch.

These were the first ships of the British Navy in which Krupp cemented armour was used. This armour, generally known as “K.C.,” has approximately a resisting power three times that of iron armour. That is to say, the 9in. belts of the _Formidables_ were approximately 33 per cent. more effective than the similar belts of the _Majestics_. These ships proved faster and more handy, easily exceeding their designed eighteen knots. The superior handiness was brought about by a superior form of hull--the deadwood aft being cut away for the first time in them.

In this year’s Estimates armoured cruisers definitely re-appeared, six ships of the _Cressy_ type being laid down.

## Particulars of these:--

Displacement--12,000 tons.

Length--454ft.

Beam--69½ft.

Draught--(maximum) 28ft.

Armament--Two 9.2, 40 cal., twelve 6-inch, 45 cal., twelve 12-pounders, two 18in. submerged tubes.

Armour--6in. Krupp belt amidships, 250ft. long by 11½ft. wide, 2in. continuation to the bow. Barbettes 6in. Casemates 5in.

Horse power--21,000 = 21 knots.

Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,600 tons.

In substance these ships were armoured editions of the _Powerful_. They steamed very well in their time, but have now fallen off considerably and are no longer of any importance. Total weight of armour 2,100 tons. An innovation introduced in these ships was the fitting of non-flammable wood, which at a later date was objected to on the grounds that it deteriorated the gold lace of the uniforms stored in drawers made of it. The _Cressy_ was completed in 1901; the others, excepting the _Euryalus_, in 1902. This latter ship was greatly delayed from various causes, and not completed until 1903.

The 1898–99 Estimates consisted of three battleships and four armoured cruisers. The battleships were practically sisters to the _Formidable_, but differed from her in that the main belt, instead of being a patch amidships, has a total length of 300ft. from the bow. At the bow it is 2in., quickly increasing to 4in., 5in., 6in., and finally to 9in., and this provided a measure of protection that the 2in. belts of preceding ships could never afford. The flat-sided turrets, first introduced in the _Vengeance_, were also fitted in these ships, the _Formidables_ having the old pattern turrets.

The advantages of flat-sided turrets lie in the fact that K.C. can be used for them instead of the relatively softer non-cemented. K.C. is not applicable to curved surfaces, for which reason barbettes, casemates, and batteries with curved portholes in them and rounded turrets cannot be constructed of it. Flat-sided turrets consist of a number of flat plates placed to meet each other at predetermined angles, thus forming one homogeneous whole.

These battleships were:--

All were completed in 1902.

The cruisers of the same year, the _Drake_ class, were “improved” _Cressies_, with increased displacement, power and speed. The increased displacement allowed of four extra 6-inch guns being mounted, these being placed in casemates on top of the amidships casemates.

## Particulars of the _Drake_ class:--

Displacement--14,000 tons.

Length--(over all) 529½ft.

Beam--71ft.

Draught--(maximum) 28ft.

Armament--Two 9.2, 45 cal. (instead of 40 cal., as in the _Cressies_), sixteen 6-inch, 45 cal., and fourteen 12-pounders, two submerged tubes (18in.).

Armour--2,700 tons, as in _Cressy_, except that the casemates are 6in. thick.

Horse-power--30,000 = 23 knots. Boilers, 43 Belleville.

Coal--(normal) 1,250 tons; (maximum) 2,500.

These ships were altogether superior to the _Cressy_ class. On trial they all easily made their contract speeds and subsequently greatly exceeded them. It was discovered that increased speed was to be obtained by additional weight aft, and this was so much brought to a fine art that weights were adjusted accordingly, and in one of them, seeking to make a speed record, the entire crew were once mustered aft in order to vary the trim!

