Chapter 4 of 7 · 14800 words · ~74 min read

IV.

THE DREADNOUGHT ERA--(WATTS).

A new era in battleship design, not only for the British Navy, but for the navies of the entire world, was opened with the advent of the _Dreadnought_. As has been seen, it was in a way led up to by previous designs, notably the _Lord Nelson_ class. The essential point of difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the _Lord Nelson_ carries heavy guns of two calibres, in the _Dreadnought_ the main armament is confined to one calibre only. The advantages of this on paper are not particularly great, but for practical purposes, such as fire control and so forth, the superiority to be obtained by a uniformity of big gun armament is tremendous.

As the historical portion of this book indicates, the “Dreadnought idea” has been a fairly regular feature of British Naval Policy, but in this particular case the inception would seem to have been due to accident and circumstance rather than to any settled policy.

Immature and abortive attempts to realise something of the “Dreadnought ideal” had taken place in the past. The earliest ship claimed to represent the Dreadnought ideal was the U.S. _Roanoake_, built at the time of the Civil War. This was a high freeboard ship, fitted with three turrets in the centre line. A few years later something of the same sort found expression in the four-turreted British _Royal Sovereign_ and _Prince Albert_, though these were merely coast defence ships. Still later in the _Tchesma_ class, Russian, and in the _Brandenburg_ class of the German Navy, six big guns were installed as the primary armament. Both these two ideas were laughed out of existence; and it became a settled fashion to carry four big guns, two forward and two aft.

[Illustration: GENERAL CUNIBERTI.]

Matters were at this stage when the late “Colonel” Cuniberti, Constructor to the Italian Navy, conceived the idea of a ship carrying a considerable number of big guns, and embodying in herself the power of two or three normal battleships. This design was considered altogether too ambitious for the Italian Navy; but permission was given him to publish the general idea, subject to official revision. It first saw the light in “_Fighting Ships_,” in 1903, and is now so historically interesting that I here reproduce the article in full, the original being long since out of print:--

“Admiral Sir John Hopkins, late Controller of the British Navy, in his admirable article, ‘Intermediates for the British Fleet,’ published in the last edition (1902) of this Annual, asks what results it would be possible to obtain in the British Navy by extending the ideas of the two Italian Ministers of Marine, Admiral Morin and Admiral Bettolo, which were translated into fact in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ (12,625 tons), so as to arrive at the much greater tonnage of recent British battleships, in the same manner as the ideas that found concrete form in the projected vessels of the _Amalfi_ class were amplified and realised in the Italian battleships alluded to and regarding which, even now, so many doubts are expressed as to such realisation being practicable.

“To proceed from 8,000 to 12,000, and from 12,000 to 17,000 tons of displacement, constitutes not only a problem of naval architecture, but also involves high considerations of quite another nature, such as the special functions of the Fleet, so as to harmonise with the political objects of any given maritime Power, the geographical position of that Power, the state of its finances, etc., etc. So that not only does the answer to such a question entail a certain amount of difficulty from the constructive point of view, but before the answer can be seriously considered it is absolutely necessary to determine exactly what end this ideal British battleship is to serve; for it is not to be imagined that we are going merely to enlarge the _Vittorio Emanuele_ until we arrive at a displacement equal to that of the _King Edward VII._ For example, putting an extra 4,000 tons on board will produce a vessel that will perhaps be a little steadier in heavy weather than the original ship.

* * * * *

“In Britain are to be found naval experts of the highest possible order, and they will have their own ideas as to what type of vessels best fulfil the needs and ideals of the British Fleet, so that it would almost appear a presumption on my part to offer suggestions for any Navy other than the Italian. But in deference to the courteous interrogation of Admiral Hopkins I may be permitted to point out that from the purely human point of view there are two leading methods by which one can strike to the ground one’s opponent, either by gradually developing the attack and disposing of him little by little, or, on the other hand, killing him at one blow without causing him prolonged suffering. In like manner there are two distinct modes of sending an enemy’s ship to the bottom.

“Let us take, for example, a human combat. The first--the most commonly used, and the most practical in the majority of cases--has as its basis the progressive dismemberment of the enemy.

“Two mortal foes place themselves on guard at a distance; they begin with exceptional strokes, with feints, with opportune advances and retreats, never coming to close quarters for a deadly blow until the capabilities of the enemy, both offensive and defensive, are well tested, and until some fortunate stroke, even although not actually deadly, has considerably weakened the foe, has rendered his defence less able, and has somewhat demoralised him. Covered with blood, stunned, mutilated, and hardly capable of remaining on his feet, then comes the moment when his adversary closes in upon him and delivers the final and mortal blow. And we may almost imagine we hear the beaten one, with thick and choking voice, repeat the terrible words of Francesco Ferruccio at the battle of Gavinana: ‘Maramaldo, thou but killest a man already dead!’

“Similarly, two opposing ships, with but slight differences in their powers, will commence their combat at a great distance, utilising their evolutionary abilities and their speed in prudent manœuvres, seeking to gain as much advantage as possible from their offensive powers, and attempting to place every obstacle in the way of the antagonist utilising powers in either direction. The discharge of projectiles will commence in earnest, greatly assisted by the rapid loading of which the guns of medium and small calibre are now capable. What results can reasonably be expected from the discharge of the smaller guns at such great distances is hard to say; nor can the slender expectation of, let us say, chancing to hit the captain of the opposing ship in the eye with a lucky shot, at all justify such a waste of ammunition. Gradually nearing one another, the ships manœuvring less freely, hits will become more dangerous; the boats that were not set adrift before the action began will be alight and burning fiercely; the cowls of the wind trunks, the funnels, and the masts will be in fragments.

“The crew, wounded and reduced in numbers, will have lost their calm, and consequently the firing will have become wilder; finally, one of the two antagonists will get in a lucky shot that will disable the other. She will speedily become unmanageable, and her enemy will as speedily close into within the thousand metres which will permit of a torpedo being launched with every chance of success, or the battle may be concluded by a final rush and the point of the ram.

“As the wounded hull sinks slowly beneath the waves, the flag which had put such heart into the crew, and the sight of which had spurred them to fight to the last, may well seem as it disappears to repeat to the enemy these sad words, ‘Thou but slayest one already dead.’

“Four ships in place of two, eight in place of four, will repeat in a perhaps more complex action the same phases of attack, and the same foolish waste of ammunition, which in these days causes the greatest preoccupation of those who, having to design warships, must decide on the quantity of ammunition and projectiles provided for each different calibre of the armament.

* * * * *

“There is, however, another method of fighting and sending your enemy to the bottom; but it is one that is capable of adoption only by a Navy at the same time most potent and very rich.

“Let us imagine a vessel whose armour is so well distributed and so impervious as to be able to resist all the attacks of an enemy’s artillery with the exception of the projectiles of the 12-inch guns. Such a ship could approach her enemy without firing a shot, without wasting a single round of ammunition, absolutely regardless of all the scratchings that her antagonist might inflict on the exterior of her armour plates.

“And as to-day the belts of fighting ships are generally of such thickness that, when we leave the results of the proving ground and come to the conditions of actual combat, we find that it would be more than difficult to penetrate them with 6-inch guns, we see at once that it would be useless to equip our contemplated ship with such artillery.

“Further, if this ideal vessel which we have imagined to be so potently armoured is also very swift, and of a speed greater than that of a possible antagonist, she could not only prevent this latter from getting away, but also avail herself of her superiority in this respect for choosing the most convenient position for striking the belt of the enemy in the most advantageous manner.

“For this swift vessel a numerous and uniform armament of 8-inch guns, such as was contemplated for the _Amalfi_ class,[27] would appear to be sufficient, if we had only to consider the penetration at right angles of modern belts, especially if capped projectiles are adopted.

“If, however, the hit is an oblique one, and the distance is considerable, it appears necessary that we should adopt the calibre of 12-inch if we want to be absolutely certain of sinking the adversary, striking him _only_ on the belt. But the loading of such guns is as yet very slow, although it has been greatly improved of late. Besides, the number of hits that one can get in on to the belt itself is small. From this it appears that in our ideal and intensely powerful ship we must increase the number of pieces of 12-inch so as to be able to get in at least one fatal shot on the enemy’s belt at the water-line before she has a chance of getting a similar fortunate stroke at us from one of the four large pieces now usually carried as the main armament.

“We thus have outlined for us the main features of our absolutely supreme vessel--with medium calibres abolished--so effectually protected as to be able to disregard entirely all the subsidiary armament of an enemy, and armed only with twelve pieces of 12-inch. Such a ship could fight in the second method we have delineated, without throwing away a single shot, without wasting ammunition. Secure in her exuberant protection with her twelve guns ready, she would swiftly descend on her adversary and pour in a terrible converging fire at the belt.

“Having disposed of her first antagonist, she would at once proceed to attack another, and almost untouched, to despatch yet another, not throwing away a single round of her ammunition, but utilising all for sure and deadly shots. A large and abundant supply of 12-inch projectiles and ammunition can be provided, in addition to the belt and guns contemplated, out of the 4,500 tons of increase of displacement that will be disposable in the enlargement of the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ to become the national British type of vessel in place of the _King Edward VII_.

“It will be necessary to defend our ‘_Invincible_’ with a thick complete belt of twelve inches, and a battery also protected with the 12-inch armour (for the redoubt must be thus defended as well as the water-line, so as to eliminate the perils of the first system of attack sketched out, of progressive damages being adopted against her); and at the same time she must be armed with twelve pieces of 12-inch, arranged as in the _Amalfi_ class or in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_, so as to be able herself to attack in the second method that has been outlined, that is to say, the system of the stronger, of the better defended, and most certainly that of the richer. But when a certain number of such colossi of 17,000 tons--six, for example--had been constructed, it is more than probable that the adversary would do his utmost to prevent their getting near him, and, fearful of the fatal result of so unequal a combat, would seek to betake himself elsewhere immediately on the appearance of the famous _Invincible_ division.

“In that case the command of the seas, or a deluded belief that they have such command, will remain with these _Invincible_ ships, even although they may be of slow speed; but to stop at this point would be too little and unworthy of the Navy of the richest and most potent Power in the world.

“For this squadron or division, however ‘invincible,’ will not be really and truly _supreme_ if it cannot also catch hold of the enemy’s tail. The bull in the vast ring of the amphitheatre deludes himself with the idea that because he is more powerful than the agile toreador he therefore has absolute command of the scene of the combat; but he is too slow in following up his adversaries and these almost always succeed in eluding his terrible horns.

“We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that the type of vessel will not be absolutely _supreme_ and worthy of such a nation unless we furnish it with such speed that it can overtake any of the enemy’s battleships and oblige them to fight. It is, then, possible to give to a vessel of 17,000 tons displacement--

Protective armour of 12ins.

Twelve guns of 12-inch calibre.

An abundant supply of ammunition, and

A very high speed, superior to that of all and existing battleships afloat.

“It has been said and written--indeed, repeatedly written--that the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ was a practical impossibility. But before long she will be actually in the water, and facts already show how vain were the suppositions and criticisms of such croakers.[28]

“But it has also been asserted that in the case of this vessel surpassing the contemplated speed of 21½ knots on trial and attaining that hoped for of 22 knots, such would only prove that that particular tonnage of displacement especially lends itself to obtaining a form of hull with which we can realise a very high speed, and more so than with larger ships. This, however, is not quite exact. The law which governs the speed and displacement, other things being equal, is well known to all naval constructors, who have by heart the rule that whilst the displacement increases as the cube of the dimensions, the resistance, on the other hand, at a given speed does not increase in the same proportion as the displacement. The pith of the kernel lies in utilising the most opportune dimensions, or, rather, let us say, in adopting the special form of hull most adapted to those dimensions, more than in the actual amount of the displacement itself.

“The amount of the displacement, however, is intimately bound up with the question of the defensive and offensive powers that it is wished to give to a ship; so that once the particular objectives of the Italian Navy had been laid down, and thereby the defensive and offensive power sought for decided on, the question resolved itself into harmonising them with a form of hull of the greatest possible efficiency, and this worked out at 12,600 tons. Nor does it appear that the problem could have been satisfactorily solved with a vessel of less displacement, as in that case it would have been impossible to realise the required power, while with a greater displacement the ship would have been incapable of obtaining the desired speed.

“In the same manner the defensive and offensive power of the projected ships of the _Amalfi_ class was harmonised with a form of hull of such high efficiency that it would have been possible to obtain a speed of 23 knots and probably more; but the statement that the problem could not have been solved with a displacement of much less or much greater tonnage than that projected, is not to be taken as insisting that the solution must be interpreted in a too absolute manner, asserting that the speed of 23 knots could not be efficiently obtained save with a displacement of from 8,000 to 9,000 tons, for this would be inexact.

“If now the question be put--Is it possible for some naval architect to design a special form of hull having a displacement of 17,000 tons, and with which we can realise a very high speed--twenty-four knots, for example?

“‘Without doubt,’ will answer all practical naval constructors.

“If we go further, and ask--Is it possible for him at the same time to arm such a vessel with twelve pieces of 12-inch?

“‘Without doubt,’ will answer but a certain number of such experienced men.

“But if we go still further, and demand, finally--Is it also possible for him to protect such a ship with 12-inch armour?

“‘Without doubt,’ will answer only one here and there who may have already made researches in that direction.

“And as the solving of such a problem necessitates many and many a calculation, and no amount of discussion or argument on the matter could in any way be conclusive unless based on definite plans and figures, these lines might well conclude here.

“But, in deference to the courteous inquiry of Admiral Hopkins, this brief article must not be allowed to close in a manner so indefinite.

“I would, therefore, say frankly at once that the designs for such a vessel have already been worked out, and that its construction seems quite feasible and attainable. Following up the progressive scale of displacement from 8,000 to 12,000 tons, and then on to 17,000 tons, a new _King Edward VII_ has been designed, 521½ft. (159 metres) in length, with a beam of eighty-two feet (twenty-five metres), and mean draught of 27ft. (8.5 metres); with the water-line protected with 12-inch plates, and the battery similarly armoured; having two turrets at the ends, each armed with a pair of 12-inch guns, and two central side turrets high up (similar to the two with 8-inch guns in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_), also each armed with two pieces of 12-inch, and four turrets at the four angles of the upper part of the battery, having each one 12-inch gun.

“This vessel has no ports whatever in her armour; she carries no secondary armament at all, but only the usual pieces of small calibre for defence against torpedo attack.

“The speed to be realised, as proved by the tank trials, is twenty-four knots.”

The idea was at first received with derision and scepticism, which lasted until, in the Russian-Japanese War, it was announced that the Japanese had laid down two battleships, the _Aki_ and _Satsuma_, which “were to be more or less on the lines of the ship projected by Colonel Cuniberti.” Contemporaneous with this the United States authorised the building of the _South Carolina_ and _Michigan_, which carry eight 12-inch guns, so disposed as to be available on either broadside.