Building details are as follows:--

For some years these were the fastest ships in the world. In 1905, in a race by the Second Cruiser Squadron across the Atlantic, with ships of nominally equal speed, the _Drake_ came in first. In December, 1906, at four-fifths power for thirty hours, she averaged 22.5 knots. In 1907, the _King Alfred_ averaged 25.1 knots for one hour, and made an eight hours’ mean of 24.8. They proved very economical steamers, being able to do nineteen knots at an expenditure of eleven tons of coal an hour, and though they are now getting old, as warships go, they have never yet been beaten on the results achieved by horse-power per ton of displacement.

The Estimates of 1898–99 included a supplementary programme of four armoured ships which, like the _Canopus_ class, again foreshadowed the battle cruisers of to-day. These were the famous _Duncan_ class, and may be described as slightly smaller editions of the _London_, with armour thickness sacrificed for superior speed. The belt amidships was reduced from 9in. to 7in., but against this the belt at the extreme bow was made an inch thicker, and 25ft. away from the ram became 5in. thick. The displacement sank by 1,000 tons, the horse-power was increased by 3,000, and the speed by one knot.

The total weight of armour is about 3,500 against 4,300 tons in the _Londons_. The _Duncans_ may be regarded as a species of recrudescence of Barnaby ideas, plus a later notion that a well-extended partial protection was better than a more concentrated protection of less area. Generally speaking, they were improved duplicates of the _Canopus_ class, in the same way that the _Formidable_ and the ships that followed her were duplicates of the _Majestic_. Two ideas were obviously at work. In other forms these two ideas have (with variations) existed to the present day. Then it was purely a question between ratios devoted to speed and protection. To-day (1912) matters have been so far modified that increased displacements are given to secure speed advantages, but protection remains proportionately as it was. Reduced armament has always been accepted.

Construction details of the _Duncans_, of which two more figured in the estimates for 1899–1900:--

The _Montagu_ was wrecked on Lundy Island in 1906.

Contemporaneous with the _Drakes_, and extending over four ships in the Estimates of 1898–99 to two in the following and four in the year later, ten armoured cruisers were provided for, which in essence were little but an attempt to provide a normal second-class protected cruiser of the _Talbot_ class, with armour protection. These ships--the _County_ class--are of 9,800 tons displacement, and may also be regarded as diminutives of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_ classes, with a touch of the _Diadems_ thrown in. In place of the fore and aft 9.2’s of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_, they were supplied with a couple of pairs of 6-inch guns mounted in turrets fore and aft. The belt amidships was reduced to 4in. (a thickness in K.C. which has no virtues over armour of earlier type) with the usual extension of 2in. to the bow. The twin turrets, in which, like those of the _Powerful_, electrical control was once more introduced, have never given satisfaction, being very cramped for working purposes, and probably no more efficient than single gun turrets would have been, certainly less than the single gun 7--5in. turrets, originally proposed as an alternative, would have been.

Had the ships been regarded frankly as modern variants of the second-class protected cruisers, they probably would have been esteemed more than they were. Unfortunately they have always been regarded as “armoured ships” and discounted on account of their obvious inferiority to the _Drakes_. In the matter of steaming all of them have invariably done well (except in the case of the _Essex_, over which a mistake in design was made). The anticipated twenty-three knots was made quite easily, once certain early propeller difficulties were overcome. The Boiler Commission, already referred to, affected these ships, in so far that, instead of the hitherto inevitable Bellevilles, the _Berwick_ and _Suffolk_ were given Niclausse boilers and the _Cornwall_ Babcocks. The total weight of armour is 1,800 tons.

Details of the construction of this class are:--

All were completed during 1903 and 1904.

For the year 1900–01 only two battleships were provided: the _Queen_, built at Devonport and engined by Harland and Wolff, and the _Prince of Wales_, built at Chatham and engined by the Greenock Foundry Co. These were laid down in 1901 and completed in 1904. They were copies of the _Londons_ in every detail, saving that, instead of being enclosed, their upper deck batteries were left open as in the _Duncans_. The _Queen_ was given Babcock boilers instead of Bellevilles.

The 1901–02 Estimates provided three battleships and six armoured cruisers of the _County_ class. These were the last ships designed by Sir William White. The battleships, of which eight were built altogether--three for 1901–02, two for the next year--were of a different type from any which had preceded them, and to some extent may be said to mark the birth of the _Dreadnought_ era. That is to say, in them the old idea of the two calibres, 12in. and 6in., died out, and heavier auxiliary guns began to appear.

## Particulars of these ships, _the King Edward VII_ class, are as

follows:--

Displacement--16,350 tons.

Length--(over all) 453¾ft.

Beam--78ft.

Draught--(maximum) 26¾ft.

Armament--Four 12-inch, 40 cal., four 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch, 45 cal., twelve 12-pounders, fourteen 3-pounders, five 18-inch submerged tubes (of which one is in the stern).

Armour--As in the _London_ (but a 6in. battery instead of casemates).

Horse-power--18,000 = 18.9 knots.

Coal--(normal) 950 tons; (maximum) 2,150 tons, also 400 tons of oil, except in the _New Zealand_.

Except the last three, all were completed in 1905. The others were completed very shortly afterwards.

The boilers fitted to these ships varied considerably. The _King Edward_, _Hindustan_, and _Britannia_ were given a mixed installation of Babcocks and cylindricals; the _New Zealand_ Niclausse boilers; the other ships Babcock only. In the _Britannia_, super-heaters were also fitted to six of her boilers. The point differentiating these ships from their predecessors was the mounting of four 9.2 guns in single turrets at the angles of the superstructure. Equally novel was the placing of 6-inch guns in a battery behind the armour on the main deck.[21] Fighting tops, a feature of all previous ships, disappeared, and in place of them fire-control platforms were substituted.

When produced, these ships were considered as something like the “last word”; but in service later on it was very soon found that the two calibres of big guns rendered fire-control extremely difficult, and they have been a somewhat costly lesson in that respect. They cost about £1,500,000 each, and were found to be all that could be desired tactically, their turning circles with engines being only about 340yds. at fifteen knots. All of them did not make their speeds on trials, and some have never quite come up to expectations in that respect, but they have all proved remarkably reliable steamers.

Six armoured cruisers provided for in the 1901–02 Estimates were the _Devonshires_. These were originally intended to have been enlarged _Counties_, carrying a single 7.5 fore and aft, in place of the twin 6-inch turrets of the prototype ships. The design was, however, modified to the extent of substituting a single 7.5 for each of the forward pairs of 6-inch casemates.

Details of these ships are:--

Displacement--10,850 tons.

Length (between perpendiculars)--450ft.

Beam--68½ft.

Draught--(maximum) 25½ft.

Armament--Four 7.5, six 6-inch, 45 cal.; two 12-pounders, twenty-two 3-pounders, two 18in. torpedo tubes submerged.

Armour Belt--(length 325ft. from the bow, width 10½ft.), 6in. amidships, thinning to 2in. right forward. Barbettes 6in. Turrets 5in. Casemates 6in.

Horse-power--21,000==22.5 knots.

Coal--(normal) 800; (maximum) 1,800 tons.

Other details are:--

Like the _King Edwards_, various boilers were given to them. All of them have one-fifth cylindrical boilers. The _Devonshire_ and _Carnarvon_ were otherwise given Niclausse; _Antrim_ and _Hampshire_, Yarrow; _Argyll_, Babcock; and _Roxburgh_, Dürr. The designed speed was exceeded by all on trials, but none have proved successful steamers ever since. They were completed between 1904 and 1905.

These were the last ships to be designed by Sir William White. He resigned his position from ill-health; but, like his predecessors, left under a cloud--at any rate, with his services not really appreciated. He had created a magnificent fleet; but its very magnificence made many of his designs look poor on paper against any foreign construction of less displacement, but--_on paper_--of equal or superior qualities. It is the fate of the naval architect in peace-time to be judged on paper with small regard to issues such as nautical qualities, constructional strength, and a score of other details which are not to be expressed by any statistical formulæ, but yet make all the difference between efficiency and the absence of it.