Both these ideas were public property before the British _Dreadnought_ was laid down. She was, however, built with such rapidity that she was completed long before any other vessel of the type.

[Illustration: THE “DREADNOUGHT”--1906.]

In the design for a new type of British capital ship, a great many ideas were considered and rejected. Eventually, however, it was decided to equip the _Dreadnought_ with five turrets so disposed that eight guns were available on either broadside and six guns available ahead or astern. The designed speed of the ship was twenty-one knots.

Together with this type of ship, another type, somewhat more resembling the Cuniberti ideal, was laid down. Three ships of this class, the _Invincible_ class, were designed for a speed of twenty-five knots, and given big guns so disposed that eight guns were available on either broadside and six big guns ahead or astern.

The _Dreadnought_ was officially laid down in December, 1905, and completed ten months later. Actually, however, materials for her were collected months beforehand, and the rate at which she was built,[29] like the secrecy with which her building was surrounded, consisted in great measure of a theatrical display, very impressive to the general public at the time, but to-day generally regarded as “unfortunate” on account of the foreign attention thus attracted. But, while the previous chapter is clear proof of the futility of any real secrecy about the “Dreadnought idea,” so far as the British Navy was concerned, it likewise serves to refute a charge which has been made to the effect that the “secrecy policy” induced foreign nations to build Dreadnoughts also. The most that can be said is that had the _Dreadnought_ been built without so much attention being attracted to her, foreign nations might have been less in a hurry to copy her. But it is absolutely clear that the all-big-gun ship era had arrived, just as in the past the ironclad era came, or, in earlier days still, the gun and steam eras did. The actual place of the _Dreadnought_ in history is that she marks a wise and rapid recognition of new conditions.

Details of the _Dreadnought_ are as follows:--

Displacement--17,900 tons.

Length--526ft. (over all).

Beam--82ft.

Draught--Maximum, 29ft. (normal).

Armament--Ten 12-inch, 45 cal.; twenty-seven 12 pounders; five submerged tubes (18 inch).

Armour Belt--11-in. to 6-in. forward; and 4-in. aft. On turrets 11-inch (K.C.)

Machinery--Parsons Turbine; four screws.

Horse-power--23,000 = 21 knots.

Boilers--Babcock.

Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; oil fuel also.

Built at Portsmouth; Engined by Vickers.

The _Dreadnought_ was unique in every particular. The exact disposition of her big gun armament was only arrived at after a long and careful consultation, and the consideration of a number of alternatives. It admits of eight big guns bearing in nearly every position, and allows a minimum fire of six in any case. It is understood that, in addition to the plan actually adopted, in the earliest plan of all (which was merely an adaption of the _Lord Nelson_ class), consideration was given to a scheme of five turrets, all in the centre line, and also to an arrangement whereby the two amidship turrets would be placed _en échelon_.

One of the particular arguments in favour of the plan ultimately adopted was that next to four, eight big guns form the best workable unit for fire control purposes. It was also considered that eight guns would probably be the maximum that could safely be fired together continuously, with full charges in battle conditions.

[Illustration: ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE DREADNOUGHT.]

In these days when all big gun armaments are the rule, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the _Dreadnought’s_ main armament was double that of previous ships, with only a comparatively small increase of displacement, and that no intermediate experience existed as to what might be expected.

With a view to standing the shock of discharge, the _Dreadnought_ was built with very heavy scantlings and generally given an immensely strong hull. The armouring followed orthodox lines, except that a certain amount was applied internally under-water as a protection against torpedoes. In addition she was given solid bulkheads,[30] though this was no novelty except with the British Navy, as they had been introduced some years before in the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and the armoured cruiser _Bayan_, built for the Russians at La Seyne. Another novelty in the _Dreadnought_ was the adoption of a high forecastle, she being the first British battleship in which this appears. Another innovation was the placing of the officers’ quarters forward and putting the men aft, a system which, however, has since been abandoned in the most recent vessels.

The greatest novelty of the _Dreadnought_, however, was the adoption of turbine machinery, and the form of her hull, with a 30ft. overhang aft, in order to adapt the ship to the new means of propulsion. The fitting of turbines to the new _Dreadnought_ was perhaps an even greater novelty than her armament, she being the first warship, other than small cruisers, to be so equipped.

The introduction of turbines was regarded with a good deal of apprehension in certain quarters, especially when it became known that the three other big ships belonging to the same programme were also to be turbine propelled. The type selected for all was the Parsons with four shafts. The wing shafts of the _Dreadnought_ have each one high pressure ahead and one high pressure astern turbine. The amidship ones are fitted with three turbines each--one low pressure one ahead, and one low pressure astern, and one turbine for going astern. Each turbine has 39,600 blades.

On her first trials the _Dreadnought_ exceeded her designed speed for short spurts by three-quarters of a knot, but on the eight hours’ run barely succeeded in making a mean of twenty-one knots. Shortly afterwards she fell a little below this, but at a later date picked up again, and on more than one occasion since she has easily made twenty-two knots or over. Such early difficulties as occurred were due to the fact that her engine-room complement were at first necessarily unfamiliar with working so large an installation. The total cost of the _Dreadnought_, which belongs to the 1905–06 programme, was £1,797,497, and save that her draught somewhat exceeded anticipations, the ship was a success in every way, proving a remarkably steady gun-platform.

The Committee which sat on the _Dreadnought_ design was by no means entirely unanimous as to what sacrifice should be made for speed. The _Dreadnought_ herself, despite a considerable increase of speed as compared with the battleships that preceded her, did not obtain that speed by the sacrifice of any battleship qualities, but almost entirely on account of the substitution of turbines for reciprocating engines. To that extent, therefore, though nearly as fast as the armoured cruisers of a few years before, she may be said to have developed entirely along normal lines, rather than on those laid down by Cuniberti.

The table on the next page and diagrams indicate how the original Cuniberti idea compares with the first results obtained. It will be noticed that, except in the case of the _Invincible_ type, and there only at a sacrifice of armour and armament, was, however, anything like the Cuniberti speed attempted. It should be stated that in the Cuniberti ship the peculiar “girder construction” of his _Vittorio Emanuele_ was obviously contemplated. This construction, which admits of far lighter scantlings than usually employed, has not been attempted in any other Navies, and a corresponding extra dead-weight results.

Coming to details, there is uncertainty as to the exact original design of the _Satsuma_; but a uniform armament of big guns was certainly the first to be projected. It is not clear whether it was abandoned from a preference for a numerically larger but mixed battery; or with a view to utilising such guns as were most likely to be available for early delivery. Japan was then at war, and there was the natural anticipation that the ships might be wanted before the war was over. It should, on the other hand, be borne in mind that the _Kashima_ and _Katori_, of 16,400 tons, carrying four 12-inch, four 10-inch, twelve 6-inch, and twelve 14-pounders, with 9-inch belts and 18.5 knot speeds were at that time held up in England on account of the war. Hence it has with some considerable show of reason been argued that the _Satsuma_ and _Aki_ are nothing but normal developments of the _Kashima_ design, bearing just the same relation to it as the British _Lord Nelsons_ bear to the _King Edwards_. It was also practically admitted by the Japanese at a later date that for diplomatic reasons, in accounts of the contemporary armoured cruisers of the _Tsukuba_ class, the armaments[31] were exaggerated.

ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.

============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============ | Normal | | | Des’d. | | Displacement. | Armament. | Belt. | Speed. | Laid | Tons. | | in. | Knots. | Down. ----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------ _Cuniberti_ (as built) | 17,000 | 12--12in., 18--12 pdr. | 12 | 24 | _pro._ 1903 _Satsuma_ Design | 19,250 | 12 _or_ 10--12in., 12--4.7 | 9 | 20 | ---- ----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------ _Satsuma_ | 19,250 | 4--12in., 12--10in., 12--6 | 9 | 20 | 1905 _S. Carolina, pro._ | 16–17,000 | 8--12in., (_or_ 4--12in., | 10 | 18–20 | ---- | | 8--10in.), 30--14 pdr. | | | _S. Carolina_ | 16,000 | 8--12in., 22--14 pdr. | 12 | 18½ | 1906 _Dreadnought_, 1st Design | ? | 10--12in. | .. | .. | ---- _Dreadnought_ (as built) | 17,900 | 10--12in., 27--12 pdr. | 11 | 21 | 1905 _Invincible_ | 17,250 | 8--12in., 16--4in. | 7 | 25 | 1906 _Nassau_ (as “S”) | ? | 8--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | ? | 19½ | 1906 _Nassau_ | 18,500 | 12--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | 9¾ | 19½ | 1907 ============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============

_Note._--The _Nassau_ was delayed a year owing to alterations in design.

Be all these things as they may, however, Japan is obviously entitled to some considerable share in originating the “Dreadnought movement.”

The claims of the United States Navy rest on a stronger basis. The _South Carolina_ type, all big guns in the centre line, all bearing on either broadside, was a distinct advance and novelty. The actual chronological date of laying down goes for nothing; the ships were designed and authorised long before they were commenced. No secrecy whatever was observed about them, and a strong body of opinion will always credit the United States with being the first Navy that definitely adopted the “all-big-gun idea.” It is interesting to note (see table) that at one stage a mixed 12-inch and 10-inch armament was regarded as a possible alternative.

[Illustration:

CUIBERI. SATSUMA. S CAROLINA. FIRST DESIGN S CAROLINA. FIRST BRITISH DREADNOUGHT DESIGN DREADNOUGHT. INVINCIBLE. NASSAU FIRST DESIGN NASSAU AS BUILT

ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.]

It has been claimed, either by those responsible for the _Dreadnought_ herself, or by others professing to speak for them, that the _Dreadnought_ was evolved entirely independently of Cuniberti’s ideal. It is practically impossible to say definitely how far there can be any truth in this. In all Admiralties, ships are, as a rule, designed as “projects” long before they see the light (some never see it at all, as witness the sea-going masted turret-ship of his design referred to by Sir Edward Reed in some remarks quoted on an earlier page!). The first British all-big-gun ship design (see diagram) is a lineal enough descendant of the _King Edward_ and _Lord Nelson_, just as Cuniberti’s is a descendant of the _Vittorio Emanuele_.

The Cuniberti design appears, however, to have been submitted as early as 1901. In any case, to Cuniberti belongs the first clear exposition of the idea, while the ridicule with which it was at first received indicates the general novelty.

Germany is also a claimant to having evolved Dreadnoughts with the “_S_” type, intended to have been laid down in 1906, to follow the _Deutschlands_. These ships can hardly have been designed much later than 1904. When first heard of they were reported to carry four big gun turrets, of which two were placed on either side amidships. Six big guns was the first reputed armament, later each turret was to carry two guns.

The absurd secrecy with which subsequent German designs have been shrouded was not then in evidence; and all the indications are that the _Nassau_, as originally contemplated, was to have been a four-turret ship--the two extra 11-inch being Germany’s equivalent for the four 12-inch, four 9.2, of our _King Edwards_. This would perhaps accord Germany a priority in actually adopting the principle of an increased number of heavy guns.

All of which suffices to indicate that the adoption of more than four big guns had little or nothing to do with the somewhat theatrical building of the original _Dreadnought_.

On the other hand (with the possible and doubtful exception of the _South Carolinas_[32]) it appears clear that the _Dreadnought_ was the first ship in which the all-big-gun principle was adopted as a technical asset in gun-laying over and above guns _qua_ guns. After four, eight was the “tactical unit” of guns, promising results altogether out of proportion to anything that six, or for that matter, ten (in proportion) could achieve.

[Illustration:

1879. French AMIRAL DUPERRÉ. 1886. French HOCHE. 1886. Austria K.E.RUDOLPH. 1886. Russian TCHESMA. 1889. German SIEGFRIED.

EARLY EXAMPLES OF WING TURRETS.]

It may not be too much to say that what Cuniberti “saw as through a glass darkly,” the _Dreadnought_ translated into fact, and that she was the first battleship avowedly so designed.

“Fire control” was a new thing in 1905. No navy, save the British, had considered it to any appreciable degree. The _King Edwards_ had taught that control of two calibres from one position was a practical impossibility. Mixed calibres were damned accordingly, and there was no outlet but the _Dreadnought_.

But for Cuniberti she might, and possibly would, have remained a theoretical desirability for several more years. The measure of his genius may be the demonstration that such an ideal ship could be built. It is to be argued that he did nothing more than put into practicable shape what already existed as a hypothesis. Even so, however, to him belongs the honour of indicating that the step from theory to practice was possible; and on that account alone he deserves to go down to posterity as the actual creator of Dreadnoughts.

In the other three ships of the 1905–06 programme, however, a high speed was accepted as the governing factor. The ships as built were designated “armoured cruisers,” and in so far as the Japanese were known to be building armoured cruisers carrying battleship guns, that designation was legitimate. For that matter, there also existed a paper by Professor Hovgaard, of the Massachusetts School of Naval Architecture, in which it was tentatively laid down that the ideal armoured cruiser of the future would be a battleship in armament and armour, increased in size, to obtain greater speed.

The three companion ships to the _Dreadnought_--the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_--adhered no more closely to the Hovgaard ideal than to the Cuniberti one. In principle they varied from the _Dreadnought_ design only in that they sacrificed a certain amount of armour in order to obtain a greater speed. By the adoption of the échelon system, the same broadside-fire was secured for them (on paper, at any rate) as for the _Dreadnought_, though with a turret less. In practice it has been found that there are very few positions in which they can bring more than six big guns to bear, but this must be considered as an error of construction rather than of principle. They have turned out to be wonderful steamers, but considerably inferior sea-boats to the _Dreadnought_, and in the British Navy are generally likely in the future to become regarded as obsolete long before the former. For all that, they probably approximate more nearly to the warship of the future than the _Dreadnought_.

Admiral Bacon, in his views as to the warship of the future, generally inclined to the idea of very large and very swift ships, relying on armament, speed, and super-scientific internal sub-division rather than on armour protection. These ships would act more or less independently, each, as it were, representing a divided squadron group of to-day.

It is interesting to note that Italy, which in the seventies evolved in the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ the “Dreadnought” of that period, eventually developed a very similar idea in the _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, which had no side armour whatever. In later designs a thin belt was reverted to, and finally the old cycle was resumed.

This result was brought about by the quickfirer, which appeared as a rival to the hitherto predominant monster gun. To-day the torpedo is becoming paramount and a danger to a fleet in close order at almost any range--hence the Bacon ideal. It remains to be seen whether the future will produce any analogy to the cycle of the quickfirer of the eighties.

Details of the _Invincible_ type are:--

Displacement--17,250 tons.

Length (over all)--562ft. (_p.p._, 530ft.).

Beam--78½ft.

Draught--29ft.

Armament--Eight 12-inch, XI, 45 calibre, sixteen 4-inch (model 1907); three submerged tubes.

Armour Belt--7-inch, reduced to 4-inch at the ends.

Machinery--Parsons Turbine.

Horse-power--41,000 = 25 knots.

Boilers--(_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_) Yarrow, (_Indomitable_) Babcock.

Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,000 tons; oil fuel also.

Builders--(_Invincible_) Elswick, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank, (_Indomitable_) Fairfield.

Engined--(_Invincible_) Humphrys, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank, (_Indomitable_) Fairfield.

As originally designed, the anti-torpedo guns of these ships would have been the same as the _Dreadnought’s_, but, having been completed nearly two years later and a new pattern 4-inch quickfirer having been invented in the interim, they were fitted with these guns. The trial results were as follows:--_Invincible_, 26.6 knots; _Inflexible_, 26.5 knots; and _Indomitable_, 26.1 knots; the designed horse power being considerably exceeded in every case. After they were commissioned and had shaken down, these trial speeds were considerably exceeded, and at one time and another they all did well over 28 knots; the _Indomitable_ having made a record of 28.7.

The fuel consumption of these ships is naturally enormous. The _Indomitable_, in crossing the Atlantic at full speed, burned about 500 tons of coal a day, as well as about 120 tons of oil. As steamers they are to be considered remarkably successful. The average cost of construction was about £1,752,000, which works out at a little under £102 per ton.

Towards the close of the year 1911 the official designation of “armoured cruiser” for them and similar ships was abandoned, and the term “battle cruiser” substituted. No further secret was made of the fairly obvious fact that they were designed as “fast battleships,” intended to engage and hold a retreating enemy till such time as the main squadron could come up.

Curiously enough, for some while, though every nation started building _Dreadnoughts_, Germany alone proceeded to build _Invincibles_ also. In 1911 Japan ordered a ship of fast battleship type; but, generally speaking, foreign nations have abstained from embodying this portion of the Cuniberti ideal in their designs.

[Illustration:

DREADNOUGHT. INDOMITABLE. NEPTUNE. INDEFATIGABLE.

DREADNOUGHTS.]

The programme for the years 1906–07 had been originally intended to include the building of four armoured ships, presumably one _Dreadnought_ and three _Invincibles_; but the Liberal party, which had just come into power, modified this to three battleships of an improved _Dreadnought_ type. This action led to a popular agitation which ultimately eventuated in the provision of no less than eight armoured ships in the estimates of three years later.

The three ships which followed, the _Dreadnought_, the _Bellerophon_, _Téméraire_, and _Superb_, are some seven hundred tons heavier, but otherwise differ only in minor details. For the one heavy tripod of the _Dreadnought_, two were substituted, and the 4-inch anti-torpedo gun was also mounted. In the next year the _St. Vincent_ class, a group of similar type, but increased by 650 tons, were provided. The anti-torpedo armament is carried to 20 guns in the _St. Vincent_ class, which are 10ft. longer than their predecessors, and carry fifty-calibre big guns in place of the forty-five calibre pieces of the earlier ships. The constructive particulars of these ships are as follows:--

==============+============+====================+===========+===========+======== Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. | Laid down.| Completed.| Trials. --------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+-------- _Bellerophon_ | Portsmouth | Fairfield | Dec., ’06 | Feb., ’07 | 21.9 _Téméraire_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, Leslie | Jan., ’07 | May, ’09 | _Superb_ | Elswick | Wallsend Co. | Feb., ’07 | June, ’09 | --------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+-------- _St. Vincent_ | Portsmouth | Scott Eng. & S. Co.| Dec., ’07 | Jan., ’10 | 21.9 _Collingwood_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, L. | Feb., ’08 | Jan., ’10 | 22 _Vanguard_ | Vickers | Vickers | April, ’08| Feb., ’10 | 22.1 ==============+============+====================+===========+===========+========

In the Estimates for 1908–09, the armoured ships provided were reduced to two, the _Neptune_ and the _Indefatigable_. Provision in the United States, Argentine, and Brazilian Navies for ships bearing ten big guns on the broadside and the prospect of ships with equal broadsides being constructed elsewhere is presumably the reason why in the _Neptune_ the original _Dreadnought_ design was varied, and a new arrangement of turrets introduced. The _Neptune_, which is of 20,200 tons, is a species of compromise between the _Dreadnought_ and _Invincible_ designs, the amidship guns being _en échelon_, and so mounted that they give a very full arc of fire on either broadside. The increased space occupied by this arrangement necessitated a certain cramping aft, for which reason the forward of the two after turrets was superposed to train over the aftermost, American fashion.

## Particulars of the _Neptune_ are as follows:--

Displacement--20,200 tons.

Length (over all)--546ft.

Beam--85ft.

Draught--29ft.

Guns--Ten 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch.

Armour--Belt 12-in. amidships, 6-in. forward, 4-in. aft. Lower deckside, 9¾-in. Turrets, 12--8-in.

Machinery--Parsons Turbine.

Horse-power--25,000 = 21 knots.

Boilers--Yarrow.

Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil fuel also.

Built at Portsmouth Dockyard.

Engined by Harland and Wolff.

On trial she developed at three-quarter power I.H.P. 18,575, with a speed of nineteen knots, and at full power 27,721, with 21.78 knots. Her best maximum spurt speed was 22.7--that is to say, about one and three-quarter knots over contract.

In the _Neptune_ the original _Dreadnought_ practice of mounting the anti-torpedo armament on top of the turrets was entirely abandoned, and these guns were placed inside or on top of the superstructure in three main groups.

The number of torpedo tubes was reduced to three, the reason for this being partly to save space and also to take advantage of improved methods for securing rapidity of fire. In the _Neptune_ the possibility of aero craft first received consideration, the upper deck being built sufficiently thick to be proof against bombs dropped from aloft.

[Illustration: “INDEFATIGABLE” AND “INVINCIBLE” 1911.]

The _Neptune_ was one of the cheapest ships ever built for the British Navy, her cost working out at a little under £87 per ton.

The other ship of the same programme was the _Indefatigable_, an improved _Invincible_. She represents an increase of nearly 2,000 tons over the type ship, with an increase in length of 18ft. and a foot more beam. Save for the addition of four more anti-torpedo guns the armament remains the same, but an extra inch is added to the belt. The principal improvement achieved in her is that the two amidship turrets are much less crowded up than in the type ship, thus securing a considerably better range of fire.

Although the horse power is proportionately less than that of the _Invincibles_, the better lines of the ship have made her even more speedy. She easily exceeded her designed speed on trial, and has reached as high as 29.13 knots.

The cost of construction was £1,547,426, which works out at about £82 10s. per ton, as against the average £120 per ton that the _Invincibles_ cost to build. She was the cheapest ship ever built for the British Navy,[33] to her date.

Details of the _Indefatigable_ are:--

Displacement--19,200 tons.

Length--578ft.

Beam--79½ft.

Draught--27¾ft.

Guns--Eight 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch.

Armour Belt--8-in. amidships, diminished to 4-in. at the ends.

Machinery--Parsons Turbine.

Horse-power--43,000 = 25 knots.

Boilers--Babcock.

Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,500 tons; oil fuel also.

Built at Devonport Dockyard.