[Illustration: EARLY TYPE OF “27 KNOT” DESTROYERS.]

Sir William White’s period of office was marked by an almost complete naval revolution. It began with the quick-firer and the disappearance of the low freeboard battleships. It ended with the coming of submarines, fire-control, and wireless. In between, it included the coming of the destroyer, the re-birth of the armoured cruiser; the arrival of the water-tube boiler, new forms of hull, unprecedented advances in both guns and armour--in fact, almost every conceivable change. Through these troubled waters with a steady hand and cool brain Sir William White guided the destiny of the Fleet and the millions of pounds expended in shipbuilding. Already his era is “the pre-_Dreadnought_” one, and to present-day ideas the term “pre-_Dreadnought_” is already very nearly akin to “pre-historic.” His creations preserved the peace, for which very reason they failed to secure glory. Already some have gone to the scrap-heap, and others are well on their way thither to join the Reed and Barnaby ships in that oblivion to which modern _Dreadnoughts_ will just as surely go in their season. More might be said: but _cui bono?_ Such public epitaph as Sir William White received when he retired was of the “about time, too!” order. The creator of the finest fleet that the world has ever seen left office with less honour and no more public interest than did half-a-dozen mediocre admirals who had chanced to fly their flags in some of his creations. It is not given for the stage manager to stand in the lime-light reserved for the principal actors. But the historian of a hundred years hence, placing great Englishmen in perspective, will assuredly place Sir William White far ahead of many who loom greater in the public eye to-day.

_GUNS IN THE ERA._

The guns which especially belong to the White era are as follows:--

===============+========+============+=========+============================ Designation. | Weight.| Projectile.| Velocity| Maximum Penetration with | Tons. | lbs. | f.s. | capped shot against K.C. at | | | +------------+--------------- | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds. ---------------+--------+------------+---------+------------+--------------- 13.5, 30 cal. | 67 | 1250 | 2016 | 9 | 12 | | | | | 12in., 35 cal. | 46 | 850 | 2367 | 11½ | 14½ 12in., 40 cal. | 50 | 850 | 2750 | 16 | 20 | | | | | 10in., 32 cal. | 29 | 500 | 2040 | 5½ | 7½ | | | | | 9.2, 30 cal. | 24 | 380 | 2065 | 4 | 6 9.2, 40 cal. | 25 | 380 | 2347 | 6¾ | 9¼ 9.2, 45 cal. | 27 | 380 | 2640 | 8¾ | 11¼ | | | | | 7.5, 45 cal. | 14 | 200 | 2600 | 5¾ | 7½ | | | | | 6in., 40 cal. | 7½ | 100 | 2200 | -- | -- | | | | | 6in., 45 cal. | 7 | 100 | 2535 | -- | 4½ ===============+========+============+=========+============+===============

_PURCHASED SHIPS._

In the year 1902 two ships, the _Constitucion_ and _Libertad_, were laid down at Elswick and Vickers-Maxims’ respectively for the Chilian Government. They were designed by Sir Edward Reed, and compare interestingly with the _King Edwards_ in being much longer and narrower. It will be remembered that in the past Reed ideals had always centred round a “short handy ship.” They had also always embodied the maximum of protection, while these ships carried medium armour only. His ships had, further, always been characterised by extremely strong construction, while these verged on the flimsy, the scantlings being far lighter than in British naval practice.

Out of all which it has been held that they represented the Reed ideal of armoured cruisers interlaced with whatever limitations the Chilian authorities may have specified.

## Particulars of these ships, which in 1903 were purchased for the

British Navy and renamed _Swiftsure_ (ex _Constitucion_) and _Triumph_ (ex _Libertad_):--

Displacement--11,800. Complement, 700.

Length--(over all) 470ft.

Beam--71ft.

Draught--(Maximum) 24ft. 8in.

Armament--Four 10-inch, 45 cal.; fourteen 7.5-inch, 50 cal.; fourteen 14-pounders, four 6-pounders, four Maxims; two 18-inch submerged tubes.