Engined by J. Brown & Co., of Clydebank.

Two other battle-cruisers almost identical to the _Indefatigable_, the _Australia_ at Clydebank, for the Australian Navy, and the _New Zealand_ at Fairfield, a gift from New Zealand to the British Navy, were launched in 1911.

The programme for 1908–09, consisting as it did of only two armoured ships, and the fact that the corresponding German programme was increased by one capital ship, bringing the total to four, brought the naval agitation to a head. Meetings demanding eight “Dreadnoughts” were held all over the country, with the result that the British programme for 1909–10 rose to four armoured ships with four other “conditional” ships. The ships of the former programme were the _Colossus_, _Hercules_, _Orion_, and _Lion_, and the first two of these were laid down some months before the usual date, the _Colossus_ being commenced in July instead of at the end of the year.

The “conditional” ships were all eventually laid down in April of the following year. They were the _Monarch_, _Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, and _Princess Royal_.

Under this programme there were no less than three distinct types of ships. The first two, the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_, are practically sisters of the _Neptune_, but of 400 tons greater displacement. They differ in appearance in having but one tripod mast instead of two. This, like the _Dreadnought’s_, is placed abaft the foremost funnel. The _Colossus_ was built and engined by the Scott Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., commenced in July, 1909, and completed two years later. The _Hercules_, built by Palmer’s, followed a month later in both cases. The first is fitted with Babcock, and the second with Yarrow boilers. A point of minor interest about these two ships is that whereas the anti-torpedo armament of the _Neptune_ is in three groups, that of the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_ is in two groups only, the mounting of small guns between the échelon turrets being done away with.

The other two types of the 1909–10 Estimates are the ships generally known as “super-Dreadnoughts.”

_SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS._

The most obvious feature of the so-called “super-Dreadnoughts” is the introduction of the 13.5-inch gun, particulars of which will be found at the end of this chapter. This gun was experimented with with a certain amount of secrecy, and was for a long time officially designated as the 12-inch “A,” although practically everybody knew that it was really a 13.5. It was only rendered possible by recent improvements in gun-mountings and gun-construction. It is not very appreciably heavier than the latest type of 12-inch, as mounted in the _Colossus_, and its adoption was not so much a matter of obtaining an increased range and penetration, as of securing the tremendously increased smashing power of the heavier projectile.

Somewhat less obvious to the general public, but really of a great deal more far-reaching importance, is the “Americanising” of British naval design exhibited in all the “super-Dreadnoughts.” Though differing in detail, the arrangement of the armament in all the “super-Dreadnoughts” followed the American centre-line system, an interesting indication of the progress of the United States Navy from the days, not so very long ago, when American warship design was more or less a _pour faire rire_! It is none the less interesting from the fact that in the earliest designs, in all ships carrying more than two turrets, the centre line was the only arrangement ever built or even considered. Yet when an increased number of turrets came into being, the American Navy was the only one which followed the original practice. In all other Navies ideas of the period 1870–1880, when strong end-on fire was considered an all-important essential, influenced design. America alone appreciated the prophecy long ago made by Admiral Colomb to the effect that whatever else might temporarily obtain, broadside to broadside would always be reverted to for battle, on the grounds that thus, and thus only, could the maximum number of guns be utilised.

It is proper here to remark that though the Americans adopted the centre line from the outset for practical reasons, this disposition became more or less a necessity when 13.5’s came in, owing to the infinitely greater strain on the structure. This has been occasionally used as an argument against American influence having made itself felt, but the balance of evidence shows that even had the 13.5-inch not appeared, the centre line system would have figured in the Navy. The original centre-line idea disappeared because the échelon system looked so superior. The échelon system of the 1875–85 era, however, died out in its turn on account of certain practical disadvantages. It was resurrected when these had been forgotten in the lapse of years; but the disadvantages entailed in firing across a deck soon made themselves felt again once the system was reverted to.

[Illustration:

U.S. ROANOKE. British. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. Russian. ADMIRAL LAZAREFF. French. AMIRAL BAUDIN. German. BRANDENBURG. U.S. S. CAROLINA.

CENTRE-LINE SHIPS OF VARIOUS DATES.]

One of the earliest advocates, if not the first of modern advocates, of the centre-line in England was Admiral Hopkins. Discussing the original Cuniberti ideal, Admiral Hopkins pointed out that although for an absolute right-ahead or astern fire wing-turrets gave an advantage, a very slight yaw entirely altered the proportion, and that circumstance in which the enemy was dead right-ahead necessitating such a yaw were likely to occur very rarely indeed in war. He leaned, therefore, to the opinion that a fewer number of guns all in the centre line would be equally as efficacious, practically, as a larger number disposed partly in wing turrets.

The échelon system, of course, renders practically no assistance here, the arc of the guns firing across the deck being necessarily restricted, even with the best échelon arrangement. While, therefore, the échelon system is good for absolute end-on, or for more or less absolute broadside firing, any intermediate and more probable position renders it less efficient than a centre-line arrangement.

Another defect of the échelon system is that with it, except exactly end-on, one side of the ship is necessarily more efficient than the other, and that this is reversed according to whether the enemy is ahead or astern, twenty-five per cent. of the big-gun armament being affected thereby in a four turreted ship.

Though attention never seems to have been drawn to the matter, it is a fact worthy of some attention that the _Von der Tann_, which is to be regarded as Germany’s “answer” to the _Invincibles_, has (like all German[34] ships on the same system) her échelonned turrets exactly in reverse order to British ones. All British ships have the port turret foremost; all German ones the starboard. The net result of this is that (as the diagram indicates) there are two worst and two best positions for either design. An _Invincible_ getting and keeping a _Von der Tann_ upon her starboard bow or port quarter would have a twenty-five per cent. superiority over her, while, supposing the German type to maintain a position on her starboard quarter or port bow she would be to the same extent over-matched, and to a certain extent “in chancery.”

With the centre line system, the imposition of fighting one side rather than the other is not imposed, and overhauling or being overhauled causes no disadvantage. Nothing is lost, save in the almost hypothetical case of two ships engaging exactly end-on--a condition which in no case would endure for more than a very short space of time, to say nothing of the fact that practically all gunnery errors being of “elevation” and not of “direction,” a ship adopting the end-on position offers the equivalent of a vertical target of some 60ft. to 70ft. instead of the equivalent of 30ft. or so that she would present broadside on.

The centre-line system may, therefore, be expected to endure against all other dispositions pending the appearance of some fresh condition of affairs which would cause the old end-on idea to be reverted to.[35]

[Illustration: DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE WEAK POINT OF THE ÉCHELON SYSTEM.]

The _Orion_ was the only one of her class which belonged to the normal Estimates, 1909–10, the other three--_Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, _Monarch_--being “contingent ships.” Details of the class are as follows:--

Displacement--23,500 tons.

Length--(between perpendiculars) 554½ft; (over all) 584ft.

Beam--88½ft.

Draught--(mean) 27¾ft.

Armament--Ten 13.5-inch, forty-five calibre; sixteen 4-inch; three 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Armour Belt--12--4-inch. Turrets, 12-inch.

Machinery--Parsons turbine.

Horse-power--27,000 = 21 knots.

Boilers--Babcock.

Coal--(nominal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil, 1,000 tons.

The _Orion_ was laid down in November, 1909, the others in April, 1910.

The _Orion_ was the first of these ships to be commissioned, and her gunnery trials were watched with great interest. Few details of them transpired, save that part of the secondary battery was injured by blast. After commissioning, the _Orion_ was sent for a voyage across the Bay of Biscay, and attracted much attention by rolling very heavily, this being attributed to the fact that her bilge keels were not large enough--not to any general structural defect.

An interesting feature of the _Orion_ type is that in it provision first appears for the protection of boats in action.

Belonging to the same programme (1909–10), the first belonging to the normal Estimates and the second to the “contingent,” are the battle cruisers _Lion_ and _Princess Royal_. A great deal of secrecy was observed about these ships, but their main details are approximately as follows:--

Displacement--25,000 tons. Full load, 26,350 tons.

Length--(water-line), 675ft.; (over all) 690ft.

Beam--86½ft.

Draught--(maximum) 30ft.

Armament--Eight 13.5 inch 45 calibre, twenty 4-inch, three 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Armour--Belt, 9--4-inch.

Machinery--Parsons Turbine.

Horse-power--(as designed) = 28 knots.

Boilers--Yarrow.

Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,500 tons; oil also.

_Lion_--Built at Devonport; engined by Vickers.

_Princess Royal_--Built at Vickers; engined by Vickers.

The _Lion_ was laid down in November, 1909, and launched in the following year. The _Princess Royal_ was laid down in April, 1910, and launched a year later. Both were arranged to be completed during 1912.

The _Lion_ was somewhat delayed owing to slight repairs being required to her turbines. In addition, the authorities very wisely did not “hurry” her--hurrying ships to fit an exact official date having done more mischief than anything else in the past.

The _Lion_ did her trials early in 1912, and reached a maximum of 31.7 knots by patent log, with a mean of 29 knots at full power and 24.5 or so at three-quarter power. For her trials the _Lion_ burned coal only, and this at the seemingly enormous rate of 950 tons a day, which worked out at approximately about a ton and a quarter per mile. This consumption, heavy though it seems, really pans out at about the usual “ton a mile,” as the ship developed horse-power far in excess of the contract. At the same time it necessarily draws attention to the enormous increase in coal stores required for supplying modern warships. It is unfortunately by no means clear that the question of the very great increase in coal required for modern warships has been thoroughly realised by the authorities. The amount provided may be said to be what ships needed in the pre-Dreadnought era. It is now an open secret that at the time of the “war scare” with Germany in 1911, the British Home Fleet was unable to proceed to sea owing to a shortage of coal supply, many ships being a thousand tons short and no proper arrangements for rapid remedy existing. This state of affairs, at one time alleged to be merely a newspaper _canard_, is not likely to occur again; but it is an indication of how difficult it is adequately to realise the problem of coal supply to ships of ever-increasing horse-power.

During the _Lion’s_ trials it was found that the heat from the fore funnel was so great that the fire-control station (then carried on a tripod mast placed immediately over the forward funnel) was so intense as to render that position practically impossible. On the navigating bridge also, instruments were badly affected by the heat. The ship was consequently further delayed in order to effect essential modifications. These included the abolition of the tripod mast, shifting the fore funnel back a long way, and enormously increasing the height of all funnels.

The principal item of the Estimates of 1910–11 was five armoured ships. Of these, four, the _King George V_ class, are slightly improved replicas of the _Orion_, while the remaining vessel, the _Queen Mary_, is a battle-cruiser of the _Lion_ type.

Ships of the _George V_ class are as follows:--

The over-all length is increased to 596ft., and the horse-power to 31,000. All were laid down during 1911, with a view to launching during 1912 and completion in 1913. The displacement of these ships is 23,000 tons odd.

The _Queen Mary_, laid down at Palmers’ early in 1911, and engined by Clydebank, is virtually a sister to the _Lion_, differing from her merely in a slight variation of the lines, and some increase in length. Save for these items, and a small difference in the arrangement of the anti-torpedo armament, the ship belongs to the same class and type.

The 1911–12 Estimates provided for five further large armoured ships, which represent an increase in dimensions over their predecessors. Of these the first four are battleships varying from their predecessors in the inevitable increase in size to allow of somewhat superior protection and an improved secondary battery--twelve 6-inch being substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the _King George_ class.

The selection of the 6-inch gun as the anti-torpedo craft weapon was due partly to the way in which Germany had persisted in her rigid adherence to that calibre for her minor armament, and partly to the rapidly increasing size of destroyers. It was held as questionable, even by the most ardent believers in the ability of the big ship to defend herself against destroyer attack, whether the 4-inch was sufficient to disable large destroyers. Hence the adoption of the 6-inch--the largest gun that can be man-handled.

The nominal displacement of these battleships, the _Iron Duke_ class, rises to 25,000 tons as against 23,000 of the previous class. The length is increased to 620ft. and the beam to 89½ (instead of 89ft.). Owing to improved lines, the horse-power is reduced to 30,000 without any very material loss of speed. In all these super-Dreadnoughts, as in the Dreadnoughts themselves, 21 knots has always been the selected speed, though in units there have been slight variations.

Ships of the _Iron Duke_ class are as follows:--

The _Emperor of India_ was originally named _Delhi_. The first two were given Babcock, and the second two Yarrow boilers. All were completed in 1914, but only the _Iron Duke_ was available for service on the eve of the outbreak of the war with Germany and Austria. The other three were, however, rapidly completed and put into commission.

The fifth ship of the 1911–12 Estimates was the battle cruiser _Tiger_, nominally belonging to the _Lion_ group, but actually differing very considerably in various important details.

She was laid down at Clydebank in June, 1912, a great deal of official reticence being maintained concerning her. She was not complete on the outbreak of war; but as she was available for service not long afterwards she is included in this survey.

The marked and most characteristic difference between her and the _Lions_ is that the third turret instead of being cramped amidships as in the _Lion_ design, is moved further aft, thus giving a greatly improved arc of fire. Twelve 6-inch were substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the _Lions_ for reasons already given.

The _Tiger_ is approximately 720ft. long, with a nominal horse-power of 75,000. Babcock type boilers are fitted. Her nominal speed is 27 knots, but this has more than once been very considerably exceeded.

For 1912–13 the Estimates provided for four capital ships, the usual twenty destroyers, and a new type of warship designated as “lightly armoured cruisers.”

This programme is of abounding interest, not only on account of the fact that--so far as the larger types of ships are concerned--it probably embodies the last new construction available for the British Fleet in the war (unless the war endure beyond all anticipations) but also because of its more or less revolutionary nature.

[Illustration: EARLY “30 KNOT” DESTROYERS.]

The big ships of the programme were as follows:--

The fifth ship in this list, the _Malaya_, is an extra vessel paid for and presented to the British Navy by the Federated Malay States.

In general appearance these ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class do not greatly differ from their predecessors; but there all resemblance ends. In every other way they embody a “new idea”--an attempt so to blend the battleship proper with the battle-cruiser so as to secure the best points of both.

Roughly, the battleship proper sacrifices speed for extra gun power and protection; while the battle-cruiser sacrifices these two latter for speed. The speed of the _Queen Elizabeths_ was fixed at 25 knots--something rather less than that of battle-cruisers, but still sufficiently high to take them out of the ordinary battleship category as hitherto understood. Certainly they differ from the normal quite as much as the original _Dreadnought_ differed from her immediate predecessors.

It was only possible to secure this high speed, plus other qualities, by the bold adoption of oil fuel only--in itself of the nature of a gigantic experiment, which, however, results have more than justified. The designed horse-power to secure 25 knots is 58,000.