Armour--Practically complete belt 8ft. wide, 7-inch thick amidships, reduced to 3-inch at ends. 10-inch bulkheads at ends of thick portion of belt. Redoubt above (250ft. long), 7-inch on sides 6-inch bulkheads to it. Deck 1½-inch on slopes amidships, 3-inch on slopes at ends. Barbettes 10-inch, with 8 to 6-inch turrets. Battery and upper deck casemates, 7-inch.

Horse-power--14,000 = 20 knots. Yarrow boilers.

Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons.

These ships compare interestingly with the _King Edwards_ and _Devonshires_, between which they struck a mean, as follows:--

===============+=================+===============+=============== | _King Edward._ | _Swiftsure._ | _Devonshire._ ---------------+-----------------+---------------+--------------- Displacement | 16,350 | 11,800 |10,850 Principal Guns | 4--12in. | 4--10in. | 4--7.5. | 4--9.2 | 14--7.5 | 6--6in. | 16--6in. | | | 5--18in. tubes | 2--18in. tubes| 2--18in. tubes ---------------+-----------------+---------------+--------------- Armour belt | 9--2in. | 7--3in. | 6--2in. Speed | 18.9 knots | 20 knots | 22.25 knots Coal (Normal) | 950 | 800 | 800 Coal (Maximum) | 2,150--400 (oil)| 2,000 | 1,800 ===============+=================+===============+===============

Other items of interest are that the armament of the _Swiftsures_ (10-inch and 7.5’s) had somewhere about that time been laid down by Admiral Fisher as the ideal armament of the future, on the principle that the best possible was “the smallest effective big gun, and the largest possible secondary gun.”

In service these ships never proved brilliantly successful. They rarely managed to make their speeds successfully, and there was a great deal of vibration with them. They were shored up internally in places with a view to strengthening them. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that some of these alleged defects have been put down to conservatism in nautical ideas, and that the shoring up was not really required. Their great drawback was that so far as the British Navy was concerned they were neither one thing nor the other, being too light in heavy guns to be satisfactory with the battleships, and too slow to act with the cruisers. Had there been six or so of them they would, possibly enough, have formed an ideal squadron. Being two ships only, they of necessity became round pegs in square holes.

_NAVAL ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._

===========+=============+============+===================================== Financial | | | Ships. Year. | Amount. | Personnel. +--------------+-----------+---------- | | | | Armoured | Protected | | | Battleships. | Cruisers. | Cruisers. -----------+-------------+------------+--------------+-----------+---------- 1887–88 | 12,476,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 3 1888–89[22]| 13,082,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 2 1889–90 | 13,685,400 | 62,400 | -- | -- | -- 1890–91 | 13,786,600 | 65,400 | 8 | -- | 42 1891–92 | 14,557,856 | 68,800 | 2 | -- | -- 1892–93 | 14,240,200 | 67,700 | 1 | -- | -- 1893–94 | 14,340,000 | 70,500 | 6 | -- | 2 1894–95 | 17,365,900 | 83,000 | 3 | -- | 9 1895–96 | 18,701,000 | 88,850 | -- | -- | 8 1896–97 | 21,823,000 | 93,750 | 6 | -- | 3 1897–98 | 21,838,000 | 100,050 | 7 | 6 | -- 1898–99 | 23,780,000 | 106,390 | 3 | 4 | -- 1899–00 | 26,594,000 | 110,640 | 2 | 2 | 1 1900–01 | 28,791,900 | 114,880 | 2 | 6 | 1 1901–02 | 30,875,500 | 118,625 | 3 | 6 | -- 1902–03 | 31,255,500 | 122,500 | 2 | 2 | -- ===========+=============+============+==============+===========+==========

In the following year 1903–04 three ships (the last of the _King Edwards_) were provided for. The total number of battleships designed for the British Navy by Sir William White was therefore 48. There were in addition 26 armoured cruisers--making a total of 74 armoured ships, and about as many protected cruisers, including some for Colonial service.