If, however, the motive power embodied novelty, still more so did the armament. For the ten 13.5’s of preceding ships, eight 15-inch guns were substituted. So far as power is concerned the 13.5 is ample for all contingencies, but the 15-inch embodies a marked superiority in range and the additional accuracy which a heavier projectile naturally affords. Furthermore--a very important point--the “life” of the 15-inch gun is much longer, owing to there being no necessity to utilise the full power of which it is capable.

The general arrangement of turrets is that of all the super-Dreadnoughts, with the middle turret (always the most restricted in arc of fire) omitted.

Nothing has ever been officially stated as to the armour protection; but it is known to be equal or superior to that of any preceding battleships.

When war broke out, the first two of these ships were nearing completion--the first being completed about the end of 1914 and the second at the end of March, 1915.

The 1913–14 Estimates provided for five more or less normal battleships designed for coal fuel,[36] the usual 21 knots speed, but 15-inch instead of 13.5-inch guns.

Beyond that they are of 25,750 tons, and were designed for 31,000 horse-power, no details of these ships have been furnished. Two were estimated to be completed by the end of 1915--the others in 1916.

The rest of the programme consisted of eight more lightly armoured cruisers, a reduced number of destroyers and an increased number of submarines.

In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the _Royal Sovereign_ class--to be named _Renown_, _Repulse_, and _Resistance_--were provided for, also a sixth ship of the _Queen Elizabeth class_, which was provisionally named _Agincourt_. The

## participation of any of these in the war is very improbable.

The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers, twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines.

When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards--two for Turkey and one for Chili--were taken over by the British Admiralty. Details of these are as follows:--

There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats--renamed _Humber_, _Severn_, and _Mersey_--of 1,200 tons each, carrying two 6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about 11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast shortly after the outbreak of war.

In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at Cowes were taken over and renamed _Broke_ and _Faulknor_.

A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty--to say nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats.

The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one.

Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter.

* * * * *

At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have reached its apotheosis.

For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to “super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts” might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as any that the “fifties” saw.

As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and “not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being screened with very numerous smaller craft.

When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally, but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available. The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly danger.

On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons?

There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other, the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it.

_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._

The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid down in 1901.

The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers of the _Bristol_ class were provided for. These were the _Bristol_ (Clydebank), _Glasgow_ (Fairfield), _Gloucester_ (Beardmore), _Liverpool_ (Vickers), _Newcastle_ (Elswick). The designed displacement was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also turbines of the Parsons type, except in the _Bristol_, in which Curtiss type turbines were installed.

For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided--the _Weymouth_ class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight 6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the _Bristol_ class. These four “Town” cruisers were the _Weymouth_ (Elswick), _Yarmouth_ (London and Glasgow Co.), _Dartmouth_ (Vickers), and _Falmouth_ (Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except the _Weymouth_, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines.

The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the _Chatham_, _Dublin_, and _Southampton_, of the same type, but with a displacement increased by 200 tons. Three more, the _Birmingham_, _Nottingham_, and _Lowestoft_, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12.

In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year, those constructed to date being the _Boadicea_, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Blonde_, _Active_, _Amphion_, and _Fearless_, all of which are unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on equal terms. Of these the _Amphion_ was lost early in the war by a mine.

Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, _Sydney_, _Melbourne_ and _Brisbane_, of which two were built in this country and the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin armour belt amidships--a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German Navy.

The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured cruisers.”

They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also a reversion to the original _Bristol_ with modifications born of experience.

In essence, these ships of the _Arethusa_ class--_Arethusa_, _Aurora_, _Galatea_, _Inconstant_, _Royalist_, _Penelope_, _Phaeton_ and _Undaunted_, compared with the prototype as follows:--

====================+========================+====================== | _Arethusa._ | _Bristol._ --------------------+------------------------+---------------------- Displacement (tons) | 3520 | 4800 Armament | 2--6in. | 2--6in. | 6--4in. | 10--4in. | 4 above water t. tubes | 2 submerged t. tubes Side protection | 2½″ | _nil._ H.P. | 30,000 | 22,000 Speed (est.) kts. | 30 | 25 ====================+========================+======================

Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the _Arethusa_, a radius equal to that of the _Bristols_ was secured with a considerable saving in weight.

Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility of yesterday. When the _Bristols_ were designed they were the “best possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely novel vista.

In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however, was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the _Calliope_, _Caroline_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, _Cordelia_, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the _Arethusa_, but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft--a wise arrangement, as a heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness.

The _Arethusas_ and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:--

which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons.

In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no details whatever have been published concerning them.

_DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._

The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of sea-going and coast-defence ironclads.

Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen; the most important being the experimental boat _Swift_, which was given a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about £280,500.

It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found vent in a _Swift_ (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the 40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years before anything else of the same size was built.

The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes; in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five 12-pounders.

The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about 260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel instead of coal.

In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made. It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat fragile. The new boats, the _Beagle_ class, averaged 900 tons instead of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to.

The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the _Acorn_ class. These are slightly smaller than the _Beagles_, armed with two 4-inch and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only.

On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were completed in June, 1911.

Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the _Acheron_ class, an Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which, except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was obtained with all.

For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for

## partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea

did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage; but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction. The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain practical difficulties which cannot be ignored.

In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer.

Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_.

The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed, the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse.

It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice. Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it should be an immense asset if properly handled.

_GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._

The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:--

=======+========+========+==========+========================= Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C. | cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------ | | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds. -------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------ | | | | in. | in. 13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26 12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24 12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22 9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13 9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼ =======+========+========+==========+============+============

It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original _Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and the better capacity of its shell.

Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts era.

========+========+========+==========+======================+================ Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C. | cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship | | | +-----------+----------+ carrying | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.| --------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+---------------- 13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9 13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12 ========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================

From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000 yards is now held in the same or even less estimation.

Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37] and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to judge are extremely careful about prophecying.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of delivering heavier and heavier projectiles.

_TORPEDO PROGRESS._

The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range. About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots. As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one, despite all the protests against “mastodons.”

With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time,

## partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form

of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship _Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes, others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position; but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the torpedo, startling things are toward.[38]

The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British, Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed.

_NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._

==========+============+===========+=============================================== Financial | Amount. | Personnel.| Ships provided. Year. | | +-----------+----------------------------------- | | |Battleships|Battle-cruisers|Armoured |Prot. | | | | |cruisers.|cruisers. ----------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------+---------+--------- 1902–03 | 31,003,977 | 122,500 | 2 | | 2 | 1903–04 | 35,709,477 | 127,100 | 3 | | 4 | 1904–05 | 36,859,681 | 131,100 | 2 | | 3 | 1905–06 | 33,389,500 | 129,000 | 1 | 3 | | 1906–07 | 31,472,087 | 129,000 | 3 | | | 1907–08 | 31,419,500 | 128,000 | 3 | | | 1908–09 | 32,319,500 | 128,000 | 1 | 1 | | 5 1909–10 | 35,142,700 | 138,000 | 6 | 2 | | 3 1910–11 | 40,603,700 | 131,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3 1911–12 | 44,392,500 | 134,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3 1912–13 | 44,085,400 | 136,000 | 3 | 1 | | ==========+============+===========+===========+===============+=========+=========

Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in order to set off a corresponding German increase.

The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while little or nothing was said about the military estimates.

For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400.

For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood at £51,550,000.

On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that “Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages.

Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum spent in any other way whatever.

The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to regard future increases with apprehension.

Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests.